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Contesting Ethnic and Religious Identities in the 2019 Indonesian Elections: Political Polarization in West Kalimantan

Abstract: During Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election, significant religious and ethnic contestations occurred using hatred and stigma in expressing support for favored candidates. This article focuses on the case of West Kalimantan Province which has a divided society and memories of ethnic-based bloody communal violence in the early 2000s. This article notifies that wherein ethnic Dayak, Javanese, and Chinese voters tended to support Joko Widodo (Jokowi)-Ma’ruf Amin, while ethnic Malay, Madurese, and Buginese voters tended to back Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno up in the election. However, such ethnic and religious contestations in West Kalimantan did not generate violent conflicts during the election. Instead, voters continued to interact peacefully and harmoniously among different ethnic and religious groups. This contestation coincided with the emergence of political awareness among the Dayaks, Chinese, and Malays of West Kalimantan, which further contributed to Jokowi’s electoral victory. Nevertheless, this political contestation produced the political identity.

Keywords: Contestation, Ethnicity, Religion, Identity, Election, West Kalimantan.

Kata kunci: Kontestasi, Etnisitas, Agama, Identitas, Pemilu, Kalimantan Barat.

ملخص: لقد حدثت أثناء الانتخابات الرئاسية في إندونيسيا لعام 2019 صراعات عرقية ودينية حادة أدت إلى إثارة الكراهية بين المؤيدين المنفصليين. ومع ذلك، فإن حالة كاليمانتان الغربية مثيرة للإهتمام، حيث مال الناخبون من العرقية الداخليّة والجاوية والصينية إلى دعم جوكو ويودودو - معرف أمين، في حين أن الناخبين من العرقية الملايوية والمادوروية والبوبوسية كانوا يميلون إلى دعم برابوو سونياندو - سانديا غاغا أوتو. وعلى الرغم من وجود اقتراحات في تقديم الدعم، إلا أن ذلك لا يؤدي إلى حدوث أعمال العنف. فالناخبون من جميع الأعراق يحافظون على السلام على المستوى المحلي، حيث لم يحدث هناك صراعات عرقية دينية تسببت في اقتراحات بين أنصار جوكوي - معرف وأنصار برابوو - ساندي. وقد ساهمت الأنشطة المختلفة التي قامت بها أنصار جوكوي المتمسكون إلى العرقية الداخليّة والصينية والمادوروية في انتشار الاختلاف. ومع ذلك، أدت هذه المناقة السياسية في النهاية إلى تعزيز سياسات الهوية. وهذه الدراسة تكشف المناقشات السياسية التي حدثت في الانتخابات العامة في كاليمانتان الغربية باستخدام المناقشات الاجتماعية السياسية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: النافسة، العرق، الدين، الهوية، الانتخابات العامة، كاليمانتان الغربية.

DOI: 10.36712/sdi.v29i1.12940 Studia Islamika, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2022
Religious and ethnic identity have been integral parts of Indonesia’s general election since the fall of the New Order on May 21, 1998 (Hamdi 2017a; Klinken and Henk 2007). In the years that immediately followed the regime’s collapse, communal conflict occurred in many parts of Indonesia, including West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku, Palu, and Poso (Bertrand 2003; Klinken and Henk 2007; Woodward 2006). Historically, such communal conflicts have marked several political transitions in Indonesia (Mas’oed, Maksum, and Soehadha 2001), and religion and ethnicity have often gone from factors that unite society to factors that divide it (Hefner 2016; Ramakrishna 2007). Even now, 20 years after the fall of the New Order, religious and ethnic stigmatization continues to occur (Hefner 2011).

Under the influence of the politics of power, religious and ethnic identity may promote either social unity or polarization (Azra 2006). Political power is frequently used to influence the interpretations and understandings of religious texts in society (Hidayat 2006), thereby exacerbating that polarization (Juergensmeyer 2005). Cultural conflicts are often prominent undertones of ethnic conflicts, as seen in the case of North Ireland, where different cultural practices contributed to fragmentation (Ross 2007).

Indonesia’s elections since the beginning of political reform (in 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014) have been marked by religious and ethnic tensions, as well as between candidates. In the 1999 election, for instance, the Javanese candidates Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati emerged victorious, becoming president and vice-president. In the 2004 election, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jusuf Kalla defeated Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi, receiving 69,266,350 (60.62%) votes, compared to their opponents’ 44,990,704 (39.38%) (KPU RI 2004).

In the 2009 general election, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Budiono emerged victorious over Megawati and Prabowo, receiving 73,874,562 (60.80%) votes, compared to their opponents’ 32,548,105 (26.79%) (KPU RI 2009). More recently, in the 2014 election, Joko Widodo and his running mate Jusuf Kalla received the most votes—70,997,850 (53.15%), while their opponents, Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Radjasa, received 62,576,444 votes (46.85%) (KPU RI 2014).

In these elections, issues of ethnicity and religion played a role. In 1999, Javanese identity and Islamic–nationalist parties were foundational
for electoral victory (Pepinsky, Liddle, dan Mujani 2012). In the 2004 general election, ethnic issues—Javanese versus non-Javanese—were less prominent; rather, the question of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s religion influenced public discourses more (Brubaker dan Laitin 1998). In the 2009 election, the issue of Javanization resurfaced, compounded by the question of religion, i.e., Islamism and non-Islamism (Tanasaldy 2009). In the 2014 election, the issue of ethnicity was less prominent; discourses focused more on claims that Joko Widodo was anti-Islam and pro-communism (Aminuddin dan Attamimi 2019; Simarmata 2015). The question of Joko Widodo’s religion was again prominent in the 2019 elections (Arifianto 2019b).

