

STUDIA ISLAMIKA

INDONESIAN JOURNAL FOR ISLAMIC STUDIES

Volume 2, Number 4, 1995



ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY:
IN SEARCH OF A VIABLE SYNTHESIS
Bahtiar Effendy

MODERNITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM:
SOME INDONESIAN LESSONS
Robert W. Hefner

ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT AND CULTURAL REVIVAL
IN MODERN INDONESIA
M. Din Syamsuddin

WESTERN STUDIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ISLAM:
PROBLEM OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
John R. Bowen

STUDIA ISLAMIKA

Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies

Volume 2, Number 3, 1995

EDITORIAL BOARD:

Harun Nasution
Mastubu
M. Quraish Shibab
A. Aziz Dablan
M. Satria Effendi
Nabilah Lubis
M. Yunan Yusuf
Komaruddin Hidayat
M. Din Syamsuddin
Muslim Nasution
Wabib Mu'thi

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF:

Azyumardi Azra

EDITORS:

Saiful Muzani
Hendro Prasetyo
Joban H. Meuleman
Nurul Fajri
Badri Yatim

ASSISTANTS TO THE EDITOR:

Arief Subban
Heni Nuroni

ENGLISH LANGUAGE ADVISOR:

Judith M. Dent

ARABIC LANGUAGE ADVISOR:

Fuad M. Fachruddin

COVER DESIGNER:

S. Prinka

STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-0492) is a journal published quarterly by the *Institut Agama Islam Negeri* (IAIN, The State Institute for Islamic Studies) Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. (STT DEPPEN No. 129/SK/DITJEN/PPG/STT/1976) and sponsored by the Department of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies, and is intended to communicate original researches and current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contributions from scholars of related disciplines.

All articles published do not necessarily represent the views of the journal, or other institutions to which it is affiliated. They are solely the views the authors.

Forum Demokrasi (Democratic Forum): An Intellectuals' Response to the State and Political Islam

Abstrak: Sejak lima tahun terakhir, kehidupan politik Indonesia banyak diwarnai kemunculan organisasi-organisasi intelektual keagamaan. Tercatat pertama kali adalah Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (ICMI) yang berdiri tahun 1990. Tahun-tahun berikutnya terbentuk Forum Cendekiawan Hindu Indonesia (FCHI) dan Keluarga Cendekiawan Budhis Indonesia (KCBI). Sementara Persatuan Inteligensia Kristen Indonesia (PIKI) dan Ikatan Sarjana Katholik Indonesia (ISKA), yang masing-masing berdiri tahun 1963 dan 1958, kembali bangkit bersamaan dengan yang lain.

Di antara organisasi-organisasi tersebut, ICMI merupakan organisasi cendekiawan-keagamaan paling menonjol. Pengikutnya paling banyak dan perannya dalam kehidupan politik sangat menentukan. Banyaknya jumlah anggota ICMI didukung kenyataan bahwa mayoritas penduduk Indonesia Muslim. Sementara keberhasilan peran ICMI lebih banyak dimungkinkan elit negara yang memberikan dukungan penuh. Para birokrat, mulai dari level menteri sampai pejabat daerah, banyak yang menjadi pengurus ICMI. Bahkan ketua ICMI sendiri adalah Menteri Riset dan Teknologi, B.J. Habibie.

Munculnya ICMI banyak dipandang sebagai preseden berkembangnya sektarianisme. Dengan pelbagai alasan, para pengikut agama lain juga turut mendirikan organisasi serupa. Selain itu, keberadaan ICMI juga dianggap dapat mengembalikan Islam politik yang pernah dibatasi gerakannya pada masa awal Orde Baru. Saat ini simbol Islam mulai banyak digunakan dalam kehidupan politik dan berbangsa. Komposisi kabinet mulai didominasi oleh kalangan yang setia terhadap Habibie. Kelompok ini juga turut membanjiri lembaga legislatif.

Akibatnya, beberapa kalangan khawatir akan terjadi dominasi mayoritas. Kelompok minoritas, seperti Kristen, Hindu dan Budha, sedikit

banyak akan tersingkir oleh arus mayoritas. Bila hal ini terjadi, pola relasi kekuasaan menjadi tidak seimbang. Setiap saat akan muncul ketegangan yang sulit dikontrol. Rasa kebangsaan yang selama ini kuat juga bisa terkikis. Dampaknya lebih jauh, pembangunan yang sudah berjalan puluhan tahun menjadi dipertaruhkan.

Beberapa cendekiawan turut prihatin atas berkembangnya suasana ini. Mereka sepakat untuk memberikan respons dengan membentuk sebuah organisasi yang bernama Forum Demokrasi (Fordem). Dalam deklarasi awalnya disebutkan, Fordem akan berjuang menegakkan demokrasi melalui proses pemberdayaan masyarakat serta peningkatan kesadaran politik rakyat. Forum ini juga bertujuan untuk memperkuat posisi rakyat di hadapan negara yang selama ini masih terlihat lemah.

Fordem memilih demokrasi sebagai kerangka kerjanya. Bagi kalangan Fordem, munculnya organisasi cendekiawan-keagamaan di atas dapat melemahkan proses demokratisasi Indonesia. Dengan kata lain, proses demokratisasi akan gagal jika sektarianisme terus berkembang. Sebaliknya, proses tersebut akan berhasil jika dilandasi oleh semangat kebangsaan.

Selain itu, kecenderungan sektarian juga dapat memperlemah posisi rakyat di hadapan negara. Wajar kiranya kalau kemudian Fordem bersikap kritis terhadap ICMI, yang dianggap telah dikooptasi negara. Selama ini negara dapat menentukan segala-galanya bagi rakyat. Sedangkan rakyat sendiri terlihat tidak memiliki kekuatan menawar yang seimbang. Akibatnya, negara sulit dikontrol dan pelaksanaan hukum menjadi tidak menentu. Pada gilirannya, aturan main dalam bidang lain, seperti ekonomi, juga menjadi tidak jelas arahnya.

