Democratic Dilemma of Malay Islamic Party: PAS, Coalition Pattern, and Rising Social Issues
Mohd. Izani Mohd. Zain & Mohd. Daad Mat Din

Contesting Ethnic and Religious Identities in the 2019 Indonesian Elections: Political Polarization in West Kalimantan
Zuly Qodir, Hasee Jubba, & Mega Hidayati

Navigating Against Salafi-Wahhabi Expansion in Malaysia: The Role of State and Society
Kamarulnizam Abdullah

What Makes Islamic Microfinance Islamic? A Case of Indonesia’s Bait al-Mal wa al-Tamwīl
Hyung-Jun Kim & Bambang Hudayana

Restructuring Traditional Islamic Education in Indonesia: Challenges for Pesantren Institution
Ervan Nurrawah & Dedi Wahyudi

review
STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-0492; E-ISSN: 2355-6145) is an international journal published by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University of Jakarta, INDONESIA. It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular, and Southeast Asian Islamic studies in general, and is intended to communicate original researches and current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contributions from scholars of related disciplines. All submitted papers are subject to double-blind review process.

STUDIA ISLAMIKA has been accredited by The Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education, Republic of Indonesia as an academic journal (Decree No. 32a/E/KPT/2017).

STUDIA ISLAMIKA has become a CrossRef Member since year 2014. Therefore, all articles published by STUDIA ISLAMIKA will have unique Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number.

STUDIA ISLAMIKA is indexed in Scopus since 30 May 2015.

Annual subscription rates from outside Indonesia, institution: US$ 75.00 and the cost of a single copy is US$ 25.00; individual: US$ 50.00 and the cost of a single copy is US$ 20.00. Rates do not include international postage and handling.

Please make all payment through bank transfer to: PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia, account No. 101-00-0514550-1 (USD), Swift Code: bmriidja

Harga berlangganan di Indonesia untuk satu tahun, lembaga: Rp. 150.000,-, harga satu edisi Rp. 50.000,-; individu: Rp. 100.000,-, harga satu edisi Rp. 40.000,-. Harga belum termasuk ongkos kirim.

Pembayaran melalui PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, No. Rek: 128-00-0105080-3
Table of Contents

Articles

1  Kamarulnizam Abdullah
Navigating Against
Salafi-Wahabi Expansion in Malaysia:
The Role of State and Society

31  Hyung-Jun Kim & Bambang Hudayana
What Makes Islamic Microfinance Islamic?
A Case of Indonesia’s Bayt al-Māl wa al-Tamwil

55  Ervan Nurtawab & Dedi Wahyudi
Restructuring Traditional
Islamic Education in Indonesia:
Challenges for Pesantren Institution

83  Mohd. Izani Mohd. Zain & Mohd. Daud Mat Din
Democratic Dilemma of Malay Islamic Party:
PAS, Coalition Pattern, and Rising Social Issues

111  Zuly Qodir, Hasse Jubba, & Mega Hidayati
Contesting Ethnic and Religious Identities
in the 2019 Indonesian Elections:
Political Polarization in West Kalimantan

143  Irham
Al-Ta‘lim al-Islāmi al-maftūḥ
lādā KH. Sahal Mahfudz (1937-2014)
Book Review
189  Mardian Sulistyati
Otoritas Keislaman di Indonesia:
Sebuah Pembacaan Ulang

Document
205  Zeen Zaenal Mutagin
Gus Yahya and the NU’s New Path:
Note on the 34th Congress
Kamarulnizam Abdullah

Navigating Against 
Salafi-Wahabi Expansion in Malaysia: 
The Role of State and Society

Abstract: This article argues that Salafi-Wahhabism’s political ideology has major effects on Malaysia’s socio-political orders. It also argues that the levels of resilience to the Salafi-Wahabi expansion are varied between state and society. At the level of society, resilience is weakened by multiple layers of grievances, which produced various effects brought by stages of reformist movements and terrors of neo-Salafi groups. The crucial indicator is its changing characteristics from being accommodative to a defensive one. The increasing tendency of Muslims embracing Salafi-Wahabism is the result of years of indoctrination, transnational Islamist networking, an external source of religious-funded activities, and the politicization of Islam. Yet this has been outweighed by the state’s resilience. Several attributes could explain the state’s ability to resist internal and external sources of radical ideologies, among others, long experience with terror threats, the state’s defined Islam, strong control on religious affairs, and the law enforcement that existed since the colonial periods.

Keywords: Reform Movements, Radical Ideologies, Resilience, Salafi-Wahabism, Malaysia.

Kata kunci: Gerakan Reformasi, Ideologi Radikal, Ketahanan, Salafi-Wahabisme, Malaysia.
Religion is an important part of Malaysian society. It has been embodied under the first tenet of Malaysia’s *Rukun Negara* (National Principles) - Belief in God. It may be modelled after the Indonesia’s Pancasila yet it does not have legal binding nor function as a guiding principle of Malaysia’s nation-building. It is a philosophical declaration to ensure political stability, racial harmony, and tolerance in a multi-racial society.

In Malaysia where Muslim constitutes at least sixty percent of the population, Islam has been the pivotal force of inter and intra-communal relations, political dynamism, threat perception, and foreign policy outlook. Muslims in Malaysia are mostly the ethnic Malays, with small percentage coming from Indians, Chinese, and indigenous people including those from the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak. Islam in the country plays complicated but almost of the time contradictory role - a unifying as well as a dividing factor. Although Malaysia is a multi-racial and multi-religious country where major religions co-exist peacefully, the debates on defending the Malays and their faith continue to dominate the political landscape. That defending role lies in the hand of state.

The Muslim-state relations in Malaysia, particularly on the dominance role of the state itself, has been discussed by several local as well as western scholars like Baharuddin (1996, 2005), Abdullah (2003, 2019), Hamid (2007, 2015), Fernando (2006), and Means (2009) among others, by pointing out how Islam is defined by state and protected by the religious authorities. Islam has been portrayed as a very sensitive issue to be discussed openly and a “controlled variable” whereby the religion is fully protected under the constitution. Islam is the official state faith under the highest law of the country, but its management is a kind of complicated issue. Under its Westminster and federal system, Islamic matters are jealously guarded by the nine sultanates, while the *Yang Dipertuan Agong* (YDP) or the King, whose position is rotated among the nine sultans, is the supreme custodian of the religion at the federal level and in the remaining four states. Malaysian Islam, furthermore, is structurally defined as those subscribed to *sunnah wa al-jamā‘ah* or the Sunni traditions. Hence, any other Muslim sects including the Shi’ism are outlawed in the country and considered deviated from the original teachings of Islam (Al-Atas 2014; Z. Othman, Idris, and Daud 2020). It has the elements of Islam.
Nusantara, where, the it promotes “…gentle, peaceful, tolerant, anti-violent, and able to dialogue with the local culture” (Gaus and Sahrasad 2019, 2). A deviant ideas that incongruent with the state-defined Islam would be subject to prosecution either at state or federal level.

