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Zulkifli

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Wahyudi Akmaliah & Ibnu Nadzir

The ‘Elective Affinity’ of Islamic Populism: A Case Study of Indonesian Politic Identity Within the Three Elections

Abstract: Scholarly inquiry into Islamic populism in Indonesia has distinctly bifurcated into two primary domains. The first is a comprehensive examination of political issues that explores various perspectives, including political identity, agency, and the influence of political figures. The second domain focuses on the impact of digital platforms, particularly how the proliferation of hoaxes and disinformation plays a critical role in shaping political identities during elections. Unlike previous studies, this article employs Gerbaudo’s concept of elective affinity to elucidate the interconnection between populism in political science and the dynamic realm of social media. These forces generate the political sentiments that shape Islamic populism in Indonesia. Specifically, this article conducts a nuanced analysis, utilizing the presidential elections of 2014 and 2019, as well as the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial elections, as comprehensive case studies.

Keywords: Islamic Populism, Elective Affinity, Indonesian Election, Digital Platform.

Kata kunci: Populisme Islam, Afinitas Elektif, Pemilu Indonesia, Platform Digital.

ملخص: تنقسم الدراسات العلمية المتعلقة بالشعبوية الإسلامية في إندونيسيا إلى تيارين رئيسيين على الأقل. أولاً، دراسة شاملة للفضاء السياسي الذي تستكشف وجهات نظر مختلفة، بما في ذلك الهوية السياسية، والفاعلية الاجتماعية، وتأثير الشخصيات السياسية. ثانياً، البحث الذي يركز على تأثير المناصب الرقمية، وخاصة كيف يلعب انتشار الخدع والمعلومات المضللة دورًا مهمًا في تشكيل الهوية السياسية أثناء الانتخابات. على عكس الأبحاث السابقة، يستخدم هذا المقال مفهوم جيرباودو عن التقارب الاختياري لشرح العلاقة بين الشعبوية في العلوم السياسية وسياق التواصل الاجتماعي. إن هاتين الدراستين متتابعتان، وليستا شيتان منفصلان ينتجان مشاعر سياسية، وفهما تأثير على تشكيل الشعبوية الإسلامية في إندونيسيا. علاوة على ذلك، يجري هذا المقال تحليلًا مختلفًا، باستخدام فترة الانتخابات الرئاسية (2014 و 2019)، وانتخابات حافظ ولاية جاكرتا عام 2017 كسلسلة من دراسات القضايا الشاملة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الشعبوية الإسلامية، التقارب الاختياري، الانتخابات الإندونيسية، المنصة الرقمية.

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Islamic populism has gained significant recent prominence in Indonesian political discourse. The term was initially coined by Vedi Hadiz (2016) who studied and compared Islamic politics in various Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), such as Morocco and Turkey, alongside Indonesia. The term gained substantial traction in Indonesian social science discourse following a series of mass demonstrations in 2016 that targeted then-Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama – known as Ahok – for allegations of blasphemy. This populist context is not unique to Indonesia. It is instead part of the global landscape, particularly amidst economic crises and other factors that result in members of the public feeling threatened. Political elites have successfully exploited these negative emotions to garner support in elections by highlighting sensitive issues emotionally connected to the grassroots. As a result of this political tension, populist figures have emerged as alternative leaders to address major social and political problems, as seen in the Netherlands with Geert Wilders, the United Kingdom (UK) with the Brexit movement, the United States (US) with Donald Trump, and, notably, the rise of Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India. In Southeast Asia, examples of this phenomenon can be seen in the rise of Rodrigo Duterte and his successor, Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Romualdez Marcos Jr., the son of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos, in the Philippines, as well as in Indonesia with the recent election of Prabowo Subianto following increasing populist moves by his predecessor, Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo. These, and other, situations have led many scholars to conclude that there is a shift in the landscape of liberal democracy towards an illiberal path.

In light of this, social media plays a pivotal role in bolstering political identity on a global scale. Political elites are adept at crafting and amplifying political identities by fabricating a common enemy, thereby fostering a sense of threat within society and attributing it as the primary cause of their challenging conditions. Through the production of both provocative and disinformation content, these political figures tap into resistant sentiments within society, re-framing ‘the real problem’ they purportedly face. This fundamental problem renders individuals and collectives vulnerable, ultimately serving the hidden agenda of political elites to secure votes and win elections. To elucidate, during campaign periods, political elites vying for candidacy in various
state institutions promise solutions to societal issues, emphasizing the removal of the imagined enemies perceived as the primary hindrance to society’s economic well-being. By doing so, these politicians suggest that the chosen path will lead to growth in prosperity, premised on the fulfilment of the offered promises. The crux of this strategy lies in portraying the removal of the imagined enemies as a prerequisite for society to reap economic benefits. In the intersection of social media and populism, scholars have predominantly explored two crucial aspects separately: the relationship between political identity and populist figures, and the nexus of social media and populism, exploring hoaxes and disinformation that significantly impact political identity. Meanwhile, it is important to note that the relationship between online and offline activities is intricate, with each influencing the other.

Amidst the various approaches mentioned above, this article adopts a different route in the study of Islamic populism by specifically applying Paolo Gerbaudo’s concept of elective affinity, as introduced in his 2018 work. This study focuses on three pivotal Indonesian elections of the past decade: the presidential elections of 2014 and 2019, and the Jakarta gubernatorial election of 2017. Utilizing a combination of observational and secondary data—including documents, reports, and published articles and books—we aim to underscore how these events have shaped Islamic populism in Indonesia. Our analysis suggests that these three elections mark a significant shift in Indonesian political patterns, where predatory politics form alliances with Islamic organizations to forge a united voice under the banner of the Ummah (global Islamic community), leveraging conservative religious expressions. This alignment coincides with the rise of new media platforms and their users. Within this context, disinformation and fake news play critical roles in shaping Indonesian public opinion about competing political figures.

