

STUDIA ISLAMIKA

Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies

Volume I, No. 1 (April - June), 1994

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STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-0492) is a journal published quarterly by the State Institute for Islamic Studies of Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta (STT/DEPPEN No. 129/SK/DITJEN/PPG/STT/1976), and sponsored by the Department of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia.

It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies, and is intended to communicate original research and current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contribution from scholars of related disciplines.

Printed in the Republic of Indonesia.

OFFICES: STUDIA ISLAMIKA, Jl. Ir. H. Juanda no. 95, Ciputat, Jakarta Selatan 15412. PHONE: (021) 701 925, 740 1606. FACS: (021) 740 1592. ACCOUNT: 0027793001 Bank Negara Indonesia 1946, Kebayoran Baru/LAIN, Jakarta. SUBSCRIPTION RATE: Rp 40,000.00 (US\$ 20.00) one year, Rp 70,000.00 (US\$ 35.00) two years. Orders for single copies must be accompanied with prepayment of Rp 10,000.00 (US\$ 5.00). For orders outside Indonesia, add US\$ 8.00 per volume for airmail delivery; for special postal delivery or other special handling, please contact STUDIA ISLAMIKA for correct rate.

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From the Editor

The fact that Indonesia is now the largest Muslim nation has become wellknown internationally in the last few years. Despite this, it must be admitted that Islam in Indonesia has only recently entered global discussion. There has been a tendency among scholars to exclude Islam in Indonesia from any discussion of Islam or Muslim society. Islam in Indonesia has been regarded by many Western scholars as "peripheral", not only in terms of its geographic location –vis-a-vis the centers of Islam in the Middle East– but also in terms of the kind of Islam that exists in this area.

Indonesian Muslims has long complained about this. But after all, who is to be blamed? Blaming Western scholars for misperceptions and misrepresentations of Islam in Indonesia is no longer very productive. It is time for Indonesian Muslim scholars to provide a more accurate picture of Islam in their region.

One of the most effective ways to present Islam in Indonesia is through publication, such as books and journals, using international languages, mainly English and Arabic. *Studia Islamika* is intended to fill the lack of credible journals, aimed at disseminating information and academic works on various aspects of Islam in Indonesia.

Publishing a journal in international languages in Indonesia is not an easy task. The hardest challenge in this respect is the relative lack of availability of articles or reports written in either English or Arabic. We have to be honest and admit that not many Indonesian Muslim scholars are accustomed to writing in either language. This is one of the chief factors responsible for the obscurity of the development of Islam and Islamic thought in this country.

Indonesian Muslim scholars have long claimed that there were (and are) several outstanding Indonesian Muslim thinkers whose Islamic thought deserve international attention. Again, the problem is that they have published their thoughts in the national language,

Bahasa Indonesia. So far there has been no serious effort to translate their works into English or Arabic. In this respect, our journal is a humble beginning to tread the path in that direction.

Studia Islamika itself has been published by the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) in Jakarta for several years in Bahasa Indonesia. However, Dr. Tarmizi Taher, the newly-appointed Minister of Religious Affairs, wishes the IAIN in Jakarta to publish the journal in a new format, mainly using two international languages, English and Arabic, and partly in Indonesian.

It is our pleasure that in this first edition of the new *Studia Islamika*, we are able to present articles by several noted scholars, among others, Dr. Nurcholish Madjid, Dr. Quraish Shihab, Dr. Martin van Bruinessen and Dr. Azyumardi Azra. All of their articles are written in either English or Arabic.

In addition, we publish other articles and reports by own staff which, we hope, should give readers a more comprehensive view of the current developments of Islam in Indonesia. These articles and report are: first, an intellectual biography of Professor Harun Nasution, one of the most prominent figures in the discourse of Islamic reforms in today's Indonesia; second, a long and deep interview with Professor Munawir Sjadzali, a former Minister of Religious Affairs, who completed his term of office last year; third, a report about the rise and development of ICMI (the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) and about the Indonesian Intellectuals' responses to the provoking idea of "Clash of Civilization" written by Professor Samuel Huntington in *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993).

With all these articles and reports we are seriously attempting to present Islam in Indonesia in the many aspects of its development throughout history. We hope to maintain this variety of contents of *Studia Islamika* in the future editions whilst, of course, doing our best to improve it in all other possible ways.

Given this we invite all scholars of Islam in Indonesia to contribute to our journal. Your contribution is crucial not only for the continuing existence of this journal, but also for a better understanding of Islam in Indonesia.

Dismantling Cultural Prejudices *Responses to Huntington's Thesis in the Indonesian Media*

Abstraksi: Dalam makalahnya, "Clash of Civilization?", Samuel Huntington menyatakan perbedaan antar peradabanlah yang merupakan sumber konflik dunia. Menurut Huntington, saat ini terdapat delapan peradaban dunia. Masing-masing menyatukan masyarakat-masyarakat yang secara geografis maupun politik berbeda. Selanjutnya Huntington melihat bahwa potensi konflik antarperadaban yang paling menonjol adalah antara Islam-Konfusius melawan Barat. Potensi perseteruan ini dapat merugikan kepentingan Barat di masa yang akan datang. Huntington, memberikan solusi bagi Barat untuk tetap mempertahankan superioritasnya dengan cara memperlambat pengurangan senjata serta mengeksploitasi konflik yang terjadi dalam peradaban tertentu yang mengancam Barat, seperti Islam dan Konfusius. Namun dalam jangka panjang, masyarakat Barat juga harus memahami peradaban lain, karena di masa mendatang tidak akan ada peradaban tunggal; yang ada hanyalah pluralitas peradaban.

Reaksi terhadap tesis Huntington ini cukup ramai di luar maupun dalam negeri Amerika. Di Indonesia, tesis Huntington juga mendapatkan reaksi yang luar biasa besar. Hampir seluruh media massa nasional memuat reaksi terhadap tesis tersebut. Bahkan sempat diadakan seminar yang khusus membahas tesis Huntington. Sisi-sisi tanggapannya pun cukup beragam: sebagian kalangan melihatnya dari sisi epistemologi dan sebagian lagi melihatnya dari sisi kepentingan politik Amerika. Bahkan ada sementara kalangan yang melihatnya secara lebih pribadi.

خلاصة

يقول سمويل هانتينجتون في مقالته "التصادم الحضارى (Clash of Civilizations)" ان العالم اليوم يواجه تغيرات سريعة ، حيث انتهت الحرب الباردة بانتهاء النظام الشيوعى السوفييتى والنظام الشيوعى فى الدول الاوربية الشرقية . واثبت ذلك انتصار الدول الغربية الرأسمالية والديمقراطية . هذا من جانب ، ولكنه من جانب آخر قد احدث مشاكل جديدة فى العالم ، وخاصة فى العالم الغربى حيث تحولت تقسيمات العالم من المعايير الايدولوجية والاقتصادية الى المعايير الحضارية.

