What Drives Anti-Shia Framing in Indonesia
Zulkipli

The ‘Elective Affinity’ of Islamic Populism: A Case Study of Indonesian Politic Identity Within the Three Elections
Wahyudi Akmaliah & Ibnu Nadzir

Islamic Underground Movement: Islamist Music in the Indonesian Popular Music Scene
Rahmat Hidayatullah
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Ulama and Manuscripts in Minangkabau: Safeguarding the Intellectual Heritage of Sheikh Abdul Laṭīf Shakūr
Abstract: Since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, music has become a site of religio-political resistance among the new Islamist generation in Indonesia. This research examines the emergence of Islamist music on the Indonesian underground music scene to show the deepening influence of the Islamist movement among urban Muslim youth and the shifting strategy of the new Islamist generation from structural politics to cultural politics. The emergence of Islamist music indicates how a new generation of Islamists negotiates an Islamist worldview with contemporary popular culture. By maintaining the aggressive character of underground music, they adopt the Western popular culture as a code of resistance against the secular cultural hegemony. They also use popular music as a cultural approach or a strategy to promote the Islamist ideology to all urban Muslim youth.

Keywords: Indonesian Popular Music, Underground Music, Islamism, Post-Islamism, Religious Conversion.

Kata kunci: Musik Populer Indonesia, Musik Bawah Tanah, Islamisme, Pos-Islamisme, Konversi Agama.

ملخص: منذ سقوط النظام الجديد عام 1998، أصبحت الموسيقى موقعًا للمقاومة الدينية والسياسية بين الجيل الإسلامي الجديد في إندونيسيا. يتناول هذا البحث ظهور الموسيقى الإسلامية في مشهد الموسيقى السرية الإندونيسية لإظهار التأثير العميق للحركة الإسلامية بين الشباب المسلم الحضري واستراتيجية التحول للجيل الإسلامي الجديد من السياسة الهيكلية إلى السياسة الثقافية. ويشير ظهور الموسيقى الإسلامية إلى الكيفية التي يتفاوض بها جيل جديد من الإسلاميين مع وجهة النظر الإسلامية العالمية والثقافة الشعبية المعاصرة. ومن خلال الحفاظ على الطابع العدوانى للموسيقى السرية، فإنهم يتبون الثقافة الشعبية الغربية كرمز للمقاومة ضد الهيمنة الثقافية العلمانية وعلاقة على ذلك، فإنهم يستخدمون أيضًا الموسيقى الشعبية كنقطة واعدة أو استراتيجية لترويج الأيديولوجية الإسلامية لدى جميع الشباب المسلم في المناطق الحضرية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الموسيقى الشعبية الإندونيسية، الموسيقى السرية، الإسلاموية، ما بعد الإسلاميةوية، التحول الديني.
In a work written while he was languishing in an Egyptian prison, the revolutionary Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb strongly criticized Western popular culture. He says:

Humans these days live in a big brothel! They only listen to the press, movies, fashion shows, beauty pageants, dance halls, bars, radio, and television. They indulge in lust for naked bodies, sick-provocative postures, and petty phrases in literature, art, and the mass media! (Qutb 2003, 511)

From the perspective of Qutb, Western popular culture, exported worldwide by capitalist power, is a dangerous, decadent culture to Muslim communities, pushing them away from the true path of Islam and plunging them into the abyss of ignorance (jāhilīyyah). According to Qutb, if Muslims want to survive, they should hold fast to Islamic values and leave behind Western culture that deviates from human nature. For Qutb, “Islam is the only system with values and ways of life that are in harmony with human nature” (Qutb 1979, 4).

Qutb’s point of view represents the Islamist prototype described by many observers. Dagi establishes the claim that “rejection of the West and Westernization in both political and intellectual domains was the basis on which modern Islamist identity was built” (Dagi 2004, 150). Islamists have been portrayed as anti-modernist and anti-Western for a long time (Toprak 1993; Gülalp 1997), and they hold the image of conservative zealots who strive to ban any form of arts and entertainment (Müller 2015, 319). As Roy points out, “The issue of entertainment and mores … is probably the major stumbling block of Islamism in power. It has no model of culture other than the neo-fundamentalist view, based on interdiction and censorship” (Roy 2004, 89). Roy, who specifies Islamism as being political, describes it categorically as anti-expressive (Hamdar and Moore 2015, 1).

The observer’s description of anti-expressive Islamists is in sharp contrast with the trend of new Islamist movements in Indonesia that have been developing in recent years. The new Islamist generation principally accepts the prescriptions that “Islam is the solution” (al-Islām huwa al-ball) from Islamic thinkers like Sayyid Qutb. However, unlike Qutb who condemns the Western popular culture and advocates a political-revolutionary approach, the new Islamist generation has a cultural approach by embracing Western popular culture as a medium of da’wa (propagation) and resistance. This new approach strongly emphasizes some semantic elements, language games, and cultural
production. They strive to creatively revamp all Islamic messages into lifestyles, arts, music, novels, films, and fashions.

The shift towards a cultural approach is, among others, reflected in the emergence of various underground musical expressions which is propagating some Islamist messages in the Indonesian popular music scene. The term ‘Islamist’ here refers to religio-political ideology and movements formulated by Asef Bayat. According to Bayat, Islamism is “ideologies and movements that strive to establish some kind of an ‘Islamic order’—a religious state, sharia law, and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities” (Bayat 2013, 4). Resembling general Islamists, several underground musicians who decided to hijrah in their life trajectory have recently created musical works that contain some Islamist messages, such as the implementation of sharia and the establishment of an Islamic State.

This study aims to examine the emergence of Islamist music in Indonesia in order to show the growing influence of Islamist ideology and movements among some urban Muslim youth, as well as to show the shifting strategy of the new Islamist generation from structural politics to cultural politics. As Müller noted, Islamist movements are ideologically, politically, and culturally much more complex and dynamic than they are generally depicted, particularly by some Western researchers (Müller 2014, 1). The emergence of Islamist music can shed light on the complexity, creativity, and dynamics of contemporary Islamist movements in the area of popular culture. The case of Islamist music shows how the new generation of Islamists concede the compatibility of an Islamist worldview and Western popular culture.

