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Democratic Dilemma of Malay Islamic Party: PAS, Coalition Pattern, and Rising Social Issues

Abstract: This article deliberates on how the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) embraces and weathers the challenges of democracy as a political culture beyond elections. The deliberation analyses the approach and behaviors of the party within a period of three general elections (GE), namely the GE12 in 2008, GE13 in 2013, and GE14 in 2018. Through qualitative approach and in-depth interviews with key PAS leaders, this article discusses PAS participation with the Pakatan Rakyat (PR), Muafakat Nasional (MN), and Perikatan Nasional (PN), which demonstrated the PAS’s unchartered undertaking to accept democracy as a political culture and not as a tool to achieve political power through an election. While it is trite to take the position that elections are the truest form of democracy, they can foster greater inclusivity, which can take place in both political and non-political realms.

Keywords: Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, Political Coalition, Pakatan Rakyat, Muafakat Nasional, Perikatan Nasional.

The participation of Islamic groups in democratic process through an election is seen as a significant transition since the 1980s. In the 1990s, such participation was increasing as a result of euphoric politics among Muslims as the democratic space expanded (Azra 2006). This development can be divided into three phases, namely, the radical phase, the democratic phase through an election and the phase when the Islamic groups are confronted with the pluralism of democracy and a variety of religions. Through the third phase there is a shift of discourse and a change of approach of the Islamic groups with the acceptance of democracy beyond the election as a new platform in a political competition. In Malaysia, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), as an Islamic group that participates in democracy through an election, is seen as trying to embrace democracy, not only in the strict context of an election as a tool to achieve political power but also to accept the Western system as a political culture.

PAS has moved into the third curve of its political development, which saw it graduate from a local state-level party to a national one with a more multi-ethnic and inclusive leadership (M. bin H. Y. Rawa 2013). PAS has tried to become a national party championing the relevant context of current issues, such as democracy, justice and good governance. Beyond that, the willingness of PAS to accept and share power and political coalition (taḥalluf siyāsī) with the People Justice Party or Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and Democratic Action Party (DAP) proves that PAS is ready to compromise on its demands to achieve political success. At the grassroots level PAS introduced inclusive policy to attract support from people of various backgrounds. The slogan “PAS for ALL” indicates that PAS is ready to be a more open and inclusive party. Nevertheless, this new approach to practice democracy beyond an election is not a simple expansion for PAS. It is a difficult situation as it must bear the impact and expectation of demonstrating ostensibly the universal values, pluralism and tolerance, which conflict with the struggles of its party narrative, ideology and constitution.

In this context, this article analyzes how PAS manages to handle the impact of recognizing democracy beyond an election, and the conflicts that arose, which ultimately affected PAS’s political cooperation. Specifically, it examines the Alternative Front or Barisan Alternative (BA), the People Front or Pakatan Rakyat (PR), the post GE14 National
Concord or Muafakat Nasional (MN) and the National Alliance or Perikatan Nasional (PN). In order to analyze how PAS manages to juggle between political demands while protecting basic party tenets, this writing incorporates interviews with a variety of top PAS leaders, such as the Member of Parliament of Parit Buntar, Dato’ Dr. Mujahid Yusuf Rawa, former PAS Deputy President, Tuan Haji Nasharuddin Mat Isa, former Vice President of PAS, Dato’ Dr. Hassan Mohd Ali and PAS Director of Operations of the Research Centre, Dr. Mohd Zuhdi Marzuki.

In addition, this research looks at original documents from minutes of PAS Central Working Committee Meetings, PAS Central Committee Daily Meetings, the series of Discussions (Munaqasyah) on the President’s keynote addresses on policy, the President’s keynote addresses on policy during the Annual General Assembly (Muktamar), PAS President Speeches during Barisan Alternatif (BA) and Pakatan Rakyat (PR) Conventions, Electorate Election Manifestos, Communal Policy of the People Front, the parties’ bulletins, the Muafakat National Charter signed between PAS and UMNO, and the MoU between PAS and Perikatan Nasional. The research also goes through the official PAS paper, Harakah, and official bulletins of other parties that are part of the alliances, such as the Voice of Justice (Suara Keadilan) of PKR and the Rocket of DAP.

PAS in Political Coalitions in Malaysia

Founded in 1951 before Malaysia gained independence, PAS is the oldest political party to advocate for the formation of an Islamic State in Malaysia (Saidin 2021; Word and Rabou 2020). The philosophy of PAS was influenced by the al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn in Egypt, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and also Jamaat al-Islami in Pakistan. For the purposes of comparison, the PAS splinter party, which is called the National Trust Party or Parti Amanah Negara (AMANAH), was established based on an alternative model of Islamic governance from Tunisia’s Ennahda Party and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (Nurdin 2019, 108; Saidin 2021, 131).

As one of the oldest political parties in Malaysia, with deep roots in the Malay hinterland, PAS was one of the first Islamist parties in Asia to come to power via constitutional means (Noor 2004, xliii). Over the years, researchers, analysts and political scientists have
demonstrated PAS’s tremendous agility for adapting to the times, with evolving discourse and priorities in line with the political terrain. With the ever-present risk of marginalization from mainstream politics, PAS fine-tuned its strategies in accordance with the changes in Malaysia’s political landscape and rising political rivalry (Zain 2014b, 44). Since its first general election in 1955, through to the 14th General Election (GE14) in 2018, PAS has acclimatized its approach and strategy, either working alone or in coalitions (Wan Saiful, 2020, pg. 10). Furthermore, PAS holds the distinction of having fought against and worked with opposite ends of the spectrum, namely UMNO and DAP. Moreover, PAS was able to transition smoothly from one coalition to another as and when needed, through its agile view of *taḥalluf siyāsī*, or political coalition, as a matter of strategy rather than principle (Wan Saiful 2020, 10; Zain 2014b, 43). Interestingly, PAS had been in government as well as in opposition, with several different incarnations of its worldview, value system and political priorities, all without abandoning its core principles of political Islam (Noor 2004, xlvi). In addition to that, PAS’s cultural transformation over the decades has not only been shaped and molded by political competition and wider social influences, but also internally with the emergence of a new generation of cultural reformists. This transformed the party from an image of conservative zealots who tried to ban any form of art and entertainment, towards being a pioneer of modern Islamic pop-cultural creativity (Müller 2015).