ويرى هانتينجتون ان هناك سبع او ثمان حضارات فى العالم . وكل منها توحد المجتمعات التى تختلف تقليديا وجغرافيا وسياسيا . وازداد احتمال الصراع الحضارى القادم هو بين الاسلام والكونفوشى من جانب و الغرب من جانب آخر ، مما سوف يؤدى الى الاضرار بمصالح الغرب فى المستقبل . واما الحلول التى تقدمها هانتينجتون ، فهى ان تدافع الغرب عن تفوقها بتأجيل محاولة التقليل من كمية الاسلحة ، وان تستغل الصراع القائم بين نمط معين من الحضارات يهدد مصالحها ، مثل الاسلام والكونفوشية ، كما ينبغى ان تفهم الحضارة الغربية حضارات اخرى ، نظرا الى انه لن تكون فى المستقبل حضارة واحدة بل حضارات متعددة .

وقد احدث رأى هانتينجتون هذا ردود فعل كثيرة فى انحاء العالم ، بل تم نشرها فى امريكا فى عدد خاص . وحينما اتاحت له الفرصة للاجابة عنها ، كان لايزال يدافع عن رأيه ، بل ويعتبره قدوة جديدة بفيه النظر الى العالم المعاصر .

واما فى اندونيسيا فكان رأيه يركز على موضوع اهتمام العلماء والمفكرين ، حيث تقدموا بأرائهم المنشورة فى كثير من المجلات والصحف الاندونيسية . بل عقدت من اجل ذلك ندوة خاصة للبحث فى وجهات نظر هذا العالم . وقد تعددت آراؤهم فمنهم من ينظر اليه من الناحية العلمية البحتة ، ومنهم من ينظر اليه من وجهة المصالح السياسية .

The ideas contained in Huntington's article, "Clash of Civilization?", are provoking. Since its publication in *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), several responses have appeared in the media world-wide. In his home country, Huntington's article was criticized from various angles. His assumptions, model, data and even his position were scrutinized mostly by social scientists and Islamicists. These criticisms, however, highlights the article's significant importance in the debates of political and cultural problems faced in the post-Cold War world. Even *Foreign Affairs* itself needed to cover and specially publish these responses in its Fall 1993 edition. Huntington's reply to the criticisms was included in this edition. It appears that Huntington still views his paradigm as a better tool for explaining recent political patterns.

Huntington states that the source of conflict in the future world will not be ideological or economic but cultural.¹ As at the end of the Cold War, ideology and economy do not define the relationship between nations. The demise of Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union clearly shows that both ideology and economy cannot be determining factors in shaping the identity of world politics. The relationship between the United States and Russia, or between Western and Eastern Europe, is no longer oppositional. On the contrary, these countries are growing closer than before. Eastern Europe and Russia have been striving to adopt both the political and the economic systems of the West. Meanwhile, the United States and Western European countries do not hesitate to promote their advancement and impose it on those countries through various forms of assistance. Consequently, the ideology of democracy versus authoritarianism, or the economic system of capitalism and socialism, is no longer applicable to describe the world situation. In Huntington's eyes, however, "nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principle conflict of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations".²

¹Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash of Civilization?", *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3) (Summer 1993), p. 22.

²*Ibid.*

His hypothesis is based on at least six premises:

First, the differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic ... The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy ... Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations ... Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities ... In much of the world religion has moved to fill this gap, often in form of movement that are labeled "fundamentalist" ... Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilization ... Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones ... Finally, economic regionalism is increasing.³

Huntington envisions that these facts will result in clashes between civilizations. There are eight major civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African. However the potential conflict likely to dominate the future world, according to Huntington, is not between **each** of these eight civilizations, but, given that the West is at its peak of power, is between the West and the rest. His prediction is further supported by evidence of the return of other civilizations to their roots. This contrast, in turn, brings the world into a kind of polarization between the West and the rest replacing the old ideological and economic poles of East and West blocs. The tension of conflict between the non-Western civilizations and the West is not the same for each civilization. Some of them have few opportunities to oppose the West, such as the Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and Japanese civilizations. "Japan has established a unique position for itself as an associate member of the West: it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West in important dimensions".⁴ Some of these civilizations are still willing

³*Ibid*, pp. 25-27.

⁴*Ibid*.

to join the West, either by enhancing economic or military relations or adopting some of the cultural and political aspects of the West. However, according to Huntington, there are some countries which, for cultural or military reasons, do not wish to join the West and instead are developing internal relations amongst non-Western civilizations. "The most prominent form of this cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, value and power".⁵ In other words, the most potential conflict emerging through the division of civilization is between the West and the coalition between Confucian and Islamic states.

Having mapped the cultural content of civilizations and the internal tendency, Huntington makes some recommendations to the West, in particular to the government of the United States. To benefit the West, Huntington proposes short-term and long-term solutions. The short-term steps for the West are:

... to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civilization ... to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West; to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan; to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into major inter-civilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction of Western military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations groups sympathetic to the Western values and interests; to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions .⁶

For the long-term, Huntington recommends the West to develop its understanding of other religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations. However, because non-Western civilizations will continue to attempt to acquire wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons, the West should also maintain their superiority of economic and military power in order to protect their interests and values. At the end of his article Huntington states that different civilizations should try to coexist

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 48-49.

together, given that there will be no universal civilization.⁷ This statement is puzzling. Huntington does not give sufficient explanation to link his short and long-term recommendations. He does not specify when the short-term ends and the long-term begins, what values and interests of the West should be protected, and in contrast, what kinds of religious and philosophical assumptions of the other civilizations should be accommodated. He also does not explicitly state whether the maintenance of the economic and military power of the West is intended to maintain this power itself or to promote the coexistence of civilizations. Huntington's recommendations appear to be an expression of a reluctant attitude towards peace. What Huntington means overall is that coexistence does not assume the absence of potential conflict. If one wishes to coexist with the other, one must also be ready to deal with conflict, *pacem para bellum*.

Huntington's Position in Indonesia

Responses to Huntington's thesis appear in almost all Indonesian nation-wide media. Some critics have tried to uncover the theoretical assumptions held by Huntington so they appear to offer a scholarly dialogue; some give comments on the possibility of Huntington's inner motives; and some try to disentangle Huntington's ideas, which they state express his own anguish and cultural bias, despite being presented in the guise of scientific interests. Almost all the criticisms are aimed at deconstructing Huntington's provocative article.

Before discussing this tendency, it seems imperative to consider some points which might help us to understand the intentions of the criticisms put forward by Indonesians. To do so, it is necessary to map several relationships: between Huntington, as a political scientist, and Indonesian scholars; between the issues contained in the article and the current Indonesian political situation; and finally, between the effects of the article on Indonesians and the actual experiences of Indonesian society. These three relationships are dialectically connected in determining the intentions of the responses to Huntington's article.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 49.

The energetic Indonesian reaction is probably has a number of causes. Huntington is a well-known scholar among Indonesians, especially among its social and political scientists. His reputation as a modernist theoretician was recognized as early as the 1970s. This was alongside the process of Indonesian development, which somehow also became part of the process of modernism. The translation of Huntington's book, *Political Order In Changing Societies*, shows his popularity as a modernist articulator and locates him as one of the world's outstanding intellectuals in Indonesia. Writings from Huntington, therefore, automatically attract the attention of Indonesian scholars, especially regarding the civilization paradigm.

