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Current Issue

The Devaluation of Aliran Politics *Views from the Third Congress of the PPP*

Abstraksi: Banyak pendapat yang mengatakan bahwa muktamar Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) yang baru lalu punya arti strategis tersendiri karena hasilnya akan menentukan pemilu 1997 dan kemudian Sidang Umum MPR 1998. Pada Sidang Umum inilah menurut banyak kalangan akan berlangsung suksesi nasional, termasuk di dalamnya pergantian pemimpin negara, presiden Republik Indonesia. Maka banyak kelompok berkepentingan dengan muktamar PPP yang ketiga ini: siapa yang memimpin kendali partai ini ia akan ikut berperan pada saat suksesi yang penting tersebut.

Bagaimana kelompok-kelompok kepentingan memperebutkan kepemimpinan PPP tidak bisa dilepaskan dari konteks makro tersebut. Namun demikian banyak pengamat yang mendefinisikan PPP sebagai wujud dari politik Islam atau politik santri, salah satu dari politik aliran yang dikenal selama ini. Sebagai suatu politik aliran santri atau Islam PPP dipandang sebagai kelompok politik yang didasarkan atas nilai-nilai Islam yang dianutnya. Jika benar kultur santri atau Islam sebagai faktor pembentuk (konstitutif) partai ini, mengapa konflik internal terus menerus berlangsung? Bukankah mereka berada dalam satu sistem nilai yang sama?

Penganut kerangka politik aliran melihat bahwa di dalam PPP setidaknya terwakili dua sistem nilai Islam yang berbeda: modernis dan konservatif. Yang pertama diwakili terutama oleh Muslimin Indonesia (MI) dan yang kedua oleh Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Konflik intern yang berlangsung dalam tubuh PPP sekarang ini merupakan refleksi dari belum tuntasnya fusi antara dua sistem nilai santri ini.

Tapi apakah betul konflik di dalam PPP itu sebagai refleksi dari

antara keduanya tidak bisa berkompromi atau berkoalisi? Lebih jauh dari itu apakah masih tepat memahami PPP sebagai wujud dari salah satu aliran politik yang selama ini dikenal, yakni politik aliran santri atau Islam?

Dari pengamatan terbatas atas muktamar PPP yang lalu seperti dimuat di media massa dan juga dari diskusi-diskusi dengan para politisi PPP terlihat adanya devaluasi politik aliran santri pada partai ini, yakni menurunnya semangat kesantrian sebagai sistem nilai yang khas partai ini, yang membedakannya secara kultural dari Golongan Karya (Golkar) ataupun Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI). Tidak terlihat munculnya ide-ide yang khas santri yang dikonfrontasikan dengan ide-ide yang khas dari Golkar ataupun PDI. Malah sebaliknya semua kelompok kepentingan atau faksi-faksi yang terbentuk menjelang muktamar berlomba-lomba mendapat pengakuan dan dukungan dari pemerintah, yang —kalau menggunakan kerangka politik aliran— justru lawan politiknya; yang muncul ke permukaan adalah perlombaan antar faksi, bukan sekedar antar unsur, untuk mendapatkan dukungan pemerintah. Faksi Rembang dan Faksi Jombang, keduanya dari unsur NU, sama-sama bersaing untuk mendapatkan pengesahan dari presiden, walaupun keduanya gagal bertemu presiden. Menurut satu penafsiran, pihak suprastruktur lebih menghendaki faksi Metareum (Buya Ismail Hasan Metareum). Dukungan suprastruktur atas Metareum terlihat jelas ketika ABRI lewat penerangan ABRI mengunggulkan Metareum untuk terus menduduki kepemimpinan PPP. Maka yang berlangsung adalah kolaborasi antara suprastruktur dan satu faksi di dalam PPP. Ini yang paling menentukan kemenangan Metareum, dan jelas tak bisa difahami dengan kerangka politik aliran.

Tidak terlihat konflik-konflik intern yang disebabkan oleh perbedaan nilai-nilai antara mereka, misalnya antara unsur MI dan NU. Warna unsur memang masih terlihat, tapi tidak banyak mencerminkan nilai-nilai yang mereka anut, melainkan lebih sebagai artikulasi kepentingan mereka masing-masing untuk merebut kepemimpinan PPP. Maka berlangsung koalisi-koalisi lintas unsur antara faksi-faksi atau kelompok-kelompok kepentingan, dan kadang-kadang lintasan itu tak terbayangkan, misalnya ketika faksi Jalil (Matori Abdul Jalil) bersedia berkoalisi dengan Naro yang dikenal sebagai tokoh PPP yang justru pernah menggusur banyak politisi NU dari PPP. Koalisi lintas unsur juga ditempuh faksi Metareum dengan faksi NU lain yang tentu saja dipandang lebih akomodatif. Namun Metareum juga tidak ragu-ragu meninggalkan rekannya di MI yang dikenal sebagai Kelompok Delapan ketika mereka

dipandang tidak mendukung kepentingannya untuk tetap duduk sebagai ketua umum PPP.

Pada perpolitikan yang sangat praktis seperti muktamar PPP tersebut aliran dan unsur tidak begitu terlihat; yang terlihat nyata adalah bagaimana merebut kursi kepemimpinan PPP. Berpolitik untuk memperjuangkan nilai-nilai seperti yang dianut dalam aliran mereka mengalami kemerosotan. Devaluasi politik aliran berlangsung; yang nyata adalah berpolitik untuk kekuasaan, dan nilai-nilai itupun ditundukkan pada kekuasaan tersebut. Tidak mengherankan kemudian di antara faksi yang kalah menyatakan keluar dari PPP dan ingin bergabung dengan PDI, partai yang berada pada aliran yang lain.

Devaluasi aliran politik pada PPP ini berlangsung secara intensif terutama karena kebijakan pemerintah yang mensyaratkan setiap partai politik harus berideologi Pancasila sehingga secara ideologis partai-partai politik yang ada sama. Di samping itu juga kebijakan pemerintah yang meletakkan partai-partai politik berada di bawah "pembinaan" pemerintah, karena itu kontrol atas partai-partai politik lebih dimungkinkan.

Pada tingkat masyarakat yang lebih luas, devaluasi politik aliran berlangsung lewat pembangunan yang digerakkan negara, terutama lewat pendidikan. Perbedaan-perbedaan aliran terkikis secara perlahan namun pasti. Islam hadir tidak lagi dalam politik aliran tapi lebih pada sistem nilai sosial dan budaya yang dapat menjangkau sasaran yang lebih luas, menembus sekat-sekat semacam partai politik. Generasi baru Islam tumbuh dengan relatif bebas dari konflik aliran ini. Mereka menjadi generasi yang lebih kosmopolit dan rasional, dan karena itu pilihan-pilihan politik mereka juga lebih rasional. Protes kelompok yang menamakan dirinya FKGMNU atas keterlibatan kyai di PPP mencerminkan generasi ini, dan diperkirakan sangat luas dan akan terus meluas seiring dengan pembangunan. Generasi ini tidak bisa lagi dimobilisasi oleh pemimpin-pemimpin politik yang mengandalkan hubungan emosional, seperti dicoba ditunjukkan oleh kyai kelompok Rembang. Massa kyai atau 'ulamâ kini sedang berubah. Hubungan emosional mereka dengan kyai sudah menurun. Maka klaim kyai bahwa mereka berbasis massa tidak lagi menarik suprastruktur politik untuk menanggapi. Kyai sebagai pemimpin politik —mampu memobilisasi massa untuk tujuan kekuasaan tertentu— sedang dalam krisis. Putera-puteri umat Islam sekarang sudah dapat masuk PPP, PDI ataupun Golkar tanpa merasa ada hambatan berarti secara kultural.

تدهور السياسة المذهبية (Politik Aliran)

نظرة من المؤتمر الثالث لحزب التنمية الموحدة PPP

تكاثرت الآراء حول نتائج المؤتمر الذى عقده حزب التنمية الموحدة PPP ، لما له من أهمية استراتيجية، وذلك لأن توصياته سوف تلعب دورا هاما فى الانتخابات العامة القادمة سنة ١٩٩٧. فى هذه الجلسة العامة لمجلس الشورى الشعبى فى سنة ١٩٩٨ ، حسب تقدير المراقبين السياسيين، سوف يحدث تغيرا شامل بالنسبة للسلطات الحكومية على المستوى القومى، منه انتقال السلطة من رئيس الجمهورية الحالى إلى رئيس جديد. ولهذا السبب تسعى كثير من الطوائف لمناقشة بعض المسائل الهامة فى المؤتمر الثالث لحزب التنمية، منها كل من يتولى رئاسة الحزب للمرحلة القادمة لا بد أن يشترك فى المناقشات حول عملية إنتقال سلطة الرئاسة بصفة فعالة.

فلذا حرصت كثير من الفئات المهتمة بموضوع الوصول إلى منصب الرئاسة بمنطلق هذا المفهوم القومى. أطلق أكثر من المراقبين على حزب التنمية الموحدة صفة الحزب الإسلامى أى الحزب السانترى Santri، وهى صورة من السياسة المذهبية Aliran المعروفة حتى الآن. وكأحد الأحزاب السياسية الإسلامية أو كالحزب السانترى فإن حزب التنمية الموحدة يضم جماعات إسلامية تتسم بمبادئها بالقيم الإسلامية التى تعترف بها. فإذا صحّ أن الإسلام هو العنصر الأساسى فى تكوين هذا الحزب ، فلماذا تحدث فيه الخلافات الداخلية بين الأعضاء؟ أليسوا جميعا يستظلون تحت نفس النظام الإسلامى؟

إن من يتمذهب بالسياسة المذهبية Aliran سوف يلاحظ وجود مذهبين من الفكرة الإسلامية، هما: المجددون والمحافظون. فأما الأول تمثله جماعة "مسلمى إندونيسيا" Muslimin Indonesia (MI)، والثانى تمثله جمعية "نهضة العلماء" (NU). وأن ما جرى من الصراعات الداخلية فى الحزب إنما هو بسبب عدم التوفيق بين هذين المذهبين حتى

الآن.

ولكن هل صحيح أن الانشقاقات الداخلية في الحزب إنما هي صورة لمدى الاختلاف بين المذهبيين؟ وهل صحيح أن شدة الاختلاف بين المذهبيين (المجددين والمحافظين) جعلت من المستحيل التقريب بينهما؟ والسؤال الأبعد من هذا، هل لا يزال حزب التنمية الموحدة يعتبر أحد المذاهب السياسية المعروفة طوال هذه السنين، أى يمثل السياسة الإسلامية أو السياسة المذهبية السانترية؟

بمراقبة ما حدث في هذا المؤتمر، وكما كتبت الصحافة عنه، ومن المناقشات التى عقدت لبحث الموضوع من ناحية تدهور السياسة المذهبية في الحزب، أى قلة تمثيل القيم الدينية التى كانت تميزه عن غيره من الأحزاب كفتة العاملين Golongan Karya (Golkar) والحزب الديمقراطي الإندونيسى Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) إذ لم تظهر آراء خاصة سانترية (إسلامية) التى يمكن مواجهتها مع آراء فئة العاملين أو الحزب الديمقراطي. بل على العكس، كانت جميع الفئات داخل الحزب تتسابق من أجل الحصول على تأييد الحكومة لها، فى حين إذا صح استخدام مصطلح السياسة المذهبية، فالمفروض أن هذا التصرف خطأ، لأنهم يلجأون لاكتساب تأييد الحزب الحاكم وهو الحزب المنافس لسياستهم. وما ظهر إلى الوجود هو التسابق بين الفئات الصغيرة فى حشد هذا الحزب للحصول على تأييد الحكومة. ففتة ريمبانغ Rembang وفتة جومبانغ Jombang كلاهما من عنصر نهضة العلماء، وكلاهما كانت تتسابق من أجل الحصول على تأييد رئيس الجمهورية. ولكنهما فشلا فى تحقيق هذا الهدف، نظرا إلى رغبة الحكومة فى عودة انتخاب ابويا إسماعيل حسن ماتاريوم لرئاسة الحزب. ويعود السبب إلى تأييد الحكومة بعودة انتخاب إسماعيل حسن ماتاريوم بعد ما أعلنت القوات المسلحة تأييدها ورغبتها فى بقائه فى الحزب. وكان ذلك عن طريق وسائل إعلام القوات المسلحة. وهذا مما أدى إلى فوزه برئاسة الحزب مرة أخرى.

