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From the Editor

The fact that Indonesia is now the largest Muslim nation has become wellknown internationally in the last few years. Despite this, it must be admitted that Islam in Indonesia has only recently entered global discussion. There has been a tendency among scholars to exclude Islam in Indonesia from any discussion of Islam or Muslim society. Islam in Indonesia has been regarded by many Western scholars as "peripheral", not only in terms of its geographic location –vis-a-vis the centers of Islam in the Middle East– but also in terms of the kind of Islam that exists in this area.

Indonesian Muslims has long complained about this. But after all, who is to be blamed? Blaming Western scholars for misperceptions and misrepresentations of Islam in Indonesia is no longer very productive. It is time for Indonesian Muslim scholars to provide a more accurate picture of Islam in their region.

One of the most effective ways to present Islam in Indonesia is through publication, such as books and journals, using international languages, mainly English and Arabic. *Studia Islamika* is intended to fill the lack of credible journals, aimed at disseminating information and academic works on various aspects of Islam in Indonesia.

Publishing a journal in international languages in Indonesia is not an easy task. The hardest challenge in this respect is the relative lack of availability of articles or reports written in either English or Arabic. We have to be honest and admit that not many Indonesian Muslim scholars are accustomed to writing in either language. This is one of the chief factors responsible for the obscurity of the development of Islam and Islamic thought in this country.

Indonesian Muslim scholars have long claimed that there were (and are) several outstanding Indonesian Muslim thinkers whose Islamic thought deserve international attention. Again, the problem is that they have published their thoughts in the national language,

Bahasa Indonesia. So far there has been no serious effort to translate their works into English or Arabic. In this respect, our journal is a humble beginning to tread the path in that direction.

Studia Islamika itself has been published by the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) in Jakarta for several years in Bahasa Indonesia. However, Dr. Tarmizi Taher, the newly-appointed Minister of Religious Affairs, wishes the IAIN in Jakarta to publish the journal in a new format, mainly using two international languages, English and Arabic, and partly in Indonesian.

It is our pleasure that in this first edition of the new *Studia Islamika*, we are able to present articles by several noted scholars, among others, Dr. Nurcholish Madjid, Dr. Quraish Shihab, Dr. Martin van Bruinessen and Dr. Azyumardi Azra. All of their articles are written in either English or Arabic.

In addition, we publish other articles and reports by own staff which, we hope, should give readers a more comprehensive view of the current developments of Islam in Indonesia. These articles and report are: first, an intellectual biography of Professor Harun Nasution, one of the most prominent figures in the discourse of Islamic reforms in today's Indonesia; second, a long and deep interview with Professor Munawir Sjadzali, a former Minister of Religious Affairs, who completed his term of office last year; third, a report about the rise and development of ICMI (the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) and about the Indonesian Intellectuals' responses to the provoking idea of "Clash of Civilization" written by Professor Samuel Huntington in *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993).

With all these articles and reports we are seriously attempting to present Islam in Indonesia in the many aspects of its development throughout history. We hope to maintain this variety of contents of *Studia Islamika* in the future editions whilst, of course, doing our best to improve it in all other possible ways.

Given this we invite all scholars of Islam in Indonesia to contribute to our journal. Your contribution is crucial not only for the continuing existence of this journal, but also for a better understanding of Islam in Indonesia.

The Indies Chinese and the Sarekat Islam *An Account of The Anti-Chinese Riots in Colonial Indonesia*

Abstraksi: *Kebijaksanaan pendidikan Belanda terhadap pribumi abad 19 telah banyak mendorong munculnya benih-benih nasionalisme (proto-nationalism). Kebijakan ini memungkinkan kalangan pribumi tertentu untuk mendapatkan pendidikan Belanda. Meskipun jumlahnya sangat kecil, peran pribumi lulusan sekolah Belanda ini sangat penting. Mereka menjadi tulang punggung dalam mengembangkan sikap kebangsaan rakyat bumiputera.*

Meskipun demikian, kebijaksanaan ekonomi yang diterapkan Belanda tetap dianggap gagal. Dengan lebih banyak mengistimewakan kelompok etnis Cina dalam pelbagai kegiatan ekonomi, kesempatan pribumi untuk mengembangkan usaha perdagangan semakin kecil. Sementara itu, pemerintah kolonial juga memperlonggar Cina Daratan untuk datang ke Indonesia dalam jumlah besar. Cina peranakan yang relatif sudah menyatu dengan pribumi terdesak oleh Cina totok yang lebih setia terhadap pemerintah Cina.

Di satu sisi, nasionalisme Indonesia sedang berkembang di kalangan pribumi, di sisi lain, nasionalisme Cina juga semakin berkembang di kalangan etnis Cina Indonesia. Latar belakang sejarah ini dapat menjelaskan motivasi serta pola gerakan anti-Cina yang terjadi sepanjang paruh pertama abad 20.

خـلاصـة

ان نوع العلاقات القائمة بين الطائفة الصينية واهل البلاد الاصيلين باندونيسيا فى النصف الاول من القرن العشرين لا يخلو من السياسة التى كانت تمارسها الحكومة الاستعمارية . ففى المجال التربوى كانت السياسة قد اسهمت فى نشأة بذور الوطنية ، كما انعكست فى منظمات جمعية خير وبودى اوتومو وشركة داجانج اسلام . وقد اتاحت هذه السياسة التربوية لبعض اهل البلاد الاصيلين تلقى التعليم الهولندى . وعلى الرغم من ان عددهم قليل ، الا انهم لعبوا دورا هاما فى تطوير الحركات الوطنية والمواقف القومية لدى الشعب الاندونيسى ، بل كانوا هم الذين بادروا فى القيام بالحركات التحريرية من اجل استقلال اندونيسيا . فلذلك كان من البدهى ان يقال ان السياسة التربوية التى مارستها الحكومة الهولندية لها آثارها فى انهاض الشعور الوطنى بين اهل البلاد .

وبالرغم من ذلك فان سياسة الحكومة فى المجال الاقتصادى فى القرن التاسع عشر يمكن ان يقال انها باءت بالفشل . فرغبات الحكومة فى تحقيق الرفاهية بين اهل البلاد كانت آثارها على خلاف ما تتوقعه ، وذلك لان الحكومة كانت تهتم بالطائفة الصينية فى اوجه النشاط الاقتصادى اكثر من اهتمامها بأهل البلاد ، حتى كانت الفرصة التى اتاحت لأهل البلاد لتطوير نشاطاتهم التجارية متضائلة ، بل ان القطاع الاقتصادى الذى كان قد سيطر عليه اهل البلاد انتقل معظمها الى الطائفة الصينية .

هذا بالاضافة الى تسهيلات قدمتها الحكومة الهولندية لعدد كبير من الصينيين لينحدروا من بعض المناطق الصينية الى اندونيسيا ، مما ادى الى ان يقوموا مقام الصينيين المولدين الذين كانوا قد اقاموا فى اندونيسيا لفترة طويلة ، وتعايشوا مع اهل البلاد ، مع ان ولاء اولئك الصينيين الوافدين للحكومة الصينية اكثر منه للحكومة الهولندية . وتلورت هذه الحالة بوجود تدخل مباشر من قبل الحكومة الصينية فى تنظيم امور الطائفة الصينية فى اندونيسيا . هذا وتلورت الحركة الوطنية الاندونيسية بين اهل البلاد من جهة ، بينما تطورت الوطنية الصينية بين الطائفة الصينية الاندونيسية من جهة اخرى .