Sikap Fordem yang keras terhadap pemerintah dan ICMI melahirkan konsekuensi tersendiri. Selain elit politik tidak mendukung, forum ini juga terbatas gerakannya. Aktivitas Fordem banyak yang diawasi oleh aparat negara. Bahkan salah satu kegiatannya pernah dibubarkan oleh pihak keamanan. Tidak jarang Fordem dicemooh sebagai kumpulan cendekiawan pembangkang.

Meskipun demikian, cendekiawan yang tergabung dalam Fordem terus menawarkan alternatif tersendiri. Mereka berusaha memperkuat posisi masyarakat melalui jalur demokrasi. Mereka juga berusaha menembus sekat-sekat primordialisme dan sektarianisme. Dapat dipahami jika Fordem mampu mengakomodasi kalangan dengan pelbagai latarbelakang budaya maupun agama. Kehadirannya dapat dijadikan catatan tersendiri bagi negara serta organisasi-organisasi lain, khususnya ICMI.

الجبهة الديمقراطية: المواجهة للثقافة نحو الدولة والسياسة الإسلامية

نبذة: منذ السنين الخمس الأخيرة، نجد الحياة الإندونيسية السياسية قد ظهر فيها كثير من المنظمات الدينية الثقافية. قد سجلت أولا رابطة مثقفي مسلمي إندونيسيا التي أسست في سنة ١٩٩٠ م. في السنين التالية كونت جبهة مثقفي الهندوكية الإندونيسية، وأسرة مثقفي البوذية الإندونيسية، وبينما كل من اتحاد مثقفي مسيحي إندونيسيا ورابطة مثقفي الكاثلكة الإندونيسيين قد أسس أولهما في سنة ١٩٦٣، والثاني في سنة ١٩٥٨، ثم ظهرا معا في الوقت المناسب. من بين هذه المنظمات، فإن رابطة مثقفي مسلمي إندونيسيا مسكت زمام الحركة في مقدمة الصفوف. المنتمون إليها عدد أكبر من غيرها، ونفوذها على الشاسة السياسية ذو قرار حاسم. وكثرة عدد أعضائها تدل على أغلبية سكان إندونيسيا مسلمون. نجاح نفوذها غالبا من تأييد تام من رجال الدولة البارزين لها. فرجال الدولة ابتداء من مستوى الوزراء إلى رجال الحكومة في الأقاليم أكثرهم من أعضائها بل الرئيس العام لها هو وزير البحث العلمي والثقافي B.J. Habibie (ب. ج. حبيبي).

وظهور هذه الرابطة كثيرا ما ينبى عن تطور الطائفية. بناء على حجج مختلفة، فإن اتباع الأديان الأخرى تسلك نفس الطريق بإنشاء مثل هذه المنظمة. وبجانب ذلك، فإن إنشاء هذه الرابطة يعتبر خطة لاسترجاع السياسة الإسلامية التي كانت قد جددت حركتها في أوائل العهد الجديد، وفي هذه الآونة، أصبح الشعار الإسلامي أكثر استعمالا في المجالات السياسية والشعبية والهيئة الوزارية إذ بدأ فيها بروز الشخصيات المؤيدة والمخلصة لحبيبي. وهؤلاء هم الذين سادوا المنظمة التشريعية.

النتيجة، إن بعض الجهات تشعر بخوف من سيطرة الأغلبية. فالجموعة الأقلية مثل المسيحيين، والهندوكيين، والبوذيين على أقل تقدير قد نرحت جانبا أثر تيار

هذه الأثرية. إن حدث هذا الأمر، فإن صورة اتصال سلطة الحكم تصبح غير متوازنة/مخلّة، ففي كل وقت قد تحدث شدة من الصعوبة التغلب عليها ان استمرت، والشعور الوطني الذي كان في الفترات السابقة قويا سيصبح بالتالي زائلا محوا. وقد يكون الأثر أكثر بعدا من ذلك، إذ التعمير الذي قد استمر عشرات السنوات قد يصبح مهددا.

بعض المثقفين يشاركون في النظر إلى هذه المشكلة، فإنهم متفقون في إعطاء إجابة بتأسيس منظمة تسمى بالجهة الديمقراطية. ففي أول إعلانها قالوا: "إن الجهة الديمقراطية سوف تجاهد لإقامة الديمقراطية عن طريق تثقيف المجتمع ورفع الوعي السياسي الشعبي". وهذه الجهة ترمي كذلك إلى تقوية الموقف الشعبي أمام الدولة التي ما زالت طيلة تلك المدة السابقة ضعيفة.

والجهة تختار الديمقراطية كهيكل أعمالها، وبالنسبة لهذه الجهة إن ظهور منظمة المثقفين الدينيين تضعف الإجراء الديمقراطي في إندونيسيا. وبأسلوب آخر، فإن الإجراء الديمقراطي سوف يفشل إذا استمرت الطائفية في تطورها، وعكس ذلك، هذا الإجراء سوف ينجح إذا اعتمد على الحماس الوطني.

وخلاف ذلك، فإن الميل الطائفي سيضعف كذلك الوضع الشعبي أمام الدولة، ومن اللائق، إذا كان فيما بعد هذه الجهة تقف موقفا انتقاديا نحو رابطة مثقفى مسلمى إندونيسيا التي اعتبرت قد تعاونت مع الحكومة فإنه إلى وقتنا الحاضر تستطيع الحكومة أن تقرر كل شيء للشعب، بينما الشعب نفسه - في الظاهر - لا يملك قوة المساومة المتعادلة. الحاصل من ذلك، صعوبة مراقبة الحكومة، وتنفيذ الحكم سوف لا يستقر. وبالتالي، نظام العمل في المجالات الأخرى مثل المجال الاقتصادي قد يصبح غير ظاهر الاتجاه.

فإن خطة الجهة الحاسمة نحو الحكومة ورابطة مثقفى مسلمى إندونيسيا تولد عاقبة خاصة، غير أن العلية السياسية لا تؤيدها، لأن هذه الجهة تكون محدودة الحركة، فإن نشاطها أكثر ما يكون تحت رقابة الجهات الحكومية بل أحد أنشطتها قد ألغته جبهة الأمة، ليس بنادر أن تحتقر هذه الجهة إذا قيل أنها جمعية المثقفين المعارضين.

