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THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN INDONESIAN AND ALGERIAN HISTORY:
A Comparative Analysis

Johan H. Meuleman

GUARDING THE FAITH OF THE *UMMAH*:
Religio-Intellectual Journey of Mohammad Rasjidi

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Johan H. Meuleman

The Role of Islam in Indonesian and Algerian History *A Comparative Analysis*

Abstraksi: *Dalam artikel ini penulis mengemukakan sejumlah catatan perbandingan tentang peran agama Islam dalam sejarah dua negeri: Aljazair di daerah Maghrib dan Indonesia pada ujung tenggara wilayah penyebaran agama Islam.*

Penulis menjelaskan bahwa dalam pelbagai periode, Islam memainkan peran yang sangat penting dalam sejarah dua negeri tersebut. Periode yang dibahas secara khusus adalah masa menjelang kedatangan Islam —yang diuraikan untuk menjelaskan keadaan yang melatarbelakangi kedatangan agama baru itu—, kemudian proses Islamisasi, peran Islam dalam perlawanan terhadap penjajahan, dan akhirnya kedudukan Islam dalam negara merdeka pasca-penjajahan.

Artikel ini juga menguraikan secara khusus peranan Islam dalam pembentukan negara dan peranan tasawwuf *di kedua daerah yang bersangkutan. Pada beberapa kesempatan penulis menggarisbawahi pentingnya pemahaman aspek ekonomi, budaya, sosial, dan politik dalam melihat peran agama Islam di kedua negeri. Penulis juga mencatat beberapa kesamaan antara kedua negeri, di samping juga beberapa karakter yang berbeda di antara keduanya. Perbedaan ini seringkali dapat dikaitkan dengan perbedaan keadaan antara kedua daerah yang sudah muncul pada awal proses Islamisasi.*

جوهان هـ . ميوليمان

ملخص

تختلف صورة الاسلام فى كل من اندونيسيا و الجزائر وتتشابه فى نفس الوقت . كان وضع البلدين فى عصر ما قبل الاسلام وضعا متباينا . فاندونيسيا كانت تشكل مجتمعا يمتلك حضارة وثقافة راقيتين ، فقيام مملكتى سريويجايا وماجاباهيت يدل على ما تتمتع به البلاد من استقرار فى بنيانه الاجتماعى والسياسى فجاءت اسلمة اندونيسيا عن طريق تفاعلات متدرجة بين العناصر الموجودة والقيم الجديدة التى اتى بها الاسلام . اما الجزائر فقد كانت قبل الاسلام عبارة عن مجتمع هامشى تحكمه قوى اجنبية متواصلة بدءا من سيطرة الرومان تلتها سيطرة الوندالين ثم اخيرا سيطرة البيزنطيين وظل الاستعمار جاثما على الجزائر حتى وصول المد الاسلامى .

هناك روايتان تاريخيتان حول اسلمة الجزائر ، فالرواية الاولى تقول ان سكان البلاد الاصليين وهم البربر حاولوا صد القوى الاسلامية ومقاومتها بينما تؤكد الرواية الاخرى ان اهالى البلاد استقبلوا الاسلام مستبشرين لاعتقادهم انه جاء لتحريرهم . على اننا يمكن ان نستخلص من كلا الروايتين ان اسلمة الجزائر ترتبط بوجود احتلال من قوات خارجية .

وبالرغم من ذلك فان الاسلام فى كلا البلدين لعب دورا مهيمنا فى ارساء دولة حديثة وفى تحويل نظام الدولة ، بل اننا حتى الآن نرى تأثير ذلك الدور المميز فى الوضع السياسى فى كلا البلدين .

One of the most fruitful approaches in the study of the history of Islam is a comparison between different regions. Because of my particular experience first in Algeria, then in Indonesia, in the present article I shall try to indicate some important aspects of the role of Islam in the history of these two countries, from a comparative point of view. I would like to make clear in advance that it is not my ambition nor my aim to present some kind of short and contrastive formulation of "Indonesian Islam" on the one hand and "Algerian Islam" on the other. That is to say that I am not following the example of Clifford Geertz's comparative study of Islam in Indonesia and Morocco, a neighboring country of Algeria which has much in common with it. Geertz defines Indonesian Islam as "illuminationism" and Moroccan Islam as "maraboutism" — at least in their classical styles.[1] I would rather stress that, apart from many differences, Islam in Indonesia and Algeria, in fact, have much in common and the differences that exist are not always straight forward oppositions. The more so if, in contradistinction to Geertz and Nikki R. Keddie (who has undertaken a similar comparative study on Islam and society in the Middle East and in Minangkabau, West Sumatra)[2], I am not going to compare Islam in two different regions, but rather the role of Islam in Indonesian and in Algerian history. We shall trace this role at several consecutive periods.

The Situation in Both Regions on the Eve of the Coming of Islam

The situation in the regions which are nowadays known as Indonesia and Algeria, just before the arrival of Islam, differed greatly from several view points. The Indonesian archipelago is known as a region which had already given birth to a number of powerful states with well-developed institutional structures. The strongest among them and those that had the widest influence were Srivijaya and later Majapahit.[3] What is more, the Indonesian Archipelago was known as a place of old and high civilization, although its form and refinement obviously were not the same for all regions and population groups. In addition, the widespread Buddhist and Hindu religions had already taken root and existed alongside a number of older forms of belief, such as traditional

Javanese mysticism. From an economic point of view, the majority of the inhabitants lived from agriculture, but the archipelago was also situated on one of the most important international trade routes, namely between East Asia on one side and South Asia and the region which would later be known as the Middle East on the other side. This international maritime trade is often mentioned as one of the primary factors of the Islamization of the archipelago.