كما لم توجد صراعات داخلية بينهم بسبب القيم، مثلا بين عنصر "مسلمى إندونيسى" MI ونهضة العلماء NU. فإن لون كل عنصر لا يزال موجودا، ولكن لا يعمل أى منهما على إظهار لونه الخاص، بل إن كلا منهما كان يركز أكثر على كيفية الوصول

إلى رئاسة الحزب. طوال فترة انعقاد المؤتمر لم تظهر سياسة المذاهب والعناصر المختلفة. لكن ما ظهر حقيقة هو كيفية الوصول إلى منصب الرئاسة. أما العمل على تحقيق القيم التي تعتنقها كل العناصر، فقد تدهور كثيرا. واستمر هذا التدهور فى السياسة المذهبية بين الفئات الصغيرة فى جسد الحزب. والواضح الآن هو سياسة السلطة. أما القيم، فأخيرا، كان لابد أن ترسخ هذه السلطة. وليس من العجيب بعد الذى حدث أن بعض عناصر الحزب أعربت عن رغبتها فى الخروج من الحزب والاندماج إلى الحزب الديموقراطى وهو حزب يختلف عما فى اتجاهه عن قيمهم.

ويرجع تدهور النشاط السياسى داخل حزب التنمية الموحدة إلى سياسة الحكومة التى دعت جميع الأحزاب السياسية لجعل أساسها على أساس أيديولوجية البانتشاسيلا، حتى تتساوى جميع الأحزاب فى اتخاذ أساس واحد. بجانب ذلك، فإن سياسة الحكومة التى أدت إلى جعل الأحزاب السياسية تحت رعايتها حتى جعلت من السهل عليها التحكم فى سياسة الأحزاب.

أما بالنسبة للمستوى الشعب، فإن عملية التقليل من دور المذاهب السياسية تم عن طريق التنمية الموجهة، خاصة عن طريق التعليم. وكانت نتيجتها زوال الفروق بين تلك المذاهب ولو أنه على مراحل لكن أخيرا زالت نهائيا. لم يعد وجود الإسلام متمثلا فى السياسة المذهبية، ولكنه ظهر أكثر كنظام للقيم الاجتماعية والثقافية التى يمكنها أن تحقق أهدافها بصفة أوسع، وتصل إلى أعماق الجماهير.

لقد نشأ الجيل المسلم الحديث حاليا إلى حد ما من مشاكل الخلافات المذهبية. لذلك أصبح هذا الجيل أكثر وعيا، ولأن اختيارهم السياسى أيضا يقوم على التفكير والتعقل. هذا الجيل الذى لن يؤثر عليه الزعماء الذين يعتمدون على إثارة العواطف. كما حدث فى علاقة الكياهى وتلاميذه التى تغيرت الآن، لم يعد الطلاب يتأثرون بما يقول الكياهى (شيخهم أو زعيمهم الروحى). وهذا لأن الكياهى كان يؤثر فى المواطن بخطبه لكى ينال منصبا معيناً. أما الآن فالشباب كلهم أحرار فى اختيار أى حزب يشاءون، حزب التنمية، جولاكار، أو الحزب الديموقراطى بدون أى عوائق ذات معنى.

One of the most remarkable political phenomenon in Indonesia in 1994 was the third congress of the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP) or the Muslim-oriented United Development Party. This congress, held August 29 to September 2, was not only important to the PPP itself but also to a short-term national political target, the 1997 general election through which the members of the People's Representative Council (DPR) will be elected. It is they, along with other members of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), who will determine the national political succession as it is assumed that the presidential substitution will take place at the 1998 General Assembly.

The national succession has become a crucial issue recently, because President Suharto is considered too old to run for the next presidential election. He will have to retire. It is the DPR/MPR members, including those from the PPP, who will decide who will replace him. The PPP will be important then. That is why many political and interest groups competed each other to seize the top spot of the PPP. The government, for the sake of preserving the status quo, will surely not let the position of the PPP chairman be taken over by a radical, critical or outspoken figure.

Historically and ideologically PPP is an Islam-based political party, and came into being from the 1973 fusion of four Islamic political parties: *Nabdlatul Ulama* (NU), *Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Parmusi, then known as the *Muslimin Indonesia* or MI), *Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* (PSII, then known as the *Syarikat Islam* or SI) and *Perguruan Tarbiyah Islamiyah* (Perti).

It is understandable therefore if many Muslims still view PPP as an Islamic political party, even although its ideology has been formally changed by *Pancasila* (the Five Principles) since the New Order government's policy on socio-political organizations (*orsospol*) in 1975. This policy had the *Pancasila* accepted as the ideology or principle of every socio-political organization (*orsospol*), including political parties.

The fusion of the four Islamic political parties to become PPP was based on the affinity of their ideological or value orientation, or more commonly known in Indonesian political discourse as an *aliran*: Islam.¹

The concept of the *aliran* has become popular in Indonesian political discourse since Geertz² used it to denote three groups of systems of meaning, or vertical structures of identity and organization:

priyayi, *abangan* and *santri*. They are viewed as primary factors in generating social identity and action in post-colonial Indonesia. The first two are Javanese: *priyayi* is an ideology oriented towards Hindu-Buddhist and Javanese mystical world views, and *abangan* is the more popular syncretic ideology of the peasantry, influenced by Javanese animism. The third *aliran*, *santri*, is a pious Islamic world view shared by both Javanese and outer Island societies. The concept of *aliran* has been associated with social and political characteristics: *priyayi* with the officials of the modern state bureaucracy and the PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, or Indonesian National Party); *abangan* with the peasant masses and the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, or the Indonesian Communist Party); and *santri* with indigenous merchants, landowners and the two political parties: the Masjumi and the NU.³

The problem is whether Islam as an *aliran* is really effective in uniting all elements, factions or interest groups within the PPP. Based on their studies, especially on the PPP in the late 70's and early 80's, Ali and Saimima conclude that, as the *aliran* party the PPP has been fading away.⁴

It needs more serious research to verify whether Islam or *santri*, as an *aliran* really constitutes the PPP. Observing the third congress of the party may contribute to that research.

Conflicts and Elemental Coalitions

The congress seemed to be very much colored by internal conflicts, particularly within the two biggest elements of the party: the MI and the NU. However the conflicts were in fact not limited to between the elements but also among factions within each element. Both the MI and the NU had broken into at least three factions respectively: the MI into the factions of Metareum, the four and Naro; and the NU into factions of Rembang, Tebuireng and Cipete.

1. Muslimin Indonesia (MI)

Muslimin Indonesia (MI) historically came into being from *Parmusi*, and it is now under the leadership of J. Naro. However, since the second congress of the PPP when he was not re-elected to the top spot of the party, his dominance in the Party has been overtaken by those who are recognized as the *Kelompok Delapan* (the "Team of Eight"):

Ismail Hasan Metareum, Aisyah Amini, Hartono Mardjono, Cholil Badawi, Husnie Thamrin, Mohammad Solaiman, Yusuf Syakir and Faisal Basyir. Furthermore Metareum had been elected as the PPP's chairman, replacing Naro.

The replacement of the PPP's chairman has opened an internal conflict in the MI: Naro's faction versus the *Kelompok Delapan*. This became a sharp conflict between the two when they paid their respects to the third congress of the PPP. As will be presented later, Naro's faction has tried hard to recover the chairmanship of the PPP.

a. The *Kelompok Delapan* (Team of Eight) and the Faction of Four

The internal conflicts within the MI element of the PPP become more acute when the *Kelompok Delapan* broke into at least three further groups: Metareum's faction (Aisyah Amini and Metareum himself), the *Kelompok Empat* or the Team of Four (Hartono Mardjono, Husnie Thamrin, Cholil Badawi and Muhammad Solaiman) and a "neutral faction" (Yusuf Syakir and Faisal Basyir).

Metareum's faction championed Metareum himself to run for the election of chairman of the PPP's. The *Kelompok Empat*, conversely, objected to nominating Metareum because, in their rhetoric, he was viewed as unsuccessful during his period of the PPP leadership (1989-94). As an alternative they appointed Cholil Badawi to run for the election. In the meantime, the neutral faction kept silent as to whether they supported Metareum or Badawi.

The conflict within the *Kelompok Delapan* was headed —before the *Kelompok Empat* was crystallized— by Hartono Mardjono who claimed that Metareum was unsuccessful in keeping the vision of PPP. However, he did not gain any support from his team and was practically alone.⁵

Seeing the friction, a meeting among the *Kelompok Delapan* was proposed in order to eliminate more conflict and to keep the team harmonious and united. At this meeting —held in Bogor on July 14 1994— all the eighters, excluding Mardjono, agreed to nominate Metareum for the election with some concessions: if Metareum was re-elected as the chairman of the PPP, he would have to recruit Cholil Badawi as a member of electoral board or formatter team elected in the congress, to include Yusuf Syakir and Cholil Badawi in his success team, and also to select Husnie Thamrin as a member of the

Party Executive Board (*Dewan Pelaksana Partai, DPP*) of the PPP.

In the process, however, these concessions were hard to keep. Metareum felt more secure with his solid success team which had been established previously. He then stated that the *Kelompok Delapan* were not his main supporters.⁶

Thamrin —following Mardjono— wrote a letter to “say goodbye” to Metareum and he then nominated Badawi —one of the senior politicians of the MI in PPP— as PPP chairman.⁷ Muhammad Soleiman agreed with Thamrin so he then spread this letter to all Provincial Executive Board (*Dewan Pelaksana Wilayah, DPW*) and all Municipal Executive Board (*Dewan Pelaksana Cabang, DPC*) of the PPP.⁸ It was hoped that the letter would influence the election because they are the majority of the voters.

In his rhetoric Cholil Badawi denied that he tried to challenge Metareum.⁹ However, when he was asked if he was on Metareum’s side, he would only say, “no comment on that matter. The chairman of the PPP will be decided by the congress”.

As the congress drew near, it was reported that the faction of four preferred Badawi and Haz to the Metareum-Jalil duet for the positions of chairman and secretary general of the PPP. Haz and Jalil, as will be presented later, are outstanding PPP politicians from the NU element and have campaigned to run for the top spot of the party.

But outspoken Thamrin and Mardjono of the faction of four were inhibited in their means to support Badawi to take the top spot of the party. They were excluded by regulations of the congress that state that a participant of the congress who votes and is being voted for must be a functionary of Party’s Consultative Assembly (*Majlis Permusyawaratan Partai, MPP*), the Party’s Executive Board (*Dewan Pelaksana Partai* or *DPP*), or a representative of a DPW or a DPC. Unfortunately they were none of them. Therefore they were automatically not allowed to be present at the critical moment, the congress. Thamrin and Mardjono only observed the congress and tried to lobby the representatives from outside the arena.

b. Metarium’s Faction

While the faction of four of the MI seemed not to be well-prepared for the congress, Metareum’s faction, on the contrary, had prepared a success team for him long before the congress started. The team con-

sisted of the young generation of HMI ex-activist PPP politicians: Yusuf Syakir (vice secretary general of PPP), Saleh Khalid (ex-chairman of HMI), Sa'ad Syamlan (a legislator), Bachtiar Chamsah (chairman of North Sumatra's DPW), Ali Hardi Kiaidemak (a legislator), Muhsin Bafadal (an ex-member of the electoral board of the second congress of the PPP) and Ali Marwan (chairman of South Sumatra's DPW).¹⁰ This team was known to be very solid, and long before the congress they had consolidated voters at the DPW and the DPC levels.