Nonetheless, the global dynamism has also challenged the way Islam is interpreted in Malaysia. The advent of information technology, the contending debates offered by the foreign religiously inclined terror groups, and the expanding influence of Salafi reform ideas, arguably affect the domineering role of state in its relations with the Muslims. State’s protective role has been questioned. Consequently, the Malaysian Muslims are also divided between those who continue to adhere the state-defined Islam, and a new emerging group that has brought new interpretation of Islam. This article, henceforth, discusses the dynamism of state-Muslim relations in the context of global rise of neo-Salafi movements. The article commences with a discussion on the historical evolution on the role of Islam in the state-society relations. This is to explain why Malaysia, as compared to other Muslim countries, has managed to flex its muscle on Muslim matters. The domineering role of state in the Muslim affairs, henceforth, needs to be contextualized through the historical development of the religion itself. The second section discusses the raising contending arguments against state’s interpretation of Islam through several phases of reform movement. One of its ramifications is the emergence of Salafi-Wahabi radical movements, which was initially a home-grown challenging state’s authority. In a latter period, several foreign-based radical movements made have been one of the driving forces in expanding radical neo-Salafi ideas. Their influence not only challenges state authorities but also perturb societal resilience.

State, Religion, and Society in Malaysia: The Historical Set-Up

It can be argued that the spreading of Islam in the Malay Archipelago particularly in the pre-independence Malaysia was attributed to the role played by the royal court and aristocrats. At the same time, Sufi practices or ṭaṣawwuf in Arabic were responsible in the early Islamization process of the Nusantara. (Al-Atas 2014) Sultan, as an institution, is the symbol of sovereignty (dawlah). Early period prior to Islam also shows that the religion of people was subject to a royal accession since the institution played as not only as a powerful uniting symbol but also a sheer authority. In the pre-Islamic era of Hindu-Buddha influences,
furthermore, the syncretism belief regards the king as Lord Siva, Visnu, or spirit of Buddha, while during the Islamic era, the king, which later changed its title to Sultan to reflect Arabic influences, was considered a replication of Allah's divineness and caliphate political authority in protecting the faith. Stockwell (1979, 75) succinctly summarizes,

[t]raditionally, the Sultan was regarded as the fount of all law and government and the head of religion; he defended the ʿādah (custom) the very fabric of Malay society, and was God's vicegerent in the world.

Islam, as it was practiced between 13th and 18th century, was also the intertwined between animism and local customs or ʿādahs. Although Sufi orders accommodated the cultural diversity of the region, the fundamentals of Islam were never compromised. The Sufi preaching or daʿwah was taken in many forms i.e., through cultural shows like wayang kulit (shadow puppets) and gamelan (traditional Javanese music ensemble)—to convey the spiritual teachings of Islam.

In the pre-independent Malaysia, the position of Islam was further entrenched in the founding constitution (undang-undang tubuh) of individual states like Melaka (as early as 1424), Johore (1895), and Terengganu (1911). During the colonial periods of the Dutch and British, Islamic affairs and Malay customs were left to the hand of individual sultans.

The position of sultan as the guardian of Islamic affair has been even guaranteed in the constitution after the independence. Given sultans' highest social hierarchy in the Malay-Muslim society, the traditional and Sufi practices of Islam have never been challenged and debated openly by the masses.

It can also be argued that Islam in Malaysia is controlled by the state. It is enforced by a conservative religious department, known as Jabatan Agama Islam (Islamic Affairs Department), of an individual state. The role played by religious departments has been subjected to numerous criticisms by the international and local civil society. Its actions and enforcements have been viewed to be inconsistent with the spirit of democracy. Some major issues like religious conversion and the role of Muslim women have been debated vigorously. The unique dual system of law, civil and Islamic law, creates more ambiguity. The Islamic law or Syariah only applies to the Muslims relating to twenty-four areas of personal matters like marriage, conversion, and apostasy, while the civil court cover other areas like crime, tort, and contracts. To date,
Malaysian civil courts, under the pretext of adhering to the article 12(1) of the constitution, have been unwilling to overrule Syariah court decisions on Muslim family matters.

Complications, however, arise when some sensitive issue like Muslim conversion from Islam or when a family case involve Muslim and non-Muslims. Legal observers argue such a case is really a litmus test of Malaysian religious and political tolerance. In the Lina Joy case of 2007, for instance, the plaintiff who was a Muslim, lost her bid in a civil court to remove Islam as her religion in her identity card after the Syariah court had earlier came to the same conclusion. She decided to denounce Islam after a marriage to a non-Muslim husband. The Federal court, the apex of Malaysian legal system, states that it does not have jurisdiction over the issue, which commonly be dealt with by the Syariah court (Star Online Edition 2007). Nonetheless, in a protracted legal case, a Hindu mother, Indra Gandhi sought legal verdict to annul her daughter's unilateral conversion to Islam by his former husband, who has converted to Islam. After a legal battle since 2009, the Federal court, decided in 2018 that the civil court has the jurisdiction to review action or decision by public authority, which involve a dispute between Muslim and non-Muslim under the Article 11 of the Constitution. The apex court declares that the conversion was null and void (Lim 2018).

The above cases suggest how the tendency towards ethno-religious conservatism- not only in the religious establishment but also within the Malay-Muslim society- has produced concerns among the non-Muslims over the socio-political direction of the country. Alrebh (2017, 279) points out, “Conservatism influences both state control and societal customs, given that these institutions and social practices are based in revered religious texts.” Growing Islamic conservatism particularly in the peninsula Malaysia affects the inter-communal relations. Studies also show that religious and ethnic tolerance are in wane (Kathirasen 2019). A survey study conducted by Wan Husin, Halim and Zul Kernain (2021) shows that 90 percent of the respondents believe that religion is the key factor of ethnic tolerance in Malaysia. It can be argued that racial tolerance in Malaysia is falling apart due to narrowed political thinking, lack of religious empathy and lack of mutual respect. Malaysian politics, which is based on ethnic, to some extent responsible for the debacles. Politicians from various ethnic background would capitalize racial issue for political gains.
There is, however, some caveats to the above study. Arguably, being a pure Muslim or religious sensitivities is generally not a perennial issue in the Borneo states of Sabah Sarawak. Societal composition and the level of religious and cultural intolerance are markedly different from that of states in the peninsular Malaysia. In Sabah and Sarawak, Muslims and Christians nearly equally represented in the population. The use of the word “Allah” (the God) in the Malay-translated version of the bible, for instance, is a politically sensitive issue for the Malays-Muslims in the peninsular but is widely used here. This liberal environment is due to the fact that the two states are religiously and culturally diverse. The religious tolerance “… is cultivated through the practice of ethnic tolerance, which is not only highlighted through inter-religious mixing and the establishment of various worship houses. This phenomenon can be seen from the aspect of coexistence in a multi-faith family” (Rahman and Khambali 2013, 89). Mixed marriages are common practice, and a house may consist of several families with different faiths live harmoniously. Patronizing non-Muslim restaurant with pork-free menu is common sightings in these two states.