North Africa, on the other hand, since the middle of the second century before Jesus Christ, had been commanded by a number of foreign states: the Roman Republic occupied a limited territory around the former city of Carthago and the Roman Empire expanded its power to a territory which extended approximately 200 km from the Mediterranean southwards and stretched westwards to the Atlantic shore; next the Vandals and finally Byzantium succeeded in conquering a zone limited to the territory of the present Tunisia and northeast Algeria. The states of Numidia and Mauritania, which had previously played a particularly prominent role in the region, were over. The indigenous population, i.e. the Berbers, lived partly as vanquished subjects within the zone occupied by these foreign powers. The Berber population living outside the zone of Roman, Vandal and Byzantine power, did not have well-structured state institutions with a clearly defined center of government and territory, but followed a tribal mode of life. Sometimes a number of tribes united to form a tribal confederation, especially in order to oppose foreign conquerors, but they had no state structure such as that which existed at the same period in part of Europe or the Indonesian Archipelago, for example.[4]

Not only from the viewpoint of state structure, but also from that of civilization, the western part of North Africa occupied a marginal position during that period. Geertz writes that "[i]n Indonesia Islam did not construct a civilization, it appropriated one" and he contrasts this situation with what happened in Morocco.[5] Although here again Geertz tends to stress dissimilarities in too schematic a manner, his last mentioned comparison fairly accurately describes the (relative) difference between Indonesia on one hand and the Maghrib in general on the other hand. In western North Africa Islam did not find any of the refined culture that it encountered in at least some parts and within some social groups of

the Indonesian archipelago. This is not to say however, that in this latter region Islam only appropriated a civilization, without contributing anything. We shall see later that such was not the case.

In the domain of religion, too, one might say that the western part of North Africa occupied a rather marginal position. Many indigenous inhabitants had already adopted Christianity, but often their Christian faith developed into unorthodox sects, such as Donatism in the fourth century of the Christian era and Arianism, which was brought by the Vandals. In general, these sects had the character of protest movements against the established forces of church, state and landowners, in which religious motives combined with social, economic and political ones. Beside the Christian religion, and much earlier, Judaism also spread in North Africa. The history of the Jewish inhabitants of North Africa is full of legends which do not withstand serious scientific research. The most famous legend is that of Kahinah, who is said to have been a Jewish queen from the Aurès region, in contemporary eastern Algeria, who played an important role in the opposition to the Arab invasion at the end of the 7th century of the Christian era. Setting aside all kinds of legends, historians assume that the first group of Jewish inhabitants entered North Africa as part of the Phoenician expansion and therefore settled in the vicinity of Carthago from the seventh century before the Christian era. The Jewish emigration to North Africa was stimulated again by the Babylonian occupation of Palestine in 587 BC and the opening of connections between Palestine and western North Africa through Egypt and the Cyrenaica. The Roman occupation of Jerusalem in CD 70 aroused another wave of Jewish emigration to North Africa. There were even indigenous inhabitants of North Africa who embraced the Jewish religion.[6] Besides the Christian and Jewish religions, part of the population still held older forms of belief, in particular in the area which had not been conquered by the Romans.

Also from an economic point of view, western North Africa had not reached a high stage of development. Most inhabitants earned their living from agriculture or pastoralism and pastoralism existed in nomadic, sedentary and several intermediate forms. Although this region was called the "Granary of Rome", as a result

of Roman exploitation this name no longer conformed to the reality of the situation on the eve of the arrival of Islam.[7]

The Islamization Process

Our knowledge of the Islamization process in the present Indonesia and Algeria is very deficient. The available sources of material concerning the first stages of the process are limited and the theories and interpretations of different researchers and authors vary a great deal and at times even contradict each other. Nevertheless, one cannot deny one fact, namely that in the Indonesian Archipelago Islam did not spread through foreign occupation as it did in North Africa.

Many authors emphasize the role of international trade as the main factor or at least an important one in the Islamization process of the archipelago and several other parts of Southeast and East Asia. It seems that in fact the role of international trade cannot be denied. However, many details concerning this role are still debated. A first point of discussion is which region and people did the merchants who brought the Islamic religion come from?[8] Were they Arabs who came directly from the Arabic peninsula[9], Arabs from India[10], or non-Arabs from India, and from which part of India[11]? Did Chinese Muslims play a role in the Islamization of the archipelago?[12] Another question is whether it was these traders themselves who spread the new religion or a group of specialized preachers accompanying them on their ships.[13] Furthermore, what exactly was the status and role of these foreign merchants in the society of the archipelago? Another question which has not been sufficiently answered to this day is why the process of Islamization only took on larger proportions from about the 13th century of the Christian era, whereas contacts with foreign Muslim traders already existed from the beginning of Islam.[14] Another interesting question is by what factor and for what reason the indigenous population —considering all their separate categories— adopted the new religion brought by these foreigners? Was it purely for reasons of conviction or was it by factors of social intercourse, for example through marriage, for economic reasons, or maybe political ones?[15] It is very probable that for all these questions there is no one,

exclusive right answer: what often happened was a combination of several of the mentioned possibilities.

We should adopt the same approach when trying to settle the controversy between those authors who indicate international trade as the main factor of Islamization in the archipelago and those who mention other factors, such as the spread of Islamic mysticism, especially in the form of mystical orders, and education.[16] All these factors played a role. However, in order to develop a balanced judgment on the different factors of Islamization, one should distinguish between the different stages and aspects of this process, the different social categories concerned and maybe also different regions.

One other, very interesting aspect of the Islamization process in the Indonesian Archipelago should be referred to. I have already argued above that this process did not take place through foreign occupation. However, one often hears the theory which goes further, stating that the Islamization of the archipelago was a wholly peaceful process.[17] In my opinion, this is an exaggeration. In certain cases, violence was involved in the process. There are some cases of rulers and states who attacked their rivals within the framework of the spread of the new religion. As examples one can refer to the war in Java of the sultanate of Demak against the remainder of Majapahit (in the years prior to around CE 1527), in West Java the sultanate of Banten against the state of Pajajaran (in the 1570s of the Christian era) and the twin state Gowa-Tallo against its neighboring states in South Sulawesi (CE 1608-1611). In all these conflicts religious motives existed alongside other motives and factors. Nevertheless, compared with the Middle East and North Africa, the spread of Islam in the Indonesian Archipelago was much more peaceful and did not involve any conquest by a power from outside the region.

If we return to the main topic, that is the role of Islam at the beginning of the Islamization process in the archipelago, we can add that, apart from its purely spiritual aspects, Islam opened increasingly wide regions and groups of inhabitants of the archipelago to a new, vast world, which was tied together through the various links of commerce, mysticism, education, science and art. This process of opening-up to new horizons is more accurately

described as a gradual process of interaction and synthesis, rather than as the eradication of the preceding civilization.