Muffling his rivals' political maneuvers from the NU element, Metareum also felt it necessary to approach Jusuf Hasyim, a senior politician of the NU who was also nominated by his faction to run for the election as PPP chairman. A meeting between the two politicians was held, and many observers saw the possibility of a coalition between them. Paving the way for the top spot of the PPP, one week before the congress Metareum also met with Idham Chalid, another senior politician of NU and ex-president of the PPP.¹¹

Metareum's political moves were not only directed towards the PPP politicians but also —this is even more important— towards the government as the patron of all political parties, specifically the Armed Forces (ABRI) and the Department of Home Affairs. So far Metareum was known to have been close to government, and had led the party as a good client of his patron.

His low profile, calm leadership and uncritical attitude towards the government, made him acceptable. So it is not strange that the Armed Forces, the real authority of New Order Indonesia, nominated him as chairman of PPP in the congress, as implicitly stated by the Armed Forces spokesman, Syarwan Hamid: "The leadership of Metareum in the PPP has been a tested success. He is able to make good communications with the Armed Forces and the government. ... the next leader of the PPP is the one who will be able to mediate the superstructure [government] and the infrastructure [people]".¹²

In Indonesian politics, the government and the Armed Forces (ABRI) are recognized as the two determining factors. Without their support or blessing, a person's political carrier, including that of one of the PPP's top politicians, will not progress smoothly. Metareum seems to be aware of these real politics.

Metareum's tricks were also much based on his interpretation of the contemporary map of Indonesian politics, in particular of the national succession. He viewed his main rival to the top spot of the PPP,

Mathori Abdul Jalil, his secretary general, as having made a coalition with certain faction of the Armed Forces (ABRI) which was assumed to be disloyal to President Suharto. The figurehead of this faction is the Catholic retired General Beny Murdani. It has been reported that he would have run for the presidential election and competed with President Suharto. This political rumor became widespread after the ambassador of the United States, John Munjo, was reported to have had a meeting with some outstanding Muslim intellectuals: Nurcholish Madjid, Sri Edi Swasono, Ismail Sunny and Muslimin Nasution. In that meeting Munjo wondered if Murdani could be nominated to be Indonesian President. Madjid gave a negative response saying that it was impossible, Indonesian Muslims would not accept him. "But Abdurrahman Wahid [chairman of the NU] accepts him", Munjo argued. Madjid then said, "it is impossible that Wahid will accept him as a president candidate. Even though he will, this does not represent the NU community, let alone the wider Muslim community". It was also gossiped that, if Murdani had been elected as president, Wahid would have become his vice-president.

This scenario is projected to the 1998 General Assembly of the MPR when it is assumed that the President's succession will take place. That is why the PPP, as one of the "fractions" of the DPR/MPR, should be controlled. Jalil was projected to unseat this party chairmanship for that political reason, and he had to take over the PPP top spot.¹³

This may be a political gossip, but has been transformed to become something meaningful in political games.

The tactics of Metareum's faction were not only limited to the consolidation of power at the levels of the DPW and the DPC but also to a wider spectrum of Muslim intellectuals and the new generation of increasingly educated Muslims when a forum, named *Forum Komunikasi Ummah Nusantara* (*Forum Konun*), was established about two months before the congress. AM. Saefuddin (a legislator), Saleh Khalid (a legislator and member of Metareum's success team), Hadimulyo (NGO activist and a member of the MPR), Imron Pangkapi (a journalist and PPP's functionary) and also Yusril Iza Mahendra — known as a young Masjumist and a member of the teaching staff at the University of Indonesia—, saw a need for intellectual participation to empower the PPP. So far, they claimed, the elite leaders of the party, dominated by exponents of the MI, NU, SI and Perti, are still

limited in anticipating and accommodating the new generation voters, the urban middle class, which have developed in the relatively non-elemental sentiments of the party. They are professionals, NGO activists, etc., who are relatively more independent, critical, cosmopolitan and optimistic.¹⁴

The founders of the *Forum Konun* may be viewed as the fresh blood of the party. In their rhetoric, they emphasize the need for complete fusion of the party. They are relatively independent from the elemental sentiments, but many observers saw the forum as a part of Metareum's faction. This is hard to deny as three of the them — Saefuddin, Khalid and Hadimulyo—are personally close to Metareum. They even started their political careers close to the last general election under his authority within the party. They are known as the ex-activists of the HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*, or the Islamic Student Association), the large Indonesian student organization. Khalid is an ex-president of the organization as is Metareum.

The Forum's exponents are also known as intellectuals who have good access to the mass media. Pangkapi is a senior editor of the daily *Media Indonesia*. Close to the congress they actively affected public opinion. They therefore not only gained more popularity but also opened up polemics and bickering between their rivals.

Before the Forum Konun was officially announced its name, the founders used the title "Nahdatul Ummah" (NU). Since "NU" is usually the abbreviation for Nahdlatul Ulama—the large organization of Indonesian Muslim community and an element of the PPP—they then added the adjective "new" (*baru*) to the NU, so it became "NU baru" (new NU) to distinguish it from the original NU.

Coming close to the congress, the political atmosphere among the PPP politicians became heated. Some original NU exponents viewed the use of the term "NU baru" (new NU) as political harassment against the original NU. It was seen as a political move of a rival of NU within the PPP. As a reaction to this maneuver, an outstanding politician of the NU, KH. Yusuf Hasjim raised the "MI baru" (new MI) as the antithesis.¹⁵ Even Mukrom As'ad of the NU element of the DPP of PPP thought that the motive behind the founders of the Forum was to strengthen their bargaining position in the next PPP leadership. It had nothing to do with completion of the fusion. They could not queue up for the elite positions in the party.¹⁶

Controversy about the "NU baru" not only involve NU-PPP

politicians but also Khalid Mawardi, an NU-Golkar politician, who said that it was deplorable to see the attempt by some PPP politicians to create a new faction within the party by using a name that was intended to resemble Nahdatul Ulama. The founders of the new forum [Forum Konun], according to him, were known for their anti-NU stance and their latest move was simply another deception to discredit his organization which was busy preparing for its own congress. He suggested that the founders should halt the plan to use the title Nahdatul Ummah at once, because the abbreviation NU was already recognized by law as belonging to Nahdatul Ulama.¹⁷ Accepting this suggestion, the founders apologized for using the name, and said that it would no longer be used.¹⁸

It is interesting however, that the government did not see the establishment of Forum Konun as a destabilizing factor in the party, whereas it is usually reactionary and conservative in facing political initiatives such as this. A Government official responsible for the control of political parties said that the establishment of the "new NU" not to muddy the party but instead to dynamize as it drew close to the congress.¹⁹

When it got closer to the congress the political interest of Forum Konun's founders became more open and they could not wait to nominate Metareum to run for the chairmanship. Saefuddin, as one of the founders, said that the masses (*arus bawah* or "lower stream") supported Metareum.²⁰ This statement was urgent as a response to deny the opinion that Jalil and Pamungkas, as the two contenders against Metareum, were supported by the masses, and conversely Metareum was viewed as rootless.

c. Naro's Maneuvers

If the maneuvers of Forum Konun were in line with Metareum's faction, conversely Naro's moves rejected the nomination of Metareum. J. Naro, the only politician of New Order Indonesia who committed "political suicide" by nominating himself to run as vice-president in the election in the 1988 General Assembly of the MPR, and now chairman of the MI, gave an open statement that the MI did not nominate Metareum as PPP chairman. He said that in the second congress Metareum begged to be nominated for one term of the PPP's chairmanship, and after he was elected he had in fact failed to develop

the party. So Metareum, according to Naro, did not have a right to re-election.²¹

Naro in the first congress devised a regulation by which there was only one formatter to form the DPP and the MPP, and it turned out that he was elected as the formatter. Therefore he practically became the single and strong authority of the PPP. Many NU politicians were disappointed during his leadership as they were not nominated in the 1982 General Election.

His authoritarian leadership not only raised opposition from the NU element but also from within the MI itself. The *Kelompok Delapan* then took over his chairmanship in the second congress, and his political career practically finished.

In the third congress, Naro tried hard to return, but it was almost impossible for him to make a new alliance or coalition within the MI' element. This made him try to negotiate, crossing the elements within the PPP, with Jalil of the NU. However, in the congress Naro had become almost powerless. No single representative at the congress voted for him. He was not even, as ex-chairman of the party, allowed to be present at the congress. His attempts to create a coalition with Jalil's faction was viewed as his second political suicide, at least in the eyes of the MI element.

2. Conflicts within the NU

Like Metareum of the MI, Jalil of the NU had also prepared his success team for the top spot of the PPP way before the congress. The team consisted of ex-activists of the PMII (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*, or the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement), a client organization of the NU and located at Jl. Asuransi No. 8, East Jakarta.²² It was from here that Jalil engineered his moves to unseat the PPP chairman. Jalil started his political career when he was a student of the Christian University of Satya Wacana Salatiga, Central Java, as chairman of the Salatiga branch of the PMII. In 1985 he was elected as chairman of the provincial chapter of the PPP in central Java. At the second congress of the PPP he was chosen as secretary general of the Party.

Jalil held the view that there are no public figures among the party's cadres. The lack of such cadres can be resolved if *'ulamâs* (Islamic scholars) become involved in the party, as they are firmly rooted among

the masses. Therefore it is crucial to involve the *'ulamâs* so that they take a more active part in the party.²³

Many observers considered that Abdurrahman Wahid, president of the NU, was behind Jalil's nomination, when he said that many PPP supporters would have turned to the PDI in the 1997 general election if Ismail Hasan had stayed at the helm after that congress. He also said that Jalil could win the leadership if the election at the congress was free from government interference.²⁴

Consolidating the power of the NU element, some NU politicians and *'ulamâs* had a meeting at Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (TMII), on April 14 1994. Seventy *'ulamâs* were present to prepare their candidate for the election of the PPP chairman. KH. Jusuf Hasyim, KH. Syansuri Badawi, Karmani, Matori Abdul Jalil, Soelaيمان Fadeli, Imam Churmen and Hamzah Haz were among those present at the meeting. Haz was considered the initiator of the meeting.²⁵

The meeting ended with a resolution that the PPP should be led by an NU cadre.²⁶ To follow up the resolution a team of five was created and known as "the congress controller assembly" (*majlis pengendali muktamar*): KH. Syansuri Badawi, KH. Cholil Bisri, KH. Hafiz Siraj, KH. Mussalim Ridho and KH. Nadhir Muhammad. At the meeting some NU nominators also rose to unseat the Metareum chairmanship: Karmani (chairman of the DPP-DPW of Central Java), Jusuf Hasyim (a senior politician of the NU, and a leader of the Tebuireng *Pesantren*, a Javanese traditional Islamic school in East Java), Matori Abdul Jalil (secretary general of the PPP), Hamzah Haz (a legislator), Soelaيمان Fadeli (chairman of the PPP-DPW of East Java) and Imam Churmen (legislator).

The team continued to consolidate powers and proposed a meeting among the NU politician *'ulamâs* at KH. Kholil Bisri's *pesantren*, in Rembang, East Java. This meeting then become known as the "Rembang meeting".