Indonesia’s most recent presidential and legislative elections, held on April 9, 2019, drew the attention and interest of Indonesians around the globe. At the same time, however, the elections—particularly the presidential election—resulted in significant religious and ethnic polarization (Arifianto, 2019). Furthermore, binary oppositions, such as Chinese and non-Chinese, Javanese and non-Javanese, indigenous and non-indigenous, were rampant (JA 2019). At the same time, to reduce their electability, certain candidates were branded as supporting blasphemy, homosexuality, communism, and atheism (Muhtadi 2018).

In West Kalimantan, questions of ethnicity polarized the supporters of Joko Widodo and his running mate Ma’ruf Amin (hereafter ‘Jokowi–Ma’ruf’) and the supporters of Prabowo Subianto and his running mate Sandiaga Uno (hereafter ‘Prabowo–Sandi’). Jokowi–Ma’ruf were supported primarily by the ethnic Dayaks, Bataks, and Javanese. Religious factors also played a role: Dayaks are predominantly Catholic or Protestant, Bataks are mostly Protestant, and the Javanese (from outside Madura) tend to practice an abangan (or syncretistic) form of Islam. Prabowo–Sandi, conversely, were supported by the ethnic Malays, Buginese, and Madurese, all of whom tend to practice a non-abangan (pure or reformist) form of Islam. In West Kalimantan, Jokowi–Ma’ruf received 1,709,896 votes (57.51%), while Prabowo–Sandi received 1,263,757 votes (42.49%). Support for Jokowi–Ma’ruf was concentrated in Bengkayang, Kapuas Hulu, Ketapang, Landak, Singkawang, Melawi, Sambas, Sekadau, Sanggau, and Sintang, while Prabowo–Sandi found a base in North Kayong, Pontianak, Kuba Raya, and Mempawah (KPU RI 2019).
This article demonstrates that notwithstanding the ethnic and religious contestation that emerged during the presidential election, violence did not result. In fact, religious and ethnic contestation served as cultural expressions, rather than reflections of group interests. We posit that West Kalimantan illustrates how religious and ethnic contestation occurred during and after the 2019 presidential election, as well as how such factors existed without resulting in polarization, as they did in Jakarta and West Java (Arifianto 2018b). Data for this article were collected through interviews with regional experts, as well as reviews of books and journal articles on the topic.

Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics in Contemporary Indonesia

As the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country—82.7% of its residents are Muslim (BPS RI 2015)—issues of religion are commonly used in Indonesia by its politicians and political parties to court the religious majority. Likewise, issues of ethnicity have frequently resulted in violent conflict (Miichi 2014, 55–83). In the 2019 presidential election, voters were polarized along religious and ethnic lines. Conservative Muslims, through Islamist groups such as the Islamic Defenders’ Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) and political parties such as the Crescent Moon Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB), Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), and United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), have sought to Islamize the political system (Hamdi 2017b, 247–250; Platzdasch 2009). This phenomenon not only underscores the emergence of identity politics (Ariëanto 2019b), but also illustrates the influence of contemporary religious populist movements from the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Hadiz 2016).

The religious and ethnic polarization of contemporary Indonesia first gained prominence immediately following the enactment of the Regional Autonomy Law in 2001, when local leaders (governors, regents, and mayors) began to contest general elections (Hidayat 2007, 171–190; Nurhasiim 2005). These elections were plagued by a range of issues, including the emergence of local bosses and political bandits (Hadiz 2000). In these local elections, democracy became a commodity, that is, something traded between capital holders and political brokers during local elections (Aspinall and Berenschot 2019). Following the passage of the regional autonomy law, clientelism ran rampant (Klinken...
2007; Leo 2010, 102–116), with local politicians predominantly drawing on their peers and their friends. As authoritarianism was replaced by democracy, local elites contested elections and sought power (Heryanto 2006), thereby becoming integral parts of Indonesian local politics (Hadiz 2004, 179–200; Torcal and Montero 2006).

In this situation, the practice of identity politics along ethnic and religious lines has been unavoidable (Hadiz 2000; S. Hidayat 2007; Qodir 2016). This contestation and polarization reached a boiling point with the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. In the contest between incumbent Basuki ‘Ahok’ Tjahaja Purnama and Anies Rasyid Baswedan (Ubaid 2017), religious and ethnic polarization was created by campaign teams as part of their electoral contestations, and ultimately charges of blasphemy were levied against Ahok to mobilize Anies’ voter base (Arifianto 2019b; Muhtadi 2018; Ubaid 2017). Similar religious and ethnic polarization have been created elsewhere as religious parties have sought to ensure their own electoral victories (Mietzner, Muhtadi, and Halida 2018).

Political parties may be rooted in various principles, including accommodation, conservativism, friendship, kinship, religion, and even secularism (Mujani 2003). In Indonesia, political parties have often been categorized as nationalist–religious, nationalist–secular, and conservative–religious, and these ideologies have come head-to-head, as seen, for example, in the 1955 legislative election (Fealy 2018; Feith and Castles 1998). In recent years, the contestation between conservative, progressive, and liberal ideologies has resulted in the creation of new groups and organizations, many of which have backed specific political candidates (Arifianto 2019b; Sebastian, 2019). These have included not only mainstream Islamic groups such as the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Hasyim 2019), but also non-mainstream groups such as FPI and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) (Arifianto 2019b; Aspinall and Berenschot 2019; Hamdi 2017a).

Identity politics have also contributed significantly to the politics of West Kalimantan, where Dayaks constitute the largest ethnic group. For example, Cornelis, a Dayak civil servant, rode the support of Dayak and Chinese voters to become governor of West Kalimantan for two terms (Tanasaldy 2012). His electoral victory indicated that Dayaks had begun to take an increasingly active role in local politics after decades of disempowerment (Sudagung 2001). Following the
Contesting Ethnic and Religious Identities in the General Election 2019 in West Kalimantan

Campaign Issues during the General Election

During the 2019 presidential election, the most common campaign issue was religion (35%), followed by political ideology (25%), public policy (20%), and social justice and welfare (20%) (Wibowo 2018). Candidates broadly discussed topics such as religious discrimination and religious sentiment, as well as their own piety (Wibowo 2018). When discussing political ideologies, meanwhile, candidates and voters discussed the specter of communism, as well as the rise of Islamism. Public policy discussions focused on infrastructure, forest fires, and the Freeport Mine in Papua. Finally, the discussion of social justice and welfare issues dealt predominantly with the dominance of ethnic minorities in Indonesia’s private and public enterprises (IPAC 2019; Pasuni 2018).