مهما كان الأمر، فإن المثقفين المنتسبين إلى هذه الجهة مستمرة في تقويم بديل ذاتي من نفسها، إنهم يسعون لتقوية وضع المجتمع عن طريق الديمقراطية، إنهم يسعون احتراق الحوائث البدائية والطائفية، إذا، يمكن إدراك ما إذا كانت هذه الجهة تستطيع أن تؤلف الأطراف الشعبية المختلفة الخلفيات الثقافية منها والدينية. إن حضور هذه الجهة يمكن أن يعتبر سجلا ذاتيا للدولة والمنظمات الأخرى ولاسيما لرابطة مثقفى مسلمى إندونيسيا.

In his capacity as a member of the intelligentsia and Indonesian ambassador to the United States of America, Soedjatmoko appealed to the intellectuals of developing countries to maintain their "inner world" when he made a speech at the Asia Society Forum in New York.¹ He was of the opinion that these intellectuals had to create a distance and keep aloof from the state, and instead create independent voluntary associations in order to establish a sound balance between the state and society. They have to encourage the development of social control to avoid the abuse of power by the state and to ensure the people's participation. This opinion provides a sufficient framework for the observation of the emergence of Forum Demokrasi (Fordem — Democratic Forum), a voluntary association of Indonesian intellectuals.

As it is apparent that during the last five years, the Indonesian socio-political arena has been colored by the emergence of religiously based intellectual organizations. The pioneer of these was the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI - Indonesian Muslims Intellectual Association), which was established in 1990.² Soon afterwards similar organizations mushroomed i.e. Forum Cendekiawan Hindu Indonesia (FCHI - Indonesian Hindu Intellectual Forum) and Keluarga Cendekiawan Buddhis Indonesia (KCBI - The Family of Indonesian Buddhist Intellectuals). In the meantime, Persatuan Intelegensia Kristen Indonesia (PIKI - Indonesian Protestant Intelligentsia Union) and Ikatan Sarjana Katholik Indonesia (ISKA - Indonesian Catholic Scholars Association), which were established in the late fifties and the mid-sixties, were also revitalized along with these organizations.

Within this context, the position of Fordem is somewhat unique. While other intellectual organizations tend to adopt religions as their symbols, Fordem prefers to use democracy as its main area of concern. To some extent, such a distinction has engendered some consequences for the existence of Fordem. Unlike these other intellectual organizations, especially ICMI, which gained full support from the state, the emergence of Fordem was very much disliked by the Indonesian political elite. Many members of this group construed Fordem as an association of intellectual and political dissidents. It is not surprising, therefore, if many of Fordem's activities became the subject of suspicion from the security forces. According to the latest news in the papers, some of their activities were banned by the government on grounds of permits and security.³ However, although Fordem is

viewed as a powerless organization, its influence is probably pervasive especially among the independent intellectuals of the country.

As its concerns are inclusive, Fordem is able to attract intelligentsia from different socio-cultural backgrounds and schools of thought. For example, it accommodates intellectuals from Nahdlatul Ulama (traditionalist Muslim), Catholic, Protestant, Democratic-Socialist and Nationalist factions. They gather together and form a forum for discussions and the sharing of ideas under the framework of democracy, human rights, political awareness and freedom. Such concerns are likely to surpass primordial interests or religious specificity.

The Formation of Fordem

The emergence of Fordem is an inseparable part of the general problems faced by Indonesians. Among these are the emergence of political Islam, the increase of religious sentiments and restrictions on political expression. The seed of political Islam itself surfaced in the late eighties when the government approved the Bill of Islamic Jurisprudence.⁴ Ever since then the government has seemed to re-open the possibility of using religious symbols in state affairs. It has, for instance, supported the establishment of ICMI. Not only were general Muslim intellectuals recruited, but also high government officials became the proponents and functionaries of this organization. This policy came to a climax when the government gave its full support for the creation of Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI — Indonesian Islamic Bank) to develop the so-called Islamic economic system. Minor voices against the government were then unavoidable. Some critical analysts regarded this governmental policy as an attempt to attract the attention of Muslims, who had been left behind during the first decades of the New Order.

The establishment of ICMI has been regarded by some circles as a precedent for the growth of religious sentiment. Adherents of other religions cannot just watch the increasing domination of ICMI both in the government and at the social level. Although ICMI declares itself not to be a political organization, the position of its members and the amount of support it gains have made it influential in almost all governmental policies. As such many critics regard ICMI as playing politics by using its members' influence, especially those who hold higher bureaucratic positions. This tendency has indeed seduced adherents of other religions to make their own alliances, which are

intended in part to balance their positions with that of ICMI, and to mobilize social support.⁵ It is for these reasons that the growth of religious sentiment is unavoidable.

The situation was even worse when religious sentiment was mixed up with political problems. In fact, political constraints have been ongoing for some decades in the Indonesian New Order. By no means neglecting the regime's achievements, social demands for openness, democracy and human rights have become stronger in the last few years. Unfortunately, the government is not likely to be in favor of these ideas.⁶ It still maintains the old rules of the political game by rejecting the possibility of creating a new political party. It also refuses the idea of oppositionalism even for the established parties. To some extent, by using the idea of cultural relativism, the government also does not like the idea of liberal democracy and universal human rights. These attitudes cause activists to regard the government as attempting to maintain its status quo by all possible means.

The creation of Fordem is based around these problems. It tries to offer different solutions not by using religion as a symbol. Instead, Fordem members are of the opinion that the establishment of these religiously based intellectual organizations can make the situation even worse.⁷ According to them, such organizations are only able to encourage people to rejoice in religious symbols, which in fact is not the principle problem. What people need at the present time is to gain their rights as members of this nation. However, as long as their position is inferior before the state's power, their basic problems cannot be resolved. Therefore, they argue, the empowerment of people through the application of a democratic system becomes indispensable.⁸ People deserve their rights and their demands for them are becoming stronger.