Indonesian society in the first decades of the twentieth century was profoundly marked by rapid social and political developments. One of the most prominent developments was the rise of various organizations categorized by Benda and McVey as the Indonesian proto-nationalist movements.¹ The most prominent organization in this early phase of Indonesian nationalism was the Sarekat Islam (SI), which will be discussed more fully later. It was, of course, not the earliest organization in the Dutch East-Indies. The Budi Utomo, primarily a Javanese-oriented organization yet claimed by certain Indonesian historians to be the precursor of the Indonesian nationalist movement, was founded in 1908. However, neither the Budi Utomo nor the SI could be claimed to be the earliest organizations having nationalist overtones in Indonesia. In 1900, the Tiong Hwa Hwee Koan (THHK), the first pan-Chinese organization, was founded.² The THHK was certainly not an Indonesian nationalist organization, though it functioned in Indonesia; it was seen and operated by the Chinese as an organization through which the Chinese in the Archipelago could assert themselves as part of the Chinese nation (*bangsa Tionghoa*), being different from both the Dutch and the indigenous population.

The establishment of such organizations and other developments within Indonesian society did not happen abruptly. They were continuations of previous trends or the results of development in the nineteenth century either at national or international levels. The rapid political and economic changes at the international level had also produced changes to Dutch policies in Indonesia. In the second half of the nineteenth century the Dutch government put new emphasis on the necessity of providing more education for the natives. Furthermore, in 1870 it also introduced the liberal economic policy in order to foster the welfare of the indigenous

¹For their argument, see the introductory essay in Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey, *The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960).

²For a more complete description on the emergence of the pan-Chinese movement, see, Lea E. Williams, *Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1916* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960); Kwee Tek Hoay, *The Origins of the Modern Chinese Movement in Indonesia* [trans. Lea A. Williams] (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1969).

population. Though the Dutch schooling system admitted only a very small number of the natives, it managed to create a new class of educated Indonesians who would play a major role in the rise of Indonesian nationalism.

Wertheim points out that liberal economic policies, however, failed to increase the welfare of the indigenous population. It is reported that there was a general complaint at the turn of the century that the economic condition of the natives was increasingly deteriorating.³ On the other hand, the Chinese consistently consolidated their economic position. Standing between the Europeans, at the apex of the socio-economic position, and the natives at the bottom, the Chinese were able to obtain many economic benefits. Much of the newly created economic opportunities provided for the natives passed immediately to the Chinese. The Chinese revenue from opium shops, pawn shops, and gambling houses also rose dramatically in the 1860s through the 1880s, while the natives bought less cloth.⁴ At the same time, the Chinese profited on a similar scale from the growth of trade, both wholesale and retail. Furthermore they expanded their economic power into sectors traditionally dominated by the natives. An inquiry in 1892, for instance, revealed that the replacement of native cloth by imported cloth, which Javanese *batik* producers bought through the Chinese, had resulted in the transfer of a large part of the *batik* industry to the Chinese, "with native workers in a position not unlike slavery".⁵

The consolidation of the Chinese economic position was inseparable from other social-cultural developments within the Chinese society as a whole both in the Indies and in the Chinese homeland. Demographically, the period under discussion saw the peak of Chinese emigration to Indonesia. As a result, the numbers of Chinese in the Archipelago increased substantially, from about a quarter of million in the mid-nineteenth century to an estimated

³WF. Wartheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change* (The Hague and Bandung: W. Van Hoeve, 1956), p. 65.

⁴For the complete figures, see Jan OM. Brock, *The Economic Development of the Netherland Indies* (New York: 1945), p. 213.

⁵JS. Furnival, *Netherlands India: A Study in Plural Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), p. 213.

one and a quarter of million by 1930.⁶ This sudden growth occurred largely as consequence of three great surges of emigration. The first of these was an inflow of Chinese laborers to the estate area of North Sumatra and Bangka islands between about 1860 and 1890; the second was the 1894 abolition of the Chinese imperial law which prohibited emigration; the third occurred after the Dutch government's relaxation of earlier restrictions on Chinese entry into and settlement in Indonesia after 1900. These new *totok* immigrants were more heterogeneous; Chinese women in particular began to arrive in groups for the first time and Chinese-Indonesian intermarriage declined as a consequence of this. By then *peranakan* men could marry *totok* women. Children of the new immigrants, by virtue of their numbers and their greater contact with China, usually did not become *peranakans* as their predecessors had, but remained culturally *totok* Chinese.⁷ These demographic trends clearly reflected the increasing process of re-sinification.

The incessant flow of Chinese immigrants affected not only the demographic composition of the Chinese in Indonesia, but to a greater degree also led to the revival of their cultural nationalism. Constant communication between the Chinese in Indonesia and their relatives in China and other Asian countries, as well as their travel between Indonesia and these countries, helped rise new consciousness of their own nationality. By the turn of the century, there was a quickening interest in Confucianism, in Chinese history, in Chinese customs, and in current events in China. The desire to unite all the Chinese as one community and nation and to promote the learning of Chinese language (even among those who knew no Chinese) spread rapidly.⁸ Therefore, modern Chinese schools founded by THHK, aimed at reviving Confucianism and Chinese culture, provided instruction in Mandarin as their national language.⁹ This helped to link different speech groups among the newcomers and even the *peranakans*,

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 408-9.

⁷Mary F. Somers, *Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series, 1964), p. 4.

⁸Williams, *op. cit.*, esp. ch. 3.

⁹Hoay, *op. cit.*, esp. ch. 3. See also Leo Suryadinata, "Indonesia Chinese

who sent their children to schools to learn the forgotten language of their ancestors.

At the same time, Indonesian Chinese newspapers and magazines in both Malay and Chinese languages were emerging and flourishing.¹⁰ The pan-Chinese chambers of commerce (*Siang Hwee*) were also founded and developed rapidly between 1901 and 1911; they not only defended Chinese economic interests but also performed political and quasi-consular functions to link the overseas Chinese to their homeland.¹¹ The Chinese government also showed a renewed interest in the Chinese population in the Indies. As a result of a series of visits by the Chinese government's emissaries, both civil and military (mainly naval) officials, the Chinese nationalist movement in the Indies was greatly stimulated. These visits succeeded not only in summoning conference of delegates from various THHK branches, but also in giving impetus to the establishment in 1907 of a federation which would standardize and supervise Chinese education in the Indies. Also, the THHK schools were encouraged to send their graduates to China for secondary schooling. It is reported that until the 1911 revolution, about 200 Chinese from the Indies studied in the homeland, with scholarships from the Chinese government.¹²

The most dramatic example of the Chinese home government's interest in the Indies Chinese was its proposal in 1908 of establishing Chinese consuls in the archipelago in order to protect Chinese interests in the region. In the proposal, the Chinese government claimed its jurisdiction over both the *totok* and *peranakan* Chinese.

Education: Past and Present", in his *The Chinese Minority in Indonesia: Seven Papers* (Singapore: Chopmen Enterprises, 1978) pp. 1-20.

¹⁰Suryadinata, "A Short History of the Indonesian Chinese Press" in his *The Chinese*, pp. 128-41. On the Malay Language press, see, Suryadinata, *The Pre-World War II Peranakan Chinese Press of Java: A Preliminary Survey* (Athens: Ohio University, Southeast Asian Series, No. 18, 1971).

¹¹Leo Suryadinata, *Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java 1917-42* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1976), pp. 11-2; Donald E. Wilmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series, 1956), pp. 5-6.