This study addresses three critical questions: What push factors drive Islamic populism to articulate the aspirations of the Ummah, which were previously suppressed in post-authoritarian Indonesia? To what extent do disinformation and fake news influence public opinion during the crucial moments of political elections amidst the expanding significance of new media? How can Islamic populism sustain itself without support from the bourgeois class, as Hadiz (2016, 2018) suggests, relying solely on predatory politics aimed at electoral victory?
This article argues that two primary factors are fuelling the rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia. The first is an increase in conservative religious expressions, stemming from various Islamic resurgences. The second is the perpetration of violence by both national and local Islamic paramilitaries against religious minorities. The articulation of religious hatred and the accompanying acts of violence contribute to creating precarious conditions for Indonesian Muslims, exacerbating uncertainty regarding their access to economic opportunities. This environment provides fertile ground for predatory politics to cultivate sentiments by forming alliances with new religious authorities, ultimately securing substantial voter support.

Furthermore, despite being numerically smaller in members compared to Indonesia’s two largest mass Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), these Islamic resurgence groups have effectively utilized social media to amplify their voices. Rather than disseminating clear information, they have chosen to deliver disinformation and fake news, drawing from embedded memories within the Indonesian populace. Regrettably, the impact of this disinformation and fake news has persisted in the Indonesian public consciousness even after achieving their electoral objectives. For example, the Islamic blasphemy accusation against then-governor Ahok resulted in his imprisonment for two years, causing him to lose the Jakarta election in 2017 despite being a strong gubernatorial candidate. However, Islamic populism endured, persisting even after Jokowi secured a second term as president in 2019. In this context, predatory politics and Islamic resurgence groups engaged in electoral politics have forged a mutual interest, shaping pre-conditions for mobilizing Islamic populism in the name of the Ummah. Furthermore, the widespread adoption of digital media is an important tool for these groups to exert massive and unavoidable influence within Muslim society. The intersection of these factors underscores the complexity and persistence of Islamic populism in Indonesia’s political landscape.

To systematize the discussion in this article, we have divided it into three parts. Firstly, we examine Islamic populism by exploring the theoretical framework and existing literature to differentiate our study from previous studies. Secondly, we focus on understanding the roots of fake news in Indonesia. By tracing Indonesian history, especially after the 1965-1966 events that marked the transition of power from the
Sukarno presidency to the Suharto presidency, we delve into the origins of hoaxes and fake news that have impacted contemporary Indonesian politics, society, and economics. At least three key issues are raised: the resurgence of the Indonesian Communist Party, anti-Chinese sentiments towards both Chinese-heritage people and China the country, and opposition to religion, particularly anti-Islam sentiments. These issues serve as the basis for cultivating fake news within Indonesia in recent years.

Thirdly, we explore the manufacturing of hoaxes and fake news amid the rise of populism. By examining the 2014 presidential election, we uncover how misinformation and disinformation were used to attack Jokowi's image, with similar tactics influencing the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017, when tension escalated due to the emergence of Ahok as a political figure, due to his being a double minority of Chinese ethnicity and a Christian. Fourthly, we examine the elective affinity of Islamic populism and media mobilization, identifying three interconnected factors in Indonesian elections. In this section, we elucidate how religious authorities, formerly part of fragmented Islamic groups, reorganized themselves under the umbrella of the Ummah, playing a significant role in the imprisonment of Ahok after he was accused and found guilty of blasphemy against Islam. The Jakarta election thus became a learning experience for other local elections in 2018, as well as the 2019 presidential election, when Jokowi selected the Chairman of the Ulema Council of Indonesia (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI), Ma'ruf Amin, as his vice-presidential candidate. This section also offers predictions for the future of Islamic populism, cautioning against supporting predatory politics to achieve their Islamist agendas. Lastly, the conclusion provides brief comments on the earlier explanations and opens the door for further discussion.

Elective Affinity: Bridging Political and Media Studies

In reviewing the literature, we identify two major trajectories in the understanding of Islamic populism in Indonesia. Firstly, many scholars have concentrated on political issues, focusing on political identity, social agency, and populist figures, particularly the rise of Islamic populism at both individual and collective levels (Adiwilaga, Mustofa, and Raman 2019; Kusman 2016; Mietzner 2020; Mietzner and Muhtadi 2018; Setijadi 2017). Secondly, scholars have examined
the nexus between social media and populism, exploring topics such as hoaxes, disinformation, and fragmented power, as well as their impacts on political identity (Irawanto 2019; Jurriens and Tapsell 2017; Lim 2017; Mujani and Kuipers 2020; Postill and Epafras 2018). These studies are crucial for understanding not only the socio-political context and precarious economic conditions and uncertainty faced by the Indonesian Muslim middle class, but also the rise of new Islamic elite figures. These figures have emerged as a distinct group to those from organizations which have traditionally dominated the scene, such as established Islamic organizations Muhammadiyah and NU. Social media has notably empowered these new Islamic elite figures, who are part of Islamic revivalist groups, to articulate their critical voices publicly, significantly shaping public discourse. Despite the existing studies, our approach diverges by examining the interconnectivity between political issues and new media.

We employ the concept of elective affinity as conceptualized by Paolo Gerbaudo (2018), providing a novel perspective in the study of Islamic populism, particularly through the lens of how these elements interact and influence one another in contemporary Indonesia. Elective affinity offers insightful intersections between social media and populism that can amplify populist narratives significantly. In his analysis, Gerbaudo (2018, 756) uses the rise of populist figures like Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump in the US, Nigel Farage of the UK Independence Party, and Marine Le Pen from France's Front National as illustrative cases. He argues that social media acts as a vital conduit for populist leaders to “represent the unrepresented”, effectively giving voice to the voiceless and fostering unity among divided populations.

Furthermore, Gerbaudo (2018, 756) underlines two crucial factors when analysing their populist leaders’ voices: networking and mass outreach capabilities in social media platforms. He contends that these factors are critical in rallying support for populist movements. By using social media’s wide and linked character, these movements can amplify their messages, engage large audiences, and cultivate networks of supporters who are not just geographically varied but also ideologically shared. This feature enables populist leaders to swiftly gain momentum while maintaining engagement with their supporters, transforming social media into an effective tool for political influence and mobilization. Specifically, Gerbaudo identifies three key aspects that contribute
to the success of populist movements in the digital age: ideological factors that resonate with disaffected segments of the population; transgressive behaviour that challenges established norms and captures public attention; and the presence of a rebellious poster containing a charismatic figure who embodies and articulates the frustrations and aspirations of their followers. These elements together create a powerful dynamic that has transformed how populist movements engage with and expand their base of support in contemporary political landscapes.

