


# STUDIA ISLAMIKA

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## The Muhammadiyah Da'wah and Allocative Politics in the New Order Indonesia

**Abstraksi:** *Islam Indonesia dihadapkan pada kenyataan tentang kuatnya semangat pribumi (indigenous) di kalangan umat Islam sendiri yang tidak menghendaki "Islam politik". Mereka ini dominan di pentas politik nasional. Maka kemudian Islam tidak banyak dihadirkan di arena politik praktis untuk merebut kekuasaan, melainkan dalam da'wah, yang secara substansial juga mengandung muatan politik: amar ma'ruf nahy munkar.*

*Perubahan dari Islam politik ke da'wah ini merupakan hasil introspeksi budaya, yang merupakan akibat dari hubungan tidak seimbang antara Islam dan negara: Islam berada pada posisi inferior sedangkan negara berada pada posisi superior. Posisi Islam ini dengan sendirinya membatasi keleluasaan gerak aktivitasnya untuk tampil secara terbuka. Sementara itu, superioritas negara sedikit banyak juga mendorong Islam untuk menampilkan diri melalui cara-cara yang lebih halus dan hati-hati. Ketimpangan ini kemudian melahirkan satu bentuk praktek politik lain: politik alokatif. Di sini aktifitas politik muncul sebagai upaya memasukkan nilai-nilai Islam ke dalam proses pembangunan politik yang didasarkan pada ideologi hasil konsensus nasional: Pancasila. Dengan demikian, politik alokatif bisa berarti repolitisasi Islam dalam kerangka Pancasila.*

*Kecenderungan politik umat Islam seperti itu terlihat pada Muhammadiyah, organisasi Islam terbesar di daerah perkotaan Indonesia. Muhammadiyah telah menunjukkan prestasinya dalam politik alokatif ini. Ia telah berusaha mendorong terwujudnya implementasi nilai-nilai Islam ke dalam wilayah politik Indonesia. Ini dapat dilihat dari peran aktif Muhammadiyah dalam mewarnai sejumlah kebijakan yang diputuskan pemerintah dan DPR, seperti Rencana Undang-undang Perkawinan (RUUP), Rencana Pendidikan Nasional (RUUPN), Rencana Undang-undang Keormasan (RUUK) dan Rencana Undang-undang Peradilan Agama (RUUPA).*

Meskipun demikian, Muhammadiyah masih dihadapkan pada sebuah dilema: posisinya masih tetap inferior di hadapan negara. Repolitisasi Islam yang ditempuh melalui model politik alokatif masih berada pada posisi pinggiran dari arena pengambilan keputusan. Ia belum mampu menunjukkan diri sebagai agen penting yang memiliki daya tawar yang menentukan. Posisi negara masih saja dominan; dan dapat dikatakan bahwa lembaga ini tetap menjadi kekuatan yang belum tertandingi dalam setiap proses pengambilan keputusan. Akibatnya Muhammadiyah terperangkap dalam situasi yang sulit dihindari: harus menyerah pada kepentingan negara ketimbang menjadikan dirinya sebagai faktor independen dalam proses pengambilan keputusan.

Muhammadiyah sendiri tampak tidak konsisten dalam melihat hubungan antara Islam dan politik dalam meresponi proses pembangunan politik. Inkonsistensi ini terletak pada sikap Muhammadiyah yang mendukung diri di antara puritanisme dan modernisme. Ini menimbulkan ambivalensi yang dapat mengarah pada satu ektrim dalam spektrum tersebut. Solusi yang ditawarkan selama ini cenderung memberi tekanan pada purifikasi dari pada modernisasi Islam. Keinginan untuk menghadirkan Islam secara murni ini dapat menyeret Muhammadiyah ke dalam prinsip-prinsip Islam yang konservatif, termasuk dalam pemikiran politik. Maka dalam hal ini Muhammadiyah dapat dikelompokkan pada paradigma yang memandang hubungan antara agama dan politik sebagai hubungan simbiotik. Pada saat politik dipandang sebagai alat da'wah Islam, maka simbiosis tersebut dapat dibandingkan dengan pemikiran politik pra-modern yang mensubordinasikan politik ke dalam agama. Namun demikian, dalam praktek, artikulasi politik Muhammadiyah nampak pragmatis, dan simbiosis itu lebih merupakan semangat dari modernisme Islam. Disinilah Muhammadiyah menampakkan sikap tidak konsistennya secara lebih transparan.

Ketidakmampuan Muhammadiyah membangun bentuk-bentuk artikulasi politik yang lebih cangguh dalam konteks dinamika politik Indonesia menunjukkan ketidakefektifannya sebagai agen reformasi sosial. Artikulasi politik Muhammadiyah nampak bekerja secara defensif, dan hanya berusaha untuk melindungi keyakinan Islam tanpa berusaha melancarkan reformasi bagi terbentuknya masyarakat Indonesia modern. Sampai saat ini Muhammadiyah belum memberikan rumusan kerangka politik yang secara sistematis mampu menghubungkan cita-cita idealnya dengan sikap nyata yang ditampilkan. Pada gilirannya situasi ini membuat politik Muhammadiyah cenderung bersifat konservatif.



محمد دين شمس الدين

## الدعوة والسياسة التخصّصية (Allocative Politics)

### لدى منظمة المحمدية على النظام الجديد بإندونيسيا

يواجه الإسلام بإندونيسيا واقعا نموذجيا إذ بعض المسلمين أظهروا رعاية ضموحاتهم القوية ضدّ الإسلام السياسى. يبرز هؤلاء فى مسرح السياسة الوطنية. ومن ثم، فلا يأخذون فى الاعتبار الإسلام فى المسرح السياسى العالى للتنافس والوصول إلى السلطة، ولكنهم ينهجون سير الدعوة (الإسلامية) التى تشمل جوهرية المفاهيم الدينية والاتجاهات السياسية، ألا وهى "دعوة إلى الأمر بالمعروف والنهى عن المنكر".

وإن التغير من وجهة الإسلام السياسى إلى دور الدعوة يمثل التوسط الثقافى نتيجة عدم التوازن وانعدام المتبادل فى العلاقة بين الإسلام والدولة. وذلك أدى إلى وقوع الإسلام فى درجة اسفل فى وضع الحياة السياسية، بينما الدولة تتمثل أعلى مكانة فى الدرجة. عدم وجود هذا التوازن من شأنه يودى إلى نوع من ظهور التطبيقات السياسية وهى ما تعرف بالسياسة التخصّصية أو التنويعية. من هذا المنطلق، أصبحت الأنشطة السياسية تحاول إدخال القيم الإسلامية فى عمليات التنمية السياسية المبنية على أيديولوجية متفقة وروح الفلسفة الوطنية وهى بانتشاسيلا (المبادئ الخمسة).

اتضح ذلك الاتجاه السياسى لدى الأمة الإسلامية من حركات "المحمدية" باعتبارها منظمة إسلامية حاضرة فى المناطق ذات الدين بإندونيسيا. فقد أثبتت المحمدية هذا الاتجاه فى مواكبتها السياسية التخصّصية المتمثلة فى نشاطاتها وأعمالها الصلبة الحائثة على تطبيق القيم الإسلامية فى المسرح السياسى وفى نظام تطبيق تلك السياسة. فقد لعبت المحمدية دورها البارز فى اصتباغ سياسة عملية اتخذتها الحكومة ومجلس النواب

الشعبي بصيغة إسلامية، من بينها مشروع قانون النكاح، ومشروع قانون النظام التربوي الوطني، ومشروع قانون المنظمات الاجتماعية، ومشروع قانون نظام القضاء الديني. غير أن المحمدية لا تزال في مأزق حتى وقع فى الدرك الأسفل من نظام الدولة. ومحاولاتها المبذولة لإعادة السياسة الإسلامية مازالت بعيدة عن التحقق فى القرار الحكومى وسياسة الدولة. وهذا الوضع جعل المحمدية تتنازل عن الاشتراك فى مصالح الدولة فمُنظمتها لم تكن عاملا فى اتخاذ قرار ما فى العمليات السياسية.

وإضافة على ذلك، فإنه يبدو أن المحمدية لم تتمسك باتجاهها المبني على العلاقة بين الإسلام والسياسة تطبيقا لعمليات النمو السياسى. ويتمثل عدم تمسكها ذلك أن وضعها السياسى وقع بين التطهيرية (البوريتانية) والتجديدية. ويؤدى ذلك إلى الازدواجية التى تميل إلى التطرف فى نطاق السياسة. ومن المؤسف أن علاج تلك المسألة يتجه إلى التركيز فى التطهير على درجة قصوى من التجديد فى الإسلام. وإن الرغبة فى تطبيق التعاليم الإسلامية بصورتها الأصلية من شأنها أن تؤدى المحمدية إلى إطار المبادئ الإسلامية السلفية القديمة، بما فيها ملازمة السياسة.

بهذا الاعتبار، يمكن إدخال المحمدية فى صف من النموذج الفكرى القائل بأن العلاقة بين الدين والسياسة هى علاقة سببية. ذلك لأن السياسة فى نظر المحمدية وسيلة للدعوة الإسلامية فحسب. ومن ثم فإن ذلك السبب يمكن مقارنته بالتفكير السياسى قبل الحديث الذى يعتبر السياسة مندرجة تحت الدين. ورغم ذلك، فإن الارتباط والتشابك السياسى للمحمدية فى الواقع يبدو عمليا، فى حين أن ذلك السبب يمثل بشكل أوضح روحا تجديدية من الإسلام.

وفى نهاية المطاف أن عدم قدرة المحمدية على الاستفادة من المشاكل السياسية الأكثر فعالية فى ديناميكية السياسة الإندونيسية تدل على عدم فعالية حركاتها كقوة للأصلاح الاجتماعى. ومن ثم، يبدو أن المشاكل السياسية لدى المحمدية إنما هى صورة دفاعية، تقوم بها لحماية العقيدة الإسلامية من الانحراف، من غير محاولة الإصلاح والتجديد لتكوين المجتمع الإندونيسى المعاصر. ويترب ذلك على أن سياسة المحمدية تسير على اتجاه المحافظة على القديم.