The theme contained in his article is original and current. It articulates something that Indonesians themselves concerned about: the fate of the post-Cold War world. Before the reign of international communism, the Indonesian government was fully aware of the potential of communism. The New Order government has been heavily associated with an anti-communist regime; it used to apply strict policies to prevent any element of communism arising in Indonesia. For example, to be a civil servant, a person had to prove that s/he was not involved in any kind of communist activities. They also had to show that their relatives were "clean" of the sin of being communists or even communist participants. With the major events that have occurred in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Indonesian political situation has changed radically in many ways. The government has loosened some of its strict policies. Political stances against communist countries have shifted to become economic and cultural relationships. The old rhetoric of anti-communism no longer occupies political debates. The fear of communist resurgence in Indonesia, which used to be the main concern of the government, no longer appears to be a determinant factor in political decision making. People are free go to ex-communist countries or even to Beijing. They no longer need to have nightmares of being suspected as communists. They can also use the political language of class or ideology at any time without fear of being suspected to be socialist collaborators. In short, the post-Cold War period has significant meaning for the emergence of a new Indonesian political scene.

The last possibility, and this may be the most important, is that

Huntington focuses his analysis on the future of the relationship between the West and Islam. There are at least two different experiences that make Huntington's thesis strikingly relevant to Indonesian. The first is that Indonesia is the biggest Muslim country in the world. Where Islam is concerned, Indonesians cannot avoid not to respond. Despite the differences which may exist, Indonesian Muslims are an inseparable part of the Islamic world community. So it is humiliating if Islam is juxtaposed with the idea of backwardness, terrorism, anti-democracy or extremism. The second experience is based on the historical fact that Indonesia, especially during the New Order government, has had a close relationship with the so called West. The Indonesian development program, which has been operated for over twenty years, is fully supported by the West and Japan. The anti-communist regime of the Indonesian government has also increased its relationship with the West in economic, ideological and military spheres. The close relationship between Indonesia and the West sometimes even casts to one side Indonesian identity as Muslim, as in the case of the Gulf War and events in the former Yugoslavia. Yet these facts are ignored by Huntington and he projects that, on the contrary, Islam will become the future enemy of the West. This thesis is indeed striking and goes beyond the actual experiences of Indonesian Muslims. In the eyes of Indonesian pacifists, Huntington's thesis is but an expression of arrogant Western colonialism in order to promote the status quo.

Whilst in his reply to the criticisms Huntington regards himself as creating a new paradigm, the article itself has far reaching consequences for Indonesians. Huntington is right to say that a paradigm cannot account for everything. "Intellectual and scientific advances ... consist of the displacement of one paradigm, which has become increasingly incapable of explaining new or newly discovered facts, by a new paradigm that account for those facts in a more satisfactory fashion".⁸ The displacement of one paradigm by a new one is not a matter of perfection but betterment. There is always, what Thomas Kuhn calls, *anomaly* within a paradigm and space that exists outside a paradigm's accountability. For this

⁸Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?", *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3) (Fall 1993), p. 186.

reason, a paradigm can only be replaced and falsified by a better paradigm. Anomalous events, which go beyond or fall outside a paradigm, cannot falsify the existing paradigm. Huntington clearly used this scientific model to support his civilization paradigm thesis. He declares that, although many events cannot be explained by using this paradigm (e.g the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the agreement between Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Israeli government on the Gaza Strip and Jericho), the paradigm has yet to be falsified. It can only be falsified by an alternative paradigm which is more capable of explaining current political phenomena. Also Huntington believes that until recently no single paradigm has replaced the old paradigms, with exception of his civilization paradigm.

Huntington's argument is scientifically acceptable. However, within the Indonesian context, it is contradicted. There are *loopholes* that have significant relevance to Indonesia, which may have been missed by Huntington. What he calls the anomaly of the civilization paradigm is in fact more important for Indonesia than the core paradigm itself. This tendency emerges from the very position of Indonesia within the paradigm. As with the Gaza Strip and Jericho agreement or Iraqi invasion, the Indonesian position falls outside the paradigm's account or, using Kuhn's proposition, Indonesia is an anomaly. Even though the Indonesian case is anomaly, it is not anomalous in the arena of world politics. Moreover, although it is peripheral in Huntington's eyes, it is an inseparable part of world events. So what is relevant to Huntington's thesis, if seen from the Indonesian perspective, is not only scientific, but also political and psychological issues.

The Construction of Civilization Paradigm

The civilization paradigm is intended by Huntington to further explain new emerging phenomena in world politics. In fact, many events that have occurred in the last five years cannot be understood by using old paradigms. The Cold War paradigm, for example, cannot account for the radical changes which have occurred in current relationships between Western and Eastern European states. Likewise, the closer relationship between the United States and Russia also cannot be explained by this paradigm. Meanwhile,

an ideological or economic paradigm is not sufficient for understanding the new relationships between China and Singapore, Bosnia and the Middle Eastern states, or Serbia and Russia. These current events, on the one hand, subvert the logic contained in the old paradigms and, on the other hand, drive Huntington to seek an alternative tool capable of explaining those phenomena. He finds the civilization paradigm to be of use in answering new problems which could not be answered by the old paradigms. It is "... an effort to lay out elements of post-Cold War paradigm".⁹

As a paradigm, however, civilization has to be definable so that the meaning of the term can be clearly established. Unfortunately, Huntington's definition of civilization is far from clear and sometimes begs questions. Donald K. Emmerson emphasizes that the meaning of civilization in Huntington's article is confusing.¹⁰ According to Emmerson, Huntington has confused many different matters in his definition of civilization, such as geography (West), doctrine (Confucian), ethnicity (Slavic), state (Japan), religion (Islam) and continent (Africa). He does not schematize the meaning of civilization, which is in fact multi-dimensional, and merely relies on a simplified definition. It is only defined as "... the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species".¹¹ He exemplifies that Arabs, Chinese and Westerners are not part of a broader cultural entity. Each of these societies constitutes a civilization. However, as indicated by Emmerson, this definition is obscure since Huntington also states that "... Islam has its Arab, Turkic, and Malay subdivisions".¹² On the one hand, Arab itself is a civilization, which cannot be constituted by a broader cultural grouping, but, on the other hand, ironically, Arab, defined as Muslim, becomes a member of Islam. There is no clear-cut statement of whether Arab or Islam is the so-called civilization or which one of the two is the irreducible

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 187.

¹⁰Donald K. Emmerson, "Konflik Peradaban Atau Fantasi Huntington?", *Ulumul Qur'an* 4 (5) (1993), p. 45.

¹¹Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash," p. 24.

¹²*Ibid.*

category.

