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THEOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO THE CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF CONTEMPORARY INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS

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REACTIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE DARUL ARQAM MOVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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ISLAM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN INDONESIA: A POLITICAL READING OF THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF MUKTI ALI

Ali Munhanif

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Ali Munhanif

Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia; A Political Reading of the Religious Thought of Mukti Ali

Abstraksi: *Problem dialog antar-umat beragama merupakan salah satu wacana penting dalam perkembangan pemikiran keagamaan Indonesia modern. Salah seorang intelektual Muslim terkemuka yang menaruh minat besar terhadap wacana pemikiran keagamaan ini adalah Prof. H. A. Mukti Ali, mantan Menteri Agama Republik Indonesia yang pernah menjabat sebagai Rektor IAIN Yogyakarta.*

Dalam pandangan banyak orang, Mukti Ali dikenal sebagai tokoh Muslim yang memiliki pemikiran keislaman yang beragam. Ia, berlatar belakang santri tradisional dan menjadi tokoh organisasi revivalis, Muhammadiyah, adalah pelopor Ilmu Perbandingan Agama di Indonesia. Ia juga dikenal sebagai tokoh yang memilih problem dialog antar-umat beragama di Indonesia sebagai 'pekerjaan abadi' sepanjang hidupnya. Tak kalah pentingnya, Mukti Ali merupakan Menteri Agama Indonesia yang melakukan re-orientasi penting dalam kebijaksanaan politik-keagamaan di masa Orde Baru.

Dengan begitu, perjalanan pemikiran keislaman dan politik Mukti Ali juga menampilkan citra intelektual yang berlawanan. Mukti Ali, pada satu sisi, disebut sebagai tokoh Muslim terpenting yang telah memperjuangkan pluralisme keagamaan di Indonesia. Pemikirannya tentang dialog antar-umat beragama dirujuk sebagai wacana tersendiri kerukunan umat beragama Indonesia, khususnya ketika ketegangan dan konflik hubungan antar agama mencapai tingkat yang paling intens, antara tahun 1968 dan 1979. Tapi, pada sisi yang lain, ia juga dituduh sebagai agen politik Orde Baru yang menjalankan kebijaksanaan sekularisasi. Tuduhan tersebut terutama berkaitan dengan peran Mukti Ali dalam kontroversi Undang-undang Perkawinan tahun 1973. Juga, ia diduga memainkan peran penting dalam usaha Orde Baru untuk memasukkan Aliran Kepercayaan ke dalam barisan agama-agama resmi yang diakui di Indonesia. Atas dasar itu, banyak orang beranggapan bahwa hampir sepanjang karir politiknya, pemikiran dan kebijaksanaan

keagamaan Mukti Ali merupakan model bagaimana pemerintah Orde Baru melakukan kooptasi terhadap Islam Indonesia modern.

Tapi, terlepas dari peristiwa politik tertentu, pertanyaan yang patut diajukan: benarkah pemikiran keagamaan Mukti Ali telah mengalami penjinakan oleh Orde Baru? Dalam konteks yang lebih luas, benarkah Mukti Ali, bersama kebijaksanaan politik-keagamaannya, menjadi agen sekularisasi? Kalau diamati secara seksama perjalanan hidup Mukti Ali—masa kanak-kanaknya di keluarga santri tradisional, aktif di Muhammadiyah, melanjutkan pendidikan di Pakistan dan di McGill University, Kanada, lalu meniti karir sebagai Menteri Agama—arah pemikiran Mukti Ali menunjukkan kurva yang konsisten. Setidaknya, dari periode awal karir intelektualnya hingga sehabis masa jabatan kementeriannya, Mukti Ali tidak mengalami perubahan pemikiran berarti. Hal itu membuktikan bahwa kesimpulan mengenai kooptasi Orde Baru atas pemikiran Mukti Ali tidak menemukan pijakan yang solid.

*Sepulangnya dari McGill, Kanada, 1957, Mukti Ali memang sudah berkeyakinan kuat bahwa masalah-masalah keagamaan masyarakat modern, tidak hanya menyangkut wilayah iman (*faith*). Tapi juga bersinggungan dengan fenomena sosial, politik dan kebudayaan. Bagi Mukti Ali, berbicara tentang "agama", tentu saja mendiskusikan banyak hal seperti tentang iman, sistem ajarannya, atau penerimaan atas aturan-aturan ritus dari iman itu. Tetapi, apabila seorang Muslim, seorang Kristen, seorang Hindu, atau seorang Buddhis melihat diri dan kelompoknya, adalah naluri tentang komunitas yang muncul dengan sendirinya. Karena itu, prinsip yang mengontrol perilaku keagamaan seseorang memiliki makna sosial dan politik yang didasarkan pada perasaan solidaritas komunal.*

Tentu saja, bagi Mukti Ali, tidak semua lapisan sosial masyarakat beragama dapat menerima pesan dialog semacam ini. Tapi ia percaya bahwa ada lapisan-lapisan masyarakat yang baik secara intelektual maupun religious siap diajak untuk berdialog. Untuk itu ia mendirikan sebuah forum yang anggotanya terdiri dari tokoh agama, cendekiawan, mahasiswa, ilmuwan yang berasal dari seluruh masyarakat beragama, yakni: Forum Dialog Antar-Masyarakat Beragama.

Dengan demikian, pemikiran keagamaan Mukti Ali mengoreskan titik penting dalam sejarah agama bangsa Indonesia. Kegigihannya dalam memperjuangkan semangat pluralitas agama-agama, keterbukaannya dalam memahami tradisi agamanya sendiri, Islam, boleh jadi akan menimbulkan praduga yang berlebihan bagi banyak kalangan. Tetapi, hal itu tidak akan memperkecil sumbangannya terhadap upaya dalam membangun sebuah 'payung' di bawah mana masyarakat beragama Indonesia dapat bertemu dan berkumpul sebagai sebuah bangsa.

علي منحنف

الإسلام والكفاح لتعدد الأديان فى إندونيسيا: المنظور السياسى لفكرة دينية معطى على

الخلاصة

مشكلة النقاش بين أمة دينية تعتبر إحدى العناوين الهامة فى تطور الفكرة الدينية فى إندونيسيا الحديثة. إن أحد المثقفين المسلمين البارزين الذى له رغبة صادقة فى التحدث عن هذه الفكرة الدينية هو الأستاذ الحاج عبد المعطى على (H. A. Mukti Ali)، الوزير الدينى الأسبق لجمهورية إندونيسيا والذى قد تولى مدير الجامعة الإسلامية الحكومية بجكياكرتا.

فى نظر أكثر الناس أن معطى على أحد فطاحل المسلمين ذو أفكار إسلامية متنوعة، إن خلفيته طالب علم تقليدى وصار شخصية بارزة لمنظمة ذات صبغة حية. تلك هى المحمدية وهو رائد علوم مقارنة الأديان فى إندونيسيا. ومعطى على معروف كذلك بأنه الشخصية المميزة فى اختياره مشكلة النقاش بين الأمة المتدينة فى إندونيسيا كعمله الدائم طيلة حياته. وليس أقل شأنا وهو وزير الشئون الدينية الإندونيسية بأنه قد أوجد توجيها جديدا هاما فى السياسة الدينية الليقة فى العهد الجديد وبالأخص فيما يتعلق بالبرنامج الاستراتيجى التجديدى.

فبذلك صار سير الفكرة الإسلامية والسياسية لمعطى على قد أظهر صورة ثقافية متعارضة، فمعطى على من ناحية، يقال بأنه شخصية إسلامية ظاهرة الشأن التى كافحت فى خلق تعددية الفكرة الدينية فى إندونيسيا. ورأيه عن النقاش الدينى بين الأمة الدينية المتنوعة يرجع إلى طريق منفرد للتونيق بين الأمة

المتدينة فى إندونيسيا، ولاسيما فى الفترة المتوترة فى العلاقة بين الأديان قد زادت تأزما وذلك فيما بين سنتى ١٩٦٨ - ١٩٧٩. ولكن من ناحية أخرى فقد اتهم بأنه أداة سياسة للعهد الجديد القائمة بتطبيق السياسة العلمانية. وهذه التهمة بالأخص ذات صلة بحادثة سياسية فى قمة مسؤوليته الوزارية حين كان معطى على ذا نفوذ ظاهر فى الخلاف الناشب حول موضوع قانون الزواج فى سنة ١٩٧٣. وكذلك وقد ظن أنه يلعب دورا هاما فى مساعى العهد الجديد لإدخال المذهب الباطنى (المذهب المؤمن بالألوهية فحسب) فى الأديان المعترف بها رسميا فى إندونيسيا (تلك الأديان الموجودة أثناء إعلان الجمهورية الإسلامية وهى الإسلام والمسيحية الكاتوليكية والبروتستانية والهندوكية البوذية). بناء على ذلك، كثير من الناس يظنون أن معطى على طيلة حياته السياسية كانت لباقته الدينية فى أساسها عبارة عن رأسمال مشابه لما لدى حكومة العهد الجديد من تغيير فى اختيار التفكير الإسلامى الإندونيسى الجديد.

ولكن بعيدا عن حوادث سياسية خاصة، يوجد سؤال واجب تقديمه، وهو هل صحيح تفكير معطى على الدينى قد استأنسه العهد الجديد ؟، وفى مجال أكثر اتساعا هل صحيح معطى على ولباقته الدينية السياسية قد أصبحا وكالة علمانية ؟.

إذا تأملنا بدقة سير حياة معطى على منذ طفولته فى أسرة دينية تقليدية كان منصبا فى أنشطة المحمدية، وتلا ذلك نال ثقافته فى الباكستان وفى جامعة مكجيل (McGill) بكندا ثم سلك مهمته كوزير شئون الدينية، فوجهة تفكيره تشير إلى إنحناءات مستقرة، على الأقل منذ مدة أول عهد ثقافته حتى نهاية مدة عمله كوزير، فإنه لم يدرك أى تغيير فى التفكير ذى أهمية. هذا الوضع يدل على أن الخلاصة المعنية باختيار العهد الجديد لفكرة معطى على لم يتحصل على أرض صلبة.