Most studies on music and social movements tend to focus on the role of music in the dynamics of social movements and how social movements use music as a means to recruit potential participants, increase the solidarity among members, strengthen the collective identity, mobilize collective action, and frame the movement ideology (Ramet 1994; Ward 1998; Eyerman and Jamison 1998; Street et al. 2008; Corte and Edwards 2008; Roy 2010; Hidayatullah 2021). Only a few studies have attempted to analyze how social movements influence and change the worldview of musicians and the musical works that they create. This research employs the social movement theory to explain some factors that encourage underground musicians to join the Islamist movement or embrace the Islamist ideology and how this
ideology influences their worldviews and musical works. To achieve this aim, I employ a narrative approach to explore the **hijrah** stories of some underground musicians through their biographies and testimonials, conveyed via either autobiographical books or social media.

**Popular Music in Indonesia**

Jaap Kunst, a Dutch ethnomusicologist and expert on Javanese Gamelan, once stated that Indonesian music has never been “autochthonomous in the (relatively) pure sense of the term, except to a very limited degree; in many respects, it is closely akin to that of the surrounding territories” (Kunst 1973, 1–2). Historically, all kinds of Indonesian music have always been syncretic and absorbed outside influences—long before the contemporary coining of the terms ‘globalization’ or ‘world music’ (Sen and Hill 2004, 75). The indigenization of foreign music in Indonesia began many centuries ago, long before the international music industry penetrated the Indonesian music market. In its development, some improvements in recording technology and music marketing practices in the 20th century also shaped the patterns of music production, distribution, and consumption in Indonesia (Sen and Hill 2007, 165). This development has encouraged the emergence of Indonesian popular music.

The term “Indonesian popular music” is an umbrella category being used to describe domestically produced music, which is heavily influenced by Western popular music—a type of Western popular music sung in the Indonesian language. Indonesian popular music is a category that includes almost all genres of Western popular music, such as rock, pop, jazz, blues, R&B, and other genres that are familiar to Westerners, which are being arranged and sung in Bahasa Indonesia. Musically, Indonesian popular music is very similar to Anglo-American pop and rock music, with dominant sounds of guitar, keyboard, bass, and drum (Lockard 1998, 83–84; Wallach 2008a, 30).

One of the Western popular music genres favored by many Indonesians is rock music. This genre has been known in Indonesia since the 1950s through several foreign films and radio broadcasts (Barendregt et al. 2017, 42). Even though it was starting to become popular among Indonesians, rock music did not have a chance to develop due to Sukarno’s policy of cultural nationalism, which put limits on Western artistic expressions in Indonesia. During his presidency,
Sukarno fought against Western pop music by calling it a social disease and describing the “rock and roll” music of that era with the pejorative expression “ngak-ngik-ngok.” Under the Old Order regime, rock music was banned because it was considered Western neo-colonialist and imperialist, or “nekolim.” For Sukarno, cultural imperialism, like economic and political imperialism, threatened the newly independent nation (Sen and Hill 2007, 166).

The protectionist cultural policies initiated by Sukarno during the Guided Democracy (1959–1966) era ended when Suharto established the New Order regime in 1966. The new cultural policies pursued by Suharto were much more liberal, promising for the future, and directed towards enlightenment, even though the government was authoritarian. Western cultural products, such as pop and rock music, started to flow freely into Indonesia during the Suharto administration (Baulch 2011, 130). Unlike his patriotic predecessors, Suharto did not prevent international music labels from selling their goods to Indonesian consumers, nor did he prevent Indonesian musicians from imitating various international styles. Under the New Order regime, the government’s control of arts and media was inconsistent, but Indonesia generally enjoyed a thriving and vibrant artistic landscape—including music. As a result, rock music developed rapidly in the 1970s (c.f., Lockard 1998; Wallach 2008a; Sumrahadi 2017).

In 1988, the Indonesian government enacted laws and regulations that made it possible to deregulate the media industry in Indonesia. Several private advertising-funded television stations earned their operating licenses, and multinational record labels were invited to develop the repertoires of local music (Baulch 2007, 39). As a result, the Indonesian popular music industry grew. In 1995, MTV began airing on Indonesian national television (Sutton 2003, 324). This development dramatically shaped a new generation of Indonesian recording artists. The MTV broadcasts through national television turned out to be essential for promoting some international music albums and increasing Indonesians’ exposure to a vast number of Western recording artists and new global youth-oriented genres such as hip-hop, R&B, alternative rock, and heavy metal (Wallach 2003, 57–58). During this era, the so-called “underground music” scene also emerged, marked by the presence of some local rock bands such as Sucker Head, Rotor, Jasad, Betrayer, Purgatory, Tengkorak, Burgerkill,
Puppen, Noin Bullet, Koil, and Superman Is Dead. According to Luvaas, these underground bands emerged as an expression of dissatisfaction with the absence of “rock and roll rebellious energy” in the mainstream Indonesian pop-rock bands (Luvaas 2009, 250–251).

Most Indonesian underground bands generally played rebellious rock music with loud rhythms, and their music often contained explicit political messages. One of the reasons for this is that they had more freedom to do so compared to the era of the New Order administration, in which musicians who wrote protest lyrics against the government could end up in jail (Wallach 2008a, 15–16). Since its inception, Indonesian underground bands—especially punk—have promoted songs which attack the corruption and brutality of the Suharto administration. Although punk musicians were as politically divided as their Western counterparts, most of Indonesia’s punk musicians placed their movement within the context of the struggle against Suharto (Wallach 2008b, 101).

The term “underground” has been used to describe a cluster of rock music subgenres and a method of producing and distributing some cultural objects. In contemporary Indonesia, “underground” is an umbrella term encompassing various imported genres of rock music on the loud side of the spectrum. These genres—called aliran in Indonesia—include punk, hardcore, death metal, grindcore, brutal death, black metal, grunge, indies, industrial, and gothic. The word “underground” also refers to the methods of production and distribution as opposed to the mainstream commercial music industry. The grassroots, small-scale nature of underground cultural production is discursively linked to a philosophy of “do-it-yourself” (DIY) independence. In other words, the artists reject the idea of “selling out” to major labels and celebrate artistic autonomy, idealism, community, and resistance to commercial pressures (c.f., Wallach 2003, 55; Wallach 2008a, 36–37).