As the nation’s democracy matured, so did PAS in its pragmatism in political discourse. The Islamic group employed a more realistic approach that opened up new opportunities and platforms for them in political rivalry, in addition to propelling the symbiosis of Islam and democracy to a greater level of tolerance and pragmatism (Zain 2014b, 4). In other words, PAS has been successful insofar in managing to connect the core principles of Islam to the pressing issues of the day (Yong Liow 2004, 359). Before this transition towards a realistic and matured democratic outlook, PAS had been repeatedly accused of intending to destroy democratic institutions in Malaysia if it gained political power (Nurdin 2019, 106). However, the party has proven otherwise in the last one and a half (1.5) years as part of the PN government.

In line with this progressive outlook, PAS has introduced a more open and inclusive approach to increase support from non-Muslims.
This was especially evident through the launching of the slogan ‘PAS for All’ in 2007, to shift the negative perception of it as an exclusive party only for religious groups and rural communities (Zain 2014b, 43). Certainly, the policy of inclusivity, which might seem to be a challenge and a burden as a result of diversity management, creates a wholesome and positive image (Zain 2014, 43). PAS believes that the core tenets of democracy are also recognized in Islamic teaching. The late Nik Aziz, the former spiritual leader of PAS, argued that democracy and Islam are not in contradiction. This is because democracy can be viewed as a vehicle that facilitates the muwajjahah silmiyah, or smooth and gentle way to gain political power, as promoted by Islamic teachings (Nurdin 2019, 107).

PAS has institutionally accepted the concept of democracy, as evidenced by its participation in Malaysian elections since PAS’s establishment in 1951 (Nurdin 2019, 107; Wan Saiful 2020, 2) Surveys and in-depth interviews with activists and leaders, ranging from individuals in opposing political parties (PAS and AMANAH) to non-government Islamist organizations (ABIM and ISMA), revealed that elections are the way forward, rather than overthrowing a regime via street demonstrations, civil disobedience or through a ‘revolution’ (Saidin 2021). This aligns with PAS’s disagreement with Islamic groups that use radicalism and violence as principle tools to achieve their goals (Nurdin 2019, 107).

Nevertheless, the crucial gap here is an in-depth analysis of the latest major events, political cooperation and the challenges for PAS in transitioning from a strongly opinionated party ruling state governments towards a party that upholds democracy as a political culture beyond an election. This transition, as discussed in this article, takes place in two main spheres, directly political and non-political, which can be evidenced through three dimensions. Namely, (i) PAS’s behavior and involvement in various emerging social issues and demands that deal with justice, equality and human rights, (ii) participation in the Perikatan Nasional to form a new Federal Government following the collapse of an elected government of Pakatan Harapan and lastly, (iii) PAS’s participation in the Muafakat Nasional together with its rival UMNO to form a new, unincorporated national cause for the Malays.
PAS Political Culture in Addressing Emerging Social Issues and Demands

The PAS political coalition in Pakatan Rakyat, with Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and Democratic Action Party (DAP) during GE12 in 2008, revolved around the demands and pushes for common issues and interests such as democracy, justice, freedom and good governance. Accordingly, the true and transparent democratic pursuit as constituted in the Orange Book was the basic thrust of the opposition alliance. This kind of cooperation had compelled PAS to strengthen its commitment to democracy beyond an electorate election, into a political culture that extolled universal values, pluralism and tolerance (Othman 2007, 16). It encouraged PAS to have a more open and realistic strategy by acknowledging civil rights and respecting differences (Tibi 2012, 121).

The sine qua non or indispensable element of this phase is that the Islamic movement should no longer embrace democracy only as an instrument to achieve political power, but also as a political culture nuanced on the practice of highly cherishing the universal values of justice, freedom, pluralism and tolerance and good governance. PAS’s expansion and experience in this aspect of political partisanship and its commitment towards embracing democracy beyond the election could be observed at two stages.

First, it was through the party internal assemblage, as found in the key Policy Speeches of the PAS President in the PAS Annual General Assembly (Muktamar) between 1999 to 2015. For instance, PAS Annual General Assembly (Muktamar) used to include democracy and justice as a theme, such as, “Together we Uphold Justice” in 1999, “Sanctify the Sovereignty of the People” in 2004, “Rehabilitate Democracy, Make Islam Sacred” in 2006, and “Save Democracy, Uphold Justice” in 2007.

In the President’s Keynote Speech on Policy during the PAS 45th Annual General Assembly (Muktamar) in 1999, which was themed, “Together we Uphold Justice”, PAS distinctly and firmly endorsed the concept of justice. In his speech, Datuk Fadzil said, “Justice is a natural necessity preordained by Allah the creator who places everything in the right places according to each and every one inherent characteristic.” He detailed what PAS meant with regards to the concept of political justice, legal justice, economic justice and justice generally. In the keynote speech on policy during PAS Annual General Assembly (Muktamar) of 2007, PAS reiterated its solemn avowal towards democracy. PAS President

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Dato’ Seri Abdul Hadi Awang asserted, “PAS is an Islamic party that chooses the democratic practices. Although democracy is man-made, but its birth is based on the inherent human characteristic to oppose cruelty since time immemorial”. 3

At the second stage, we could observe that PAS embraced democracy beyond the election through platforms in the opposition alliance, such as the Commutual Policy and mutual statement. Through the Commutual Policy of the People Front (PR) of 2010, for example, PAS authorized and verified the struggle to enshrine a genuine and transparent democracy that can empower the sovereignty of the voters. This item is among the four basic frameworks that shaped the Commutual Policy of the opposition alliance. PAS believed that emphasizing democracy as the basis for political cooperation would provide more benefits for Islam and the party agenda as a democratic system fosters the rights and freedom of the people. Consequently, PAS placed an immense expectation on the opposition block, who sincerely fought for democracy as it was confident the People Front would be more open to the Muslims, which would also include the installation of hudud law into the country (Samad 2014, 197).