¹²Wilmott, *Ibid.*; Suryadinata, "Indonesian Chinese Education", *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

This was in accordance with the Chinese Nationality Law of 1909, by which statutory effect was given to the principle that a child of a Chinese father, regardless of place of birth, was a Chinese national. This proposal was refused by the Dutch government and consequently there was a great deal of negotiation which delayed the consular agreement between these two governments.¹³

Given the strong ties between the Indies Chinese and their homeland, it is not surprising that the Sun Yat Sen revolutionary movement in the first decade of this century also gained momentum among the Chinese in Indonesia. In 1907, the T'ung-meng Hung (Together Sworn Society—Sun Yat Sen's revolutionary party) established branch in Pintu Kecil, a *totok* quarter in Batavia. It was not long before it changed its name to Chin-nan She (Nanyang Travellers' Club) and began to set up reading clubs or Soe-pao Sia (Shu-pao She) in various cities in the Indies. Before the formation of the Republic of China, there were 52 branches of the Soe-pao Sia in the Indies, of which 6 were in Java. Starting as study clubs, with evening courses on national and international affairs, they were essentially aimed at spreading revolutionary doctrines. They became centers of Kuomintang organization and influence among the Indies Chinese after the 1911 Revolution. In addition, a number of radical and secret nationalist organizations were also active, including the Ten Men League, the "Kong Tong" labor federation, the Blood and Iron Union, and the National Salvation Brigade. These organizations were considered dangerous by the Netherlands Indies government, and in 1920 they were suppressed or outlawed after a series of violent disorders among the Chinese. Some of their leaders were deported and the Chinese press was generally more closely supervised.¹⁴

As far as Chinese people's civil liberties and legal status were concerned, there were many concessions granted by the Dutch government. Although until 1910 they were still required to have a pass in order to be allowed to go to certain places, restrictions on immigration were already applied under the European Civil Code

¹³For a complete account of this matter, see Wilmott, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-5.

¹⁴Suryadinata, *Peranakan*, p. 12; Wilmott, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

on most of their commercial transactions.¹⁵ Yet, they did not have equal status with Europeans since they were still treated as a "foreign orientals", subject to the *landraad* or native courts.¹⁶ Furthermore, the Chinese were also subject to the *politie rol system*, a court with jurisdiction. Under this system Chinese criminals could be punished at the discretion of the judge without any obligation on him to hear witnesses.¹⁷

All these became major sources of Chinese resentment against the Dutch system of law. They resented the 1899 Dutch recognition of the Japanese as Europeans in their legal relations, whilst most activities of the Chinese remained under the jurisdiction of the courts. Growing Chinese agitation, assisted by the unification policy of van Deventer and other Dutch liberals, led to the abolition of the *politie rol system* in 1914 and to a measure in 1917 which permitted individual non-Europeans to submit themselves to European law, thus participating in its benefits. Moreover, subsequent legislation between 1917 and 1925 had the effect of completely removing the Chinese from the civil jurisdiction of the *landraad*. Yet by the time of the Japanese invasion, their demands to be placed on the same legal footing as Europeans in criminal proceedings yet to be granted.¹⁸ Apart from the grievances concerning their legal status, as compared to the native population, the Chinese actually generally enjoyed privileged positions in the colonial society.

One of the most far-reaching policies of the Dutch towards the Chinese was the establishment of the *Hollands Chinesche Scholen* (HCS) or Dutch-Chinese schools. These new type of primary schools in which Dutch language was the medium of instruction, were established in 1908 exclusively for Chinese children. The curriculum of the schools was the same as that in European schools. By 1914 there were 27 HCS and their number continued to expand throughout the period of Dutch rule. Many of the

¹⁵Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 433.

¹⁶Williams, *Overseas*, pp. 27-36.

¹⁷Purcell, *op. cit.*, pp. 436-7.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 436-8.

graduates of these schools were able to continue their education in Dutch language secondary schools, and an increasing number went to Holland for university education.¹⁹ Later, these Westernized Chinese graduates proved to be alienated from the mainstream of Chinese Movements.

Further developments from Dutch policies occurred in the political field. The Dutch appointed several Chinese to Municipal Advisory Councils following their establishment during the first decade of the century, and after 1909 the Chinese community was allowed to select some of their own representatives. In 1917, when the government announced that it was ready to establish a national council, the *Volksraad*, the Chinese were to be allocated at least three of the sixty-one seats. This Dutch proposal became a hotly debated issue among the Chinese which led to the Semarang Conference of 1917. This Conference, the largest gathering yet held by the Indies Chinese, decisively rejected the proposal.²⁰ Nevertheless, in spite of this opposition, individual Chinese continued to accept appointments to the municipal and provincial councils and to the *Volksraad* after its opening in 1918. Most of those who accepted the appointments were Chinese graduates who had studied in Holland and acquired Western outlooks.²¹

We have seen various Dutch responses to the Chinese awakening. It is clear that there was a strong tendency towards the relaxing of the Dutch policies. The slackening of Dutch-Chinese policies, particularly during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, was largely stimulated by pressure from the Chinese community itself, and Dutch fears of the growing influence of the Manchu government and of the anti-Manchu movement upon the Indies Chinese. In response to these developments, in 1900 the Dutch government established a Bureau of Chinese affairs. This bureau proved to quicken the process of the relaxing of the Dutch policies largely because its officers—supported by public champions of the Chinese such as van Sandick, de Veer, and especially Fromberg—were quick to loosen colonial policies and embark on a long range

¹⁹Suryadinata, *Peranakan*, p. 16.

²⁰For a more complete account of this conference, see *Ibid.*, pp. 17-75.

²¹Wilmott, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

policy of attraction in order to win the allegiance of the Chinese.²²

Despite the relaxation of the Dutch policies, the Indies Chinese were, by and large, still resentful. The *peranakan* in particular resented the fact that although they were officially considered to be Dutch subjects, most government departments continued to class them as "foreign orientals". On the other hand, because of the handicaps of the legal system provided for the natives, the Chinese community continued to demand total assimilation to European legal status. The bitterness of their resentment was intensified by the fact that the government once promised such assimilation, but later announced that this was impossible. The Chinese also continued to be dissatisfied with the amount of government education provided for their children, whilst being convinced that their taxes were being assessed at discriminatory rates.²³

Meanwhile, resentment among the native population against the Chinese had also greatly increased. They were resentful not only of the ever increasing Chinese economic predominance in Indonesia but also because of continual Dutch concessions to the Chinese. Their resentment gained a strong impetus with the rise of Indonesian nationalist organizations, the most prominent among these being the Sarekat Islam (SI). As one might expect, the SI soon became the main tool for the expression of the natives' resentment toward the Chinese.

In general, relations between the native population and the Chinese community in Indonesia before the twentieth century were unruffled. As far as is known, there was no report of conflicts nor riots between the two communities prior to this century. Nevertheless, the seeds of tension and conflict had been planted and soon their bitter fruits were ripening. Their relations become increasingly uneasy; deep hostility and resentment grew more rapidly in the early decades of the century, during which the

²²*Ibid.*, p. 6.

²³George MT. Kahin, "The Political Position of the Chinese in Indonesia" (unpubl. Phd. Thesis, Stanford University, 1946), pp. 87-90, cited in Wilmott, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

Chinese became more vocal and organized in their demands to the Dutch government. The continued concessions granted by the government exacerbated the latent conflict between the native and the Chinese communities.