The emergence of the Muhammadiyah in 1912 can be seen as an antithesis to the realities of Indonesian Muslims, who were showing syncretic and anti-modernistic tendencies. These modes of life were the outcome of several centuries of two types and two phases of cultural contacts, involving Islam on the one part, and internal and external factors on the other. The first phase included a harmonious acculturation between Islam and indigenous cultures, and the second took the form of struggles of the two against Western culture.

In the first phase the two factors of acculturation emphasized a cultural element, i.e. spirituality, producing peaceful interactions, yet bringing to Islam an important dimension of a degree of syncretism. These two essential elements of Indonesian culture, i.e. Islam and the indigenous culture, were then involved in cultural contacts with Western culture during the periods of colonization when Islam occupied an "inferior" position in the face of the "superiority" of the West.<sup>1</sup> This, along with cultural resistance to Westernization, led Muslims, the largest segment of Indonesian society, to maintain a kind of traditionalist, conservative and anti-modernist outlook.

This "inferior-superior" type of acculturation, in the case of Indonesian Islam, had manifested itself in cultural Islamic revivalist movements, such as Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, which in turn were transformed into politicized Islamic movements, such as the Partai Islam Indonesia (PPI — Indonesian Islamic Party), which continued later in the Masjumi. Both these cultural and political movements included the return to an autochthonous Islamic cultural heritage, to borrow Tibi's term, which took the diverse forms of the Islamic movement in Indonesia.

The Muhammadiyah opted to combine a return to pristine Islam in its Islamic revivalism together with the adoption of certain forms of Western culture, or, to be precise, to select and reinterpret some elements of this culture within the framework of an autochthonous Islamic heritage.<sup>2</sup> In this case, Muhammadiyah, in its inception, advocated a modern, culturally absorbed Islam or Islamic modernism which, according to Tibi, "... fulfills the criteria of voluntary decision, selection and reinterpretation of foreign (Western) and autochthonous cultural elements".<sup>3</sup> Yet, it is clear that cultural autochthony, to the Muhammadiyah, does not mean the return to traditions in their cultural sense, but rather, the return to orthodoxy<sup>4</sup> based on

the Scripture. Its attachment to scripturalism, as a trend in Islamic reformism, reveals the Muhammadiyah's literal-practical approach, as compared to a rational or contextual one. All this has brought Muhammadiyah to occupy "a position between two positions": those of Islamic puritanism and Islamic modernism.<sup>5</sup>

This "unique" position appears to offer a "synthetical" formula to 'Abduh's modernism and Ridâ's conservatism within the Indonesian cultural and political scene. It was from 'Abduh that Muhammadiyah inherited its Islamic liberalism towards religious traditionalism and picked up, to some extent, the modernizing spirit of the West. From Ridâ it developed a strict observance of scripturalism and a close allegiance to salafism. Based on these foundations Muhammadiyah developed into a socio-religious movement with a definite leaning toward both scripturalism and liberalism.

Ideally, the Islamic liberalism that the Muhammadiyah wanted to exercise was meant to spur the creation of a feasible new societal framework and structure which would transform the principles of the Scripture into a new Islamic "cultural" realm, as revealed by the movement's ultimate goal "to uphold and revere the Islamic religion so that an ideal, just and prosperous society will be realized, by the grace of God".<sup>6</sup> In order to achieve this goal, the Muhammadiyah elected to become a *da'wah* movement, which is perceived as covering all activities in the fields of religious propagation, education, social life, the economy, health and politics.<sup>7</sup>

Muhammadiyah's decision to become a *da'wah*, and not a political movement, despite the logic of the political situation faced by the Muslims, appeared to derive from its cultural retrospection, without necessarily stemming from a cultural loss. Rather it resulted from the conclusions it drew about the "cultural reality" it ought to face. The Muhammadiyah's cultural retrospection was not directly followed by a policy of politicizing Islam, as Tibi concluded from his assessment of the phenomena of Middle Eastern Islam, but rather, proceeded in four dynamic phases. These were: (1) the revitalization of Islamic culture in order to prepare the ground for Islamic polity, (2) the politicization of Islam through its involvement, although indirect, in practical politics, (3) the "depoliticization" of Islam in the sense of a withdrawal from practical politics, and (4) the repoliticization of Islam, by exercising allocative politics.

The revitalization of Islamic culture launched by the

Muhammadiyah carried, in equal measures, elements of both Western culture and Islamic heritage. Yet familiarity with the former did not lead this organization to accept the actual structures of that culture, except in the field of education. Even in this field, the Muhammadiyah only interiorized the outer form of Western education within its experimentation of constructing an Islamic system of education, which, contrary to the traditional system, embraced the pursuit of non-religious sciences in addition to religious sciences.<sup>8</sup> However, Muhammadiyah's system of education served to offer an alternative to the traditional and secular systems. This system, according to John Legge, has an important role in bringing about a reconciliation between Muslim intellectuals and the Westernized intelligentsia.<sup>9</sup> Many graduates of this system have become part of the "strategic elite" in the bureaucracy, parliament and the military, and have, in various ways, supported Muhammadiyah's allocative politics.<sup>10</sup>

Nevertheless, the Muhammadiyah's contribution to the national "strategic elite"<sup>11</sup> did not provide the movement with an easy path when it came to attempt the politicization of Islam, i.e. by playing the game of practical politics via Masjumi or Parmusi, which in turn, led to its divorce from any political party. The Muhammadiyah's decision to "depoliticize" Islam, coinciding with the regime's depoliticization of Islam in the New Order period, marked the movement's second phase of cultural retrospection in the face of Indonesian cultural politics. This led to its "repoliticization" of Islam, though in a different mode of political activism, i.e. in allocative politics, and this concurs with Tibi's conceptual framework.

It is the Muhammadiyah's practice of allocative politics that will be discussed in this article in an effort to identify the movement's problems. But first, the Muhammadiyah's view of politics will be discussed briefly.

### **Da'wah for Establishing an Ummah: the Muhammadiyah's View of Politics**

Although the Muhammadiyah is overtly a non-political organization, its involvement in politics is inevitable because the achievement of even non-political ideals is impossible without a role in politics. Besides, for the Muhammadiyah, as an Islamic movement, political life is inseparable from religious life, in a general sense.

Why then, has the Muhammadiyah never been a political organization nor directly engaged in practical politics, and is this stance "religious" or "political" in nature? In other words, is the Muhammadiyah's view of politics determined by theological reflection i.e. that religion and politics are symbiotically related, and that Islam does not invoke the concept of an Islamic government but, rather, the concept of an *ummah* or is it based on empirical considerations i.e. that the development of the Indonesian Muslim community is not strategically attained through political life?

Answers to such questions should be sought in the history of the development of the Muhammadiyah's thinking, since there is a lack of written documents on this particular subject, and also because the Muhammadiyah's emergence was, more possibly, a case of "chicken and egg." Its first ideological discourse, called "the Steps of Muhammadiyah" (*Langkah-langkah Muhammadiyah*), was first formulated and systematized about twenty six-years later, during the leadership of K.H. Mas Mansur (1938-1940). This formulation was a response to the needs of the time, when the Muhammadiyah had spread in the country and a guideline expressing the movement's direction was needed which could steer its various branches towards the achievement of the ultimate goal: the dissemination of Islam in the country. This process helped to consolidate the movement and, in turn, provided the Muhammadiyah with a foundation that enabled it to play a more significant political role at the time. Another factor leading the Muhammadiyah to engage in politics was the impression that the position of Indonesian Muslims was continually threatened by the logic of the political situation.<sup>12</sup> It was during this period that the Muhammadiyah, or more precisely, its leaders, laid down the foundations of the *Partai Islam Indonesia* (Islamic Indonesian Party, or PII).<sup>13</sup>

The Muhammadiyah's involvement in politics in the pre-independence period started even earlier. It had been an effective agent for the articulation of Muslims' political interests. Yet its achievements had not led the Muhammadiyah organization to become a political party. The reason may be that although there were socio-political considerations favoring the creation of a political party, the Muhammadiyah's decision was more likely to be based upon theological considerations. The Muhammadiyah's initiatives in establishing or supporting various Islamic political parties through the years,



(for example, it supported the PII and Masjumi in the Old Order period, and Parmusi at the eve of the New Order period) suggests that the Muhammadiyah believed in the important role that a political party plays as an instrument of struggle. But its involvement was in keeping with its strategic framework and as a complementary activity on the road to its ultimate goal.

The Muhammadiyah's involvement in the PII, Masjumi and Parmusi illustrates that it was inconsistent in perceiving the value of polity. In the case of the PII, there was still a distance between the Muhammadiyah and the party (the Muhammadiyah's involvement was not undertaken in the name of the organization, but in the form of individual members joining the PII). Consequently, the movement's involvement did not reflect negatively upon it. Its involvement in Masjumi during the Old Order period (1945-1960) was organizational in nature (the Muhammadiyah became one of Masjumi's four extraordinary member organizations, which led, as a consequence, to its close attachment to this party). However, Masjumi's critical attitude towards the regime, finally led to its abolition in 1960, with consequences for the relationship between Muhammadiyah and the government.

The Muhammadiyah's last temptation to engage in practical politics occurred on the eve of the New Order, when the movement, or more precisely some of its leaders, were willing to revive the PII. This was presumably motivated by regret of the loss of Masjumi, or by the logic of the political situation. But, due to both internal and external conflicts, the ideas of reviving the PII was never realized. Instead, the Muhammadiyah initiated the creation of Parmusi. This initiative appears to have been motivated by several factors, such as the Muhammadiyah's conviction that it had played a great role in crushing the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and in the emergence of the New Order, when the movement perceived that the momentum was favorable to the achievement of Islamic political ideals; and also because of its desire to establish a political vehicle through which the interests of the then still unrepresented Muslim modernists group could be articulated.