Before that meeting, a preliminary meeting was held in Purwokerto on May 26 1994 at the residence of KH. Mussalim Ridho. It was hoped that from this meeting some criteria would be formulated for proposal to the Rembang meeting.²⁷ At Purwokerto some NU *'ulamâs* and politicians from East, Central and West Java were present. It was reported that at this informal meeting they restated that the involvement of NU *'ulamâs* in the PPP should be intensified.²⁸

However the FKGMNU (Forum Komunikasi Generasi Muda

Nahdlatul Ulama, or Communication Forum of the Young Generation of Nahdlatul Ulama) protested about the meeting, saying that the *'ulamâs* had been manipulated by some NU politicians, whereas the NU had decided to return to the "1926 *khittah*" (mission). This mission stated that the NU had no formal relationship with any political parties; it is more a socio-cultural organization focusing on religion, education and income generating by the *ummah* (Muslim community). 1926 was the year of the NU's establishment as a socio-religio-cultural organization.

Amid controversy about the Rembang meeting, KH. Sahal Mahfudz, a senior and charismatic *'ulamâ'* of the NU and also known as an NGO activist, stated that the meeting was a kind of NU dynamic. The Central Committee of the NU, according to him, did not need to forbid nor to support the meeting.²⁹ However he questioned the urgency of the meeting, as the strength of the PPP did not depend on whether its leadership was held by an NU man or not. He said it was not certain that the PPP would be a stronger party under the helm of the NU's nominee because this does not automatically make the NU community vote for legislator candidates of the PPP in the General Election. He described that NU neutrality from political parties as making the community more independent. They will not automatically accept *'ulamâs'* appeals to the NU community to vote for legislators of a certain political party. It is believed that these independent political attitudes are a result of a political change within the NU community, and a result of political education among them, particularly after NU returned to the *khittah*.

His attendance at the Rembang meeting was surely hoped for, but before the committee of the meeting invited him, he had decided not to go because it was viewed as no connected with the NU.³⁰

In the meantime Mahbub Junaidi, another NU exponent, suggested that the Central Committee of the NU (PB NU) should not interfere with the internal affairs of the PPP. He said that if the NU community needed political party it would be better to propose a new one, rather than taking part formally in existing political parties. Therefore party politics act which only recognizes the tri-party system, should be changed.³¹

However KH. Munasir, of the Consultative Council of the NU, stated that the NU community was the majority of the PPP's supporters, and therefore it would be fair if an NU man, as a representative

of this majority, ruled the party.³²

The initiators of the Rembang meeting officially stated that the motive behind the meeting was a commitment to develop the PPP and to succeed the congress. It needed a moral force to strengthen the party.³³ The involvement of the *kyais* (Javanese Islamic scholars) was considered crucial for that purpose, because they were viewed as a major moral force. Without their strong involvement the party would be much weaker. KH. Kholil Bisri, the head of the meeting, stated that the role of the *'ulamâ* in the PPP had not been just minimized but completely eliminated. He further claimed, "if this is continued I do not know how the prospects of the party, because the *'ulamâs* have become leaders of the Muslim community (*ummah*), the basis and source of the party's authority."³⁴ Meanwhile, Jalil who had been nominated by the *'ulamâs* of the Rembang faction, stressed that an NU exponent had been prepared to unseat the PPP chairman, and that the Rembang meeting was considered to be a route to the position selected through some criteria of the PPP leader which would be formulated at the meeting.

Because of the controversy between the Rembang and the *khittah* factions, the meeting was reported to have been canceled. Soelaiman Fadeli, chairman of the PPP-DPW of East Java, said, "the PPP of East Java will reject the meeting if it does harm [to the NU as well as the party]".³⁵ Wahid also predicted, "There [in the meeting] will be a clash between the non-PPP and the PPP *'ulamâs*". Therefore he was pessimistic about whether the meeting would be successful, and Anwar Nurris, ex-secretary general of the NU felt the same.³⁶

This pessimism made Wahid and Jusuf Hasyim state that the meeting was nothing to do with the NU. "They'd be better claim themselves as PPP exponents than the NU's, because there are NU exponents in Golkar and in the PDI", said Hasyim.³⁷ Then Wahid, as the president of the NU, stated that he would not go to the meeting.

However, Jalil, as a nominated figure to run for the PPP chairmanship election, hoped that the meeting would provide him with a moral force for the election. "Besides that from Abdul Rahman Wahid I also need blessings from other *'ulamâs*, such as KH. Sahal [Mahfudh], KH. Ilyas [*ra'is sūriyyah*, or chairman of the Consultative Council of the NU] and KH. Idham Cholid".³⁸ But these three *'ulamâs* were in fact not among the Rembang faction, and therefore they were not present at the meeting.

Among the NU politicians who took part in the TMII meeting but then opposed the Rembang meeting were Hasyim and Fadeli of East Java, known as the faction of Jombang or Tebuireng or East Java. They proposed an alternative meeting which included not only NU exponents and PPP politicians but also those from Golkar and the PDI.³⁹ In a meeting held in Hasyim's house it was suggested that the Rembang meeting be canceled as it was seen as harmful to the NU.⁴⁰

From the provincial chapters of the NU there also arose some negative responses to the Rembang meeting. The Central Sulawesi NU, for example, threatened that they would propose that the Central Committee of the NU (PB NU) should purify the mission of returning to the 1926 *khittah*.⁴¹ Lahamado, chairman of the provincial committee of the NU (PW NU) of Central Sulawesi, stated, "the *kyais* who participated in the Rembang meeting have no institutional awareness. If the *kyais* do not return to the *khittah*, the NU of Central Sulawesi, which is neutral to any political parties so far, will affiliate with Golkar".

In line with this spirit, KH. Sahal Mahfudz had decided not to go to the meeting when he knew he was to be invited. "The meeting has nothing to do with the NU. I know nothing about the meeting, have never participated in nor wished to be involved with it. It does neither harm nor good to the NU."⁴² However he preferred the meeting to be canceled.⁴³

Slamet Effendy Yusuf, chairman of the Pemuda Anshor (Youth organization of the NU) and a Golkar legislator, saw the Rembang meeting as having harmed the consensus of returning to the 1926 *khittah*. Agreeing with this view, Choliq Murod, an NU-PDI legislator, reminded people that neither the meeting nor the PPP congress uses the NU.⁴⁴ KH. Dudung Abdul Halim, chairman of West Java's NU, also said that their *'ulamás* would not take part in the meeting.⁴⁵

Amid this controversy, Fadeli proposed another meeting, called the Jombang meeting, in anticipation of the failure of the Rembang meeting.⁴⁶ He maneuvered even further when he said that it was not impossible to create a coalition in the congress with the MI of Metareum's faction.

Another maneuver of the Jombang faction was made by Hasyim when he invited the Armed Forces chief Gen. Faisal Tanjung to attend his school's graduation. As it was only a graduation of secondary school students it was considered extraordinary when Tanjung ful-

filled this invitation.⁴⁷ Therefore it made sense when this was seen as evidence of a coalition between the Jombang and Metareum's factions as it was known that the government backed Metareum's.

Controversy about whether or not the Rembang meeting would be held had in fact forced some of its initiators to meet and lobby the chief of the Armed Forces' socio-political affairs, Gen. R. Hartono. They assured the General that the meeting would not decide who would be nominated as the PPP chairman.⁴⁸ However it was reported that another meeting was held and elected Karmani and Jalil as candidates to run for the PPP chairman election. These two figures would be proposed in the congress.⁴⁹

Uncertainty about whether the Rembang meeting would be held or not, also depended on the government's permission, i.e. the security agent. However this was answered when the Armed Forces' chief gave the green light to the proposed meeting.⁵⁰

News of this green light quickly soon spread, but the committee had doubt about the security of the meeting when it was reported that the FKGMNU would come and stir up trouble. As a response to the possible lack of security, the house head of the meeting, KH. Kholil Bisri, stated that it would not only be secured and guarded by *pesilats* (traditional self-defenders) but also by ghosts and powers of other mystical beings (*kekuatan ghaib*).⁵¹ In a sense this is a cultural reflection of this traditional NU faction.

The meeting, held on June 26 was attended by 79 *kyais*. Haz, Jalil and Karmani, the NU-PPP politicians, were present among them.⁵²

There were five agendas to discuss at the meeting: the nationhood, the statehood, the criteria of PPP's chairmanship, the 1926 *khittah* and national succession. The drafts of all of these agendas were formulated by the NU-PPP politician *kyais*.⁵³

The most crucial and controversial agenda item was about the criteria of the PPP chairmanship because some *kyais* wanted to specifically name a candidate for the PPP chairman and some did not. If one had been chosen it would have resulted open clashes among them, that would have been harmful to the unity of the faction itself. According to KH. Kholil Bisri the meeting would discuss the criteria then form a team (*lajnah*) to follow up the recommendations of the meeting. The team would be responsible for lobbying at the top level of political decision-makers.⁵⁴ At the meeting the status of the MPP would also be discussed. The problem with the PPP-MPP, where many

NU *kyais* are involved, is its minimal role in the decision-making process in the PPP. The meeting would propose that the MPP be elected by the representatives of the congress through the electoral board, not chosen by the DPP.

However, the Rembang meeting finally did not officially decide the name of a candidate to run as the PPP chairman. They seemed to be confused with three names: Jalil, Haz and Karmani. However *Suara Karya*, a daily paper belonging to the government backed Golkar, reported that all the *'ulamās* wanted Jalil to be the candidate. Compared to the other two, he was considered the most suitable for the agreed criteria.⁵⁵ This aspiration could not officially be relayed to the public because of an agreement with the government not to select a name, besides the need to safeguard the unity between the NU-PPP politicians involved in the faction.⁵⁶

From the meeting, some political statements arose: "the PPP is a party of the NU community. Therefore it must be led by an NU man. The community is aware of this. Under the MI chairmanship, the gain of votes in General Elections has continued to decrease. So the PPP must be under the helm of an NU man in order to increase the gain of votes".⁵⁷

The meeting also stated that they supported President Suharto's leadership, and supported his re-election as President for the next five year term. Suharto has been President since 1966, some 28 years, and therefore many critics hope that he will be replaced and say that Presidential term should be limited to two periods. But the *kyais* of the Rembang meeting stated:

In Islamic teaching there is no limitation on a position [*jabatan*]. If there is it will be legally forbidden [*harām*]. Whoever leads, he/she may continue to be elected as far as he/she is able and just. ... and one of the criteria for a national leader is listening to the advice of the *'ulamās*.⁵⁸

A "team of nine" was formed to follow up all the recommendations of the meeting: KH. Syansuri Badawi (legislator and chairman of the MPP of PPP), KH. Kholil Bisri, KH. Nadhier Muhammad, KH. Mussalim Ridho, KH. Hasyim Syiraz, KH. Alawy Muhammad, KH. Dimiyati Rais, KH. Nukman Zein and KH. Syuaidi.

As has been mentioned above, the meeting did not choose a candidate for the PPP chairman, whether it should be Jalil, Haz or Karmani. It was the job of the team to lobby for who was the most acceptable,

particularly to the government, among the three. They needed to lobby the elite of the government, as Syansuri Badawi as chairman of the team said: "the names will be discussed with the President [Suharto], and if God wills one proposed name to the president will be accepted".