The first concerted effort among the native population against the Chinese economic encroachment was materialized in the founding of the Jami'at Khair in Batavia on July 17, 1905. This organization was open to every Muslim without discrimination regarding his origins, but the majority of its members were Arabs. The primary aim of the Jami'at Khair was to establish and develop a form of modern Islamic education for Muslims.²⁴ The organization, however, also placed strong emphasis on economic protection and cooperation among the Muslim population so that they would be able to compete with the Chinese. A conscious effort was made to encourage any Indonesian Muslim who was engaged in economic enterprise or commerce to cooperate with the organization.²⁵ The Jami'at Khair stagnated after a controversy about its status hierarchy based on descent, which led to a schism.²⁶ As a result, it failed to achieve its goals, particularly in the economic field. The Jami'at Khair does however, seem to have been potent in spreading the idea of organized groups within the Muslim community.

Niel suggests that one person who was influenced by the rise of the Jami'at Khair was Haji Samanhudi, a batik dealer in Surakarta.²⁷

²⁴For a more complete account of the Jami'at Khair, see Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Mederen Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988), pp. 68-73.

²⁵Robert Van Neil, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (The Hague and Bandung: W. Van Hoeve, 1960), p. 88. On the role of Islam in uniting Muslims against the Chinese economic encroachment, see, WF. Wartheim, "The Trading Minorities in Southeast Asia", esp. pp. 78-82 in his *East-West Parallels* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965).

²⁶Al-Irsyad, a competing, more egalitarian organization established in 1913, was more dynamic and established branches and schools in half a dozen other cities in Java. See, Noer, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-80.

²⁷Niel, *op. cit.*, pp. 88, 182, 266n. Niel admits that the influence of the Jami'at Khair on the Budi Utomo and the Sarikat Dagang Islam is difficult to determine. However, Haji Agus Salim in his interview with Niel, suggested that many Budi Utomo and SI members had formerly been members of the Jami'at Khair, yet no other evidence to this effect has yet been uncovered.

As may be expected, Haji Samanhudi was very concerned by the decline of the Javanese roles in the batik industry. It was mentioned earlier that the Chinese were gaining an ever firmer hold over the batik industry in which their control of essential import commodities gave them an enormous advantage. Because of this economic issue and other matters, Samanhudi took the initiative of forming what was in essence to be benevolent and protective organization. For that purpose he requested the help of Raden Mas Tirtoadisuryo, who had experience in commercial organization. In 1909 they founded the Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI –Islamic Trade Union) in Batavia. Two years later branches were opened in Buitenzorg (Bogor) and Surakarta.²⁸

It was in Surakarta that the SDI had its greatest success. This is not difficult to understand. Surakarta was one of the main centers of the batik industry. The SDI soon became a powerful rallying point for the batik merchants who were resentful of the Chinese encroachment upon their industry. Batik traders, both Arabs and Javanese, were now united under the banner of the SDI. In August 1912, the SDI launched a boycott against the Chinese dealers, followed by a strike of the Javanese batik workers at the Chinese-owned factory at Krapyak of the Mangkunegaran principedom. Both boycott and strike were successful, but they turned into riots against the Chinese. This riots broke out not only in Surakarta, but also spread to Surabaya. The Chinese began to be attacked in the streets; shops and warehouses were damaged and open violence began to be the order of the day in Surakarta and Surabaya. Soon the fighting forces of the principedom of Surakarta became involved in the rioting and disturbances which reached such proportions that on August 10, 1912, the Resident of Surakarta had to issue a decree banning the activities of the SDI. The Resident blamed the SDI leaders for failing to control their members.²⁹

Surakarta seemed to be vulnerable to such anti-Chinese riots. As

²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 88-90. See the statutes of the SDI in Bob Hering, "The Sarekat Islam: Some Selected Documents", Appendix II, in *Studies on Islam* (Occasional Paper No. 22, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, James Cook University of North Queensland, 1987), pp. 49-51.

²⁹Bernard Dahm, *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century* [trans. PS. Falla] (London: Praeger, 1971), p. 40; Noer, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-7; Niel, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

early as July 1912 riots against the Chinese broke out after a fight occurred between two members of the Mangkunegaran legion and a group of Chinese. The next day a platoon of the Mangkunegaran Cavalry launched a counter attack against the Chinese quarter. During the next few weeks Surakarta witnessed clashes and communal troubles which had been brewing for some time; it was even reported that children were engaged in the fighting. The over-confidence exhibited by some Chinese as a result of the foundation of the Republic of China aggravated the tensions. Rumours circulated that the Dutch would soon be driven out of Java and the Chinese would take over the government. It is reported that abusive talk and aggressive gestures from the Chinese also exacerbated tensions. The continuing rancour created a dangerous situation requiring quick and stern measures by local authorities in order to contain it.³⁰In Semarang, about 60 miles from Surakarta, there were also repercussions of the Surakarta disturbances. However, there is no suggestion in official reports that the SDI was directly involved in these July disturbances.

Sometime before the August boycott against the Chinese, Haji Samanhudi located another brilliant organizer, Raden 'Umar Sayyid Cokroaminoto, a Javanese of *priyayi* birth, who had attended the administrative school (OSVIA) but did not wish to enter government service.³¹ He joined the SDI at Surabaya in 1912 at the invitation of Haji Samanhudi. His involvement in the SDI proved to be an important touchstone for the phenomenal rise of the Sarekat Islam (SI). It was only a few days after the above-mentioned August rioting that Cokroaminoto, Samanhudi and other leaders of the banned SDI appealed to the Resident of Surakarta for the lifting of this. The suspension was finally withdrawn on August 1912 with the proviso that its statutes be changed in such a way as to stipulate that the organization would confine its operations to the Surakarta area only. Ignoring the proviso of the Surakarta Resident,

³⁰For a more complete account of these riots, see Sartono Kartodirjo, *The Protest Movements in Rural Java* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 162-3.

³¹For the biography of Cokroaminoto, see, Noer, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-2; Amelz, *HOS. Tjokroaminoto: Hidup dan Perjuangannya* (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952); Sabirin, *Tarich Almarhum Tjokroaminoto-Pergerakan, Pahala dan Djasanya* (Bandung: Sumber Ilmu, 1935).

Cokroaminoto drew up new statutes for the organization for the whole Indonesia. He also applied to the for legal recognition in order to escape its "preventive and repressive administrative control".³² On September 10, 1912 the SDI formally re-founded under the name of Sarekat Islam (SI) or the Muslim Association, with Cokroaminoto as its leader.³³

The aims of the SI, as laid out in its statutes, were (a) advancement of commercial spirit and enterprise among the indigenous population; (b) assistance to members who were in difficulties through no fault of their own; (c) advancement of the spiritual development and material interests of Indonesians, thereby assisting in raising their living standards; and (d) combating misconceptions of Islam, and prompting religious life among the Indonesian people in accordance with the laws and customs of that religion. It was further declared that these objectives would only be pursued by legal means, without breach of public order or offense to morals and decorum. Almost immediately after the the founding of the SI, the statutes were sent to the Netherlands Indies government for its legal status to be recognized.³⁴

Membership of the SI grew at a rate unparalleled in the history of pre-independence organizations in Indonesia. Its phenomenal growth can be clearly seen in the table below.

As Dahm points out, so far there has been no critical study of the membership statistic of the SI. The table shows us that in April 1914 a peak was reached. From then until 1917, a decline was noticeable. However in 1918 there was again a large increase in its membership. Furthermore, its increasing propaganda in the Outer Islands had resulted in the recruitment of many members, this

³²Noer, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-8; Dahm, *History*, p. 40; Niel, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

³³There are very few comprehensive studies of the SI. For instance, see, AT. Jaylani, "The Sarekat Islam Movement: Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism" (unpubl. MA Thesis McGill University, Montreal, 1959); APE. Korver, "Sarekat Islam 1912-1916 (unpubl. Phd Dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 1982). The latest study of the SI is an anthology, *Studies on Islam* (Occasional Paper No. 22, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, James Cook University of North Queensland, 1987).