In dealing with economic crisis, Gerbaudo strengthens that this is strongly related to challenging the legacies of the neoliberal system. In this sense, while Gerbaudo’s argument holds merit to some extent, Postill (2018) introduces a more nuanced perspective, specifically on economic crisis as the primary trigger in challenging the neoliberal order. Postill emphasizes that historical backgrounds contribute in shaping the roots of populism, and are equally significant in activating critical voices. Additionally, Postill asserts that social media’s role extends beyond online activities. In contrast, it is an integral part of the hybrid media system, a concept developed by Chadwick (2017). In this hybrid media system, social media is not isolated but integrated into the offline field, serving as the most effective communication system across various media, including transport networks, public spaces, and face-to-face interactions. Through this lens, we examine Islamic populism in Indonesia in the discussions below.

Understanding the Roots of Fake News on Digital Platforms

Many scholars argue that since the 2014 presidential election, Indonesia has been polarized into two main camps, one supporting Jokowi (elected in 2014 as president for the first time) and one supporting Prabowo (Jokowi’s opponent in 2014 and now president-elect following the 2024 elections). The emergence of these two candidates in the electoral arena has entrenched polarization, a phenomenon attributed to the ‘enclave algorithm’. This polarization is notably linked to two key factors: oligarchic media support for each candidate and internet algorithm structures, both of which guide members of the public to choose candidates based on their social media networks and preferences (Lim 2017; Tapsell 2015; Tyson and Purnomo 2017). This analysis holds significance in delineating the backdrop of political tension affecting the grassroots in Indonesia. Nonetheless, scholars should further expound
on the roots of fake news to elucidate how these camps solidify, providing the public with a clear understanding of the challenges they face. We delve into the origins of fake news, considering it as the foundational material for fabricating disinformation in various forms. This involves a review of the discourse that emerged under the authoritarian regime of the Suharto presidency, which lasted 32 years until its fall in 1998. This discourse has left a lasting impact on the Indonesian public, particularly in the context of the growth of digital platforms.

The origins of essential Indonesian fake news can be traced back to a 1965-66 event. This period left a lasting imprint on the memories of most Indonesian people, marking the creation of the Suharto regime and the negative portrayal of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI), its affiliates, and then-President Sukarno. During and after 1965-66, the Suharto regime came to power and not only successfully eliminated leftist groups and communist individuals through widespread killings in Java Island and various Indonesian provinces, but also subjected suspected PKI sympathizers and followers of Sukarno to imprisonment for extended periods without trial. Many were isolated from society and sent to far-flung Buru Island after being classified as ‘dangerous prisoners’. Despite this brutal violence, the Suharto administration still needed a narrative to legitimize its newfound power. To do so, the then-incoming Suharto presidency framed the September 30, 1965, movement as a PKI-led coup d’état that resulted in the deaths of six army generals (Roosa 2008). Through the creation of fictional stories, the New Order regime gruesomely depicted how the PKI and its affiliated organizations had, allegedly, brutally killed these generals in ways that defied common humanity. For instance, it was falsely claimed that before their deaths, the generals were flayed by Gerwani women activists using razor blades. The women purportedly danced and sang songs during this gruesome act. The Suharto regime commemorated this narrative of violence during its rule (1965-1988) at the Pancasila Sakti monument in Lubang Buaya, East Jakarta. Contrary to the regime’s claims, a monograph by a Cornell scholar, drawing information from doctors’ autopsy results and reports from the death squads, clarified that there was no evidence supporting the stories fabricated by the Suharto presidency (Anderson and McVey 1999; Saskia 1999).
Nevertheless, the fabrication of a scapegoat narrative has deeply influenced Indonesian collective memory, shaping it through ceremonies, educational curricula, and memorials like the Pancasila Sakti Monument, both during the Suharto New Order regime and afterwards (Budiawan 2004; McGregor 2007; Schreiner 2005). This false collective memory, crafted around the events of 1965-66, significantly bolstered the position of Islamic groups, even though they themselves were complicit in the violent purges orchestrated under military rule. However, it is essential to recognize that these Islamic groups held different views before this period. Prior to 1965-66, during the Sukarno presidency, a policy of land reform was implemented to justify land ownership for every segment of society. This policy was well-received by PKI members, while generating anxiety among those with extensive land holdings, including many elite religious figures (kyai) in Java. Consequently, tensions between PKI members and Islamic groups, representing their religious leaders, were inevitable. PKI members often exacerbated this tension by provoking Islamic groups on the issue of land ownership (Bush 2009; Cederroth 2004; van Dijck 1984; Rahman Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017; Sawita 2018; Wertheim 1966).

As the power dynamics shifted and victims of human rights abuses, along with their families, were able to articulate their memories of 1965-66 in the post-New Order era, Islamic groups used their memory as a tool to legitimize their own actions from the 1960s. While acknowledging the killings, they asserted the violence was a defensive response, portraying themselves as victims under the authoritarian regime’s power. This defensive stance gained momentum during the presidency of Abdurrahman ‘Gus Dur’ Wahid, who strongly advocated for breaking the silence in public, with support from civil society and human rights NGOs. Yet, this situation persisted through subsequent presidencies, including that of Jokowi, and the idea of defensive action became a pretext for Islamic groups to avoid accountability for the killings of PKI members and alleged sympathizers. Consequently, the discourse surrounding the ‘communist threat’ and its associated stigma in the post-authoritarian era has resulted in a negative tendency for individuals and communities to label events and people as nightmarish and horrible by attributing them to the PKI, without necessarily adhering to the truth or seeking clarification. In essence, the term ‘communist’
is often used in Indonesia to criticize and blame, contributing to a distorted and negative narrative (Heryanto 1999, 2006).