In his second article, "If Not Civilization, What?", Huntington further indicates that "in the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps *the* central, force that motivates and mobilizes people".¹³ His insistence on religion as a new defining factor has also been covered in the first article. Religion will fill the gap left by the traditional identity that has been eroded and destroyed by the rapid changes of modernization, and thereby people will shape a new broader identity. If this is so, why should Huntington define civilization by using various categories ranging from space to continent? In other words, why does he not simply use religion as the key term for his new paradigm, instead of civilization. It is indeed acceptable to say that civilization is defined by "common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people".¹⁴ It is also understandable that what he means by civilization is the highest cultural grouping. However the problem lies in the kind of measurement that can be consistently applied in order to make something cultural or civilization. Is it religion that constitutes civilization, or ethnicity or customs, or all of these? Herein lies the very problem of the civilization paradigm. It seems that Huntington's articles do not give a precise answer and "... without a consistent definition of the word *civilization*, how can the thesis, which consists of this key word, be verified?"¹⁵

The significant role of religion in Huntington's thesis raises some comments from Indonesian scholars. According to M. Syafi'i Anwar, Huntington's book, *Political Order of Changing Societies*, has succeeded in explaining the interaction between modernization and political development. "He [Huntington] describes the relationship between political changes and political participation as well as political institutionalization ... the relationship between the two variables determines political stability. Meanwhile, the main source of the extension of political participation is the socio-

¹³Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not", p. 192.

¹⁴Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash," p. 24.

¹⁵Donald K. Emmerson, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

economic processes which relate to modernism".¹⁶ This thesis has been widely affirmed by the experience of the Third World process of modernization. The success stories of some of the Third World states show that political participation and institutionalization are the key factors that motivate people toward modernization. Modernization becomes a process that may not be distinguished from political development. Although modernization focuses on economic development, it deserves political support, that of stability, in order to smooth the process of modernization itself. In turn, in order to create stability, extensive opportunities for political participation and institutionalization must be available. It is on this point that Anwar regards Huntington to be one of the outstanding modernist theoreticians, comparable to such writers as Daniel Lerner, Marion Levy or Dankwart A. Rustow.

What distinguishes Huntington's new thesis, in Anwar eyes, is the role of religion as the main factor in the modern world. Modernism does not only mean economic or political democratization, but also religious. His thesis that future conflict will occur along civilization lines, assumes that religion is but one of the strong motives driving people to such conflict. In this case Huntington has moved to a quite new approach of modernism. Unfortunately, Anwar appears not to have investigated whether, as a paradigm, the new approach is more able of accounting for recent phenomena compared to the old approaches. He merely objects that the new approach leaves many things unexplained which, according to Huntington's response, are regarded as anomalous events. Although Anwar's comment seem to affirm that religion will have a more dominant role in shaping future international relations, he rejects the thesis of the civilization paradigm. Yet still the comments do not deeply touch the problem of the civilization paradigm as proposed by Emerson.

The civilization paradigm does not only consist of religious categories. Although religion is regarded to be the most powerful motive in shaping civilization's identities, civilization itself could mean many things. It is language and customs, and might be doctrine, religion or even state. The only principle put forward by

¹⁶M. Syafi'i Anwar, "Islam, Barat, dan Konflik Peradaban: Respon atas Pemikiran Samuel P. Huntington", *Republika* (16 July 1993).

Huntington is that civilization is the highest and the broadest cultural grouping of people. The terms "highest" and "broadest" are of importance for people like Huntington. This might be a common implicit underlying principle beneath the very assumption of modernist theoreticians. It runs parallel with his historical trajectory, in which mankind is constituted within a single linear movement toward progress. In the beginning, the identity of people was constituted by local and confined categories, such as language or ethnicity. By the end of tribal or traditional society, local identity was fused into broader categories, such as race or nation. Now, Huntington needs to propose the "broadest" and "highest" category, that is civilization, to cover advanced modern phenomena.

Such logic can be easily located in his previous book *Political Order in Changing Societies*, in which Huntington states his belief that modernism is imperative. It expresses the form of development and advancement of technology and economy as well as the democratic political system of the West. Traditional societies therefore have to overcome their traditionalism in order to move into modern condition. However the linear logic in his civilization paradigm is not as simple as in his modernization theory. Whilst in the modernization thesis Huntington defines precisely what modernism is, he does not do so with the civilization paradigm. Although the logic behind these two theses is just the same, the meaning of them is quite different. Based on its clear definition, the idea contained within modernism can be regarded as a paradigm. However, given that the meaning of civilization is not itself the broadest nor the highest grouping of people, which consequently means civilization is anything and at the same time is nothing, its position as a paradigm cannot be defended. This point seems to be ignored by Huntington and he simply emphasizes that his paradigm cannot be falsified merely by anomalous events. In fact, the paradigm itself has its own intrinsic problems.

At this point in the discussion, one has to leave this epistemological debate, since the thesis itself cannot be scrutinized by or placed on an epistemological sphere. It might be of use to think of why Huntington holds such a thesis, and what kind of situation has driven him to such conclusions. To do so, the analysis has to consider various external factors that might support and lead to Huntington's thesis. These factors are generally taken as

determining forces, such as institutions, hidden assumptions, mass media or even traditions of knowledge.

Huntington's point of departure is culture or civilization. This approach is extensively used by many social science scholars and is one of the most powerful tools in explaining social phenomena. Cultural approach regards society as a system of values, which can be expressed in terms of metaphysics, customs, religion or world views. It also assumes that the attitudes of people are fully determined by the set of values which they hold. The attitude of a society corresponds in an exact way with the direction of its norms or values. Because of this, to understand the attitude of a certain society one has to decipher the content of its values. In a way this approach is workable in explaining certain phenomena, but it can hardly account for changes and diversity. For example, the civilization paradigm, which stresses religion, is a good tool to explain the former Yugoslav conflict or the biases in Western states' assistance to Eastern European countries. However, one cannot explain the PLO-Israeli agreement or even Confucian-Islamic collaboration by using the same approach. It also cannot be employed to understand difference in attitudes between Iraqi and Indonesian Muslim, or even Dutch and Korean Protestants. Other shortcomings of a cultural approach is its tendency to essentialize values and to have an insufficient definition of culture itself. Value are instead construed as something that exist in the consciousness of and independently act through the attitude of the people. It is not seen as an institutionalized dynamic process of the internal and external experiences of the people, which change continuously throughout history. In effect, society is always observed on the basis of its values without considering the context of the values themselves. Meanwhile, culture as the constituent of values never has obvious meaning. What scholars mean by culture is far from clear. Thus the usage of culture to explain certain phenomena could mean almost anything and if it is so, culture could also mean nothing.

The case of a cultural approach is well illustrated by A. Dahana's article. He puts forward the case of China, in particular the tragedy of Tiananmen in June 1989, and the failure of the democratization process in that country. "Sociologists and structuralists try to focus the analysis on the development of social order, government polity

and the role of bureaucracy. Historians evaluate the historical chains of the development of Chinese communism. Meanwhile, conflict theoreticians pay attention to the factionalism in the Chinese elite political arena".¹⁷ Their efforts are useful but, according to Dahana, there are always *loopholes* that cannot be explained by using these approaches. In order to overcome these shortcomings, a simple and practical tool is then used: cultural approach. This simple approach argues that the Tiananmen tragedy and the failure of the democratization process in China root in the internal elements of Chinese values and norms that have been held for a long time.