³⁴BB. Hering, "The Sarekat Islam: A Historical Perspective", in *Studies on Islam*, p. 2; Niel, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-3; Dahm, *loc. cit.*

SI Membership in Java, 1912-18³⁵

April 1912 (SDI)	4,500
August 1912	66,000
December 1912 (SI)	93,000
April 1913	150,000
April 1914	366,913
April 1915	319,251
June 1916	273,377
October 1917	268,355
October 1918	386,410

giving rise to the supposition that the SI had continued to grow at the original pace and had soon passed the million mark. According to Pringgodigdo, the SI had 800,000 members in 1916 and over 2,000,000 by 1919.³⁶ These figures, taken from propaganda statements of the time, have been accepted in more recent scholarly works.³⁷

The mass following of the SI can be explained by the groupings within its membership. In the initial phase support seems to have come mainly from members of the exiguous Javanese middle class, whose desire for union was stimulated by the successful boycott against the Chinese traders. They were *dokter jawas*, teachers, lesser *priyayis*, merchants and traders who realized, as Tirtoadisuryo

³⁵This table is from Barnard Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence* [trans. Mary F. Somers Heidhuis] (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 13.

³⁶AK. Pringgodigdo, *Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia* (Djakarta: Pustaka Rakjat, 1950), 16ff., cited in Dahm, *Sukarno*.

³⁷HJ. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. 42; Niel, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

once put it, that the only way to give forceful expression to the desire for progress was to form a strong organization.³⁸ For the *dokter jawas*, teachers and *priyayis* in particular, the SI presented the possibility of materializing in Indonesia success similar to that achieved by the Japanese, the Young Turks, and the Chinese revolutionaries. Cokroaminoto himself made it clear from the outset that the SI aimed, *inter alia*, to build Indonesian nationalism and elevate the inferior position of Indonesians.³⁹ Yet for the merchants and traders the SI was a tool for economic advancement. The SI was, from the very beginning, clearly advocating some forms of indigenous economic autonomy. It emphasized the establishment of businesses under Indonesian control to reduce dependence on Chinese commerce. For these reasons, the SI urged the natives to establish, for example, cooperative businesses. It was part of the SI analysis of society that much of the cultural backwardness of the natives sprang from their economic backwardness.

The second largest group of SI members were those who were often categorized by certain scholars as *santri* Muslims. It is already known that by the end of the eighteenth century there was a new wave of Islamic revitalization in Indonesia. Due to improvements in transportation and communication, more and more Indonesians went to make the hajj in the Holy Land. Dahm assesses that in 1890 there was about one hajj to every *desa*; by 1905 this ratio had doubled, and before long it had increased fourfold. In 1911 there was a surge in the number of pilgrimages due to this being the year of the *hajj akbar* (greater pilgrimage), which normally attracts larger numbers of Muslims. However the major rise, especially in Java, began just at the time when the SI was recruiting members in great numbers.⁴⁰

It is clear that the revitalization of Islam had helped the SI to enlarge its membership. The SI itself responded to this revitalization in a sensible manner. A great deal of its concern was directed toward matters of personal morality. Members were expected to

³⁸Dahm, *History*, p. 41.

³⁹Noer, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁴⁰See table V in Dahm, *History*, p. 41. For a more complete account of the hajj phenomenon, see Jacob Vredenberg, "The Hâdj", in *BKI*, Vol. 118, 1962.

live according to strict Islamic prescriptions, to deal honestly with all men, to obey all established authority, and to recognize a sense of mutual responsibility. In its programs in the religious field, the SI demanded: the withdrawal of all laws and regulations which hampered the spread of Islam; payment of salaries to *kiyais* and *penghulus*; subsidies for Islamic educational institutions; and official recognition of Islamic holidays.⁴¹ With these demands, it is not surprising that the SI came to be regarded as the united Muslim movement attempting to struggle for the advancement of Islam in Indonesia.

The largest group of SI members was the rural population. It is reported that huge numbers of villagers joined the SI and flocked to its meetings. It is clear that the rapid spread and tremendous popularity of the SI among the rural population cannot be explained in terms of intellectual appeal reflected by the prominent leaders of this organization. Instead, many of the villagers joined the SI in order to realize of their messianic expectations which had increasingly dominated their thoughts since the nineteenth century, during which the colonial power had already entirely invaded the rural areas. A large part of Java's rural population believed that a messianic figure usually called the *ratu adil* or *Prabu Heru Cokro* would appear at the time of distress or oppression. Association of the SI with the idea of *ratu adil* was strengthened by many SI propagandists in rural areas who used the texts of prophecies and certain ritual practices of the time of acceptance of new members.⁴² It is not difficult to understand why, by 1914, Cokroaminoto was regarded as the long-awaited Prabu Heru Cokro, the Ratu Adil. For many of the peasantry, this was not a mere coincidence of names; Cokroaminoto himself was a captivating and moving speaker. He won the hearts of the masses and became a symbol of hope for those who felt suppressed or disillusioned. He became

⁴¹Noer, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

⁴²Niel, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-5. For an analysis of the secretive and mystical nature of the SI membership in rural areas and comparison with the Chinese secret societies, see, The Siaw Giap, "Group Conflict in Rural Society" (henceforth "Group Conflict II"), *Revue du sud-est asiatique* 2 (1966), pp. 209-17. See the SI secret oath in Hering, "The SI: Some Selected Documents", Appendix II, pp. 43-5. Cf. "Secret Code of Sarekat Islam", Appendix IV, in Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-201.

the medium through which real and imagined grievances found expression. Wherever Cokroaminoto appeared, crowds of villagers flocked to him, reaching out to touch his clothes and kiss his feet.⁴³

Apart from its messianic appeal, it is obvious that the SI had become the tool for the rural population to express their growing discontent, resentment and grievances. It helped to create awareness among the villagers, to explain the causes of existing causes of discontent and generally poor situation of the rural population. In brief, the SI helped to articulate particular feelings of discontent and, in doing so, gave a means of expression to popular aspirations for material betterment and social emancipation. As local branches of the SI were established, the rural population began to undergo a process of politization whereby their objectives, ideology, leadership and strategies were directed towards economic, social and political changes in the society rather than towards the realization of their half-perceived messianic goals. The widespread protest movements following the introduction of the SI among the rural population were directed by particular grievances arising from the colonial order. As can be observed, the colonial order itself represented a relationship of authority and subjection, superiority and subordination, and it was essentially a racially based order. It was within this order that the Chinese held such an important place.