The focus on religious and ethnic sentiment reflected a shift in Indonesia’s political culture, as the country became increasingly autocratic, authoritarian, and anti-liberal (Menchick 2016; Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi 2012). If not handled properly, such religious and ethnic sentiment could result in deliberative democracy (Hardiman 2009), illegal democracy, or even an illiberal democracy (Horowitz 2013).

Religious and ethnic sentiments were widely exploited during the candidates’ campaign activities, reflecting a trend that began following
the fall of the New Order in 1998. Online media widely covered the rise of religious and ethnic hatred (Annisa 2018), the creation and dissemination of which widely involved Islamic online media (Ridho 2018). This not only resulted in the phenomenal series of protests known as the Action to Defend Islam (Aksi Bela Islam) (Ahnaf 2016, 30–40; Kusman 2016, 44–51), but also directly influenced local elections across Indonesia.

**Ethnic and Religious Mobilization**

The focus on ethnic and religious issues during Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election drew significant public attention (Aspinall and Berenschot 2019). A clear and significant divide existed between the supporters of Jokowi–Ma’ruf and Prabowo–Sandi, one that was informed by supporters’ ethnic and religious backgrounds (JA 2019; Muhtadi 2018).

Political campaigns in Indonesia have long looked to ethnic issues to mobilize support, both directly and indirectly (Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi 2012). Direct mobilization has occurred through the use of ethnic issues and the creation of political cartels to gather voter support (Ambardi 2009), while indirect mobilization has been conducted by the representatives of candidates hiring their campaign teams. Both types of mobilization have provided political spaces to radical and conservative religious groups (Hikam 2016), and consequently resulted in political spaces being used for the contestation of religious beliefs and interpretations (Haar and Tsuruoka 2007; Juergensmeyer 2005).

This shows that identity politics (both ethnic and religious) have become an unavoidable part of contemporary politics. As seen elsewhere, including in Eastern Europe following the fall of communism and socialism (Fukuyama 2018), and China following the contestation of Confucianism, Islam, and Christianity (Huntington 1993), ethnic and religious sentiments have become integral in Indonesia’s local, national, and legislative elections.

Conservative Islamic groups have become powerful political forces through their use of campus and political movements. In Indonesia, PKS and HTI have become primary drivers of religious conservatism (Arifianto 2018c). These organizations, as well as FPI, have shown themselves to be capable of affecting the course of elections at the local, provincial, and national levels (Arifianto 2018c). Since the fall
of the New Order, such conservative forces have challenged moderate religious groups (i.e., Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama) to gain political power. Conservative Islam has not only changed how Indonesia does and understands religion (Hasan 2009; Kersten 2016), it has also transformed the country’s political demography (Mudzakir 2018). There has been a change in the country’s political composition due to the transformation of religion (from progressive to conservative) that has occurred at the national level. The emergence of conservatism, which occurred not long after Indonesia began its political reform and spread rapidly through state campuses and Islamic congregations, has threatened Indonesia’s democratic growth.

During the Action to Defend Islam, conservative Muslims mobilized their congregations to hold demonstrations in the nation’s capital of Jakarta, Surabaya, Makassar, Yogyakarta, Bandung, and Tangerang. During these demonstrations, orations were provided by politicians and religious leaders, including Amien Rais and Zulkifli Hasan (from the National Mandate Party; PAN); Hidayat Nurwahid and Fachri Hamzah (PKS); Prabowo Subianto, Sandiaga Uno, and Fadli Zon (Gerindra Party); Rizieq Shihab (FPI); Bachtar Nasir (the National Movement for Safeguarding the MUI Fatwa, GNPF-MUI); and Teuku Zulkarnain (Indonesian Council of Ulama, MUI). Such Muslim parties and groups also spread their ideas on campuses across Indonesia, including campuses run by moderate Muslim organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama (Ariëanto 2018a).

Following the collapse of the New Order regime, conservative Muslims have changed the direction of Indonesian Islam (Ariëanto 2019a), often standing with groups that have sought the creation of an Islamic State (Burhani 2018a). Such conservative Islam has found real political support from local candidates, who in turn have protected and promoted their interests through the passage of religious bylaws (popularly known as perda syariah) in Aceh, Madura, Tasikmalaya, Cirebon, Sukabumi, Makassar, and Lombok. This “conservative turn” (van Bruinessen 2013) has reached the national level, and Islamic groups widely supported Prabowo Subianto in the 2019 presidential election (Ariëanto 2019b; Aspinall and Berenschot 2019; Muhtadi 2018).

Such conditions will threaten the freedom of religion and tolerance that has developed in Indonesia (Fossati 2019). Indeed, as Casanova has
noted, the emergence of democracy in a country does not always result in religious freedom. In Balkan countries such as Serbia, Yugoslavia, and Montenegro, for instance, people of different religions and ethnic backgrounds have viewed each other as enemies and even killed each other (Ben Shitrit 2013). Democratic openness does not always correlate linearly with religious freedom (Menchik 2019).

This holds true in Indonesia as well. While shaping Indonesia’s political and religious climate, conservative Muslims have competed with progressive and moderate Islamic organizations, such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (Arifianto 2019b), and their ideals of wasatiyyah Islam (Islamic moderatism). Although contestations have not been frontal and explicit (Hasan 2009), Salafi and jihadist groups have nonetheless staunchly opposed the moderate religious paradigms of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organizations (Burhani 2018b).