In order to follow up the meeting the team also intensified their meetings and consolidation among the DPWs and the DPCs.⁵⁹ They even met Metareum to convey a recommendation of the meeting, asking that the *'ulamâs* of the Rembang faction be invited to the congress as advisors.⁶⁰

The wish to meet the President was conveyed to Gen. R. Hartono and his help sought about this.⁶¹ It was reported that the General would be pleased to help them meet the president.⁶² However, a few days later it was reported through the State Secretary, Murdiono, that the President had no time to meet them.⁶³

Amid their disappointment about the President's refusal to meet them, it was reported that KH. Alawy Muhammad, chairman of the team, who is known as an outspoken and charismatic *kyai* of Sampang, Madura, "baptized" (*bai'ah*) that Jalil be nominated as candidate for the PPP top spot.⁶⁴

Consolidating his support, Jalil facilitated a meeting in Garut, West Java, as he saw a sign that the *kyais* of the Rembang faction had decided to nominate him. However the Garut meeting only resulted in the team of nine dispersal and a recommendation to choose one candidate for nomination through *istikhârah* prayer (a special prayer when someone is confused about how to decide the best) which would be undertaken by three charismatic *kyais* known to be very close to Jalil: KH. Syansuri Badawi, KIL Alawy Muhammad and Cholil Bisri.⁶⁵

Amid the maneuvers of the Rembang faction, another group of the NU, known as the Jombang, Tebuireng, or Ampel faction, which nominated Hasyim, stated that the NU *'ulamâs* of East Java would send a letter to the President and ask him that an NU man —Jusuf Hasyim— be trusted to unseat the PPP top spot. It was also said that if it was necessary the *'ulamâs* would convey the letter directly to the President.⁶⁶ They had nominated Hasyim because there was no candidate of the NU as senior as him in politics.⁶⁷

Before the open conflict among the NU element, Hasyim himself had cross the elemental lines when he had a meeting with Metareum of the MI. After the meeting he stated that the chairman of the PPP

should not be from the NU.⁶⁸

Just as the Hasyim faction made a coalition with Metareum's of the MI, the Rembang faction also made a cross element coalition with another MI faction, Naro's. This latter coalition gained special attention from many PPP politicians and observers as under Naro's leadership, many NU politicians in the PPP were swept along, including Hasyim. Therefore the coalition in the eyes of the Hasyim faction, was a betrayal of the NU.⁶⁹

Amid the clash between Jalil's faction and Hasyim's, Haz, known as a faction of Cipete NU and disappointed with the Rembang faction which had nominated Jalil, made a beautiful maneuver when he gave a response to Metareum's open declaration of his wish to be re-elected. He said that Metareum was correct to be ready to be re-elected.⁷⁰ He pointed out that Metareum's readiness was based on the real support of the DPCs and the DPWs: representatives of 75 DPCs are from the MI, and only 55 from the NU. Therefore, if it was based on elemental interests, all of the electoral board or formatters would be from the MI. He hoped that Metareum would not take that route, and stated that the first priority was the unity of the party beyond the elemental interests. He said, "togetherness to develop the party must be the first priority".⁷¹

It was surely a smooth maneuver on Haz's part to make a new coalition with Metareum's faction after he was disappointed with the Rembang faction. Actually Metareum felt that Haz was close to him, and he had reminded him not to be deceived by the actions of the Rembang faction.⁷²

As the congress was drawing close, a statute of the congress was formulated and agreed. It is stated in this that there are no observers for the congress, including the *'ulamâs*. This disappointed the Rembang faction *'ulamâs*, because they hoped that they could attend as observers and as the advisers. Metareum, as chairman, was seen to be ignoring their requirements for the proposes.⁷³

A week before the congress, the Rembang faction had another meeting in TMII, and it was there that the faction finally decided to choose Jalil as the official candidate of the faction to compete with other candidates for the top spot of the PPP. This surely disappointed Haz and therefore, in the congress he left the faction and tried to make a new

coalition.⁷⁴

3. *Sri-Bintang Pamungkas: a Single Power*

Amid the maneuvers of the two mainstreams in the PPP, Metareum's faction and Jalil's, Dr. Sri-Bintang Pamungkas rose as a single figure to contend the PPP chairmanship. An economist, who graduated from Ohio State University and is now on the teaching staff of the Faculty of Technology, the University of Indonesian, he, however, a new-comer to the PPP. He ran as a legislator and was elected in the General Election two years ago.

Pamungkas is known as an outspoken politician of the PPP, and tries to define it as an opposition party to the government party, Golkar. Because of his critical views, he gains sympathy and support from a small layer of society, certain circles of students, NGO activists, intellectuals and politicians. The attendants at his strategic book discussion a few days before the congress, such as Rudini, Ali Sadikin, Gunawan Muhammad, WS Rendra, Adnan Buyung Nasution, and many others, may show his political position.⁷⁵

Pamungkas has questioned some political issues which are taboo to most Indonesian politicians: the dual function of the Armed Forces (Dwi-fungsi ABRI), the lack of an opposition political party, the political party act and the national succession. He disagrees with the dual function of the Armed Forces in which they are not only responsible for security and defense but also involved in the socio-political field. Pamungkas views this as the source of an authoritarian regime. He proposes that the dual function be abolished. Because of this view he had been warned by his "fraction" in the DPR, and advised that he might be recalled from his position as a legislator.

Pamungkas views the PPP as an Islamic party. He said, "if the PPP is in fact not an Islamic party I will leave it and establish an Islamic one".⁷⁶ According to him politics should be based on conscience guided by faith, science and technology, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. He is convinced that "Pancasila will become an empty slogan without being filled with a strong Islamic spirit".⁷⁷

An ex-activist of the PII and a member of Expert Board of the ICMI, Pamungkas views the weaknesses of the PPP as lying in some internal cliques, an orientation crisis between the wish to be part of the people or of the government, a lack of firm cadres, and a strong

belief that it is difficult to state the truth and justice.

But is there a place for a politician like him in New Order Indonesia?

One regulation of the congress is that a candidate for the PPP chairman must have been a functionary of the party at the level of the DPC, the DPW to the DPP. This requirement surely cannot be fulfilled by Pamungkas, because he has never been in any of these positions. He is a new-comer to the party. Therefore he has to forget his wish to run for the election.

However the DPW of East Kalimantan nominated him as the chairman, and this made him continue his campaign. In order that he could run for the election, he proposed that the above rule be changed, but the committee of the congress ignored him and kept the regulation. So the door was closed to Pamungkas.

Besides which, the representatives were limited to the functionaries of the DPP and MPP only, three representatives of each DPW and two of each DPC. The representatives of the DPW and the DPC are those who have been affirmed by the DPP.⁷⁸ Therefore many PPP figures were not allowed to attend the congress, e.g. Naro, Dault, Pamungkas, Thamrin, Mardjono, Hasyim and many others. The *kyais* of Rembang, as Jalil's success team were also not allowed, and they were indeed disappointed with the congress committee.

But ironically, the congress was open to more than 50 government officials of the Department of Home Affairs and the Armed Forces. They were invited as observers, and as Pamungkas testified,⁷⁹ as lobbyists of a government backed faction. It is they who controlled the congress so that it was carried out in accordance with government interests. Many observers questioned their presence: how far would they interfere in the selection of the new party chairman?

Besides this, the congress had also been troubled about its costs. For this convention the PPP needed at least Rp 1.5 billion but had only Rp 100 million in its coffers. The chairman of the Party, Metareum, appealed to the government to provide adequate help with funding. He said, "without the government's contribution we will not be able to hold our congress".⁸⁰ The Government fulfilled the request although did not provide as much as had been proposed, providing only one billion rupiah instead of the one and a half billion requested.

Metareum and Jalil seemed to disagree about the governmental fi-

nancial help. To Metareum the help would not decrease the independence of the party, as the money is from the people but managed by the government, and every party has a right to funding from the government. Jalil on the contrary viewed the help as making the party more dependent on the government. He suggested that the congress costs should be allocated from contributions from party members.⁸¹

Despite the problem of the congress coast, it was finally held and opened by President Suharto, a chairman of Golkar's patron board on 29 August 1994 at the Grand Hyatt Jakarta Convention Center (JCC). According to the congress committee, the opening ceremony was held at the JCC, in order to commemorate the greatness of Indonesia under Suharto's leadership, as it was at the JCC that the summit of the non-Allied Countries Movement was held under President Suharto's chairmanship a few years ago.

The following session were held at the plain Hajj Dormitory, Pondok Gede, Jakarta. To the committee however, this place has a special meaning, since it is there that Muslims prepare to go on the pilgrimage to the holy land, Mecca.

This third congress was attended by 716 representatives of 294 DPCs and 27 DPWs, by functionaries of the DPP and the MPP, and a chairman of PPP's fraction in the DPR. If viewed in terms of elements, the MI element appeared dominant (see *table 1*). Therefore many observers nominated candidates of the MI for the 1994-99 top spot of the party.

If seen from the DPW's general views it is evident that the elements were still determining factors in voting. 17 DPWs nominated Metareum of the MI to be re-elected, 2 from East Java and West Java nominated Jalil of the NU, and the remainder (9) asked the selected Electoral Board or Formatter team to chose the chairman. Meanwhile the outspoken Pamungkas gained no votes. But this overview cannot be taken as representing real power in terms of elements because many DPCs protested against the DPWs' nominations.⁸² This is crucial to consider since the DPCs represented the majority of the voters.

At this congress it was agreed that the election of the chairman of the party should be through an Electoral Board or formatter team which consisted of seven members and was elected by the representatives. This team then elected the chairman and members of the DPP and the MPP.⁸³

The congress, which was guarded by 2100 military personnel, was

Table 1: Representatives according to elements

Representatives	Elements				
	MI	NU	SI	Perti	Total
DPP	25	20	6	3	54
MPP	9	6	2	2	19
Aceh	18	-	2	2	22
North Sumatra	23	5	5	3	36
West Sumatra	23	2	2	3	30
Riau	13	4	1	-	17
Jambi	11	-	4	1	16
South Sumatra	12	6	2	2	22
Bengkulu	6	2	1	1	10
Lampung	6	5	1	-	12
Jakarta	6	2	1	-	9
West Java	30	15	5	2	52
Central Java	32	36	2	2	72
Yogyakarta	8	4	-	-	10
East Java	27	45	2	2	76
South Kalimantan	6	16	-	-	22
West Kalimantan	3	13	-	-	16
Central Kalimantan	6	8	-	-	14
East Kalimantan	5	9	-	-	14
North Sulawesi	4	2	9	3	18
Central Sulawesi	4	-	4	2	10
South Sulawesi	25	15	6	2	48
South-east Sulawesi	7	1	2	-	10
Bali	12	8	-	-	20
NTB	9	6	1	-	16
NTT	14	12	-	-	26
Maluku	8	4	-	-	12
Irian Jaya	15	7	-	-	22
East Timor	8	1	1	-	10
Total	375	254	59	28	716

Source: *Kompas* (August 29, 1994)

enlivened by demonstrations and protests from Pamungkas' supporters. They were youths and students from several regions and universities, and were grouped together in what they called the *Forum Pemuda Mahasiswa Pro Demokrasi* (FPMPD, Forum of Pro-Democratic Youth and Students). They came with large posters supporting Pamungkas, and attempted to enter the congress arena. But the security guards broke up their protest.