Regrettably, the intertwined factors of low Indonesian literacy levels, specifically on their comprehension, the prevalence of the oral tradition, and the surge of social media platforms and citizens’ limited digital literacy have significantly contributed to positioning the Indonesian people as targets of hoaxes and fake news. This is specifically pronounced during political elections, where these falsehoods can dangerously influence public opinion and either sway votes or delegitimize candidates. The term ‘communist’ and its associated labels – such as anti-Islam, pro-China (being portrayed as a puppet of the People’s Republic of China), and atheist – have been successfully weaponized by predatory politics to manipulate voters. An illustrative case is accusations alleged against Jokowi, branding him as the son of the PKI since the 2014 presidential election. Despite efforts by his campaign team to debunk and counter the spread of hoaxes, there remains a need to address the root sources of (dis)information. Reactively responding to the resurfacing PKI issue, Jokowi opted to fortify his position by asserting his commitment to personally combat the PKI if it were to revive. While this strategy may alleviate suspicions about him, it indirectly lends support to the persistence of hoaxes surrounding PKI and communism (Heryanto 2018). Given this backdrop, the perpetuation of such hoaxes is likely to persist, becoming a recurring pretext in future political elections. This cycle reinforces the importance of addressing misinformation at its roots to mitigate its impact on electoral processes and public perception.

The contemporary digital landscape, coupled with the emergence of ‘buzzers’ (social media users who are often paid to spread both positive news and negative disinformation), has amplified the role of online weapons, generating fake news that evolves into viral content. Buzzers disseminate information through personal uploads, generally presenting their posts as accurate, despite a lack of thorough verification. This new profession sees many buzzers being paid by political candidates to safeguard their images, while others work voluntarily to produce content supporting their preferred candidates. The intensive work of buzzers has led to the proliferation of hoaxes and fake news, particularly during election periods (Akmaliah 2018; Indah and Zuhdy 2020; Sastramidjaja 2021; Seto 2019). Hoaxes have also impacted other countries around the world, such as the US, with social media users’ age
not significantly influencing their impact (Guess, Nagler, and Tucker 2019). In a study focused on journalists and students, Khan and Idris (2019) found that internet experiences related to information-seeking, sharing, verification, and belief in information reliability are crucial in determining digital literacy. The results underscore the significance of these factors in combating hoaxes and fake news, while both levels of class and decree of education are shaping their understanding of those issues significantly. Nevertheless, Mujani and Kuipers (2020) took a different perspective on the 2019 Indonesian presidential election, with their survey results suggesting that those most affected by hoaxes primarily come from the upper-middle class and have high levels of education. This nuanced finding challenges previous assumptions about the demographic impact of misinformation during elections, highlighting the need for context-specific analyses in understanding the dynamics of misinformation propagation.

The intricate interplay of buzzers and hoaxes in the Indonesian digital landscape has marked a shift from offline to online mobilization in political campaigns. This transition poses a challenge to Indonesian liberal democracy, potentially evolving into an illiberal aspiration amidst the backdrop of rising Islamic populism in the post-authoritarian era. A notable example is the involvement of the ‘Muslim Cyber Army’ during recent Indonesian elections. This group orchestrates online mobilization for Muslims to choose and support a Muslim leader, garnering warm support from some ulama (religious leaders). They generate provocative content from hoaxes and fake news, disseminating it through Islamic websites and social media to sway voters’ minds. Nastiti and Ratri (2018) developed the concept of emotive politics to address this issue, arguing that offline activities, such as the display of banners in certain Jakarta streets during the Ahok case, have strengthened emotional bonds among the Muslim audience. This situation triggered both anger and solidarity, fostering a sense of ummah or community. Nevertheless, this argument alone may not be robust enough to comprehend the intricate links between Islamic populism, social media-based hoaxes and fake news content, and offline activities as the primary factors fuelling the series of Islamic mobilizations across three consecutive elections over a period of five years. Further discussion will elaborate on these connections following the exploration of the manufacturing of hoaxes and fake news.
Manufacturing Hoaxes and Fake News amidst the Rise of Islamic Populism

Prior to becoming president in 2014, Jokowi was the Governor of Jakarta. A negative campaign targeting Jokowi first emerged during his candidacy in the 2012 Jakarta election, although it did not have a significant impact. Islamic preachers delivered sermons containing subtle attacks in numerous Jakarta mosques, and there was a surge in anonymous text messages featuring sectarian issues. These attacks attempted to encourage Muslim voters to favour a leader who was similar to them in both religiosity and ethnicity. This argument emerged in response to Jokowi’s selection of Ahok as his running mate, who, as mentioned, is Christian and of Chinese descent. The pair faced this challenge during the length of the 2012 gubernatorial election. However, this did not deter the enthusiasm of Jakarta’s youth, who actively engaged in the local election by registering themselves as volunteers to support both Jokowi and Ahok. The negative vibe surrounding the campaign did not prevent the young volunteers from empowering themselves and actively participating in the election to support the, ultimately successful, candidacy of Jokowi-Ahok.

Three factors contributed to the limited impact of hoaxes and fake news in 2012. The first factor was the presence of promising candidates who embodied youthful spirit, diversity, and cosmopolitanism. Jokowi, renowned for his success as governor of Solo and his association with the reform spirit for the lower class, and Ahok, representing dual religious and ethnic minorities, were perceived as capable leaders for Jakarta. This image stood in stark contrast to the then-incumbent governor, Fauzi Wibowo, and his vice-gubernatorial candidate, Nachrowi Ramli, a retired Army Major General. Despite their representation as Betawi people (the indigenous inhabitants of Jakarta), the pair was seen as part of the old generation unlikely to bring about positive change for Jakarta’s future. Amidst this scenario, a second factor emerged: the transformation in the tradition of political elections on a national scale. Historically, money politics has played a significant role in Indonesian political behavior. However, the emergence of Jokowi-Ahok as new candidates in the Jakarta election caused a shift in the political landscape. Specifically, a grassroots-level partisan movement gained momentum, with a notable number of Jakarta residents voluntarily supporting the success of this candidacy (Suaedy 2014).
The third factor pertained to the burgeoning global use of digital platforms in political campaigns. The political campaign of Barack Obama in the US, particularly its extensive use of social media, had a profound impact worldwide, including on the political landscape in Indonesia. The 2012 Jakarta election serves as a notable example of how political campaign teams maximized digital platforms through diverse products. Utilizing flash mobs, song adaptations, parodies, and other activities rooted in pop culture, numerous volunteers supporting Jokowi-Ahok uploaded their content to YouTube and Facebook, given the platforms’ popularity among Indonesians at the time. Through this wide variety of content, supporters conveyed the belief that Jakarta needed a new kind of leadership. Jokowi and Ahok, with their commendable track records in Solo and Bangka Belitung respectively, symbolized the desired spirit. This sentiment was further reinforced by past citizen mobilizations, such as ‘Coin for Prieta’ and ‘Cicak Versus Buaya’, which had galvanized political virtues in both offline and online spaces (Lim 2013). These earlier mobilizations laid the social structure and foundation for the 2012 election in Jakarta, despite the clear distinctions between offline and online activities. Simultaneously, a considerable number of Indonesians began to mobilize themselves, gathering information from social media, television, and offline sources, such as colleagues, friends, families, and neighbours. This marked a significant shift in how political engagement occurred, encompassing both digital and traditional avenues.