Religion has long been seen as personal (Casanova 2006), while political matters have been seen as secular, and as something profane that must be distanced from the sacred. However, as discussed above, politics in Indonesia are inherently personal and include not only religion, but also ethnicity. Conservative Muslim groups have asserted their religious morality and used it to inform and guide politics (Cini 2018, 7–8), often using religious symbols in their political activities to promote the “reunion” of religion and politics (Casanova 2006b). These symbols, however, have not been used in conjunction with religious substance; the essence of religious teachings has remained divorced from practical politics (Ferrara 2009). The use of religious and ethnic considerations in politics has been justified through the argument that politics—as part of public space—requires morality (including religious morality) to guarantee the correctness of policy and policymaking (Habermas 2006a). In other words, it is hoped that religious values will contribute positively to public politics (Habermas 2006b), and, as such, political processes will integrate the sacred. Religious sentiments—as with ethnic sentiments—have thus been exploited to access political power (Hefner 2011).

**Joko Widodo vs. Prabowo Subianto**

Joko Widodo’s electoral victory over Prabowo Subianto in the 2019 Indonesian presidential election has been framed as a victory for religious nationalists over religious conservatives. Indeed, despite both candidates being Muslim, Jokowi–Ma’ruf were depicted by their
opponents as anti-Islam, citing a decision made by the National Ulama Conference (comprising former Action to Defend Islam protestors) that supported Prabowo–Sandi (Alvara 2017; Arifianto 2019b; Aspinall and Berenschot 2019; JA 2019; Muhtadi 2018).

On May 21, 2019, the General Elections Commission officially announced that Jokowi–Ma’ruf had won the election with 55.50% of valid votes, to Prabowo–Sandi’s 44.50% (KPU 2019). When Prabowo challenged these results in the Constitutional Court, he was unable to establish his claim that the election had been rigged, citing nothing but unclearly sourced social media reports. His claim that structured, systematic, and massive election rigging had occurred was rejected by the court, and his witnesses were similarly unable to prove his claims. Ultimately, on June 27, 2019, Prabowo’s legal challenge was rejected entirely, and Joko Widodo was confirmed as Indonesia’s president for the 2019–2024 term. Despite having capitalized on the momentum of Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election, during which the conservative Muslim-backed candidate Anies Baswedan had emerged victorious, FPI, GNPF-MUI, PKS, PAN, and Gerindra were unable to guarantee Prabowo’s victory. There had been no domino effect, and the framing of the candidate as representing all Muslims did not sway voters (JA 2019; Muhtadi 2018).

In West Kalimantan, Joko Widodo won the election with a similar margin. According to data from the General Elections Commission, the incumbent received 1,709,896 votes in the province (57.50%), while Prabowo–Sandi received 1,263,757 votes (42.50%). The Democratic Party of Indonesia – Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, PDIP), which had created a coalition with the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), the National Democrat Party (Partai Nasdem), Golkar (Golongan Karya), and the People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, Hanura) to back Jokowi–Ma’ruf, had successfully gathered support for their candidate. Conservative Islamic groups failed to influence voters. As Zainuddin noted:

“The Conservative Islamic forces that affected Jakarta and the rest of Java did not influence the behaviors and political choices of voters in West Kalimantan. The people of West Kalimantan stood by their decisions, by the candidate they desired. We in West Kalimantan, both members of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, did not fight as they did in Jakarta and Java. We were not influenced by FPI or GNPF” (Zaenuddin 2019).
The electoral victory of Jokowi–Ma’ruf over Prabowo–Sandi in April 2019 did not end the political polarization of Indonesian society. Rather, Indonesians have remained heavily divided. On social media, political debates have continued almost incessantly, and it is feared that—if this situation remains unchanged—it will continue into the 2024 presidential election. As Haedar Nashir, the Chairman of the Muhammadiyah Central Council, remarked:

“The involvement of religious and ethnic identities, if it does not stop, will have a negative effect on Indonesia’s model of politics, removing all semblance of dignity and civilization. This is the duty of Muhammadiyah, of Nahdlatul Ulama, and other civil society organizations. As such, we need to find a solution to make sure that our people are not polarized along religious and ethnic lines” (Nashir 2019).

As Habermas notes, the exploitation of religious identities in politics could have a deleterious effect on the development of liberal democracy. Religion is expected to guide people in their political practices and help them improve themselves. Although it is hoped that the incorporation of religious values into politics will not impugn the sacrality of religion (Gaus 2009; Habermas 2006b), as the facts in the field are often different (Hefner 2016).

**Election Results: Ethnic Identity**

The significant victory of Jokowi–Ma’ruf over Prabowo–Sandi in West Kalimantan can be attributed to the broad support for the former among ethnic Dayak and Chinese voters. As in the 2007 gubernatorial election, during which Cornelis rode a wave of Dayak and Chinese support to the governorship, these long-marginalized groups became significant political forces in the 2019 presidential election (Hasanah 2018, 267–275). Under the New Order, the Dayak and Chinese of West Kalimantan faced considerable political subjugation. Over time, however, they became aware of their political rights and power. It may thus be argued that Jokowi–Ma’ruf’s victory in West Kalimantan was the result of increased political awareness among Dayak and Chinese voters who, seeking to advance their own interests, had fearlessly backed their preferred candidates. As Hermayani Putera, the Director of WWF Indonesia, noted:

“In West Kalimantan, especially in Pontianak City, the Dayaks and Chinese have long lived in political fear. After Indonesia’s political reform began in
Contesting Ethnic and Religious Identities

1998, they rose and demanded their political rights. There was increased political awareness, rooted in ethnic identity. In the general election of April 9, 2019, the Dayaks, Chinese, Batak mostly voted for Joko Widodo and his running mate Ma’ruf Amin, whom they considered to politically represent the Dayaks and Chinese of West Kalimantan. The victory of Joko Widodo and Ma’ruf Amin in West Kalimantan can thus be attributed to their majority support among the Chinese, Dayaks, and Batak. And the Malays supported Prabowo–Sandi” (Putra 2019).