Democracy pivoted on the power of the people, impelled PAS to include or enclose democracy as a long-term objective and not an objective simply within the context of participating in an election and on specific issues only. In the words of Dr. Mujahid Yusuf Rawa, democracy could not be achieved without a continuous process of democratization and engagement towards the political system (Mujahid, 2015, pg. 38). The level of PAS’s acceptance of democracy should shift from using it as a tool to achieve power in the short term to focusing upon long-term fundamental goals. Consequently, PAS should consider accommodating democracy beyond the phase of participation in an election (Zain 2014b, 379).

In line with the desire to sustain the ideal of democracy amid political cooperation, it naturally followed that PAS should be a democratic party that fully practiced democracy. In the words of Dr. Dzulkefly Ahmad, it was only when PAS had assumed such a pledge to exercise this democratic idealism, then it would be able to shred the image and perception that PAS used democracy for the sake of achieving political power (Dzulkefly 2012, 211). The stance enunciated by Dr. Dzulkefly Ahmad is relevant since, for some time, Islamic parties (including PAS)

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were perceived to normally participate in democratic processes during an election simply to use democracy as a vehicle that would bring them to a certain destination (political power) and abandon the vehicle (democracy) as soon as they arrived (Zain 2014a, 367). As a result, democracy could be considered as a means to replace the autocratic leadership with a theocratic leadership consisting of Islamic groups. When this group achieved power though an election, they would destroy democratic institutions and practices such as elections and replace it with a rigid theocratic Religious Order (ulama) leadership.

Dr Dzulkefi argued that the necessity of PAS to be a democratic party was as part of a global trend of Post Islamisme (Zain 2014, 385). This was to deny the allegation that Islamic movement was against democracy. Dr. Zuhdi Marzuki elaborated:

It is a global trend in the Islamic movement. Towards the end of the 90’s, when the Islamic movement won the election in Algeria and Turkey, their victories were robbed. This resulted in two extreme movements. One group became terrorists, no election approach, and did not believe in democracy, the other group said that we had to transform ourselves to be a democrat, not as an Islamic movement, we have to be a genuine democrat. That is the style of democracy if we have to clear our image. These groups have emerged and because of it, Refah party, happens everywhere, the aftereffects of what happened towards the end of the 90’s. The theory of what they said about Post Islamism has some truths. Olivier Roy noted that the Islamic movements were forced to do as they wanted to show that. It is not to hijack democracy for the purpose of the Islamic goal. That’s why some aspersions were made that they did not give the votes to the Islamic movement because these movements were using democracy. When they won, it was a different story altogether. That’s why they said they want to be a fully democrat (Zuhdi 2014).

It is clear that beyond the election and in a non-political sphere, PAS has embraced democracy as a political culture by striving to enhance the party’s understanding of democracy, the concept of justice, good governance and how these are compatible with and encouraged by Islam. All this emphasis was discussed and nuanced beyond the context of election.

**PAS Political Culture in a Directly Political Sphere – Muafakat Nasional and Perikatan Nasional**

The events leading up to the 14th General Election (GE14) in 2018, and the political happenings since then, continues to highlight PAS’s
intriguing experience in embracing democracy beyond elections. With a long history of working with various political parties, PAS is no stranger to coalition politics. Interestingly, it decided that it would not stand with the newly formed Alliance of Hope or Pakatan Harapan (PH), nor would it cooperate politically with the National Front of Barisan Nasional (BN) for GE14, as neither coalition was favorable to PAS. This was due to the presence of DAP in PH, which made the coalition severely unappealing to the conservative PAS grassroots supporters, while allegations of corruption and kleptocracy tainted longtime rival UMNO’s presence in BN (Wan Saiful, 2020). Instead, PAS led the formation of an Islamic opposition coalition in 2016 named Ideas of Prosperity or Gagasan Sejahtera (GS), together with much smaller parties, namely Parti Ikatan Bangsa Malaysia (Ikatan), and Barisan Jemaah Islamiyah Se-Malaysia (Barjasa).

As a third force in the already heated political scene, GS launched their manifesto based on nine main issues, which include the formation of a government with integrity, trustworthiness and free from corruption; boosting the people’s disposable income and generating new job opportunities; empowering the people to overcome the effects of inflation and rising costs of living; and improve the effectiveness of the social support system for the less fortunate (Reduan and Ngah 2018).

The overarching principles in the manifesto seem to align with the principles of democracy beyond the elections, and yet is grounded in Islamic principles. Supporting this notion, it is interesting to note that PAS chose to address bread and butter issues in a clear departure from previous elections, whereby PAS openly championed the controversial pledge to turn Malaysia into an Islamic state, which used to scare Non-Muslim voters away (Rodzi 2018). When asked whether the manifesto would be able to attract non-Muslims to vote for the newly formed coalition, Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man, PAS Deputy President, explained that through the manifesto, the coalition aims to form a society that is suitable for all members to live together well, regardless of race (Reduan and Ngah 2018). This shows the pragmatism taken by PAS towards increasing its chances of winning parliamentary seats by expanding its potential voter base.