Like Pamungkas, Jalil also had "informal" supporters. They came from central Java and also tried to enter the arena. Again the military forces broke them up. They seemed to be very frustrated and said that "the congress is really like being in hell".⁸⁴ Like being in hell was not only felt by his supporters but also by Jalil himself when the majority of the DPWs proposed Metareum for re-election. Jalil then anticipated the real power to be at the DPCs levels and, with his Rembang faction, he consolidated this power and lobbied some senior NU politicians. For example, they met KH. Idham Chalid and it was reported that he was on Jalil's side. This image was necessary to consolidate the powers of the DPWs and DPCs of Kalimantan in which Chalid was considered influential, although his secretary then denied that he had supported Jalil.⁸⁵

However, Jalil stated, "I am still optimistic, because it is the 'ulamâs who back me in running for the election. Also in the next formatters' election the DPCs will be the real force instead of the DPWs. Just wait and see".⁸⁶

The closer it got to the Electoral Board's election the more support there was for Metareum. Some of the DPCs from East and Central Java as Jalil's two main bases, claimed they would vote for Metareum. Conversely Jalil seemed not to be gaining support from representatives from outside Java except for some DPCs from Bali and North Sumatra which were considered to be Naro loyalists. This proved the coalition between Jalil and Naro.⁸⁷

Maneuvers in the congress not only intensified between Metareum's and Jalil's factions but also between Metareum's and the MI faction of four led by Thamrin and Marjono. As is already known, this faction had nominated Chalil Badawi to unseat the PPP top spot. Thamrin consolidated forces from the side-lines because he was not allowed to enter the congress arena.⁸⁸

However Badawi himself stated that he did not feel in competition with Metareum, and he seemed to be more accommodative and realis-

tic when he said: "if I am elected to be a formatter I will keep the unity with Metareum, and the structure of the formatters will be given to him provided that he accommodates provincial aspirations".⁸⁹

Amid the moves of the MI faction of four, Metareum seemed to have intensified his coalition with Haz's NU faction. It was reported that they ever come to an agreement about the formatter structure: 4 from the MI and 3 from the NU. However Metareum seemed to feel insecure with the formation so he and his success team (Amini, Bafadal, Kiaidemak, Hamzah and Adam) then announced a "formatter package" which consisted of Metareum, Amini, Kiaidemak, Bafadhal, Adam, Asmoredjo and Hamzah. All of these were from the MI element of Metareum faction. Haz and other NU men were excluded.⁹⁰ Haz and Fadeli were surely disappointed and felt deceived, because in the short time left it was almost impossible for them to consolidate an alternative formatter team to accommodate their aspirations.⁹¹ However it was reported as if Haz and Fadeli would have returned to Jalil's faction. In fact they made a formatter team by themselves without involving the Rembang faction. If they had returned to the Rembang faction, said some observers, they would have gained at least four of the seven formatters.

Meanwhile the faction of four also announced a formatter package without Metareum in this. Jalil also announced his package without Haz and Haz's also excluded Jalil but interestingly included Metareum and Badawi of the MI. Even Metareum and Badawi, beside Haz, were nominated for the top spot of the PPP.⁹²

However Metareum's package proved dominant (see *table 2*), and some nominated figures such as Haz, Cholil Badawi, Thamrin and Fadeli were tossed aside from the top seven, the Electoral Board. The elected formatters were five from Metareum's faction (Metareum, Amini, Kiaidemak, Bafadal and Asmoredjo) and two from the Rembang faction (Jalil and Syansuri Badawi). These two factions were known as the most competitive and the most conflicting.

Among the votes there are some that were invalid. These were for non-representatives, such as Pamungkas. However it is interesting that Pamungkas gained 14 votes compared to Naro who gained none.

The elected formatters (*table 3*), led by Metareum as he gained the majority, should soon compose new structures of the DPP and the MPP for the 1994-1999 period. It was hoped that the Electoral Board would compose the structures by consensus. However, many observ-

Table 2: Voting for formatter candidates
in the third congress of the PPP, 1994

Candidates	no. of votes	element	Candidates	no. of votes	element
<i>A. Materium's package</i>			Yudo Paripurno	24	Perti
Ismail Hasan Materium	230	MI	Syafriansyah	22	NU
Ali Hardi Kiaidemak	156	MI	Hasan Dassy	16	?
Aisyah Amini	153	MI	Y. R.I Tjokroaminoto	8	SI
Muhsin Bafadhal	139	MI	M. Buang	7	Perti
M. Djufri Asmoredjo	128	MI	Zarkasih Noor	6	NU
Didik Iskandar	128	MI	Yusuf Pardamaian	5	?
Ali Marwan Hasan	87	MI	Zain Badjeber	5	NU
<i>B. Jalil's Package</i>			Anshary Syam	4	?
Matori Abdul Jalil	134	NU	Tosari Wijaya	4	NU
K.H. Syansuri Badawi	131	NU	M. Syafie Nongke	4	?
Ahmad Karmani	123	NU	Arwis Rangkuti	3	?
Rusnain Yahya	82	NU	Usman Saidi	3	?
Saaduddin Ibrahim	56	NU	Mardinsyah	3	MI
Abd. Mappagiling	47	MI	Barna Sumantri	3	?
Ki Drajat Purba	44	SI	Darussamin	2	MI
<i>C. Thamrin's Package:</i>			Abduh Padare	2	?
Cholil Badawi	83	MI	Rustam Eifendi	2	?
Tapudin Ibrahim	63	MI	Mukrom Asad	1	?
Alihan Dharmawan	31	?	Chozin Chumaedi	1	?
Yahya	20	?	Yusuf Syakir	1	MI
Aziz Imran	12	?	Ramli Nurapi	1	?
Soritua Siregar	5	?	Enron Pangkapi	1	MI
Deddy Sutardi	1	?	<i>E. Invalid votes:</i>		
<i>D. Non-package votes:</i>			Sri Bintang Pamungkas	14	none
M. Rodja	72	?	Zainudin MZ	1	?
Hamzah Haz	70	NU	Husnie Thamrin	1	MI
Syafiful Anwar Husein	58	SI	HM Dault	3	MI
Soelaiman Fadeli	37	NU	M. Shaleh Khalid	1	MI
			Mohd. Rozak	1	?
			M. Rajab	1	?
			Total	2240	
			Invalid votes	14	
			Valid votes	2226	
			Imperative votes	2240	

ers were pessimistic about the consensus since the two factions in the Electoral Board were known to be conflicting, and this was prove when the Electoral Board came to a deadlock and failed to compromise.

How the process of decision-making came to a deadlock was reported by Amini on the floor of the congress and it was stated that Jalil agreed with her.

Matori [Abdul Jalil] asked for a seven NU men quota, including the positions of general secretary and chairman of the MPP. The board

Table 3: Electoral Board of the third congress
of the PPP 1994.

Name	No. of votes	Element	Faction
Ismail Hasan Materium	230	MI	Materium
Ali Hardi Kiaidemak	156	MI	Materium
Aisyah Amini	153	MI	Materium
Muhsin Bafadal	139	MI	Materium
Matori Abdul Djalil	134	NU	Rembang
Syansuri Badawi	131	NU	Rembang
Djufri Asmoredjo	128	MI	Materium

agreed with him, but he insisted that he and his faction [Rembang] chose the seven NU men and he himself requested the secretary general position. The board disagreed and Jalil asked that the discussion be postponed for a few minutes to consult with his faction. Then the discussion was continued, but Jalil and Badawi entered with no other alternatives. Jalil and Badawi then walked out, and the discussion was continued with only five members [Metareum's faction] of the board. We finally completed our duty to compose compact and harmonious functional structures of the DPP and the MPP".⁹³

The composed structures keep Jalil's aspiration of including seven NU men, including the positions of general secretary and chairman of the MPP. Jalil was not included in the structure, but Badawi was. He was chosen as vice chairman of the MPP.⁹⁴

In the meantime Jalil stated that he and KH. Syansuri Badawi could not compromise as they had to follow the aspirations of the *'ulamâs* (Rembang). What he proposed in the Electoral Board discussion was the *'ulamâs*' aspirations. The *'ulamâs* want the NU cadres who sit in the DPP and the MPP to be those who have mass support, united with the grass root masses. It is the *'ulamâs* who know these cadres instead of Metareum's faction, because the *'ulamâs* have contact with the masses. Metareum's faction, said Jalil, seemed to prefer cohesiveness or solidity among the DPP and MPP rather than mass support.

It was also reported that the *'ulamâs* met Metareum to discuss the structures before the Electoral Board was elected. The *'ulamâs* claimed that Metareum would accommodate their aspirations as conveyed by Jalil. Therefore they felt harassed when he in fact did not take up

Functionary Structures of the DPP
and MPP of the Central Committee of the PPP 1994-1999

The DPP:

Chairperson	:	H. Ismael Hasan Metareum (MI)
Vice-chairpersons	:	Aisyah Amini (MI)
		Hamzah Haz (NU)
		Ali Hardi Kiyayidemak (MI)
		Yudo Paripurno (Perti)
		Djufri Asmaredjo (MI)
		Zain Badjeber (NU)
		Syaeful Anwar Husein (SI)
		Yusuf Syakir (MI)
		Zarkasih Noer (NU)
General Secretary	:	Tosari Wijaya (NU)
Vice-gen. Sec.	:	Muchsin Bafadhal (MI)
		HM. Buang (Perti)
		Bachtiar Hamzah (MI)
		Yusuf Rizal (SI)
		H. Abduh Paddare (NU)
		H. Ali Marwan Hanan (MI)
		H. Anwar Nuris (NU)
		Abd. Muis AY (MI)
Treasurer	:	Faizaal Basyir (MI)
Vice treasurer	:	Danial Tanjung (NU)

The MPP:

Chairman	:	Maemun Zubaer (NU)
Vice-chairpersons	:	Jusuf Hasyim (NU)
		Syansuri Badawi (NU)
		Rusdi Hamka (MI)
		Ridwan Ibrahim Lubis (MI)
		Nurul Huda (SI)
		Oesman Suhaedi (Perti)

Jalil's proposals. Because of this disappointment Syansuri Badawi, one of the *'ulamâs*, claimed that the structures of the DPP and the MPP formulated by Metareum's faction were invalid or illegitimate, and he then refused to sit in the MPP's structure when he was chosen.

Jalil's claim that Metareum preferred solidity among the MPP and the DPP to mass support, was shown to be reasonable when Tosari Wijaya was chosen as secretary general. This is because Wijaya is not very popular compared to Jalil or Haz even among the NU community, even though he is a functionary of the Central Committee of the NU. Wijaya himself claims very close to Metareum, which is prob-

ably why he was chosen for the sake of solidity among the Central Committee of the PPP.

When Badawi refused to sit as the chairman of the MPP, Metareum ordered Haz to lobby KH. Maemun Zuber, another NU's senior *'ulamâ*, to replace him. Zuber at first appeared reluctant to take the position, and he viewed Jusuf Hasyim as better for the position. But Haz persuaded him that he was more acceptable. "Pak Ud [Jusuf Hasyim] is less acceptable to the government", said Haz.⁵⁵ Hasyim himself was chosen as a vice chairman of the MPP, but he appeared reluctant to join the MPP. He criticized the Electoral Board because they were considered to be unable to reach a consensus, and he also objected to being chosen for the position because he was not asked previously.

A New Political Party: a Reaction

The congress ended with the success of Metareum's faction. This surely disappointed other factions, Pamungkas and the Rembang faction being among those who expressed their disappointment.

In his evaluation of the congress Pamungkas wrote,

... the winner of the congress has been determined by the entry of the authorities [government] into the congress' arena as an invited party. This is very ironic ... when members of the party [itself] were not allowed to enter ... [The authorities] were not haphazardly invited but specifically to interfere ... hundreds [of the authorities] entered the congress room in disguise ... officials from socio-political affairs section of the Department of Home Affairs entered the congress room. They, individually or together with the security guards, really interfered with the formatters' election and also with the composing of the electoral board. Directly or indirectly intervention has taken place. They even entered the rooms of voters [to interfere with them]. This is not really the congress of the PPP, but of the authorities. A lesson from the congress is that there is a strong collaboration between the Party's functionaries and the authorities for the sake of the chairman's position.