Henceforth, the increasing religiosity, religious-laden educational system, and enhanced protective role by the religious institutions can be explained from the perspectives of internal dynamic changes that have occurred within the Malay-Muslims society since the turn of twentieth century. It has major consequences to the inter-societal as well as intra-Malay relations. At the intra-Malay relations in particular, social changes take place where through-out time, reform movements keep questioning the meaning of Islam in the society. These reforms movements also challenge and debate not only local understanding of Islam and but the way it has been managed by the authority.

Elusive Permeation of Salafi-Wahabism through Reform Movements

The period of reform movements in Malaysia can be divided into three phases. In the first phase, as early as late 1920s, a new breed of religious students, who mostly graduates of the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, were encouraged by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī's and Muḥammad ʻAbduh's religious education and political reforms (Hashim 2011, 2014). They averred similar transformation of pre-independent Malaysia's religious educational system could also happen. This,
nonetheless, created a friction between the so-called “traditionalist” and “reformist”. The traditionalist, known as *Kaum Tua* (old faction/old Turks), represented by the religious establishment here can be referred to as a conservative “…who theoretically refused any compromise with modernization and secularization”, whereas the reformist, known as the *Kaum Muda* (young faction/young Turk) pursue to accommodate the western modernizing logics and norms with that of the tenets Islam” (Aly and Wenner 1982, 338). They were also attracted to Rashīd Riḍā’s ideas of “…purifying Islam from innovations (*bid‘ah*) which made Muslims depart from the “true” Islam, on opposition to *taqlīd* (accepting previous scholarly opinion as binding), and on following the path of *ijtihād* (personal interpretation of the basic elements of the faith) (Aly and Wenner 1982, 338). Their reform ideas were to some extent in line with Salafi’s puritan Islam. But their agenda and approach were different from that of the later waves of reformist Salafi movements in the late-1970s and, the current Salafi-jihadi campaigns. The conflict between the two factions has been described by Abdul Hamid (2015, 11) as the beginning of religious variances among the Malay-Muslims. The uniformity of local interpretation of Islam has then been challenged.

It is also interesting to note that the focus of contention between the two factions was more about creating progressive Malay-Muslims through modern educational and management transformation. Religious authorities were criticized for failing to adhere to the principle of Islamic teaching, to modernize the system throughout time, and to stop promoting Malay customs deemed to be unIslamic and modelled after the *jāhilīyah* (age of ignorance) period. Never did the *Kaum Muda* go to the extent of questioning or challenging the authority of the sultan on religious matters.

The rational and pragmatic approaches brought by the *Kaum Muda* were manifested by the growing establishments of madrasah schools. The madrasah introduced a more systematic curriculum development in Islamic teaching, compared to that of the informal pedagogy of traditional *pondok* system. More importantly, however, was the friction also led to the rise and competition of Malay nationalism. Two nationalist factions represented the *Kaum Muda* – the leftist and Islamists. Both were opposed by the third faction – the conservative elites and traditionalists (Suryadinata 2000, 133–36). The leftists,
led Kesatuan Melayu Muda or Union of Young Malay (KMM), were the Malay ultra-nationalist who championed a political merger of Indonesia Raya. The Middle-eastern western educated Hisbul Muslimin (also known as Parti Orang Muslimin or HAMIM), on the other hand, was part of efforts to brought Islamic scholars into a political platform that attempted to bridge the Kaum Tua-Kaum Muda divides. The party revolutionized Malay political thinking, which was perceived by the Malay elites and religious traditionalist, as radical and militant. Supporters of Hisbul Muslimin were strongly present in the madrasah school system, such as Madrasah Aliiah Islaiah and Maahad Il Ihya AsSyarif Gunung Semanggol. These two madrasahs were part of Malaysian history for its important gravity of nationalist movements during the colonial period. Several of their students and graduates were even members of the now defunct- Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). Both Hisbul Muslimin and KMM were banned by the British for their radical political reform ideas. Consequently, it was the third faction, which align with the colonial ruling elites and the royal court, that was given mandates to lead country's independence.

The period of Islamic awakening since the Iranian revolution of 1979 is considered the beginning of the second phase of reform movement in Malaysia. The political influence of Egyptian al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn (Muslim Brotherhood) and Pakistani Jamaat Islami contribute further to the flourishing of local Salañ movements in the country. If the early reform was associated with modernization of Islamic school system and the rise of nationalist movements, this second phase displays a visible role and a more comprehensive vision of Salañ-Wahabism reform agenda ranging from education to politics. The expansion of Salañ-Wahabism in Malaysia and around the region, nonetheless, need to be understood from a broader perspective of a “cold war” between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Alarmed by Sunni terrorists-seized incident at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in the same year and a belief that the attack was motivated by the Iranian influences, the Saudi Kingdom, by using the petrodollar, embarked upon a worldwide da’wah (Islamic propagation) missionaries, which also carried Wahhabism. The Iranian revolution and the subsequent incidents in the country, in short, triggered decisive responses from Saudi Arabia, fearing not only possible recurrence of similar style of revolution, but more importantly the possibility of the expanding influence of Shi’ism in Sunni Muslim countries. Koelbl,
Shafy and Zand (2016) argue that the 1979 incident was not only the watershed of the expansion of Islamic revolution, but also marks by the Saudi's move to plant,

“… the seeds of Sunni extremism, the bitter fruits of which are still being harvested today in the lawless valleys of Pakistan, in Raqqa, the capital of Islamic State, and also in the West, in the heads of confused young men. And in the kingdom, itself: Now, Sunni extremism is even threatening the country where it was once spawned.”

In the same vein, the Iranian revolution did inspire local religious movements to imitate some social and political reforms (iṣlāḥ) in the country. Anwar Ibrahim, the then President of the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) or Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, reportedly admired the political transformation that occurred. but distanced himself by pointing out that the Iranian type of revolution was not suitable under the Malaysian socio-political settings (Abdullah 2003).

Like the earlier phase in the early 1920s, external variables did play an influential role in the reform movement during this period. The agent of change was notably students who were graduated from religious institutions in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Egypt) and South Asian continent (Pakistan and India). The emergence of Malaysian students graduated from the Pakistani and Indian madrasah school system was as a result of Saudi’s earlier focus of Wahabi expansion into the South Asian in the 1950s and 1960s. Massive funding was channeled into Pakistani and Indian madrasah schools (Commins 2006). These South Asian institutions eventually became another source of breeding grounds of what dubbed to be known as Malaysia’s da’wah phenomenon.