Our knowledge about the first stage of the Islamization process in the Maghrib is very limited. All documentary sources available on this period emanate from Sunnite circles from the Mashriq, who approach this process from the perspective of the extension of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphate, and do not fully understand or appreciate the social structure, religious visions and interests of the local (Berber) population.[18] Besides the lack of information and bias which characterized most classical Muslim historians on this subject, our understanding of the first stage of the Islamization process in the Maghrib is further impeded by the existence of two very contrasting visions in more recent historiography. On one side we have French colonial historiography, which emphasizes the fierce resistance of the Berber population against Islam. On the other hand, what can be called "Islamic" historiography accentuates the local population's warm welcome of the Muslim "liberation army".[19] The strong ideological bias of both historiographical traditions and the procedure, which both have in common, are at the basis of their two rather inadequate versions.[20]

However, what can be established is that the spread of Islam to the western part of North Africa —henceforth known as the Maghrib— can be characterized as a process of foreign conquest, in contradistinction to the Islamization of the Indonesian Archipelago. The Arab expansion in North Africa did not meet any significant resistance from Byzantium, but the reaction from the Berber population was very different, especially amongst the sedentary groups. They were only subjugated after several violent battles.[21] Afterwards, the Berber population was really treated as a defeated enemy. They were given the status of *mawâlî*, had to pay *jizyah* and *kharaj*, and some of them were even made slaves.[22] With the exception of `Umar b. `Abd al `Azîz, the Islamization of the local population was not a matter of prime concern to the Arab caliphs.[23] This attitude induced resistance and even a number of revolts, of which the largest one was the great Berber revolt of 122 AH (CE 739/740).[24]

It is interesting to note that the Islamic religion played a particular role within this resistance, namely as the source of the principles which inspired and justified it. Of special importance in

this respect were several religious movements which —in Sunnite circles— were considered to be rather unorthodox, i.e. which held views different to Sunnite ones especially concerning the qualifications for leadership and membership of the Islamic community. The movements in question were different forms of Kharijism and finally Isma`îlî Shi`ah. It was a group of Ibadite Kharijites who in the 770s of the common era founded the Rustamid state, with its center in the present central Algeria. At the end of the ninth century CE, the foundations of the Fatimid state, which was to play such an important role in the Middle East, were laid in the region currently known as Eastern Algeria. The role of religion, in particular in some "less orthodox" forms, in a series of conflicts which had political, social and economic aspects as well, reminds us of similar phenomena during the Christian period of Western North Africa.

Islam and State Formation

In both the regions which are the object of our investigation, Islam played an important role in the formation of new states or the transformation of existing states.

As for Southeast Asia in general and Indonesia in particular, Taufik Abdullah distinguishes three types in the relations between the Islamic religion and the state during the Islamization process. The first model is represented by the small states of Samudra, Pasai and finally the larger Aceh Darussalam, the three consecutive Muslim states formed in the northern part of Sumatra, starting from the late 13th century of the Christian era, and also by the state of Banten in West Java, which developed from about 1525.[25] The creation of these states was directly related to the arrival of Islam. In the second type, Islamization started by the conversion of the existing ruler. An example is the twin state of Gowa-Tallo in South Sulawesi, whose ruler converted to Islam around 1605. In both cases, the role of the rulers and their state apparatus was important in the further progress of the Islamization process of their communities. The third model is characterized by the development of Islamic institutions and leading figures as rivals of the established state. Taufik Abdullah indicates that this became

the main model of the relations between the state and Islam in Java.[26]

Earlier we noted that, from the point of view of state structure, the situations in western North Africa and in the Indonesian Archipelago differed widely. Except for the small part that was ruled by Byzantium, in western North Africa there was no state of significance, in the sense of a government structure with a defined territory, a fixed government center and a number of administrative institutions. The tribal structure formed the basis of organization of the indigenous population. The relationships between several persons, especially on the basis of real or imaginary kinship, was more important than the relationships between particular people and particular territory. The number of tribes was considerable and even their cooperation in the form of a tribal confederation did not lead to state formation. A supplementary complicating factor, from the viewpoint of state formation, was that a large part of the indigenous population was nomadic or semi-nomadic.

One of the most important effects of the Islamization in the Maghrib was the formation of a number of states within the above-mentioned meaning of the word, with an urban government center. Amongst the three present states of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, the process of state formation was the earliest and simplest in Tunisia, where a stronger tradition of urban government existed from pre-Islamic times, whereas in Algeria and Morocco the process was slower and more complicated.[27] Especially in the two last-mentioned territories, that make up by far the largest part of the region, the Maghrib was generally characterized by division and instability. Ibn Khaldûn has offered the most well-known description of this situation.[28] One of the reasons for this phenomenon was the attitude of the Arab conquerors towards the Berber population, as described earlier.

The Role of Islamic Mysticism

Whereas other factors were more pronounced during the first stage of the Islamization process, notably commerce in the Indonesian Archipelago and conquest in Algeria, in both of these regions Islamic mysticism played a prominent role in the

strengthening of the position of Islam in the state and its extension to wider circles of the population. Firstly, Islamic mysticism became a factor in the formation and mode of functioning of the state. Secondly, mysticism contributed in several ways to the development of social and economic life. Finally, in both regions it played a particular role in the resistance to European colonization, which is discussed below.

In the Indonesian Archipelago, at the very least Islamic mysticism influenced state ideology and the government system. In some states the *`ulamâ'*, who were often influenced by various mystical orders, were attributed a prominent position at the center of government, as advisors to the sultans and other rulers, among other positions. The most famous example is that of the sultanate Aceh, where the *`ulamâ'* were considered to be the authorities who had to guide the sultans and legitimate their power.[29] Later, this institution was even laid down in the *Adat Aceh*, an 18th century exposition of the principles and rules underlying the Acehnese state.[30] A very particular case —a unique one as far as I am aware— is that of the sultanate Buton, in Southeast Sulawesi. There a governmental system was conceived as the embodiment of the doctrine of the *martabat tujuh*, the seven stages, as taught in *al Tuhfat al mursalah ilâ rûh al nabî* by Muhammad b. Fadl Allâh al Burhânpûrî, who was born in the Gujarat in 1545 and died in Burhanpur in 1620.[31] This doctrine was closely related to the doctrines of *tajallin* and *wahdat al wujûd*.[32] This governmental system, which was developed in the first quarter of the 17th century and was maintained, with few variations, until the death of the last sultan in 1960, related the three lineages of the local aristocracy, and the four leading public offices which were reserved to them, to the "seven stages" of al Burhânpûrî's mystical system, from the highest level i.e. that of *ahadiyyah*, to the lowest one, *`âlam al insân*.[33]