The intervention of the government is obviously hard to avoid. It also happened at the PDI congress. However at the PDI congress the authorities came without invitation. In the PPP congress the authorities on the contrary came and were asked to enter the arena because the party chairman invited them. So there was collaboration and agreement between the PPP chairman and the authorities. Therefore the PPP congress was relatively more 'peaceful' than the PDI's. ... the PPP has been made 'yellow' (*dikuningkan*).⁵⁶

Pamungkas' evaluation is in someways true, because in Indonesian

politics the intervention of the authorities (the military and Golkar) is not unusual. In the Department of Home Affairs there is a Directorate General which plays a patron role in the party system in Indonesia. In the Armed Forces there is also a socio-political affairs section which is responsible for the implementation of the dual-function of the Armed Forces, and in practice is also responsible for controlling political parties. How these two political institutions of the New Order interfered with the PPP congress was also admitted by Metareum himself when he said that he had to consult the two institutions when he wanted to choose functionaries of the MPP and the DPP, particularly for the position of general secretary.⁹⁷

Because the results of the congress do not accommodate his interests or aspirations, Pamungkas said that he was considering leaving the party and establishing the new one, which would be more independent or even be a similar opposition party because that is what is necessary to control the authorities, as a prerequisite to a desired democratic state.

A more major disappointment occurred within the NU community, particularly in the Rembang faction. Even Wahid, chairman of the NU who claimed to be neutral on PPP's affairs, seemed unable to hide his disappointment with the results of the congress when Jalil was not elected. He said that, with a non-NU man in the top spot of the party, the NU community who have been supporters of the party to date, would leave it.⁹⁸ "The newly elected DPP is less representative of the hopes of NU devotees. If in reality their aspirations are not accommodated they will probably vote for ... PDI, Golkar or shun the [next general] election (*Golput*)".⁹⁹ When he was asked whether he would appeal to NU devotees to vote for PDI or Golkar instead of PPP, he answered: "It is too early for the Central Committee of the NU to appeal to its members to convert to the PDI. ... although it is necessary to appeal [to vote for the PDI] this is to avoid them shunning the election. If I did not appeal to them, a boycott of the next general election would be undertaken by many. If I appeal to them to vote for the Golkar this will be difficult because this party does not suit them. So shunning the general election or voting for the PDI are left as the alternatives".¹⁰⁰ Wahid, like Jalil, also considers that the NU men in the new functionary structure of the DPP are not mass based politicians.

Disappointment was also expressed by KH. Cholil Bisri, as the

house head of the Rembang meeting: "Metareum had promised to choose Matori [Jalil] as the secretary general ... But in fact he did not keep his promise. ... we feel harassed by him breaking this promise".¹⁰¹

KH. Idham Chalid—a figure of the Cipete NU, a rival of the Situbondo NU now led by Wahid—conversely holds the view that the congress was successful. He sees that there are now more NU men in the new composition of the Central Committee of the PPP. He then assessed that there are charismatic figures among them, and therefore there is nothing to worry about if NU members will leave the party.¹⁰²

In accordance with this opinion, Gen. Aminullah Ibrahim of the Armed Forces' 'fraction' (*Fraksi ABRI*) in the DPR stated that the congress was successful and the process was democratic.¹⁰³ More a specific assessment was given by the Armed Forces' spokesman, Syarwan Hamid, who had nominated Metareum, when he said that Metareum was indeed more popular.¹⁰⁴

However, Cholid's opinions and the Armed Forces' views seem not to cure the disappointment of the Rembang faction. They became more and more disappointed even to an unthinkable level, if this is understood in terms of *aliran politics*, when they considered converting to the PDI. KH. Alawy Muhammad, a charismatic NU *kyai* of Sampang, said that he was thinking of joining the PDI.

That statement seems to have been taken seriously by the PDI's functionaries. Even Muhammad himself proposed a *khaul* (passing ceremony) for Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia and a symbol of the PDI's power, at his *pesantren*, in Sampang, Madura.

Also the *kyais* of the Rembang faction continue to consolidate powers to make the NU more involved in politics. KH. Syansuri Badawi has a plan to revise the consensus of returning to the 1926 *khittah*. He hopes that the NU will return to political party: to the PPP or by establishing a new party. This can be proposed as an agenda item in the NU congress to be held at the end of this year in Tasikmalaya, West Java.

Whether the NU will decide to return to politics or to stick to the 1926 *khittah* depends on how its elite defines Indonesian New Order politics. Their definition, however, will not be very independent. They have to take account of the authorities' definition of Indonesian politics. It is not too pretentious to assume that they will generate their definition from that of the authorities.

The authorities' definition is reflected in President Suharto's speech delivered at a reception commemorating the 30th anniversary of the ruling party Golkar:

Indonesia does not need a new political party or functional group [Golkar] ... the current three political organizations, Golkar, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), are adequate. ... We have had unfortunate experiences with a multi-party system. It hampered political decision-making. ... the current system has created political stability, crucial to the national development effort. Therefore we need to continuously maintain, solidify and improve our political order. We don't want to add a new political party or a new functional grouping.¹⁰⁵

This ruling definition of political parties or party politics in Indonesia seems to have closed the possibility of establishing a new political party in order to accommodate the political aspirations of the NU factions after their disappointment with the PPP. Even in an audience of NU *'ulamâs* with President Suharto to ask him to open the NU congress he said that keeping the 1926 *khittah* is a correct commitment.¹⁰⁶ "I am grateful, feel happy and thank God for the commitment of NU community in keeping the *khittah*", he said.¹⁰⁷

This means that it is almost impossible for the NU to return to formal politics. Perhaps some NU *'ulamâs* will oppose the ruling decision, but it will be political suicide, or they will define it as "political martyrdom".

If the possibility of new political party for the NU community is almost closed, how will they articulate their political aspirations or interests? Will they leave the PPP? The last congress of the PPP is perhaps an experience to answer the question: What lessons can be learned from the congress? Why did the Rembang faction fail?

The State and the Aliran Politics

Amir Santoso observed that the success of Metareum rested on his ability to understand Indonesian political culture. He explains,

Those who are vocals, like Pamungkas and Djalil, that is, those who campaign are usually not elected. On the other hand those who remain silent hold a good possibility of becoming a member or even chairman of an organization. ...

In Indonesia, to present oneself is considered as a show of arrogance or stirring up trouble. Those who have ambition of becoming a party chairman will have to be aware of this aspect of Indonesian culture.¹⁰⁸

Santoso seems to ignore¹⁰⁹ the probable intervention of the state. He sees the Indonesian culture instead of the state as explaining Metareum's success, and the failure of Jalil, Pamungkas and the others.

The political culture referred to by Santoso is usually associated with Javaneness, but it is also common among Muslims. If it is true that the failure of Jalil, for example, is due to his failure to understand the culture, what kind of culture is this? Jalil is Javanese, and therefore he must be more familiar with the culture than Metareum who is Acehnese. In terms of culture Jalil must have had a greater chance than Metareum to gain the PPP chairmanship. So it is doubtful if the success of the latter is connected to culture.

Syamsuddin Haris¹¹⁰ of the Indonesian Science Institute (LIPI) attempted to give a "holistic" explanation of the NU failure, particularly of the Rembang faction. He says that there are three factors in this faction's failure in the congress: 1) their political behavior, 2) the relationship between the authorities and party politics and 3) internal conflicts within the NU.

The political behavior of the NU politicians was very demonstrative: they demonstrated that they were supported by large masses. They defined that mass support is significant in unseating the chairman of the PPP. This was a mistake, because mass support is not very relevant to Indonesian politics which is more determined by the elite (authorities) rather than the masses.¹¹¹

He argues that the New Order government defines political parties as "partners" instead of as articulators of people. The elites of the parties will be accepted only if they are accommodative to the authorities. So, the authorities are the only powerful givers of blessing to any political elites. The *'ulamás* or the people are not significant here.

Also the authorities have not forgotten the "political sins" of the NU, since they opposed some government proposals: the marriages' act, the general election act, etc. They are also known to have supported the "Petition of Fifty" (*Petisi Limapuluh*), an opposition group.¹¹²

Haris also sees internal conflict within the NU as a factor in its

failure. The commitment to return to the 1926 *khittah* has in fact polarized NU into some factions: 1) supporters of "pure khittah", who really want to free the NU from formal politics such as political parties. They want the NU to focus its activities on social, economic and religious affairs (education, income generating, etc.); 2) ex-politicians of the PPP who were removed especially Hasyim's circle during Naro's chairmanship, who still dream of returning to the PPP; 3) NU-PPP politicians of the Cipete faction, in which Idham Chalid has become a figure head, who are known as more accommodative to the MI element of the PPP as well as the authorities; 4) the NU politician '*ulamâs*' of the PPP, known as the Rembang faction, who believe that the *kyais*' charisma makes people vote for the PPP; and 5) NU politicians of other political parties, Golkar and the PDI, who condemn PPP politicians use of the NU's name in their political maneuvers.

Amid this polarization the central committee of the NU appeared ambivalent in its view of the PPP's congress: at one time it was said that the NU is neutral to any political party, but at another they showed their disappointment with the Rembang faction's failure.

Haris also predicts that the prospects for the NU's involvement with the PPP will not be relevant if it is based on an *ideology*: Islam. This is because the prospects of the party will have to depend on rational and pragmatic programs otherwise it will have no supporters. He argues that the majority of voters in the future will be a new generation with less ideological sentiments as they were born in the time of non-ideological competitions. Besides, Islam is no longer the monopoly of the PPP, other political parties have also claimed themselves as Islamic and they often compete with each other in the name of Islam.

Afan Gaffar¹¹³ of Gajah Mada University observes that the Rembang faction failed because they forced themselves to nominate Jalil, whereas he did not accommodate Metareum enough. Besides which, Jalil did not have enough access to the DPWs and the DPCs compared to Metareum. His lobbying and coalition were limited to within the NU, whereas Metareum crossed the element boundaries of the PPP. Thus Metareum was more acceptable.

Compared to Metareum, Jalil's maneuvers took less account of the superstructure's (the authorities') aspirations. Metareum, however, had no doubts about leaving his senior colleagues in the MI for the sake of his position at the top of the party as they were considered less acceptable to the authorities.

The failure of the Rembang faction, according to Gaffar¹¹⁴ will not make all NU members leave the PPP. Those who will leave the party are perhaps from the Rembang and the Jombang factions. Meanwhile the Cipete faction will remain loyal to the party. He also doubts a move by some of the NU *'ulamâs* to join the PDI, because the NU and the PDI are culturally incompatible. If an *'ulamâs* joins the PDI he will be challenged by the Christians and secularists within the party.

Gaffar also hypothesizes that the failure of the Rembang faction will not make NU politicians leave the party, because they will somehow choose something more pragmatic than sustaining their emotional relationships with the *kyais*. Becoming a politician is interesting enough economically.

In the above explanations by Haris and Gaffar there are some inconsistencies, perhaps because of the complexities of the PPP phenomena.

On the one hand, Haris and Gaffar argue how the New Order state was a determining factor in the election of the PPP chairman, but on other hand they tend to blame the Rembang faction (Jalil) for their failure to understand the political aspirations of the authorities. Besides which, Haris sees the decision to return to the 1926 *khittah* as a source of the internal conflicts of the NU and this is also another factor in their failure at the congress. However he does not see any correlation between that decision and the political engineering of the authorities, whereas this engineering is clear cut, as a result of the depoliticization of masses by the holders of powers. It is no wonder that President Suharto was the first to say "thank God for the *'ulamâs*' commitment to keep the decision of returning to the 1926 *khittah*".

Gaffar's analysis also seems to be incoherent when he predicts that the politician *'ulamâs* will not join the PDI because they are culturally incompatible. Yet he also hypothesizes that the pragmatic interests of NU politicians are more determinant than their emotional relationship with the *'ulamâs*. Therefore they will not leave the PPP because becoming a legislator of the party is economically worthwhile. For the sake of economic or pragmatic interests, why is it not possible for the politician *'ulamâs* to leave the PPP and join the PDI? Gaffar is still constricted here by the concept of *aliran* politics.