Underground music in Indonesia has been stigmatized by an association with certain “immoral behaviors”, such as the consumption of narcotics and alcohol or pre-marital sexual intercourse. Its loud music is often blamed as a source of violence (Saefullah 2017, 268). This stigma has been available since the rise of underground music in the Western world. In Western academic literature, the term “underground” is expressed in connection with the study of subcultures (Cohen 1972; Thornton 1995) and is used in academic literature for
the first time in texts on youth delinquency (Kerouac 1958; Matza 1961; Matza and Sykes 1961).

Hebdige, for example, discusses the “subterranean values” in juvenile delinquency and subcultural ideology. Along with analyzing the more subtle forms of subversion, Hebdige elaborates on the nature of underground values that establish some contradictions. Expressions of underground values, in some cases, are identified with violent machismo and drug abuse (Hebdige 2002). This negative image is reflected in several underground music genres, such as heavy metal, grunge, and punk (Walser 1993; Arnett 1996; Weinstein 2000). Nevertheless, from the womb of this underground music, what is known as “Islamist music” emerged in the Indonesian popular music scene.

Islamist Voice in the Underground Music Scene

The development of Islamist music in the scene of Indonesian underground music is closely related to the trend of hijrah among young and middle-class urban Muslims—including musicians, artists, and celebrities—in the last two decades. The term “hijrah” comes from Arabic, meaning “migration” or “journey”. In the Islamic tradition, this term refers to the journey of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD to escape the oppression of the Quraish infidels. Unlike this historical meaning, the term hijrah in contemporary Indonesian Islam refers to individual transformation from a less religious person into a more pious one or a process by which a Muslim individual strives to become a better Muslim and leave behind an un-Islamic lifestyle for a more Islamic lifestyle.

Hijrah, in this sense, can be taken as a form of religious conversion, especially the intra-religious conversion, namely the process whereby an individual makes a significant, renewed commitment to their existing faith traditions, the reconnection and intensification of practices within a religious tradition, or the change of an individual or a group from one community to another within a major tradition (Rambo 1993, 13; Hervieu-Léger 1999, 120–125; Galonnier 2022, 94). The intra-religious conversion requires acceptance of a new religious interpretation in contrast to the previous religious understanding (Zulkifli 2016, 303). This kind of conversion can be called a “born-again” or “twice-born”—an individual who has been born and raised into a faith or tradition from birth but then undergoes a “rebirth” within it later in life (Gilliat-Ray 1999, 316 ).
As a form of religious conversion, *hijrah* can transform an individual’s life, which includes a change in beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviors, identities, and communities. The results of this self-transformation would ultimately include changes in all areas of life to a greater or lesser degree (c.f., Berger 1967, 50–51; Snow and Machalek 1984, 170; Radford 2015, 3–4; Katznelson and Rubin 2016, 3). Those changes are commonly apparent in a Muslim’s choice of dress, such as women who previously did not wear a headscarf but then choose to wear a headscarf or men who previously wore trousers below the ankles (*isbāl*) but then prefer to wear trousers above the ankles (*sirwāl*) and grow a long beard (*liḥyah*). The *hijrah* is also indicated by the popularity of using Arabic nicknames or changing Javanese names to Arabic ones. Some Muslims even leave their jobs or professions to follow what they call a “*hijrah kāffah*” (c.f., Wahib, 2017; Sunesti et al., 2018; Annisa, 2018).

The *hijrah* phenomenon occurring in recent years was triggered by, among other things, the wave of Islamization and the penetration of Islamist and neo-fundamentalist movements in the social, cultural, and political life of post-New Order Indonesia. The term ‘Islamism’ here mainly refers to the ideology that employs Islam as a tool for political actions. Islamism claims to recreate a true Islamic society, not simply by imposing sharia law but also by establishing an Islamic State through various political means. Examples of Islamist movements are the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir. In contrast, neo-fundamentalism is less concerned with purely political issues targeted by Islamists and rather focuses on the spirituality of individual believers. Salafis and Tablighi Jamaat fall into this category (Boubekeur and Roy 2012, 3–5).

Many researchers have discovered that since the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, Islamist and neo-fundamentalist movements have been taking a more significant role in public life in Indonesia. In the political realm, this phenomenon is marked by the emergence of parties with an Islamic ideology in national politics, demanding the re-enactment of the Jakarta Charter and fighting for the implementation of Islamic sharia in the legal system and government through parliamentary channels (Azra 2004; Platzdasch 2009; Hilmy 2009; Tanuwidjaja, 2010). In the cultural realm, this phenomenon is characterized by the strengthening of Islamic symbols and the growth of new Islamic-based institutions and lifestyles, which are dominated by expressions of militant Islamism (Hasan 2009). In the socio-religious
realm, this phenomenon is marked by the emergence of conservative
groups that campaign for the implementation of Islamic law, raising
the flag of *jihad*, attacking minorities, and calling for the duty of *amr ma'raf nahy munkar* (enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong)
in public spaces (Zada 2002; Jamhari and Jahroni 2004; Abuza 2007;
Nashir 2007; Menchik, 2014). These conservative groups, which are
morally austere and possess an intolerant attitude towards minorities,
are increasingly gaining prominence at the grassroots level (Feillard
& Madinier 2011) and even encompassing some mainstream Islamic
organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah (Wahid
2009). Some observers call this phenomenon a “conservative turn” (Van

The *hijrah* wave among musicians cannot be separated from the
deepening influence of Islamist and neo-fundamentalist movements.
Many Indonesian musicians made a decision to *hijrah* after conducting
some interactions with Islamist and neo-fundamentalist networks such
as Salafis, Tablighi Jamaat, Muslim Brotherhood, Jemaah Tarbiyah, and
Hizb ut-Tahrir. For example, musicians such as Irfan Sembiring (Rotor),
Derry Sulaiman (Betrayer), Sakti (Sheila on 7), Reza (Noah), and Yukie
(Pas Band) decided to *hijrah* after their deliberate encounters with the
Tablighi Jamaat activists (Tirto Online 2018). Other musicians such as
Alfi Chaniago (The Upstairs), Madmor (Purgatory), Fani (Innocenti),
Reda Samudera (Speaker First), Agus Sasongko (Media Distorsi), and
Andri Ashari (Hospital) determined to *hijrah* after some interactions
with the Salafi network (Nismara 2015). Several other musicians,
such as Aik (The Forty's Accident), Ombat (Tengkorak), and Richard
Stephen Gosal (Stompkin), decided to *hijrah* after coming into contact
with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jemaah Tarbiyah, the Hizbut Tahrir
Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI).