Apart from its influence on the state, Islamic mysticism also colored and stimulated the Islamization of wider circles of the population in the Indonesian Archipelago. In this process the mystical orders in particular played a fundamental role. Through these worldwide organizations, large groups of the population were not only familiarized with the new religion, but they also became part of huge international networks. It was often through the same

networks that religious sciences were transmitted from the core region of Islam to the archipelago —and to a lesser degree the other way round.[34] In this respect one should note however, that, as Martin van Bruinessen writes, the available evidence suggests that before the 18th century the adherence to mystical orders remained largely restricted to court circles.[35]

In the Maghrib, Islamic mysticism also played an important role in the intensification of the Islamization process. Partly due to a lack of detailed knowledge and partly because of the uniformity of the whole region in this respect, we shall here mainly discuss the Maghrib as a totality. In this region the most salient manifestation of mysticism was what is known as "maraboutism". Up to the present no certainty or agreement has been reached by the specialists concerning the origin and development of maraboutism. Apparently, it originates from the combination of three elements: pre-Islamic beliefs in local figures who are thought to have possessed supernatural power, the stationing of defensive troops in the border region of the Islamic territory (the border stations were known as *ribât* and their occupants *murâbit*, the origin of the words "marabout" and "maraboutism") and, finally, Islamic mysticism including its organization in orders. Ahmed Nadir assumes that the expulsion of the Muslim elite from the Iberian peninsula was another important factor in the development of maraboutism. He explains that the marabouts played a primary role not only in the intensification of the Islamization of the rural population in the Maghrib, but also in their education and development in several domains of life.[36]

Part of the marabouts took up positions as government officials or military leaders, in particular in Morocco.[37] The development of the Almoravid state, aside from its name, possibly represents some characteristics of this type of maraboutism. However, one of the sources of tension within that state was in fact the conflict between the *fuqahâ'* with their narrow, legalistic and dogmatic understanding of Islam, and the sufis who understood Islam in mystical ways and had their basis in several *ribâts* —to be distinguished from the particular *ribât* which had been the base of the Almoravid movement at an early stage in its development.[38]

In general, the marabouts kept aloof from the government centers and rather concentrated their activities on countryside.

Nadir writes that their main function, of extreme importance for the development of Islam in the Maghrib, consisted in the Islamization of the mass of the rural population, which up to then had not been touched by Islam except in a superficial way. In this connection, they played in important role, at the some time, the cultural field —by spreading religious science, the economic— by clearing new land for agriculture and animal husbandry; and in the social field. They fiercely combated slavery, constituted several "maraboutic tribes" and, in this way, developed social stability and the feeling of belonging to a specific region rather than to a common ancestor. In Algeria there were numerous marabouts in those rural zones which lay outside the sphere of influence of established authorities.[39]

Islam and the Resistance to Colonial Occupation

In both of the compared regions, Islam played an important role in the struggle against colonization —Dutch in the Indonesian Archipelago and French in Algeria. Because the situation was different in each region, the role of Islam in the resistance against the foreign intruder also differed.

In the Indonesian Archipelago, Islam was the religion of the majority of the indigenous population but not all of them. This is why Islam became an important factor in the resistance to foreign power and exploitation but, for the archipelago as a whole, did not become a principle of radical distinction between the colonizing and the indigenous population.

However, in order to develop this question, certain regional and chronological distinctions should be made. In the resistance of Aceh against Dutch colonization, which led to the longest and most difficult colonial war ever waged by the Dutch, the Aceh War of 1873-1903, Islam clearly played a prominent role. Several documents indicate that the population of Aceh, which, as described earlier is one of the oldest Muslim regions in the archipelago if not the oldest, viewed this as a conflict between Muslims and *kuffâr*, and thus made their most critical decisions after considering appropriate Islamic jurisprudence.[40] In other regions Islam did not always function as the primary criterion to

distinguish each groups, although it played a role as a source of spiritual values and organizational power.

The Indonesian historian Sartono Kartodirdjo, speaking about the resistance against colonial authorities that had been established and concentrated in rural areas of Java in the 19th century, makes clear that the contribution of Islam to this struggle basically consisted of its battle ideology and its organization. It was notably the mystical orders, which, as we saw above, were spread all over the country, which provided an organizational infrastructure that played an important role in various anti-colonial protest movements.[41] It is interesting to note that the author distinguishes between a traditional and a modern stage of the struggle. During the first stage, the anti-colonial movements were oriented towards the *status quo*, having a local perspective and were rural based. At the modern stage, the resistance movements were directed towards change, having a wider horizon and organization and were urban based.[42] At this stage, which finally led to the attainment of independence, the main function of Islam was that of a prominent source, although not the only source, of spiritual values and ideals. Azyumardi Azra, however, indicates the existence of an earlier stage, before Sartono Kartodirdjo's traditional one, where the mystical orders were generally not used as a means in the resistance to foreign colonization.[43] Van Bruinessen explains that this is because before the 19th century no mystical order in the archipelago had a sufficiently strong popular basis to play such a role. The same author agrees with Sartono Kartodirdjo's opinion that from the early 20th century onwards the role of mystical orders in protest and resistance movements diminished, as far as the general trend is concerned. However he adds that, as a result of political repression, at several times during this century large groups of Indonesians have moved back from "politics" in the modern sense of the word to mysticism.[44]

During the stage of modern forms of resistance to the Dutch colonization, as distinguished by Sartono Kartodirdjo, Islamic reformism also played an important role. It developed strongly from the beginning of the 20th century.[45] The main reformist organization in the Netherlands Indies was the Muhammadiyah, created in 1912 in Yogyakarta, Central Java. Alfian describes the Muhammadiyah as a movement opposed to the establishment —

and therefore to colonization — but not primarily a political organization. Instead it concentrated on religious reform through its widespread educational activities and this was one reason why in practice it adopted an attitude of moderation and collaboration towards the colonial regime.[46] Especially in Java, the more radical opposition to the Dutch rule was voiced by different political parties of Islamic orientation, notably the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union),[47] and the 'secular' Partai Komunis Indonesia and the Partai Nasional Indonesia. "Secular" in this case does not mean that most of their adherents were not Muslims, but that their nationalism was not based on specifically Islamic values and traditions. It was the latter which was to become the dominant party after independence until the political reorientation of 1965/1966.