Apart from democracy, Fordem is very concerned with nationalism.⁹ The members of this forum are critical of the growing tendency of all forms of sectarianism. They appreciate the achievements of the first decades of the New Order regime in overcoming sectarianism. This regime, according to their point of view, has successfully united the heterogeneous Indonesian people, in particular by introducing the state ideology, Pancasila, as the sole basis for all social organizations. However, since the late eighties the government has allowed certain seeds of sectarianism to flower within national life. On this basis the members of Fordem insist that democratization should be

applied along the framework of national solidarity. It can be inferred that on the one hand Fordem members see any sort of sectarianism as possibly threatening national unity, and that democratization does not always mean Westernization on the other.

Fordem, which is ridiculed as being a "marginal" organization by established politicians, was formed in Cibereum, Cisarua, West Java.¹⁰ Using the auditorium of a guest house, 40 intellectuals from different parts of Indonesia met together in the middle of March 1991. During the two days of the meeting, which started on Saturday 16 March 1991 and ended the following evening, the themes discussed were mainly centered on politics. Among the participants were: the head of Nahdlatul Ulama, a traditionalist Muslim organization, Abdurahman Wahid, and his former general secretary, A. Gaffar Rahman; independent intellectuals and NGO activists Bondan Gunawan, Dhaniel Dakhidae, Manuel Kaisepo, Aswab Mahasin and T. Mulya Lubis. Also present at this forum was a leading figure from ICMI, Soetjito Wirosardjono, who later withdrew from Fordem as he had different ideas to the other members. Some activists of the 1966 generation, such as A. Rahman Tolleng and Arief Budiman, were seen among the others. Catholic priests such as Y.B. Mangunwijaya, Frater Danuwinata, Franz Magnis-Suseno S.J and Mudji Sutrisno S.J also joined the meeting, which was enlivened by the presence of journalists such as Aristides and Marianne Katoppo, Rikard Bagun, Parakitri and so forth.

The social background of Fordem members varies. Bondan Gunawan, who is the director of Hasta Manunggal Ltd., and Kristiya Kartika were activists of the Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasionalis Indonesia (GMNI—Indonesian Nationalist Students Movement). Chris Siner Key Timu and Marsillam Simanjuntak were signers and activists of the Petition of 50, which is regarded by the government as a dissident organization. Meanwhile Eko Tjokrodjojo was an activist of Pergerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Republik Indonesia (PMKRI—Movement of Indonesian Protestant Students) and Djohan Effendi was a researcher of the Department of Religious Affairs. According to the newspapers, the host of the meeting was Abdurahman Wahid. Some participants received written invitations, while the rest were invited by telephone. To some extent, this meeting was a kind of reunion. "We rarely meet together. Rahman Tolleng and Eko Tjokrodjojo were my classmates in high school",¹¹ said Arief Budiman.

According to Bondan Gunawan, although the meeting did not prepare specific papers or an agenda, all the participants focused their attention on democracy. This happened partly because almost all the participants had experienced similar problems in their involvement in socio-political organizations. Even though the meeting was informal, at its end they produced an important document called "Mufakat Cibereum" (Cibereum Consensus).¹² This document contains four principles that function as a proposal of action to be realized in the coming programs. The four principles are to widen the people's participation in order to develop the nation's maturity through democratization; to increase communication between democratic groups; to unite diverse democratic forces; and to keep up the struggle for democracy through various means and publications. As the manifestation of these principles, the participants agreed to establish an intellectual movement called Forum Demokrasi. This forum would actively take part in the process of uplifting political awareness and upholding a correct, just and healthy political life.

The responses towards Fordem were not all negative. Marwah Daud, one of ICMI's leading proponents, viewed the creation of Fordem as a logical necessity of the present situation.¹³ She was of the opinion that this forum might act as an institution to provide an alternative political education for Indonesians. In a huge country with a diverse population like Indonesia, she argued, everything should not come from only one source, the state. Thus, she reminded people not to be trapped by the assumption that everything that came from outside the system meant opposition to the establishment. Similar voices were also heard from some armed forces' leaders. Although the majority of the members of this group preferred to be in favor of ICMI and the loyalty of Muslims to the state, a tiny number of them expressed support for Fordem. Those who were not in favor of Fordem generally regarded the existing political institutions to be sufficient in accommodating the people's participation. On the contrary, those who supported the idea of Fordem tended to see this organization as a good sign of the progress of democratization in Indonesia. General (Ret.) Soemitro, for instance, who used to be Commander for the Restoration of Peace, Security and Order, viewed the creation of Fordem positively. "I think Gus Dur [the nickname of Abdurrahman Wahid, ed.] is only willing to accelerate the progress of democratization after the destruction of the PKI (Indonesian Com-

munist Party, ed.) and after the achievement of several aspects in Indonesian life".¹⁴

The State and Sectarian Intellectuals

Fordem emerged amidst the blooming of sectarian tendencies in the fields of regionalism, ethnicity and religion. Generally the members of Fordem are of the opinion that such phenomena have discouraged the spirit of democracy and national solidarity. Democratic values are being subjugated by group interests which in turn hinders the development of the nation.¹⁵ In the *Monitor* case, one of its reports having triggered Muslims' anger, Wahid was of the opinion that, apart from the Muslims' anger, the solution must be decided through legal procedures.¹⁶ Ironically, by only considering Muslims' resentment, the government one-sidedly abrogated the publishing license (SIUPP) of this tabloid. This meant, according to Wahid, that the government killed one of the institutions of democracy.¹⁷ To some extent, such a policy may bring about far reaching consequences concerning the internal relationships between Muslim groups and between Muslims and other religious adherents.

Wahid's ideas are well supported by Ian Chalmers' observations.¹⁸ The latter found that the *Monitor* case produced a schism among Indonesian Muslims themselves. The government's decision to close this tabloid encouraged leading conservative Muslim figures to demand responsibility from the tabloid's parent company, the Kompas-Gramedia group. This publisher is run by a Catholic group and is allegedly seen by many Muslims as supporting the process of Christianization in Indonesia. To some extent, such a decision also legitimized the action of Muslims who acted violently towards the *Monitor* office. However, moderate Muslim figures such as Wahid himself tend to view the case as a set-back for the process of democratization in the country. On the one hand it raises the issue of majority-minority relationships and on the other drives the resurgence of political Islam.