The path of *hijrah* undertaken by these musicians has, in turn,
changed their life orientations and worldviews. However, these
changes are not monolithic, and they vary according to the ideological
framework of each Islamist movement that manages their *hijrah*
process. Musicians who decided to *hijrah* through the Salafi network
tend to abandon music completely and forbid it. They tend to switch
to other professions—generally to the business sectors—which are
considered *ḥalāl* and do not conflict with the Salafi-style Islamic
doctrine. They also changed their fashion style and appearance, such
as wearing trousers above the ankles and growing a long beard like all Salafi activists. This tendency is exemplified in the behaviours of Reda Samudera (Speaker First), Mohammad Kautsar Hikmat (Noah), and Ahmad Zarkasy (Purgatory).

The musicians who decided to hijrah through the Tablighi Jamaat network generally focus on da’wa activities in their post-hijrah life trajectory. They are prone to leave their former professions or work as musicians, but they do not leave music at once. On certain occasions, they have utilized music as a medium for da’wa. Some of them continue to producing albums or singles but their work now contains powerful religious messages. They also alter their clothing styles and appearances by wearing robes and turbans, resembling the Tablighi Jamaat activists in general. This tendency can be observed in figures such as Irfan Sembiring (Rotor), Derry Sulaiman (Betrayer), and Sakti Ari Seno (Sheila on 7).

The musicians who decided to hijrah through the Muslim Brotherhood, Jemaah Tarbiyah, HTI, or FPI networks remain active in music. Even though they have decided to emigrate, they believe that music is not in opposition to Islam. Instead of leaving music, they continue to perform activities like metalheads, punkers, or scenesters in general, such as releasing albums, holding music performances (gigs), and creating music magazines (zines). However, they no longer practice music as an aesthetic experience or entertainment but as a tool of resistance and a medium for preaching, especially in the underground subcultural arena. By maintaining the aggressive character of underground music, they perform their music as a counter-cultural discourse for their former community and a code of resistance against the Western cultural hegemony. The music they create often contains various ideological messages that are commonly echoed by Islamist groups in the lyrics of their songs, which raise themes surrounding resistance against the West, anti-Zionist sentiment, the virtue of jihād fī sabīlillāh, the implementation of sharia and the establishment of Islamic Caliphate. This approach can be seen as taken by figures such as M. Hariadi Nasution (Tengkorak), Richard Stephen Gosai/Thufail Al Ghifari (Rapper, Stompkin), and Aditya Rahman Yani (The Forty’s Accident).

Many factors can explain why these musicians chose different Islamist movements and took different hijrah trajectories including their social
networks, biographical backgrounds, and individual preferences. The social networks which connect the musicians to Islamist movements are essential in leading them to join a particular Islamist movement. As social movement theory argues, social ties to a movement are critical for the process of joining. The critical role of social networks—both formal and informal—is prominent and does not generate significant criticism from social movement researchers (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). Many studies suggest that interpersonal relationships or “knowing someone already involved in social movement activities” is one of the strongest predictors of recruitment into a social movement membership (Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 1986).

Other important factors are biographical backgrounds and individual preferences. Musicians who struggle purely with personal-moral problems generally tend to choose a neo-fundamentalist movement such as the Tablighi Jamaat or Salafis. In contrast, musicians who struggle with socio-political problems—in addition to personal-moral problems—are prone to join a political Islamist movement. Some musicians such as Irfan Sembiring, Derry Sulaiman, Sakti Ari Seno, Reda Samudera, Mohammad Kautsar Hikmat, and Achmad Zarkasy do not seem concerned with socio-political issues, as is obvious in their lives and works in the pre-hijrah phase. Therefore, the neo-fundamentalist group’s apolitical, religious discourse tends to be more attractive to them.

In contrast, musicians such as M. Hariadi Nasution, Richard Stephen Gosal/Thufail Al Ghifari, and Aditya Rahman Yani are musicians who struggled intensely with socio-political issues as is apparent in their lives and works in their pre-hijrah phase. Even the genres of music they play—such as grindcore, hardcore-punk, and rap—are historically and thematically synonymous with the spirit of rebellion, resistance, and anti-establishment, all of which are inspired by left-wing movements. Therefore, the ideological discourse offered by political Islamist movements tends to be more attractive to them. Influenced by political Islamist movements, these musicians eventually played an essential role in developing Islamist music in the Indonesian underground scene.

One of the key actors who played an essential role in the growth of the Islamic underground movement is M. Hariadi Nasution, better known as Ombat. He is the founder and vocalist of Tengkorak, an underground band that first introduced the grindcore subgenre to
Indonesia. Grindcore is a genre of extreme metal music that emerged in Birmingham, England in the 1980s. The band considered a pioneer of this genre is Napalm Death (c.f., Overell 2010; Overell 2014). Tengkorak is often dubbed the Indonesian version of Napalm Death by fans of underground rock music in Indonesia. This band has released one mini-album entitled *It’s a Proud to Vomit Him* (1995) and three full albums entitled *Konsentrasi Massa* (Mass Concentration) (1999), *Darurat Sipil* (Civil Emergency) (2002) and *Agenda Suram* (Gloomy Agenda) (2007).