However, the moderate democratic strategy did not do much to sway the non-Muslim voters, as PAS only won 18 out of 155 parliamentary seats contested. However, PAS recorded a laudable performance by
winning a greater 90 state seats nationwide, mostly in Muslim-majority rural or semi-urban constituencies on the east coast and the northern part of the Malaysian peninsula. To the contrary, PAS’s partners, Berjasa and Ikatan, lost their contests in 3 seats and 1 seat respectively. While it can be argued that Gagasan Sejahtera (GS) was still very much framed and centered on an election, especially GE14, PAS’s participation in the National Consensus or Muafakat Nasional (MN), and later on in the National Alliance or Perikatan Nasional (PN) as a part of Federal Government, provides stronger and clearer evidence of the party’s readiness and approach to embracing democracy beyond an election, especially in its attempt to practice a more progressive political culture. The evidence is manifest in at least four (4) circumstances.

First, Muafakat Nasional and Perikatan Nasional are not coalitions formed for the purpose of a general election. Even though PAS and UMNO did use MN as a tool for their campaign in the Tanjung Piai by-election, the entire basis of MN was not election-centred. The MN national charter and PN Memorandum of Understanding are completely silent on strategies in preparation for elections.

Muafakat Nasional appeared as a new political arrangement for both parties, based on an understanding that Malays require a stronger unified political force and thus must be united under one national ethos, better known as the unification of the ummah (community). In this circumstance, from the perspective of political cultural practice, some observations can be made. PAS tolerated long term animosity toward and rivalry with UMNO and expressed willingness to work together as a new Malay-Islam cause nationally. Previously, under the ulama faction spearheaded by Nik Aziz, PAS constantly warned against cooperation with UMNO, given the relatively secular position of the latter (Saat 2019, 3). However, PAS has now demonstrated an improved level of maturity, professionalism and openness by being able to sit down with UMNO and formulate a consensus on their political direction. The consensus has been adopted and shaped into an official charter signed by both parties.

Second, in the case of Perikatan Nasional (PN), it was a collaboration among Members of Parliament (MPs) on an understanding and agreement to form a federal government without a new election, following the collapse of PH. This is not only a new political culture for PAS alone but for Malaysia overall, with democracy translated into
the formation of a democratic government without a new election. This governance structure is reflected in the second purpose of the PN Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which is to provide a form of administration and management of government at the federal and state levels that is good, inclusive and aligned with global standards regarding caring for people’s interests, welfare, prosperity and harmony, as well as ensuring the country’s advancement, development and economic recovery (New Straits Times 2020). Through the MoU, we can observe a maturity displayed among the political parties, including PAS, in pragmatic political cooperation for inclusive and good governance in a multiracial and culturally diverse Malaysia.

Third, PAS demonstrated an even greater level of maturity and rationality by maintaining professionalism while working with UMNO and Bersatu in PN, as an effective political strategy to remain in power. This is important, as the UMNO-Bersatu relationship was tumultuous. Considering Bersatu was a splinter party from UMNO, in addition to the party-hopping of parliamentarians from the latter to the former after GE14, members of both parties were political nemeses from the beginning. Through several rounds of mud-slinging in the by-elections post GE14, intense competition for the Chief Minister’s post in the Sabah state elections and sustained attacks and retaliation through most of the year 2020 and 2021, 147 of the 189 UMNO divisions representing grassroots voices rejected cooperation with Bersatu (Fareez 2021).

However, PAS reveled in its position as unifier of the ummah, urging the Malay parties to work towards unity to prevent political cooperation in PN from falling apart. This benefitted PAS greatly, fulfilling both its desire to retain governing power and satisfying religious obligations (Wan Saiful 2020, 22). For instance, PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang posted on his official Facebook profile that “this is our unity agenda together, so we shouldn’t be hostile towards our friends. Instead, we need to strengthen our bonds. Let’s not be the reason for discord. Have patience and make peace” (The Straits Times 2021). This highlights how PAS had worked hard to make both the Muafakat Nasional and Perikatan Nasional coalitions succeed. In fact, PAS positioned itself as the rational partner in political cooperation, constantly upholding Malay and Muslim unity as the higher cause, in the willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of unity (Wan Saiful 2020, 22).
Fourth, the political cooperation between MN and PN reflects PAS's progressive approach to democracy beyond upholding radical ideologies, such as through the implementation of hudud law and the discourse of an Islamic Nation. For instance, the PN MoU seeks to guarantee the welfare and interest of all Malaysians regardless of religion and race; strengthen the spirit of togetherness in Malaysia between Sabah, Sarawak, and the peninsula to realize the aspirations of the MA63; and strengthen and empower the racial unity agenda, religious harmony, and culture which is part of the Federal Constitution's framework as the axis of national and political stability (New Straits Times 2020).

In a seemingly populist move to prove the party's capability to govern a multiracial and multireligious Malaysian society, PAS president Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang signed the MoU, a clear departure from its earlier lifelong struggle to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia and implement hudud as the criminal code of the Shariah law. In other words, PAS displayed pragmatism by focusing more on holding on to power through universal principles of good governance, rather than investing in its Islamist agenda.

Four (4) out of five (5) core issues under the MN Charter consider the multiracial nature of Malaysia and the need for racial harmony, reflecting the notion of inclusiveness aligned with 'democracy beyond an election'. Furthermore, the final agenda of the Charter, which prioritizes a new offer for the country to enhance good governance, inclusive development policy and a distribution that will enrich social justice regardless of one's skin color and religion, demonstrates PAS's acceptance of a progressive governance mandate beyond a narrow and strict ideology.

Overall, PAS's new post-GE14 strategy, termed ta'awun siyāsī or political cooperation has demonstrated a commitment to practice a more progressive political culture through MN and PN in the last three (3) and one and a half (1.5) years respectively. It demonstrates PAS applying the core tenets of democracy beyond an electorate election.