بعد عودته من جامعة مكجيل بكندا سنة ١٩٥٧ قد أصبح معطى على حقا على يقين قوى بأن المسائل الدينية للمجتمع الجديد ليست متعلقة فحسب بالقضية الإيمانية (العقيدية)، ولكن كذلك ذات علاقة بالمظاهر الاجتماعية والسياسية والثقافية. وبالنسبة لمعطى على أن التحدث عن الدين لا بد من مباحثة كثير من المسائل مثل الإيمان، ووسيلة تعليمه أو تقبله بناء على الأنظمة الترتيلية لذلك الإيمان، ولكن إذا كان مسلم ما، ومسيحى ما، وهندوكى ما أو بوذى ما يرون أنفسهم وجماعاتهم، فإن الشعور الحساس بهذا التجمع يظهر فى نفسه ذاته. فلهذا، إن المبدأ المراقب للمعاملة الدينية الشخصية يملك معنى اجتماعيا وسياسيا مبنيا على الشعور بالتضامن الاجتماعى. ففى هذا الحماس فإن معطى على طيلة عمله الوظيفى كوزير يقدم اللباقة الدينية فى حالين، الأول تجنيد الأنشطة والأعمال الدينية فى الحياة الشخصية والثانى دعوة الأمة المتدينة على القيام بالمحادثة بين كل منها.

ولا شك فعلى رأى معطى على أنه ليس كل الطبقة الاجتماعية للمجتمع الدينى تقبل دعوة المحادثة مثل ذلك، ولكنه على يقين أن طبقات المجتمع التى على درجة ثقافية طيبة أو دينية لائقة على استعداد لتقبل دعوة النقاش الدينى. ولذلك، فقد أسس جبهة أعضاؤها مكونون من زعماء الأديان، والمثقفين والطلاب والعلماء من جميع المجتمع الدينى، والجبهة هى جبهة مباحثة بين المجتمع الدينى.

على ذلك، فإن تفكير معطى على الدينى قد خطط النقطة الأساسية فى التاريخ الدينى للشعب الإندونيسى. وتمسكه بالجهاد لتعدد الأديان، وتفتحه فى تفهم تقليد دينه الإسلام قد يحدث تهمة مبكرة من كثير من الأطراف، غير أن هذه الحالة لا تقل من معاونته إزاء المساعى لبناء مظلة تحتها يعيش المجتمع الدينى الإندونيسى يستطيع اللقاء والتجمع كشعب موحد.

It is hoped that this article will be the first of many biographical studies presenting the rich and varied aspects of Mukti Ali's religious thought. Such an undertaking would, I believe, present a definite view of Mukti Ali in the history of Indonesian Muslim contemporary thought that may be considered as a political reading of his thought, albeit a reading that is concerned with politico-religious phenomena.

By political reading is meant not a theological or philosophical formulation analogous to biographical studies as such, but, rather, an understanding of the role of Mukti Ali within the context of the Indonesian political constellation. These ideas are clearly expressed in both Mukti Ali's political concerns and his religious quest, and, thus, provide the basic framework for the intellectual portrait of Mukti Ali. I wish to argue, however, that Mukti Ali's works alone are not a sufficient source for the understanding of his religious thought. Hence, in my research for this study I have relied on a variety of primary and secondary sources. The most important source is, of course, Mukti Ali's own works. These have been preserved by the Department of Religious Affairs' publication entitled *Agama dan Pembangunan di Indonesia* (Religion and Development in Indonesia), 3 vols. There are some other important works as well.

I shall, first of all, present the biography of Mukti Ali and then, some discussion of his intellectual, religious, and political concerns will follow.

A Santri Family at Balun-Saudagaran, Cepu; The Formative Years

Cepu, the native location of A. Mukti Ali, was one of the petty regions of the north mountainous land of Java which was long under the overlordship of the Dutch Petroleum Company. It came to prominence in the twentieth century due in particular to its abundant production of wood *(jati)*, oil and tobacco. During the early decades of this century, it was involved in voluminous tobacco trade with other big cities in Java such as Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Semarang and even Batavia.[1]

Like most people during the Dutch colony, most Cepu residents supported themselves through, firstly, working as labor for the Dutch *Jati* plantation, or for the oil company, and, secondly, by becoming traders. Starting in 1891, about twenty five years after the Dutch opened *jati* plantations in most of the Blora regions, the Cepu resi-

dents became wealthier with the discovery of oil in every single area of land between Cepu and east of Blora. Henceforth, Cepu was quickly transformed into a business city under the colonial patronage. Many people benefitted from this development and easily increased their sources of livelihood. One of these was Mukti Ali's father who was well known as one of the successful tobacco traders in Cepu.

Mukti Ali's father, named Idris, or Haji Abu Ali after performing his *hajj* pilgrimage to Mecca, was a rich and pious man living in the business town of Balun-Saudagaran. He was admired as a charitable man, in particular for patronizing religious activities. Thus, Islam — obviously *santri* — became a strong and enduring tradition in the life of Abu Ali's family.

As indicated by its name, Balun-*Saudagaran* — meaning the area of trading people — was well known as a village of non-bureaucratic upper class families of Cepu, especially those who were associated with *santri* communities. In the same town, in which Mukti Ali's family continued to live even after he became the Minister of Religious Affairs, he was born in August, 1923, and named: Boedjono.[2] To this day he often returns to this town of his birthplace to resume his life in a large home among the members of his family and relatives.

Although Boedjono's father, Abu Ali, had a poor education, he was open and modern in the sense that his children — especially the male children — received some education.[3] He therefore brought a teacher to teach his children in their early years to read the Qur'ân. In this respect, Boedjono never left his teacher and showed an extraordinary desire for learning. At the age of seven or eight, he was sent to Dutch elementary education in Cepu which later became the HIS or Dutch Native School. At the same time, filling in the afternoons, he also started studying at a *madrasah* (traditional Islamic school), training in the Qur'ânic reading and religious knowledge. As Abu Ali could expect from the performance of his son, in both schools Boedjono became an exemplary student in terms of moral standing and academic achievement. Among his peers, according to his school mates, Boedjono was known not only as a highly refined boy, but also as a rich student with the heart and spirit of a commoner.

Eight years later, when he was fifteen years old, Boedjono completed his studies and earned a certificate from the school for Lower Government Officers (*Klein Ambtenar Examen*) of Cepu. In mid of

1940, Boedjono was then sent by his father to the *Pondok Pesantren* of Termas,[4] about 170 kilometers away from his home, founded by K.H. Abdul Manan (1830-1862) and continued by his son, K.H Muhammad Mahfudh.[5] It is difficult to understand why Abu Ali preferred his son to study at the *pesantren*, rather than at Dutch school. Mukti Ali himself cannot recall his father's decision. He just argues that "my father was a man with a high respect for *kyais* (religious teachers), especially those who claim to be '*sayyid*' descendents. In his late years, my father even withdrew from the family business and spent his time in *tarekat*. I think it was within these kind of notions that he wished to see his children being pious."[6] Henceforth, as far as Mukti Ali can remember, the purpose of his father's decision was probably:

> ... to give the young boy a chance to pursue his religious knowledge. While yet a child, I loved to listen to stories of the bitter struggle of the prophets against their enemies. My father also told me that I distinguished myself by having a great interest in the Islamic religion when I was still at a tender age. I think it is for this reason that my father wanted me to continue these studies at Pesantren, rather than in Dutch schools.[7]

From this *pesantren*, another stage began in the life of the young Boedjono.

Studies and Early Political Activities

In Termas (now a small town in the Eastern Java Province) Boedjono was admitted to study at the intermediate level of the *pesantren* which used the Western schooling system *(sistem madrasi)*.[8] Considering the traditional pattern of the learning system used in most of the *pesantrens* at that time, the question arises as to how the *pesantren* of Termas was actually capable of adopting the Western schooling system, instead of the traditional one. According to Mukti Ali, it was probably some educational innovations which have been undertaken by the three kyais of the pesantren in 1932, i.e., K.H. Hamid Dimyati, K.H. Abul Hamid of Pasuruan, and K.H. Ali Ma'shum of Termas. Despite his studies at the pesantren, Boedjono was obliged to follow *ngaji kitab* (book recitation), a traditional system of learning which is typified by a group of students following, writing and listening to what is taught by an instructor. It was in this *ngaji* activity that Boedjono felt that the *pesantren* gave him an ability to appreciate the intellectual heritage of Islamic civilization, and — due to its advanced study materials — widened his religious outlook.[9]

However, the *pesantren* of Termas is not the only place where Boedjono spent his study years while he was young. There are some other *pesantrens* which helped shape in him an open attitude towards religious knowledge. These are: the *pesantren* of Tebuireng, Jombang, for studying the science of hadîth; the *pesantren* of Lasem, Rembang, for studying Islamic jurisprudence; and the *pesantren* of Padangan, Tuban. This, Mukti Ali asserts, often took the form of short terms of training (about two months) conducted during the months of Sha'bân and Ramadân.

But Termas was to be the most important in the development of Boedjono's personality. There are two unforgettable incidents which transformed him into a person with a religious as well as an intellectual ethos. Firstly, having lived in Termas for three years, one night, K.H. Abdul Hamid, called him and said that he wished Boedjono to change his Javanese name to a more Islamic one. Mukti Ali tells us:

> That night, kyai Hamid proposed that I replace Boedjono with Abdul Mukti, because the latter was his own name before going to Mecca. I was surprised, but also glad, given that this request must be for a certain purpose. I believed that it was a kind of honor. For me, to change a name among Javanese people is common, like in my family. But, to receive a name from *kyai* is not experienced by every one. For the name holder, it is a kind of a moral challenge. It is a blessing too."[10]

Therefore, Boedjono happily told his family the story, when he returned to his home for a vacation two months latter. His father has strongly agreed and, even added his second name "Ali" to be put in his family name: Abdul Mukti Ali. With full of traditional ceremonies, beginning 1943, Boedjono officially applied to become Abdul Mukti Ali; Abdul Mukti being taken from *kyai* Hamid's gift, and Ali from his father's name.