It has been mentioned in passing that there were anti-Chinese riots in Surakarta and Surabaya, which were followed by the SDI boycott against the Chinese traders. These disturbances proved to be the beginning of wider scale anti-Chinese riots in Java during the period 1912 to 1915. This period at the height of anti-Chinese agitation, did not just coincide with the rise of the SI. This organization clearly inherited some anti-Chinese characteristic from the SDI. However, the SI rapidly dropped all anti-Chinese principles from its program because, among other reasons, by 1914 it was primarily Chinese money that was keeping alive the *Oetoesan Hindia*, the SI newspaper. After the withdrawal of Arab

⁴³Dahm, Sukarno, pp. 15-6; Niel, *op. cit.*, 105-7.

merchants' support to the newspaper, it had to rely upon paid advertisements which were mostly placed by Chinese merchants. Perhaps because of this, as well as other reasons, the central leaders of the SI barred their members from attacking the Chinese.⁴⁴

Though the leaders of the SI consistently emphasized the peaceful character of the movement and denied that it represented a violent challenge to the colonial order, they could not always control their members. The local SI branches, in the course of their development, often deviated from the guiding principles laid down by the overall leaders of the movement. This happened because local branches had to respond variety of local pressures. The resentment and grievances of the local population towards the Dutch, as well as against the Chinese, were very real. In the absence of a legal channel to express their grievances, it was the local SI branches which rallied people to disorderly actions.⁴⁵

The anti-Chinese riots during the years of 1912-1915 and 1918 (as described below) were very complicated. The disturbances can not be described simply because of the rise of the SI. As has been seen, the rise of the SI itself involved complex developments within Indonesian society as a whole. It is true that the SI, to a certain degree, was created as a result of an attempt to break Chinese commercial power and as a response toward the rise of the Chinese nationalism. However this is not the only reason. It can be argued that the Chinese factor was simply a trigger to the establishment of the SI. In essence, the birth of the SI was a response of the native population to rapid changes in the colonial society, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century. The rise of the SI was a culmination of growing awareness among the natives regarding their economic, social and political situations; it was a reflection of the rise of Indonesian nationalism however basic this may have been. Furthermore, the SI was also a reflection of a revitalization of the life of Muslims—a new perception of Islam and its role *vis-a-vis* the Dutch and Chinese infidels was gaining momentum among

⁴⁴Niel, *Ibid.*, p. 120; Suryadinata, *Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1978), p. 15.

⁴⁵Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

Muslims.⁴⁶ The combination of these developments in the native population on the one hand and development in the Chinese community on the other hand, widened the gap between them.

The disturbances in the second decade of the century, furthermore, reflected several distinct cleavages within the colonial society, though these often overlapped with each other. There was an economic division, i.e. the generally poor natives rich Chinese division. In most cases this coincided with the racial division (indigenous-alien) and with religious division (Muslim-*kafir*). In contrast to the Chinese who usually united in their reactions toward the violent attack against them, among the natives there was a split between the SI and non-SI camps. In many cases of disturbances, it was not unusual that the non-SI camp stood on the Chinese side against the SI camp.

All the complex situations described above obviously became the underlying reasons for the sudden outburst of the anti-Chinese riots during 1910s. It seems that certain pattern emerged from such riots. First of all, the triggers of the riots in most instances were trivial, such as a traffic collision, a disagreement over prices, competition in retail trade, arrogant and abusive statements of the Chinese, various kind of rumors, and so on. Triggered by one of these, riots soon broke out in which Indonesian on the hand and the Chinese on the other attacked against each other. In many cases of the riots, it appears that the SI local leaders and members tended

⁴⁶For further analysis of the relationship between the growing anti-Chinese sentiment and Islamic revitalization in Indonesia, see, The Siaw Giap, "Religion and Overseas Chinese Assimilation in Southeast Asian Countries", *Revue du sud-est Asiatique*, 2 (1965), pp. 67-83. He argues that, before the nineteenth century, Islam did not appear to be a significant barrier in relations between the Chinese and the natives. In his opinion, even the increasing penetration of the Dutch, by and large, did not change that situation. However, the rise of Chinese nationalism along with the Islamic revitalization, helped to widen the gap between the Chinese and the native Muslims in Indonesia. For a more complete discussion on the Chinese and Islam in Indonesia before the arrival of the Dutch, see for instance, H.J. de Graaf and TH. G. Pigeaud, *Kerajaan-kerajaan Islam di Jawa: Kajian Sejarah politik Abad ke-15 dan ke-16* (Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 1974); *Chinese Muslims in Java in the 15th and 16th Centuries: The Malay Annals of Semarang and Cerbon* (Melbourne: Monash papers on Southeast Asia No. 12, 1984). For the argument that the Dutch helped to create conflict between the Chinese and the Muslims, see, for instance, WD. Soekiman, *Masalah Cina di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Yayasan Lima, 1975); Lie Tek Tjeng, *Masalah WNI dan Masalah Huakiau* (Jakarta: LRKN/LIPI, 1970).

to be the leading forces of the natives against the Chinese. And, there was a strong tendency among the Chinese to rally the support from among the non-SI Indonesians that the SI camp had to face their fellow Indonesians.

We have mentioned the successful SDI boycott against the Chinese which turned into riots in Surakarta and Surabaya in August, 1912. This success seems to have an important impetus for the SI in launching their cooperative economic program. This was undertaken by collecting capital from its members and establishing shops in various places. With the rise of such cooperative programs, the Chinese small traders suffered a decrease in their customers. As a result many Chinese felt resentful. Early in 1913, anti-Chinese riots broke out in Semarang. According to the government's reports on the origins of the disturbances, it was the Chinese who provoked the Muslims. It is said that a Chinese named Lien Mo Sing, who had lost many of his customers because of competition from the SI cooperative shops, frequently threw a piece of pork into the *langgar* or Muslim prayer house. Furthermore, some Chinese people seemed intentionally create excessive noise by beating tins at the front of the *langgar* during the prayer times. It is therefore not surprising that anti-Chinese riots soon broke out and lasted for several days. It is reported that one Chinese man was killed and several others wounded.⁴⁷

Regarding economic causes, the riots may also have occurred because of disputes over prices. In the middle of 1913, it was reported that riots broke out in Pamanukan, East Java, following a dispute between a Chinese shop owner and a group of *santris*. The latter then attacked the stores of the Chinese and as a result some of them were detained by the police. Shortly afterwards, a large number of SI members marched to the police station and demanded the release of the *santris*, threatening that all Chinese in the area would be killed if this did not happen. The angry mob seem to have been serious in their demands; they also threatened the district head and attacked his policemen. Disturbances also occurred in Tuban, East Java, where a Chinese man used the village head to force his striking workers to return to their work with a Chinese

⁴⁷Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, p. 163; The following accounts of the anti-Chinese riots are largely based on Kartodirdjo's chapter on "The Local Sarekat Islam Movements", in *ibid.*, pp. 142-85.

man who paid them very low wages. The local branch of the SI become involved, attacking the village head for his collaboration with the Chinese.⁴⁸ Disturbances originating in wage disputes also occurred in Cakung, Bekasi (West Java) in December, 1913. The natives refused to work in the rice-fields owned by Chinese landlords because of low wages and instead moved to work for Indonesian rice-field owners. The Chinese therefore asked a non-SI leader to recruit women to work for them. This angered the SI members, and on 14 November, 1913 they blocked roads in order to prevent the women from working in the fields. A number of police officers was sent to trouble spot in order to prevent riots. In the evening the *bedug* (mosque drum) was beaten as a signal for SI members to rally and attack the Chinese and their native collaborators.⁴⁹

Tangerang, the largest Chinese settlement in West Java, also became a location of anti-Chinese riots in the early years of this century. In May 1912 disturbances broke out in Tegal Kunir after a native was beaten by a Chinese man for failing to pay the rice that he had bought. During relatively wide-scale riots following this incident, at least one Chinese and twenty natives were arrested. Though the riots were finally quelled by the police, tension remained high. Many natives quit their jobs in Chinese-owned rice-fields and many Chinese did not dare to go to other places. In May 1913, riots broke out in Pasir Gadung, a center of gambling organized by some Chinese and a Eurasian. The Muslim population was very unhappy about this gambling center. On May 23, 18 SI members, accompanied by some police agents, marched to the gambling center in order to arrest the gamblers. Soon people from neighboring villages flocked to join them and the police lost control of an explosive situation. Riots followed, during which 6 Chinese and 3 SI members were wounded, and 16 people were arrested.⁵⁰ Communal relations continued to deteriorate during the period of 1913 to 1915. According to official reports, there were a considerable number of clashes between the natives and the Chinese.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 164-5.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 172.