In West Kalimantan, the Dayaks and Chinese constitute the ethnic majority, with Malays being the third largest ethnic group (BPS RI 2010). During the 2019 election, the majority of Dayak and Chinese voters supported Jokowi–Ma’ruf, while the Malays and Javanese predominantly backed Prabowo–Sandi (KPU 2019). The latter fact may also be attributed to identity politics, as Prabowo was of Javanese heritage and was therefore seen as representing Javanese interests, reflecting what Stange (1998) calls the “politics of attention”.

According to the 2010 census, the ethnic composition of West Kalimantan is: Dayak (49.91%), Malay (16.50%), Javanese (8.66%), Chinese (8.17%), Madurese (6.27%), Buginese (3.13%), and Sundanese (1.13%). The province’s total population was 4,385,356; it had increased to 5,457,352 by mid-2020 (BPS Kalbar 2020). For demographic information, see Table 1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
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<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>2,144,009</td>
<td>49.91%</td>
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<td>Malay</td>
<td>814,550</td>
<td>16.50%</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Java</td>
<td>427,333</td>
<td>8.66%</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>358,451</td>
<td>8.17%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Madura</td>
<td>274,869</td>
<td>6.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bugis</td>
<td>137,282</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sunda</td>
<td>49,530</td>
<td>1.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Batak</td>
<td>26,486</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Daya</td>
<td>22,690</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Banjar</td>
<td>14,430</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Other Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>58,306</td>
<td>1.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,385,356</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BPS Kalbar 2010

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Meanwhile, according to the 2020 census, the religious composition of West Kalimantan is: Islam (3,275,798; 60%), Catholic (1,209,634; 22.2%), Protestant (630,242; 11.5%), and Buddhist (323,877; 5.9%). For more complete information, see Table 2 below.

Table 2. Total Population by Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>1,675,662</td>
<td>1,600,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>327,350</td>
<td>302,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>628,532</td>
<td>581,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td>1,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>168,901</td>
<td>154,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucian</td>
<td>7,032</td>
<td>6,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folk Religion</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,809,944</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,647,408</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dukcapil Kalbar 2020

In the years leading up to the 2019 Indonesian election, the Dayaks of West Kalimantan had become politically empowered through the work of local non-governmental organizations such as the Dayakology Institute. Similar empowerment efforts had been undertaken by the Chinese Association of West Kalimantan and the Pancur Kasih Credit Union (Hasanah 2018). These empowerment activities had proven quite successful; after being stifled by decades of centralization, ancestral cultures were again practiced by the Dayaks and Chinese of West Kalimantan (Yuniar 2011). Over time, this political awareness became an integral part of West Kalimantan’s contemporary politics; without such an awareness, the Dayaks and Chinese of West Kalimantan would not have been able to mobilize significant support. As Professor Al-Qadrie remarked:

“The development of political awareness amongst the Dayaks, Chinese, and Malays of West Kalimantan has significantly affected the political map of West Kalimantan. This can be seen, for example, in how local elections have been contested by various candidates, with the Dayaks and Chinese emerging victorious. Javanese and Malay candidates, however, failed in their efforts to represent their ethnic groups. During the Presidential Election of April 9, 2019, the Dayaks and Chinese were able to vote for Joko Widodo without any pressure or fear” (Qadrie 2019).
Al-Qadrie explained that, although both Joko Widodo and his running mate Ma’ruf Amin were Javanese, the Dayaks and Chinese of West Kalimantan saw these candidates as representing their political interests. Furthermore, PDI-P had successfully coordinated its cadres in West Kalimantan, thereby consolidating support during the presidential and legislative elections. It could not allow this support to go to waste (JA 2019).

In West Kalimantan, while ethnic struggles did occur in the lead up to the 2019 presidential election, they did not cause division between these groups. Although ethnic Dayaks and Malay Muslims supported Jokowi–Ma’ruf en masse, while other Malay Muslims and ethnic groups supported Prabowo–Sandi, society remained united and harmonious, even. Likewise, the ethnic Madurese who supported Prabowo–Sandi could co-exist with the Batak supporters of Jokowi–Ma’ruf (Prasojo, Elmansyah, dan Haji Masri 2019). As such, the contestation did not evolve into conflict, as it did elsewhere (Mietzner, Muhtadi, dan Halida 2018). Rather, it merely increased tensions; any divisions that emerged during the election were resolved following its conclusion.

**Vote Buying**

Serious issues remain following Indonesia’s 2019 presidential, legislative, and regional legislative elections. Vote buying and selling, cases of which were reported in West Kalimantan during the 2019 presidential election, which took place simultaneously with the legislative election, posed a special challenge to the election. Voters received between Rp. 300,000 and 500,000 each (Aminuddin dan Attamimi 2019) for their votes.

Money politics, such as vote buying, is not a new phenomenon in Indonesian political practice. It is identified by the General Elections Commission as a violation of proper democratic processes. Money politics takes many forms. Religious voters, for example, may be enticed with religious objects (i.e., hijabs, jilbabs, sarongs, and mukenas for Muslim voters) or religious infrastructure (i.e., prayer rooms, mosques, churches, and even temples). Voters may also be given money in return for their campaign activities and joining discussions, or be promised certain positions or offices in return for their support (Muhtadi 2019).

The transactional practices involved in vote buying vary significantly. Candidates for municipal/regency-level parliament, for example, may
give voters Rp. 200,000 each, while candidates for provincial parliament may pay upwards of Rp. 300,000 per vote. Candidates for the national parliament may spend Rp. 400,000-Rp. 500,000 per vote. From this information, it may be extrapolated that candidates for municipal/regency-level parliament require between Rp. 350,000,000 and Rp. 500,000,000 per election; candidates for provincial legislature spend between Rp. 1 and 2 billion; and candidates for national parliament must spend at least Rp. 5 billion. Such “political expenses”, no matter how they are identified, contribute to the significant cost of Indonesia’s elections (Aspinall and Berenschot 2019).