Violence and revenge are the very core element of values in Chinese culture in overcoming conflict. Democracy would never be able to be implemented in China because their traditional values do not constitute egalitarianism, openness, transparency, *check and balance* such as in the West. Chinese culture is class-base oriented. The Chinese government is a replica of the old authoritarian dynasties. And Chinese communism is but an amalgam of Chinese Confucian and Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, which is mixed in with the so-called Mao Zedong doctrine (*Mao Zedong Sixiang*).¹⁸

Some of these statements may be correct but still they do not answer the problems of the Tiananmen tragedy and the process of democratization in China. Should these statements be applied to try to answer the problems, they may only result in inconsistent solutions. If it is about culture, tradition or Confucianism, why should the process of democratization in Taiwan in the middle of 1980s succeed? The Taiwanese government itself insisted that the process of democratization was in accordance with the teachings of Confucianism. Indeed, the simple answer for the simplified approach would be that the Taiwanese case is an anomaly from the Confucian mainstream. However, given that Japanese, Korean and Singaporean cultures also possess Confucian culture, it seems in appropriate to regard them as anomalous. If they are anomalous, it would mean that the only normal Confucian culture is Chinese, and the rest of them are subversions of the normal culture. Because of this, the alibi of anomaly tends to be a way of avoiding problems

¹⁷A. Dahana, "Konfusianisme Plus Islam Versus Barat?" *Ulumul Qur'an* 4 (5) (1993), p. 32.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 33.

with contradictory data rather than an exception in implementing a paradigm.

Huntington's cultural tendency is the same. His cultural approach only possesses inconsistent large categories of values, such as religion, philosophy and state. He does not care, for example, whether the implementation of these categories is applicable for discovering the dynamic and multiple phenomena of world events. In speaking about the acute confrontation between the West and Islam, Huntington, following Bernard Lewis, argues that this conflict emerges from the different roots of civilizations. He cites Lewis' conclusion that the West is "... facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the government that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilization – the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the world-wide expansion of both".¹⁹ What Lewis means by the clash of civilizations between the West and Islam is the different sets of values contained in Islamic doctrines and in Western traditions.

Saiful Muzani²⁰ and Abduh Hisyam²¹ provide a valuable investigation of this commonality between Huntington and Lewis. Both of them agree that Huntington's image of Islam, as always in opposition to the West, runs parallel with Lewis' view. Lewis comes to see that, in contrast to the West, Islam has different concepts of cosmology, politics and society. "In classical Islam there was no distinction between Church and state. In Christendom the existence of two authorities goes back to the founder, who enjoined his followers to render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and to God the things which are God's".²² Lewis also states that although Islam is a monotheistic religion, it has been

¹⁹See, Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash," p. 32.

²⁰Saiful Muzani, "Benturan Islam-Barat, Suatu Proyek Di Zaman Pasca-Modern?", *Ulumul Qur'an* 4 (5) (1993).

²¹Abduh Hisyam, "Peradaban Islam vs Amerika?", *Media Indonesia* (31 July 1993).

²²Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam*, (Chicago University Press, 1988), p. 2.

influenced by the idea of dualistic cosmic clash: good and evil, order and chaos, truth and falsehood. Within its development, this cosmology shaped the military and political systems of Islam. The absence of distinctions between Church and state in Islam was manifested in the role played by the Prophet Muhammad, in which he acted as a religious as well as a political leader. But the dualistic cosmology of Islam was then manifested in the distinction of space occupied by Muslim and the Other, in which "... from the time of the Prophet to the present day, the ultimate definition of the Other, the alien outsider and presumptive enemy, has been the *kâfir*, the unbeliever".²³

Lewis believes that these patterns have a strong effect on Muslim thought and attitudes. Political legitimacy in Islam, for instance, is derived from the teachings of Islam itself, whereas in the Western tradition this legitimacy comes from secular power i.e the sovereignty of the people. The duality of morals, which in turn affects the Islamic concept of space, *dâr al-harb* and *dâr al-Islâm*, led Muslims to invade Europe several centuries ago. Now, according to Lewis, this dualism also motivates Muslims to despise the West. Muslim views the West as the embodiment of evil power, the enemy of God, *dâr al-harb*, *kâfir*, that should be conquered. The Iranian revolution is another example of Muslim attitudes that are inspired by such a tradition. Thus, in Lewis' opinion, the seeds of conflict between the West and Islam, are actually motivated by their different value orientations. Lewis' account is useful in order to understand the Iranian revolution or the so-called Muslim fundamentalist' attitudes against the West. However, it cannot decipher the diverse reality of Muslim culture. Lewis' argument tends to focus its attention on, what Muzani calls, the grand narrative of Islam.²⁴ Even in implementing this narrative, Lewis does not account for the possible changes and differences that might occur within Muslim societies. Islam or Muslim, however, is not a single entity, and the teachings of Islam has always been transformed in different ways throughout its history. Thus there is no reason to classify the world into a single Islam and a single West as Huntington and Lewis do.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁴Saiful Muzani, *op cit.*, p. 7.

Scientific Anomaly vs Political anomaly

The basic failure of Huntington's thesis lies in the fact that he does not provide a rigorous construction for the civilization paradigm. What he calls civilization is obscure, his cultural approach is far from capable of explaining social and political phenomena, and his usage of anomaly does not allow him to avoid criticisms. Within the Indonesian context, the term "anomaly" is of importance, as Indonesia itself is included within this term. As an anomalous society, Indonesian responses propose other assumptions and data which may have been neglected by Huntington. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, for instance, questions in detail the premises held by Huntington. She implicitly argues that Huntington applies these premises without any specification. Therefore, she sets out an alternative way of understanding these premises:²⁵

– Anwar affirms that although civilization is not only real, but also basic, it has limited integrating power. For example, in a short time European Christendom was replaced by the enthusiastic spirit of nationalism. Meanwhile, the contemporary political arena also indicates that the integrating power of civilization is still limited. The end of the Cold War does not automatically bring people into the highest groupings. On the contrary, the divisions of society tends to be based on smaller categories, such as ethnicity or language.

– Although the world is becoming smaller, this does not always result in the consciousness of different identities; it also broadens the possibility of knowing each other. For instance, in the first half of this century, anti-Semitism was widespread in European societies. Nowadays, the indigenous population, both European or American, can accommodate the presence of Jews. Through the process of intensified communication, different civilizations have chance to understand each other.

– Huntington also believes that the process of modernization has uprooted people from their local identities and weakened nation-states as the source of identity. According to Anwar, this premise

²⁵Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Merosotnya Barat dan Kerisauan Huntington", *Ulumul Qur'an* 4 (5) (1993), pp. 27-30.

does not account for developing countries, which are in the process of *nation-building*. In these countries, commitment to the nation-state still provide the main reference for identity.

– In away Anwar concurs with Huntington that Western domination brings about reactions of de-Westernization from non-Western civilizations. This kind of reaction, according to Huntington, emerges from the elite of non-Western societies rather than from the common citizens. Anwar adds that the process of openness and democratization also occurring in many countries is started by the elite. So the potential conflict of civilization between the West and the rest is hindered by the processes occurring within non-Western societies themselves.