The Muhammadiyah's involvement in this party took the same form as its involvement in Masjumi, that is, it was a "formal involvement" giving the Masjumi legitimacy and representation. This close yet separate stand has, however, given the Muhammadiyah a nega-

tive image, because the new military regime began to tamper with Parmusi.<sup>14</sup>

The decision taken by the Muhammadiyah's Congress in 1971 that the movement would no longer affiliate itself with any political party seems partly due to its bitter experiences in Parmusi<sup>15</sup>, apart from Muhammadiyah's own soul-searching and need to purify its image as a *da'wah* movement.

To overcome the difficulty in disinterring the Muhammadiyah's political views, (due, as has already been pointed out, to the lack of documentation) most observers, such as Alfian, base their analyses on the inner logic of the Muhammadiyah's political behavior. Here, the Muhammadiyah's ultimate goal, which emphasizes the establishment of an Islamic society (*masyarakat Islam*), is indeed political, and serves as a suitable departure for the analysis of the Muhammadiyah's political ideas.

The Indonesian term "masyarakat" is derived from the Arabic *mushâarakah*, and is precisely translatable as "society" or "community," or with the connotation of the Arabic *mujtama'*. The term defines a sociological concept denoting the unity and togetherness of individuals based on a feeling of solidarity. The Islamic society (or *masyarakat Islam*) is thus based on religious solidarity and is the manifestation of moral and doctrinal concerns with the existence and continuity of a community that orients itself toward Islamic impulses.

Similarly, the term "*ummah*," which is quite often used synonymously with "*mujtama'*," is a concept which denotes a religious community, or those who belong to the same faith. Or more generally, as the Qur'ân signifies it, the concept denotes a single community bound together in one religion, ethnicity, and morality.<sup>16</sup> In the historical perspective, the *ummah Islâmiyyah* organized by Muhammad as soon as he migrated to Medina was aimed at promoting solidarity among Muslims (both *Muhâjirîn* and *Ansâr*). More specifically for the *Muhâjirîn*, the concept served as an alternative to their abandonment of the traditional clan links by becoming Muslims.<sup>17</sup> All this suggests that both "*ummah*" and "*masyarakat*" have social rather than political connotations.

It appears that the term "*masyarakat*" which is used in expressing the Muhammadiyah's ultimate goal, substantially constitutes the above mentioned meaning. From this perspective it can be inferred that the Muhammadiyah does not maintain a certain form of political system

or institution, but, instead struggles to spread the word of Islam in order to establish, as is stated in its objective, an ideal or principled society (*masyarakat utama*).

Interestingly enough, the term "*masyarakat utama*," which literally means "primary society," evokes echoes of al-Farâbî, or Ikhwân al-Safâ's *al-madînah al-fâdilah*. Yet, according to Djindar Tamimi, then Vice Chairman of Muhammadiyah's Central Board, the concept "*al-madînah al-fâdilah*" did not occur to the members of the commissions of either the Tanwir or the Mukhtar (Congress), whose task was to tackle the issue, but rather, their discussions centered on elaborating the Qur'ânic concept "*baldah tayyibah wa rabb ghafûr*."<sup>18</sup> This latter term constitutes elements that are now included in the Muhammadiyah's objectives: ideal, principled, just, prosperous and under the grace of God. As Hadikusuma puts it, *masyarakat utama* means a society where true justice, felicity, prosperity and morality are widespread.<sup>19</sup> If this is the case, then Muhammadiyah's "*masyarakat utama*" concurs with (though without apparent reference to it), the philosophical *al-madînah al-fâdilah* previously described. Or, it can be said that the two concepts, *masyarakat utama* and *al-madînah al-fâdilah*, although they parted from different points, head teleologically toward the same end: *baldah tayyibah*! If this juxtaposition is accepted, then, based on *madînah* as meaning a political society,<sup>20</sup> it is possible to understand the concept *masyarakat utama* as not being free of political connotations.

A change in the Muhammadiyah's objective is important. This change took place at the Muhammadiyah's 41st congress in 1985 and arose in response to the enforcement of the National Law on Community Organizations, obligating community organizations to subscribe Pancasila as their sole foundation, and consequently affecting their objectives. Although the old formulation of the Muhammadiyah's objective —to establish a true Muslim society— did not imply any contradiction of the Pancasila state, and the new formulation —to establish an ideal society— did not, apparently, incorporate the word "Pancasila", the decision to change the formulation was not made without political consideration. This consideration was tactical in nature,<sup>21</sup> that is, according to Tamimi, that the old formulation could be easily misunderstood as maintaining the Jakarta Charter.<sup>22</sup>

Tamimi's reasoning is understandable because the old formula-

tion, unlike the new one, conveyed no relationship to such Indonesian political terms as "just" and "prosperous" (*adil dan makmur*), as these are expressed in the ultimate goal of the New Order's National Development —to establish a just and prosperous Indonesian society based on Pancasila.

Apart from this, the Muhammadiyah's view of politics, as can be implied from its concept of an ideal society, can also be understood by considering it as a *da'wah* movement at heart. The Muhammadiyah conceived this concept as constituting the whole process of inviting mankind to follow Islam.<sup>23</sup> In Muhammadiyah's conception *da'wah* is not limited to religious propagation in its strictest sense, but embraces all aspects of community development, including activities in the field of education, social life, the economy, health care and even politics.

In its conception of *da'wah*, Muhammadiyah emphasizes the preparation of a state of affairs among Muslims conducive to the development of their comprehension and implementation of Islamic teachings.<sup>24</sup> Because this process includes enhancement of the quality of the community's social life, which presumably encourages the comprehension and implementation of Islam, the Muhammadiyah's conception of *da'wah* suggests dynamic and harmonious interactions between spiritual and material life. This means that an intensive spiritual life could lead to a prosperous material life and *vice-versa*. Thus, for the Muhammadiyah, all activities in the fields of material life possess the same degree of importance as activities in the field(s) of spiritual life.

As a logical consequence of becoming a *da'wah* movement, Muhammadiyah posits this doctrinal entity as central and cardinal in the framework of its socio-cultural struggle. Muhammadiyah's activities in various fields are organized and carried out for the single purpose and in the interests of Islamic preaching.<sup>25</sup>

Therefore, Muhammadiyah's view of politics and political activism are not separate from its view of *da'wah*. Here, the importance of politics for *da'wah* coincides with the importance of *da'wah* for politics. This symbiosis was implied, for example, in the Muhammadiyah's strategical discourse, the 1968 *Khittah Perjuangan*, which suggested that a superficial divergence of the movement into two major strategic approaches, namely the pursuit of practical politics and socio-cultural activities, was to be launched simultaneously; the first was to

take the form of a political party, and the second, a social organization.<sup>26</sup>

The 1968 *Khittah* served to reveal what is to date still the most transparent view of the Muhammadiyah's attitude to politics. The concluding remarks of the discourse deserve special attention:

"With Islamic *da'wah*—to enjoin the good and to prohibit the evil—, in its true and proportionate meaning, it would confirm that pure Islamic teachings are feasible in organizing (*mengatur*) society in the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution to become a just, prosperous, and materially and spiritually happy society by the Grace of God the Almighty, both in the theoretical and practical senses.<sup>27</sup>

This statement is presented in full because it reveals some important points relating to Muhammadiyah's view of politics. Firstly, it clearly asserts the Muhammadiyah's belief in the feasibility, in both the theoretical and practical senses, of Islamic principles of being the moral basis for a cultural transformation within Indonesian society. Secondly, the movement's belief that this "Islamic" cultural transformation must be exercised within the framework of the Pancasila State; and thirdly, that the process is one which would, consequently, lead to the emergence of a Pancasila society, but with a substantially Islamic content.

As far as the relationship between Islam and the state is concerned, one may conclude that, for the Muhammadiyah the Republic of Indonesia, as at present, serves as an ideal form of the political goal of Indonesian society. The role of the Muhammadiyah's leader, like that of its chairman, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, in formulating Pancasila at Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI) meetings in 1945, and the Muhammadiyah's political attitude towards the government and in its acceptance of the Pancasila may well serve as historical facts that confirm this political stand.

Taking all this into consideration, one may draw the conclusion that the Muhammadiyah's view of politics observes the substantivistic mainstream of Indonesian political Islam, while absorbing the modernist paradigm of modern Islamic political thought.

However, the nature of the Muhammadiyah's leaning toward this mainstream and paradigm needs to be further examined in terms of its political activism—in the form of allocative politics—viewed as a repoliticization of Islam, which, to the Muhammadiyah, serves to

affirm the degree of importance that it attach to incorporating Islamic idealism into the political realm.

### Muhammadiyah's Allocative Politics

The implementation of a political ideal that does not aim at achieving political power generally manifests itself in the form of allocative politics, that is, political activity that attempts to instill certain values within the framework of the state ideology that enjoys a national consensus. In this respect, allocative politics takes the form of the instilling of Islamic principles into the process of political development based on Pancasila.

In this context, the Muhammadiyah has played a significant role in articulating the interests of the Muslim community. This study limits itself to an analysis of the Muhammadiyah's activities in allocative politics in the New Order period. These include its involvement in the legislation process of four draft laws on Marriage in 1973, Mass Organization in 1985, National Education System in 1988, and a Religious (Islamic) Judiciary in 1989.

In line with Muhammadiyah's view, that political activities are conducted for the purpose of the preaching (*da'wah*) of Islam, Muhammadiyah's allocative politics constitute a part of "*amar makruf naby munkar*" (Ar. *al-'amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar*), to command the good and to prohibit the evil. As a case study, this focuses on only a few examples of the Muhammadiyah's organizational involvement in allocative politics, particularly in the framework of discussing draft laws in the House of the People's Representatives (DPR).

Muhammadiyah has conducted allocative politics more seriously since this organization left the practical political arena (that is, was involved, directly or indirectly, in the political parties). This decision was made at its congress in 1971 at Ujung Pandang. A few years later, in 1973, the Muslim community faced a serious problem in connection with the Bill on Marriage (*Rancangan Undang-undang tentang Perkawinan*, or RUU-P) at the DPR. This Draft Law on Marriage constituted a threat to Islam, since its contents were contrary to Islamic teaching, such as the permission of inter-religion marriages. Strong protests were not only expressed against this Draft Law by members of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) Faction (FPP) at the DPR, but also by Islamic community organizations



and prominent Muslim personalities.