**PAS Challenges in a Democracy Beyond an Election**

Within the milieu of political cultures, PAS's deference towards democracy, which affirmed the rights of the people based on universal values, pluralism and tolerance, caused uncertain trials and tribulations. It had to face issues of liberal democracy, individual freedom, thumping
petitions for human rights, and tolerance among religions. PAS President Dato’ Seri Abdul Hadi Awang dwelled upon the challenges in democracy for pluralism and the variety of religions based upon the sovereignty of the people. At PAS’s 61st Annual General Assembly in 2015, he defined PAS’s involvement in democracy:

PAS actualised democracy based on the Islamic belief in Allah the Almighty God. It is not based on Western democracy depicting a human as a God, no matter how intelligent he is. This is how it differentiated from Western democracy, which advocated the slogan, *The Voice of the People is a Sacred Voice, Long Live the People*, or to adhere to the wishes of the people who are ignorant about democracy, up to a point to defy the boundary of Allah.6

As an Islamic party attached to the concept of *tablīf siyāṣi*, which wanted to see that political cooperation could uphold Islam, it strengthened the position of the Islamic people by opening up more avenues in the implementation of Islam. PAS could not accept a democracy that placed the liberal voice of the people above the interest of Islam.

Undoubtedly, the implementation of PAS’s version of Islam was challenged throughout its involvement in the opposition alliance, as the rights of Muslims to promote Islam was not respected (Ali 2015). For instance, PAS’s inauguration of hudud law in Kelantan, supported by the majority of Muslim society, was opposed by its allies in the opposition alliance, particularly by DAP. This proved that democracy that validated the freedom of an individual and the right to choose did not provide any benefits to PAS for promulgating Islamic infrastructure. This raises an important question as to why individual rights to establish Islam were obstructed. Was individual freedom only relevant if it was unrelated to Islam? This was highlighting that there was a double standard in cultivating individual freedoms.

PAS faced two major challenges in undertaking the struggle for democracy, based on the sovereignty of the people as the norm in the political alliance. First, how should it address the challenge of pluralism, which emphasized the question of authority, absolute individual freedom, and the clamor for human rights that are against or in conflict with the Islamic teachings? Did the concept of absolute individual freedom and the solicitation of broad human rights work against PAS’s integral principles, such as undertaking missionary efforts and forbidding wrongdoings (*nahy munkar*), or in opposing transgression?
Second, how did PAS handle the variety of religions that were part of the democratic political culture that encouraged tolerance but would also derail the unique position of Islam in the Federal Constitution and the country? These two challenges are further adumbrated collectively below.

**Addressing Conflicting Interests and Stances**

*Pluralism of Religions*

Typical human rights calls for equality and the absolute freedom of individuals poses a challenge for PAS, as these are against the teachings of Islam (“Cabaran Islam Liberal dan Pluralisme Agama,” 2013). Every freedom enjoyed by human is not absolute but has to adhere to the regulations and precepts of religion based on the principles as outlined in Quran (book of Islamic religion) and Sunnah (hadith or sayings of the Prophet Mohammad) of the Islamic religion. There should be a limit to individual freedoms so as to not threaten the interests and the security of the people or ummah as a whole. PAS was quite worried about the solicitations for human rights that conflicted with the shariah (Islamic jurisprudence), as put forward by the Coalition of Malaysian NGOs in the UPR Process (COMANGO). This was because these quests contained hidden agendas meant to defile the sacred Islamic religion as the official religion of the country, as enshrined in the Federal Constitution (Isa 2014, 3).

Among COMANGO’s petitions that would ruffle or upset the status of Islam in Malaysia was one rebutting the ruling to prevent the spread of Shia beliefs and other deviant teachings, on the basis it was a constraint on the freedom of religion. Another considered the dominant interference from *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā’ah* Islamic school as a constraint on the freedom of thought. They sought the right to be an apostate as part of the freedom of religion, and to deny the power of the shariah court to determine the religion or Islamic position of an individual. They also proposed to abolish the shariah criminal laws practiced in most states. They gave a negative perception on the responsibility of enjoining what was right and forbidding what was wrong (*al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ’an al-munkar*), which were enforced in the religious departments across the whole country, by labelling it with the western stereotype of “moral policing.”
Recognition of LGBT

Another struggle faced by PAS in its appreciation of democracy beyond the election is the push for recognition of social rights and the human rights of those who practice LGBTQ (Lesbians, Gays, Bi-sexual, Transgender, Queer) lifestyle and the abolishment of laws that regarding aberrant sexual behavior as a crime (Isa 2014, 6). During PAS’s 59th Annual General Assembly in 2013, PAS’s Religious Scholar Assembly (Dewan Ulamak) put forward a resolution on “Islamic thoughts and pluralism that are deviants.” According to its head, Dato’ Harun Taib, PAS had to deal with Islamic liberal issues, which sought unlimited freedom, such as allowing homosexuality, which was now practiced openly. PAS also warned the Muslim community to be wary of western influence masquerading as a human rights campaign that was against the Islamic teachings (Harakah 2014). The fight for the rights of transgender people, which was a part of the LGBTQ agenda, must be thwarted, as it was against the virtues of normal human behavior. Dato’ Seri Abdul Hadi vehemently affirmed that “there are some things we can accept, some we cannot. There must be a boundary” (Harakah 2014).

PAS’s actions to resist the demands of LGBTQ groups were diametrically opposed to the stand taken by DAP. In this respect, DAP was sympathetic towards the practice of LGBTQ lifestyle. In one instance, it appointed a transgender person as a political secretary to the state assemblyman of Tanjung Bungah Teh Yee Cheu (Jalleh 2013). The Penang Island state government also passed a personal resolution by Teh Yee Cheu, with the formation of a transgender committee with an allocation of RM 200,000, even though the DAP Tanjung Bunga state assemblyman had earlier withdrawn his resolution.