The seed of political Islam in the New Order period has been growing since September 1989 when a group of 'ulamâ' mobilized support for President Soeharto to be reelected for the period of 1993-1998.¹⁹ Soeharto himself then supported the idea of the creation of ICMI and gave his blessing to the Minister of Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie, to lead this organization. This maneuver, according to Fordem members, has become a potential threat to the democ-

ratization process which has been taking place for several years. As long as ICMI dominates the national political arena and controls Islamic symbols, the balance of power relations among Indonesians will be shaky. The direction of political policy, for example, is based on two extreme poles: majority and minority.²⁰ As such the future of Indonesian politics will probably be colored by tension at all levels. While the minority tends to be pushed aside, the majority will certainly dominate all aspects of socio-political lives. The *Monitor* case affirms that the government could not easily control Muslim mobs when the latter destroyed the tabloid's office.

According to Wahid, were law enforcement and freedom of expression applied, this tragedy would not have happened. Unfortunately, Wahid says, such conditions do not exist in Indonesian public life.²¹ On the contrary the government often violates the socio-political rules which have been formally approved. For example, the government has banned some Indonesians from going abroad and has withdrawn some publishing licenses (SIUPP) without stating any legal reasons. Wahid sees that rule making occurs mechanistically; it is only based on limited public opinion and poor implementation. Court mafia and corruption are spread contagiously throughout all bureaucratic levels. Wahid sees that only those who hold power could enjoy the condition of law in this country. Therefore, he argues, Fordem is certain that democracy must at the same time include the transformation of social institutions and political culture.²²

As the head of the Nahdlatul Ulama, Wahid's position is strategic. His influence is not confined to the circle of NGO activists, but also pervades to grass-root Muslims in rural areas. However, he frankly refused to join ICMI even when Habibie himself asked him to do so. He preferred to join Fordem which does not constitute any Islamic symbol. Wahid, on the contrary, is very critical of ICMI's political maneuvers, especially to those who use religious symbols as a means of obtaining political benefits. Many Muslim figures criticize him of being anti-Islamic. Against this criticism Wahid comments "Just because I do not join ICMI, some Muslims accused me of being distanced from Islam. This is ridiculous! All NU's programs are directed to and inspired by Islam. If that statement is correct, the head of NU must be a stupid person".²³

Apart from legal enforcement, the political behavior of the state apparatus is also a target of Fordem's criticism. Rahman Tolleng proposes a different logic to show the paucity of democracy in Indone-

sia. According to his point of view, the presence of political institutions such as party politics, parliament and general elections cannot ensure that democracy is running well in this country.²⁴ He argues that even in communist or fascist state such institutions can easily be found. The criteria of democracy is instead determined by the extent to which people's rights and freedom are ensured. In fact, some Indonesian laws related to politic restrict freedom of union. It allows only three political parties to exist, i.e Golongan Karya (Golkar —Functional Group), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP — United Development Party) and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI —Indonesian Democratic Party).

According to Tolleng's analysis, the New Order's political system has two faces. Firstly the symbolic, i.e formal political institutions such as parliament. Secondly, the real face which is divided into two consecutive frames: the presidency and the Armed Forces.²⁵ All decision making processes are decided by the latter two institutions, while the former merely act as a legitimizing agent. As a result, law enforcement is uncertain and the power of the state is difficult to control. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR — People's Representatives Assembly) itself cannot undertake its main function of protecting the people. Tolleng points out the case of abolition of the SDSB (national lottery —ed.) abolition as an example of the formal institutions' weaknesses. The idea of creating the SDSB, which is similar to a forecast game, has actually been opposed by many parties. However, the government was always trying to defend this program while arguing that SDSB could generate funds for the national sports scheme. Only after people from various parties rallied to protest against this game, was the government willing to give up. Indeed, in her announcement of the abolition, the Minister of Social Affairs, Mrs. Inten Soweno, maintained the consideration of the People's Representatives. However, Tolleng says, it has become an open secret that the decision was actually decided beforehand by certain invisible hands as a result of high level political lobbying.²⁶

Similar political behavior of the state also struck down the PDI when it held a congress in Medan, North Sumatra. On this occasion the state was widely believed to have dictated its own political will. A potential candidate of the party, Soerjadi, was forced to give up because the state refused to acknowledge the validity of the congress. Soerjadi himself was reported to have enjoyed support from the state

in his earlier career, but later he did not receive such support as he abandoned his loyalty to it. Consequently, the PDI had to carry out an extra ordinary congress in Surabaya, East Java. The state showed a similar attitude to the final result of this special congress. It half-heartedly supported Megawati Soekarnoputri, a daughter of the first Indonesian president, Soekarno, as the new elected leader of the PDI. However, support from the consecutive members of this party seemed too strong to be ignored. As a result, even though Megawati could not succeed in overcoming all the acute internal conflicts, she was finally able to put aside the government's pressure and appeared as the leader of the PDI.

Such a tricky political attitude of the state is not confined to the political field, but it is also apparent in the economic management of the country. Although the state never makes public statements on the real economic condition, for example, reports from some independent and international economic institutions show that the Indonesian economy faces a fairly major problem.²⁷ Indeed, the New Order regime has achieved much in economic development. During its thirty years of power, the government has eradicated absolute poverty from almost all areas of the country and, to a certain extent, has made some limited circles prosperous. It has also created a wide range of economic structures and infrastructures, which are incomparable to the same facilities in the Old Order period. As a result, the people's education and mobility are increasing. However, Fordem's members regret that these achievements are not likely to be accompanied by the sufficient mode of management systems. As such the Indonesian economic system suffers from practices of bribery, corruption, nepotism and collusion.²⁸ To note just one example, that of the Bapindo case, these practices appear to be common phenomena in the country's economy. When Bapindo, a government-owned bank, was found to have a huge amount of bad credit, a commission of investigation revealed that some top state bureaucrats had been involved in the collusion and manipulation that brought this bank to bankruptcy.