These da’wah movements came into multiple forms- either as youth movements like ABIM or Jemaah Islah Malaysia (JIM); Muslim economic reform movements like Darul Arqam, or as political party like Islamic Party of SeMalaysia (PAS) and Berjasa. There was also an ethnic dimension in the da’wah struggle. The Darul Arqam movement (House of Arqam) adopted economic model in its da’wah activities and approaches. Not only the movement built a self-sustainable Islamic village where life of the community was modelled after the prophet Muhammad (PBUH) era, but also ventured into businesses with the aim to break-up ethnic Chinese business monopoly in the country. The businesses subscribed to the halal concept. By establishing various entities
of business enterprises, its Islamic business model won praises from every level of the society and political divides. It had sizeable presence in Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand. But Arqam supreme leader, Ashaari Muhammad (1937-2020), created theological challenges against the religious authorities. Ashaari was allegedly deviated from original Sufi teaching by propagating Wahabi-Salafi ideas. The controversies were also centered around questions of “…alleged additions to the Islamic shahādah (testament of faith) in their epistles, the validity of Awrād Muḥammadīyah as a collection of dhikr (remembrances of Allah) inherited directly from the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) via spiritual communication, the permissibility of invoking the awliyāʾ (saints) of Allah during prayer by tawassul (intercession) and the conditional belief in the messianic attributes of the founder of Awrād Muḥammadīyah…” (Hamid 2015, 20). Eventually, the movement was banned by the government not only for its alleged deviating theological challenges but also for national security reasons. Ashaari was accused by the authorities of preparing a group of soldiers to topple the government. The accusation, nonetheless, was never being proved till today.

ABIM, JIM, and PAS, on the other hand, have been the major political proponents for Malaysia’s socio-structural overhaul. They have different views, approaches, and mechanisms on how best the socio-political landscape of the country should be. PAS, for instance, works through political platform. All the three movements, however, share the idea of the reassertion of Islamic values by rejecting western materialistic and immoral values.” Islam is part of life and viewed comprehensively as din wa dawlah. They seem to share Jansen’s argument (1979, 17) that Islam is indeed “… a vast and integrated system of law, it is a culture and a civilization; it is an economic system and a way of doing business; it is a polity and a method of governance; it is a special sort of society…” The party calls for political solidarity of ummah (a bonding of Muslim community worldwide) to fight against infidel, corrupt leaders, and detestable un-Islamic acts.

ABIM and JIM, given their moderate and apolitical position, have been ambiguous over political solidarity of ummah. For ABIM and JIM, tarbiyah (education) is an essential component in introducing the idea of Islamic state. The apolitical stance of ABIM and also JIM ended when they became part of pro-Reformasi groups calling for eradicating corrupt practices in the government machineries, justice
for Anwar Ibrahim, the abolishment of detention without trials, transparency, nepotism, and free and fair elections. ABIM and JIM have been also an instrumental part of the establishment of Parti Keadilan Nasional (National Justice Party) of Malaysia. Leaders of the two movements subsequently contested in the general elections and some of them won.

The involvement several ABIM leaders in politics in 1980s was not by accident but more by a grand design to infiltrate government machineries and Malaysian political system. There was a popular assumption that Anwar’s and his friends’ political entrance into UMNO and government was part of Mahathir’s strategies to placate and to accommodate Muslim reform movements. But the move was also part of political maneuver from the Anwar side to pursue radical changes from within. Those with Wahabi inclination and mostly graduates of Middle Eastern Islamic studies like Abdul Hadi Awang and Fadhil Nor decided to join PAS, while others joined UMNO. The influx of religious background ABIM members in PAS led to generational and political-ideological conflict in the party. They initiated campaigns to change PAS leadership, who was deemed to have of nationalist inclinations. The strategies were also supported by new cadre who were graduates from the Saudi-Wahabi sponsored universities. The campaign “led my ulama” won support from the party members and eventually Abdul Hadi Awang managed to be part of senior leadership team in the party. He then became the seventh PAS president since 2005.

Another major strategy was to recruit cadre among Malaysian students locally and overseas. In the United Kingdom (UK), for instance, these students formed an Islamic Representative Council (IRC) in 1975, inspired by reform idea propagated by the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimūn, Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan, and Nursi movement of Turkey (Malik 2014, 149). The IRC was later expanded to other Malaysian-students majority areas in the USA and Canada. Like ABIM and PAS, IRC also used īsraḥ activities to recruit new cadre. The IRC later managed to create a systematic fraternity in Malaysia through ABIM and JIM. Since they are also government-sponsored students, these graduates are also placed in various ministries, government agencies and public institutes of higher learning upon their return. They in turn become the agent of reform from within in these establishments. Their ārbaḥā strategies continue till today.
The inclusion of young and new breed of *ulama* in PAS and UMNO’s Islamization has major repercussion to the Malaysian political landscape. This is an era where religious polarization become more evidence. New leadership in PAS began to challenge UMNO’s Islam, as part of’s strategy to win political support from the Malay-Muslims. Mahathir’s Islamization programs were viewed as the direct hit to PAS’s credibility and Islamism. Hence, PAS that was already being filled with Sala’i-inclined leaders embarked upon political attacks on UMNO Islamization agenda. The culmination of the political confrontation was when Abdul Hadi Awang, through one of his religious lectures in 1981, issued an unofficial fatwa labelling UMNO members as infidel (*kāfir*) for the party’s failure to adhere to the fundamental principles of Islam. His non-binding legal opinion created serious ideological division in the Malay-Muslim community such marriage divorce, separate Friday prayer in a mosque, separate imams for daily prayer, and even separate burial site for supporters of both parties.

The Malay-Muslim split expanded toward more radical actions by PAS members. The 1985 Memali incident is an example how radical ideas were transformed into militant actions. A group of obsessed PAS members, led by Ibrahim Libya, clashed with the police over the later attempts to arrest him. Ibrahim Libya and his 400-odd followers- man, women and children- were wanted by the religious department for forming a radical sect in a remote village of Baling, Kedah, the north-western part of Peninsular Malaysia. Police siege resulted in eighteen deaths including four policemen.

The Middle east political-theological connection and influences on local Islamic movements continue until today. Its impacts vary ranging from local chapter of Sala’i-jihadi transnational terror groups to a new generation of *da’wah* movements. For the new generation of *da’wah* movements such as Pertubuhan Ikram Malaysia (IKRAM), Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia or Muslim Solidarity Front (ISMA), and Hizb at-Tahrir Malaysia (HTM), al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn’s influential thinkers and leaders like Ḥasan al-Banna, Sayyid Quṭb, Sa’īd Hawwa, Mustapha Mashyur, Mustapha Sībāie, Karim Zaidan, Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Badrī, ʿUmar at-Tilmisānī, Zaynab al-Ghazālī, and Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī continue to have impact on their social and political orientation. Al-Banna’s ideas, for instance, was the major theme of ISMA national convention in 2010 (Isma Perak 2010).
Like earlier da’wah movements, membership appear to be coming from professional, intellectuals and urban. It is interesting to note that the usrah has been the thematic method of cadre recruitment not only for local Islamic movements but also foreign based radical terror groups like al-Qaeda, Daesh, or Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Except for Daesh, students and alumni of religious institutions were the focus of cadre recruitment. Both JI and Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (also known as KMM) members, for instance, were part of Halaqah Pakindo, “…a clandestine movement formed as an alumni association for Malaysian graduates from religious institutions in Pakistan, India, and Indonesia” (Aslam 2009, 95).

