Islamic Turn in Malay Historiography: 

Bestan al-Sultan: Of 17th Century Aceh

Jajat Budhanudin

The Political Dynamics of Islamophobia 
in Jokowi’s Era: A Discourse Analysis of 
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To Combat Extremism, 
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Takeshi Kohno

The Roots of Indonesia’s Resilience 
Against Violent Extremism

Jamhari & Testriono

Revisiting the Dusun Nyoir Rebellion 
in Narathiwat (South Thailand), April 1948

Christopher Mark Joll

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Table of Contents

Articles

483   Takeshi Kohno  
To Combat Extremism,  
How to Frame Religion Matters:  
Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective  

517   Jamhari & Testriono  
The Roots of Indonesia's Resilience Against Violent Extremism  

547   Christopher Mark Joll  
Revisiting the Dusun Nyoir Rebellion in Narathiwat (South Thailand), April 1948  

579   Jajat Burhanudin  
Islamic Turn in Malay Historiography:  
Bustān al-Salāṭin of 17th Century Aceh  

607   Bambang Irawan & Ismail Fahmi Arrauf Nasution  
The Political Dynamics of Islamophobia in Jokowi’s Era: A Discourse Analysis of Online Media Reporting  

637   R. Yani‘ah Wardani & Muhammad Nida‘ Fadlan  
Al-Ḥadāthah al-Islāmiyah al-mutaghayyirah:
Book Review

677  
Endi Aulia Garadian
Jawisasi: Proses Integrasi
Muslim Kamboja ke Dunia Melayu

Document

699  
Laifa Annisa Hendarmin, Ida Rosyidah,
& Mochamad Iqbal Nurmansyah
Pesantren during the Pandemic:
Resilience and Vulnerability
Christopher Mark Joll

Revisiting the Dusun Nyoir Rebellion in Narathiwat (South Thailand), April 1948

Abstract: This article revisits the Dusun Nyoir rebellion of April 1948. My primary objective is to fill gaps missed by others whom I have learnt much from. Few familiar with the wider geography of violence in South Thailand are unaware of connections between this and the coordinated attacks on April 28 2004, which included the employment of Malay magic. This article demonstrates the importance of commitments to both conducting fieldwork in conservative rural communities and interacting with the secondary literature. The former revealed connections between Haji Mat Karae (who led the Dusun Nyoir rebellion) and Kyai Salleh active in Batu Pahat before the return of the British in 1945. Equally importantly, engaging in both ethnographic fieldwork and the relevant secondary literature brought into focus case studies of Malay rebellion having occurred during epochs of geo-political chaos throughout the Thai-Malay Peninsula, which those concerned with the political chaos caused by Thailand’s disorderly state have missed.

Keywords: South Thailand, Sufism, Ilmu Kebal, Rebellion, Malaysia.

Kata kunci: Thailand Selatan, Sufisme, Ilmu Kebal, Pemberontakan, Malaysia.
This article revisits an infamous three-day altercation that began in late April 1948, in Dusun Nyoir. At the time, this was a relatively isolated village in the district of Rangae, in the Narathiwat Province close to the north-eastern Malaysian state of Kelantan. Before the co-ordinated attacks against Thai security forces in April 2004 (McCargo 2008, 108–10) that occurred four months after an audacious arms heist at an army camp in Narathiwat (International Crisis Group 2005, 17–21), the Dusun Nyoir rebellion was the largest, most lethal clash between Thailand’s southern Malays and the Thai police and army. It is difficult to imagine anyone even superficially interested in the geography of violence in South Thailand not having heard of this incident, which has been most thoroughly analysed by Chaiwat Satha-Anand (Satha-Anand 2006).

The ethnographic vignettes and textual titbits introduced below are informed by my primary objective of filling in gaps missed by others. Firstly, my informants cited Haji Mat Karae (d. 1977), mentioned by Chaiwat (Satha-Anand 2006, 21), as one of the leaders of the Dusun Nyoir rebellion, who played the leading role in April 1948. Secondly, the forms of invulnerability (‘ilmu kebal), and invisibility (‘ilmu ghaib) “magic” were the result of contacts between Haji Mat Karae, and Muhammad Salleh bin Abdul Karim (1916-1959), better known in British Malaya as Panglima (commander) Kyai Salleh. This relates to the third gap that my revisiting of the Dusun Nyoir rebellion achieves, namely reconstructing the geo-political chaos that existed throughout the Thai/Malay Peninsula in the decade before 1948. As is well known, an issue which colonized the carnal cavities of security specialists working in South Thailand immediately after 2004 was the role of trans-national jihadism (Liow 2006a, 2016, 99–134). As Mark Woodward et.al. have observed (2014), too many assume a strong correlation—even causal relationship—between the school of thought that Muslim constituencies subscribe to, and their propensity to violence. Specifically, Salafism—however defined—is intolerance and violence, whereas Sufi orders (tariqah) are tolerant and nonviolent. Woodward rejects correlations between theology and violent tendencies. This case study documents the role of Islamic movements connected to tariqah, but—more importantly—suggests that political instability, more than anything else, leads to violence.

This article is divided into three sections. The first summarizes commonalities and connections between the attacks in South Thailand
on April 28 2004, and those in Dusun Nyoir in April 1948, concluding with a summary of links between Haji Mat Karae, and Kyai Salleh. The second section moves from South Thailand to Batu Pahat, in Negeri Johor. This documents the career of Panglima Kyai Salleh and his connections with the Qadiriyyah wa Naqshabandiyah through his murshid (guide) Haji Fadil (d. 1951), who was both the Mufti of Johor and one of the Sultan’s favourite practitioners of magic (pawang). I describe Kyai Salleh’s leadership of the Tentera Sabiliolah Selendang Merah (Army of Red Bands) in Batu Pahat, his magical prowess, and the geopolitical chaos at both the end of the Japanese occupation, and the tumultuous two-week interregnum before the return of the British. The third section returns to Thailand and presents details of the geopolitical chaos that affected Malay communities in both Thailand and British Malaya during the 1940s, material noticeably absent in extant studies of the Dusun Nyoir rebellion.