Like most underground musicians, Ombat previously practiced a brutal rock and roll lifestyle and supported the Left movement in the past. Ombat admits he has gone through the “ignorance” (*jāhilīyyah*) phase like most metalheads in the underground subculture scene. In an interview with Putrawan Yuliandri, Ombat stated: “We used to follow the devil too…Your uncle knows how brutal I was in college” (Yuliandri 2012). Ombat realized that the metal music he had been involved in had kept him away from Islamic values. This awareness emerged when Ombat met a foreign journalist who wanted to interview him regarding the development of metal music in Indonesia. The journalist told Ombat there was no need to deploy combat troops and military equipments to occupy Indonesia; it is enough to colonize Indonesia with music. The journalist then encouraged Ombat to develop heavy metal music as a means of colonialism in Indonesia. After realizing that the journalist’s attitude demeaned Indonesian Muslims, Ombat became obsessed with shifting metal music from a means of colonialism to a tool of resistance. Ever since then, Ombat started including jihadist and anti-Zionist themes in his music and modifying the heavy metal “three-finger salute” symbol to the “one-finger salute,” whose philosophy is to remind the underground community and its fans of the essence of *Tawhid* (Hidayatullah 2014, 340). On another occasion, Ombat explained that his change of mind occurred after he met Napalm Death members who explained the satanic culture behind the three-finger salute symbol:

> We once performed together with Napalm Death, a grindcore band from England. Then, we chat with the members. Then one of the members, Mitch Harris, the guitarist, tells us, “We take pictures like this [three-finger salute—red].” Then he said, “Why do you greet me like that? Do you understand what it means?”
“I don’t know,” I said. “It’s the metal salute.”
“Oh no,” he said. “It is a satanic culture,” he said. “This one is like this: goat’s head, devil’s horn.”
“Isn’t it metal?”
“No,” he said. No wonder I see he never greets like that. It seemed that he has understood. So, we look for the literature on the internet; there’s a lot of it all, and it’s valid. We got valid data. There are books, too. It turns out that such a greeting is one of the rituals for devil worship. Ever since then, we are restless. We have to fix this, just for us first, our band. (Septiawan 2014)

After hearing the conspiracy theory about the satanic character of metal music, Ombat experienced what Jaspers called a “moral shock”. Moral shock generally occurs when an unexpected event or a piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person so that he is inclined toward political actions. Moral shock is often the first step toward the recruitment process into social movements (Jasper 1997, 106). Ever since then, Ombat started to believe that the underground culture he had practiced for so long was part of the ghazw al-fikr (war of thoughts) waged by the West to undermine the morality of Indonesian Muslim youth (Saefullah 2020, 326). Ombat began to realize that the metal music he had been involved in had obstructed him from the values of Islam that he embraces. He undertook what Lofland and Stark call “religious seeking,” a process in which an individual searches “for some satisfactory system of religious meaning to interpret and resolve his discontent” (Lofland and Stark 1965, 868). It was in this process of religious seeking that Ombat interacted with some right-wing Islamic groups such as the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Forum Umat Islam (FUI), and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). His contact with these Islamist movements has, in turn, changed his worldview radically. Therefore, he began employing metal music as a site of resistance. This voice of resistance is reflected in Tengkorak’s third album, Agenda Suram (2007) which includes many themes which can be seen in the song titles such as “Jihad”, “Boycott Israel”, “United States of Asu”, “Zionist Exaggeration”, “Hisbullah”, “Dajjal Dunia” and so on. In the song “Jihad”, Tengkorak expresses anti-Zionist rhetoric explicitly and the song calls on young Muslims to wage jihad against Zionists:

Jihad...
To whom it may concern
which testify to Syahadat,
Israel had declared
a war by throwing words
Let’s fight in the name of Allah
Let’s fight in the name of Allah
Jihād fī sabīlillāh
Jihād fī sabīlillāh
Jihād fī sabīlillāh

Ombat also often throws out revolutionary Islamic discourses at music events. During a concert at the Jakcloth 2012, for example, Ombat delivered a discourse on Islam kāffah and the application of sharia on the stage:

Assalāmu’alaikum wa raḥmatullāh wa barakātuh... Okay, before the first song, it seems our country will not be in order if the law does not use Islamic sharia law. Do you agree? Are you ready? We sell all this world for the ultimate truth. Brother! So Islam has already perfectly (kāffah) descended to earth, right? So we no longer need liberal frills; what is so odd? Islam is Islam, do you agree? One, lā ilāha illallāh. (Hidayatullah 2014).

In addition to incorporating various Islamist messages into his music, Ombat initiated the Salam Satu Jari movement—often called the One Finger Movement—in the underground music scene. Ombat first declared this movement in the Urban Garage Festival, an underground music concert held in March 2010 in South Jakarta. This event consisted of several invited underground bands across genres.
considered to share the same Islamic vision and ideology. Unlike common underground music concerts, the Urban Garage Festival is more like a metalhead-style sermon that is characterized by *da’wa* rhetoric and Islamic symbols. Throughout the show, the beat of rock music that is blared across the stage does occasionally intersperse with some shouts of “*Allāhu Akbar*”, greetings of “*Assalāmu’alaikum*”, and the words “*Ashhadu an lā ilāha illallāh wa ashhadu anna Muḥammadan Rasūlullāh*”. The lyrics of the songs performed by the bands generally contain Islamic messages and anti-Zionist rhetoric. Even so, the appearance of these bands is still consistent with the usual style of metal music performances, characterized by some loud guitar distortions, thick and fast drum beats, growling vocals, and distinctive choreography such as slam dancing, moshing, and headbanging.

The Urban Garage Festival has been possible due to the support of the *Berandalan Puritan* (Puritan Hooligans) led by Thufail Al Ghifari, a converted Muslim rapper who used to be active in the Bekasi underground music scene with the rap-metal band Stompkin. Thufail was born in the early 1980s in Makassar to a Protestant missionary family. His real name is Richard Stephen Gosal. While active in the underground music scene, Gosal began to engage with some ideas of socialism and nihilism. Of his many rock music influences, Marlyn Manson and Rage Against The Machine—a socialist rock band from the US—are the two most influential musicians/bands to Gosal’s musical development. His penchant for Marlyn Manson brought him...
to Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical thoughts. The combination
of Manson and Nietzsche encouraged Gosal to be acquainted with
nihilism. According to his confession, nihilism made him doubt the
existence of God, and it led him to the spirit of atheism. Ever since
then he recalls, “I have experienced wild thinking where I am no
longer afraid of heaven and hell” (Al Ghifari 2019a). In the 2000s,
Gosal made many contacts with leftist political groups, especially the
People’s Democratic Party (PRD). Through his interactions with leftist
communities, he expanded his reading towards socialist thoughts and
Western philosophical discourses. The free life he had expereined had
not only made his thinking more liberal but it also switched his lifestyle.
In the perspective of his friends at that time, he used to be known as a
brutal child, a loudmouth, and a drunkard. In the memoir he wrote in
2014, Gosal admitted that he spent much of his youth using marijuana
and alcohol:

> When we spent our single years, we were rolling marijuana on the side
> of the road, and glasses of alcohol were constantly circulating among our
> close friends. We swallowed the rest of the coffee powder as the night
> greets the arrival of cold dawn. At that time, Bebek [nickname of Ridwan
> A. Wijaya, vocalist of the punk band Garputala] had become one of the
> coordinators who led the punk barricades between corporate buildings
> along Bulak Kapal, Tambun, Cibitung to Cikarang and Karawang streets.
> (Gosal 2014).