Daesh has directly targeted to its potential cadre through online usrah method. It does not focus only on students with religious background since its theological arguments could not be accepted. The group in fact has manipulated various verses in the holy book of al-Quran to justify its jihad (Wan Mat Yusoff 2020). This explains why the majority who has involved in this group were individuals with broken family, loner, and lack of religious knowledge (Yaacob, Abdullah, and Fauzee 2019). In the Daesh’s usrah activities, small cells were created in either Facebook (FB) or popular chatting service. The usrah was meant not only for cadre recruitment but also as a platform to stage attacks against the security agencies. The usrah WhatsApp application managed by its Malaysian leader, Muhammad Wandy also known as Abdul Hamzah al-Fateh, used various names like Al-Qubro Generation, Kumpulan Gagak Hitam, Kumpulan Fisabilillah, and Kumpulan Daulah Islamiyah Malizia, to avoid of being detected by the police (Wan Mat Yusoff 2020). The Gagak Hitam cell, for example, was able to attack 38 people, ready to launch jihad in Malaysia (Shah 2016, 7).

Similarly, the current cadre recruitment among new generation of Islamic movements or neo-da’wah movements does not necessarily having Islamic studies background. The majority of them are in fact graduates of professional degrees like accountancy, engineering, and medical. They were more exposed to al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn’s as well as Jamaat-i-Islami political philosophies. This pattern of recruitment, nonetheless, is not unique. The same method was used during the 1970s awakening of Islamism in the country.

Yet, depicting or labelling the current Islamic movements as neo-da’wah movements is a misnomer. This is because their function is
no longer associated with Islamic propagation, but focus more on strengthening the *iṣlāḥ* (for the betterment of reform through concrete action and strategies) and *tajdīd* (continuing to reform and to purify the society). It can be argued in the earlier *da’wah* period, propagation was a crucial tool to educate public about a pristine notion of Islam.

This new breed of local Islamic movements, nonetheless, continues to display diverging organisational aspiration, social-political orientation and strategies. Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia or Muslim Solidarity Front (ISMA), which initially known as Ikatan Siswazah Muslim Malaysia (Muslim Graduates Solidarity Front) has the toughest stance on Islamic affairs in the country. The movement, for instance, rejected western liberalism expansion, other deviant Islamic sects including Shi’ism dissemination, and “Christianization” movements. Furthermore, its social-political orientation displays a conservative Malay dominancy with nationalist characters and Islamic partisan. In 2018, for instance, the movement launched a petition to drum-up Malay supports on the establishment of Islamic state under a slogan “Malaysia, an Islamic State” (Rodzi 2018). Earlier in 2008, ISMA, which was part of the Coalition of Islamic Organizations in the Universal Periodic Review Process (UPR) of the Human Rights Council, known as MuslimUPRo, showed its strong resistance against COMANGO’s (The Coalition of Malaysian NGOs in the Universal Periodic Review Process (UPR) of the United Nations) attempts to influence United Nations periodic report on human rights record of member countries. The COMANGO’s arguments that Malaysia has curbed among others religious freedom and rights of minorities did not get well with some conservative Islamic movements (Mohd Sofian and Azman, 2021). The movement has also shown its political inclination by fielding several members of its political bureau in the Malaysia 13th General Election under the Berjasa Party ticket. All of its political candidates were fielded in Malay-Muslim majority areas, where other ruling or opposition parties named non-Muslim candidates in the area.

Another conservative movement is the local chapter of Salafi-Wahabi transnational movement - Ḥizb at-Tahrir Malaysia (Party of Liberation). Its presence in Malaysia is full of obscurity, unlike its sister organisation in Indonesia. Ḥizb at-Tahrir in Indonesia has been labelled as the “leading radical organisation” in the country for its opposition to the state ideology, Pancasila, and caliphate conviction (Osman 2019).
Ḥizb at-Taḥrīr’s negative portrayal is due to the fact that it believes, in general, the implementation of transnational caliphate system and rejects any notions of western democratic system by caliphate system; the classification of global system into dār al-kufr and dār al-Islām; anti-Zionism, and Salaĥi-jihadi strategies (Commins 1991). Nonetheless, Ḥizb at-Taḥrīr Malaysia did issue several strong statements through social media related to local and international politics, which could be alluding to calls for strenuous action. It is understood that, the group has been monitored by the special branch of Royal Police of Malaysia (RMP) for some times since its banning in 2015.

On the other spectrum, however, IKRAM and IRF represent accommodating form of Malaysian Islamic movements. The Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF) has been criticised for its liberal stance and association with Sister-in-Islam, human rights movements such as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transsexual (LGBT) (M. A. Othman and Boyman 2018, 691). On the other hand, IKRAM, which is an offshoot of JIM, appear to represent an active moderate Salaĥi movement. JIM, was known to have strong political inclination by aligning with the political reform movements in the country. Its establishment can be traced back to the IRC activities during height of Islamic awakening in the 1970s. In 2012, the remaining JIM leaderships decided to end the movement activities and set up another new organization called Pertubuhan Ikram Malaysia (IKRAM). IKRAM still shares JIM’s mission of extending Egyptian al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn ideals of establishing an Islamic State …. but within the Malaysian context” (Malik 2017, 7). Its major emphasis is on the concept of rahmab rahmatan li al-‘ālamīn (literally means a mercy to all creations). Hence, IKRAM believes that harmonious relation could be established among different faith (Ahmad 2015). Unlike ISMA, IKRAM’s approach to COMANGO issue, for instance, was more on inclusivity and accommodation by having good relations with group. It is believed that COMANGO position and campaign could be placated if IKRAM continues to engage them to achieve possible win-win situation.

IKRAM claims that it is non-partisan movement yet its historical evolution could not support it. As an offshoot of JIM, the movement continues to have political inclination aligned to Anwar Ibrahim opposition group. IKRAM members, who are mostly professionals, were allegedly infiltrate into PAS, representing the moderate view of
the Islamic party. The increasing influence of moderate views was in fact not well received by the ulama in PAS. There were also IKRAM members who joined UMNO. Interestingly, IKRAM members, either in PAS or UMNO, have close and friendly relations with Wahabi-inclined influential ulama. Some of these ulama have been appointed as state muftis, a federal minister, senior officers at the state and federal Islamic departments and, members of party religious bureau. It has been alleged that Wahabi advocators and sympathisers have managed to fill in some important and strategic posts in state and religious department including Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia or Department Islamic Development (JAKIM).³

Due to internal power struggling, the IKRAM elements in PAS decided to form a new political platform by establishing Parti Amanah Malaysia (Amanah) (I. M. Zain 2019). The so-called “Ikramization” became more obvious when Amanah was part of the 22-month-old Pakatan Harapan (PH) government (May 2018- February 2020). The IKRAM-IRC-JIM connection held important post in the PH government – Mazlee Malik (Minister of Education- Bersatu), Khalid Samad (Minister of Federal territory- Amanah), and Dzulkefly Ahmad (Minister of Health- Amanah). There were also scores of them who sat as deputy ministers in various ministries. Mazlee Malik who was the Minister of Education, for instance, allegedly embarked upon systematic plan of replacing sitting vice-chancellor or rector of government-funded university with IKRAM senior members. Vice-chancellor from Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin (Unisza), Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS) and Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) were among the casualties (Wan Mat Yusoff 2020). In fact, vice-chancellors of UUM and UMS were their tenure cut short and replaced by unknown and inexperienced professor.