– Another specification that Anwar makes is that the differences between civilizations may also lead to communication. Global issues affecting all the societies of the world, such as human rights, environmental matters, peace and natural resources, motivate different civilizations to work together as fellow human beings.

– The last premise, that the clash of civilizations will be intensified by the existence of economic regionalism is, however, rejected outright by Anwar. She maintains that civilization consciousness in not the *raison d'être* for economic or political regionalism. In the case of ASEAN, it is evident that although Indonesia and Malaysia have cultural commonalities, their economic cooperation is not as intense as that between Indonesia and Singapore, which are culturally different to each other. It is hard to dispute, Anwar states, that the commonality of culture or civilization may ease the relationship, but it may also engender the risk of conflict. The economic cooperation among China, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, cannot be regarded as being based on civilization; the commonalities among these countries are instead their ethnic identities.

Ethnic, economic, political and civilization interests are of course different matters. One cannot mix them up, because the meaning of these terms would be confusing. So not only is specification lacking in Huntington's premises, but also the precision of his data is sometime confusing to his readers. Alternative data put forward by Anwar weakens Huntington's thesis about the clash of civilizations. There are at least two reasons why Huntington's prediction is questionable. Firstly, too many

events are contrary to Huntington's statements. This data can be used as counter-evidence to Huntington's data. Secondly, Huntington has failed to understand and interpret some data concerning economic and political events.

Basically, the first point has already been outlined sufficiently in Anwar's arguments. However, given Huntington's statement about anomaly, it is appropriate to refer to other evidence. Robert L. Barry, the United States Ambassador to Indonesia, challenges Huntington by putting forward such counter-evidence. He argues that, compared to the number of conflicts, the sense of interdependence and cooperation of world societies is becoming stronger.²⁶ He directly refers to some important events which should not be neglected when predicting future economic and political situations. This counter-evidence includes:

- the meeting between President Soeharto, as the Secretary General of the Non-Aligned Movement, President Bill Clinton and the Japanese Prime Minister in Tokyo last year with the purpose of overcoming the gap between North-South countries;
- the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) to create a fair system of trade and to uplift the sense of interdependency;
- the agreement between the PLO and the Israeli government regarding the Gaza Strip and Jericho in order to resolve territorial conflicts;
- the growing consensus in the United Nations toward restructuring its Security Council by involving new members from other countries;
- the cooperation of world societies on environmental and population problems;
- religious tolerance that is rapidly growing among adherents of various religions;
- the growing consciousness of the need for democracy, human rights and clean government in world societies.

This collection of facts is evident and strong enough to challenge Huntington's data. All reality and number of the facts quoted

²⁶Robert L. Barry, "Benturan Peradaban atau Persatuan dalam Keanekaragaman?", *Kompas* (4 October 1993).

above is more than enough to show that Huntington has over-generalized the existing data.

Huntington often over-generalizes to support his arguments. This tendency results in some misinterpretations or misunderstandings. He confines Confucian civilization to Chinese society. This interpretation is not common, because Confucian culture usually means the usage of Kanji characters as a written tradition.²⁷ This notably includes Japanese, South and North Koreans, Taiwanese, and so on. Of importance is that these do not have common political and economic systems. Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese political and economic systems are democratic and capitalist, whilst the Chinese and North Korean systems are authoritarian and socialist. The only reason that these countries are called Confucian is that all of them use Kanji characters in their written traditions. If Confucianism is regarded as the integrating factor, these countries must have united and developed internal cooperation. But the facts prove otherwise; there has yet to be found any indication of cooperation amongst these countries, especially between socialist North Korea and capitalist Japan or Taiwan. Political and economic connections are limited among these countries which have similarities of interests, whether economic or regarding military defense.

Misinterpretation also occurs in the usage of the phrase *torn-countries*. Huntington again confines his description to Turkey, Yugoslavia and Mexico. These countries are reported to face problems of identity such that they constitute a potential conflict for the future, being driven by their internal conflictual cultural orientations. Turkey, according to Huntington, has two faces: Islamic and Western. Historically, Turkish culture was a part of Islamic civilization, but it has joined with the West. The same applies to Mexico and Yugoslavia, in which such split orientations of culture threatens the unity of their societies. Yet, Huntington does not look at the societies which face more complex problems of cultural diversity, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the United States or Australia. Indonesia, for instance, has hundreds of vernacular languages, tens of systems of religious beliefs, and hundreds of ethnic and sub-ethnic groupings. The cultural diversity is more

²⁷A. Dahana, *op cit.*, 35.

complex in these countries than in the countries mentioned by Huntington. But also the diversity of cultures is an advantage for national unity rather than a potential conflict in these countries. Therefore, it is understandable when Huntington fails to distinguish between culture and ethnicity. The very character of the Yugoslavian conflict is ethnicity-centered, whilst Turkey's conflict is political, and Mexico's is economic. These characteristics cannot be mixed up in the single term of civilization.

Huntington's blatant over-generalization, however, rests on his thesis about the Confucian-Islamic connection. He notes the growing connection between Islamic and Confucian countries and their military cooperation. This relationship is intended to challenge Western domination in world economy, politics and military situations. What he means by the Confucian country is China, and what he means by Islamic countries are those in the Middle Eastern. On the other hand, Huntington clearly states that Islamic civilization has its sub-divisions of Turkey, Arab and Malay. This simplification is but one expression of his inconsistencies and also an indication of his misinterpretations. Above all, his failure is most clearly indicated in his assumption that the cooperation between China and some of the Middle Eastern countries is based on civilization and a common interest in challenging the West. The latter point might be true, but civilization cooperation between China and the Middle East is highly speculative.

Chinese military arms trading started after the 1960's following the Cultural Revolution.²⁸ Until the 1970's China had been a major supplier of military arms for Third World countries. The motive behind this activity was ideological. Comrade Mao intentionally planned to export his revolutionary model to Third World countries. Based on this consideration, the countries which received assistance in the form of military weapons were socialist, such as African countries and Albania. However, this policy changed in the 1980s, when Western countries applied military and economic embargos on some of their enemies; and among the most unfavorable list is some of the so called "fundamentalist" countries of the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Chinese government itself needed financial support to run its modernization program. To

²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

resolve this problem, the Chinese government sold some military weapons to countries that needed these. On the one hand, the Chinese government thereby receive financial support which could not be provided by the West and, on the other hand, the radical Middle Eastern countries could protect themselves by buying military tools from China relatively cheaply. Thus the Chinese government arms trading had two bases: ideological in the 1960s-1970s and economic in the 1980s up to the present time. Ironically, Huntington neglects and misinterprets this data and attempts to defend his thesis under the guise of "a new paradigm".

Perhaps the most important question which should be put forward is why does he reach such conclusions? What motives and situations surround Huntington and constitute to his views? As a well-known political scientist, it is surprising that he should launch such provocative and highly speculative ideas. Perhaps his other roles within his society might lead him to think in different ways. In order to answer these questions, one needs to understand Huntington's intentions in writing "Clash of Civilization?". If it were available, this analysis must also include the possible factors that may shape Huntington's ideas.