The second unforgettable experience was regarding his decision to abandon his *sufi* inclination. It is apparent that Mukti Ali's family background, which highly respected the ascetic religious life, (his father and his older brother were members of the Qâdiriyyah *tarekat* of Cepu), influenced his decision to enter a Samarqand *tarekat* circle in Termas led by kyai Hamid Dimyati. Having been more devoted to the *tarekat* life, *kyai* Dimyati suddenly advised him to stop his activities in the circle.

> Of course, I was not happy with this. I was so interested in *tarekat*. But the reality came with a different thing. I remember exactly word for word what kyai Dimyati said: "This is not your world. There is no talent in you

> to be a *sufi* (*mutasawwif*). If you will deepen your knowledge, read *Milhâq al-Nadar* by al-Ghazâlî. And I myself will teach you." I then tried to reflect that there may be a *hikmah* (blessing) in the future. I just listened to and accepted it, finally.

It was in the meeting with kyai Dimyati that his sad feeling was relieved. The book of *Milhâq al-Nadar* (Theory of Analysis) which contains the principles of logic in al-Ghazâlî's philosophy re-opened Mukti Ali's mind to choose the book as his additional reading activity, instead of the *tarekat*.

In the course of these religious experiences, whilst at Termas Mukti Ali was admired by his fellow *santris* (students of the pesantren) for his passionate interest in knowledge and his ability to organize political activities. He used any political issue or significant event as an occasion for activities in the pesantren: the spread of the spirit of nationalism at the end of 1944, the emergence of Masjumi in Jakarta, the foundation of Hizbullah, and so forth, were only a few examples. In Termas, too, Mukti Ali formed a small circle of like-minded friends to whom he confined his political ideas. Among these were sons of the *kyais* and others who have remained close associates of Mukti Ali throughout his political career.

It is not surprising therefore that during his fifth year in Termas, in 1945, as was the case with most students of the *pesantrens* during the Dutch colony in the fourth decade of the century, Mukti Ali and his friends soon found themselves involved in a local movement, or *pergerakan*, that was spreading like wild-fire. The movement included young *santris*, civil servants, Muslim teachers from different parts of the city. This movement was in the beginning free from any party identity. It was a rather civilian political movement in its aims and characters, but with a national ideology as its preference. Mukti Ali, as one of the main actors of the movement, honestly states that the movement was simply motivated by the commitment of their religious teachers, such as K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari — in terms of religious spirit — and their national leaders such as Soekarno — in terms of national independence.

But, in its development, this movement became a paramilitary group, immediately after Masjumi took control of it, and transformed it into the Masjumi paramilitary wing, the Hizbullah branch of Termas. It is worth mentioning here that for many youths in the middle of 1945, independence and freedom from colonial rulers were

the nucleus of fire burning in their souls. Benedict R.O.G. Anderson strongly argues that "the Indonesian revolution was a youth revolution (*Revolusi Pemoeda*)."[11] It is observed that the first revolutionary movement, especially in Jakarta, occurred among the youth. As early as August 1945, a central Committee composed exclusively of young military personnel was formed. It was this Committee which, according to Anderson, actively propagated the political spirit that the only means to liberate the country from colonial exploitation was through a military revolution. It is not too difficult to see, therefore, that when Masjumi tried to transform Mukti Ali's youth movement into a paramilitary movement under Hizbullah of Termas, he had no objections. He thus urged his close friends to join the military corps of Hizbullah.

Mukti Ali himself was strongly attracted to involvement in the military. He thus returned home to Cepu, first, in order to ask for permission from his family. What he hoped from this permission was to receive appreciation and encouragement, and to work with them as his friends did. It was nonetheless unfortunate for him to find that his father did not allow him to be involved in the military. "I sent you to Termas not to become a soldier. But to study, to become somebody (*untuk jadi orang*)..."[12] These are the words that his father said with anger. His mother was also sorry to imagine her beloved son fighting in the battle field against the Dutch. Realizing his family's anger, Mukti Ali could not defy his father's order because of his indebtness to the latter. As a son with a strong religious background, he was able to accept the situation, and so cancelled joining Hizbullah with composure. However, he returned to Termas to be involved in the political movement; not as a soldier, but as a member of Masyumi.

The following year, Mukti Ali finished —or more precisely— terminated his studies in Termas. His concern with the political situation during the early independence of Indonesia led to his political career continuing. In 1946, he was elected as a member of the People's Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*) of the Blora District representing the Masjumi party. It was in this early political activity that his understanding of the condition of the Muslim community in Indonesia took shape. As one may perceive, the Muslim communities —meaning *Santri*— in early Indonesia were less developed than others (Chrsitian, *Priyayi* and *Abangan* people) in social, political and economic terms. More important still is that Muslims were suspi-

cious of the concept of the newly created modern, national state of Indonesia.

Even though Mukti Ali became a political figure in Masjumi, exposed to all sorts of Islamic aspirations, he remained constant in his interest in knowledge. His early studies of the Qur'ân, his training in the village *madrasah*, and his religious devotion at Termas, all remained the main framework of his decision to enroll at the *Sekolah Tinggi Islam*, STI (Islamic College), which became Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII), in Yogyakarta in 1947. He was admitted as a preparatory student in the Faculty of Religious Studies.

Here, Mukti Ali was highly impressed by the personality of K.H. Mas Mansur, a public figure in Muhammadiyah (founded in 1912) and one of the sympathetic lecturers at the STI. He was particularly attracted by *Kyai* Mas Mansur's method of lecturing which was more oriented towards reason and humanity than simply repetition of tradition —relying on his study experience of traditional instruction at Termas— which trains the students to read texts rather than to understand them in a certain context. It appears that, at the STI, Mukti Ali found what he had searched for; a method of religious studies with a rational and comprehensive approach. He therefore wished to study with kyai Mas Mansur and followed his involvement in the Muhammadiyah of Yogyakarta. As one may expect, Mukti Ali was gladly admitted, and this brought him to enter this puritan-modernist organization, leaving his traditional *santri* background, and, of course, his family's affiliation toward Nahdlatul Ulama (founded in 1926).

But, again, his studies were interrupted by the arrival of the Dutch in Yogyakarta and political steps towards a military clash in 1948. Mukti Ali, being called by his patriotic spirit, immediately joined a military corps, *Angkatan Perang Sabil*, APS (the Divine Armed Forces) under the leadership of K.H. Abdurrahman of Kedungbanteng. One of his battle mates in the corps, who has continued to be a close associate, was Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap who became Prime Minister of Indonesia in 1961.

The months of the military clash at Yogyakarta were of profound and far-reaching consequence in the life of Mukti Ali. It was lived with great intensity both before and after its appearance —inaugurated by the General Attack of March, 1949— the turning point of a nation's history. But, at the same time, this clash was also felt with fear, pressure and threat. It brought with it uncertainties, mistrust,

and national chaos which prevailed as long as the military fight continued to unfold. It was this disturbing situation which, according to the accounts of Mukti Ali, occupied the minds of students like him. This is because his interest was in knowledge, as he always would follow his father's message. Therefore, after Yogyakarta was recaptured and the government of Indonesia was re-established, Mukti Ali accepted his parent's suggestion that he perform the *hajj* pilgrimage to Mecca, with the condition that he would be supported to continue his studies at the Haram Mosque (*Masjid al-Haram*), Mecca, for a couple of years.

Together with his younger brother, in 1950, Mukti Ali finally traveled to Mecca. For Mukti Ali, going to Mecca and becoming a "*haji*" was actually a means to fulfill his intellectual passion for knowledge.

From Karachi to Montreal; a Remarkable Change

Mukti Ali arrived in Mecca at the end of 1950. There was not much to say about this city except his ritual activities and his struggle to pursue his studies. Mecca, in Mukti Ali's account, was a "big town" patterned by a medieval style of life. The people who lived in this city, both the permanent residents and immigrants, were also less educated. Not until after a year living in Mecca after performing his *hajj* rituals, did Mukti Ali plan to leave the city. Having learned from the advice of H. Imron Rosyadi S.H., the Consular of Jeddah at that time, who said that he should not expect anything from study in Mecca, Mukti Ali then thought about continuing his studies in Cairo, Egypt. However, he finally decided to go to Karachi, Pakistan, after realizing that there were a few close associates of Imron Rosyadi whom he might ask for help. In the following month, he travelled to Pakistan and arrived at Karachi in the spring of 1951.

With his abilities in Arabic, Dutch and English, Mukti Ali was admitted to the undergraduate program of the Faculty of Arabic Literature, the University of Karachi. He took Islamic history as his major subject. Having known that the study method used in the university was well established, Mukti Ali soon devoted himself to study activities in Karachi. He read many books on Islamic civilization, and met many fellow students who had a clear vision of Islam. Among his associates in the university were Khurshid Ahmad, later to become a spokesperson of Islamic revivalism in Pakistan, and Aziz Ahmad who became an advocate of Islamic neo-modernism. Most

important of all was that Mukti Ali became acquainted with a number of Western-orientalist scholars who wrote on Islam, some of whom he befriended later while he was studying at McGill University, Canada.

Having completed his undergraduate studies and reached the Ph.D level of the program for Islamic studies — which he did in a period of five years — at the university, he prepared to return to Indonesia. It goes without saying that whether or not Mukti Ali finished his dissertation and, accordingly, graduated and earned a Ph.D. degree from the University of Karachi. What is certain is that, while he was working on his Ph.D. program, Mukti Ali received a letter from Anwar Haryono, a former Secretary General of Masjumi and now director of the Council of Islamic Mission in Indonesia (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia*), urging him to proceed with his studies at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Canada. This was the news which, as our sources indicate, led him not only to cancel his plan to return home, but also to leave his Ph.D. to pursue another study program at the McGill Institute of Islamic Studies.[13]

Mukti Ali is a man with a passionate interest in knowledge. Although he had spent several years at the University, he could not reject this opportunity. As one may expect, in the 1950s, studying at the a Western university was a personal privilege. Therefore, having confirmed to the Indonesian Embassy in Pakistan that this news was correct, he set out for Montreal, Canada. He reached Montreal in fall of 1955, and started studying at the university majoring in Comparative Religion.