The Muhammadiyah's Central Board also reacted strongly; and the Muhammadiyah Youth Movement and the Muhammadiyah Student Association, together with other Islamic youth groups, participated in demonstrations at the DPR.

Apart from the fact that the letter and substance of the Draft Law were contrary to Islamic Teaching, these strong reactions were also caused by the situational logic of politics at the time, when Muslims felt that the very existence of Islam in Indonesia was threatened. Firstly, political Islam had just lost ground in the 1971 General Elections and the depoliticization of Islam had started to become evident, especially when the new Islamic Party (the PPP) was not allowed to use the word "Islam" in its name; and secondly, the Muslim community had become increasingly concerned about the Christianization issue, which had been voiced since the early 1970s. Furthermore, the Draft Law on Marriage touched upon a very sensitive area, namely the problem of faith, which for Muslims constitutes a matter of life and death.

All the Islamic groups contributed to the success of the struggle to amend the Draft Law. Allocative politics (obviously, not by Muhammadiyah alone) was in this case manifested in a reactionary stand, or rather, was more in the nature of "*nahy munkar*." The allocation of Islamic injunctions, as ratified in the Marriage Law, came about through Muslim interaction, and it had more of a "physical force" dimension, since at that time, the situation did not offer the opportunity for a dialogue.

The dichotomy between politicized and non-politicized Islam was very clear, and the polarization of the DPR members' attitudes was strictly divided into the PPP faction versus the other factions, but a different state of affairs occurred in subsequent cases.

A real test of Muhammadiyah's allocative politics was the Draft Law on Community Organizations (*Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan*, or RUU-OK), submitted to the DPR in 1982. This Draft Law contained the principle requiring all community organizations to subscribe to Pancasila as the sole foundation. For Islamic organizations like Muhammadiyah, this meant abolishing an Islamic foundation from the Statutes of the organization, and thus would naturally have had the consequence of changing the special character of the movement's objectives.

In Islamic circles, both organizations and groups as well as individuals, strongly opposed the draft law. For them, the sole foundation of Pancasila (*asas tunggal Pancasila* — this was the popular term at that time) contained a threat against the Muslim religion and community, and, in turn, against the very existence of Islam itself in the country. Various forms of protest surfaced, particularly at Friday prayer and preaching forums, as well as in articles in the mass media. This opposition climaxed in a riot in Tanjung Priok, the Jakarta harbor area, in August 1984, with the loss of hundreds of lives.

Muhammadiyah took very cautious steps in facing this political development. This was apparent from the way Muhammadiyah responded, since the Government signaled that a law on community organizations, obligating them to subscribe to the Pancasila as their sole foundation, would soon be submitted to the DPR.

As a systematic agenda in the New Order's political engineering, the Government, after successfully enforcing the application of Pancasila on all political organizations, then attempted to enforce it on community organizations. President Suharto's first indication of this was given through the Junior Minister for Youth Affairs, Dr. Abdul Gafur who received the news in the President's office on August 30, 1982.<sup>28</sup> A clearer indication was the statement made by President Soeharto himself in his address at the opening of the Third National Congress of the Golkar on October 20, 1983 in Jakarta. It is interesting to note the process whereby the draft law was submitted. Unlike other draft laws, for which discussions within the community usually followed discussions at the DPR, in the case of the draft law on C.O's, discussions within the community preceded its submission to the DPR.

It is very possible that this procedure was intended to be "conditioning" in order to invite responses from the community; responses which would affect the process of preparing of draft law. However, since the response from community, and particularly from community organizations, was not strong, that process proceeded smoothly according to plan.

Muhammadiyah responded to the draft law plan early namely by holding a *Tanwir* Session (its second highest legislative forum after the congress) in May 1983. One of items on the agenda was the problem of the sole foundation of Pancasila. On this, the *Tanwir* Session passed several resolutions. These read:

*First*, Muhammadiyah agrees to include Pancasila in the Muhammadiyah's Statutes, without changing the present existing Islamic foundation;

*Second*, since the problem of Pancasila as the sole foundation is a national problem, it is to be faced on a national scale by the Central Board. Therefore, the Regional Boards and below are not permitted to issue an opinion or to adopt an attitude with regard to this problem;

*Third*, the discussion thereof will be conducted at the coming 41st Congress.<sup>29</sup>

Some evaluations can be made of the measure taken by Muhammadiyah in facing the problem of Pancasila as the sole foundation. Firstly, Muhammadiyah was responsive enough, namely, by immediately seeking information on the issue, by immediately launching discussions of it in periodic national forums and by involving executives of the organization on the regional level. Apart from that, Muhammadiyah applied tight discipline in facing the problem by limiting the competency source for decision-making. These preventive measures at the national level had an effect on the decision-making process and helped to ensure the intactness of the Muhammadiyah. The attitude of Central Board in taking firm measures, i.e. organizational discipline, against those who violated the *Tanwir* decision,<sup>30</sup> also showed that the organizational principles could still be upheld within the body of Muhammadiyah.

Secondly, in one respect, the decision taken by the *Tanwir* forum was tactically right, i.e., accepting the inclusion of Pancasila, while still maintaining the Islamic foundation in the organization's Statutes, and resolving that a discussion on this acceptance would be conducted at the next congress. The decision to include Pancasila, although only made later, at the competent forum, insofar as it involved an amendment of the Statutes, constituted a decision that was logical in view of the existing political situation. This situation was the result of the new Order's effective political engineering, which required community organizations to give their "obedience" to the Government. From another point of view, however, the Muhammadiyah's decision gave the impression of ambivalence, particularly regarding the juxtaposition of the Islamic principle with the Pancasila principle.

The main problem that may arise does not lie with the Muhammadiyah's attitude towards Pancasila, but in how Muhammadiyah should explain the relationship between Islam and Pancasila. Presenting theological argumentation on this relationship

apparently escaped the thinking of the Muhammadiyah executives, as can be seen in the report by Lukman Harun, the Muhammadiyah's spokesman at the 1985 congress (later published) and also by the statement of Muhammadiyah's chairman H. A. R. Fachruddin at the same congress, that acceptance of the Pancasila was like motorcycle riders wearing "safety helmets".<sup>31</sup> Muhammadiyah's explanation of the relationship between Islam and Pancasila was more political in nature than theological.

In the next phase, Muhammadiyah started to actively conduct allocative politics, in order to disseminate its views, especially to the Government. Several lobbying channels to the decision-making arena started to open up for the organization. Functionaries of Muhammadiyah's Central Board, particularly those domiciled in Jakarta, met with several ministers who were in charge of the Draft Law on Community Organizations, such as the Minister of Home Affairs, Soepardjo Rustam; the Junior-Minister/Cabinet Secretary, Moerdiono; the Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Sjadzali; the Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare, Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara; and the Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Surono. At meetings with these officials, the Muhammadiyah emphasized the historical arguments, both concerning the relationship between the organization and Islam, and the relationship between the organization and Pancasila, namely that (a) Muhammadiyah was born from Islam so without the Islamic principle, it would, naturally, not be Muhammadiyah any more, and (b) prominent leaders of Muhammadiyah, like Prof. Kahar Muzakir, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and Kasman Singodimedjo, had an important role in the formulation and acceptance of Pancasila as the state's foundation at the PPKI session in August, 1945.<sup>32</sup>

The above historical argument had at least two implicit meanings, namely that Islam was not contrary to Pancasila and that prominent Muslim figures (especially those in Muhammadiyah) had a share in the formulation of Pancasila. In the historical perspective, this confirmation of Muhammadiyah's position may have a sufficiently effective implication, particularly in elucidating the relationship of Islam and Pancasila, and therefore the position of continuing to maintain the Islamic principle, while also accepting the Pancasila principle, should not be regarded as not a full acceptance of Pancasila.

The Muhammadiyah lobby not only communicated with Minis-

ters, but also with the President. This points to the fact that this very serious problem for Muhammadiyah had to be raised with the President, since only he was responsible for making decisions on the institution of Pancasila as the sole foundation of the state. Two prominent Muhammadiyah personalities had the opportunity to meet with President Suharto on separate occasions, namely Fahmi Chatib, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Bureau, and A. R. Fachruddin, Chairman of the Muhammadiyah Central Board. When Fahmi Chatib (who, at that time, together with the Indonesian Association for Economics Scholars or ISEI delegation, was received by the President), stated that it was difficult for Islamic community organizations to accept Pancasila as the sole foundation, President Suharto indicated that all the community organizations must accept it, and that the word "Islamic" could be placed as the objectives etc., in the Statutes of Islamic organizations.<sup>33</sup>

Similarly, when receiving the Muhammadiyah's Chairman on September 23, 1983, President Suharto urged the organization to wait until the requirement to accept the Pancasila principle was promulgated, but to begin planning to define Muhammadiyah's identity and features as extensively as possible, apart from the principle of Pancasila.<sup>34</sup> This could indicate that, for the Government, the application of Pancasila as the sole foundation constituted a "fixed price" to be paid to them, suggesting that this application is only formal in nature, i.e., by including the principle of Pancasila, so the articles on the objectives, etc., can be adjusted to meet the specific features of each organization.

Of interest was the dialogue at the end of the meeting between A. R. Fachruddin and President Suharto, which took place in the high level Javanese language (*keromo inggil*). According to Fachruddin's account, when he submitted an invitation to the President to open the Muhammadiyah's 41st congress, the President replied: "God Willing, I will come, provided Muhammadiyah accepts Pancasila." Fachruddin responded: "Yet Mr. President will not abolish the Islamic principle." On this question, according to Fachruddin: "President Suharto remained silent, so I also remained silent, and then took my leave."<sup>35</sup>

In addition to this, Muhammadiyah's efforts to disseminate its views on the issue of Pancasila as the sole foundation were still proceeding, both through dialogues with fellow Islamic community or-

ganizations like Nahdlatul Ulama and *Majlis Ulama Indonesia* (the Indonesian Council of Ulama or MUI) as well as through intensive lobbying of the Government and the legislative institution (or DPR).