In the 2014 presidential election, these forms and structures continued, with the most significant impact stemming from robust offline activities, particularly in the realm of black campaigns. Jusuf Kalla, having previously served as the vice president under the first Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration (2004-2009), supported Jokowi in his bid for the presidency, challenging Prabowo, who had been Jokowi’s primary supporter in the 2012 Jakarta election. Throughout the campaign period, hoaxes and fake news targeted Jokowi, leading to the creation of a negative public image. The proliferation of fake news intensified in 2014 with the emergence of the Obor Rakyat tabloid, which has a circulation of half a million across Java. The tabloid was distributed widely to Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in Central Java and West Java, areas with substantial populations. A survey conducted by Tyson & Purnomo (2017) demonstrated that
the circulation of *Obor Rakyat* significantly influenced the views of citizens living on Java. They found that 58% of respondents in Java had heard of the tabloid, with 189 respondents remembering specific details from its coverage, contributing to the unfavourable image of Jokowi (Tyson and Purnomo 2017, 8–9). *Obor Rakyat*, throughout its reporting, portrayed Jokowi in three negative images: a bad Muslim, a puppet president (‘presiden boneka’), and having support from Chinese financiers (‘cukong’). Depicting Jokowi as a bad Muslim, the tabloid framed him and his prominent allies as betraying the *Ummah*. Allegations were made, suggesting a perceived significant role in the process of Christianization, reinforced by the Christian backgrounds of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) elites, whose party symbol, a cross, further fueled this narrative in the minds of Indonesian Muslims.

Furthermore, allegations that Jokowi had Chinese ancestry and was sympathetic towards communism were used to construct negative images of his background. Meanwhile, within PDI-P, Jokowi’s position as an ordinary member of the party raised questions in the public’s mind as to whether he could truly be a leader for all Indonesian citizens, or if he was merely seen as a servant to PDI-P head and former president, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Megawati’s public statement about Jokowi’s candidacy for the presidency, which emphasized his role as solely a ‘party officer’ (‘petugas partai’) and not a leader, sewed doubt among many. He was perceived as serving Megawati’s interests and the interests of her oligarchic alliances. This differed significantly from the image projected by Prabowo, the chairman of the advisory board of Gerindra Party, whose background as a figure in Indonesian history and part of an oligarchic family strengthened the public perception of Prabowo as someone capable of voicing the interests of the Indonesian public. The contrast between Jokowi and Prabowo was emphasized by Prabowo’s perceived dedication to serving Indonesian citizens, in contrast to the doubts surrounding Jokowi’s allegiances (Tyson and Purnomo 2017, 9–16).

Regarding his alleged association with ‘cukong’, Jokowi was perceived as being supported by various Chinese conglomerates and businesspeople, such as James Riady, a controversial evangelist who had planned to establish 1,000 Christian schools in most Indonesian provinces (Tyson and Purnomo 2017, 13–14). The term ‘cukong’
carries a negative connotation, and Jokowi’s support from Chinese conglomerates was seen unfavourably by many Indonesian Muslims. This negative perception was deeply rooted in two historical events. Firstly, the events of 1965-66, which were perceived as being related to the People’s Republic of China, betraying the Indonesian people to serve the communist country and treating Chinese-Indonesians as second-class citizens through subsequent discriminatory policies. Despite being a minority ethnic group, the Suharto regime relied on the economic contributions of Chinese-Indonesians due to their business expertise, international Chinese diaspora links, and involvement in businesses with the Indonesian armed forces. Secondly, in May 1998, major riots directly impacted Chinese Indonesians, as they became the targeted victims of violence, looting, and rape. These two events contributed to the negative image associated with the term ‘cukong’ and deepened the apprehension towards the involvement of Chinese conglomerates in Indonesian politics (Minarwita 2011; Purdey 2002; Strassler 2004).

Understanding the persistent negative image of Chinese Indonesians and China among Indonesian Muslims requires an examination of the power vacuum that emerged after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. With this transition, both old and new Islamic organizations sought to strengthen their identities in the public space. This was evident through the implementation of Islamic laws in certain Indonesian provinces, the incorporation of conservative religious interpretations in Indonesian events, and an increase in acts of violence against religious minorities (Akmaliah 2020b; Arifianto 2020; Buehler 2016; Hamdani 2020; Hariyadi 2010; Hasan 2009; Heryanto 2014; Rakhmani 2014). The new religious authorities that emerged during this period had diverse backgrounds, interests, and ideologies. Many operated within fragmented communities, making it challenging to advance their Islamic agenda without collaborating with political party elites. The political electoral landscape became a significant opportunity for these authorities to integrate their interests and ideologies, forming alliances with political elites to effectively gain voters. Consequently, these unholy alliances became unavoidable. Islamic political parties like the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the National Mandate Party (PAN), the United Development Party (PPP), and the Crescent Moon Party (PBB), along with various Islamic groups representing diverse backgrounds and ideologies, including Muhammadiyah at the grassroots level,
culturally supported Prabowo-Hatta in the 2014 presidential election as the perceived representation of the *Ummah*. These alliances reflected the complex interplay between religious authorities and political elites in shaping the political landscape in post-Suharto Indonesia.