"Clash of Civilizations?" is intentionally not just for "purely" academic consumption. Of course the tools of analysis utilized in the article are scientific and Huntington uses his broad knowledge to support his thesis. He also uses scientific codes, methods and language in analyzing data and events. Above all, the so-called civilization paradigm appears to be a genuine hypothesis. Yet these seemingly scientific explanations do not stand for themselves; his article is written for and shaped by other matters.

One of the most apparent motives behind Huntington's hypothesis is Western interests. At the end of the article, Huntington makes some recommendations to the West, notably to the United State government, these recommendations being based on his previous scientific analysis. They are intended to protect and prolong Western interests and domination. Western countries should make all possible efforts to gain power over other countries. Huntington details the steps for the United States government as mentioned at the start of this article. Huntington, therefore, has a double role within his own article: as a political scientist and as a government advisor. His role as a political scientist has been widely

discussed in this article, but his role as a government advisor now needs to be analyzed.

Huntington's role as an official advisor to the United States government and his outstanding reputation as a political scientist must have had a certain influence in his country. Apart from this role, he has also become part of a certain political orientation in North American society. His political orientation can be located in his assumptions used as the basis of his analysis. Although Huntington does not agree with Francis Fukuyama, he possesses similar view on certain points. He believes that modern society is the best system in the history of mankind; he views democracy to be the most advanced political system and capitalism an incomparable economic system within the world. Above all, he holds that these systems belong to Western civilization. In other words, what he calls the West is "the best society" which should be protected and defended. Thus, Huntington is trapped in a kind of Westernism. He believes that the world is divided into a binary opposition which consists of the West and the rest. The West is a single entity that is radically distinct from the rest. Because of the logic of the binary opposition, the existence of non-Western societies does not present a compliment to the West but instead are potential opponents to the West. Non-Western societies are dangerous, threatening and snake-charming, so Huntington feels the need to write recommendations in order to prevent these dangers. Using Ihsan Ali-Fauzi's words, Huntington is falling into a blind love with his own culture.²⁹

Such a view is not alien in the American or European hemispheres. What Rosihan Anwar³⁰ calls "Islam bashing" in the mass media is based on similar assumptions as those in Huntington's view. The image of Islam described by much of the American and European media is mostly pejorative. Western media often makes up the face of Islam using its own false images. Islam is presented as swords, hijackers, extremism, barbarous, and not having a sense of mercy or love. Some of these images are true, since many extremist movements exist in the name Islam. However,

²⁹Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, "Bentrok Antarperadaban", *Media Indonesia* (17 July 1993).

³⁰Rosihan Anwar, "Salah Paham tentang Islam", *Republika* (23 July 1993).

the over-generalization of Islam also often arises from the fanatical views of Western truth and a reluctance to transcend from cultural traps. The same description might well be given by Indiana Jones or Rambo, in which non-Western societies are pictured in contrast to Westerners. The non-Westerner is characterized as primitive, paganistic, irrational and cruel, while Rambo and Indiana Jones are embodiments of heroic, rational, wise and sound values.

This tendency brings about impulsive reactions to Huntington's article. Huntington's failure can be viewed from this position. His attitude of Westernism makes him uncritical in using, analyzing and interpreting the existing data. He takes for granted any data that can support his ideas, while ignoring some data without sufficient investigation. He subverts many terms, concepts and models in order to fit his analysis. On the other hand, he is over-sensitive to certain events which might threaten his interests. His thesis of a clash of civilizations and his recommendations reveals his overreaction to new emerging political phenomena. His use of anomaly can be understood not just scientifically but also politically. What he calls anomaly not only emerges from his scientific paradigm, but also from his anomalous feelings about the new world politics.

American Huntington vs Indonesian Huntington : Concluding Remarks

On the basis of this investigation, there are some important points to be noted. The so called scientific method cannot stand in and for its own position. It is always related to external factors and motives which act as the driving force behind or the intention of the scientific analysis itself. The usage of a certain method is a kind of preference which always assumes the involvement of the subject. This involvement also assumes that the subject brings with him certain considerations rooted in his everyday life. The logic of this epistemology is clear in Huntington's case. Even though he tries to propose a scientific discovery about newly emerging political events, he cannot escape his own position as a person involved in the events themselves. Moreover, his involvement appears to be a strong force in the selection, analysis and interpretation of the data. What arises from his article is not just scientific, but also political

and economic. His view of the hierarchy of civilizations declares his political aspirations; his recommendation to the United States government is the embodiment of his will to power. Thus, he is apparently unhappy with the fact that other civilizations are becoming stronger, especially after the end of Cold War. He warns the West to look carefully at the changing political climate, otherwise it will lose its domination and hegemony as it did during the Cold War period. So, his roles as a political scientist and as an American nationalist dialectically support each other. His scientific curiosity is strengthened by the new political agenda of the United States and his political interest is supported by his knowledge of politics. Consequently, the position which Huntington takes is multi-dimensional and his views cannot be understood from just one angle.

As far as the Indonesian responses are concerned, they do not just focus their reactions on Huntington's role as a scientist. Some of them attack him from different points of view and some of them criticize him personally. The position which one takes obviously influences the way one sees phenomena. The premises proposed by Huntington, for instance, appear to be different in the hands of Indonesian writers. Just as Huntington regards these premises to be facts that will bring about conflict between civilizations, most of the Indonesian responses do not regard them to be so. There are many issues that may arise from the premises and some of the critics understand them in a contrary manner. The critics' peripheral position within Huntington's paradigm also leads their attention to not accept the view proposed by him. They have their own experiences which do not accord to Huntington beliefs. Most Indonesians, according to Emerson, feel that Indonesia does not have serious difficulties with the West.³¹ Although they are Muslim, they do not feel uneasy with the existence of the Western countries as Christian societies. They do not see the West as a threatening force and, conversely, they have obtained many advantages from the West during the New Order regime. So, Huntington's insistence of the existence of conflict is itself problematic in the mind of Indonesian critics.

Basically, most of Huntington's critics accept some of his data.

³¹Donald K. Emerson, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

They do not dispute the existence of religious involvement in the former Yugoslavian conflict or in the exclusion of Turkey from the European Economic Community. They do not deny the truth of the data about the cooperation of China-Middle Eastern countries in military matters; and they do not refute that some "Islamic" countries are threatening the West. Yet this affirmation of data does not mean that they accept Huntington's interpretations. They argue that these "tragedies" are not solely epitomized by Islam; the motives underlying of these events may be economic, political, or ethnic.

Given the variety of responses, there are also some critics that tend to concur with Huntington. These critics still view the world as if it is simply divided into a binary opposition, be this the West and the East, or the West and Islam. This is evident from some interviews conducted by some newspapers when reporting responses to Huntington's thesis. They criticized Huntington for not understanding Islam properly, and they do not expect him to do so. Huntington's knowledge of Islam is limited to a political perspective, which only constitutes a very small part of the whole of Islam. Islam is a way of life covering all aspects of Muslim thought, attitudes and feelings. Above all Muslims believe that Islam is a peaceful religion, not one of violence and hatred. For this reason, Huntington's view of Islam is provocative, giving it a distorted image. According to them, this is a typical image of Islam that exists in the consciousness of the Western society in which Huntington lives.