It was at McGill that Mukti Ali's understanding of Islam and its religious tradition changed remarkably. This, in my view, resulted from his close friendship with the professors at the Institute, most notably Wilfred Cantwel Smith, an Islamicist with sympathetic expertise on Islam who became Mukti Ali's supervisor.

In this respect, Mukti Ali said that he was really excited to learn that the program of Islamic studies at the Institute was presented in a systematic, rational, and — in his own words —"holistic" fashion: its doctrines, history and civilization. At McGill, too, he found the primary aim of studying Islam, or religion, to be a total attempt of how a religious tradition can adapt itself to the challenges of modernization. To this end, he asserts the need for introducing an empirical approach to Islam as a means of re-interpretation of its doctrines in

the context of modernity. For Mukti Ali, such an approach to Islam, which is often ignored by Islamic traditional instructions in *pesantren*, would bring Islam and the Muslim society to accept and even sympathize with some important discourses of modernism such as intellectual freedom, the concept of the state, the rights of women, and dialogue among religious communities.

It is also worth mentioning here that although McGill gave him a new horizon of Islamic thought, Mukti Ali did not integrate his new findings and his intellectual contradictions continued. It is apparent that while he was at McGill and also after he returned to Indonesia, Mukti Ali was unable — or unwilling — to develop further his own system of thought. Therefore, however much progress his ideas and spirit made, he could not formulate them into a more clear vision of thought. This was evident when, in 1970, Ahmad Wahib, one of his younger colleagues in Yogyakarta who knew Mukti Ali very well, wrote in his diary:

> "... throughout his [Mukti Ali's] intellectual career in Indonesia, as a Muslim scholar, he seems not to have had a strong desire to integrate his contradictory ideas. Mukti Ali, if I may describe him, is a thinker within the process of transition, but, unfortunately, he lets the transition itself go on for ever. Therefore, he looks like a person who has put one foot across the bridge but left the other behind. This is because he does not realize that transition has to be evolved contradictions. Oh, poor the man who experiences contradictions, but does not try to solve them.[14]

However, there is a positive benefit regarding Mukti Ali's position in Indonesian intellectual history. His decision to major in Comparative Religion and his close friendship with Wilfred Cantwel Smith have placed him as the first Muslim scholar in Indonesia to be an expert in the field. Within two years, he completed his Masters degree in 1957, with a thesis on *Bibliographical Studies of the Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesia.*

Introducing the Science of Comparative Religion

By the middle of 1957, Mukti Ali returned to Indonesia with a strong desire to serve his county by teaching and lecturing. The first weeks after his arrival in Jakarta were filled with less activity. The vast changes in the social and political situation in the country during the decade of the 1950s made him realize that he apparently knew nothing about his nation. It was hard to Mukti Ali —who had just left his schooling years— to enter this new situation with his expecta-

tions. Mukti Ali reflects in his memoirs, written fifty years later, on his feelings in those days.

> They were long, long days, filled with doubts and expectations. I was so blind about my own country. I had left this country for only seven years, but the situation was so different. I witnessed, at that time, ideological conflicts which were acknowledged in the political scene. There was a tension among religious communities in Java as well. Again, there was a threatening power from the Communist people to take control of the nation, and so on. By then, I realized that 'I did not know exactly what was going on'.[15]

It is understandable for that Mukti Ali was not able to work immediately in the field that he desired. The years after the midst of the democratic crisis in 1957, as many observers on Indonesia will note, were the most disturbing turn in Indonesian history. In early 1957, Soekarno — as President and the Great Commander of the Indonesian Revolution — took some important steps towards form of Indonesian politics called 'Guided Democracy' (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*). M.C. Riclefs characterizes this system of politics as "a fluid system, born of crisis and constantly changing through the most disturbed period of Indonesian history since the revolution."[16] The political machinery of this system was entirely dominated by the personality of Soekarno, although he shared the initiative for its introduction with the army and party leadership. He therefore represented a center of legitimacy and 'guidance' for governmental policy at that time.[17]

All of this is true in Mukti Ali's account. The personality of Soekarno — who hated stability, order and predictability; but wanted continuing revolution and mass mobilization — influenced many aspects of political life in the country. The circumstances of the Indonesia's guided democracy, as Mukti Ali sadly felt, can be described as having created increasing political intrigues and conflicts which manifested in social and cultural significance. On the surface, parties were clearly on the defensive, but their mutual antagonism was too great for them to work together in defence of the parliamentary system. Henceforth, as Mukti Ali put it, "there were many political divisions and conflicts within the single nation. Some of them were even totally irreconcilable."[18]

In April 1957 Sukarno announced a 'functional cabinet' (*Kabinet Karya*) under the non-party politician Djuanda Kartawidjaja, a sensible man with an understanding of economics, as Prime Minister. Three Deputy Prime Ministers were appointed: the PNI's Hardi, the

NU's K.H. Idham Chalid, and Dr. Johannes Leimena of the Christian Party. Although the cabinet had no PSI or PKI members in it, at heart it was a coalition of the Communists sympathizers through two main political forces: the leftist PNI and the NU.[19]

The political implications of this scene were not entirely profitable to Muslims, particularly those who belonged to Masjumi. Masjumi and some organizations and government bodies which were associated with it were pushed out as the main actors in the political constellation. This conditioned the Muslims to be confrontative towards the state. In Mukti Ali's opinion, "the Muslims have generally considered all this to be part of a plan to repress the Islamic political aspiration."[20] This was the situation when Mukti Ali arrived in Jakarta.

However, his meeting with K.H. Fakih Usman, the former Minister of Religious Affairs, enabled him to work in an administrative bureau in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In that meeting too Mukti Ali expressed his strong desire to teach at one of Islamic colleges belonging to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. "I will be glad," as he said to kyai Usman, "if I can teach the students at that college." Kyai Usman then replied: "Why don't you start working here [in the Department]. I will be offering that position shortly."[21]

Mukti Ali was fortunate, in this respect, that in July 1957 the Department had recently founded two higher educational institutions, *Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama*, ADIA (State Academy for the Science of Religion) in Jakarta and *Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri*, PTAIN, (the College of Islamic Studies), both having now become the Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN). These institutions were initially intended to fulfil the need for administrative officers for the Department of Religious Affairs. Now they had become educational institutions, devoted themselves to religious and Islamic instruction, equal to other universities supervised by the Department of Education and Culture. Having been involved in the Department, Mukti Ali was soon appointed to teach some courses at the IAIN in Jakarta beginning 1958. He married in the same year to a woman whom he knew through *kyai* Usman.

In August 1960, the IAIN opened a study program of Comparative Religion.[22] Mukti Ali was immediately appointed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to lead the Department of Comparative Religion at the Institute, both in Jakarta and in Yogyakarta. It was the

policy of the IAIN rectors that Mukti Ali was also commissioned to formulate the curriculum and the study instructions of the program, since he was the only IAIN lecturer who had studied the Science of Comparative Religion in depth.

In this respect, Mukti Ali was definitely aware that for many Muslims in Indonesia, even for those who have a higher educational background, the science of Comparative Religion is a new phenomenon in studying religion. The field of Islamic studies is not excluded. Until recently, and for some Muslim scholars to date, doctrinal and ideological preferences have rendered scientific methods of studying religion (Islam) an intellectual stigma or crime. Islamic studies, as Mukti Ali observed in the 1960s, were narrowly confined to certain traditional subjects within an Islamic classical heritage, text books or branches of knowledge (such as *fiqh*), and deviation was considered heretical or meaningless. It may in fact be argued that a scientific approach to religion, including Islam, is, as an ideal, a historical requirements due to the socio-religious reality in Indonesia and the rise of scientific method in the modern world.[23]

In addition, Mukti Ali also felt that Indonesian Muslims, the *'ulamâ'* in particular, have assumed that this science was imported from the West. Therefore, they have come to suspect everything related to the science of Comparative Religions. In fact, there are classical Muslim scholars who are genuinely interested in the science of comparative religions as a rich discipline and intellectual discussion worthy of their concern. Indeed some have contributed greatly to religious scholarship and hence to a greater appreciation of world religions in all their aspects. In an introductory article on the development of the science of Comparative Religion in Indonesia, Mukti Ali observed that:

> ... perceiving Comparative Religion as a science imported from the West is not correct. There are many Muslim scholars in Medieval Islam who were sincerely interested in sharing their faith with others without any coercion or ulterior motives. Based on this, I do believe that it is the Muslim scholars who establish the foundations of the methodology of comparative religions. We have to know therefore that great books such as *Al-Fashl fî Al-Milal wa al-Nihal* by 'Ali ibn Hazm (994-1064), or *Al-Milal wa al-Nihal* by Muhammad 'Abd al-Karîm al-Sahrastâni (1017-1143) discussed many topics about comparative religions, especially on Judaism and Christianity.[24]

Therefore, it is the tradition of Islamic scholarship which established the science of Comparative Religion. Yet so many Muslim

thinkers have been unwilling to continue their own intellectual tradition.