The Coordinated Attacks of April 28, 2004, in South Thailand, and the Dusun Nyoir Rebellion of April 28, 1948

Connections between the coordinated attacks in South Thailand (in April 28 2004), and the Dusun Nyoir rebellion (of April 28 1948) have been made by a number of Southern Thailand specialists, with the most authoritative penned by Chaiwat Satha-Anand (Satha-Anand 2006). In ways that resemble Cheah Boon Kheng’s approach to reconstructing “facts” about rebellions in British Malaya (See Boon Kheng Cheah 2006, Cheah Boon Kheng 2012, 2014), Chaiwat is attentive to differences in the “facts” of these incidents across the range of sources. Comparisons between these events are many. It was no coincidence that the April 2004 attacks, the most symbolic of which was on the historic Kru-Ze Mosque (See Satha-Anand 1993), were 56 years after the three-day rebellion in Dusun Nyoir began. In both, Malay magical practices were involved. The weapons of choice for both incidents were swords, rather than firearms. The primary purpose of this section is to summarize the most pertinent elements of these two incidents and to achieve this article’s stated objective of filling gaps overlooked in extant explanations of Dusun Nyoir. I conclude by bringing readers back to Dusun Nyoir, where I began conducting fieldwork in 2012, and—more importantly—made my first connections with Kyai Salleh of Batu Pahat, which is the focus of the following section.
The English translation of *History of the Malay Kingdom of Pattani*, which was written in Jawi by a Patani Malay nationalist under the pseudonym Ibrahim Syukri, provides the following summary of the Dusun Nyoir rebellion:

On 28 April 1948, there occurred a fierce battle between one thousand Malays and a force of Siam-Thai police at Kampung Dusun Nyoir in the province of Narathiwat. The Siamese police began the attack against the Malays, accusing the Malays of actions against the Siamese government. The battle lasted for 36 hours before the Malays retreated to the jungle to carry out a guerrilla struggle. Close to 400 Malays, including old people, women, and children, were killed in the battle, and more than 30 Siamese police were killed [...] On 27 April, three Siamese bombers flew over the area of the battle to bomb the Malays. Siamese warships harboured at Kuala Bengenara were ordered to land their troops to assist the Siamese police in killing the Malay people (1985, 9).

Chaiwat notes that this incident has been referred to in a number of ways; in Thai sources these include “rebellion” or “riot”. By contrast, Malay sources employ terms such as “uprising” (*kebangkitan*) or “war” (*perang*). These are not the only discrepancies between Thai and Malay accounts. The former assume that local representatives of the Thai state were the targets, but the latter assume that this was a “spontaneous incident”, rather than an “organized movement” possessing “clear political objective(s).” For reasons explained below, Mohammad Zambiri Abdul Malek (1993) claims that the Royal Thai Police had mobilized against a Malay gathering they suspected of preparing an attack against them. According to Chaiwat, members (mainly Chinese) of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) had begun threatening, abusing, and stealing from Malay communities. One of his informants related that, after repeated attacks by CPM bandits, local villagers organized their response. One group performed a sacred oil bathing ceremony in a small cave known as “ox cave”, where many dipped their hands into a pan of boiling coconut oil that had been blessed for the ceremony. The oil was then applied over their bodies, and it was believed to make them invulnerable.

They met at the house of one of the leaders, adjacent to a mosque. Some of Chaiwat’s local informants cite Tuan Hajji Abdul Rahman from the Malay state of Perak (known locally as “Tok Perak”) as one of the main leaders. In addition to Tok Perak, Haji Ma Karae (Pageseng)—who we deal with below in detail—is cited by Chaiwat as one of the
local leaders, along with Ma Lagor Hasan, Guedor Awae, and Luedor Awae Ju (Satha-Anand 2006, 21). Weapons—including axes, knives and swords—were collected and sharpened, while new weapons were constructed out of bamboo and wood.

Duncan McCargo (McCargo 2008, 135) relates that in the morning of April 28, 2004—exactly 56 years after the Dusun Nyoir rebellion—twelve targets in Pattani, Yala, and Songkhla provinces were attacked (see figure 1). These led to 107 deaths, most of whom were Malay militants. As a result of the attack on the checkpoint next to Patani’s historic Kru-Ze mosque, 32 Malay, who had taken refuge after their abortive attack, were killed by Thai security forces.

Ustadz Soh, who had worked at Pondok Babor Ming, although as an administrator—not a teacher, is widely regarded as one of the masterminds of these attacks. He had also taught at a local *tadika* (*Taman Didikan Kanak-kanak*) in the village of Ban Som, Pattani Province in 2003, which McCargo claimed was where the attack on the Kru-Ze Mosque had been planned. Ustadz Soh was also invited to speak on a regular basis at a mosque in Ban Kuwa, where in addition to expounding on the grievances common among fellow Patani ethnonationalists, he referred to “magic spells and their efficacy for
around half an hour.” He also arranged visits to historic places such as the Kru-Ze mosque, and Ban Dato, and recounted the success of the Dusun Nyor rebellion. Approximately two months before these attacks, Ustadz Soh had held ceremonies where young recruits gave an oath of allegiance (PM. Supoh). He had led physical training sessions, but the use of firearms were not included in these (McCargo 2008, 135–36).

Most participating in the April 28 attacks acquired magic spells from a certain Ismael Jaffar (aka, Ismael Yameena, Poh Su), who lived in a village in Tanoh Merah, across the border from Narathiwat in Kelantan. Interesting details added by McCargo include that Ismael Jaffar had constructed a “brick meditation cave” in his house and that he was one of the authors of the booklet Berjihad di Patani (Anonymous nd). His assistants—one of whom was from Waeng (a district in southern Narathiwat)—administered spells. Although Ismael Jaffar sometimes visited Ustadz Soh in Patani, on March 7 2004 Ismael Jaffar stayed for two days and conducted “spell ceremonies at a house near Mae Lan”. These ceremonies were attended by “more than two hundred people from Pattani, Yala, and Songkhla”—some of whom led the April 28 attacks. Ismael Jaffar also blessed between thirty and forty knives and swords, as well as tasbih (prayer beads) and azimat (amulets), which were found on those involved on April 28. McCargo also relates that Ismael Jaffar visited the Kru-Ze mosque to perform a ceremony on March 7, 2004, thus “completing his activities” (McCargo 2008, 138–39).