The above issue illustrates the level of resilience of the country to the religiously linked foreign but radical political ideas or ideologies. Resilience here may refer to the ability to withstand adversities that could affect one’s responses and reactions. It may also refer to the ability to endure and overcome certain forms of onslaught and tribulation (Malkki and Sinkkonen 2016; Prior and Hagmann 2014). It does not necessarily, however, connote the negative form of adversaries. According to Mastern (2009, 119), resilience is a “positive
adaptation in the context of significant challenges, variously referring to the capacity, for, process of, or outcome of successful life-course development during or following exposure to potentially life-altering experience.” In the context of societal resilience, it explains the degree of society’s response to normal condition of functional after the disturbing occurrence of events (Jore 2020). Hence, it can be argued that resistance is ability of a system, either state or society to pull through after a major disturbance. State or societal resilience displays characteristics of strength, steadfastness, sustainability, efficacy, quality, seriousness, and soundness.

Yet the measurements of resistant between state and society are different. State’s resilience includes capacity to employ new strategies or policies to enable state to withstand future adversaries. State could modify, change or replace its existing strategies. The major variables that could support state resistance are the outside and inside structural stability, political experiences, and public support. Societal resistance measurements are based on fluid variable such the changing demography of the society, socio-political correctness, cultural identity, educational process (i.e., the level of understanding and exposure to issues), and the role of stakeholders (ulama, religious leaders, and civil societies)

Based on the above conceptual discussion, it can be argued that Malaysia’s societal resilience has been affected by multiple layers of adversity, which led to various effects. Prior to the September 11 incident, Muslim radicalism is no more a local affair. But subsequent developments have shown that Malaysian exposure to radical Salafi-Wahabism has affected societal characteristics from being accommodative to be very defensive. The process Salafism-Wahabism in the country are largely due to years of indoctrination, student networking, funded religious activities and educational scholarship.

Salafi-Wahabism radical ideas has systemically changed Malaysia’s social cultural fabric and political landscape through various forms brought by the Islamic movements. Malaysian multiracial society was known to be accommodative, but the current development show otherwise. Muslims in Malaysia is becoming more protective by rejecting ideas or debates that deemed to be unIslamic. Malaysia seems to offer a paradox. Its vibrant society with consumerism focused tends to be outweighed by “… a swing of toward Islamic conservatism…” (Liow 2009, 3). Several indicators could explain these changes.
Firstly, there is growing consciousness of being a pure Muslim among the Malays. The insistence on halal (permissible) products or services is one of the examples. The halal certificate in fact must be issued by the relevant authorities recognized by the religious department. Important products with overseas halal certificate are also subject to scrutiny of its authenticity. In addition, halal industry is a big business in the country. Malaysia’s embarkation on halal, either in products, banking, or services, have placed the country in the world map. The halal industry has indeed contributed seven percent of the country total Growth Domestic Products (GDP) valued more than USD12.4 billion a year. The halal inclination among Malay-Muslims does not augur well with the Malaysian social integration (BusinessToday 2020). The Malay-Muslims are now more conscious about their eating habit and socialization culture. They refuse to eat at local non-Muslim coffee shops without ascertaining the halal status of the premise. This phenomenon is very different from that of between 1950s and early 1980s, when non-Muslim coffee-shops that mostly run by the Chinese were the culture nerve of Malaysian socialization and nation-building processes. The halal issue has created opposite effects where ethnic polarization becomes more obvious. Social segregation based on ethnic-religious line, religious intolerance and cultural misunderstanding has taken shape in the Malaysia societal fabrics.

Secondly, Malay-Muslims now are socially more concerned by their piety appearance. Veils and abaya are part of new Arabized cultural of Malay society. Critics like Bowie (2017) and Bajunid (1998) attribute the development as threat to Malaysia social fabric and religious society, whereas Ghoshal (2016) notes that in their endorsement towards the “uniformisation of Islam”, the Arabisation tends to be “…the norm of the pure and ideal form of Islam to be followed by Muslims.” It would further post “… a threat to all Muslims who believe in Islam’s divine character and universalism and can be combated only by them” (Ghoshal 2010, 88).

The final indicator is the decreasing number of non-Malay’s enrolment in the national school system. At the same time, there has been a phenomenal rise of a privately funded tahfiz school. (The Sundaily 2014) The school is different from acnormal Islamic school system that embedded religious and secular studies together. The focus of tahfiz school is to produce hafizan, as young as nine-year old,
who could memorize the whole al-Quran. Some government-funded boarding schools have introduced the *taḥfīz* method through their *ūlū al-albāb* (literally means people of intellect in the Quran) program. Under this program, students are required to memorize several chapters in the al-Quran before being conferred a high school certificate.

Furthermore, universities are not spared by the increasing pressure of Islamic conservatism in the country. In one incident, an academic discourse by a Muslim classical Indian dancer, Ramli Ibrahim, at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) was cancelled at eleventh hours due to senior management directive. In response, Ramli blames the existence of “…some form of religious thuggery…” that could affect Malaysia’s diverse cultural appreciation (Augustin 2021).

Malaysia could potentially move toward Salafi-Wahhabi inclined society. The country is a living example of, according to Abdul Hamid (2020), Salafi-Wahabism’s work-in-process. The Salafi-Wahabi circles have managed to use popular platforms such as social media to disseminate their ideas. They offer simple analogy and language to answer questions raised by the younger generation. It is not surprising that they have succeeded in gaining thousands of followers in their Instagram or Facebook. At the same time, they are progressively been given opportunities to appear in the religious programs of national television.

Furthermore, the increasing Salafi-Wahabi influence in policy making process especially in religious matters has become more obvious. As highlighted earlier, strategic posts in many Islamic departments at the state and federal level have been fulfilled by Salafi-Wahabi advocators. This has resulted in serious internal political clashes between the established proponents of Al-Sunnah wal Jamaah (ASWJ) and Salafi-Wahabi group. Zamihan Mat Musa, a long antagonist of Wahhabization in Malaysia’s religious departments, has staged several attacks against the Salafi-Wahabi group. Through Pertubuhan Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah Malaysia (Aswaja), Zamihan has embarked various platforms to warn the increasing influence of Salafi-Wahabism. He is also known to be head-to-head with the Perlis State Mufti, Mohd Asri Zainal Abidin, who is known to be Wahabi inclined (Sidek, 8 February 2016). It was reported that Salafi-Wahabi protagonists like Rozaimi Ramle and Kamilin Jamilin and several others were lobbied to be appointed as mufti of the Federal Territory replacing another allegedly
Navigating Against Salaï-Wahabi

Salaï-Wahabi inclined ulama, Zulkiìi Mohamad Al-Bakri, who has been promoted to the minister of religious affairs (H. Zain 2020). The intense lobby did not go down well to Aswaja.