Although PAS did oppose efforts to push for an adoption of liberal freedoms and human rights that were contrary to the teaching of Islam, PAS was criticized for not being firm enough to vigorously counter the petitions by COMANGO (Isa 2014). According to PAS’s former Deputy President, Nasharuddin Mat Isa, as an Islamic party with the underlying missionary zeal to spread the teaching of Islam, PAS should be on the frontline in repelling the solicitations of COMANGO in regards to human rights issues that negated the special position of Islam in the Federal Constitution, and ignoring the backdrop of the multi-religious society in Malaysia. According to him, it was the NGOs who led the way in challenging COMANGO, rather than PAS.
PAS’s ineptitude to strenuously refute the contentious matters of absolute individual freedoms, and the human rights petitions that were against the shariah (Islamic jurisprudence), was out of respect for the harmonious relationship in the alliance with the PKR and DAP. PAS’s forbearing attitude towards the clamoring for absolute individual freedoms and human rights claims emanated from PAS’s understanding of the reality of society at that time. This attitudinal approach was different to what was taken during the time of PAS Chairman Yusuf Rawa, who wanted to change the waqi (surrounding) and reality of society. Ironically, if there were any efforts to fight what was forbidden, they were opposed from within the party itself (Ali 2015). It seemed that PAS’s new focus on the issues of democracy, justice and the sovereignty of the people has become an inevitable challenge for the party. As a result, the party was blamed for not being belligerent enough when it came to the welfare and sanctity of Islam.

Ratification of ICERD

The epitome of this renewed conservative agenda is the strong pushback against the Malaysian government’s initial move to ratify the International Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in 2018, which highlights the ongoing challenge for PAS to uphold international standards of human rights. In early September 2018, then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad announced at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that Malaysia would ratify all six of the human rights conventions it had yet to adopt, including the ICERD, which condemns discrimination and calls upon states to pursue a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all forms. On the contrary, PAS, in alignment with United Malaysia National Organisation (UMNO) as a fellow opposition party, promulgated a narrative that ICERD would erode Malay-Muslim rights and gradually push Malay-Muslims to the margins of society (Waikar 2018). PAS President Datuk Seri Haji Abdul Hadi Awang emphasized that Muslims have an obligation to reject liberal concepts that place all religions equally, and thus have a duty to oppose the ICERD ratification, which he claimed would place Islam on the same level as other religions (Pilus 2018). In addition, he explained that Islam had a more extensive definition of rights and fairness, while the version adopted by international bodies is incomplete and unfair (Rahmat 2018). Since
55 out of the 57 Organisation of Islamic countries (OIC) have ratified the ICERD, including Indonesia, Pakistan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Iran, researchers have expressed their skepticism that ratifying the ICERD is a move against Islam and against Muslims (Jayasooria 2018; Yong Liow 2004).

This magnifies the distinct dichotomy between the human rights and struggle for equality upheld by international organizations versus the conservative principles and beliefs of PAS as a political party in its political culture. In a multicultural Malaysia, where the social political landscape is founded upon tolerance and diversity of religious beliefs, PAS faces an uphill battle in light of the democratic principle of pluralism, which is an essential element of democracy beyond an election. This is especially evident in the by-elections after the ICERD fiasco, in which PAS joined forces with UMNO to capitalize on growing Malay-Muslim resentment of ethnic displacement, stoked anti-reform resistance, and the erosion of the protection of Islam (Welsh 2020). This has compounded the manifold challenges for upholding the principles of democracy as a political culture beyond an election.

Use of ‘Allah’ by the Non-Muslims

The most controversial challenge facing PAS during its time in the political coalition of the opposition front was overcoming the use of the lexical term “Allah” by Christians believers. This really tests PAS’s resolve to embracing democracy beyond an election, especially in regard to tolerance in religious matters. This issue began on the 31st of December 2009, when the High Court decided that the weekly Christian paper, The Herald, would be allowed to use the word “Allah” in its publication after it had been prohibited from using it by the Ministry of Home Affairs (KDN). High Court judge Datuk Lau Bee Lan ruled that the prohibition was against the law, and null and void.

On 5th January 2010, the Ministry of Home Affairs filed an appeal against the High Court decision. In July of 2013, the Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur filed an application to nullify the government application at the High Court. Nevertheless, the Appeal Court disallowed the appeal and fixed a new full hearing on the 10th of September 2013. The Appeal Court then ruled that The Herald could not use the word “Allah” in its publication (Borneo Post Online 2013). The legal process finally concluded when the Federal Court...
ruled that the Catholic Church was not allowed to appeal the ruling of the Appeal Court.

The ruling by the Federal Court gave welcome relief to the Muslim community, as it was seen as an Islamic victory, but it left a deep impact on PAS. Since the issue emerged in 2010, PAS was considered a party that was too squeamish and pliable to the dictates of non-Muslims, or more specifically, Christian believers. PAS President Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang released a statement that said using the lexical word “Allah” was not wrong, provided that it should not be confusing. His statement was supported by People Front Leadership Council, and he was given the opportunity to take a mutual stand on the issue with the People Front.

The PAS President’s standpoint was backed by a few party leaders. Among the ardent supporters was the Member of Parliament of Parit Buntar, Dr Mujahid Yusuf Rawa, a PAS leader who had often led the way to bring the party closer to non-Muslims. He considered that the issue was critical, as it laid the groundwork for the future relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in Malaysia. He said:

“The truth is not the lexical word “Allah” that they want to translate into Malay, it comes from the Hebrew word, Eli or Elohim ... this is the Hebrew word for Allah in Hibranic … Eli or Elohim means the Supreme Being … Allah … they found the words Eli and Elohim in the Old Testament … this word is only in the Old Testament ... so what do you want to translate, it is not God, it is a supreme being. The fact of the matter is that it indicates the existence of Allah more than Jesus, God and the rest. That’s why they translate what they do not know … so God is not an ordinary God … as the Malays understand it as a supreme being, namely Allah, so write Allah” (M. Y. Rawa 2014).