Based on this and other notions, Mukti Ali's concern is therefore not to introduce to the IAIN students the Science of Comparative Religion as such, but rather the spirit which nurtured it along with revitalization of traditional Islamic scholarship and appreciation of other world religions. More precisely, the science of Comparative Religion to be developed in Indonesia must be concerned with the ways Muslims have perceived their own intellectual traditions and, by the same token, their position in a modern multi-religious country in order to preserve the religious pluralism. Mukti Ali's book, *Ilmu Perbandingan Agama: Pengantar tentang Metodos dan Sistema* (The Science of Comparative Religions: Introduction to the Method and System) set the tone and provided the themes for that subsequent concern. It is, therefore, important that we dwell on this text book in some detail.[25]

In general, the issues discussed in the science of Comparative Religion are patterned with "an attempt to understand and to explain the religious phenomena of a belief with regard to other religions."[26] Its main objective is "to observe the basic characteristics of a certain religious belief in order to raise a respect and appreciation."[27] Mukti Ali gives the means by which the study of comparative religions can be effective. These are: firstly, the history of religion, secondly, the philosophy of religion, and thirdly, ethnography and sociology (social sciences). This, Mukti Ali asserts, often took the form of implementing an empirical approach to religious phenomena.[28]

All this is true for scholars in Medieval Islam. Mukti Ali points out that the questions regarding the problems of the divinity of Jesus, of the Bible, and of the prophets of Israel have been put to Muslim thinkers in a great variety of formulations throughout Islamic history. There is, to be sure, a positive attitude among those thinkers towards other religious traditions such as Christianity and Judaism, including primitive religions. Among the earliest works on the comparative study of religions is *al-Fashl fi al-Milal wa al-Ahwâl wa al-Nihal* (Expositions on Sects of Religion and Philosophy) by 'Ali ibn Hazm (994-1064). Here, Mukti Ali shows the ethos of empiricism performed by ibn Hazm. It is followed, to mention a few other names, by Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Shahrastani (1071-1143) who wrote *al-Milal wa al-Nihal* (On Religions and Philosophy), Ahmad Sanhaji al-Qarâfi (d. 1235) who wrote *al-Ajwibah al-Fakhriyah 'an Asl al-Fajirah*

(The Exciting Answers to the Origins of Greek Religions), and, finally, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) who wrote *al-Jawab al-Shahîh liman Baddala Dîn al-Masîh* (The Exact Answer to Those Who Refute Christian Faith). There are a few modern Muslim thinkers who have been concerned with this comparative study of religions, such as Muhammad 'Abduh, Jamâluddîn al-Afghâni and Sayyid Amir Ali.[29]

What Mukti Ali tries to show by his observation is that there is a positive attitude among Muslim thinkers towards other religious traditions, including primitive religions. This is due, firstly, to the fact that the Qur'ân said much about Christianity, Judaism and other faiths of man. Secondly, there is an increased knowledge of the fundamental principles of other religious traditions and cultures of the men and women living by these principles. Most significant of all, however, has been the change in the map of the political expansion of the Muslim world, especially since the spread of Islam to the lands of Christians in Europe, Zoroastrians in Persia, Hindus in India and some other parts of central Asia. The fruits of this change may have been discerned in the works on those religious traditions in Islamic scholarship to promote an understanding of the other faiths of men.

Nevertheless, Islamic scholarship which deals in depth with the problem of comparative religions has tended to disappear. This has notably been the case since the emergence of apologetic works on Christianity (and on the West) by Muslims in the first decades of this century. It is not surprising, therefore, as Mukti Ali insists, that the development of methodology of Comparative Religion was turning to the West in a more profound way. He tells us, "It is the West which produced the big names of scholars in the field such as Max Muller (1828-1900), Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), W.C. Smith (1918) and so forth."

For Mukti Ali, the methodology of the Comparative Religion developed in the West is not so different from that of Islamic scholarship: it is a research of empirical facts which transcends all theological and religio-legal considerations.[30] This is because "a student of Comparative Religions is neither concerned with faith nor trying to make a judgment of a religion, but rather concerned with objective knowledge."[31] Therefore, among the disciplines listed above, social sciences are the most important. Basing his argument on Emile Durkheim's ethnographical studies of the primitive religions of aborigines in Australia, Mukti Ali wrote:

> This science tries to compare the origins, structures and characteristics of various religions in the world, aiming to recognize similarities and differences in an objective way. The questions that we want to answer are: to what extent the symbiotic relationship of a religious belief to others can be determined, how we can typify the superiority and inferiority of world religions, and so forth.[32]

It is important to observe that this notion, which seems to be inspired by the Darwinian theory of evolution, is meant to disengage the methodology of Comparative Religions from the apologetic pattern of religious studies that has been dominant in the Medieval Ages. It is also noteworthy that this is to establish a scientific understanding of religion.

In view of this, the question of motives behind this scientific approach to religion must be raised. Is it possible for a good Muslim, Christian, Jew or whoever, to study other religion in an objective way? Or, is it not dangerous? Mukti Ali has convincingly argued that for people with a certain religious background "Comparative Religion should be intended to understand how God has revealed his religion to mankind through His prophets, and how mankind tries to respond to it."[33] Mukti Ali gives us an example regarding a Muslim who wants to study other religious tradition. To him, because the science of Comparative Religion tries to objectively describe the characteristics of a certain religious community; it is not necessary for a Muslim to feel that he has lost his faith. Neither is it necessary to account for whether it is true or false. "It is not his task," Mukti Ali asserts, "to make a judgment of true or false. It is understandable, of course, that such feelings will arise. But, as a scholar of Comparative Religion should do, we [Muslims] will put them in the right place."[34] The science will not therefore result in any problems for a Muslim's religious faith.

It was observed earlier that the introduction of the Science of Comparative Religion is not to give a better understanding of the science as such, but rather to give rise to greater tolerance among Muslims to other religious traditions. In connection with this, Mukti Ali puts forward that the search for objectivity of religious phenomena is only one aspect of the science of Comparative Religion. Not only does a student of Comparative Religion have expertise in religious research, but the inner spirit of the science has also to enrich his own religious horizon.[35] It must be examined frankly, Mukti Ali said, that the Science of Comparative Religion is not merely an academic discourse of

religious studies; it is a call to be concerned with dialogue between the religious communities in the world. It is this final aim of the science that has led Mukti Ali to be one of few Muslim scholars who has made the field of inter-religious dialogue activities his long-life concern in Indonesia.

He lived in Jakarta until 1964 and moved to Yogyakarta when the Department of Religious Affairs selected him as in the Rector Assistant for Public Affairs at the IAIN in Yogyakarta.[36]

From the Chair of Ministry; Strengthening Faith, Preaching Dialogue

With his special expertise and, of course, his active involvement in inter-religious dialogue, he was soon very much expected to contribute his ideas in the many forums which dealt with the problems of religious communities. Throughout his intellectual career, most notably in the 1960s and 1980s, he has attended many —national and world wide— meetings, conferences, and seminars; given several lectures and courses; and written books and articles dealing more or less with the cultural and scientific conditions of a modern view of the religious legacies of the religious communities.

In addition to his conference and teaching activities, Mukti Ali has been admired by his students at the IAIN, and by young rising intellectuals of Yogyakarta for his liberal-minded attitude towards religious problems. He placed himself as "a guide who wanted to see the younger generations develop religious [Islamic] thought in modern Indonesia."[37] Generated by this personal concern, between 1967 and 1971 he accommodated and hosted those young students who came to his house and created a study circle, called the "Limited Group", which, in 1971, became a stepping-stone of the "Renewal Movement of Islamic Thought" *(Gerakan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam)* in Indonesia. Among those who have been involved in this club are Ahmad Wahib (d.1973), Djohan Effendi, Dawam Rahardjo, Syu'bah Asa and so forth.

In 1971, after the "New Order" government held its first election, Mukti Ali received news from Jakarta that he was selected to be the Minister of Religious Affairs.[38] It seems that this selection was the result of his capacity as a Muslim scholar who was devoted to inter-religious dialogue activities. That is to say that he was appointed individually, not representing any political party. Therefore, as he reflects in his memoirs about the time when he met President Soeharto,

he knew what he should do with this new task. It is not too presumptuous to say that Mukti Ali, serving the Minister of the Department of Religious Affairs from 1971 to 1978, brought to his office not only the expected expertise, indefatigable energy and moral candor, but, equally important, a vision for the future evolution of a multi-religious state of Indonesia in keeping with the best program of a modern religious policy.

The untold story of Mukti Ali's road to the chair of ministry can be traced in its process to the New Order's political plan to sharply disengage the Department of Religious Affairs from ideological and political loyalty to a certain party. In 1970, the Department was loyal to the Nahdlatul Ulama (N.U.).[39] It must be observed that before Mukti Ali, the Department of Religious Affairs was led by K.H. Muhammad Dahlan, a leading figure in the N.U. who ordered the Department to be associated with the N.U.'s political wing, and who, in turn, played an important role in the policy re-orientation of the Department, especially during the early years of the New Order. Before the general election of 1971, the Department of Religious Affairs was one of the politically poorest government bodies in Indonesia. Yet the New Order's huge campaign during 1970 to co-opt all the government apparatus to become political supporters of Golongan Karya (Functional Group), the ruling party, did not markedly improve the ideological orientation among the people in the Department. It only created a small class of apparatus, most of them intellectuals in the Department, who placed their aspiration to Golongan Karya. The Minister himself, K.H. Muhammad Dahlan, was still a malleable instrument in the hands of the N.U., and, consequently, party nepotism was rife at all levels of the Department.

Like nepotistic institutions everywhere, the Department of Religious Affairs attempted to re-structure its functional bodies such as Islamic religious courts, research centers, or IAINs, based on like- and dislike-minded considerations. Thus, for political support of its policy and agenda the Department relied neither on the New Order government nor on objective evaluation, but on the N.U. party leadership. The Department, for instance, re-structured the administrative and academic apparatus of the IAIN by appointing some important figures of the N.U. to the offices of rector, vice rectors, deans and so forth. The personnel of Islamic religious courts, both at regional and national levels, likewise had strong affiliations to the N.U. As a result, some people in the Department who were believed not

to have affiliations to the N.U. were kicked out of their political positions and become jobless in an uncertain time. Among those who were victims of this re-structuring were Dr. Harun Nasution (Dean of the Post-Graduate Program, IAIN of Jakarta), Dr. Muljanto Sumardi (now Director of the Center for the Study of Islam and Society), Drs. Soenarjo (the former Rector of the IAIN in Jakarta), and some other intellectuals of the Department whose origins were in the Masjumi family.