State’s Resistance to Salaï Jihadi Struggle

If the ability of the society to withstand elements of radical Salafi-Wahabism seems to be weakened by various variables, state's resistant, on the other hand, appears to signal the opposite. State tends to be more prepared and resilience against not only the ideological challenges but also Salafi-Jihadi threats. Various factors could explain this state's strong resistance: Malaysia's long exposure to radical ideological movements; state's grips on religious affairs; and the implementation of various preemptive laws since colonial period.

The post-September 11 terror threats, which has been associated with Islam, posed challenges to Malaysia. The threats represented two transverse images – political and theological. Al-Qaeda reflects more with the image of political motivation against western injustices. This Sunni militant movement was initially launched armed attacks against the American and its allies. Its struggle was parallel to the Middle Eastern conflict stalemate with very much anti-Israel rhetoric and abhorring Arab corrupt regime. Haynes (2005, 182) outlines four ideological goals of al-Qaeda. First is to return to the seventh century of the golden era of Islam where “pure and authentic” Islam was practiced. Second is to depose all the non-Islamic regimes. Third is to expel westerners and non-Muslims who are deemed “to propagate individualistic and corrupted values”, from the holy land of Mecca and Medina. The final objective is to establish pan Islamic Caliphate system “by working with a network of like-minded Islamic militant organizations.” Al-Qaeda’s political strategy received regional political support through local chapter of JI. To be relevant, al-Qaeda needed to realign its political objectives into a more religious cause, i.e., by calling jihad against the American and those Muslim governments conspired with the west (Rollins 2011). It stresses on Salikuh Salleh concept.

The threats also posed diplomatic and local political dilemma to Malaysia. Cooperating with western major powers through Global War Against Terrorism (GWAT) campaign could render political backlash to the ruling government. Diplomatically, GWAT would also be the perfect solution to gain supports from the western allies to aid its
campaign against local militant issues. Politically, it is also easier for the government to discredit Islamist campaign to forcibly wanting to turn the country into a theological state. Malaysia’s eventual involvement in campaign, nonetheless, could be due to various reasons. Firstly, Malaysia was allegedly being blamed for providing safe-haven to Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar, the founding leaders of JI. Secondly, Malaysia was discovered to be the meeting place, prior to the September 11 attacks, of four al-Qaeda members including Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi, who were involved in the American Airline Flight 77 (Abdullah 2003, 40). Thirdly, the involvement of Malaysians in JI as the prime architecture to the series of bombing forced Kuala Lumpur to work closely with its regional peers. Riduan Isamuddin @Hambali, Dr Azahari Husin, Nordin Mohamed Top dan Yazid Sufaat, were among the important members of JI regional operations. Fourthly, threats posed by al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates such as JI, Abu Sayaf group (ASG), and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), could also derail government efforts in countering radical Islamic ideas. Finally, a local militant group, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), was discovered to have links with JI regional networking. One of the KMM cells invited several JI key-figures like Hambali and Abu Bakar Bashir to its usrah. The group was also linked to various criminal activities like church bombing, police station attacks, and murder on a non-Muslim politician. In Sauk Siege in 2000, the group launched a coup attempt against the Malaysian government. The group “… conducted a fake inspection at the 304th Malaysian Army Reserve camp … through the use of deception to obtain firearms from military armories” (Tee 2019).

Another factor that could explain the state resistance to Salafi-jihadi terror threats is the country’s operational capability. Compared to that of al-Qaeda and JI, managing Daesh’s threats is indeed challenging to the state. According to the Counter Terrorism Division of the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), the security agency has managed to thwart at least twenty-three potential Daesh-planned attacks since 2013 on non-Muslim religious shrine, politicians, and key individuals (Tee 2019). The then prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad was also one of the targets of Deash assassination plot (Azmi and Mustafa 2021). It can be argued that managing Salafi-Wahabi terror group like Daesh is not only the ability to anticipate but also to mitigate the possibility of terror attacks in the Malaysian soil. Countering its theological narratives which have derailed
from the real teaching of Sunni Islam is also utmost importance. Hence, Malaysia has addressed Daesh threats with a two-pronged strategy- firstly, to cut the recruitment links on social media platform and, secondly, to counter narratives offered by the Daesh theological claims (Wan Mat Yusoff 2020). One of the keys to debunk Daesh narrative has been through extensive intelligence networking and strategic partnership with other government agencies such as the Malaysian Multimedia and Communication Commission (MMCC), JAKIM, and state religious department. Key influential ulama or figures with Salafi-Wahabism ideas especially those who hold important government position are under the close watch of the security authorities. Furthermore, rehabilitation process of former terrorist members involve extensive counter narrative programs to ensure official form of Sunni interpretation of Islam remains intact. The religious authorities through the federal-led JAKIM at the Prime Minister Department and religious experts from local universities have been actively involved in assisting the authorities in this counter-narrative programs.

The final factor is the existence of various laws since the colonial period to deal with the potential threats of religious deviance and terror threats. In Malaysia, state and federal government have the constitutional rights to manage Muslim affairs and to define Islam. Islam in Malaysia, as argued earlier, is constitutionally defined at state level based on the Sunni tradition, where others like Shi’ism are outlawed. Any deviant Islamic teachings or practices can be subject to state and federal’s prosecution. Furthermore, enforcement through the enactment of several laws is another essential tool of state in containing Salafi-jihadism in the country. All the law mechanisms are in place like Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 (POTA), the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 747 (SOSMA), and the Prevention for Crime Act 1959 (Revised 1983) or POCA. Previously, the enforcement agency relied on the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) and the 1969 Emergency Ordinance to combat terrorism. But political circumstance and human rights pressures made the two laws being repelled.

Conclusion

Islam in Malaysia has undergone three phases of reforms where Salafi-Wahabism appears to have challenged the conservative local Sufi practices of Islam. The three phases of reform inevitably produce a
notable change to societal resilience. The reform produces contrasting features of Malaysian Islam. The article argues that Malaysian Muslim society seems to have been submerged under the strong influence of Salafi-Wahabism. It does not only affect the stability of inter-ethnic relations in the country but importantly lead to serious polarization of local Muslim polity. The infiltration of Salafi-Wahabism into Muslim society happens partly due to the Malaysia’s social reengineering approach to uplift the social ladder of Malay-Muslims through educational process. The products of this process are now part of the governing bodies of Malaysia’s social and political landscape. They have been exposed to more radical Salafi-Wahabism brought by transnational Muslim reform groups especially from Middle East and South Asia in their tertiary life of education. Subsequently, they became part of the government establishment where they could exert those ideas through various policy implementations.