Aspinall identifies the practice of money politics as creating a situation where “democracy is for sale”; all legislative and executive candidates spend lavishly to gain access to power. Owing to this expense, corruption is rampant amongst Indonesia’s executives and parliamentarians at the regency, provincial, and national level, and further erodes the quality of Indonesia’s electoral democracy (Aspinall and Berenschot 2019). If this continues, Indonesians may ultimately desire a return to the authoritarianism practiced by the New Order government. At the same time, Indonesia’s elections have received the attention of foreign observers, who are concerned that such practices will reduce voter participation and create a situation wherein intolerance, intimidation, and coercion are rampant. Indonesia’s practice of democracy has thus been widely criticized by proponents of liberal democracy and human rights (Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi 2018, 1–3).

There is concern that the immense cost of Indonesia’s electoral democracy, caused in part by the widespread practice of money politics and vote buying, will create a resurgence in authoritarianism. This concern is amplified by the rise of dynastic and oligarchic politics, which have resulted in Indonesia being ruled by only a few elites and their families—often the founders of political parties (Aspinall and Rohman 2017). This can be seen in Banten under Ratu Atut Chosiyah. Members of the executive’s family were involved with Golkar and created a new political dynasty in post-New Order Indonesia. Such a resurgence in political dynasties has been accepted by voters, who have helped to extend their rule (Leo 2010).

The increased prevalence of vote buying since Indonesia began its political reform in 1998 has indirectly benefited the elites and other politicians with the capital to become politically active. This situation
has been a particular boon to those with close ties to existing rulers, including party founders’ descendants, subordinates, and colleagues. People without such ties, meanwhile, are politically disadvantaged and have inferior political power. Consciously or not, almost all of Indonesia’s post-reform parties have become oligarchies (Aspinall and Rohman 2017). Nonetheless, these were the parties that received voter support at the 2019 legislative election. Less oligarchic parties, including the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB), the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), and the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), were less competitive.

**The Issues Since the 2019 Election**

*Political Dynasty*

After the 2019 presidential and legislative election, Indonesian politics became increasingly oligarchic. Oligarchic politics tend to be familial in nature, thereby allowing the emergence of a single group that dominates political activities. Aspinall (2015) offers political dynasties as examples of political oligarchies. The trend towards oligarchy is partly due to the paternalistic relations between capital holders and candidates in regional elections, a tendency that has marked the fragmentation of Indonesian politics in the neoliberal era (Edward Aspinall 2013).

More critically, Power (2018) has warned that the Jokowi–Ma’ruf government—due to the emergence of political oligarchies and political kinship—may become an authoritarian regime. Power holds that, since Jokowi–Ma’ruf won the 2019 election, there has been a decline in the quality of democracy; supporting this, he cites several policies, such as the dissolution of HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), as well as the emergence of anti-pluralism and conservatism forces that have used the regime to crush opposition forces. This has prevented opposition forces in Indonesia from competing and empowering people with more democratic political ideas (Power 2018).

The Jokowi–Ma’ruf government, initially believed to be able to eradicate corruption on a massive scale, has been questioned from Civil Society. (Hadiz 2017; Mietzner 2014; Warburton 2018). Freedom of religion and freedom of opinion have likewise come under attack, as Jokowi–Ma’ruf have tended to see their opposition as potentially disrupting Indonesia’s political stability. Such a situation has caused
a significant decline in Indonesia’s ranking on the international democratic index. It is difficult for Indonesia to become a superior democratic country when cases of corruption and violence in the name of government power are directed at the opposition; indeed, it can even be said that the administration is simply looking for justification to fight against the opposition. Tapsell (2017) identifies this as Jokowi’s authoritarianism, an oligopoly within the government (Tapsell 2017).

Given such oligopoly and authoritarianism, the government has given more authority and power to investors and the military, which has accelerated the decline and decay of Indonesian democracy (Aspinall and Mietzner 2014). We can see how electoral battles at the local level are ultimately controlled by the descendants of previous rulers, as oligarchic forces have affected political and power struggles from the national to the local level (Aspinall and Berenschot 2019).

Such a situation confirms that cartelism is, in fact, occurring, including at the local level. In West Kalimantan, for instance, former governor Cornelius gave his daughter, Karolina Margret, his blessings to advance in the gubernatorial election (Ambardi 2009).

Ethnic Segregation

Another challenge since the presidential election is the ethnic segregation that has resulted from the rising term of conservatism, as Burhani (2019) notes. In Burhani’s view, religion and ethnicity were decisive factors in Indonesia’s 2019 elections, affecting the political composition of voters, such as the Madurese in both Madura and West Kalimantan (Burhani 2019).

Burhani writes that the ethnic Javanese, Madurese, as well as the non-Javanese and non-Madurese in East Java and elsewhere in Indonesia, participated in demonstrations against Joko Widodo because they saw him as not representing their interests (Burhani 2019). Based on this view, it can be said that, even though Ma’ruf Amin emerged from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Jokowi–Ma’ruf did not have the support of all NU members. Nahdlatul Ulama was not monolithic, including in Madura and West Kalimantan (Burhani 2019).

Social Disharmony

As Jonkers (2019) notes, the issue of social disharmony has been a serious concern since the 2019 presidential election in West Kalimantan.
and other parts of Indonesia. Jonkers argues that the main reason value pluralism has become conflictual is that it challenges people’s socio-cultural identity. It is closely linked to the issues of globalization, such as cosmopolitanism, immigration, and cultural integration, and belies the belief that substantial socio-cultural values will be replaced by universalist, procedural ethics. Jonkers also offers some philosophical reasons for the potentially conflictual character of value pluralism: the fragility of socio-cultural identity, the spread of expressive individualism and the ethics of authenticity, and the influence of the (politics of) recognition of socio-cultural differences.