Writing as he did before Sascha Helbardt’s analysis of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate (BRN-C) (Helbardt 2015), McCargo referred to the structure of the movement in 2004 as “sketchy.” Nevertheless, what was clear was the employment of “small cells, locally recruited, who had personal knowledge of only one or two core leaders; and a division of labour between those whose primary duties were observation and intelligence gathering, and those who carried out actual attacks” (McCargo 2008, 142). Over and above propagandists, there were recruiters (in sympathetic Malay communities) and supporters (who gathered local intelligence on Thai police and military) (See Helbardt 2015, 27–89). Young operatives in 2004 referred to themselves as “abadae” (from abadan). They had undergone the supoh ceremonies which conferred invulnerability and invisibility (McCargo 2008, 148). A widely cited report by the International Crisis Group claims that
the attackers belonged to the *Hikmat Allah Abadan* (Brotherhood of the Eternal Judgement of God) (International Crisis Group 2005, 21). Although Ustadz Soh did not specify “who to recruit or how;” once recruited, he assumed responsibility for deciding who could join his *Abadae*, and only those who had undergone these “protective spell ceremonies” attacked state officials. Following their initiation, they were informed that their group was *Permuda* (SM. Youth). They were told nothing about the background or leadership of the group, but that recruiters or other leaders provided “instructions and ideological explanations”, often in empty mosques. The night before the attack, participants drank holy water, which “boosted their confidence”, as they believed this would make them “invulnerable to bullets” (McCargo 2008, 135). Nevertheless, this audacious attack began with a raid of the nearby police post for weapons, in which two policemen were killed, and with the firebombing of both this post and police motorbikes. Police and army reinforcements surrounded the Kru-Ze mosque where the attackers had retreated to. In addition to three fatalities amongst the security forces, the 32 Malays who tragically perished were aged between eighteen to sixty-three years-old (McCargo 2008, 141).

My brief summary of the Dusun Nyoir rebellion, and the raids across South Thailand’s Malay-dominated provinces have documented what I consider to be the most important connections between these events. Given that April 28 is widely assumed to be the date that the former began, it is no coincidence that the latter occurred exactly 56 years later. Secondly, the most important characteristic of both was that local Malays did not fight with conventional firearms. Their weapons of choice were a mixture of axes, knives, swords, spikes, and spears. More importantly, those wielding these believed in the efficacy of Malay magic and its conferral of (amongst other things) invulnerability and invisibility.

Since late 2012, I have been regularly visiting an isolated *pondok* located in the mountains between the village of Dusun Nyoir and the upper reaches of the Saiburi River. This particular *pondok*, where there was neither running water nor electricity when I first visited, had been established and led by Ayoh Ding, the son of Haji Mat Karae mentioned by Chaiwat. I had first visited Ayoh Ding in his *pondok*, with a team of local Malay researchers. I was primarily interested in his reputation as an important conduit for local Sufi movements that I had begun studying, scattered...
between Ayutthaya and Narathiwat.\textsuperscript{11} Committed as I was to a patient, slow, and long-term approach to ethnographic fieldwork, it was only after I felt that sufficient trust had been established that I began asking questions about his father, and his role in the events of April 1948. Given that I was in the habit of asking permission to make copies of locally produced books, collections of prayers, \textit{azimat} (amulets), or Sufi lineages (\textit{silsilah}), I asked whether his father had written anything. If he had, would he be willing for me to make an electronic version of this? Did he have an email address that I could send a PDF of this precious family document to?

Ayoh Ding produced from his bag a well-worn—and clearly much loved—booklet which was held together with grey duct tape. Its title, written in the Jawi script, was \textit{Rahasia Amalan Kyai Salleh} (The mysteries of the practice of Kyai Salleh) (see figure 2). Ayoh Ding explained that upon hearing reports of Kyai Salleh’s successful employment of Islamic knowledge brought to Batu Pahat from Java, Haji Mat Karae travelled from Dusun Nyoir to Negeri Johor. After staying with Kyai Salleh for 6 months, Haji Mat Karae undertook a period of seclusion in the jungle before returning, in early 1947.
Connections between Batu Pahat, Negeri Johor (1945), and Dusun Nyoir (1948)

In the preceding section, I summarized connections between the Dusun Nyoir rebellion of April 1948, and the attacks in South Thailand on April 2004. The latter occurred exactly 56 years after the former. In both, rather than firearms, those involved wielded traditional weapons, and employed a range of magical practices influenced by Javanese mysticism. I concluded by bringing readers back to Dusun Nyoir, by introducing documentary evidence that Haji Mat Karae (mentioned by Chaiwat) had direct connections with Kyai Salleh of Batu Pahat, in Negeri Johor. In the following section, I reconstruct Kyai Salleh’s career and influence. These began in Batu Pahat at the end of the Japanese occupation, but spread with the growing geopolitical chaos created by a combination of the Japanese occupation, their surrender, and the power vacuum that followed in its aftermath, which also impacted South Thailand.12

Figure 3: Location of the Southern Thai Province of Narathiwat and Batu Pahat (Negeri Johor). Insert is based on Cheah Boon Kheng (2012, 205).

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It will soon become evident that I (unapologetically) draw on Cheah Boon Kheng’s *Red star over Malaya: Resistance and social conflict during and after the Japanese occupation of Malaya* (2012, 241), first published in 1983. This includes a description of the inter-racial conflicts between Malays and Chinese which began in the district of Batu Pahat, in Negeri Johor, in May 1945 (see figure 3). These soon spread to other parts of south-western Johor but increased in intensity after the Japanese surrender. Norwithstanding these not having been coordinated, similar clashes also occurred as far north as lower Perak. The most important commonalities between these were their religious nature: *jihād fī sabīlillāh* (literally War in the Path of Allah). Cheah Boon Kheng describes that while many of these stories became myths, “even myths have their origins in real events.” Distinguishing between myth and fact is a difficult task, for a number of reasons. The most important reason is the inter-racial dimension, with each blaming the other for causing the trouble (2012, 241).