In order to render its allocative politics more effective, the Muhammadiyah's Central Board formed a team, charged, inter alia, with preparing the basic ideas of the organization. One of the emphases in these basic ideas was the relationship between religion and community organizations, and the relationship between religion and Pancasila itself.<sup>36</sup> In this case, Muhammadiyah proposed that religious community organizations still be given the right to organize their membership and activities in the various sectors in accordance with their respective religions. With regard to Pancasila, Muhammadiyah proposed to affirm that Pancasila was not a religion, that religion would not be 'Pancasilafied', and that Pancasila, as the sole foundation, would be the Pancasila as contained in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution.

This attitude clearly shows Muhammadiyah's strong commitment towards maintaining the existence of Islam, and therefore constitutes a preventive anticipatory measure against the possibility that "Pancasilaization" would eliminate the religion.

In striving for its basic ideas, Muhammadiyah had conducted quite intensive lobbying in DPR circles, including its various factions, the DPR executives, and individuals who played a role in discussions of the draft law. One of the prominent personalities who formed a lobbying channel for Muhammadiyah at the DPR, was Dr. Suhardiman, Master of Economics —chairman of the special committee (*Panitia Khusus*, or *Pansus*) on the Draft Law on Community Organizations.<sup>37</sup>

In the area of allocative politics oriented towards the legislature, the distribution of ideas disseminated by Muhammadiyah during the discussions of the Draft Law on Community Organizations, did not cease with this Law's submission. The organization continued its efforts to reach the factions, and to air ideas in the mass media, and this course was pursued until these ideas could become an agenda for discussions and be accepted. This latter objective appeared to have determined the "success" of Muhammadiyah's allocative politics where the Draft Law on Community Organizations was concerned.<sup>38</sup>

Muhammadiyah's struggle in facing the Draft Law on Community Organizations had a certain influence on the 41st Muhammadiyah



Congress, which was held several months after the enactment of the Law. At this congress, Muhammadiyah (to borrow Amien Rais's phrase), "easily" accepted the Pancasila principle.<sup>39</sup> According to Dr. M. Amien Rais, then Chairman of the Propagation Council (*Majelis Tabligh*) of the Muhammadiyah's Central Board, Muhammadiyah consented to a measured acceptance of Pancasila as the sole foundation as a result of the 41st congress. What is meant here by a measured acceptance, is the ability to put Islam and Pancasila in their (proper) places, namely, putting one in the category of revealed religions, and the other in the category of ideologies created by man, and therefore, that it was quite irrelevant to compare the two or to place them on a parallel.<sup>40</sup>

A "side effect" of Muhammadiyah's flexibility in adapting itself to the political engineering of the New Order was its capability to confirm its identity. In this respect, although Muhammadiyah has, as a result of its 41st congress, replaced the Islamic principle with the Pancasila principle in its Statutes (Article 2 regarding its foundation, or *asas*), it has also added on identity (*identitas*) in Article 1, to the effect that the Muhammadiyah Association is an Islamic and "*Amar Makruf Nahy Munkar*" Movement with the Islamic faith, and has as its source, the Qur'ân and sunnah of the Prophet. In view of the relationship between these two articles, it may be concluded that an "Islamization" of Pancasila has occurred.

Similarly, the change in the old formulation of Muhammadiyah's objective—to uphold and revere the religion of Islam so that a true Islamic community can be realized—into the new formulation stating "... so that a principal community (*masyarakat utama*) with justice and prosperity can be realized which is blessed by God Almighty", reveals a qualitative dynamic change in this objective. Although there is no substantial difference between the two formulations, the change in wording implies a change in emphasis. If the old formulation did not have a political connotation, or had a more social connotation, therefore giving the impression that Muhammadiyah was a social service organization,<sup>41</sup> the new formulation had a political dimension, namely, it implicitly provided an Islamic coloration (the emphasis placed on the blessing of Almighty God) in a just and prosperous community. This conforms with the National Development objective which is to establish a just and prosperous community based on Pancasila.

With the experience gained in confronting the Draft Law on Community Organizations, Muhammadiyah increasingly intensified its "new pattern" of political activism, activating its allocative politics, namely by developing its lobbying wings in the arena of the State's decision-makers. The Muhammadiyah lobby faced a new "challenge" in 1988 with the submission to the DPR of the Draft Law on National Education. This draft law received serious attention from Muhammadiyah, not only because, as an organization operating in the education sector, it is concerned with all forms of national education arrangements, but also because, from Muhammadiyah's perspective, this draft law contained many matters which were not in accordance with the Broad Outline of State Policy (GBHN), in particular concerning the existence of religious education.

Muhammadiyah immediately responded to the Draft Law, conducting discussions at its Teachers Training Institute (IKIP Muhammadiyah) in Jakarta, and setting up a team to prepare its basic ideas on this Draft Law (*Rancangan Undang-undang tentang Pendidikan Nasional*, or RUU-PN). Unlike its tactics when facing the Draft Law on Community Organizations, in facing the Draft Law on National Education, Muhammadiyah commenced its endeavors by expressing its ideas through the press, including the magazine *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER) published in Hongkong. The statement by the then Vice Chairman of Muhammadiyah's Central Board, Lukman Harun, published in FEER, that the Draft Law on National Education was heavily secular<sup>42</sup>, stimulated the Minister of Education and Culture, Fuad Hassan, to deny that it was secular-oriented, and to state that the Government had no intention whatsoever of tampering with the principle of religious education.<sup>43</sup>

Several reactions by Islamic organizations and institutions were also published, commenting in particular, on issues, which were considered harmful to Islam, such as the absence of the word "faithful" (*beriman*), apart from the word "pious" (*bertakwa*), in the educational objectives, the unclear inclusion of religious education, and the existence of religious schools.

Within the framework of striving to improve this draft law, the Muhammadiyah was, as usual, directed toward the Government and the DPR. In addition to meetings with the Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare, Soepardjo Rustam, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Sjadzali, and the Junior-Minister/Cabinet Secretary,

Saadilah Mursjid, the Muhammadiyah leaders' meetings with the Minister of Education and Culture, Fuad Hassan and Vice President, Sudharmono, were particularly important, since a guarantee was obtained from both of them on the existence of religious education. The Muhammadiyah leaders' informal meeting with the Chairman of the Golkar Faction (FKP), Major General (Ret.) Suharto, at his residence, constituted an initial break through for their lobbying of the DPR. Within the framework of these efforts, Muhammadiyah also conducted meetings with various factions and with the executives of the DPR.

The Muhammadiyah's intensive efforts to improve the Draft Law on National Education yielded maximal outcomes. All points on the basic ideas, as well as Muhammadiyah's contributions were accommodated in the final law on a National Education System.<sup>44</sup> Beyond all expectations, one very important issue concerning religious teaching even appeared in the body of the Law, although in the elucidation of Article 2 paragraph 2, which reads "Religious education teaching staff shall be of the religion which is being taught, and the religion of the participants being educated. "For Islamic circles, this dictum, for which they had struggled for many decades, was very important, since its application would eliminate their concern about the issue of Christianization in Christian schools, which are attended by many Muslim children.

It is not so clear, however, whether the inclusion of this elucidation is due to Muhammadiyah's efforts. Clearly, the lobbying activities on this Draft Law were not as "penetrating" as the lobbying undertaken on the Draft Law on Community Organizations. In the case of the Draft Law on National Education, Muhammadiyah did not, for example, try to get its ideas included in the *Daftar Inventarisasi Masalah*, or DIM (Problems Inventory List) as an agenda of discussions. For these, Muhammadiyah had to open special channels with certain factions. This may have been caused by the Muhammadiyah's conviction that, as result of its meetings with Government and DPR circles, its basic ideas would be accommodated.

It is noteworthy that during discussions on the Draft Law on National Education, a situation conducive to Muslim allocative politics increasingly opened up. At the time of the Draft Law on Community Organizations, for example, the pro-contra polarization on the issue of the sole principle, lay with two parties with different

political interests the Regime and Islam whereas in the case of the Draft Law on national education, this polarization more or less shifted into two camps with distinct (political) religious interests-Islam and non-Islam. In the latter case, the success of Muslim allocative politics was influenced by "religious sentiment". The appearance of this "religious sentiment" in the political life of the New Order can be observed in the last case to be discussed in this study, i.e. the Draft Law on a Religious Judiciary (*Rancangan Undang-undang tentang Peradilan Agama*, or RUU-PA). Since this draft law was submitted to the DPR by the Government, various reactions have surfaced, unlike the previous draft laws, where reactions generally originated from among Muslim circles. The Indonesian Association of Churches (PGI) submitted a statement on its stance to the executives and factions of the DPR. This statement constituted the result of the Plenary Working Council Session of the PGI, which was especially held for that purpose. The core of the PGI statement was that (a) in accordance with the "Archipelago World view" (*Wawasan Nusantara*), only one National Law was required to serve the National Interest; (b) the Draft Law on a Religious Judiciary was beyond its duty, and it was the joint responsibility of the whole Nation to stipulate a basic framework in the legal sector; and (c) the Draft Law was "contrary" to the implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in a pure and consequent sense.<sup>45</sup>

Since that time, reactions have also appeared from various mass media questioning the draft law. The Christian magazine *Hidup* for example, alleged that the existence of a law on a Religious Judiciary constituted an effort to revive the Jakarta Charter, and constituted discrimination in the legal sector.<sup>46</sup>

No less important was the response of the Vice Chairman of the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly), R. Soeprapto. In a special letter to the Chairman of the DPR, he declared that the existence of a Religious Judiciary was contrary to Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, the Broad Outline of State Policy and the Archipelago World view.<sup>47</sup>

A Paper entitled "Basic Ideas of the Functional Group Faction (FKP)" on the draft law was circulated in April 1989. This working paper, apparently constituting an official statement from this faction, also linked this draft law with the enforcement of the Jakarta Charter, although the general Chairman of the Central Executive

Board of the Functional Group (DPP Golkar) declared as non-existent.