Contrary to the situation in the Indonesian Archipelago, in Algeria the Islamic religion formed a criterion which, almost without exception, distinguished the indigenous population from the European immigrants. In this context the term "indigenous" is used for all inhabitants who lived in the region before the French colonization and for their descendants, i.e. Berbers, the oldest group, as well as Arabs, who had arrived later and had partially mixed with the Berber population. Another striking difference with the colonial situation in the Netherlands Indies was that, in Algeria, Europeans had settled in much larger numbers, relatively as well as absolutely.[48] As for the indigenous population of Jewish religion, i.e. the descendants of the Jews living in the territory before the French colonization they were for a large part integrated into the group of European immigrants. This development was a result of colonial policy and legislation as well as of the attitude of the Jewish inhabitants themselves.[49] For these reasons, the role of Islam in the resistance against colonization was even more prominent in Algeria than in the Indonesian Archipelago.

During the first part of the colonial period, the mystical orders formed the strongest and most influential type of socio-religious organization, mainly because of their widespread, hierarchical networks, which covered a large part of the population. Many of these orders soon surrendered to the French authorities. Some orders, however, became the basis of fierce resistance to the colonization, which could only be contained after a long and arduous struggle. The most outstanding case was the resistance

movement led by `Abd al Qâdir between 1832 and 1847. A large part of his force was based on the Qâdiriyyah order.[50]

What was left of the mystical orders after their initial resistance was crushed, increasingly compromised with the colonial authorities and often were even used as intermediaries between the French administration and the indigenous masses.[51] Because of this collaborationist attitude and some not so "orthodox" elements which became increasingly salient in the activities of the mystical orders, the Salafi and reformist movement was, on the whole, very much opposed to them.

It was precisely this reformist movement —or Salafiyyah as it is often called there— which took over the role as the main opponent of the foreign rule in the next stage of the colonial period. The Salafiyyah, which was born in Egypt during the second half of the 19th century and started to spread in the Maghrib before the First World War, developed widely in Algeria during the 1920s and 1930s.[52] The essential aspiration of the Salafiyyah was to recover the full strength of the indigenous religion and culture, as a reaction to colonization. As was the case with the reformist movement in the Netherlands Indies, its main activities and the basis of its power lay in the field of education. The *Salafiyyah* was not a political organization and did not question the colonial regime in a direct way. Nonetheless, it is correct to say that the Salafiyyah played an important role in preparing the nationalist movement which was to struggle during a later period, i.e. after the Second World War, for the independence of the country. For this reason it is wrong to pretend, as is sometimes the case, that it was the Salafiyyah —or a religious movement in general— which recovered the Algerian independence. A balanced analysis shows that cultural and religious, as well as social and economic factors, drove the Algerian people to throw off the reins of colonial rule.[53]

The Place of Islam in the Independent State

Both in Indonesia and Algeria, Islam continued to play an important role after the recovery of independence, either in the process of state formation, in government policy, or in protest and resistance to the principles of the state and to government policy.

In Indonesia, Islamic values were among the most important ideas proposed and taken into consideration by the politicians involved in setting up the new, independent state and elaborating its leading principles. The fact that the vast majority of the people are Muslim, but not the totality, once again determined the position which was finally conceded to Islam. The demand of part —and not all— of the Muslims that Indonesia should become an "Islamic state" was dropped and, in order to accommodate all religious communities, a kind of compromise was devised: Indonesia was not to be an Islamic state, nor a secular one, but a religious state based on the "belief in the One God", where all monotheistic religions were accepted and even protected. The belief in the One God became the first principle of *Pancasila* —the five principles— which has been the official Indonesian ideology ever since. It was also stipulated in the constitution. A demand by some Muslims to complete the article of the constitution in question with the words "*dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*" (with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic *Sharî`ah*) —the so-called "seven words"— was finally dropped.[54] A few months later, on 3 January 1946, the religious character of the state was underlined once more by the creation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.[55] During the "Old Order" regime under President Soekarno and still more so under the "New Order" regime of his successor Soeharto, the Indonesian government was directly or indirectly involved in the construction of many mosques and the development of public institutions of Islamic religious education, from the primary to the *Institut Agama Islam Negeri* level (IAIN —State Institute for Islamic Studies).[56] The New Order regime, on the other hand, has strived for the "depolitization" of Islam, which was primarily materialized by a ban on political parties based exclusively on Islam or on any other particularism for that matter. It favored the development of Islamic values in the social, cultural and intellectual spheres of life, in order to create the so-called "ethical basis of national development".

In the resistance to this newly established state, Islam also often played a role. The longest and most famous resistance movement is known as the "Darul Islam". It swept different regions of the country until the early 1960s. Cees van Dijk, in his study of this

movement, makes clear that in this case, once again, no monocausal explanation is satisfactory. The Islamic religion was just one of the factors which induced the movement, in particular as a source of motivation, besides various other factors.[57]

Up to the present time, Islam often functions as a source of motivation for demands of adjustment of different aspects of government policy. In these demands, the Islamic religion is generally combined with other reasons and motives, of a cultural, social, economic or political nature. An example is the movement for the democratization of the political system, which has been growing for some years now. Its background is partly based on Islamic values, legal notions and organizations. The Islamic element was still more prominent in the recent campaign for the abolition of the SDSB (*Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah* —Social Philanthropical Contribution with Prizes) lottery, in which formal arguments about Islamic law amalgamated with the denunciation of growing social and economic disparities. This latter campaign finally attained its goal on 25 November 1993, when the Minister of Social Affairs announced the discontinuation of the lottery. However, at present Islam seldom becomes a source of criticism of the political system or the public authorities as a whole in Indonesia.

In Algeria the situation is different. Although Islamic religion cannot be considered the only factor determining the course of Algerian history, it became the fundamental point of reference in the legitimation of either the form of the state and governmental policy or in various cases of protest against the established state and regime. In this respect, it is not always easy to decide whether politics and the state were used to realize Islamic ideals or whether some Islamic-sounding slogans were artificially applied to cover miscellaneous interests. I shall comment further below.

In the first place, in order to legitimate the post-colonial state and regime, the Algerian authorities referred to Islam on multiple occasions. All official declarations during the war of liberation, and then the constitution and the National Charter in its successive versions, emphasized the Islamic nature of the Algerian society and state. Islam became the state religion.[58] This reference to Islam was always combined with a second one, namely to socialism, which was understood to be the materialization of Islam in the economic

and social domain. The choice of a socialist system was justified by referring to Islam, not to Marxist doctrine, which was rejected in official texts and only found adherents in limited circles. The emphasis on socialism was strongest during the leadership of Boumediene (1965-1978). It then gradually diminished, although it was officially maintained until the end of the one-party system, in 1988. Another tendency which became increasingly strong from 1964 onwards —although it had already manifested itself during the war of independence— was the dominating power of the state and the single party. It was within this framework that the state limited the role of the *`ulamâ'* with their Salafiyyah background and took control of all educational institutions, including those for religious education. In their efforts to legitimize their own position and to oppose the groups which called into question the Islamic nature of the regime, the authorities made frequent use of Islamic symbols, including television broadcasts of the *salâh* of the President at religious celebrations and the construction of a large number of mosques and Islamic educational centers, culminating in the mosque-cum-Islamic university 'Amîr `Abd al Qâdir, opened in 1984 in Constantine.