In their support for Prabowo-Hatta in 2014, however, these new religious authorities ultimately faced defeat. Nevertheless, the production of hoaxes and fake news did not significantly alter the perceptions of Jokowi within many Islamic groups, where he continued to be criticized for his perceived poor performance on Islamic identity and labeled as a descendant of communists. Despite these challenges, the polarized structure between those supporting and opposing Jokowi persisted into the 2017 Jakarta election, when new players emerged amid the growth of social media and its users: the ‘buzzers’. Unlike traditional media, which requires a substantial budget for advertisements on television channels as well as public intellectuals to shape a positive image through discussions, buzzers – with their substantial follower bases – utilize social media accounts to disseminate provocative visual content. Since 2017, buzzers have played a crucial role in influencing the Indonesian public’s reference points and have reshaped the power dynamics in elections. The function of buzzers extends beyond influencing election outcomes; they significantly contribute to driving public discourse in Indonesia.

Originally employed for marketing products by selecting micro-celebrities with fame and large followings, buzzers are now thoroughly engaged in political campaigns (Akmaliah 2018, 12–13). Unlike their previous roles, in political campaigns buzzers face risks due to the sensitivity around issues involving prominent political figures, making them targets of public attacks. In this context, the 2008 Electronic Information and Transaction Law (UU ITE in Indonesian) aimed to protect Indonesian citizens amidst internet cybercrime, as well as targeting the creation of hoaxes and fake news. This legislation can impact anyone involved in such activities, including buzzers.

Due to these concerns, political buzzers, whether supporting or criticizing political figures, often refrain from acknowledging payment for their services. Many pretend to support certain figures based on shared visions for the future of Indonesia and the perceived personal virtues of these political figures, believing they can bring about positive change for the country. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that a significant
number of these political figures, supported by political buzzers, may align with and further the interests of oligarchies through regulations. This dynamic raises questions among Indonesian netizens regarding the sincerity of buzzers’ support. To safeguard their identities from social media backlash and potential criminal charges, many political buzzers are anonymous on social media, using non-identifiable account names. Despite this, micro-celebrities who genuinely choose to support specific political figures do exist. The impact of these dynamics, particularly in the 2017 Jakarta election, will be discussed in the next section. It will explore how their contributions significantly fuelled Islamic populism, leading to the imprisonment of Ahok for two years after a series of massive public demonstrations, ultimately influencing the 2019 presidential election. In essence, the production and circulation of hoaxes and fake news play a role in reinforcing emotive politics, making it easier for Islamic populism to mobilize in advocating in the name of Islam as part of their solidarity efforts.

The ‘Elective Affinity’ of Islamic Populism, Mobilization, and Social Media

The context of the 2017 Jakarta election serves as a critical lens for understanding the transformation of Indonesian Muslim society, often referred to as the ‘conservative turn’ predicted by some scholars. Not only did this election lead to the imprisonment of the strong incumbent candidate, it also fuelled the rise of new religious authorities in the public sphere, including those who had previously had a relatively small impact on Indonesian Muslim societies in the post-authoritarian era. Utilizing Gerbaudo’s concept of elective affinity between populism and social media, and incorporating Chadwick’s (2017) concept of a hybrid media system, as coined by Postill (2018), we can analyze local electoral politics in Jakarta and its subsequent impact on the 2019 presidential election. This impact becomes apparent when considering Jokowi’s choice of Ma’ruf Amin as his vice-presidential candidate for the second term of his presidency (2019-2024). In 2016-17, Ma’ruf played a key role (as head of MUI) in the blasphemy accusations alleged against Ahok.

In this context, three fundamental factors deserve exploration: the stable form of Islamic populism ideology, transgressive actions amid a series of Islamic mobilizations, and the influence of provocative social media posters and their narrative content, often amplified by buzzers.
Understanding these factors provides insights into the complex dynamics that shaped the political landscape in Jakarta, and, ultimately, Indonesia.

Jokowi’s election as president in 2014 meant his governorship of Jakarta was cut short, meaning his deputy, Ahok, became governor for the remainder of the term. During Ahok’s administration (2014-2017), he implemented numerous positively-received policies and development initiatives, earning widespread satisfaction from the majority of Jakarta residents. According to an Indikator Politik survey, 75% of Jakarta’s population expressed satisfaction with his progressive work (Detik.com 2017; Katadata.co.id 2017; Muhtadi 2017; Tirto.id 2017). Despite his accomplishments, Ahok faced several challenges in the leadup to the 2017 Jakarta election. Firstly, his background as a double minority, being both Christian and of Chinese descent, raised concerns among some citizens, especially among conservative Muslim groups in Jakarta. This included the city’s indigenous Betawi people and those affiliated with the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI). While Jakarta is a diverse and cosmopolitan city, these conservative groups had a strong voice in responding to Islamic issues and advocating for indigenous rights. Secondly, Ahok’s public communication style differed significantly from Jokowi. Where Jokowi was considered calm and composed, Ahok’s more impulsive style, which included occasionally borderline-offensive comments, while resonating with Betawi people, was sometimes poorly received. Despite his effective criticism of government officials’ laziness and corruption tendencies, this communication style became a vulnerability for Ahok’s political opponents to exploit. Thirdly, Ahok’s policies, particularly those related to forced evictions for the revitalization of the Ciliwung River and a large maritime land reclamation project, triggered negative responses from civil society and human rights defenders. These policies, implemented just months before the Jakarta election, provided political competitors with strong ammunition to criticize Ahok. His opponents argued that these measures adversely affected Jakarta’s most vulnerable socio-economic groups, and accused the government of neglecting their needs and welfare. This controversy added further complexity to the political landscape in the run-up to the election.