According to Gunawan and Budiman, another basic shortcoming of the Indonesian economy is the practice of monopoly.²⁹ With support from the government, some conglomerates occupy all sectors of the economy from upper to lower industries. They dominate almost all strategic industries such as cement, paper, vegetable oil, automotives

and flour. These conglomerates also control the network of distribution for both imported and exported goods. As a result, prices and markets are dictated by their will while other people have very little bargaining power. Against this phenomenon, Dawam Rahardjo, a leading Indonesian economist and NGO activist, illustrates the severe conditions of Indonesian monopolies:

Monopolies should be limited. In the United Kingdom, one company cannot dominate up to 50 per cent of the market share, but is restricted to only 15 per cent. Meanwhile, a 50 per cent monopoly is not yet considered to be a problem in Indonesia. The bureaucrats may talk about it, but they have no clear solution. To make business situations healthier, the ideal is a 10 per cent limit for each company.³⁰

Since the middle of the 1980s the government has launched some deregulation policies. These are intended to reduce bureaucratic procedures and the high economic costs which have weakened the competition forces of Indonesian businessmen. At the same time, economic deregulation is also aimed at creating more equal access to business life. This decision is to some extent successful. Many big enterprises are growing and the rate of Indonesian non-oil exports is also increasing.

However, the existence of these big enterprises is now a quite dilemma. Most of them still enjoy support from the government in terms of special protection or other facilities. Blatant examples are the automotives, vegetable oil, flour and paper industries, all of which enjoy both government protections and deregulations. In other words, they become giant powers by absorbing huge amounts of state property. Eventually, the state itself seems to find it difficult to effectively control these business actors. To take another example, Indonesian conglomerates recently met in Bali to discuss national awareness.³¹ Officially, the meeting was said to be organized by the businessmen's circle itself, but many people believe that it was the government that took the initiative. At the end of the meeting they made Deklarasi Jimbaran (Jimbaran Declaration), one of the main contents of which was to reduce the economic gap. This may become an indication of how major the bargaining power of these conglomerates is in directing the national economy. Even the state itself prefers to make compromises with economic actors rather than directly enforce firm regulations. Therefore, according to Budiman, economic deregulation to be accompanied by political openness.³²

Economic liberation without political openness, Budiman says, tends to encourage increasing conspiracy between political elites and economic actors.³³ As a result, growing social unrest will be unavoidable as the peoples' economic opportunities are eliminated and their political rights are marginalized. Within this context, Budiman and Gunawan are of the opinion that capitalism tends to benefit only the middle and upper classes.³⁴ In the Indonesian case, apart from the political elites, the Chinese ethnic group is the most privileged group of the capitalist system. Such a gap drives growing tensions between local people and Chinese descendants. Ironically, Budiman states, this problem is actually driven by certain policies designed by the elite bureaucrats who are themselves local people.³⁵ During the last five years, for instance, regular labor strikes have been seen in many parts of Indonesia, especially in the big cities. The issues being proposed not only pertain to economic demands but also include racial problems.

Increasing democratic values in this complex situation is not an easy task. Moreover, the role of the middle class, which has been viewed as the backbone of the democratization, shows a different direction. Fordem figures do not see the activities of this class supporting the democratization process in Indonesia.³⁶ Indeed, such a phenomenon is due in part to many restrictions, such as freedom of union and of speech, which are applied by the government in all social spheres. However, the Indonesian middle class cannot be construed as an independent group since they are dependent upon the upper class' authority. Therefore, the existence of a middle class is not automatically as a pioneer for the democratization agenda. Structural bounds often heavily press this class to make a dilemmatic choice between defending the status quo or loosing opportunities.

Francois Railon's ideas³⁷ seem to have similarities to those of Toleng. Raillon regards the Indonesian middle class as a group which is born in the era of industrialization, consisting of businessmen and intellectuals, holding moderate but dualistic views, soft but unstable, and basically consumerist and conservative. So that, it would be somewhat of an overexpectation to view this class as the machine for democratization. The New Order's middle class is clearly different and is not the same as its counterpart in the West. Deliar Noer, a senior political observer, holds the view that the Indonesian middle class is far from the expectation of being a pioneer for democracy.³⁸ On the contrary, he adds, members of this class are sometimes seen to be involved in collusion with the state apparatus.

According to Fordem's members, barriers to economic and political democratization do not only come from the state. Some strategic groups, which are expected to be on the side of the people, have on the contrary strengthened the position of the state. The creation of the ICMI is one example of how Muslim intellectuals let themselves to be coopted by the state.³⁹ On the basis of this, Tolleng, Gunawan and Wahid are very critical of the ICMI members' political maneuvers. They argue that ICMI's attitude may revive the spirit of sectarian politics which has been minimized since the beginning of the New Order. Although the government has put into effect the state's ideology, Pancasila, as the sole basis for all political and social organizations, it seems to take a risk when it gives support for the establishment of such a sectarian organization.

Fordem's members are of the opinion that, instead of creating narrow sectarianism, intellectuals must be committed to widening social consciousness.⁴⁰ This commitment is indispensable since the position of the state is more powerful than society. In this context, although the existence of the ICMI in the national arena has given privileges to certain circles, it makes society's position even weaker. As a result, the democratization process runs slowly as social integrity suffers from the internal conflicts of its intellectuals. The future of Indonesian democracy has become unpredictable since Islam has been integrated into the state. Sadly, ICMI's proponents prefer to rejoice in Islamic symbols within the state rather than strengthen society's position before it.

Criticism of ICMI is also voiced by its own members like Rahardjo. He, for example, calls Habibie a "super minister" to illustrate his pervasive influence and authority.⁴¹ According to Rahardjo, Habibie's influence is supported by a huge amount of financial resources which are provided by the state-owned strategic companies. Therefore, Habibie could easily create political maneuvers beyond his formal authority, such as placing his close colleagues in the cabinet and legislative body.