In Batu Pahat, Malay resistance against the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was mainly organized by Javanese kyai who led local chapters of Sufi orders. These were “highly venerated” by local Malays, largely due to their “charismatic powers” which they disseminated during times of crisis. Cheah Boon Kheng summarizes that among the “secret powers” that these Javanese Sufi Kyai possessed were *ilmu batin* (spiritual or mystical knowledge), *ilmu ghaib* (knowledge of becoming invisible and inaudible), *ilmu pencak silat* (knowledge of martial arts), and *ilmu kebal* (knowledge of invulnerability) (2012, 245). Malay self-defence groups in Batu Pahat might have coalesced into Sabilillah movements, but this was not an organization but instead a “loose religious movement based on Sufi mysticism” (2012, 248). Kyai Salleh formed *Tentena Sabil Selendang Merah*, a name coined by the red (*merah*) sashes (*selendang merah*) worn by its members across their chests. Rather than guns, *parang panjang*, *lembing*, *kris*, *pedang*, and *rombak* were their weapons of choice (2012, 208).

Kyai Salleh was born in Parit Jawa, south of Muar town. His mother was Javanese, and his father was said to be an Indian. In terms of his spiritual lineage (*silsilah*), Kyai Salleh’s Sufi *murshid* was Kyai Haji Fadil of Johor (d.1956), who was a well-known member of the Qadiriyyah wa Naqshbandiyyah (2012, 200, 07). Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas (1963, 34-5, 52-4) describes Haji Fadil as Sultan Ibrahim’s favourite pawing, and he lived in the Pasir Plangi Mosque patronized by him. Perhaps as a result of royal patronage, Kyai Haji Fadil reputedly functioned as *murshid*
to as many as 4,000 murid (disciples), all of whom he had personally inducted into the Qadiriyyah wa Naqshabandiyah. As the name suggests, this tariqa combined the devotional practices of the Qadiriyyah and the Naqshabandiyah orders, an innovation undertaken by a Malay from West Kalimantan by the name of Sheikh Ahmad Khatib bin 'Abd al-Ghaffar al-Shambas (1802-1872). As was the custom during the 19th century—which Michael Laffan has suggested was a “Sufi Century” (2014)—his operational base was Makkah. He personally inducted thousands of pilgrims to Makkah and established personal representatives (khalīfah) with formal permission (ijāzah) to induct others into his order following their return to Southeast Asia.

Before the passing of Shaykh Aḥmad Khāṭib al-Shambas in 1872, 'Abd al-Karīm (b. 1840) was appointed as his successor. He was a native of the West Javanese polity of Banten, and this appointment significantly contributed to the growth of the Qadiriyyah wa Naqshabandiyah in Java. Furthermore, this was the most popular order among the large Javanese Diaspora in British Malay and included Kyai Salleh’s parents and spiritual father. One of the many contributions made by Sartono Kartodirdjo in his (now classic) study of the 1888 revolt in Banten, was his meticulous analysis of the role that members of the Qadiriyyah wa Naqshabandiyah played in this rebellion (1966, particularly 142-88). As is well known, other rebellions followed, the most important of which occurred in 1927 (See Ensering 1995).

Returning to Kyai Salleh; before the Japanese occupation he was rumored to have led a gang of robbers, and had spent a period in prison. At the height of the fighting Kyai Salleh recounted receiving visions of the widely revered Shaykh ‘Abdul-Qadir Jilani, who was dressed in black and would warn him of any imminent danger. His panang panjang (long sword) apparently claimed 172 Chinese heads (Cheah Boon Kheng 2012, 250-51). Kyai Salleh and his followers recited Quranic verses and other Islamic formulas hundreds of times after each of the five obligatory daily prayers. Disciples were instructed that invulnerability depended on their own behavior and the diligent performance of this ritual regime. They were forbidden to “steal, rape, torture, or kill anyone innocent, or to provoke action”. Anyone failing to scrupulously follow these instructions would immediately lose their invulnerability (2012, 206).

Kyai Salleh first came into prominence in mid-1945 after organizing a successful attack against the MPAJA in Simpang Kiri, and his fame soon spread throughout the district of Batu Pahat. Malays were impressed by
Revisiting the Dusun Nyoir Rebellion

559

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Studia Islamika, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2021

stories of his strength and fortitude; of his single-handed defeat of 200 Chinese, or of his ability to lift two huge coconut trees barring his assault. Cheah Boon Kheng (2012, 206) cites a British intelligence report that describes some of his known supernatural powers: he “cannot be killed by bullets; he can walk dry-shod across rivers; he can burst any bonds that are put upon him; his voice can paralyze his assailants, making them drop their weapons; and were Chinese to take him and set him in a cauldron of boiling water he would emerge alive and unharmed” (2012, 250). Chinese accounts confirm that despite few Malays using automatic weapons, they inflicted heavy casualties. This attests to the “fighting courage and religious fanaticism” of Kyai Salleh’s Sabīlillāh (2012, 208).

Although Kyai Salleh was the commander of various groups in Batu Pahat in June 1945, he was most active during the two-week interregnum between the Japanese surrender and arrival of British troops (see Table 1). During this period, the Sabīlillāh “meted out retaliation for the widespread MPAJA abductions, tortures, and executions of Malays regarded as informers and collaborators” (2012, 252). The first Malay attacks occurred in Batu Pahat on 10 May 1945 (2012, 218), although although Malay informants cite these as beginning a month earlier, following the abduction and murder of a Malay headman in Tanjong Sembrong which was allegedly provoked by his failure to pay the monthly tax of $3 to Chinese MPAJU officials (2012, 196). On May 1945, members of the MPAJA abducted two Malays in Parit Khalid. One escaped, fleing to the home of Haji Talib, a disciple of the Sufi mystic Tuan Guru Haji Mokhtar.