The three above factors indirectly set the stage to delegitimize Ahok’s work performance. The pivotal moment that exacerbated the situation
occurred during a speech Ahok gave for almost two hours in September 2016, in which he discussed the empowerment of the fishing industry in Jakarta’s Thousand Islands area. This speech marked the beginning of a perfect storm that severely damaged Ahok’s credibility. Ahok was addressing the issue of the empowerment program’s continuity, assuring residents that the program would continue even if he did not win the election. Despite Ahok’s clarification, he softly reminded the audience not to be misled by the Quranic verse Al-Mā’idah in choosing him, considering his background as both a Christian and of Chinese ethnicity. He explicitly said, “It could be in your heart, dear audience, you will not choose me, but please, do not lie by the verse of Al-Mā’idah. You are right not to choose me because you are worried that you will go to hell because people fooled you. Again, it is your calling.” This speech, originally uploaded to the Jakarta government’s YouTube account, was later edited and re-uploaded on social media in a dramatically shortened version, in which it appeared Ahok had instead encouraged his audience to “Do not be lied to by the verse of Al-Mā’idah”. The video went viral, and triggered widespread anger among Muslims and activating long-held stigma against Indonesians of Chinese heritage, communism and communists, and the emotive politics during the presidential election in 2014. These elements were brought together under a new rallying cry, which alleged that the religion of Islam had been insulted.

Between November 2016 to May 2017, there were five significant Islamic protests in Indonesia, aimed at pressuring the authorities to bring Ahok to trial. These mobilizations occurred on November 4, 2016; December 2, 2016; February 21, 2017; March 3, 2017; and May 5, 2017. The accusations of blasphemy against Ahok significantly strengthened Islamic populism during this period, generating momentum that led to a cross-alliance from diverse backgrounds and orientations within religious authorities. The case brought together individuals from various economic classes in Indonesia, rallying around influential religious leaders who were gaining new prominence. One notable figure in this movement was FPI Chairman Rizieq Shihab. Despite a negative image due to FPI’s human rights violations, including attacks on Ahmadi and Shia people in various Indonesian provinces and engaging in public verbal violence, Rizieq Shihab’s voice became crucial in the push to prosecute Ahok. Interestingly, the community,
comprised of many Islamic members and organizations, declared Rizieq Shihab as the Imam Besar (the highest Muslim leader for all Indonesian Muslims) as part of their insistence on bringing Ahok to justice through Islamic mobilization. Additionally, Bachtiar Natsir, a religious leader who was previously unknown nationally, played a pivotal role in these Islamic mobilizations, emerging as a new star in the defense of Islam. The confluence of these figures and movements reflects the complex dynamics and alliances within the emerging Islamic populist movement.

The November and December 2016 protests stand out as the two largest mass actions in the nation's history, drawing around 500,000 to 700,000 demonstrators. These movements were driven by the movement's insistence on gaining Jokowi's intervention in the case against Ahok. In the subsequent Jakarta gubernatorial election in April 2017, Ahok and his running mate Djarot Saiful Hidayat gained only 2,350,366 votes (42.04%) in the runoff round, despite multiple earlier survey predictions indicating their likely victory. On the other hand, Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno, originally considered underdogs in the race, secured victory with 3,240,987 votes (57.96%). The legal outcome of Ahok's case was determined on May 9, 2017, less than a month after the runoff round of votes; the court found him guilty, sentencing him to jail for two years. This verdict marked a significant turning point in Indonesian politics, highlighting the influence of Islamic mobilizations and their impact on electoral outcomes.

Several factors contributed to the significance of these movements in achieving their goals, shedding light on two critical issues that build upon previous studies. Firstly, these movements received substantial funding from political predators seeking to leverage their influence, particularly to win the Jakarta election. Muhammadiyah and NU, acting as hubs for infrastructure and facilities, became instrumental in supporting these new religious authorities who largely came from lower and middle socioeconomic backgrounds. These movements, representing Islamic identity, drew considerable support, and their financial backing was crucial for organizing and sustaining large-scale Islamic mobilizations. Bachtiar Natsir’s statement, representing the Salafi-modernist network, publicly mentioned that the funding for these movements could reach up to IDR one hundred billion (62,501.585 USD (Assyaukanie 2017, 8). Secondly, the growth of Indonesian social media and the emergence of buzzers have played a pivotal role in shaping public perception.
Indonesia has witnessed a significant increase in the number of social media users each year, contributing to the creation of public images and opinions. In 2024, the three largest internet user populations in Asia are China (1.09 billion internet users), India (751.5 million internet users), and Indonesia (185 million internet users) (Reportal 2024). APJII, the Indonesian Association of Internet Service Providers, reports a slightly higher figure for Indonesian internet users, at 221.56 million internet users out of a total population of over 278 million people. This indicates that around 75% of the Indonesian people currently use the internet. This substantial online presence has helped bridge the gap between Indonesia’s urban and rural contexts, with 65% of internet users living in urban areas and 35% in rural areas (APJII 2023). The widespread adoption of social media across different geographical areas has facilitated the seamless circulation of messages, contributing to the extensive influence of social media in shaping public discourse.

Social media serves as a powerful medium for political candidates during elections, enabling them to construct a favorable image for their audience. Yet, as we show, it can also be wielded as a weapon to delegitimize political competitors. In the 2017 Jakarta election, buzzers became essential for shaping public opinion, and this strategy was employed by both Ahok and his competitors. Nevertheless, Ahok faced significant challenges due to his background as a double minority and the blasphemy case against him, coupled with his alliance with Jokowi. Despite employing buzzers, the abundance of hoaxes and fake news undermined Ahok’s work performance. These misleading narratives contributed to the construction of a sense of Islamic solidarity, including physically – such as through banners at key road intersections in Jakarta – and digitally, through the dissemination of emotive political content on social media. These efforts aimed to persuade Indonesian Muslims and encourage their participation in Islamic mass mobilizations. Moreover, hate speech on religious issues, such as the assertion that Muslims are obligated to choose Muslim leaders, became a persuasive theme in many Jakarta mosques, particularly during Friday prayers. These offline activities, combined with emotive content online, influenced Jakarta voters not to support Ahok, despite his outstanding work in developing the capital city. The complex interplay of online and offline strategies underscores the multifaceted nature of political campaigning in the digital age.
The Ahok case served as a valuable lesson for political competitors in subsequent local elections in 2018 and the presidential election in 2019. The focus shifted from identity politics to the development of infrastructure, transparency in national budgeting through e-government, and the delivery of excellent public services through bureaucratic reforms. These factors became crucial considerations for voters in the elections that followed. However, the impact of the Ahok case on political identity resurfaced in the local elections of 2018. Many political competitors felt compelled to emphasize their Islamic credentials, particularly in regions like South Sumatra, West Java, and Central Java. The shadow of Ahok’s blasphemy case loomed large, with candidates striving to distance themselves from any perceived insult to Islam. In the 2019 presidential election, Jokowi’s choice of Ma’ruf Amin as his vice-presidential candidate raised controversy. MUI leader Ma’ruf was associated with human rights violations on minority religion issues and had served as a witness against Ahok in court, which angered many of Ahok’s supporters. The decision to select Ma’ruf raised questions about whether he would present a moderate or conservative face for Indonesian Muslims. In essence, the enduring impact of Ahok’s case underscored the complex interplay of identity politics, religious considerations, and governance issues in shaping electoral dynamics in Indonesia (Nadzir and Permana 2018).