Compared with other cabinet ministers, the figure of Habibie is outstanding. As part of his political maneuvers, for instance, Habibie invited the members of the Petition 50, who are regarded as dissidents by the state, to the state-owned air craft company in Bandung, West Java. This event was covered by all nationwide mass media and became headlines for a couple of days. Some people admired him as

he was brave enough to invite dissidents to the state company. They were also of the opinion that he was about to make a reconciliation between the government and the members of the Petition 50. However, the most important thing about Habibie is that journalists always pay a lot of attention to his activities. Therefore, it is not surprising if Simandjuntak regards TV reports on Habibie as “Habibie’s show time”.⁴²

The integration between Islam and the state is widely believed to create concern among other groups. Prior to the establishment of ICMI, the government had supported the ratification of the National Education Law and Religious Jurisdiction, all of which benefited Muslims. This was an unprecedented phenomenon. At the beginning of the New Order, the position of Islam was marginal and it was often involved in conflicts with the government. However, the present political realities tend to take sides with Muslims, especially the ICMI. Thus, quoting Affan Gaffar, a political observer, ICMI “flaps its wings like a peacock”.⁴³

Sectarianism seems to be the concern of many groups in Indonesia. Hariman Siregar, a former student activist, argues that the sectarianism tendency has pushed society to choose its own ways.⁴⁴ If so, there will be no bridge connecting the state to society. The elite revolves within its cycle and so do the lower orders. Meanwhile, according to Tolleng, the global tendency indicates that the creation of justice, democracy, and human rights are to be the responsibilities of all nations. No one can avoid horizontal accountability for the struggle to maintain shared values, such as human rights.⁴⁵ He takes the example that Indonesians had to help the Vietnamese “boat-people” when their government deprived them of their human rights.

Towards Independent Intellectuals

Fordem members are persistent in making bold criticisms of the state’s socio-political policies. They believe that such action is compulsory for it is an expression of intellectuals’ responsibility. The New Order regime, they argue, has weakened people’s bravery and closed the opportunities for making constructive criticism.⁴⁶ People are afraid of being regarded as the state’s opponents or being accused of the government’s enemies. When the state invalidated the publishing license of *Tempo*, *Detik* and *Editor*, only a tiny number of people expressed their disagreement. Conversely, Fordem members launched

severe criticism towards the state for using an authoritative approach in solving the problem. The state's action cannot be tolerated, they argue, because these three mass media were not given the opportunity to defend themselves. According to Fordem, such a decision expresses the elite's authoritarianism in weakening democracy and the freedom of the press.

Considering the above facts, it may be assumed that Fordem members voluntarily position themselves to be a critical force before the state. This role is not new. In the course of Indonesian history intellectuals have been playing significant roles in developing the nation. As Van Neil tells us,⁴⁷ at the beginning of this century, intellectuals were playing a major role in shaping a group of modern Indonesian elites as the foundation for independence. The creation of post-colonial Indonesia was very much dependent upon elite figures such as Soekarno, Hatta, Tan Malaka, Sjahrir and so forth. In the dawn of the New Order era, Indonesian intellectuals also proved their critical force through their corrections of the Old Order regime and their involvement in creating a new order.

Using Gramsci's perspective,⁴⁸ the function and role of Fordem can be clearly seen. Fordem members can be classified in terms of "organic intellectual", elaborate social and political agendas for the sake of society. They are not detached or value-free intellectuals, labeled by Gramsci as "traditional intellectuals". In this context, Richard Robison argues that Fordem's formation is a mixture of urban and rural middle class reformists who are trying to build institutional bases, which are not coopted by the state and ICMI, as a political power.⁴⁹ The Fordem is viewed as a basis for escalating political awareness, instead of party politics. Their main concern is not gaining proportional representatives in the parliament, but encouraging the development of a civil society. Given that they work outside the system, negative attitudes from bureaucrats and other parties seem unavoidable. Fordem is often even regarded by many as an association of intellectual dissidents. This label is appropriate since, quoting Julia Kristeva, the tendency of the new intellectual is dissident.⁵⁰ They want reforms in the fields of economy and politics by attacking the ruling political power.

Regarding this stereotype, Gunawan argues that the pattern of intellectuals' reactions concerning the present situation are instead intended to create a new culture.⁵¹ All Fordem's activities are de-

signed to attract the people's participation in responding to real economic and political problems. Therefore, it is somewhat an overreaction if the security forces are suspicious of Fordem, because this line of thinking could enrich democratic life in this country. The presence of Fordem is by no means intended to be a political movement, but is aimed at increasing society's awareness of their basic rights. Fordem, says Wahid, is not willing to mobilize the masses, but is willing to develop a democratic culture within society. If this statement is correct, then there is no risk to political stability from Fordem.

It should be noted that, although Fordem is still weak and marginal, its future seems to be not so cloudy. Fordem members regularly meet together and publish their ideas through various media. They believe that political openness and liberation are the necessary conditions for creating a civil society in the sense that people have the freedom to direct their own lives. In other words political liberalization is a process towards the development of basic rights and protection for freedom of expression. These ideas are parallel with Tolleng's opinion in the early 1980s. At that time he was of the opinion that the Indonesian development process was difficult to control because it was not based on democracy, and did not implement the goals which were set up in 1966 i.e social justice and social participation.⁵² To achieve these goals, Tolleng argued, the New Order's political system should provide opportunities for the emergence of alternative leadership and development strategies. However, according to Simandjuntak,⁵³ the government often uses the concept of an integralistic state, which was formulated in the 1945 Constitution, to defend its status quo and to legitimize its actions. He asserts that this concept tends to ignore the peoples' sovereignty by placing public interests above individuals' rights.

The possibility of Fordem failing in its mission is quite great. However, as Soedjatmoko maintains,⁵² the most important thing for the intelligentsia is not success, but the struggle to achieve the goals. Fordem's aim for raising social and political awareness may be of special note for the state and Indonesian Muslims.