On the other hand, state continues to display its resilience towards various threats of radical Islamism. One may argue that Muslims in Malaysia is moving away from its moderate feature where Wahabi style of Islam has made inroads in the society. But, as being argued in this article, the country, which equipped with multi-level experiences, approaches and strategies, has been successfully adopting to those challenges. The state has so far right handedly managed all possible threats to its defined Islam or any possible threats from radical Islamist groups through various mechanisms.
Endnotes

• This article is part of a research supported by the Policy Research Network of Contemporary Southeast Asia (PRN-SEA), with a grant from National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Japan.

1. The abbreviation should not be confused with another militant group during the height of al-Qaeda threats. Known also as KMM, the now defunct Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia is a smaller local Islamist group claimed to be aligned with the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Please refer to another discussion of this group in the later part of this article

2. Another party also known as Parti Hisbul Muslimin Malaysia or HAMIM was established in 1983 by Asri Muda, former president of PAS. He decided to leave PAS after the party failed to recapture state of Kelantan during the 1982 General Election. In the 1986 General Election, HAMIM was part of the coalition member of Barisan Nasional (BN). The party is now neither active nor deregistered.

3. Usrah is a small religious group discussion, average between 5-6 people, that meet at least once a week. The major theme of discussion was how to improve one's obligation as a Muslims.

4. He was reportedly killed in an attack in Raqqa, Syria in April 2017.

5. The information is based on several interviews conducted. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the interviewees requested their name not to be published.

6. The concept refers to an obligation to the members of the group to launch jihadi against the enemy of Islam.

7. Due to security reasons, the informer refused to be identified.

Bibliography


Studia Islamika, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2022 DOI: 10.36712/sdi.v29i1.25213


Kamarulnizam Abdullah, *Institute of Malaysia and International Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Malaysia*. Email: kamarulnizam@ukm.edu.my.
Guidelines

Submission of Articles

Studia Islamika, published three times a year since 1994, is a bilingual (English and Arabic), peer-reviewed journal, and specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular and Southeast Asian Islamic studies in general. The aim is to provide readers with a better understanding of Indonesia and Southeast Asia’s Muslim history and present developments through the publication of articles, research reports, and book reviews.

The journal invites scholars and experts working in all disciplines in the humanities and social sciences pertaining to Islam or Muslim societies. Articles should be original, research-based, unpublished and not under review for possible publication in other journals. All submitted papers are subject to review of the editors, editorial board, and blind reviewers. Submissions that violate our guidelines on formatting or length will be rejected without review.

Articles should be written in American English between approximately 10,000-15,000 words including text, all tables and figures, notes, references, and appendices intended for publication. All submission must include 150 words abstract and 5 keywords. Quotations, passages, and words in local or foreign languages should
be translated into English. *Studia Islamika* accepts only electronic submissions. All manuscripts should be sent in Ms. Word to: http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/studia-islamika.

All notes must appear in the text as citations. A citation usually requires only the last name of the author(s), year of publication, and (sometimes) page numbers. For example: (Hefner 2009a, 45; Geertz 1966, 114). Explanatory footnotes may be included but should not be used for simple citations. All works cited must appear in the reference list at the end of the article. In matter of bibliographical style, *Studia Islamika* follows the American Political Science Association (APSA) manual style, such as below:


Arabic romanization should be written as follows:

Letters: 'a, b, t, th, j, h, kb, d, dh, r, z, s, sh, s, d, t, z, gh, f, q, l, m, n, h, w, y. Short vowels: a, i, u. long vowels: ā, ī, ū. Diphthongs: aw, ay. Tà marbūtā: t. Article: al-. For detail information on Arabic Romanization, please refer the transliteration system of the Library of Congress (LC) Guidelines.
تقدم صالون إسلاميكا (ISSLN 0215-0492; E-ISSLN 2335-6145) مجلة علمية دولية محكمة تصدر عن مركز دراسات الإسلام والمجتمع (PPIM) جامعة شريف هدى الإسلام الحكومية تجاكرتا، تعنى بدراسة الإسلام في إندونيسيا خاصة وفي جوب شرق آسيا عامة. وتستهدف المجلة نشر البحوث العلمية الأصلية والقضايا المخصصية حول الموضوع، كما تُركز بإسهابات الباحثين أصحاب التخصصات ذات الصلة، وتُتضمن جميع الأبحاث المتعلقة بالبحوث من قبل مجموعة مختصة.

تم اعتماد إسلاميكا من قبل وزارة البحث والتطوير والتعليم العالي جمهورية إندونيسيا باعتبارها دورية علمية (رقم القرار: 32a/E/KPT/2017).

إسلاميكا عضو في الإحالة التالية في الأدوات الأكاديمية (CrossRef) منذ 2014، وبالتالي فإن جميع المقالات التي تنشرها مرتبة حسب مرجع الوثيقة الرقمية (DOI).

إسلاميكا مجلة مقررة في سكوبس (Scopus) منذ 30 مايو 2015.

عنوان المجلة:

الناشر:

Phone: (62-21) 7423543, 7499272, Fax: (62-21) 7408633; E-mail: studia.islamika@uinjkt.ac.id
Website: http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/studia-islamika

قيمة الاشتراك السنوي خارج إندونيسيا:
للمؤسسات: 75 دولار أمريكي، ونسخة واحدة قيمتها 30 دولار أمريكي.
للفرئ: 40 دولار أمريكي، ونسخة واحدة قيمتها 20 دولار أمريكي.
والقيمة لا تشمل تكلفة الرسال البريد الجوي.

رقم الحساب:
خارج إندونيسيا (دولار أمريكي):
PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia account No. 101-00-0514550-1 (USD).
داخل إندونيسيا (روبية):
PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia No Rsk: 128-00-0105080-3 (Rp).

قيمة الاشتراك السنوي داخل إندونيسيا:
لسنة واحدة 150,000 روبية (المؤسسة) ونسخة واحدة قيمتها 50,000 روبية.
لفرد 100,000 روبية (الفرد) ونسخة واحدة قيمتها 40,000 روبية.
والقيمة لا تشمل على التكلفة للرسالة البريد الجوي.
سودانيا إسلاميا
Democratic Dilemma of Malay Islamic Party: 
PAS, Coalition Pattern, and Rising Social Issues
Mohd. Izani Mohd. Zain & Mohd. Daud Mat Din

Contesting Ethnic and Religious Identities 
in the 2019 Indonesian Elections: 
Political Polarization in West Kalimantan
Zuly Qodir, Hasee Jubba, & Mega Hidayati

Navigating Against 
Salafi-Wahabi Expansion in Malaysia: 
The Role of State and Society
Kamarulnizam Abdullah

What Makes Islamic Microfinance Islamic? 
A Case of Indonesia’s Bait al-Māl wa al-Tamwīl
Hyung-Jun Kim & Bambang Hudayana

Restructuring Traditional 
Islamic Education in Indonesia: 
Challenges for Pesantren Institution
Ervan Nurrarrah & Dedi Wahyudi

التعليم الإسلامي المفتوح
لمجتمع معاشر مفتوح (1937-1943)
إرهام

 красивая статья