When the issues on the link between the Draft Law on a Religious Judiciary with the Jakarta Charter became heated, the Muhammadiyah's Central Board was received by President Suharto at the Presidential Office on May 9, 1989. At this meeting it was stated that Religious Judiciary was not linked with the Jakarta Charter, but only constituted the implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The government is obligated to protect the Muslim majority and to approve the performance of their worship (*ibadat*). According to President Suharto, *ibadat*, does not only cover prayers, fasting or paying of alms. The government had to protect the entire range of *ibadat*, as contained in the 1945 Constitution Article 29 paragraph 2.<sup>48</sup> It is notable that after this meeting the issue of the link between the Draft Law on a Religious Judiciary and the Jakarta Charter began to wane.

However, the debates at the DPR were still heated, and a polarization of "religious sentiments" was discernible. At a public hearing between the Functional Groups Faction (FKP) and the Muhammadiyah Central Board on June 26, 1989,<sup>49</sup> for example, the "spirit of defending Islam" was strongly felt in the major circles of the FKP members. While, on other hand, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) was quite vocal in submitting the scope of authority of Religious Judiciaries in connection with Religious (Islamic) law, the draft law's link with the Jakarta Charter, the guarantee regarding the skill and limited competency of Religious Judiciaries, and also asking what freedom of choice of law existed for seekers of justice who wished to choose proceedings other than those of a Religious Judiciary.<sup>50</sup>

With regard to the development of discussion in the DPR, Muhammadiyah actively joined in providing a response. A rather strong reaction was put forward by Lukman Harun, who stated that the critical attitude of the Indonesian Democratic Faction in discussing the Draft Law of Religious Judiciary should be noted by Muslims, and that the PDI should not be supported in the next General Elections.<sup>51</sup> This reaction, to a some extent, influenced the attitude of that faction in its discussion of the Draft Law. The discussion proceeded relatively smoothly and, in December 1989, the law on a Religious Judiciary was finally ratified by the DPR.

### Muhammadiyah's Dilemma

The Muhammadiyah's involvement in politics, particularly in the New Order period, reveals its cultural transformation ensuing from the course of a campaign to this effect. The modernization launched by the New Order regime had both positive and negative impacts on Indonesian society. On the negative side, modernization has proved the way to the rise of certain secularistic tendencies, including individualistic and hedonistic modes of life. These tendencies have, to some extent, influenced society's perceptions of religion by questioning its effectiveness to respond to the needs of modern life.<sup>52</sup>

This external challenge added an influential factor to the internal one, that is, that the regime's economic and political development policies have brought a consequential dimension to the existing degree of Islamization, since these policies have led to the "deterioration" of Muslim middle class traders, who were, historically, supporters of the (Muhammadiyah's) Islamic *da'wah*.

These phenomena suggested to the Muhammadiyah, that its existence as a *da'wah* movement was then challenged by an inevitable political-cultural reality. The cultural retrospection that the Muhammadiyah then experienced led this organization to engage in the politicization of Islam, as revealed in its conclusion that a political party was a necessary agent of *da'wah* that it conceived. The Muhammadiyah's decision to politicize Islam, albeit indirectly, does however, suggest an emotional political decision as well as the degree of its vision of (practical) politics. Although the Muhammadiyah's superficial divergence of the *da'wah* movement into two strategic approaches, i.e. practical-political and socio-cultural, was tactical, for it provided it with a "political safety", to borrow Fachruddin's term, the manner in which it carried out its practical politics, i.e. by affiliating with an additional structure, the Parmusi, was crucial and critical.

The affiliation with Parmusi gave the Muhammadiyah the credit of not becoming an overtly political organization, yet this sort of relationship simply meant a lack of confidence. Bearing in mind that the Muhammadiyah's confidence stems from its endorsement of political change, the manner of its practice of practical politics in affiliating with the Parmusi is, of course, paradoxical. This paradox is one of political ambivalence, especially as it relates to historical evidence, namely the Muhammadiyah's attachment to the 1964 creation of



Golkar's embryo, the Sekber Golkar. It is pertinent to suggest here, that the regime's consent to the right of the modernist Muslim groups, including the Muhammadiyah, to establish a new Islamic political party appears to have been a deliberate "political plot" to control them.

All this may well suggest that the Muhammadiyah faces a problem of "political alienation." Despite its inclination towards a substantivistic political orientation, its political activism has demonstrated its tendency to seek every possible way in its efforts to provide the groundwork for the realization of its ideal society. The Muhammadiyah's substantiation of Islamic polity thus has a utilitarian character.

Yet, the Muhammadiyah's substantiation of an Islamic polity was, to a certain degree, made formalistic by its emphasis on the importance of a political party as the form for political articulation. In the theoretical sense, its view of politics appears reformist because of its perception of Islam as a religion relevant to modern times, and of politics as an agent for implanting Islamic values into modern society.<sup>55</sup>

Thus, the Muhammadiyah may be classified in a paradigm which maintains that there is a symbiotic relationship between Islam and politics. Because its political articulation is meant, in the theoretical sense, to be one of the instruments of Islamic *da'wah*, the symbiosis of religion and politics is, in this case, comparable to the pre-modern tendency of Islamic political thought, which subordinates politics to religion. But since, in the practical sense, the Muhammadiyah's political articulation appears pragmatic, the symbiosis belongs to the paradigm of Islamic modernism.

Nevertheless, the Muhammadiyah's inability to develop more sophisticated forms of political articulation in the context of the dynamics of Indonesian politics (as has been shown by the absence of any new significant political ideas emerging from the organization) reveals its ineffectiveness as an agent of social reform. In this respect, the Muhammadiyah's universities, for example, do not yet serve as "centers of science and concepts" for the social engineering of society in general and the Muslim community in particular.<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, because Muhammadiyah's political articulation appears to have operated defensively, only to preserve Islamic belief without attempting its reformation in relation to modern life and in the framework

of the Indonesian perspective, its politics tends to be conservative.

It is clear the Muhammadiyah's political activity during its involvement in Parmusi was reformist and to some extent "militant," and that its activities in allocative politics during the process of the legalization of the four Draft Laws reveals a contrary policy. The latter case shows a dynamism in the Muhammadiyah's vision of the political process. However, the execution of this vision in the political arena was not systematic, and was exercised for the purpose of self-defense and survival. The Muhammadiyah's inclination to defend Islam and its self-interest through the conservation of Islamic values in their strictest sense, without attempting to domesticate these values in the framework of the ongoing political process, as revealed in its allocative politics, confirmed the existence of a certain degree of conservatism. In other words the Muhammadiyah's view in the context of a particular political situation, (in this case the New Order) has not always been along modernist or reformist lines.

This state of affairs is the outcome of both external and internal factors. The external factor is the political environment, the result of political engineering launched by the New Order regime, in which the depoliticization of Islam has placed Muslim organizations, including the Muhammadiyah, in a defensive corner of the political arena. In this situation the Muhammadiyah was unable to escape by, for example, altering its strategies in dealing with the ruling elites. If there were individuals in the decision-making arena sympathetic to the Muhammadiyah, due to their past connections with this organization, this political asset was not well managed. This is due to the lack of a relevant body, in the Muhammadiyah's organizational structure, charged with the task of advancing social relations by developing its human resources and making these an effective force.

Yet this is not the only factor that caused the Muhammadiyah's ineffectual relationship with those individuals occupying strategic positions in the decision-making arena, because the degree of this relationship has also been determined by a widespread mentality of fear among those individuals, originating from *Islamophobia* among the ruling elite. This mentality caused those people to distance themselves from Islamic organizations such as the Muhammadiyah. The Muhammadiyah did not succeed in countering this fear by providing a broader meaning to the concept of *ummat Islam* so as to break the psychological barrier within the dichotomy of *santri* and *non-santri*.

It was because of the latter that the "Muhammadiyah has been suspected... (and feared...) for its supra-national Islamic universalism".<sup>57</sup>

The Muhammadiyah's image in the eyes of outsiders which encourages universalist aspirations originates from its theological outlook. Its theology, especially regarding the principle of *tawhîd*, has shown more of a link with Rida's salafism than with Abduh's modernist ideas of *tawhîd* as revealed in his *Risâlah al-Tawhîd*.<sup>58</sup> In the field of theology however, this implies that the Muhammadiyah is a conservative, salafi movement. This theological stand has affected its activities in other fields, including that of education, which historically was its agent of renewal and reform. In the political domain, this theological position has led the Muhammadiyah to adopt a kind of "scriptural polity" (*al-siyâsah al-shar'îyyah*), like that of the "father" of salafism in Islam, Ibn Taymiyyah.<sup>59</sup>

All this may suggest that the Muhammadiyah, faces a problem of "self-determination", or, in Azyumardi Azra's word, a condition of "theological shock".<sup>60</sup> This problem is traceable from the rigid scripturalism which led this movement into difficulties in articulating its reformism. In the absence of a methodological approach to both the scripture and reform, a scripturalist-reformist movement would stagnate in the process of self-determination. As a process of self determination, the repoliticization of Islam exercised by the Muhammadiyah in the form of allocative politics still faces the problem of how to reconcile the demands of the Scripture with the need for political reform.

The fact is that the problem of Islamic modernism lies in its scripturalist orientation, which originated primarily from belief in the totality of the Scripture and the self-sufficiency of Islam as an agent of social reformation and change. This value orientation induced Islamic modernism to maintain normative, dogmatic attitudes, which have, in turn, led to the failure of Islamic modernism.<sup>61</sup> That Islamic dogmaticism has not lead to social reform is due to its limitation of the social function of the religion itself. The inability of religious dogmaticism to bring about change is suggested in Niklas Luhmann's description of its social function:

...On the one hand it works with functionally unanalyzed abstractions and in this respect is unreflective. It does not thematize its social function but understands itself, its concept of dogma, in turn in a dogmatic fashion.... It rests, on the other hand, on the context-free availability of its materials; that

is, at a distance from the connections which it interprets.<sup>62</sup>

This assertion seems to confirm the Muhammadiyah's dilemma. Its "position between two positions," as described above, has crystallized through its process of self-determination into the position of "neo-Salafism." This ideology emphasizes the return to a pristine Islam; with strict scripturalism it enforces purificative action in the field of Islamic faith (*'aqidah*), and affirms the necessity of *ijtihad*, particularly in the fields of material life (*mu'amalah*), but without actually practicing this ideology. Its inclination toward adopting modern ideas and methods does not necessarily mean its acceptance of these on a substantial level, but rather only on a formal level; while in substance it confirms its own strict normative attitude and methods.