Jonkers draws his conclusions based on the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial campaigns. Fauzi Bowo and Nachrowi Ramli relied primarily on typical strongman tactics, including money politics, voter intimidation, ethnic and religious discrimination, the mobilization of various allied groups from patronage networks, staged media events, and expensive advertising. The team carried out two main kinds of public campaign events: staged media events, mostly held at their media center for journalists only, and outdoor events that usually involved VIP pavilions, a stage, and microphones in bridging the distance between speakers and voters.

A lineup including local leaders, strongmen, and party allies delivered long-winded speeches of support and even the occasional threat of consequences for voters, should the election result be unfavorable. In addition, there were also closed-door events for selected audiences and widespread ‘black campaigning’ (discriminatory, illegal, or otherwise morally dubious strategies such as defamation, falsehoods, and personal attacks). Despite both teams having been accused of black campaigning, the attacks by the incumbent were perceived as more prominent, widespread, and often particularly nasty, as well as a significant part of their campaign strategy—particularly during the second, more aggressive round of elections. Pamphlets attacking the moderate Muslim and Javanese Joko Widodo or the Christian and ethnic-Chinese Indonesian Basuki Tjahaja Purnama were frequently
distributed. This black campaigning was aimed at dividing the predominantly Muslim electorate and the non-Muslim minorities of Jakarta, and the local Betawi and other ethnic groups, particularly ethnic-Chinese Indonesians.

**Blasphemy**

The issue of blasphemy has been very important in Indonesia, both before and after the 2019 presidential election. In the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, a speech delivered by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama on Pramuka Island, part of the Thousand Islands district (*Kepulauan Seribu*), resulted in protests from FPI and several other Islamic groups (such as MUI, Anas, Asyaëah, Wahdah Islamiyah, Indonesian Islamic Students, and HMI). These protests led to the Action to Defend Islam, members of which have formed a group of ‘212 Alumni’—named after the largest rally, held on December 2, 2016. Kapitra Ampera, a member of the group’s advisory board, has stated that his movement was founded in order “to elect observant Muslims to office—as local and national legislators, local executives, and president of the Republic of Indonesia”.

During the 2019 election, these ‘212 Alumni’ worked to defeat President Joko Widodo in his re-election bid, arguing that he had issued policies that were “detrimental to the interests of Indonesian Muslims”. One often-cited instance is the Regulation in Lieu of a Law (Perppu) Number 2 of 2017 on Civil Society Organizations, which some have argued was designed to “[criminalize] members of the ulama” (Arifianto 2018b).

Zainal Abidin Bagir has written that the issue of blasphemy is highly political, rather than merely theological (Bagir 2014; Stanzhevskiy and Goncharko 2019). Take, as an example, the issue of plural Russian identities and the role of “otherness” (as embodied by Catholicism) in Russian identity. The stereotypical idea of two opposed identities, i.e., elites and common people, is corrected by suggesting a third Russian identity, one shaped by the followers of the Old Belief after the split of the Russian Church. In analyzing this identity, one should consider not only the intertwined political and religious dimensions of Russian identity, but also its historical dimension. The Old Believers, owing to their worldview and way of thinking, gave rise to new anthropological figures that contrasted with the stereotyped image of the Russian
grounded in the history of serfdom and rural community. This new type of Russian identity was associated with democratic governance, a rigorous way of life, higher rationality, and dynamic and successful economic activity. Nevertheless, the history of the Russian Raskol reveals a latent conflict inherent in the Russian past and present, and in underlying Russian identities. Unlike the religious wars in Europe, this conflict received no resolution; instead, it has been repressed, while its latency affects contemporary Russia. Present-day Russia should draw inspiration from the religious and political heritage of the Old Believers, if the conflict is to be resolved.

Presently, there remains disharmony between majorities and minorities in Indonesia (Regus, 2019). Regus considers the intersection of socio-political spaces and the exclusion of religious minorities in Indonesia based on the current situation of the Ahmadiyya, seeking to spread the discipline of ‘the politics of religion.’ The Ahmadiyya constitute an Islamic minority worldwide, with their own community in Indonesia. The group was founded in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908) in the village of Qadian, Punjab, India. Several key factors encouraged him to initiate the new Islamic movement that later became the Ahmadiyya, including British colonialism in South Asia, the degradation of Muslim culture in many areas, and the Christianization processes promoted by Western missionaries. It was thus partly a result of self-criticism by concerned Muslims and partly resistance against the interference of other religions in India at that time (Regus 2019).

In political theory, secularism is defined as the separation of religion and state. In concrete and practical terms, secularism is a description of “the absence of God” in social and political discourses. It holds that God has no position in social and political arenas, and thus religion has no role in constructing “identity politics”. Religion is seen as a private matter. Secularism has to do with the decline of religious interest in the whole political process and space. Meanwhile, in the context of Southeast Asia, unlike in Western democracies, religion has a very close connection with social and political complexities. It cannot be denied that religion plays a leading role in social and political dynamics. This does not mean that secularism is never implemented in state-building processes, nor does it mean that states cannot be based on secularism. Rather, in the application of liberal democracy, religious sentiments still
influence and affect the dynamics and problems in society and polity. Some scholars remind us that the relationship between religion (Islam) and democracy (secularism) is one of the most important and challenging themes of Indonesian political discourse today. By identifying Islam as a central actor in the democratization of the country, this paper shows that democracy has already justified the role of Islam in politics. This religious community has also offered distinct contributions to the trajectory of the democratization process in the country. In fact, so many political opportunities have been interpreted and claimed differently by different groups within Islam. The assumption is that Indonesian Islam has undergone a significant shift from the view that Islam can manage democracy to the critical view that Islam is encountering conflict and tension (Menchik 2019; Regus 2019).