As seen earlier, the Indonesian government also engaged in mosque building, Islamic education and related activities but, contrary to the Algerian authorities and for both practical and material as well as for ideological reasons, it has never aspired to or pretended to monopolize Islamic culture or education.

Among the opposition movements to the Algerian regime, which was far from democratic and strove to arrange everything from above, including religious life, the most prominent group, in particular since the end of the 1970s, stressed Islam as the basis of protest against the *status quo* and as the source of ideals for the future. The reference which this group made to Islamic values and law was partly a result of a fact that was also understood by the established rulers: the most effective way to obtain support in the Algerian society —as in most societies with a Muslim majority— is to refer to Islam. Therefore, government and opposition often outdid each other in the use of Islamic symbols and this process continues to the present situation. Contrary to almost all protest movements in Indonesia which, among other values, are motivated by Islamic or allegedly Islamic values, a large part of the opposition

movement in Algeria calls into question the very principles of the state and authority of the rulers. Nobody ignores the struggle for power which is actually taking place in Algeria. At the core of this struggle one can detect a difference in the understanding of Islam and the place that it should have in political and social life. Deeper analysis, however, shows that the matter is not as simple as this and other factors and motives cannot be ignored. In spite of the complexity of the subject matter, one can conclude that, since the Roman epoch, the role of religion in conflicts between rulers and various groups of opponents has manifested itself recurrently in Algerian history.

Conclusion

In this article I have presented a few comparative notes on the role of Islam in the histories of Indonesia and Algeria. I hope to have shown that in both countries Islam has played a prominent role, in various ways and at different periods. I have also tried to make clear that this role cannot be understood in isolation from other manifold aspects of life, economic, cultural, social and political. In addition, many similarities have been shown in the role of Islam in the history of both countries, as well as some differences. In the main, these dissimilarities can be explained by differences in situations, which has manifested itself from the beginning of the Islamization process.

Endnotes:

1. Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Developments in Morocco and Indonesia* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 60. The exact meaning as well as the basis of these definitions are not totally clear (among the earliest of several critical reviews of Geertz's analysis are R.M. Koentjaraningrat, "Pembicaraan Buku" [Book Review], *Majalah Ilmu- Ilmu Sastra Indonesia* 1 (1963), pp. 188-191; Soedjito Sostrodihardjo, "Religious Life in Java", *Sosiografi Indonesia dan Hukum Adat* (Yogyakarta: 1963), pp. 17-31; Harsya W. Bachtiar, "The Religion of Java: A Commentary", *Majalah Ilmu-*

Ilmu Sastra Indonesia 5 (1973), pp. 85-118). As is the case in some other works of Geertz, the suggestive force of his descriptions is greater than the clarity and depth of his analyses.

2. Nikki R. Keddie, "Islam and Society in Minangkabau and in the Middle East", *Sojourn* 2 (1) (Feb. 1987), pp. 1-30. The Minangkabau is a region of particular interest to researchers because of its combination of a strong Islamic consciousness and a matrilineal tradition.
3. The state of Srivijaya, which was already mentioned in reports of the 7th century of the Christian era, had Palembang, South Sumatra, as its capital. During several centuries it was the major maritime commercial power between India and China. Its last remaining part was finally conquered by Majapahit in CE 1377. The kingdom of Majapahit, named after its capital city in East Java, is often dated from 1293 to 1478, according to the years when its capital city was built and when it was conquered by competing forces, respectively. However, a residue of this state probably lasted until the beginning of the 16th century. At the height of its power, it dominated most of the Archipelago, either directly or through vassal states.
4. *Cf.* Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 11 ff.
5. Geertz, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
6. *Cf.* f.ex. Joseph Tolédano, *Les Juifs maghrébins* (s.l. [Belgium]: Brepols, 1989), pp. 11 ff.
7. *Cf.* Mahfoud Kaddache, *L'Algérie dans l'antiquité* (Algiers: Société Nationale d'Edition et de Diffusion, 1982), pp. 139 f.
8. The best and still relevant survey of the debate is G.W.J. Drewes, "New Light on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia?", *BKI* [*Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*] ('s-Gravenhage), 124 (1968), pp. 433-459.
9. As "officially" formulated as conclusion no. 1 of the "Seminar Masuknya Islam ke Indonesia" [Seminar on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia] organized in Medan, 17-20 March 1963: "[the participants conclude] that according to known sources, Islam first entered Indonesia during the first century of the *hijrah* (seventh/eighth century of the Christian era) and directly from Arabia" [original in Indonesian] (A. Hasymy, *Sejarah Masuk dan Berkembangnya Islam di Indonesia (Kumpulan Prasaran pada Seminar di Aceh)* [The History of the Arrival and Development of Islam in Indonesia (Collection of Preliminary Reports to the Aceh Seminar)] (s.l.: Almaarif, 1989), p. 7). This seminar, besides its scientific aspect, was strongly colored by political motives related to national and religious pride.
10. As formulated in 1872 by the Dutchman J. Pijnappel, see Drewes, *op. cit.*, p. 440.
11. Pijnappel and others thought from the west coast, Gujarat and Malabar, but Snouck Hurgronje from South India (see *ibid.*, pp. 440 ff.).
12. Proposed as a second line of penetration of Islam by S.Q. Fatimi in 1963 (see *ibid.*, p. 455). D. Lombard, without studying in depth the rather technical question of the "first origin" of Islam in the archipelago, stresses the importance of Muslims of Chinese descent for the Islamization process in the archipelago as a whole (Denys Lombard, *Le carrefour javanais: Essai d'histoire globale* (Paris: E.H.E.S.S., 1990), especially Vol. II, p. 44). On the possibility

of a Chinese contribution to the beginning of the Islamization of Java, *cf.* also H.J. de Graaf and T.H.G. Pigeaud, *De eerste Moslimse Vorstendommen op Java: Studiën over de staatkundige geschiedenis van de 15de en 16de eeuw* ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, Verhandelingen van het K.I.T.L.V., no. 69, 1974), p. 10 and *passim*, and their *Chinese Muslims in Java in the 15th and 16th centuries: The Malay Annals of Semarang and Cerbon* (Melbourne: Monash Papers on SE Asia, no. 12, 1984).