This bent can be observed in the Muhammadiyah's development of a system of education which has merely verified the existence in the curriculum of so-called *Al-Islâm* and *Kemuhammadiyahahan* ("Islamism" and "Muhammadiyahanism").<sup>63</sup> The former is designed to disseminate Islamic teachings (from the Muhammadiyah's perspective, of course), and the latter to propagate dogmas relating to its world view and struggles. As in Islamic salafism, inconsistency and ambivalence can be observed in the way that the Muhammadiyah overcomes the problems it faces in the field of economy. The endeavors by its Economic Council (*Majelis Ekonomi*) to establish the *Bank Perkreditan Rakyat* ("People's Credit Bank," or BPR), in its attempts to reactivate its members' economic and business activities, have not proceeded smoothly, because this decision has not concurred with the conclusions of the *Majelis Tarjih*, whose task is to interpret Islamic jurisprudence on the legal status of bank interest. The *Majelis Ekonomi*'s demand to operate several banks, i.e. BPRs, without the prior consent of the Muhammadiyah Central Board, has revealed the existence of an internal problem within the organization.<sup>64</sup>

The Muhammadiyah will face similar problems in the future if it does not immediately change its methodological framework in positing Islam in the modernization process. In general, the Muhammadiyah's way, and that of the *Majelis Tarjih* in particular, of countering the challenges of modern life are inadequate, because it has shown, as observed by Djohan Effendi, a normative rather than a problem-solving approach.<sup>65</sup> The problem faced by the

Muhammadiyah at present are the outcomes of two unbalanced processes in the organization, namely mobilization and institutionalization. Mobilization, which includes the mobilization of the ideas and the material of the Muhammadiyah's members so as to establish various kinds of institutions called *amal usaha* (meaning "of good deed efforts"), has yielded tremendous results.<sup>66</sup> Yet this mobilization process has not yet been followed up by appropriate institutionalization either in terms of preparing "software", such as principles and regulations, nor in terms of creating "hardware", including relevant institutions.

A result of the interaction of the two processes is that this organization has been occupied with problems relating to more routine technical matters which, in turn, paved the way to conflicts within the Muhammadiyah's elite prior to its 42nd congress in Yogyakarta, in December 1990.<sup>67</sup>

### Conclusion

From the above discussion, the conclusion can be drawn that a "structural transformation" has occurred within the Muhammadiyah, that is, it has transformed itself from being a "movement of ideas" (*gerakan ide*) to a "movement of action" (*gerakan amal*). However this transformation may be seen as a logical consequence in a process. In other word that a movement with an ideology will invariably become a movement of action if the ideology is implemented. The transformation, in the Muhammadiyah's case, reveal the organization's negligence in developing new ideas. This has made it face a scarcity of intellectualism<sup>68</sup> and a "crisis of relevance".<sup>69</sup>

In the political sphere, this crisis reveals the Muhammadiyah's lack of several things, including seriousness in dealing with political issues, a think-tank on public policies and strategies, systematic plans for the expression of long-term political goals, an political lobbyists. According to Hartono Mardjono, the Muhammadiyah's major weaknesses in this respect lay in its poor comprehension and anticipation of political developments at the national level, such as the National Development's objectives and programs. Besides which it never conducted studies and research so as to prepare meaningful conceptions in order to be able to respond to draft law on various political issues, such as lands, workers, banking, etc.<sup>70</sup>

These are the internal factors leading to the Muhammadiyah's

ineffectiveness in the political arena. The most important of these factors is the absence, in the Muhammadiyah's organizational structure, of a body whose task is to study political development and to provide it with ideas and proposals concerning the ongoing political process. In fact, the Muhammadiyah had a political bureau, called *Majlis Hikmah*, but this was abolished in 1985 due to the involvement of its functionaries in the political opposition of the regime.<sup>71</sup> This abolition, however, clearly shows Muhammadiyah's inconsistency in its perception of politics and its rigid behavior in the management of political affairs.<sup>72</sup>

Nevertheless, the reorganization of the *Majlis Hikmah* suggests a constructive introspection. This decision also implies the Muhammadiyah's dynamic view of politics and its desire to play a more significant role in the political arena in the years to come. The active roles played by community organizations like Muhammadiyah, as against the ineffectiveness of political parties in articulating the society's political interests, may well serve to bring about political change in Indonesia.

### Endnotes:

1. This point of view is borrowed from Bassam Tibi, who tended to view cultural contacts between Islam and the West as an interaction between industrial and pre-industrial culture. In this context acculturation included socio-economic as well as asymmetrical cultural modes of interaction. Tibi's "inferior-superior" formula corresponds to Samuel Kojo's and Johan Galtung's, "center-periphery". According to this "paradigm" acculturation, from the perspective of the inferior, includes three phases: cultural revitalization, self-resignation and projection, and cultural restrospection. See Bassam Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam*, (Salt Lake City, 1988)
2. The first teaching of K. H. Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah, to his disciples was the elaboration of the Qur'ân, namely Surah al-Mâ'ûn, dealing, inter-alia, with Muslim obligation of care for the orphans. Dahlan's emphasis of the implementation of the verses in a real community development project seemed to confirm the "Western mode of production". Such a confirmation was further evidenced in his adoption of the "Westernized" Christian Boy Scout activities in his newly established Muhammadiyah.
3. Tibi, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
4. Federspiel is right to include the Muhammadiyah in the line of Muslim orthodox reformations of the twentieth century; Orthodoxy here means an orientation concerning the totality of Islam. The term is used by Federspiel so as to distinguish Muhammadiyah from two other types of Islam existing in Indonesia, namely syncretic Islam and secularistic Islam. See Howard Federspiel, "The



- Muhammadiyah: A Study of an Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia" in Indonesia, No. 10 (October, 1970), p. 57-79.
5. This has led many observers to identify this movement in terms of the weight of its leaning, in the eyes of these observers, of course. For examples, Peacock chose to characterize its as a puritan movement; see James L. Peacock, *Purifying the faith: The Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesia* (Berkeley: 1978), whereas Deliar Noer, Alfian and Alan Samson tend to include it in the modernist Muslim movement. Muhammadiyah itself has, in fact, shown that this tendency exists in this identity (*kepribadian*). See *Penjelasan Kepribadian Muhammadiyah*, a document endorsed by the 35th Muhammadiyah Congress in Jakarta in 1963 (especially Article VI A.2).
  6. See the Muhammadiyah's Statutes, in Lukman Harun, *Muhammadiyah and the Pancasila Ideology* (Jakarta: 1986), p. 70. As will be discussed later, this objective is the latest revised version of a previous one reading: "... so that a true Islamic community ..."
  7. As community organization, the Muhammadiyah is registered with various characteristics in various Government's department: in the Department of Religious affairs as a religious organization; in Department of Education and Culture as an educational organization; in the Department of Social Affairs as a social organization. Even the Vice Prime Minister in Charge of Social and Political Affairs as well as the Minister of Home Affairs in 1966 stated in their official letters respectively that the Muhammadiyah was a social and political organization (*Organisasi Sosial Politik* or *Orsospol*) that is, a community organization with a real political function like that political parties.
  8. This type of education, which was later adopted by the public as well as private religious schools under the Ministry of Religion Affairs, now faces an epistemological problem as how to create an Islamic concept of science. Much criticism has been made of Muhammadiyah's system of educational, including that by Abdurrahman Wahid, who asserted that the modernist Muslims' educational institution are based by two equally irrelevant issues: how to balance two religious instruction by against non-religious instruction, and how to explain the modern sciences within a Qur'anic context. See Abdurrahman Wahid, "Islam, the State and Development in Indonesia" in Ashgar Ali Engineer, *Islam in South and South-East Asia* (Delhi: 1985), p. 93.
  9. Johan d. Legge, *Indonesia* (New Jersey: 1964), p. 109.
  10. President Soeharto acknowledgement, in his address at the opening ceremony of the 41th Muhammadiyah Congress in 1985, describing his experience in a Muhammadiyah elementary school, for example, paved a way for many government officials on the district levels or below to support the organization's activities. *Interview* with Ramli Taha, Secretary of the Muhammadiyah Central Board, Jakarta, October, 1990.
  11. In this context, Muhammadiyah has, in fact, contributed several important figures to the country, including four national heroes (namely Ahmad Dahlan, Aisyah Dahlan, Fachruddin and Mas Mansur), the founder of the Indonesian National Army, General Sudirman, and even the first of the republic, Soekarno, who become a functionary in Muhammadiyah's Educational Bureau when living in exile in Bengkulu. For further information, see Yusuf Abdullah Puar, *Perjuangan dan Pengabdian Muhammadiyah*, (Jakarta: 1989), p. 291.

12. Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization Under Dutch Colonialism* (Yogyakarta: 1989) p.316
13. PII was created by May 1938 under the initiative and leadership of several leaders of Muhammadiyah, including K. H. Mas Mansur, Ki Bagus Hadikusuma and Dr. Sukiman Wirdjosandjojo, who become its chairman. One of the motives behind its creation was the immediate need for a political channel to articulate the Muhammadiyah political interests, owing to this distinct relationship to PSII, which once become its political vehicle. See Puar, *Perjuangan*, *op. cit.*, p. 290. Djarnawi Hadikusuma, then vice Chairman of the Muhammadiyah's Central Board, said in the interview, that according to his father, Ki Bagus Hadikusuma, there was a ineffectiveness if PSII, leading to the foundation of the PII, that is, the injunction of *tabkîmiyyah* (God's sovereignty) in the Qur'ân (Surah *al-Mad\_nah*, 44-47). *Interview* with Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Yogyakarta, September, 1990.
14. Parmusi's leaders, Djarnawi Hadikusuma and Lukman Harun, both belongs to the Muhammadiyah, but the party was then taken over by Djaelani Naro, who was once "the government man" in the party as well as later in the PPP.
15. Lukman Harun, then Vice Chairman of Muhammadiyah Central Board and once the Secretary-General of Parmusi, confirmed that the decision had sprung from the tragic *coup d'etat* over the "Muhammadiyah's" leadership of the Parmusi. *Interview* with Lukman Harun, Jakarta, June, 1990
16. Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago and London: 1988), p. 32.
17. Huh Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, (London and New York: 1986), p.34.
18. *Interview* with Djindar Tamimi, Yogyakarta, September, 1990.
19. *Interview* with Djarnawi Hadikusuma, September, 1990.
20. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
21. This can be implied from Hadikusuma's opinion that the conception of *ummah* or *masyarakat* is flexible and adjustable in accordance with the situation and the circumstance. *Interview* with Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Yogyakarta, September, 1990.
22. *Interview* with Djindar Tamimi, Yogyakarta, September, 1990.
23. In this respect, Muhammadiyah's leaders have approvingly referred to the Qur'anic verse (3:104), stating the obligatoriness of the Muslims to form an organization to enjoin the good and prohibit the evil.
24. See the Muhammadiyah's politically strategical discourse, called *Khittah Perjuangan Muhammadiyah*, a product of 1968 Congress in Yogyakarta, appended to Umar Hasyim, *Muhammadiyah Jalan Lurus* (Surabaya: 1990), p. 200-204 (especially Article B.5.2).
25. See the explanation of the Muhammadiyah's Identity, called *Penjelasan Kepribadian Muhammadiyah*, appended to Hasyim, *op. cit.*, p. 422-441 (especially Article VI.A.1).
26. See "Khittah Perjuangan" (Article 5.3) in Hasyim, *op. cit.* p. 200-201.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 204. It should be noted that the discourse was revised in the Muhammadiyah's Tanwir Session in 1969 and then in 1971 Congress in Ujung Pandang. Yet, these revisions dealt with Muhammadiyah's relationship to practical politics without altering its view of the relationship of Islam to the state.
28. The message was conveyed through the Junior-Minister for Youth Affairs in

- relation to the enforcement of the sole foundation of Pancasila for Youth Mass Organizations which were holding the congress of the time, but it was also generally applicable. See *Sinar Harapan*, August 30, 1982.
29. See Lukman Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas Pancasila*, (Jakarta: 1986), p. 38.
  30. There was only one violation, by the Chairman of the Muhammadiyah Provincial Board of West Sumatra, who eventually, at the request of the Central Board, resigned from office. See *ibid.*, p. 43.
  31. See Amin Rais, "Kata Pengantar" in Drs. M. Rusli Karim (editor), *Muhammadiyah dalam Kritik dan Komentar*, (Jakarta: 1986), p. IX.
  32. Harun, *op. cit.* p. 41.
  33. *Interview* with Fahmy Chatib, Jakarta, November, 1990.
  34. Harun, *op. cit.* p. 42.
  35. As told by A. R. Fachruddin on various occasions, among other (the author happened to be present) at the commemoration of Muhammadiyah's Anniversary (*Milad Muhammadiyah*) held by the Regional Board of Muhammadiyah of DKI in Gedung Granada, Jakarta, in 1993.
  36. For detail on Muhammadiyah's views, see Harun, *op. cit.*, p. 46-66.
  37. Suhardiman, who had his early education in a Muhammadiyah school in Surakarta, teach economics in the University of Muhammadiyah at Medan, North Sumatra, which honored him professorship in 1983. He has, until recently, become the General Chairman of SOKSI (the Federation of Functional Organizations of All Indonesia, one of the major elements within the Golkar.
  38. Based on calculation on total proposals filed and rejected by the DPR, Lukman Harun reported that Muhammadiyah was 60% successful in struggle. *Interview* with Lukman Harun, Jakarta, January, 1991.
  39. Rais, *op. cit.*, p. IX.
  40. *Ibid.*, p. IX.
  41. Taufik Abdullah, "Semangat Tajdid Harus Terus Dikembangkan" in *Tajdid*, No. 5, 1986, p. 16.
  42. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 28, 1988.
  43. *Tempo*, August 6, 1988
  44. For details on Muhammadiyah's contributions, see Lukman Harun, *Mubammadiyah dan Undang-Undang Pendidikan*, (Jakarta: 1990), p. 12-15 and p. 153-160.
  45. See the letter from the Association of Churches in Indonesia to the Speaker of the DPR and Chairman of Factions in the DPR dated May 10, 1989.
  46. *Hidup*, No 7 (February 1989) in an article on National Affairs wrote "Antara Agama dan Negara Pancasila" (Between Religion and Pancasila State) and subtitled "Hukum Islam di Indonesia Mulai Berlaku" (Islamic Laws Begin to be Enforced in Indonesia).
  47. Letter signed by R. Soeprpto on behalf of Vice Chairman of MPR/DPR and using the official letterhead of MPR, dated June 12, 1989.
  48. This statement by the President was publicized by the mass media and repeated by Lukman Harun in hearing between FKP and Muhammadiyah. See transcript made by the Central Board of Muhammadiyah.
  49. The author happened to attend under the auspices of Muhammadiyah's Central Board.
  50. See General View of Indonesian Democratic Faction (PDI) with respect to the

- Bill on Religious Judiciary submitted on June 15, 1989; *Kompas*, June 16, 1989.
51. *Tempo*, June 14, 1989.
  52. M. Din Syamsuddin, "Kata Pengantar" in M. Din Syamsuddin (ed.), *Muhammadiyah Kini dan Esok*, (Jakarta: 1990), p. IX.
  53. Such a conclusion is implied, for example, in Yahya Muhaimin, "Muslim Traders: the Stillborn Bourgeoisie" in *Prisma*, English edition, p. 83-90. See also Kuntowidjojo, "Peran Muhammadiyah dalam Masyarakat Moderen" in Syukrianto AR and Abdul Munir Mul Khan, *Pergumulan Pemikiran Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: 1990), p. 59-65.
  54. See the Muhammadiyah's 1968 discourse on political strategy (Article 5.4) in Hasyim, *op. cit.*, p. 201.
  55. As Allan Samson has identified the reformist faction within the Parmusi, comprising the Muhammadiyah's element. See Samson, "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism", in R. William Liddle (ed.), *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*, (New Haven: 1972), p. 118; See also Samson, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia", Ph.D dissertation, UC. Berkeley, 1972, p. 87.
  56. *Interview* with Hartono Mardjono, Jakarta, March, 1991. Hartono Mardjono was once a member of the Muhammadiyah's *Majlis Hikmah*, under whose decision and approval he engaged in practical politics since 1971. After becoming the Vice-Chairman of the PPP'S Advisory Council (*Majlis Pertimbangan*) he become, as the party's representative, the Vice-Chairman of *Dewan Pertimbangan Agung* (The Supreme Advisory Council, od DPA).
  57. R. William Liddle, *Politics and Culture in Indonesia*; unpublished research paper, p. 22.
  58. *Risalah al-Tawhid* (literally the message or treatise of unity) is Abduh's important work on Islamic theology. The book emphasizes the important place of reason in relation to revelation, and suggests a rational approach to theological issues.
  59. Mardjono implied in the interview that the Muhammadiyah's principled attitude — derived from this theological stand — served as an influential factor to the achievement of its allocative politics. *Interview* with Hartono Mardjono, Jakarta, March, 1991.
  60. *Pelita*, 9 November 1990.
  61. Tibi, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
  62. Cited in Tibi, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
  63. These two has becomes required subjects in the Muhammadiyah's educational institutions in all levels and in all stratas.
  64. See *Tempo*. No. 42 (December, 1990).
  65. Djohan Effendi, "Tajdid dalam Perspektif Muhammadiyah" in *Muhammadiyah Menyongsong Masa Depan*, a proceeding of Panel Discussions at the University of Muhammadiyah at Surabaya, 3-4 December, 1990 (Surabaya: 1990), p. 21-22.
  66. Muhammadiyah leaders have often proudly exposed the organization's achievements in these fields of *da'wah*, such as its possession of about 4000 mosques; 12.000 schools, including 73 higher learning institutions; 516 health and maternity clinics and 14 hospitals; 326 orphanages, etc.; see *Muhammadiyah at a Glance*, a booklet published by Muhammadiyah Central Board, 1986. Since 1989 Muhammadiyah has intensified its activities in the field of economy and established about seven banks (or BPRs).
  67. See, for example, *Tempo*, No. 42 and No. 43 (December, 1990), or *Editor*, No. 12

and No. 13 (December, 1990).

68. The conclusion may sound paradoxical in the light of the fact that the Muhammadiyah has many intellectuals, who are now engaged in teaching research in various universities and centers, including Dr. Kuntowidjojo, Dr. Yahya Muhaimin, Dr. M. Amien Rais, Dr. A. Watik Pratiknya, Dr. Affan Ghaffar, Dr. Safri Sairin, and Prof. Dr. Baroroh Baried of Gajah Mada University; Dr. A. Syafii Maarif and Prof. Dr. Noeng Muhajir of the IKIP Yogyakarta; Prof. M. Daud Ali and Prof. Dr. Ismail Sunny, SH, MCL of the University of Indonesia; Dr. M. Yunan Yusuf, Dr. Peunoh Daly of the IAIN Jakarta, or M. Dawam Rahardjo, Adi Sasono, and Amin Aziz of the NGO's activists, and others from the Muhammadiyah's universities. But it appears that the Muhammadiyah has not managed effective communication with its "children" on the outside, which may lead it to face a "brain drain".
69. This is implied, for example, in Amien Rais' concern about the Muhammadiyah's present and future condition. See Amien Rais, "Beberapa Pemikiran Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia" in Syukrianto and Mulkhan, *op.cit.*, p. 37-38.
70. *Interview* with Hartono Mardjono, Jakarta, March, 1991.
71. *Interview* with Lukman Harun, Jakarta, June, 1990.
72. The last Muhammadiyah's Congress, in December, 1990, decided on the reorganization of the bureau, but limited its function and scope. If the old *Majelis Hikmah* reached from the central board level to the district level, the new *Biro Hikmah* only functions on the central board level.

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