In the twenty years since Indonesia’s democratic transition and consolidation, scholars have pointed to mass Islamic organizations as a crucial reason for the country’s relative success. While other Muslim-majority democracies—including Egypt, Turkey, Senegal, Pakistan, and Nigeria—have backslid into authoritarianism, Indonesia has remained a largely successful democracy, according to indicators from Polity as well as most scholars (Mujani, Liddle, dan Ambardi 2012). In comparison to its region, too, Indonesia is a surprising success: Thailand and the Philippines have reverted to authoritarianism, while durable authoritarianism reigns in Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Burma (James 2010). Although facing major challenges with regard to corruption, rule of law, sectarianism, and economic inequality, Indonesia continues to hold successful elections with alternations of power, and state policies are largely crafted and implemented by broadly accountable elected representatives (E. Aspinall 2015).

Authoritarian politics, which exist in several countries, such as Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Burma, present a severe problem in Indonesia. Post-Reformasi Indonesian politics has led to a political dynasty, oligarchy, and kinship such that it has not provided ample space for broad citizen participation. Such conditions are part of a democracy held hostage by elite political interests (Edward Aspinall et al. 2020). Therefore, civil society, in the end, lacks space for expression. Moreover, the strength of Islamic civil society, led primarily by Muhammadiyah and NU, was blocked by the paramilitary power of non-mainstream Islamic groups. Muhammadiyah and NU are
expected to be the main supporting forces for Indonesia’s democratic growth (Hefner 2019).

In recent years, however, imperfections in Indonesian democracy have become visible to the point where the breakdown of democracy is imaginable, if not yet underway (Warburton and Aspinall 2019). While scholars have devoted considerable attention to the role of moderate Muslims in supporting democracy, and the role of Islamic extremists and autocrats in undermining it, less attention has been paid to the role that moderates such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah have played in undermining democracy (Nashir et al. 2019). This gap deserves attention if scholars are to understand the role of Islam in democracy. Normatively, too, this gap merits attention to combat the country’s backsliding into authoritarianism. Under what political conditions do these organizations support democrats, and under what conditions do they support autocrats and Islamists? Drawing on original survey data and interviews, as well as case studies that reveal the preferences of organizational leaders, this article argues that their values are compatible with both democracy and authoritarianism.

This argument builds on Robert Hefner’s canonical book, Civil Islam, which presciently unearthed a pluralist movement among Islamic intellectuals. This movement celebrated mutual respect, individual autonomy, and volunteerism, thereby providing the social infrastructure for Indonesia’s democratic culture. Yet, while Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah exemplify the civic associational ties and democratic culture that are necessary for making democracy work, civic pluralism is not their only value. These organizations have a hierarchy of values that they promote and defend, and they are willing to forgo civic pluralism to oppose blasphemy against Islam, ensure Muslim control over overwhelmingly Muslim regions, limit political expression concerning heterodox approaches to Islam or non-Muslim involvement in matters of aqidah (faith), and gain patronage. While Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah are interested in the maintenance of an open democratic political system, they have other priorities too, which means that under certain circumstances they do not defend democratic institutions or values. Such a hierarchy of values is not exceptional; rather, it is the norm among political actors and a reoccurring component of democratic breakdown (Linz 1978, 4). Such conditions clouded Indonesia’s democracy during the General Election, coupled with the issue of Islamic populism.
Moderate Muslims in the local election becomes a dignified political future in Indonesia, so the fight between conservative and progressive groups does not make Indonesian democracy a deadlock.

The ideological contestations between conservative Islam and progressive nationalism during the 2019 Indonesian election also affected civil society organizations. Prabowo–Anies, for example, received the support of the Ijtima’ Ulama, FPI, and the 212 Alumni. These groups mobilized their supporters both through religious activities and through online media such as WhatsApp (IPAC 2019). Jokowi–Ma’ruf did not take this idly, forefronting the incumbent’s efforts to eradicate corruption and promote social welfare (IPAC 2019). At the same time, the candidate highlighted his own piety to combat rumors that he and his supporters were anti-religious or even communist (IPAC 2019). Nevertheless, rumors that Jokowi was anti-religious and discriminated against Muslims spread rampantly. Seeking to capitalize on the religious sentiments that had been exploited during Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial elections, Prabowo branded his opponent as having implemented numerous policies that limited the development of Islam and impugned upon the welfare of Muslims. The implication that a new president would advocate for Muslims was clear (IPAC 2019).

Conclusion

Identity politics and contestations along religious and ethnic lines have created a new political climate in Indonesia, including in West Kalimantan. As a result, religious and ethnic factors significantly affected the campaign activities of Jokowi–Ma’ruf and Prabowo–Anies in Indonesia’s 2019 presidential elections. However, despite clear religious and ethnic contestation, West Kalimantan (unlike several other provinces) did not experience violent conflict. Nonetheless, there is concern that continued identity politics and contestations will detrimentally affect political freedom and tolerance, potentially resulting in the decline of Indonesian democracy.

In the context of local politics in Indonesia, such as in West Kalimantan, the challenges of democracy lie in dynastic politics, social segregation, blasphemy, and ethnic segregation. Since the 2019 presidential election, Indonesia has also seen revived authoritarianism, wherein opposition groups are suppressed and their freedom of expression is limited with the pretext of enforcing the law.
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Contesting Ethnic and Religious Identities


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The journal invites scholars and experts working in all disciplines in the humanities and social sciences pertaining to Islam or Muslim societies. Articles should be original, research-based, unpublished and not under review for possible publication in other journals. All submitted papers are subject to review of the editors, editorial board, and blind reviewers. Submissions that violate our guidelines on formatting or length will be rejected without review.

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قيمة الاشتراك السنوي داخل إندونيسيا:
- لسنة واحدة: 150,000 روبية (المؤسسة) ونسخة واحدة قيمتها 10,000 روبية،
- لأفراد: 105,000 روبية (الفرد) ونسخة واحدة قيمتها 4,000 روبية.
والقيمة لا تشمل على نفقة التسليم بالبريد الجوي.
سُودُنِّيَّة إسْلَامِيَّة