Undoubtedly, Tangerang was one of the most troubled areas during the years of 1912-1915. One of the most serious incidents was an attack against a group of Chinese by about 500 SI members.⁵¹

In many cases it can be seen that riots broke out not just because of disputes in matters relating to trade or wages but also because of Chinese ill-treatment of the natives. With their relatively high position compared to the natives during the colonial order, and along with the rise of their group consciousness, the Chinese increasingly tended to treat the indigenous people in the same manner as the Europeans. For example, early in 1993, in the Chinese Malay newspaper *Djawa Tengah* there was a discussion about the adoption of Javanese children by the Chinese people. The newspaper asserted that Chinese people committed a crime by mixing with children of a "low race". Naturally Indonesians were irritated by such racial arrogance from the Chinese.⁵² This kind of attitude from the Chinese often triggered riots. Another example occurred in Bulu, East Java, in October 1913. It was reported that a Chinese man badly mistreated a native woman. Insulted by that ill-treatment, SI members assembled in front of the house of this man and threw stones at it.⁵³

It is apparent that during these years deep hostility and anger had developed every where—but especially in Java—between the natives and the Chinese. Given this explosive communal situation, it is not surprising that trivial matters easily led to violent clashes. In September 1914, disturbances broke out in Cirebon following a traffic collision between a Chinese man and members of the SI. It is reported that after the collision two Chinese man came to fetchede and challenged to a fight. Many SI members and a large crowd launched a counter attack against the Chinese; their quarters were burned down to the ground, their possessions were looted and many of them had to take refuge elsewhere. In his report the Resident of Cirebon accused Haji Muhammad Umar, the branch leader of the SI, of having organized the attack on the Chinese

⁵¹*Ibid.*, pp. 163-4.

⁵²Giap, "Group Conflict II", *op. cit.*, p. 200.

⁵³Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

quarter. Whether or not Umar organized the attack, rumors about the Chinese challenge to the natives had already spread out throughout Cirebon; the natives seemed to feel obliged to meet that challenge and to teach the Chinese a lesson.⁵⁴

The period of 1913 to 1915 was perhaps one of the worst periods of anti-Chinese disturbances in Indonesian history. Riots broke out in almost every large cities in Java, including Surakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, Cirebon, Batavia, Tangerang and Bekasi. Many villages also became the scenes of what official reports called "Chinese-Javanese clashes". The gravity of the situation can be gauged from the significant amount of spaces given to reports and discussion of the so-called "communal riots" in the leading newspapers of the time. It seems that communal conflicts became a recurring feature in various parts of Java during this period. However, the sources do not indicate the exact number of killed and injured nor the material loss resulting from these disturbances. By the end of 1915 the wave of anti-Chinese riots had almost died down. However, smouldering embers of hostility remained a latent source of potential outbursts.

As far as native-Chinese relations were concerned, the period between the end of 1915 and 1917 was relatively calm. There were, however, occasional minor incidents such as a conflict in Punggursugih, Central Java in June, 1916. This conflict originated from Chinese man's refusal to pay for using the village road for his transportation enterprise. His refusal angered the local SI leader who, accompanied by about 30 SI members, blocked the road. A riot broke out when this group attacked the village officials and police who tried to persuade them to open the road for public transportation.⁵⁵

A major outburst of anti-Chinese riots occurred in Kudus, Central Java at the end of October, 1918.⁵⁶ Kudus was (and still is)

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 166.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 172.

⁵⁶For a more complete account of the Kudus riots, see, The Siaw Giap, "Group Conflict in Plural Society", (henceforth "Group Conflict I"), *Revue du sud-est asiatique* 1 (1966), pp. 20-31. Cf. Suryadinata, *Pribumi*, pp. 15-6.

one of the major centres of the *kretek* industry. This industry was traditionally dominated by the Javanese. In early 1910 the Chinese began to enter this lucrative industry and, under the leadership of the local SI, the Javanese exerted concerted efforts to halt their entry. However the native cooperative trade went bankrupt and this was attributed to unfair Chinese business practices. It is also reported that the Chinese entry into the *kretek* industry was followed by a rise in serious abuses of Javanese laborers working in the Chinese-owned factory. The trigger behind the riots was the Chinese processions in Kudus held for four days on 24, 26, 28 and 30 October, 1918. In one of these processions, some Chinese wore the familiar *haji* garb and they were circled by several women. As one may expect, this was considered offensive by the Muslims. In addition, a Chinese man, the escort of the processions, hit an Indonesian cart driver because he considered this driver to be disturbing the processions. The native watching crowd became agitated and a fight broke out. The *bedug* (mosque drum) was then beaten in order to warn people that something out of ordinary was happening. The 30th October riots could only be controlled by the police after the procession was disbanded and the crowd dispersed.

News about the incidents, however, spread to the villages surrounding Kudus. It seemed that riots would resume. In order to prevent this and to maintain order, the Dutch controller convened a meeting the following morning with the SI local leaders and asked them to urge the masses to remain calm. It is reported that the SI leaders agreed to meet the wishes of the officials provided that in future Chinese processions there would be no further displays which were offensive to the Muslim population. They also requested that there be no processions during the times of Muslim prayers and that the government officials should remove any guns and pistols from the Chinese. Despite the promise which the officials had conveyed to the groups involved, the situation became worse. On the very evening of the same day large-scale riots broke out throughout Kudus, and the police could no longer control the situation. Houses of the Chinese were ransacked, looted and burned down; and the city became a scene of lawlessness all night. At least 8 Chinese and Indonesian people were killed, 24 were wounded, 43 houses were burned to the ground, and almost 2,000 Chinese fled to Semarang, and 5 local leaders and 21 ordinary

members of the SI were arrested.⁵⁷

The Kudus riots were some of the worst anti-Chinese incidents in Indonesian history. Each side blamed the other for the riots. Suryopranoto, a leader of the Central SI, issued a report presenting the SI view of indigenous and local Chinese relations. He asserted that the SI was not involved in the riots and claimed that they were a result of insulting Chinese behavior prior to the disturbances.⁵⁸ Semaun, the leftist leader of the SI, telegraphed Cokroaminoto, chairman of the Central SI, to state that Suryopranoto's report was correct. In his opinion, it was the Chinese were to blame. He said that the presence of Dutch troops and the arrest of the SI leaders in Kudus were aimed at discrediting the SI and encouraging what he called "the exploiters" (Chinese). He suggested that Cokroaminoto propose a motion in the *volksraad* (the people's council) that the government should withdraw its troops and leave the Chinese alone. Semaun later analyzed the situation, revealing the extent of ethnic tension in colonial Indonesia:

"Nowadays the life of the natives is worsening, they feel that they are getting poorer but they can see for themselves that other people (*bangsa*), [particularly] the Chinese are getting richer. [The Chinese] show off their wealth and contrast it with the poverty of the natives.