For the New Order government, the presence of K.H. Muhammad Dahlan and his N.U. predominant colleagues was clearly the main cause of the difficulties in the political co-optation of the Department into of Golongan Karya unit, as has already been observed. Henceforth, one of the main aims in searching for a replacement for K.H. Muhammad Dahlan was the disengagement of the Department of Religious Affairs from its N.U.'s affiliation. At the same time, the people in the Department who were dissatisfied with the policy of re-structuring founded in a forum called Korps Karyawan Departemen Agama (Corps of the Government Employees of the Department of Religious Affairs), a forum which later became a king maker in Mukti Ali's road to the ministerial office. Through informal lobbying between Muljanto Sumardi, the main actor of the forum, and his colleagues at the Center for Strategy and International Studies, CSIS, in Tanah Abang, the forum was then officially inaugurated by Soenawar Soekowati, a leading figure of Golkar, in Ciputat, in April 1970. Even though the Department of Religious Affairs tried to react against the establishment of this forum, its existence and role in controlling the expansion of the N.U in the Department was overwhelmingly evident due to CSIS political patronage. Muljanto Sumardi reflects on his experience at the time when he and his associates struggled for this goal as follows:

> We certainly realized that in order to fight back against the policy of restructurization, we could do nothing except through cooperating with the power center of the New Order. At that time, in 1969, wherever we say power center, it means the CSIS or the Tanah Abang group. In the Korps Karyawan, we have *pak* Narjo, former IAIN rector, who is close associate of *pak* Sumiskum. Through the personal contact with *pak* Sumiskum, we were finally able to meet *pak* Ali Moertopo and *pak* Soedjono Humardani. In the first meeting at pak Moertopo's house, we were asked 'what do you want from us?'. Then we explained our concern that we needed a replacement for the Minister of Religious Affairs, because the Minister in charge was so favorable to the N.U.'s political agenda. We told of our experiences in the

IAIN of Jakarta, how N.U. members used a political pressure towards non-N.U. people. We were surprised that the New Order itself, the CSIS in this respect, in fact had the same concern: that the government planned to bring the Department into one of the main Golkar units. I remember *pak* Moer said to us that 'actually we want to take that step (*Golkarisasi*) after the election. But, after learning of your aspiration, okay let us do it now ...' This was surprising; to me, at least. Here, our concerns matched each other in the sense that there must be a new Minister for the Department of Religious Affairs.[40]

It was from this common concern that the CSIS and the Korps Karyawan of the Department worked together for a total reorganization of the Department of Religious Affairs according to new plans and ideals. In other words, a true reorganization is in the form of, as the term implies, a radical change in the superstructure of the Department from top to bottom; from the Minister to the lowest employee.

It was therefore decided to search for a proper candidate for the Minister. From a meeting in Pacet, Bogor, in August 1970, between Ali Moertopo, Soedjono Humardani (two Generals who for a long time served as personal assistants to the President) and Muljanto Sumardi's group, four candidates' names arose. These were: Kafrawi Ridwan, Anton Timur Jaelani, Bahrum Rangkuti, and Mukti Ali. After a long discussion regarding the strengths and weaknesses of each candidate, both the CSIS and the Korps Karyawan voted for Mukti Ali as the right person for the position of Minister. Muljanto Sumardi said that "Both Mukti Ali's special expertise in the problem of inter-religious dialogue and the fact that he is a figure of Muhammadiyah have led us to believe that he is the person whom we have been looking for."[41] As has been mentioned earlier, President Soeharto accepted the CSIS proposal with the expectation that Mukti Ali would devote his expertise and concern to the re-orientation of religious policy in Indonesia, which must go in the direction of the New Order's ideals of a religio-political strategy of modernization.

In connection with this, we may perceive that Mukti Ali's principal achievement was, therefore, the part he played in the political orientation of the Department's policy which led to the mobilization of religious practices in private life. Beyond this more limited goal, Mukti Ali's fame derived from the more general improvement in relations among religious communities in Indonesia, especially between Muslims and Christians.

To sketch the analysis, we can assume that Mukti Ali's political framework for his religious policies logically follows his accounts of both the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 (UUD 1945) and the New Order's creed of political modernization.[42] In theory, the Constitution of Indonesia, which came into being on August 17, 1945 with Independence, was the consummation of attempts to create a kind of unity of the existing religious communities (Muslim, Christian, Catholic, Hindu and Buddhist) as an acceptable basis for a non-theocratic form of authority. As a result, it assumed a governmental structure with powers distinguished between religious and political authorities. But, by the same token, it established a type of state responsibility to support and to supervise religious life as a principal task of the Government. The Constitution thus recognized religious activities and offices as inclusive parts of state political policy.[43]

Such a characteristic of the Constitution, as Mukti Ali conceives, indicated thing which is often considered to be the basis of the ideology of the New Order's modernization. To Mukti Ali, the New Order government envisaged a general division of religious activities into two parts, one purely religious, and the other political. Toward the former end, the government is in favor of tolerance spelt out in terms of support and encouragement *vis-a-vis* religious life. Yet, while the government respects the religious life of its subjects, it discourages all religious trends that lean, or tend to lean, towards a political character. Therefore, Mukti Ali has uniquely perceived that "it is the concept of politics which I am convinced would improve the relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia."[44]

Mukti Ali, in this respect, tried to counter Muslims' fears concerning the issue of an Islamic versus a secular state. In the1970s, Indonesian Muslims still believed that modernization, upon which the New Order's development policies are based, is a cultural strategy for social development through the process of secularization, i.e., separation of religion and state. In responding to these fears, Mukti Ali profoundly argued that the government of Indonesia (by means of the New Order) would be responsible for the development of religion and religious activities. He explicated his vision in the following phrases:

> ... Indonesia has chosen its own way. It is not a theocratic state. It is not secular either. Our state principle, Pancasila, is correct to mention belief in God: showing that Indonesia is a multi-religious country. But, religion (Islam), in its legal form, does not serve as the state principle... However, the

government will observe an operative principle for religious communities: to protect, to assist, to support, to give guidance to all voices of religious activities.[45]

This statement is in line with an exposition of the New Order's political framework presented by Ali Moertopo (1928-1981). In his book *Strategi Pembangunan Nasional* (The Strategy of National Development) Moertopo insisted that in order for the New Order to follow the stages of development, any programs and policies made by the government must not only accord to the social and political realities of Indonesia, but must also reflect a mental re-orientation of the Indonesian people to be transformed into a modern society.[46] One of the most significant social fields for the project of re-orientation mentioned above is religion.

Moertopo regarded religious ideology as "of threatening power which may disturb the process of national development in Indonesia"[47] At first, he wished to argue, because of the spirit of religious ideology which nurtured its aspiration with fanaticism and sectarianism, with the absolute allegiance of the masses to their leaders, the Government has to start eliminating the role of religious ideology in political parties and organizations. Secondly, after the long period of inharmonious relationships between Muslims and the state, the New Order had great hopes — beginning in the mid 1970s in particular — of transforming religion (Islam) to a private area of life by running the mobilization of religious activities. This is partly anchored in the fairly widespread interest in religious practices among Muslims, and partly in the assumption that the success of education among Indonesian Muslims at the village level has rendered easy the change from struggle for an "Islamic state" to the awareness of the desirability of creating a religious society at large.[48]

Within these two basic lines, the direction of the religious policy of the Department of Religious Affairs during Mukti Ali's leadership can be mapped out. Generally speaking, the religious policies of the New Order are an attempt to create a religious society. The Government, by means of the Department of Religious Affairs, brings with those policies a tremendous program of religious activities — as long as they remain outside of politics — and takes care of everything related to religious worship and instruction in schools, army corps', prisons, hospitals, government offices and so forth. The Department is also engaged in social and cultural development focused on the preservation of religious traditions that exist in the country. These

include traditional religious institutions, such as *pesantrens*, with their important elements.[49]

This "strengthening faith" policy, as one may call it, went hand-in-hand with a great propagation of tolerance for all the Indonesian religious communities. Mukti Ali introduced the policy for inter-religious dialogue.[50] At best, it can be perceived that besides the religious policies and programs are being aimed at keeping the religious communities committed to the practice of religious duties, at the same time, those policies must go hand-in-hand the call for peace among them.

The dialogue policy was also generated by the fact that, in the fifth year of the New Order's power, the relationships among the religious communities, especially between Muslims and Christians, had seen serious tension and violent conflict. This principally arose due to the spectacular success of Christian missions in 1970.[51] Historically speaking, it was after the failure of the Communist coup in 1965, that Muslim communities in Indonesia felt themselves threatened by the growing number of Christian churches. It appears that between 1966 and 1970, when the Christian mission —operated with a huge number of volunteers and focusing their efforts on education, health and monetary gifts— had great success in converting two million Javanese Muslims to Christianity, many Muslims began to blame the Government of being in favor of the spread of Christianity.[52] This development in the relations between religious communities led to overt tension. It was unfortunate that Mukti Ali came to lead the Department while these inharmonious relations were at such an intense level in Indonesian religious history.

Mukti Ali wished to characterize inter-religious dialogue as encounters between persons and groups with different religions or ideologies in order to come to a common understanding on certain issues, to agree and disagree with appreciation and, therefore, to work with them to discover the secret of the meaning of life.[53]

A clear exposition on Mukti Ali's understanding of inter-religious dialogue was presented in a World Conference of Religion and Peace in Beirut, June, 1973. His understanding of dialogue runs as:

> ...a process in which individuals and groups learn to wipe out fear and distrust of each other and develop new relations based on mutual trust. A dialogue is a dynamic contact between life and life — not only between one rational view against the other — which is directed towards building the world anew together.[54]

This is quite a new phenomenon for religious communities, at least among Indonesians. In the past, when different religions or ideologies met, it was mainly to overcome, or at least to teach, the other, because each was completely convinced that it alone held the secret of the meaning of human life. But, today, persons of different religions have slowly come to the conviction that the other religious adherents have something important to learn from which they can learn.

Based on this and other notions, the main goal of inter-religious dialogue policy, to use Mukti Ali's own words, is "how the government institutes a well functioning forum to bring the adherents of religions in Indonesia to respect, to understand each other and to make them feel that they are living together under the canopy of one nation."[55] In this respect, Mukti Ali was aware that it is difficult path for inter-religious dialogue to result in total peace among religious communities in a country such as Indonesia. But he was sincerely convinced that there must be a certain socio-religious level of religious communities whom he may expect to contribute highly in the activities of dialogue policy. As a result, what Mukti Ali could do was to meet and to summon the elite class of religious communities and work with them for dialogue: religious leaders, scholars, students, intellectuals and so forth. Based on this background, the Forum for Inter-Religious Consultation *(Musyawarah Antar-Umat Beragama)* was established in 1972.[56] Chaired by Mukti Ali, this forum consisted of five religious bodies representing their own communities. These were the Council of the Ulama of Indonesia (MUI) for the Muslims; the Council of Bishops of Indonesia (PWGI) for the Catholics; the Office of Indonesian Churches (DGI) for the Protestants; the Masters of Indonesian Buddhist (Walubi) for the Buddhists; and the Association of Indonesian Hindu-Dharma.