13. The latter theory was proposed by A.H. Johns (see Drewes, *op. cit.*, p. 453).
14. Denys Lombard, "L'horizon insulindien et son importance pour une compréhension globale de l'Islam", *Archipel* (Paris), 29 (1985), pp. 45 ff.; Ricklefs, M.C., "Islamization in Java: Fourteenth to Eighteenth Century", in Ahmad Ibrahim,; Sharon Siddique; Yasmin Hussain (eds), *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, s.a.) [reprint of "Six Centuries of Islamization in Java", in Nehemia Levtzion (ed.), *Conversion to Islam* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979)], pp. 36-43.
15. For example to support the aspiration to establish a state independent Majapahit or to oppose the influence of China, Siam and India (as suggested in J.C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History* ('s- Gravenhage: Van Hoeve, 1955) [reprint Dordrecht/Providence: Foris, 1983 - K.I.T.L.V.-reprint], pp. 110 ff.), or in order to obtain a new form of supranatural power (as suggested in Ricklefs, *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 40; A.C. Milner, "Islam and the Muslim State", in M.B. Hooker (ed.), *Islam in South-East Asia* (Leiden: Brill, 1983), pp. 23 ff.).
16. The role of mysticism as well as education has been stressed a lot by Anthony H. Johns, see A.H. Johns, "Islam in Southeast Asia: Reflections and New Directions", *Indonesia* (Ithaca), 19 (April 1975), pp. 33-55; A.H. Johns, "Islam in Southeast Asia: Problems of Perspective", in: C.D. Cowan & O.W. Wolters (eds), *Southeast Asian History and Historiography: Essays Presented to D.G.E. Hall* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 304-320 [partly reprinted in Ibrahim e.a. (eds), *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, pp. 20-24] as well as earlier articles by the same author mentioned in Drewes, *op. cit.*, pp. 438, 452. The role of international educational networks in the development of Islam in the archipelago, at successive stages, is also stressed in Azra, Azyumardi, *The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian `Ulamâ' in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (diss., Colombia University, New York, 1992) [to be published in English by K.I.T.L.V., Leiden and in Indonesian translation by Mizan, Bandung]; William R. Roff, "Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920s", *Indonesia* (Ithaca), 9, pp. 73-87; and Mona Abaza, *Islamic Education. Perceptions and Exchanges: Indonesian Students in Cairo* (diss., University of Bielefeld, 1990) [probably to be published by the Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient, Paris]. The term "mystical order" seems more appropriate than the equally usual one of "mystical brotherhood" because many women adhered, too (as clarified for Algeria in Julia Clancy- Smith, "The House of Zainab: Female Authority and Saintly Succession in Colonial Algeria", in: Nikki R. Keddie & Beth Baron (eds), *Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender* (New Haven and London: Yale

University Press, 1991), pp. 256 ff. and orally confirmed by several Indonesian colleagues in the case of Indonesia).

17. For example conclusion no. 5 of the Seminar in Medan mentioned in footnote 9, cited in Hasymy, *loc. cit.*
18. Abun-Nasr, *op. cit.*, pp. 26 ff.
19. *Cf.* f. ex. Abû al Qâsim Sa`d Allâh, *Abhâth wa ârâ' fî târîkh al Jazâ'ir* (Algiers: al Sharikah al Wataniyyah lî al nashr wa al tawzî`, 1978), pp. 5 ff.
20. *Cf.* Johan Hendrik Meuleman, "Islam in Algerian History: Some Facts and their Interpretation", in W.A.L. Stokhof & N.J.G. Kaptein (eds), *Beberapa Kajian Indonesia dan Islam: Makalah- Makalah yang Disampaikan dalam Rangka Kunjungan Menteri Agama R.I. M. Munawir Sjadzali, M.A. ke Negeri Belanda (31 Oktober - 7 November 1988)* [Some Studies on Indonesia and Islam: Papers Presented in the Framework of the Visit of the Minister of Religious Affairs of the Indonesian Republic, Munawir Sjadzali, M.A., to the Netherlands (31 October - 7 November 1988)] (Jakarta: INIS, 1990), pp. 247-8.
21. Abun-Nasr, *op. cit.*, pp. 28 ff.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 33 ff.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 35 ff.
25. Evidence on these early times is limited. In North Sumatra, we know from his gravestone that the first king of Samudra, a Muslim known as Sultan al Malik al Sâlih, died in CE 1297. Later, the centre of power shifted to the neighbouring Pasai. The ensuing state, often called "Samudra-Pasai", was conquered by Aceh Darussalam in 1524.
26. Taufik Abdullah, "Islam dan Pembentukan Tradisi di Asia Tenggara: Sebuah Perspektif Perbandingan" [Islam and the Formation of Tradition in South-East Asia: A Comparative Point of View], in Taufik Abdullah & Sharon Siddique (red.), *Tradisi dan Kebangkitan Islam di Asia Tenggara* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1989), pp. 62 ff.
27. For a concise comparison between the process of state formation and the nature of the ensuing state in the three mentioned territories , see Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge e.a.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 409 ff.
28. In his *al Muqaddimah*, esp. `Abd al Rahmân ibn Khaldûn etc., *Târîkh Ibn Khaldûn al musammâ bi Kitâb al `ibar* etc. (ed. Beirut: Mu'assasah Jamâl lî al Tibâ`ah wa al Nashr, s.a.), Vol. I, pp. 137-8.
29. The most famous example was that of Nuruddin Ar-Raniri (Nûr al Dîn al Rânîrî), the main spiritual advisor of Sultan Iskandar Thani (al Iskandar al Thânî), who reigned from CE 1636 to 1641. Ar-Raniri was nominated *Shaykh al Islâm* of the sultanate in CE 1637. He wrote about several branches of religious sciences and history. He was also affiliated to the Rifâ`iyyah, Aydarûsiyyah and Qâdiriyyah orders (Abdullah, *op. cit.*, p. 79; Azra, *op. cit.*, pp. 360 ff.).
30. See Abdullah, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.
31. This work has been edited and translated from the Arabic and Javanese versions by Anthony H. Johns as *The Gift Addressed to the Spirit of the Prophet (Canberra: Australian National University, 1965).*