The contrast between the poverty of the natives and the wealth of other people has caused the hatred of these natives towards the rich, of whom a large number are Chinese. The hatred of the poor natives towards their rich fellow natives has disappeared because they belong to the same race and same religion. What is left is only their hatred towards the rich Dutch and the rich Chinese. Their hatred towards the Dutch is drowned because the Dutch are the rulers and they are strong, but the hatred towards the rich Chinese has no counter balance..."⁵⁹

The same view was also voiced by Abdul Muis, another SI leader, at a rally in Batavia. He criticized the government for using the Kudus incident to discredit the SI. He asserted that the occurrence of the Kudus incident was due to the existence of

⁵⁷Giap, "Group Conflict I", *op. cit.*, pp. 25-30.

⁵⁸Suryadinata, *Pribumi*, p. 11.

⁵⁹This statement was originally published in the *Oetoesan Hindia*. It is cited in "Peroesoehan di Koedoes dan Hal-hal jang Berhoeboengan dengan Itoe", *Sin Po* (15 November, 1918). The English translation is provided in Suryadinata, *Peranakan*, p. 123; Cf. Suryadinata, *Pribumi*, pp. 16-7.

different economic status between the two races (*bangsa*) in Kudus. The indigenous population (*bumiputera*) generally did not hate the local Chinese as evidenced by the numbers of Chinese living among the indigenous population in rural areas. In Muis' view, the Kudus incident was just an example of how violent and cruel the oppressed people could be when they considered of the situation.⁶⁰

The above statements of the SI leaders were soon answered by the Chinese leaders through a series of articles in the *Sin Po*. They accused Semaun and other SI leaders of committing libel and using all kind of excuses to defend what they called "the uncivilized acts" of the natives. In their view, it was the natives who initiated the riots, and it was the indigenous leaders involved in the incident who slandered and insulted the Chinese. In these articles, Chinese leaders furthermore cast the blame on the SI leaders' failure to control the direction of the SI and they stated that there were few indigenous leaders who were courageous enough to take responsibility as leaders. According to the *Sin Po*, the Kudus incident should be used by the indigenous leaders as a constant reminder in their future actions.⁶¹

This kind of Chinese reaction to such disturbances was not unusual. During the height of the anti-Chinese riots in the years of 1912 to 1915 the Chinese were determined to defend their group as a whole and put all the blame upon the indigenous population. The determination of the Chinese and the intensity of the passions aroused, can be judged from inflammatory comments and storms of protest which appeared in the Chinese daily newspapers of the time. The Chinese also took various forms of retaliatory action, particularly in the economic field. It is reported that after the riots in Surabaya, the Chinese closed their shops for a few days as a protest against what they viewed as brutality from the natives.⁶² In Temanggung and some other places, they refused to lend money or

⁶⁰Suryadinata, *Pribumi*, *loc. cit.*

⁶¹An article on the Chinese response to the statements of Semaun and other Central SI leaders is in Suryadinata (ed.), *Political Thinking of the Indonesians Chinese, 1900-1977* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979), pp. 10-6.

⁶²Giap, "Group Conflict II", p. 202.

to give advance payments to SI members.⁶³ They also founded a kind of secret organization, known as *Kong Ji Hin*, in order to counter the SI threat. *Kong Ji Hin* admitted non-SI members and was secretly supported by certain government officials who were opposed to the SI.⁶⁴

In most cases of the disturbances in which the local SI leaders and their members were involved, the Central SI leaders were not held responsible by the Dutch government. The Central SI leaders consistently asserted that it was very difficult for them to control events at the branch level of the organization. They were insistent that the SI's political goals were not incompatible with loyalty to the colonial government, and that they would not allow the use of violent means to achieve these goals. It is perhaps because of these statements that the government could not take repressive measures against the Central SI leadership regarding the anti-Chinese riots. However, the Dutch government applied stern measures against the local SI leaders and members who were directly involved in such disturbances.

The anti-Chinese riots that occurred in Indonesia during the second decade of the twentieth century were complex. They were caused by the cumulation of a series of factors—economic hostility, growing national consciousness among the Chinese and the natives, ethnic prejudices, religious revivalism, and so on. Therefore, the anti-Chinese agitation cannot be simply identified as a purely racial movement aimed at the elimination of the Chinese from their position as a dominant economic or ethnically distinct group. In fact what happened was that during the period of the riots genuine economic conflict became complexly entangled with political, religious and racial conflicts. Given the situation of rapid social change and increased poverty among the natives, it could be expected that civil disturbances could occur at any time.

The rise of the SI coincided with these complex developments,

⁶³Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 176-7.

and its existence was also a reflection of the crystallization of various expectations among the natives. For the general population, it soon became the vehicle for the expression of their grievances and resentment towards the colonial order. The anti-Chinese disturbances which were often led by groups of SI members though not launched in the name of the SI, generally had little to do with the wider objectives of the SI as envisaged by its central leaders. In a situation of endemic social unrest, the SI simply became an all-embracing organization for the discontented sections of the native population. And its branches, spread throughout the archipelago, proved capable of serving as an outlet for all kinds of grievances.

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ستوديا اسلاميكا

مجلة أندونيسية للدراسات الاسلامية
السنة : ١ ، العدد : ١ (ابريل-يونيو) ١٩٩٤ م

هيئة الاشراف على التحرير:

عبدالعزیز دحلان
محمد ساتريا افندي
قمرالدين هدايات
مسطوحوه

واهب معطى
هارون ناسوتيون
مسلم ناسوتيون
محمد قريش شهاب
دين شمس الدين

محمد يونان يوسف

رئيس التحرير:

ازيوماردي ازرا

المحررون:

نور الفجر
يوهان هيندريك موليمان
سيقول مزانى
هيندرو براسيتير
بدري يتيم

سكرتير التحرير:

عارف سبحان

مخلص عين الرفيق

تصميم الغلاف:

س. برينكا
على اكبر

ستوديا اسلاميكا (ISSN : ٠٢١٥-٤٩٢) مجلة دورية تصدر اربع مرات فى العام عن جامعة شريف هداية الله الاسلامية الحكومية جاكرتا (STT/DEPPEN No. 129/DITJEN/PPG/STT/1976) برعاية وزارة الشؤون الدينية بجمهورية اندونيسيا ، وتخصص للدراسات الاسلامية فى اندونيسيا ، بقصد التبليغ عن نتائج البحوث والمقالات التى تبحث فى القضايا الاخيرة المتعلقة بالموضوع . وتدعو المجلة العلماء والمثقفين الى ان يبعثوا اليها مقالاتهم العلمية التى تتعلق برسالة المجلة .

تصدر المجلة بجاكرتا ، اندونيسيا .

عنوان المراسلات : ستوديا اسلاميكا ، جامعة شريف هداية الله الاسلامية الحكومية بجاكرتا ، شارع جواندا رقم ٩٥ ، تشيوتات ، جاكرتا الجنوبية ، الرمز البريدى ١٥٤١٢ ، الهاتف : ٠٠٢٧٧٩٣٠٠١ . بنك نيجارا اندونيسيا ١٩٤٦ كبايوران بارو/جامعة شريف هداية الله الاسلامية الحكومية ، جاكرتا قيمة الاشتراك السنوى فى اندونيسيا : لسنة واحدة (٤ اعداد) : ٤٠٠٠ روبية (٢٠ دولارا امريكيا) ، لسنتين (٨ اعداد) : ٧٠٠٠ روبية (٣٥ دولارا امريكيا) ، قيمة العدد الواحد : ١٠٠٠ روبية (٥ دولارات امريكيا) وتسدد القيمة مقدما . وفى البلدان الاخرى يضاف الى قيمة العدد مبلغ ٤٠٠ روبية (دولاران امريكيا) للارسال بالبريد العادى . اما الارسال بوسائل خاصة فيرجى قبل ذلك الاتصال بالمجلة .