Explaining the PPP congress and conflicts within the party within the conceptual framework of *aliran* and the *elements* of the PPP, appears more clearly in Loade Ida's analysis, from the Uhlaw.¹¹⁵ He

argues that the fusion of the PPP is hard to achieve because of the sharply differing elements within the party, particularly that of the MI and the NU. These two elements are considered to have very distinct ideologies or value orientations and, therefore, it is hard to compromise them. In Indonesian political discourses, MI is usually understood as a modernist Muslim political organization, and NU as traditionalist Muslim group.

Ida seems to ignore the pervasive developmental programs driven by the authorities which cannot be avoided by any community such as the NU. It is hard to deny that the NU community has become less traditional: how unmodernist are NU men such as Wahid, Mahfudz, Masdar Farid Masudi and particularly many of the new generation of the NU when they work together for peace and democracy with, for example, Catholics and Protestants through Fordem, *Kompas*, Interfidei and many other organizations or forums? If the *aliran* had really constituted the NU they would have preferred to have worked exclusively with other Muslim organizations rather than with non-Muslim groups.

The inadequacy of the conceptual framework of *aliran* politics to explain the contemporary PPP phenomena has implicitly been described above at length. In concluding this article however, it needs to be more stated explicitly.

In the congress there arose many factions and coalitions among the PPP activists, not because of their ideological differences or affinities but rather because of their temporal interests to fight for the chairmanship of the party. In order to achieve this target, Metareum's faction may have made a coalition with the Cipete NU, and Rembang NU faction with Naro. The elements in fact did not hamper them in making elemental cross-coalitions.

However the elemental cross-coalitions seemed to be insecure for the target, so they not only crossed the elements but also the *aliran* lines. The *santris* in PPP should also make coalitions with the authorities which are considered culturally more Javanese (*Priyayi* and *abangan*). These *aliran* cross-coalitions are actually a determining factor of whether a faction will lose or win the game. The faction which can make a coalition with the authorities is that which is considered most acceptable to the letter. Metareum's faction seemed to be the one because, under his chairmanship, the PPP can play its role as a loyal client (the authorities being its good patron), not an opposi-

tion party.

A *devaluation* of *aliran* politics in the PPP seems to be occurring. The central agent of that devaluation is clearly the New Order state with its developmental or modernizing programs, and developmentalism seems to have substituted the *alirans*.

Development that is driven by the government particularly through educational programs and certain political policies, obviously has pervasive consequences both socially and culturally.

The massive education program has opened vertical mobilization including that of rural to urban, in which most of the Muslim community are within the stream of mobilization. *Santri* Children become exposed to more cosmopolitan culture especially through their education. They enter modern schools, built by the authorities, together with children from other *alirans*: Christian, *abangan*, *priyayi* and secular modernists. They grow to be a more urban and cosmopolitan generation, relatively free from *aliran* conflicts. Therefore *alirans* have become a less socially significant factor than the developmentalism. The new generation generally does not experience open ideological or *aliran* conflicts along their lives in New Order Indonesia. This cannot be separated from the intensive efforts by the authorities to maintain national stability.

This New Order generation therefore has different political aspirations from those of their parents. They are culturally more pragmatic, rational, and so forth, and therefore they would rather define political parties as interest groups than ideological ones. This generation is less familiar with the old socio-political leadership: the *kyais* or *'ulamâs*.

In the NU community, this generation manifests itself, for example, in the FKGMNU, who condemned the *kyais'* involvement in the PPP. This generation views their maneuvers as "purely" political tactic in the name of the NU. This layer of the NU community is growing, and it is upon their shoulders that the future of the NU rests. They are less and less convinced by the *'ulamâ's* political leadership which is therefore fading away or in crisis. The *'ulamâs* could claim to be leaders of the masses, but their relationships with the masses has changed, and the masses can no longer be mobilized for emotional proposes. Devaluation of the *'ulamâ's* leadership can not be avoided.

The slackening of the political role of the *'ulamâs* would have taken a long time if it had only occurred through mass education. Therefore the authorities should specifically engineer that devaluat-

ing process through political policies: fusion of Islamic political parties into the PPP and establishing Pancasila as the sole ideology of political and social organizations. The fusion is closing the political story of the NU and its *'ulamâs*, and establishing the Pancasila as the sole ideology has closed the books on the NU and the PPP as one of the *alirans* in the arena of New Order politics. The idea of returning to the 1926 *khittah* is, at least indirectly, a result of that political engineering.

Deideologizing Islam within the NU has opened new opportunities for the NU community to join other political parties (the Golkar and the PDI).¹¹⁶ Khalid Mawardi and Slamet Effendi Yusuf may join Golkar without becoming less Islamic. KH. Choliq Murod may also join the PDI without any significant obstacles. Observing these phenomena, it is no wonder that KH. Alawy Muhammad of the NU is thinking of joining the PDI.

Devaluation of *aliran* politics within the political parties is occurring, and the PPP is vulnerable to that process as reflected by the congress. Islam as *aliran* politics disappeared in the congress, power *per se* has become determinant factor of their coalitions and maneuvers in the congress, and the state has played a central role in that *aliran* devaluation of the PPP.

Endnotes:

1. Fachry Ali and Iqbal Abdul Rauf Saimima, "Merosotnya Aliran dalam Partai Persatuan Pembangunan", in Farchan Bulkin (ed.), *Analisa Kekuatan Politik di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), p. 227.
2. See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960).
3. See Richard Robison, "Culture, Politics, and Economy in the Political History of the New Order" in his *Power and Economy in Suharto's Indonesia* (Manila and Wollongong: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1990), pp. 66-7.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
5. *Republika* (August 29, 1994).
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Suara Pembaruan* (August 12, 1994).
9. *Media Indonesia* (August 13, 1994).
10. *Republika* (January 15, 1994).
11. *Republika* (August 22, 1994).
12. *Kompas* (July 25, 1994); *Republika* (August 25, 1994).
13. This Metareum's interpretation of his main political rival was presented in a discussion, September 1994, in Jakarta.

14. *Media Indonesia* (August 1, 1994); see also *Forum Komunikasi Nahdlatul Ummah Nusantara Memperkenalkan Diri* (Jakarta: Manajemen Konun, 1994).
15. *Kompas* (August 3, 1994).
16. *Merdeka* (August 2, 1994).
17. *The Jakarta Post* (August 3, 1994).
18. *Kompas* (August 4, 1994).
19. *Republika* (August 6, 1994).
20. *Kompas* (August 27, 1994).
21. *Suara Pembaruan* (August 30, 1994).
22. *Republika* (January 15, 1994).
23. *Media Indonesia* (August 19, 1994).
24. *The Jakarta Post* (July 28, 1994).
25. *Media Indonesia* (April 15, 1994).
26. *Republika* (April 15, 1994).
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Republika* (May 28, 1994).
29. *Kompas* (May 17, 1994).
30. *Suara Karya* (May 19, 1994).
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Republika* (May 17, 1994).
33. *Merdeka* (May 18, 1994).
34. *Kompas* (June 23, 1994).
35. *Kompas* (May 24, 1994).
36. *Republika* (May 31, 1994).
37. *Media Indonesia* (June 14, 1994).
38. *Kompas* (June 17, 1994).
39. *Kompas* (June 21, 1994).
40. *Suara Pembaruan* (June 20, 1994).
41. *Republika* (June 21, 1994).
42. *Republika* (June 13, 1994).
43. *Republika* (June 8, 1994).
44. *Media Indonesia* (June 15, 1994).
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Republika* (June 17, 1994).
47. *Kompas* (June 3, 1994).
48. *Suara Pembaruan* (June 8, 1994).
49. *Media Indonesia* (June 16, 1994).
50. *Media Indonesia* (June 15, 1994).
51. *Media Indonesia* (June 17, 1994).
52. *Media Indonesia* (June 13, 1994).
53. *Suara Pembaruan* (June 26, 1994).
54. *Media Indonesia* (June 25, 1994).
55. *Suara Pembaruan* (June 25, 1994).
56. *Suara Karya* (June 27, 1994).
57. *Suara Pembaruan* (June 27, 1994); *Media Indonesia* (June 27, 1994); *Kompas* (June 27, 1994).
58. *Kompas* (June 27, 1994).
59. *Republika* (June 27, 1994).

60. *Republika* (August 5, 1994).
61. *Media Indonesia* (July 6, 1994).
62. *Republika* (July 15, 1994).
63. *Suara Karya* (July 15, 1994).
64. *Media Indonesia* (July 26, 1994).
65. *Merdeka* (August 12, 1994).
66. *Media Indonesia* (August 12, 1994).
67. *Republika* (July 13, 1994).
68. *Republika* (May 6, 1994).
69. *Republika* (May 17, 1994).
70. *Suara Pembaruan* (July 19, 1994).
71. *Ibid.*
72. Metareum said this in a discussion, September 1994, in Jakarta.
73. *Republika* (August 12, 1994).
74. *Media Indonesia* (August 30, 1994).
75. *Kompas* (August 26, 1994).
76. *Ibid.*
77. *Media Indonesia* (August 12, 1994).
78. *Republika* (August 23, 1994).
79. Sri-Bintang Pamungkas, "Pelajaran Lain dari Muktamar III PPP, Tanggapan untuk Hadimulyo", *Republika* (September 22, 1994).
80. *The Jakarta Post* (July 18, 1994).
81. *Suara Pembaruan* (August 11, 1994).
82. *Republika* (August 30, 1994).
83. *Media Indonesia* (August 30, 1994).
84. *Media Indonesia* (August 30, 1994).
85. *Republika* (August 31, 1994).
86. *Kompas* (August 31, 1994).
87. *Suara Pembaruan* (August 31, 1994).
88. *Kompas* (September 1, 1994).
89. *Ibid.*
90. *Suara Karya* (September 1, 1994).
91. *Republika* (September 2, 1994).
92. *Ibid.*
93. *Kompas* (September 2, 1994).
94. *Suara Pembaruan* (September 4, 1994).
95. *Suara Pembaruan* (September 3, 1994).
96. Sri-Bintang Pamungkas, *loc. cit.* 'Yellow' in this context is the symbolic color of the government backed political party, Golkar.
97. He said this in a discussion in Jakarta, September 1994.
98. *Suara Pembaruan* (August 31 1994).
99. *Kompas* (September 3, 1994).
100. *Ibid.*
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Republika* (September 3, 1994).
103. *Republika* (September 5, 1994).
104. *Republika* (September 5, 1994).
105. *The Jakarta Post* (October 21, 1994).

106. *Republika* (October 21, 1994).
107. *Ibid.*
108. Amir Santoso, "PPP Congress Reveals Tolerance, Maturity", *The Jakarta Post* (September 5, 1994).
109. He used to use the concept of the "corporatist state" to explain the political phenomena of the Indonesian New Order. Besides working at the University of Indonesia, Dr. Santoso is also now active with Din Syamsuddin of Golkar in their new organization, CPDS (Central for Policy and Development Studies), which is accommodative to military officers known to be loyal to President Suharto.
110. "Faktor-faktor Kegagalan NU dalam Muktamar PPP", *Republika* (September 16, 1994).
111. Cf. Afan Gaffar, "NU, Sistem Kekuasaan dan PPP", *Kompas* (September 22, 1994).
112. *Kompas* (August 29, 1994).
113. "Kenapa Kelompok Rembang Gagal?", *Republika* (September 12, 1994).
114. "NU akan Menggembosi? Nanti Dulu", *Republika* (September 13, 1994).
115. "Negara dan Kemelut Internal Partai Politik, Tanggapan untuk Syamsuddin Haris dan Aef Saefullah Fatah", *Republika* (August 25, 1994).
116. Cf. Kuntowijoyo, "Percobaan Sosial Budaya Menuju Pluralisme", *Republika* (September 29, 1994).

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