Concurrently, he supported the use of the word by non-Muslims based on the rationale that this could acknowledge differences, that there was no compulsion in religion, and dialogues between religions could take place. He opined that the word was universal in nature, and not exclusive to Muslims as indicated in Quran, surah Luqman, verse 25, which says, “if you ask them, who creates the sky and the earth, they must say it is God who creates them, just say Alḥamdulillāh (thanks to God) but most of them do not know it.” Dr Mujahid believed that in the context of a country that assured a person’s right to religion, no religion including Islam could force non-Muslims to do things not within the demands of their own religion. Consequently, the
non-Muslim contention to use the word ought to be respected, as there was no compulsion in religion.

PAS’s laissez-faire or liberal attitude in dealing with the use of the word invited criticism from three quarters, namely the United Malaysia National Organisation (UMNO), within PAS itself, and from allies within the opposition block. UMNO claimed that PAS was very ineffectual in confronting the issue, despite fervent protests from Muslims all over the country. UMNO added more pressure on PAS by accusing the party of being liberal with its allies (DAP and PKR) to gain support from non-Muslims and safeguard its relationship with them up to the extent that it was willing to mortgage the interests of Islam.

In response, PAS criticized the National Front (Barisan National) for exploiting the issue to gain support from the Malays to the extent that it undermined the harmonious relationship between races and religions. Alongside Dr Mujahid, Member of Parliament for Shah Alam, Abdul Khalid Samad, also reproached UMNO and the National Front (BN) for manipulating the issue. He said UMNO earnestly defended the use of the word by non-Muslims with the intention to signal to the Malay community that Islam was under threat from Christians who wanted to use the term. This issue has also created classes of opinions within PAS itself. More clearly when PAS Deputy Spiritual leader, Dato’ Dr. Haron Din, gave a personal statement not to allow use of the word by non-Muslims (M. bin H. Y. Rawa 2013). This contradicted the PAS President’s view that non-Muslims were not forbidden from using the word.

Besides the challenges from UMNO and within PAS, nerve-racking pressure came from allies in the opposition block, particularly from DAP. The party deliberately placed PAS in an unpleasant position by giving out the statement supporting the use of the word by non-Muslims. The chief minister of Penang, Lim Guan Eng, issued a statement urging the Federal Government to allow non-Muslims to use the word in the Malay version of the Bible. The motive in his New Year address of 2013 was questionable, since it did not take into account that PAS represented a considerable number of Muslim voters in the People Front (M. bin H. Y. Rawa 2013).

Although the DAP secretary general claimed his speech was misconstrued, as it was specifically meant for the Christians in Sarawak.
and Sabah, Mujahid was of the view that it was like throwing a stone and simultaneously hiding one hand, as it was PAS that received an enormous backlash regarding the issue.\footnote{13}

In response to the Lim Guan Eng’s statement, PAS felt that their view in 2010 - that was more open and diplomatic - should be reviewed. On the 13\textsuperscript{th} of January 2013, the Religious Scholars Consultative Council finally reached the decision that the word God or Lord could not be translated as “Allah.” The PAS President endorsed the decision, which was later explained by Dr Marzuki:

That’s why we are not saying they can use it. We said, in principle, Islam does not forbid, but it is wrongly used, and for specific reasons the Islamic Religious Ruling (fatwa) says this cannot be done, so we are following the fatwa. When the fatwa says there was a specific reason that can cause an unstable political situation, then the Consultative Council ruled that this was not permissible (Zuhdi 2014).

Incontrovertibly, the decision of the Religious Scholars Consultative Council was at odds with the positions previously taken by PAS and PR. PAS reluctantly had to accept this unpopular decision within the context of the opposition alliance, so as to protect the interests of Islam and maintain the bedrock support of the Malay Muslim communities. The entire fiasco presented PAS with a challenge that the party must address strategically in its journey to embrace democracy outside the realm of the election.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The efforts of PAS to adopt democracy as a political culture beyond the election has given it new experience in confronting the challenges of democracy, especially within the context of political coalitions post-election to form a government, its performance as a federal government, and its attempt to participate in and address various social issues and demands. In this sense, PAS had to acknowledge democracy is a flexible and broad political culture and not simply an expedient platform to achieve power through an election. Although this effort is seen as a new platform for PAS to demonstrate its ideals more inclusively and effectively, the party has nonetheless been heavily browbeaten and ineffectively pliable in conceding to the inherent nature of democracy as a political culture that emphasized universal values, pluralism and tolerance.
The ideals of absolute individual freedom, and the demands of human rights that are not consistent with Islamic jurisprudence (shariah) have tested the resilience of PAS. Based on the discussion in this article, we find that PAS has to comprehend reality, as it affected the party’s perennial mission to oppose all transgression.

Analyses on PAS behaviors and performance in PR, PN and MN in three elections, and its post-election attitudes, provide valuable and meaningful lessons for understanding Islamic political party’s behavior, struggles and performance to embrace democracy beyond the election.

Firstly, there will be a strong push for a total recognition or practice of the absolute principles of democracy based on international standards, such as total and absolute freedom of speech, equality and human rights, which may be in conflict with the tenets, narrative and ideology upheld by the party. Therefore, it is crucial for Islamic political parties to revisit their tenets, principles and interpretations so that a mutually acceptable position can be reached.

Secondly, the experience of PAS has shown that the principles of democracy and progressive Islam are not contradictory. Instead, democracy should be acknowledged as the political system that promotes muwajjahah silmīyah, or the smooth and gentle way to gain political power, in alignment with the ideals of the Islamic teachings.