Haji Mokhtar led the resistance to the MPAJA, initially by training a group of warriors. On 5 May, he issued a fatwa declaring a jihād (2012, 211). Malays related rumors of organized MPAJA attacks on Malay populations to both Ismail bin Dato Abdullah (the district officer of Batu Pahat), and Japanese authorities. Although discounted by the district officer, the Japanese organized a joint Malay/Japanese attack in which a MPAJU leader was killed. On 6 May, Japanese troops and two Malay youths rounded up a lorry-load of Chinese. The MPAJA retaliated with raids against Malay villages. Malay attacks comprised of forty men wielding long swords (parang panjang). After this point, no one could escape the conflict that ensued. The clashes soon spread to a district led by Penghulu Muhammad Kari, who invited Kyai Salleh to lead Malay attacks against the Chinese. Rumors about communist atrocities included the MPAJU having “butchered, gunned down, or beheaded
Malays and administered the 'water treatment'—pumping water into the victim’s body until the belly swelled, immersion in a tub of water until drowned, or scalding with hot water” (2012, 211). Cautions were issued by both groups: the Malay informers were instructed to warn people in their villages of the imminent Chinese take-over of their country, and communists in the MPAJA alerted Chinese communities about the coming Malay rampage. Attacking Malays wielding “parang panjang and spears, hurled themselves into Chinese houses and settlements, screaming and killing men, women, and children in their path and those who could not escape or resist them. After pillaging Chinese houses, the Malays usually set them on fire” (Cheah Boon Kheng 2012, 219).

Despite the lack of evidence substantiating these claims, Chinese, MPAJA, and British accounts, also analysed by Tim Harper, claim that Japanese provocateurs instigated these inter-racial clashes (Harper 1998, 52–53, Bayly and Harper 2007, 44, 47). What is clear is that they “added their own military support to the Malay onslaughts, inflicting great suffering on the Chinese in the Batu Pahat district” (2012, 266). There were a number of developments after the Japanese surrender on August 16. The MPAJA in south-western Johor were optimistic about their future chances. They took “control of most towns” and began settling old scores with the “Malay police and others who had worked under the Japanese” (2012, 223). These discussions, along with the general lack of respect for Malays among the MPAJA brought further deterioration to already strained race relations (Burridge 1957, Khoo Kay Kim 1981). Chinese pursuit of political power and the brutal settling of scores in the days and weeks following August 16 was, according to Cheah Boon Kheng, the “last straw for the Malays” who had by that time ceased attacks (Cheah Boon Kheng 2012, 267).

The formation of the Tentera Sabilillah Selendang Merah by Kyai Salleh was one Malay response to MPAJA aggression. Batu Pahat again witnessed “terrible bloodshed during this interregnum”. Malay attacks were said to be more ferocious than those of the Chinese and surpassed their earlier level. They fought more determinedly and with greater religious fanaticism. During raids, the Tentera Sabilillah Selendang Menab chanted prayers while wielding “parang, kris, bamboo spears, and iron rods (some bearing Quranic verses)” (2012, 224). The intensity of Malay resistance is partly explained by rumors that the Chinese would seize political power, both in Johor and throughout
British Malaya. Other claims were made that the British had promised to hand Malaya over to the MPAJA. It was at this juncture that Kyai Salleh was commissioned by the Sultan of Johor, through Kyai Haji Fadil. At a meeting in the Pasir Plangi Palace, the Sultan “embraced Kyai Salleh, kissed his hand, and thanked him for his deeds. He asked Kyai Salleh to “menjaga negeri kita” (guard our country)” (2012, 225).

In August 1945, MPAJA guerrillas took control of Muar and Batu Pahat while Kyai Salleh’s militia was attacking Chinese in neighbouring regions. Kyai Salleh personally led attacks on “Chinese strongholds around Ayer Hitam, while his commanders attacked Chinese in the area around Batu Pahat.” Cheah Boon Kheng recounts plans for their biggest attack on the predominantly Chinese town of Parit Jawa, south of Muar. All commanders including Kyai Mashudi, and Kyai Wâk Joyo were to be involved, and Saturday the 25th of August, the start of the fasting month of Ramadan, was chosen. Kyai Mashudi argued that the attack should begin on the Wednesday before, and mobilized his militia, which was perhaps motivated by his desire to set himself up as a rival to Kyai Salleh. The night before Mashudi’s attack, his forces “assembled at Parit Gantong, a quarter mile from Parit Jawa”, where they spent the entire night performing prayers. The Chinese in Parit Jawa who received news about this attack evacuated the town. Mashudi’s attack (which no other commanders joined) was not only repelled, but the MPAJA and other Chinese groups counter-attacked Malays in nearby areas and 10 Malays were killed (2012, 226).

This setback served to strengthen the unity of the Malays under Kyai Salleh’s leadership. Kyai Salleh led an attack on Batu Pahat town, which had one of the largest Chinese populations in south-western Johor. His army marched into Peserai on the border of Bandar Penggaram. The British had appointed Datuk Onn Jaffar (the founder of UMNO), as the District Officer (DO) to settle communal disputes. Onn Jaffar and a local chief intercepted Kyai Salleh, requesting that he call off his attack. Cheah Boon Kheng recounts that Onn Jaffar rode his bicycle to Bukit Pasir. He had arranged for Kyai Salleh to follow him a short distance behind. Should the Datuk succeed in reaching MPAJA headquarters, Kyai Salleh was to join him inside. Despite his reservations, Kyai Salleh agreed to accompany and protect him. After shocking two Chinese by introducing himself as the district officer (DO), Datuk Onn was taken to MPAJA headquarters. He was later joined by Kyai Salleh. These “peace”
talks lasted the entire day and ended with a truce. Follow up talks were scheduled to iron out any further misunderstandings with the MPAJA. It was the month of Ramadan, and this was seen as a most auspicious achievement. Nevertheless, while these talks were being conducted, violence in nearby districts continued. Upon receiving this news, Datuk Onn suspected that Kyai Salleh had betrayed him. Together with Datuk Abdul Rahman Musa, he rushed to Kampung Bagan to avoid the shattering of the peace settlement with the MPAJA (2012, 228).

There is no consensus on what took place when Datuk Onn confronted Kyai Salleh. Some recount Datuk Onn’s nervousness upon catching up with Kyai Salleh and his 1,600-strong militia who “had already worked themselves into (a) frenzy”. Another account claims the following rebuke being meted out:

What is the meaning of this, Salleh, Datuk Onn asked of him. ‘You can’t do this sort of thing. Such an action is against the law. You should have consulted with me first. I am the District Officer here. This gathering has been inspired by you.’ ‘Here is my breast’, Datuk Onn offered him. ‘Plunge your dagger into it if you do not wish to obey me. After you have struck me down then you may do what you wish. So long as there is life in this body, I shall stop you. I, as the DO and the representative of the Sultan and the ra‘ayah [the people] am responsible for what happens in this district. I do not want to be held responsible later for any major disaster such as you have planned (Cheah Boon Kheng 2012, 228).