However, the logic of this kind of criticism is similar to Huntington's own stance. They hold that Islam or the West should be defined in opposition. Islam will never meet the West, because the West is the opposition of Islam. Western people do not want to understand Islam and always want to destroy it. In their view, the West is a dangerous force that always threatens Islam. What comes from the West should be rejected, because it must be distortive and, consequently, they regard Huntington's thesis as an expression of Western hatred toward Islam. "Huntington expresses his restless feeling towards Muslims through the article under the guise of scientific discovery".³² "He is getting older, so that the baffling

³²See *Republika's* reports (1 July 1993).

phenomena of world politics provokes him to overreaction".³³ Above all, according to Ahmad Suhelmi,³⁴ Huntington's provoking article actually emerges from his inner feelings of Vietnam Syndrome, which has always haunted him since the end of the Vietnamese War. He was deeply involved in the Vietnamese War, which America lost, and he does not want the American government to repeat the same mistakes.

Interestingly, these critics implicitly accept Huntington's vision of a potential clash of civilizations, especially between the West and Islam. Because of logical similarity, this fact is not striking. Huntington believes that Islamic resurgence, which is manifested in the Islamic-Confucian connection, threatens the West. Within the Indonesian context, this hypothesis finds its affirmation in the tendency of some Indonesian critics to view the West as an enemy. Meanwhile, these Indonesian critics also hold that the West is a threatening force and their view is also proven by Huntington's attitude towards Islam. Thus, Huntington's thesis and recommendations are well-suited to the people who hold the same views as Huntington himself. Although they suspect, if not despise each other, they have a common platform of thinking: extreme fanaticism towards their own way of life. So, this argument is a kind of American Huntington versus Indonesian Huntington.

Huntington's article is, however, not without use. There are some points that can be used for the analysis of future international relations. He has provided invaluable data about current conflicts that are occurring in world politics today and the potential conflicts that might erupt in the future. Although he does not fully succeed in outlining the characteristics of these conflicts, he has at least noted some of their changing patterns. Regardless of its shortcomings, Huntington has also proposed an alternative paradigm, that of civilization, which could replace the outdated paradigm. In response to his critics, Huntington still states, "If Not Civilization, What?" This means that the existing paradigms are not able to explain growing political phenomena.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴Ahmad Suhelmi, "Konflik Peradaban dan Sindrom Islam Huntington", *Pelita* (1 September 1993).

This is an invitation which demands the attention of political scientists. For this reason, according to Barry, "Huntington's article should be regarded as a warning, and not as an American government policy".³⁵ Meanwhile, Emerson emphasizes that Huntington does not represent Americans' views of Islam nor that of non-Western societies.³⁶ He also regards Huntington's thesis as a reasonable outcome of the changing political trend following the end of the Cold War, which has affected political scientists. He feels challenged by this new political situation and motivated to construct a new thesis on it.

As a warning, Huntington's findings are useful, and as scientific discoveries, they are also a good start. If nothing else, Huntington has disclosed some hidden political phenomena and his vision of a clash of civilizations is a good starting point to transcend old-fashioned paradigms, which are less useful given new changing political patterns. His recommendations, however, have to be understood from a different point of view. His tendency to defend America as the only Super Power and as the dominant power in the world is beyond epistemology. It is a matter of choice and not of truth. His political aspirations and his deep involvement with the Department of Defense may lead him to make this defense. This is legal for him, and is part of his rights as a citizen of the United States – one of the so called democratic and capitalist countries – to choose certain political orientations.

There is, however, another alternative recommendation from Huntington's mode of thought. The recommendation runs contrary to his logic of *pacem para bellum*. Although the existence of conflict cannot be eradicated from world politics, one has not had to prepare oneself for war. To quote Ali-Fauzi's phrase, "peace has to be attained by peaceful efforts".³⁷ It is impossible to attain peace by being prejudiced to the other or by using military weapons. Conflict is to be solved and not to be defended. This logic is, ironically, well-fitted to Huntington's long-term recommendation as written at the end of his article, that "... there will be no universal

³⁵Robert L. Barry, *loc. cit.*

³⁶Donald K. Emerson, *loc. cit.*

³⁷Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, *loc. cit.*

civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others".³⁸

³⁸Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash," p. 49.

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ستوديا اسلاميكا

مجلة أندونيسية للدراسات الاسلامية
السنة : ١ ، العدد : ١ (ابريل-يونيو) ١٩٩٤ م

هيئة الاشراف على التحرير:

عبدالعزیز دحلان
محمد ساتريا افندي
قمرالدين هدايات
مسطوحوه

واهب معطى
هارون ناسوتيون
مسلم ناسوتيون
محمد قريش شهاب
دين شمس الدين

محمد يونان يوسف

رئيس التحرير:

ازيوماردي ازرا

المحررون:

نور الفجر
يوهان هيندريك موليمان
سيقول مزانى
هيندرو براسيتير
بدري يتيم

سكرتير التحرير:

عارف سبحان

مخلص عين الرفيق

تصميم الغلاف:

س. برينكا
على اكبر

ستوديا اسلاميكا (ISSN : ٠٢١٥-٤٩٢) مجلة دورية تصدر اربع مرات فى العام عن جامعة شريف هداية الله الاسلامية الحكومية جاكرتا (STT/DEPPEN No. 129/DITJEN/PPG/STT/1976) برعاية وزارة الشؤون الدينية بجمهورية اندونيسيا ، وتخصص للدراسات الاسلامية فى اندونيسيا ، بقصد التبليغ عن نتائج البحوث والمقالات التى تبحث فى القضايا الاخيرة المتعلقة بالموضوع . وتدعو المجلة العلماء والمثقفين الى ان يبعثوا اليها مقالاتهم العلمية التى تتعلق برسالة المجلة .

تصدر المجلة بجاكرتا ، اندونيسيا .

عنوان المراسلات : ستوديا اسلاميكا ، جامعة شريف هداية الله الاسلامية الحكومية بجاكرتا ، شارع جواندا رقم ٩٥ ، تشيوتات ، جاكرتا الجنوبية ، الرمز البريدى ١٥٤١٢ ، الهاتف : ٠٠٢٧٧٩٣٠٠١ . بنك نيجارا اندونيسيا ١٩٤٦ كبايوران بارو/جامعة شريف هداية الله الاسلامية الحكومية ، جاكرتا قيمة الاشتراك السنوى فى اندونيسيا : لسنة واحدة (٤ اعداد) : ٤.٠٠٠ روبية (٢٠ دولارا امريكيا) ، لسنتين (٨ اعداد) : ٧.٠٠٠ روبية (٣٥ دولارا امريكيا) ، قيمة العدد الواحد : ١.٠٠٠ روبية (٥ دولارات امريكيا) وتسدد القيمة مقدما . وفى البلدان الاخرى يضاف الى قيمة العدد مبلغ ٤٠٠ روبية (دولاران امريكيا) للارسال بالبريد العادى . اما الارسال بوسائل خاصة فيرجى قبل ذلك الاتصال بالمجلة .