Thirdly, Islamic political parties can benefit greatly from adopting a more inclusive and temperate approach or political culture in a multicultural setting, in comparison to a radical and narrow front. As part of the ruling government in the past one and a half (1.5) years, PAS understood the need to deviate from its previous championing of an Islamic state and the implementation of the hudud law, towards a more progressive and pragmatic cooperation with other center-right parties. In a multiracial and multireligious country like Malaysia, pragmatism and maturity to ensure the welfare of its diverse communities and focusing on the universal principles of good governance is highly important, rather than investing in exclusive ideologies.

Fourth, PAS’s experience in establishing links with parties across the political spectrum over many decades provides important lessons for Islamic parties in the region. Whether the mechanism chosen is political coalition (tahalluf siyāsī) or political cooperation (ta’āwun siyāsī), working with other political parties towards a common goal can be beneficial in the short and medium term. This also affirms the
need for Islamic parties to consider strategic changes and alignments in approaches for political advancement.

Fifth, PAS is still at a learning stage, with limited experience when it comes to cooperation and collaboration with NGOs and, most evidently, other civil society movements to embrace democracy as a political culture beyond an election, compared to similar parties in Indonesia. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) for instance, capitalizes on its good relations and support from Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of the Ulama), which is the largest Islamic organization in the world with up to 90 million followers (Winn 2019). From patronage from high leadership positions, raising funds for party activities and election-related programmes, to garnering stronger grassroots support, PAS can learn from PKB in terms of the manifold advantages of establishing wider cooperation with civil society movements.

This study of PAS as a constantly evolving Islamic political party has brought about many important value propositions that can be further observed and evaluated by other political parties in the Southeast Asian region. Its journey in navigating the highly complex political terrain of Malaysia, marked by numerous social issues in a multiculturally diverse society, provides a better understanding of how Islamic political parties can grow and coexist in a young, growing democracy.
Endnotes

2. PAS President keynote policy address in the 45th (1999) Annual General Assembly by Datuk Fadzil Mohd Noor, “Together we Uphold Justice”. This speech was delivered on 28th of May 1999.
3. PAS president keynote address policy speech in the PAS 45th Annual General Assembly in 1999 by Dato' Fadzil Mohd Noor, “Together we Uphold Justice”
4. This situation is called the “Free Election Trap”, where the Islamic Party used the electorate election as a tool and a trap to achieve the objective of its struggle, namely, to establish an Islamic Nation.
5. Post Islamism is a trend where ideology is considered not important, not to be emphasized and no adoption of any form of ideology. It also means that the rhetoric to install an Islamic Nation and the implementation of Islamic laws are not a priority.
6. Keynote address on policy by PAS president during PAS 61st Annual General Assembly (Muktamar) in 2015 with the theme, “Consistency until Victory”.
8. Before this on the 16th February 2009, Head of Roman Catholic Church in Kuala Lumpur Tan Sri Murphy Pakiam had filed a judicial review regarding the use of the word ‘Allah’ as printed in The Herald and named the Ministry of Home Affairs (KDN) and the government of Malaysia as respondents. The church claimed that the prohibition by the Ministry of Home Affairs in using the word ‘Allah’ in The Herald on 7th January 2009 was illegal and the usage was not exclusive to Islam.
9. Nevertheless, according to the Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak the ruling by the Appeal Court regarding using the word ‘Allah’ does not apply to Christians in Sabah and Sarawak. Najid stated that the 10 points resolutions by the federal cabinet remained intact for both states.
11. Dr. Mujahid opinion that the word ‘Allah’ is universal and not the exclusive property of the Muslims was opposed by Islamic Scholar. Khalif Muammar in his book, Islam and Religious Pluralism, Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Advanced Studies on Islam, Science and Civilisation (CASIS) stated that the word ‘Allah’ is a special noun that was agreed upon by the previous Islamic Scholars. He cited a writing by Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi in Tafsir al-Kabir

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Submission of Articles

Studia Islamika, published three times a year since 1994, is a bilingual (English and Arabic), peer-reviewed journal, and specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular and Southeast Asian Islamic studies in general. The aim is to provide readers with a better understanding of Indonesia and Southeast Asia’s Muslim history and present developments through the publication of articles, research reports, and book reviews.

The journal invites scholars and experts working in all disciplines in the humanities and social sciences pertaining to Islam or Muslim societies. Articles should be original, research-based, unpublished and not under review for possible publication in other journals. All submitted papers are subject to review of the editors, editorial board, and blind reviewers. Submissions that violate our guidelines on formatting or length will be rejected without review.

Articles should be written in American English between approximately 10,000-15,000 words including text, all tables and figures, notes, references, and appendices intended for publication. All submission must include 150 words abstract and 5 keywords. Quotations, passages, and words in local or foreign languages should
be translated into English. *Studia Islamika* accepts only electronic submissions. All manuscripts should be sent in Ms. Word to: http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/studia-islamika.

All notes must appear in the text as citations. A citation usually requires only the last name of the author(s), year of publication, and (sometimes) page numbers. For example: (Hefner 2009a, 45; Geertz 1966, 114). Explanatory footnotes may be included but should not be used for simple citations. All works cited must appear in the reference list at the end of the article. In matter of bibliographical style, *Studia Islamika* follows the American Political Science Association (APSA) manual style, such as below:


Arabic romanization should be written as follows:

Letters: ' b, t, th, j, h, kh, d, dh, r, z, s, sh, ẓ, ḏ, ṭ, ẓ, gh, f, q, l, m, n, h, w, y. Short vowels: a, i, u. long vowels: ā, ī, ū. Diphthongs: aw, ay. Tā marbūtā: t. Article: al-. For detail information on Arabic Romanization, please refer the transliteration system of the Library of Congress (LC) Guidelines.
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