Endnotes

1. Interview with the late Soedjatmoko, April 1988 in Jakarta. See his article "Peranan Intelektual di Negara Sedang Berkembang", *Budaya Jaya*, July, 1970; Aswab Mahasin "Soedjatmoko dan Dimensi Manusia: Sekapur Sirih" in Soedjatmoko, *Dimensi Manusia Dalam Pembangunan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983), pp. IX - XXVII. For comparison, see Andraz Bozoki, "Intellectuals and Democratization", *The Hungarian Quarterly* (Vol. XXXIV, No. 132, Winter 1993), pp. 93-105; Aswab Mahasin and Ismed Natsir (eds.), *Cendekiawan dan Politik* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983).
2. For information about the establishment of ICMI and government policies toward Islam, see Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for an Indonesian Middle Class", *Indonesia* 56 (October, 1993), pp. 1-35.
3. See, "Kasus Hefner Memilukan" and "Hefner: Saya Tidak Mengerti Kenapa Diinterogasi", *Media Indonesia* (16 June, 1995); for further information, see "Meramal Kukuhnya Akar Beringin" and "Dari Mana Datangnya Kader Jenggot", *Tempo* (30 May, 1992).
4. For responses toward the Bill of Islamic Jurisprudence, see Franz Magnis-Suseno, "Seputar Rencana UU Peradilan Agama", *Kompas* (16 June, 1989); S. Widjojo, "Antara Negara Agama dan Negara Pancasila", *Majalah Hidup*, 7 (12 February, 1989); and P.J. Suwarno, "Peradilan Agama di Negara Pancasila", *Suara Pembaruan* (6 April, 1989).
5. See *Tempo* (4 May, 1993).
6. Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, April 1991.
7. See Abdurrahman Wahid, "Individu, Negara dan Ideologi", unpublished paper for the Soedjatmoko Memorial Lecture, (Jakarta 1994).
8. Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, *loc. cit.*
9. See for example, Bondan S. Gunawan, "Kebangsaan di Tengah Keberagaman Aliran", *Media Indonesia* (20 May, 1994).
10. See, "Demokrasi Versi Mufakat Cibeureum", *Tempo* (13 April, 1991). The creation of Fordem was reported by almost all the Indonesian national newspapers, such as *Kompas*, *Suara Pembaruan* and *Media Indonesia* during 14 - 26 April, 1991.
11. *Tempo*, *ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Tempo*, (4 May, 1993).
15. Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, *loc. cit.*
16. See, "Call to the Faithful", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (14 December, 1989).
17. *Ibid.*
18. Ian Chalmers, "Indonesia 1990: Democratization and Social Forces", *Southeast Asian Affairs* (1991), pp. 118-121.
19. "Call to the Faithful", *loc. cit.*
20. See *Tempo* (4 May 1993); Saiful Muzani, "Mempertimbangkan Lagi Gagasan Desakralisasi Politik", *Media Indonesia* (12 July 1995); and Franz Magnis-Suseno, "Kekhawatiran Itu Bisa Dimengerti", *Ulumul Qur'an*, 1 (Vol. VI, 1995), pp. 32-39.
21. *Tempo*, *loc. cit.*

22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. Interview with Rahman Tolleng, January 1994.
25. Rahman Tolleng, "Wajah Riil dan Wajah Simbolis", *Tempo* (8 January, 1994).
26. Interview with Tolleng, *ibid.*
27. Also see Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Sydney: Ullen and Unwin, 1994).
28. See Fordem's pamphlet "Tumbuhkan Kembali Daya Kritis Masyarakat" (Jakarta, 19 April 1992).
29. Interviews with Arief Budiman and Bondan Gunawan, July 1995.
30. Interview with Dawam Rahardjo, August 1995
31. See Wimar Witoelar, "Deklarasi Jimbaran Cuma Lips Service", *Forum* No.15 (6 November, 1995)
32. Interview with Budiman, *loc. cit.*; Also see his book, *State and Civil Society in Indonesia* (Clayton: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990); and Rustam Ibrahim, "Pemberdayaan Rakyat dengan Civil Society", *Media Indonesia* (5 July, 1995).
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. Interview with Arif Budiman, July 1995.
36. Interviews with Abdurrahman Wahid, Arief Budiman, Bondan Gunawan and Marsillam Simanjuntak during 23-30 June 1994.
37. See, special edition of *Forum Keadilan* (August 1995), p. 74.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.
39. ICMI is only one example of cooptation by the state. For details of Fordem's opinion of this issue, see Abdurrahman Wahid, "Forum Demokrasi, Sebuah Pertanggungjawaban", *Jurnal Demokrasi* 001 (September 1991).
40. Such an idea has been expressed by Fordem's members several times in the interviews.
41. Interview with Dawam Rahardjo, *loc. cit.*
42. See *Tempo* (12 June 1993)
43. Interview with Affan Gafar, July 1995
44. Interview with Hariman Siregar, April and May 1993. Also see his book, *Hati Nurani Seorang Demonstran* (Jakarta: Mantika Media Utama, 1994).
45. Interview with Tolleng, Januari 1994.
46. Abdurrahman Wahid, "Forum Demokrasi", *loc. cit.*
47. Robert van Neil, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (Amsterdam: Foris Publication, 1984); Also see John Legge, "Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia : Study of the Following Recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in Occupation Jakarta", monograph series (Iitaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, 1988); and Mochtar Pabottinggi, "Bahasa, Kramanisasi dan Kerakyatan", *Prisma* (February, 1991), pp. 16-26.
48. See Walter Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
49. See Richard Robison, "Indonesia: Tensions in States and Regime" in Hewison et al. (ed.), *Southeast Asia in 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993).
50. See Toril Moi (ed.), *The Kristeva Reader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 292-300.

51. Interview with Gunawan, 2 August 1995.
52. Interview with Tolleng, *loc. cit.*
53. Marsillam Simanjuntak, *Pandangan Negara Integralistik* (Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 1994); Also see, Rahman Tolleng, *Dialog: Indonesia Kini dan Esok* (Jakarta: Leppenas, 1991).
54. Interview with Soedjatmoko, *loc. cit.*

Herdi SRS *works as a journalist in the Media Indonesia daily.*