While actively playing music with Stompkin around 1999–2001,
Gosal produced work that contain blasphemy against God and religion.
However, it was through this musical activity that Gosal was attracted
to Islam. His band often performed “Wake Up” by Rage Against the
Machine. The song’s lyrics include the lines: “You know they murdered
X and tried to blame it on Islam.” Gosal was interested about the letter
X being mentioned in the song. The song’s lyrics discuss the conspiracy
to assassinate Malcolm X, a black Muslim, anti-racism leader being
famous as a da’wa activist in the United States. Having read Malcolm
X’s journey, Gosal became curious about Islam, and he endeavored to
find out more about it:

> That is when I started thinking about exploring Islam. Is it a barbaric
> religion? Is it a wild Kedar Tribe? Or a group of wild horses? Many (people)
> say that. I want to discover who, what, why, and what Islam is. From that
> story, I learned that there was a figure named Prophet Muhammad (peace
> be upon Him). Finally, from there, I decided to find out who Muhammad


was. Who was Muhammad? What is Islam? I am interested in Islam. (Al Ghifari 2019a)

Since his conversion to Islam, Gosal changed his name to Thufail Al Ghifari. He continues his religious seeking by attending several halaqah and liqa’ held by Tarbiyah activists. His contact with the Tarbiyah movement was made possible by his acquaintance with Ali Utrujjah, a Robis activist known as a Bekasi rapper (Al Ghifari 2019b). Besides studying Islam in the Tarbiyah community, Al Ghifari also gains insights into Islam from other Islamist movements such as FPI, MMI, and HTI (Al Ghifari 2019c). From these groups, Al Ghifari engages with the Islamic thoughts of Hasan Al-Bana, Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azam, and Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani. His encounter with this Islamist discourse has shifted his worldview. Thus, Al Ghifari has released several albums of hip-hop music with an Islamist style—as is obvious in Thufail Al Ghifari’s trilogy of albums: Syair Perang Panjang (2004), Dari Atas Satu Tanah Tempat Kita Berpijak (2006), Jurnal Untuk Para Singa Tauhid (2009). His music and lyrics contain messages of anti-Zionism, jihad, an Islamic caliphate, and so on. His support for the Islamic caliphate, for example, is clearly written in the lyric of the song entitled “Dari Gerakan ke Negara” (From Movement to the State):

Built from the basic ingredients of a movement
A movement toward change

When guerrillas have to appear at the surface of the mainstream
So convey this greeting to every da’wah Molotov
The ranks of the Islamic revolution began to manifest
Even if you have to be threatened by thousands of hell police

At the communication point of the Heaven assembly cells
Reconstructed from Medina’s root energy
Built from the basic ingredients of a movement
An unforgettable oasis from the shadow of Uhud to FIS in Algeria

This is how time has taught us well
To never believe in the ranks of disbelievers and hypocrites
On the stakes of democracy and the shackles of casuistic confrontation
The threat of parasitic democracy and political monopoly

From Sabra Shatilla stocks to Bosnia Herzegovina
History has forced us to rearrange the agenda of human struggle
At the start of the movement to the state
Then, it ends in the rise of a glorious civilization
Islamic caliphate, Islam will surely triumph again.
Like Ombat, Al Ghifari also transformed into a Muslim activist after studying Islam from the Islamist movements that supervised his *hijrah* process. The changes that occurred in Al Ghifari are even more radical than those of Ombat. He separates himself from his former community, and Al Ghifari attacks those whose values and beliefs are different from his new worldview. This radicalization process was made possible because of his interactions with two separate but intersecting variants of Islamist discourse, namely the Ikhwani-Qutb and the Salafi-Jihadi. Initially, Al Ghifari studied in the Ikhwani circle and admired Sayyid Qutb’s thoughts but then he followed the Salafi-Jihadi figures such as Abdullah Azzam and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. From these figures, he absorbed the doctrine of *al-walā’ wa al-barā’*, a doctrine which became the basis for the Salafi-Jihadi to develop a wall of separation between the saved group (*al-firqah al-nājiyah*) and the deviant group (*al-firqah al-ḍalālah*).

In addition to creating songs with Islamist messages, Al Ghifari also formed the Ghuraba Militant Tauhid (GMT) community—also known as “Underground Tauhid” (UGT). The community, established on June 1st, 2011, at the Al-Azhar Grand Mosque, Jakarta, prioritizes activities to develop *da’wa* strategies in underground subcultures, and it focuses on implanting the Tarbiyah values in their community members. GMT/UGT’s *da’wa* activities receive support from several Islamic organizations, such as the Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought and Civilizations (INSISTS) and the Indonesian Young Intellectual and Ulama Council (MIUMI). These two organizations are managed by Muslim intellectuals who have been aggressively attacking the discourse of secularism, liberalism, and pluralism, such as Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi, Adian Husaini, Adnin Armas, and Bachtiar Nasir (Underground Tauhid 2012).

The birth of GMT is supported by Aditya Rahman Yani (Aik), the vocalist of Surabaya-based hardcore punk band The Fourty’s Accident (TFA). Inspired by punk rock bands such as Rancid, Bouncing Soul, and Operation Ivy, TFA initially raised issues of socio-political criticism like other punk bands. However, after experiencing a “cognitive opening” due to his reading on some Islamist discourses, Aik thus decided to *hijrah* and turn TFA into a weapon of resistance and a medium of *da’wa*. As Wiktorowicz points out, “cognitive opening” often arises in a moment of crisis. A crisis can produce a cognitive opening that shakes
confidence in a previously accepted creed and it renders an individual to be more receptive to the possibility of alternative views and perspectives (Wiktorowicz 2005, 20). Aik determined to hijrah after listening to Aa Gym’s (Abdullah Gymnastiar) preaching and witnessing the death of his older brother, Jack, in 2007. Jack was previously a TFA vocalist who had decided to hijrah and served as a da’wa activist prior to Aik making a similar decision. In an interview Aik stated, “Jack died in 2007. He brought much inspiration for me to change from a religious standpoint... Since Jack died, I was inspired to make TFA a medium for preaching around early 2012” (Hidayatullah 2015).