Cheah Boon Kheng notes that other accounts claim that Datuk Onn “recognized Kyai Salleh’s authority and flattered him”, before warning all present that “British troops would soon arrive, and that if order were not restored by then Malay blood would flow; and he indicated that the Malays had achieved their goal, when he forced the Chinese leaders to promise the crowd that no more Malays would be killed. Kyai Salleh promised the Chinese that if another Malay was killed all the Chinese in the town would be slaughtered.” Datuk Onn informed the militia that they had “succeeded in their objectives”, and that the Chinese had learnt a lesson they would not forget. Furthermore, the Chinese would not commit any further attacks on the Malays. (Cheah Boon Kheng 2012, 229).

Over the next few days, Kyai Salleh and Datuk Onn met with Selendang Merah chapters throughout Johor Baru to appeal for calm and peace. Many (celebratory) feasts were also arranged which they were obliged to attend as honored guests. This resolution was achieved before the arrival of British troops in Johor, perhaps around the time of the
Muslim festival celebrating the end of the fasting month of Ramadan. The first British officials arrived in Johor on 8 September, reaching Batu Pahat a few days later where 14,000 refugees from conflict affected regions were encountered. British attempts to arrest Kyai Salleh were blocked by Datuk Onn who realized the utility of securing his support for furthering his political ambitions. Datuk Onn appointed Kyai Salleh as the new penghulu (village headman) of Simpang Kiri in September. Moreover, after Datuk Jaffar formed Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung (Peninsular Malay Movement) in January 1946, the president of its Simpang Kiri branch was Kyai Salleh.

There were other altercations in Sungai Manik (southern Perak) involving the mixed Banjarese/Malay population. This was over a 4-week period from mid-August 1945, but there were indirect links to Batu Pahat. Abductions and murders by the MPAJA led villagers to organize self-defense forces. Local religious teachers taught Malay silat (martial arts) and Javanese ilmu kebal (knowledge of invulnerability) (2012, 274). Imam Haji Bakri and Haji Marzuki were appointed by the congregation as khalifah (official representative) and were able to issue a fatwa or (more correctly) hukum (legal ruling). Local ilmu kebal inductions spread about the time of the Japanese surrender (15 August, 1945). Among the many penghulu co-opted by the MPAJA was Haji Hassan Ibrahim. As an exponent of silat, the (armed) Chinese attempting to arrest him were reputedly killed by his “powerful blows and kicks.” His four attackers were also decapitated by him (Cheah Boon Kheng 2012, 231). Malay attacks in Sungai Manik resembled those in Johor Baru, although these were in no way directed by Kyai Salleh. However, suggestions have been made that Kyai Salleh’s Sabilillah was involved in the death of 170 Chinese in Padang Lebar, in Negeri Sembilan. For example, Kyai Selamat reputedly led 1,000 Malays on a rampage between there and Batu Kikir (Cheah Boon Kheng 2012, 233–34).

Widening Geo-Political Chaos

Above, I related the most important aspects of Kyai Salleh’s career at the end of the Japanese occupation, and during the two-week interregnum both in (and beyond) his home base of Batu Pahat. Readers will recall that Haji Mat Karae had direct contacts with his Sabilillah movement. Although there is no denying Kyai Salleh’s importance, I also documented the communal violence involving Malays, Javanese,
Banjarese, and Chinese which reached its peak in 1945. Although the preceding section took readers from South Thailand to British Malaya, we return below to South Thailand. The primary purpose of the range of secondary literature introduced below is to develop arguments that, following the defeat of the Japanese, the geo-political chaos in British Malaya (described by Cheah Boon Kheng, and Tim Harper) was widespread throughout, what I refer to as, the Thai/Malay Peninsula.

More importantly, this geopolitical chaos needs to be more widely appreciated as the context in which the Dusun Nyoir rebellion occurred. In Dusun Nyoir, Malays were preparing their response to local Chinese provocateurs. It is safe to assume that Haji Mat Karae’s sojourn to Batu Pahat was inspired by news of his prowess in defending his community. Finally, this occurred approximately two months before the British announced the Malayan emergency against the CMP that (operationally) were based in relatively isolated, mountainous parts of the Thai-Malay Peninsula, such as Dusun Nyoir. Given that few of my readers share my interest or expertise in both Thai and Malay Studies, I have summarized the most important developments between the Japanese occupation in late-1941 and the mid-1948 in Table 1, below.

Table 1: Synoptic Chronology of Geo-political Chaos in Thailand and British Malaya (1938-49)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>British Malaya</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Nov: Field Marshall Phibun Songkhram becomes Prime Minister.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>15 Feb: Singapore surrenders, The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) takes to the jungle to organize the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terengganu administered by Thai.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Thailand’s most traumatic decade of the twentieth century began with Field Marshall Phibun Songkhram becoming Prime Minister in November 1938. In British Malaya, this was initiated by the Japanese invasion in late-1941. Far from coming to an abrupt end after the
return of British colonial rulers, in post-war British Malaya the state of emergency was only declared in June 1948. It is important to reiterate that during the two-week interregnum which ended with the return of British colonial forces, rumours of war and imminent violence spread among rural Malays throughout newly liberated British Malaya. British intelligence reports (Anonymous 1947) during this time were replete with accounts of careless talk in kedai kopi (coffee shops), invulnerability cults, and underground cells “preparing to serve the motherland.” Tim Harper refer to the widespread presence of millenarian movements and secret societies (See Wynne 1941, Musa 2003) among both Chinese and Malay communities, including the following description.20

Intoxicated by a doctrine propagated by the Nan Sien Temple near Bukit Mertajam, eighteen Chinese men, women and children threw themselves into a nearby river one night in late November 1945 ‘to learn how to become saints’. Eleven of them drowned. ‘Our Chinese,’ an Ipoh newspaper warned, ‘are being deceived and cheated by various false doctrines and teachings.’ In a more [adjective missing] sense the period saw a resurgence of secret societies as ‘protectors’ of Chinese communities groups in the default of other leadership. These shadowy figures were to dominate the politics of the rural Chinese in the coming years” (1998, 53).