There was no specific task and program to be carried out by this forum. It was basically a forum to discuss, to consult and to contribute solution to the tensions among the religious communities, especially when particular problems come to the fore. "At best", as Mukti Ali asserted, "we can expect this forum to propagate inter-religious tolerance. And with dialogue in this forum, we will try to bring the various communities to respect other religions and their adherents."[57]

It is important to note, however, that Mukti Ali's inter-religious dialogue ideas — as we have already seen — seem to some extent to be an imperfect residue of the discourse of religious thought in modern

Indonesia. This account was borne out of the fact that even though Mukti Ali's policy called the adherents of religion in Indonesia to be tolerant, open and appreciative to other religions, this assertion in fact only touched the political and psychological sphere of those religious communities. In other words, the work and the obstacles of the dialogue would depend mainly on a political will or the good intentions of the communities, not on the encouragement rooted in the internal structure of the epistemology of religious doctrine itself.

There are, no doubt, theological perspectives by which Mukti Ali tried to base his ideas on the Qur'ân, the life of the Prophet and early Islamic traditions, as an expression of his faith. There are assertions as well which are clearly cited from the universal messages and esoteric doctrines of other religious traditions, especially Christianity and Hinduism.[58] But, these ideas and assertions are principally meant to preserve the Indonesian religious pluralism from being seen in a political context and, consequently, due to their psychological preference, appear to be superficial in their nature. This, and the fact that neither appears to have a specific basis of thought nor ethical formulation, leads one to believe that Mukti Ali's inter-religious dialogue theory relies on no distinctive and permanent philosophical underpinnings as a basis for his insistence on the problem of dialogue among religions. Therefore, compared to the ideas of some Muslim intellectuals who shared the same spirit about the inter-religious dialogue, e.g., Nurcholish Madjid's paradigm of *Kalimah Sawâ'* (common term) and *al-hanafiyyat al-samhah* (straight and tolerant path), or Djohan Effendi's Theology of Peace, or Muhammad Amin's Ethico-Religious perspective, or, even, Komaruddin Hidayat's perenialism, Mukti Ali's inter-religious dialogue is spiritually and ethically lacking. This is perhaps the argument why, in response to the problem of internal tensions between dialogue and mission *(da'wah)* which exist in any religious tradition, Mukti Ali could not go beyond his political preferences.

An example of this concerns his policy on methods of religious propagation. When the programs of inter-religious dialogue were criticized as ignoring the fact that faith contains a religious mission, Mukti Ali pointed out the ways that should be performed by religious communities in political terms. Each religion, if we wish to argue, claimed from its start to be a universal message intended for humankind. Yet each also claimed to be the final and universal expression of truth. This latter claim creates the theological supposition in any religious

tradition that a religion should be carried out by a "mission." In Islam, for example, the Qur'ân calls Muslims to "go and call them to the path of your Lord" (Q. 2:13). In Christianity, too, the demand for a mission was considered to be a massage of Christ: "Go, therefore, and make disciples in all nations." (Matt. 28:19). Hence, how could Mukti Ali deny the activities of religious mission?

Considering all these points, Mukti Ali tirelessly preached to carry out the mission in a wise way. He seemed to solve the contradictory notion between inter-religious dialogue and religious missionary activities in a political sphere. His clear decree on this was made in a speech that he delivered in front of national Christmas Eve audiences in Jakarta in 1972, entitled: "*An Adherent of A Religion Should Not Be A Target of Religious Mission.*" Here, Mukti Ali urged religious communities, Christians in this context, to carry out their religious mission in a more persuasive way. He strongly warned Christians by saying:

> It is impossible, however, to convert a person who has embraced a religion to leave his religious belief to embrace another religion, either by compulsion or by offering material gifts; it is unworthy to exploit the weakness of the uneducated, sick and young people to embrace a certain religion. ...It is unworthy as well for religious people like us to try to convert a person by attacking his religious belief and duties.[59]

It is true that the spirit of this statement has become the foundation of missionary activities throughout the New Order's religious policy, although the points of this exposition have never been formulated into a bill of regulation. But its achievement and success must be examined in further research.

It should be clear from the discussion so far that Mukti Ali's framework of his religious policy is meant to fulfil an important demand for Indonesian society in preserving religious life and activities in a modern state. Meanwhile, in political terms, the policy will bring those religious communities nearer each other in positive understanding and appreciation.

However, in the midst of his ministerial career, Indonesian Muslims —supported by the most foremost Islamic organizations in the country: the NU and the Muhammadiyah— deeply regretted his actions and protested when Mukti Ali and the Department of Religious Affairs tried to proceed a new bill for marriage regulation which was considered to be an attempt to "secularize" Islamic Law in Indonesia.

This was in July 1973, when the New Order government, through the Department of Religious Affairs and the Department of Justice, presented the Marriage Bill to the People's Representatives *(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR) in Jakarta. The bill was intended as a unification and codification of the national law on marriage for Indonesian people across religious affiliations. It was also meant to be an innovation of all the previous regulations concerning marriage, including the Dutch Civil Code of 1937, Law No. 32 of 1954, the Marriage Bill for Muslims of 1968 and Law No. 14 of 1970. Representing the Government in this regards were Mukti Ali (the Minister of Religious Affairs) and Oemar Senoadji (the Minister of Justice). Because there were several articles regarded by Muslims as fundamentally contradictory to the principles of Islamic law, they strongly objected and protested about the implementation of the Bill. The protest reached its most dramatic event on September 2, 1973 when more than 500 Muslim men and women took control the House of Parliament for 2 hours when Mukti Ali was presenting the government's exposition of the Bill. The Muslims were outraged and the Minister's presentation reached a deadlock. However, after the Government dropped in a large number of marines the situation in the House of Parliament was finally resolved.

The most crucial points of the proposed Marriage Bill of 1974 which aroused controversy for the Muslims were with regards to, firstly, the position of civil courts which weakened the position of religious courts (article 2: 1); secondly, the legality of inter-religious marriages by the civil court (article 3 and 40: 1); thirdly, the status of adopted children who would have the same status as natural borne children (Articles 8 c and 62); fourthly, the status of children borne by unmarried women [engaged] being equal with children borne by married women (articles 13 and 62); and the possibility of a husband having more than one wife without a limit of 4 (article 3:2).[60] It was on these points that the Muslims considered the Bill to contain political plots towards the secularization of Indonesian Muslims.

Muslims accused Mukti Ali, as the Minister, of having been responsible for the formulation of the Bill due to the fact that there were no Muslim leaders or *'ulamâ'* consulted about its formulation. The accusation even went further that Mukti Ali was suspected as having shared a political agenda with the CSIS, dominated by Catholics and followers of Javanese spiritualism, to work together in the direction of a policy of de-Islamization.[61]

After long discussions and informal lobbies took place between the Government and Muslim leaders, including many informal meetings held at Mukti Ali's ministerial residence, the Government finally accepted the request of the Muslims to make radical changes in the Bill. The President conceded to the Muslim Faction in the People Representatives that all the points which aroused the controversy would be deleted. At last, the new formulation of the Marriage Bill was presented and proceeded in the Parliament on December 22, 1973, and was signed by President Soeharto on December 22, 1973 to become the Indonesian Marriage Law of 1974.

Mukti Ali himself did not clearly detail the story related to the Muslim's accusations about his 'invisible role' in this issue. In his defense of his ministerial position, and the fact that he also shared the same opinions as the Muslims, he tried to clarify, written twenty years latter, the controversy of the Marriage Bill of 1974. His story goes as follows:

> I was in a dilemmatic position. It was Kowani [Korps Wanita Indonesia, *Corps of Indonesian Women*] who strongly asked for the Bill to proceed. You know who the *Kowanis* are. There are only a few Muslim women in this organization. They do not know Islamic Law either. They were very tiring days for me to explain to them. But, they strongly argued that this is a must in a modern state like Indonesia. Therefore, I could not do much. I was in a dilemma. But we have to understand that there is no such thing as the so-called secularization by the New Order government. It is not true.[62]

Whatever the case, Mukti Ali said that he was also proud to be the Minister of Religious Affairs who reconciled between the Government and the Muslim's religious aspirations.

Mukti Ali completed his ministerial career in 1978 following the end of the First Development Cabinet. We have no clues as to why his name was not included in the proceeding cabinet when the Second Development Cabinet was formed in 1979. He then returned since then to Yogyakarta to continue teaching and writing in the Faculty of Fundamentals of Religion in the IAIN of Yogyakarta. Many books have been written, many students have been supervised, many articles have been produced during this post-ministerial career. To date, Mukti Ali still lives and works as a lecturer for the IAIN postgraduate program.

Indonesia and the Challenge of Pluralism

Indonesia is an obviously multi-religious country. All the major world religions — Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism — are represented. Although Muslims are the largest percentage of the population (87 %), and have often held important positions in Indonesian history, it is impossible to place other religious adherents as second class citizens. The question that may be posed is in what way Indonesians (Muslim in particular) can prevent unity and accept the reality of religious pluralism. There is no single answer. But, for Mukti Ali, inter-religious dialogue would be an important discourse of religion in Indonesia, since this is the only means by which the communities of faith may accept the disparity of belief and theological disagreement.

Muslims and non-Muslims — I will pay more attention to Christianity here — have, since independence, had an ambivalent relationship which, at one and the same time, has held possibilities of deep and violent conflict as well as constructive and meaningful dialogue. Many attempts have been made to call for tolerance, dialogue and appreciation: government policies, conferences, seminars, intellectual debates, religious workshops are only a few examples. Yet tension seems to remain among religious communities.