After deciding to hijrah, Aik began to acquire Islamic insight from some Tarbiyah activists through ḥalāqah activities, in which he regularly participated. After reading several pieces of Islamist literature, Aik concluded that the Qur’an and Sunnah provided complete answers to problems and challenges in life. He says, “All life’s problems, the solution is already in the Al-Qur’an and Hadith” (Yani 2017, 43). Ever since then, Aik revamped his music into a means of resistance against Western culture, as is evident in TFA’s latest album, Against the Stream. Aik says, “As the title of the last album, Against the Stream, we want to fight against the currents of Western culture that have entered the underground world” (Hidayatullah 2015). This album contains several songs such as “Small Protest Against Mass Media Lies in Reporting Islamic Issues”, “Israel is A Fascist Nation that We Must Hate Together and Forever”, “Muslim Hardcore Is What We Stand For”, and “It is Not Difficult to Choose Islam as a Solution for All of Your Problems”. The lyrics for the last song include:

Sure, you know what we are talking about
A religion that some of you believe in
I say that you are in a good choice
‘Cause all of your problems can be solved by this
Islam is the right choice!

In addition to expressing the spirit of religious resistance and rebellion through music, Aik operates zines (music magazines) as a medium for da’wa. Prior to hijrah, Aik used to be known as a punker (a punk musician) who pioneered the publication of zines in the Surabaya punk music scene, namely the Sub Chaos Zine (SCZ). After hijrah, he stopped producing the zine for a while. However, after studying “fiqh al-da’wa” from several murabīs who guided his hijrah journey,
he reproduced zines as a medium for da’wa using a new name, the Sa’i Zine (SZ). Carrying the slogan “Media Indie Aktivis Dakwah Islam” (Indie Media for Islamic Da’wa Activists), SZ covers issues regarding the condition of the Islamic world, the discourse of Islamic revival, the ideals of Islamic unity, the defense of Palestine, anti-Zionism, and criticism of various Western ideologies such as secularism, liberalism, and pluralism. This magazine also covers some issues such as Islamic lifestyles, the growth of Islamic punk and metal bands in Indonesia, and critiques of secular punk and metal bands. In general, the Islamic discourse presented by SZ is similar to the Islamic discourse promoted by the Tarbiyah and Muslim Brotherhood groups. From the first issue, this magazine has explicitly discussed the thoughts of Hasan al-Banna—the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood—on Islam as a comprehensive religion.

Figure 3. Several Sa’i Zine editions are produced by Aik after hijrah.
Source: Personal Documentation.

Besides Ombat, Al Ghifari, and Aik, there are many other musicians, bands, and communities who have been playing an essential role in the growth of the Islamic underground movement in Indonesia, including Salameh Hamzah, Ali Utrujjah, The Roots of Madinah, Barat Hijau.
Indonesia, The Last Samurai Syuhada, Melody Maker, Ketapel Jihad, Punk Muslim, Punk Hijrah, and Hijra Core. They are musicians who have been engaging with the Islamist movement, are influenced by Islamist ideology, and are then promoting this ideology in new ways that are different from the old Islamist generation. They distribute their musical works via digital platforms such as ReverbNation, Spotify, Joox, and iTunes. They also spread religious messages on social media such as Instagram, TikTok, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. In their hands, the Islamist ideology is transformed from being a political movement to a cultural movement while maintaining the imperatives of classical Islamism with respect to the establishment of an Islamic order.

The emergence of Islamist music and its subculture in Indonesia brings forth a different picture from the “post-Islamist turn” in wide parts of the Islamic world. Bayat argues that post-Islamism is both a critique of Islamism from within and an alternative project to go beyond it. Post-Islamism appeared to oppose Islamist religious politics (Bayat 2013, 25–26). According to Bayat, post-Islamism reflects a qualitative shift towards a project that emphasizes religiosity, individual choices, human rights, and plurality instead of a singular authoritative voice (Bayat 2007, 10–11). Boubekeur and Roy describe post-Islamism as a change in strategy, tactics, and views of Islamist activists from state politics to society, and the absence of aspiration to establish an Islamic State marks such change. Whereas Islamism marks the overt-politicization of religion, post-Islamism seeks new autonomous spaces and means of expression beneath party politics. According to Boubekeur and Roy, post-Islamist society is characterized by the emergence of “a younger post-Islamist generation which has used micro-politics via Facebook and social networking, not to talk about the Islamic State but to join global discourses on freedom and pluralist societies” (Boubekeur and Roy 2012, 13).

LeVine, in his study of “Heavy Metal Islam” in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), observes the development of post-Islamism through the emergence of several musicians, bands, and fans of extreme music—such as death metal, gangsta rap, and hardcore punk—who express resistance to dominant values in their own areas. According to LeVine, this trend is a manifestation of post-Islamism. This young generation employs metal music as a means of counter-culture against a set of Islamist cultural norms which put more emphasis on obligations
rather than individual rights. They take a radically different approach from traditional Islamists in understanding politics and reject the Islamists’ conservative views on religion and morality. Through music, they fight in favor of autonomy, democracy, and tolerance and reject their leaders’ hypocrisy, corruption, and authoritarianism. These musicians and bands, which LeVine calls “Heavy Metal Islam”, have been dedicating their resources to creating an open and democratic alternative system in a bottom-up approach, against the interests of political, economic, and religious elites in their own countries as well as the interests of the United States and other global powers (LeVine 2008a, 2008b, 2012).

LeVine’s description of the Heavy Metal Islam subculture in MENA as a representation of post-Islamism is very different from the Islamic Underground Movement that has been developing in Indonesia in recent years. Rather than reflecting the phenomenon of the “post-Islamist turn”, the emergence of the Islamic Underground Movement initiated by several musicians in Indonesia does represent the phenomenon of the “Islamist turn” on the scene of Indonesian popular music. Although both variants of the Islamic Metal subculture make use of music as a counter-cultural tool against the dominant culture, what they consider as the dominant culture is indeed very different. On the one hand, to the Heavy Metal Islam subculture in MENA, the dominant culture that is the locus of their resistance is conservative Islamist culture. Whereas to the Islamic Underground Movement in Indonesia, the dominant culture that is the target of their resistance is Western secular culture.