In addition to developments in the demise of Dutch colonialism being closely monitored, so were those in Thailand. After his successful coup in 1938, Field Marshall Phibun Songkhram declared himself Prime Minister (See Suwannathat-Pian 1995, 1996). The Malay Communist Party (MCP) did not agree to an amnesty with Bangkok until 1989 (See Marks 1994, Hack 2008). Khuang Aphaiwong might have replaced Phibun as Prime Minister in August 1944, but between this date and the coup in November 1947 that returned him to the top post, Thailand had no less than six Prime Ministers. As is well known, the Japanese invaded Thailand in 1941, landing in South Thailand, Pattani. They swiftly overran British positions along the Thai/Malay Peninsula before capturing Singapore in February 1942. Tim Harper adds that in 1943, the ceding of the northern Malay states of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu to Siam were central to the Japanese dismantling of British Malaya (1998, 36). Further south, by 1945 over 20,000 of Singapore’s Chinese residents had been evacuated to “unknown destinations.” An estimated 80,000 British subjects in Malaya were deported to Siam where as many as 30,000 died while constructing the railway to Burma. Over 20,000 Malays took refuge in
southern Siam, some taking years to return home. In October 1945, there were still 27,600 labourers living in Thailand (Harper 1998, 41).

A number of developments in Thailand during 1948 impacted dynamics on both sides of the Thai-Malayan frontier. 1948 got off to an inauspicious start with the arrest of Muhammad Sulong bin Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad al-Fatani (Haji Sulong) (1895-1954). In July 1947, Haji Sulong had issued his (now famous) seven demands that Bangkok change the way that local leaders are appointed, tax revenues spent, the Malay language used, and Islamic institutions such as courts (re)established. The chaos between the official end of WWII and early 1948 have been dealt with by others (Pitsuwan 1985, 1987, Aphornsuvan 2004, 2007). One of the accounts of this period, which best captures the geo-political chaos, is provided by Ibrahim Syukri (1985), whose short description of Dusun Nyoir, cited above, is followed by descriptions of developments in Bangkok and how these impact southern Malays.

On both sides of the border, Malays perceived that there was a historic opportunity for Patani to reclaim its freedom. Between March 13 and 16 1947, a gathering, calling itself the People’s Congress, at a local Islamic school in Perak, by the name of al-Ihya Asshariff in Gunong Semanggol, was attended by 5,000 people. Many of the speeches mentioned the growing crisis in Patani. It was here that Ustaz Abu Bakar al-Baqir and Dr Burhanuddin launched Malaya’s first Islamic political party, the Hizbul Muslimin. Among other things, they claimed that revolution in South Thailand was imminent, and that, should this spread to British Malaya, it would contribute to the end of British rule. There were also attempts to “recruit for the struggle in Patani” (Bayly and Harper 2007, 417-18).

Around the same time, Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen (the son of the last Raja of Patani) formed GAMPAR (Gabongan Melayu Pattani Raya/Association of the Malays of Greater Pattani) (Naidu 2020). Since the Japanese surrender three years earlier, Patani Malays living in Kelantan had engaged in uncoordinated attacks. Tengku Mahyiddeen’s biographer, Hugh Wilson, suggests that the objective of these groups was nothing more than creating “sufficient chaos to persuade the Thai central authority of the advantages to be gained from extending some form of self-government” (1992, 52). Their lack of co-ordination was largely due to ideological divisions. Wilson refers to some as
“fundamentalist”, while others were somewhat secular, with a third constituency being magical/spiritual (1992, 32). Groups possessing magico-religious overtones were associated with “invulnerability cults”. These spontaneously evolved in reaction to particular circumstances (1992, 52). Wilson also mentions the role of individuals “held in high esteem at the village or district level”, whose resistance to Thai idolaters was based on the threat to Islam. Other leaders, however

Indulged extravagant notions by claiming a magico-religious power to confer invulnerability on their followers. In one area, 250 villagers formed themselves into Parang Panjang […] and elsewhere, similar groups were reported to have come into existence with such names as Sabillullah […] Selendang Hitam (“Black Scarves”) and the Selendang Merah (“Red Scarves”) (1989, 378).

We are now able to identify who these red scarves were, and they included Haji Mat Karae of Dusun Nyoir, who had been influenced by his contacts with Kyai Salleh in Batu Pahat.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding my primary formation as an anthropologist (See Joll 2011) who has written some revisionist historiographies of Thailand’s Muslim minority (See Joll 2012, Joll and Srawut Aree 2020, Dalrymple and Joll 2021), I have also sought to “put anthropology to work” by pointing out what security studies specialists have missed (Joll 2010, 2015b, 2020, 2021). I lived in Pattani between 2000 and 2010, and conducted extensive multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork between Ayutthaya and Narathiwat between 2012 and 2019 before becoming a COVID-19 refugee in my native New Zealand in March 2020. I write as an expatriate anomaly. My primary interests—and expertise—are empirical. Particularly in comparison with rank outsiders, I am able to access a range of Malay communities affected by this ongoing conflict with relative ease. This is related as much to my ability to communicate in the local (Patani) Malay dialect, as it is to connections with my extensive network of local Malay researchers whose trust was crucial to me meeting Ayoh Ding.