32. Abd. Rahim Yunus, *Posisi Tasawuf dalam Sistem Kekuasaan di Kesultanan Buton pada Abad ke-19* [The Position of Islamic Mysticism in the Power System of the Sultanate Buton in the 19th Century] (unpublished diss., IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, 1994), pp. 107 ff.
33. Yunus, *ibid.*, pp. 108, 227-8.
34. In perticular see Azra, *op. cit.* An outstanding example of a figure who had much influence on the development of Islam in the archipelago, both as a prominent leader of mystical orders and as an expert in religious science, was Sâfî al Dîn Ahmad b. Muhammad Yûnus al Qushâshî al Dajânî al Madanî (Medina, 1538-1661), a scholar in various branches of Islamic science as well as a *khalîfah* of the Shattâriyyah order and affiliated to almost a dozen other mystical orders (*ibid.*, pp. 185-188).
35. Martin van Bruinessen, "The Origins and Development of Sûfî Orders (*Tarekat*) in Southeast Asia, *Studia Islamika*, 1 (1) (April-June 1994), p. 13.
36. Ahmed Nadir, "Le maraboutisme, superstition ou révolution?", in Fanny Colonna, Mustapha Haddab e.a. (eds), *Méthodes d'approche du monde rural* [results of a seminar in Paris, 1976] (Algiers: Office des Publications Universitaires, 1984), pp. 195 ff.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
38. Abun-Nasr, *op. cit.*, pp. 80, 85.
39. Nadir, *op. cit.*, pp. 196 ff.
40. Including the request of *fatwâs* from *fuqahâ'* in the Holy Land and Johore, on the Malay Peninsula (*cf.* Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld, "Some Religious Aspects of the Aceh War as Reflected in Three Unpublished Arabic Documents", in Stokhof and Kaptein, *Beberapa Kajian*, pp. 89-99, indicating also, on p. 95, that the *fatwâ* of Sâlim b. Amad b. Muhsin al `Attâs from Johore did not analyze the conflict as one between Muslims and Unbelievers, but between Muslims and Christians or "People of the Book").
41. Sartono Kartodirdjo, *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888. Its Conditions, Course and Sequel: A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia* ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1966), f. ex. pp. 25, 92 ff., 140 ff.; Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Singapore/London e.a.: Oxford University Press, 1973), esp. pp. 7 ff., 19, 188.
42. *Peasants' Revolt*, p. 2, referring to E.J. Hobsbawm; *Protest Movements*, pp. 17-8, 188 ff.
43. Azra, *op. cit.*, p. 448, speaking about the 17th century.
44. Bruinessen, *op. cit.*, pp. 13 ff.
45. Many authors stress a form of continuity from the Padri movement, which was active in West Sumatra and the beginning of the 19th century with a precursor at the end of the 18th century, while the central thesis defended in Azyumardi Azra's dissertation is that Islamic renewal and reformism in the Indonesian archipelago started as early as the second half of the seventeenth century, influenced by scholarly developments in the Middle East (Azra, *op. cit.*, esp. p. 583).
46. Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University

Press, 1989), esp. pp. 347 ff. This author emphasizes that in the Minangkabau, West Sumatra, the political character of the Muhammadiyah was more outspoken and radical, mainly because of the absence of groups of Western educated intellectuals or other political movements of large importance in this region (*ibid.*, pp. 351 ff.).

47. Renamed in 1923 Partai Sarekat Islam and in 1929 Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia.
48. According to the Algerian census of 1948, Algeria had 922,272 "European" and 7,679,078 "Muslim" inhabitants, i.e. a proportion of 1:8,3. In 1936 the number of "Europeans" had been greater: 946,013 - compared to 6,201,144 "Muslims". (Mahfoud Kaddache, *Histoire du nationalisme algérien: Question nationale et politique algérienne 1919-1951* (Algiers: Société Nationale d'Edition et de Diffusion, 1980), Vol. II, pp. 736-7). According to the census of the Netherlands Indies of 1930, the last one of the colonial period, the colony had 60,727,233 inhabitants, of whom 240,417 (0.4%) were European (born in the colony or outside it), 59,138,067 were "indigenous", 1,233,214 were Chinese (born in the colony or outside it) and 115,535 were "other non-indigenous Orientals" (Arabs among others). Religious conviction was only recorded for the European population and for three indigenous ethnic groups, the Ambonese, Bataks and Menadonese, of whom a particularly important number had converted to Christianity. In this way, the comment to the census results explains, the majority of the Christians were as such enumerated. Of the Europeans 196,061 declared to be Christian, of the 1,719,598 inhabitants belonging to the three indigenous groups, 714,960 declared themselves to be Christian (most Protestants) (See Departement van Economische Zaken [Department of Economic Affairs], *Volkstelling 1930: Census of 1930 in the Netherlands Indies* (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1933-1936), Vol. VIII (1936), pp. 2, 32.).
49. They were about 2% (*cf.* Tolédano, *op. cit.*, p. 200 for a general idea, although the exactness of the figures mentioned seems doubtful).
50. *Cf.* Abun-Nasr, *op. cit.*, pp. 253 ff.
51. For example part of the Tijâniyyah order (*ibid.*, p. 382).
52. See *ibid.*, pp. 271-2, 325, 328, 333 ff., 369, 382 ff.; Mahfoud Kaddache, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 220 ff.; EI^2, *s.v.*, "Islâh, vol. IV, pp. 141 ff., esp. 158 ff. (A. Merad).
53. *Cf.* Meuleman, *op. cit.*, p. 245 and Johan Hendrik Meuleman, *Le Constantinois entre les deux guerres mondiales* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1985), pp. 192 ff.
54. For a detailed exposition of these intricate discussions, which took place from May till Augustus 1945, see B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1982) [slightly revised reprint of the first, 1971, edition], pp. 15 ff.; Endang Saifuddin Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945* [The Jakarta Charter of 22 June 1945] (Bandung: Pustaka, 1981).
55. At first most non-Muslims did not favor this decision, whereas most Muslims welcomed it as a victory for Islam. Some Muslims, however, regarded the Ministry as a means created by the state authorities to control the Muslim mass. For part of this discussion see Boland, *op. cit.*, pp. 105 ff.
56. *Cf.* Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class, *Indonesia*, 56 (Oct. 1993), p. 11. Feillard,

Andrée, "Les oulémas indonésiens aujourd'hui: de l'opposition à une nouvelle légitimité", *Archipel*, 46 (1993), pp. 91 ff.

57. Cees [Cornelis] van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* ('s-Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1981), pp. 391 ff.
58. Algerian Constitution of 1076, art. 2.

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