The differences between Heavy Metal Islam in MENA and the Islamic Underground Movement in Indonesia in identifying which one is the dominant culture must be seen in the different socio-cultural contexts between the two regions/countries. On the one hand, the Heavy Metal Islam subculture in MENA emerged as a consequence of the disillusionment felt by the younger generation of Muslims’ with the shackles of Islamist cultural norms. Amid the hegemony of an anti-expressive Islamist regime, this young generation is striving to fight against a set of dominant cultural codes through music, entertainment, and lifestyle in order to embrace individual autonomy and freedom. On the other hand, the Islamic Underground Movement in Indonesia emerged as a combination of Muslim youth’s boredom with the secular lifestyle inherited from the New Order regime and the Islamization
process in various aspects of post-Reformation Indonesian society. For the Islamic Underground musicians in Indonesia, which had previously been secularized, an Islamist worldview can provide answers and certainty to the life crisis they are experiencing. Thus, the Islamic Underground subculture in Indonesia took a different trajectory from the Heavy Metal Islam subculture in MENA. While the latter reflects a shift from Islamism to post-Islamism, the former represents a shift from secularism to post-secularism.

Conclusion

Members of the punk subculture in various parts of the world often utter the slogan: “Punk is not dead”. The emergence of underground Islamic movements that articulate Islamist ideology through music, art, and subcultural practices does depict the same story concerning the fate of contemporary Islamist movements: “Islamism is not dead”. In opposition to Roy’s thesis discussing the end of Islamism and the failure of political Islam (Roy 1994), this study discovers that the shift from the political to the cultural arena in contemporary Islamism does not automatically imply what Roy and other researchers call “post-Islamism.” Instead of abandoning the state-political orientation of classical Islamism, the Islamic underground musicians employ popular music as a medium of da‘wa to spread the Islamist public agenda and as a counter-cultural means to attack the values of Western modernism and secularism. In many cases, they tend to use popular music as a cultural approach or strategy to promote the Islamist ideology towards the urban Muslim youth. In other words, the new Islamist generation is not abandoning politics but pursuing politics through functionally differentiated spaces, taking advantage of existing and new social and cultural practices—often far more effectively than the state can achieve. In a nutshell, the claim of the emergence of a post-Islamist society, which has been the dominant view among some contemporary scholars, remains empirically the subject of open questions for further study.
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Submission of Articles

*Studia Islamika*, published three times a year since 1994, is a bilingual (English and Arabic), peer-reviewed journal, and specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular and Southeast Asian Islamic studies in general. The aim is to provide readers with a better understanding of Indonesia and Southeast Asia’s Muslim history and present developments through the publication of articles, research reports, and book reviews.

The journal invites scholars and experts working in all disciplines in the humanities and social sciences pertaining to Islam or Muslim societies. Articles should be original, research-based, unpublished and not under review for possible publication in other journals. All submitted papers are subject to review of the editors, editorial board, and blind reviewers. Submissions that violate our guidelines on formatting or length will be rejected without review.

Articles should be written in American English between approximately 10,000-15,000 words including text, all tables and figures, notes, references, and appendices intended for publication. All submission must include 150 words abstract and 5 keywords. Quotations, passages, and words in local or foreign languages should
be translated into English. *Studia Islamika* accepts only electronic submissions. All manuscripts should be sent in Ms. Word to: http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/studia-islamika.

All notes must appear in the text as citations. A citation usually requires only the last name of the author(s), year of publication, and (sometimes) page numbers. For example: (Hefner 2009a, 45; Geertz 1966, 114). Explanatory footnotes may be included but should not be used for simple citations. All works cited must appear in the reference list at the end of the article. In matter of bibliographical style, *Studia Islamika* follows the American Political Science Association (APSA) manual style, such as below:


Arabic romanization should be written as follows:

Letters: ' , b, t, th, j, h, kh, d, dh, r, z, s, sb, š, d, t, g, gh, f, q, l, m, n, h, w, y. Short vowels: a, i, u. long vowels: ā, ī, ū. Diphthongs: aw, ay. Tā marbūtā: t. Article: al-. For detail information on Arabic Romanization, please refer the transliteration system of the Library of Congress (LC) Guidelines.
مجلة علمية دولية محكمة تصدر عن مركز دراسات الإسلام والمجتمع (PPIM) بجامعة شريف هداية الله الإسلامية الحكومية بجاكرتا، تعتنى بدراسة الإسلام في إندونيسيا خاصة وفي جنوب شرق آسيا عامة. وتستهدف المجلة نشر البحوث العلمية الأصلية والقضايا المعاصرة حول الموضوع، كما ترحب بإسهامات الباحثين أصحاب التخصصات ذات الصلة. وتُخصص جميع الأبحاث المقدمة للمجلة للتحكيم من قبل لجنة مختصة.


مجلة علمية دولية محكمة تصدر (ISSN 0215-0492; E-ISSN: 2355-6145) ستوديا إسلاميكا بجامعة شريف هداية الله الإسلامية الحكومية بجاكرتا، تعنى (PPIM) عن مركز دراسات الإسلام والمجتمع (PPIM) بجامعة شريف هداية الله الإسلامية الحكومية بجاكرتا، تعتنى بدراسة الإسلام في إندونيسيا خاصة وفي جنوب شرق آسيا عامة. وتستهدف المجلة نشر البحوث العلمية الأصلية والقضايا المعاصرة حول الموضوع، كما ترحب بإسهامات الباحثين أصحاب التخصصات ذات الصلة. وتُخصص جميع الأبحاث المقدمة للمجلة للتحكيم من قبل لجنة مختصة.


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ستوديا إسلاميكا
مجلة إندونيسيا للدراسات الإسلامية
السنة الحادي والثالثون، العدد 1، 2024

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أومان فتح الرحمن

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تصميم اللافت:
س. برنكا
سنودي اسلاميًا
Mau'izzat al-Ikhwan and the Knowledge of the Acehnese Past

Amirul Hadi

تحابير الدولة العثمانية لعل القضايا المعقدة
لعُجُم الجاوي 1849-1917 هـ:
دراسة في ضوء وثائق الأرشيف العثماني

أسماء مصطفى توفيق خليل أحمد