With access comes responsibilities to both accurately represent conservative rural Malayan communities and assist students and colleagues sharing my commitment to fieldwork. Some of the new insights into the Dusun Nyoir rebellion that I have presented were the
fruit of my slow, long-term approach to fieldwork. My primary objective was to fill some of the gaps missed by others. The most important was documentary evidence that I have presented which revealed links between Haji Mat Karae (the primary protagonist in Dusun Nyoir), and Kyai Salleh (of Batu Pahat). That said, other evidence has been in the public domain for decades. Therefore, I argue that the quality of peace research is unnecessarily compromised when the relevant secondary literature, which details wider context and specific connections, is overlooked. The most authoritative commentaries on Thailand’s subnational conflict in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat since 2004, have been provided by political anthropologist Marc Askew (Askew 2007a, 2007b), and seasoned commentator of Thai politics, Duncan McCargo. While the former is most famous for forwarding his “disorderly state” thesis, the latter has drawn attention to the failure of the (ill-conceived and ultimately unsuccessful) policy of co-opting Malay political elites who were members of the Wadah faction that joined General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh’s New Aspiration Party. McCargo also draws attention to the role played by Thailand’s “monarchy network” (2006) which dominated the Privy council and upper echelons of the army, both of which refused to entertain any form of regional autonomy (Jitpiromsri and McCargo 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012).

English economist John Maynard Keynes (d. 1946) once retorted that “When the facts change, I change my mind.” Askew drew attention to the impact of political chaos in Bangkok on Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat since 2004, but I have documented the geo-political chaos throughout the wider Thai/Malay Peninsula during the 1940s. A number of scholars seeking to make sense of Thailand’s subnational conflict in the Malay-dominated provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat before and after 2004 have sought comparisons with similar struggles and conflict dynamics in Aceh and the southern Philippines. In ways that demonstrate a commitment to seeking synergies between Thai and Malay studies (Dalrymple 2021, Joll 2017), I have evidenced the utility of contextualizing conflicts with ones closer to home. Related to my interest in context, I have documented the range of connections between both incidents in South Thailand, and British Malay: the attacks of April 28 2004 resembled those 56 years earlier. Over and above the timing of these incidents, both involved the wielding of traditional weapons, and both employed a range of magical techniques.
advocated by Ustadz Soh and his collaborator Ismael Jaffar. Equally important connections are those between the Dusun Nyoir rebellion led by Haji Mat Karae, and Kyai Salleh’s *Tentera Sabilillah Selendang Merah* appearing in accounts of Malay-led rebellions during the 1940s and 1980s. My empirical contributions in revisiting the Dusun Nyoir rebellion serendipitously brought me into direct contact with the son of Haji Mat Karae. Beyond these contributions, I have demonstrated the utility of spending time in both the field, and the library, which confirms that it is political stability rather than sectarian affiliation that leads to violence.
Endnotes

2. In the Malay/Indonesian World, invulnerability is referred to as 'ilmu kebal, while magical knowledge conferring invisibility is 'ilmu ghaib. See Farrer (2009) and Sevea (2020).
3. Amrita Malhi has provided the most thorough treatment of tariqa involvement in rebellions in British Malaya during the 1920s (Malhi 2010, 2011).
5. For details of rituals involving boiling oil, see Farrer (2009, 232–42).
6. Indeed, Mohammad Zamberi Abdul Malek has referred to this 1948 incident as the “Tok Perak Dusun Nyor War” (Mohammad Zamberi Abdul Malek 1993, 210–11).
7. For more on Ustadz Soh, see International Crisis Group (2005, 21–23), which claims that he had studied in Indonesia.
8. Muhammad Ilyas Yahprung notes that its co-author was Abdul Wahab Dama, the Imam at Tarpai Tulwataq Mullaniti, an Islamic boarding school in Yala Province (Muhammad Ilyas Yahprung 2014, 189).
9. In addition to the many (shorter) visits to Ayoh Ding’s house and pondok, most of my data was collected on the following dates: October 15, 2011; November 17, 2012; May 21, 2013; January 9 and 11, 2014; March 3, June 15–20, 2015.
10. Pondok is a generic term used throughout the Thai/Malay Peninsula for traditionalist Islamic schools led by a babo where students live in huts that they construct or maintain themselves. These are distinct from madrasah where Islamic subjects are taught alongside the national curriculum.
13. The importance of “Indonesians” in Britain is one of the themes in a declassified report entitled “Sabilu’llah and Invulnerability”, in the Supplement to Political Intelligence Journal, dated June 15 1947. This specifically mentions Kyai Salleh (referred to as Che Gu Salleh), Haji Osman, and Syed Mh. Idris bin Syed ‘Abdullah Hamzah (Anonymous 1947, 2–3). This alleged that “Parang Panjang” and “Sabilu’llah” movements in British Malaya took their name from a “body of Indonesian militant Muslims called ‘Barisan Sahlibullah.’” Moreover, “Indonesian influence is strong through the presence of numerous so-called religious teachers and exponents of the invulnerability cults.” Answers to questions about the strength of Indonesian influence included the “presence of numerous […] religious teachers and exponents of invulnerability cult(s).” Both the “orthodox Sabilul’Llah doctrine,” and what was referred to as the “unorthodox invulnerability cult” are covers for “political and terrorist activities.” Central to future exploitation of “revolutionary causes” were “Hajis and other Muslims of religious standing, usually of Indonesian parentage”(Anonymous 1947).
14. For an analysis of silat in Malay political activism, see Ross (2019).
15. Kyai Salleh’s leadership included the following: Kyai Wak Joyo (General commissioner); Kyai Kusin (first commander of South Johor); Kyai Mashudi (second commander of South Johor); Kyai Mayor (third commander of South Johor); Kyai Saudli (first commander of East Johor); Kyai Maskam (second commander of East Johor); Kyai Sarbin (third commander of East Johor); Kyai Mustahir (first commander of North Johor); Kyai Haji Shamsuddin (first commander of North Johor).
16. Details about Sheikh Ahmad Khatib al-Shambas are provided by the following (van Bruinessen 1994, 1995b, 2000, Mulyari 2002, 37–45, Hurgronje 2007, 278, 87, 96,
Laffan 2011, 54, 56, 61, 136, 45).

17. One of these was Sheikh ‘Abdullah Soon, who was from—and returned to—Ayutthaya in Central Thailand, where he led what appears to have been a revival of the Qadriyyah tariqa that had been established in the 16th century (Madaman 1999, Joll 2014b, 2015a).


19. Another movement, known as the Barisan Islam (Muslim Front) had appeared in Tanjong Sembong under the leadership of Haji Mokhtar.

20. For more on Chinese secret societies, see Wynne (1941) and Musa (2003).


22. The most recent exemplars of commitments to fieldwork include Unno (2018) and Streicher (2020).


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