Some scholars argue that Jokowi’s strategic choice of Ma’ruf Amin as his vice-presidential candidate was a rational move to win the election (Burhani 2018; Nadzir and Permana 2018). By entering the same field as his competitors, particularly in terms of political identity, Jokowi aimed to counter the wave of hoaxes and attacks that had targeted him in 2014. The campaign confirmed that Ma’ruf played a key role in diminishing the impact of fake news that had previously portrayed Jokowi as a communist and anti-Islam figure supported by Chinese-Indonesian oligarchies. Both campaign teams engaged in using social media and influencers (buzzers) to manipulate their candidates’ images and launch black campaigns against their opponents. Despite these efforts, hoaxes during this stage did not significantly tarnish Jokowi’s public perception, and Ma’ruf actively fought back against such disinformation during the election, though this approach had the unintended consequence of closing off the political space and leading Indonesia towards illiberal democratic tendencies. While Jokowi was
initially seen as a figure pushing for political reform and distancing the country from the legacies of the New Order, the 2019 presidential election shifted the focus to more primordial issues. The election became centered around narratives of leadership representing religious piety for the *ummah* and nationalism to defend the Pancasila and Indonesia’s pluralistic values against radicalism. Instead of promoting citizenship agendas, good governance, and strong economic plans, the discourse became polarized, dividing the public into two camps with competing narratives. Supporters of Jokowi believed that his opponent, Prabowo, and his associates supported radicalism, Islamist individuals, and anti-Pancasila sentiments, while Prabowo’s supporters portrayed Jokowi as being supported by anti-Islamic elements, religious blasphebers, and foreign interests. Both camps utilized buzzers on social media to propagate these narratives, which, to some extent, were accepted by segments of the Indonesian public (Akmaliah 2019).

Following Jokowi’s victory and his subsequent inclusion of Prabowo in his cabinet as the defense minister (2019-2024), the impact of hoaxes and fake news seemed to diminish, leading to a more neutral perception of the administration among the Indonesian people. Nonetheless, the spirit of Islamic populism continued to wield influence in the public sphere. The post-election activities of Islamist groups like FPI and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, though minimal in both quantity and impact because their organizational permits were revoked, reflected their ongoing commitment to advocating their interests in different ways (Akmaliah and Pamungkas 2023; Hew 2022). The influence of Islamic populism, particularly at the grassroots level, relies on forming alliances with groups possessing strong economic capital, typically aligned with oligarchic power, as evidenced in previous elections where predatory politics sought to establish such alliances. Despite this, at the grassroots level new religious authorities are increasingly influencing the new middle-class Muslims in Indonesia’s urban areas. They achieve this through Islamic teachings delivered with an urban style and aligning with pop culture, using social media as a mainstream channel for their message. This approach has brought a fresh perspective to Islamic teachings with tendencies towards religious conservatism (Aidulsyah 2023; Akmaliah 2020a; Chaplin 2018; Hasan 2020).
Conclusion

This article investigates the rise of political identity in Indonesia through an analysis of three elections as a case study. Utilizing the concept of elective affinity, the study identifies three key aspects contributing to the strong growth of Islamic populism. Firstly, it highlights the continuity observed in Indonesian elections over the years (2014, 2017, and 2019). Secondly, it emphasizes the role of the blasphemy case against Ahok, which triggered significant Islamic mobilizations among Indonesian Muslims, leveraging social media and buzzers as powerful tools, often disseminating hoaxes and fake news. Lastly, the study underscores the support from predatory politics in the form of financing and forming alliances to achieve diverse goals. The findings illustrate how these three factors are interconnected and cannot be understood in isolation when exploring contemporary Indonesian political identity. Now, a lingering question pertains to the sustained power of these religious authorities and whether they can continue to grow, captivating a significant Muslim audience and imprinting their ideologies on the Indonesian public sphere.

We contend that, at the grassroots level and within fragmented social circles, these new religious authorities exert a substantial influence on emerging middle-class Indonesian Muslims. Leveraging urban style and pop culture, they infuse a sense of novelty into Islamic teachings, aligning with the trend for conservative interpretation, and predominantly utilize social media as their primary channel for mainstreaming. Their influence positions them strongly for negotiations with other predatory politicians in future elections, despite varying interests and agendas. Therefore, conducting further studies to explore how these religious authorities are adapting becomes imperative, particularly in understanding their ability to navigate different environments in the absence of independent support from the Islamic bourgeois class. Moreover, the shifting alliances among political parties and the varying interests of the oligarchies in the 2024 Indonesian elections are shaping different trajectories for Islamic populism.
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The ‘Elective Affinity’ of Islamic Populism


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سنديا اسلامية
Mau’izat al-Ikhwan and the Knowledge of the Acehnese Past

Amirul Hadi

تحابير الدولة العثمانية لحل القضايا المعقدة
لعامي الجاوي 1849-1911
دراسة في ضوء وثائق الأرشيف العثماني

أسمهان مصطفى توفيق خليل أحمد