Mukti Ali found that there are three areas of activity in Indonesia in which the roots of Muslim and Christian conflicts can be clearly observed. These are: firstly, colonialization; secondly, evangelization (Christian mission) and; thirdly, political rivalry among the religious communities. It is, in my view, necessary to discuss Mukti Ali's findings at some length.

In a paper presented at the Conference of Dialogue Between Men of Living Faith in Beirut, 1970, Mukti Ali tried to describe Indonesian Muslims' attitude toward the Christian missionary activities. Basing his opinion on some incidents in Java, Irian and Aceh, he wrote:

> In Indonesia, the Muslims have been experiencing these kind of lies and slanders. Christian preachers are consciously distorting the verses of the Qur'ân for their propaganda purposes. ...They visit the houses of Muslims when the husbands are not at home and try to entice their wives and children to Christianity.[63]

In another passage, he wrote:

> The Christian mission has enjoyed its relationship with foreign countries. ...a number of foreign missionaries were detained by local authorities for being involved in instigating tribesmen to revolt against the Indonesian government. It was said that the Christian missionaries were helping to organize the unfortunate trouble...It is clear that foreign Christian missionaries do not hesitate to interfere in the domestic affairs of any country, regardless of whether this deed is detrimental to the unity of the nation or not.[64]

Such statements are held true in the opinion of most revivalist Muslims in Indonesia; a group which tends to be severely critical of Christian missionary works. For them, Christian missionaries have a long history of cooperation with colonialism, with which they enjoyed a symbiotic relationship. This was very much the case in the methods of colonialism used by the Dutch, British, and Portuguese in Indonesia. Hence, Muslims regard missionary work as of greater harm to their countries than colonialism, because colonialism only penetrated Indonesian lands under the cover of missionary activities. This feeling of hatred has occupied — and continues to do so — the minds and pens of educated Muslims. One of these, H.M. Rasjidi, who was educated first in Egypt and later in Europe, has made this problem one of his longlife occupations. His book *Muslim Ummah's Responses to the Expansion of Christianity* (Sikap Umat Islam Terhadap Perluasan Agama Kristen), has provided an important description of how Muslims should perceive Christian missionary activities.

Rasjidi has generally viewed the aim of Christian missionaries as a well-planned and well-executed process of westernizing the Muslim world. He argues that, because of the close cooperation between missionaries and colonial powers, their religious mission becomes unclear. Therefore, Rasjidi concluded, the motives behind missionaries are not very religious. This is because their primary aim is to westernize Indonesia; not to embrace their religion. Rasjidi then goes on to define the process of westernization as follows:

> Westernization, in its simplest conception, is the conditioning of Muslims to willingly accept the western mentality and reject the fundamentals [of Islam] which impose on Muslim society a particular identity and a specific Islamic character. In addition, it seeks to raise doubts concerning Islamic principles.[65]

If we observe Muslims' responses to Christian missionary activities in the other Muslim world, Sayyid Qutb, the most leading ideologue of Ikhwân al-Muslimîn of Egypt, shares the same feeling as

Rasyidi's. In his book *Amrikâ al-latî ra'aitu* (*America That I See*) Qutb condemned everything related to missionary activities. Here, after presenting the political crime of colonialism, Qutb stated "missionary work to be altogether evil." It is evident, he argues, that western society is itself atheistic. It is a materialistic society which knows no meaning of the spirit. Then, referring to his experience of living in America for several years, he continues: "America, which worships gold, iron and petrol, has nonetheless covered half of the earth with missionaries. Likewise, Italy, while showing hostility to the Church in its struggle for independent statehood, has nonetheless built its imperialistic policy on the efforts of missionaries."[66]

Based on this and other notions, most Muslim peoples have come to suspect missionary work. Behind every missionary activity they see colonial interests. Indonesian Muslims are no exception. Rasjidi, for instance, explicitly wrote, "the battle between the missionaries and Islam is not one of religion; rather, it is one whose aim is political and economic domination."[67]

In addition to this mistrustful attitude towards Evangelist work, the struggle for power in most of the Muslim world appears to imbue what Mukti Ali phrased as "religious differences with political significance."[68] In Indonesia, which is a predominantly Muslim country, political struggles between religious communities sharply increased after independence and reached in as intense degree with the rise of the New Order in 1966. Mukti Ali observed that the political conflict between religious communities mainly rests on how non-Muslims, during the formative period of Indonesia, have been threatened by the ongoing struggle of Muslims to establish an Islamic state, a struggle which has taken place not only in politics, but also in the form of military revolts.[69] Up until this time, although Pancasila (not Islam) is a firm basis for the national Constitution, non-Muslims have not undergone a thorough, comfortable feeling of their social and political position. It is for this reason that, Mukti Ali argues, these communities attempt to increase their political mobility into power which tends to bear conflict with the Muslim majority. This political rivalry has created a situation in which Muslim and non-Muslim brethren exhibit a deep-felt dislike for the each other's values and doctrines.

Therefore, it may be some what clear in our discussion that the main obstacle to peace among religious communities in Indonesia by far is the mistrust, misgiving, and misunderstanding that has occurred

throughout the nation's religious history. This, in its turn, involves how they perceive and change their attitudes within the basic framework of the universal message of religion, which transcends all political and economic considerations.

In this respect, Mukti Ali believes that instead of looking at our past history, revising old prejudices, imagining the victory of our own religion, we —as members of a religious community— have to be prepared to achieve to a common term (to use Nurcholish Madjid's term of *Kalimah sawâ'*) for understanding and fruitful cooperation. Speaking from the point of view of a Muslim, Mukti Ali hoped that:

> As far as the Muslims are concerned, their hands are always stretching to their Christian brethren. What they want is freedom and peace. Muslims believe that this is a time of cooperation and national development. ...This is not the Middle Ages when the spirit of the Crusades was dominant. Let us try to work together fruitfully and creatively for the benefit of mankind, whether he is Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist or otherwise.[70]

All this is true for the modern Indonesian religious problem. Along the lines of the spirit of Mukti Ali's assertion, one may argue that our problem today is no longer the problem of faith or religious affiliation. It is rather disparities among people in terms of wealth, democracy, industrial development, and the exploitation of the resources and markets of poor people by the rich. To be sure, the old religious issues and deep-seated prejudices and hostilities lie at the root of mankind's conflict today.

This is a challenge not just for Muslim alone, but for all people of faith in Indonesia, and it is a challenge for dialogue too.

Mukti Ali and the New Order's Agenda ?

Mukti Ali's religious thought treats the question of faith and religious communities not only as an issue of a system of belief, but also as social and political phenomena. To speak of a "religion", as far as Mukti Ali is concerned, is to speak of many things such as faith, systems of doctrine, or accepted sets of rituals. But when one looks at how a Muslim, a Christian, a Hindu, or a Buddhist regards himself and his group, it is the sense of community that asserts itself at every turn. Hence, the controlling principle of a certain religious attitude possesses social and political meaning based on a powerful sense of communal solidarity. It is in this important point that we can observe Mukti Ali's preferences for, firstly, the mobilization of reli-

gious life in modern Indonesia and, secondly, to the propagation of inter-religious dialogue.

In terms of its spirit, these preferences are closely related to attempt towards the political re-orientation of religious life and activities in the New Order's policy of modernization. It is New Order policy to disengage religious activities from their political atmosphere. The government, in general, assists, protects, supports, and even provides guidance for religious practices. It implements and supervises religious instructions in state schools and universities. It also regulates the practices and supervises everything related to the registration of Muslim marriage (*nikâh*), the revocation of repudiation (*rujû'*), and divorce (*talâq*). Moreover, the government grants material help for the renovation and upkeep of the religious places of worship and institutions. All of this is aimed at assisting the Indonesians to perform their religious duties with the condition that these practices remain outside the political arena.

More significant still is that these policies are in line with the government hope of uniting the Indonesian religious communities through a specific cultural strategy by which the government can improve the dialogue between the adherents of different religions. The government perceives Indonesian society as one with certain important characteristics: harmonious, equal, family-oriented and, in turn, very religious.[71] Based on this perception, a dialogue between religious communities is, therefore, inherently rooted not only in every religion of the Indonesian people (Islam, Christianity, Catholic, Hinduism, Buddhism), but also in their cultural systems. Moertopo wrote at some length explaining why inter-religious dialogue is necessary:

> The principle of Belief in One Supreme God in Pancasila emphasizes a religious attitude. It does not emphasize one of the religious systems. This is because a religious attitude can be manifested in many forms of expression, either in religion or in certain systems of belief. Therefore, this principle does not serve as a theocratic state. Rather, because of the religious attitude mentioned above, we should respect and understand other religions and systems of belief. It is stated that Indonesia guarantees religious freedom, embracing any religion or system of belief. Indonesian society also expects to build peace between religious communities, based on the principle of the family. There are, of course, differences between religions and systems of belief, but this is not necessarily conflict. ... Because, the most important issue is how religion and systems of belief become striking forces towards the process of humanization, and not the process of de-humanization.[72]

He points out that the state apparatus, by means of the Department of Religious Affairs, serves as an important agent through which inter-religious dialogue may work in practice.

However, although there is a parallel between Mukti Ali and the general policy of the New Order, it is too presumptuous to say that Mukti Ali's religious thought has been totally framed by, or has tried to justify, the political agenda of the New Order's ideology of modernization. Thus H.M. Rasyidi, for example, totally mistakes this in an article in which Mukti Ali has been accused as being framed by the New Order government due to the controversy of the Marriage Bill of 1973 and the admission of Javanese spiritual beliefs into part of the Department of Religious Affairs which led to a political vote in the Parliament. In doing so, H.M. Rasjidi must have also mistaken when he tried to suggest that the spread of Christianity during the New Order era (most notably after 1970) principally resulted from Mukti Ali's dialogue policy which allowed the Christian missionaries to work more effectively.[73]

One wonders, in fact, how is it possible for people to misplace Mukti Ali in certain issues of political and religious events and, worse still, to ignore the fact that the problems of dialogue among religions and religious communities have become a distinctive concern for Mukti Ali since the early period of his intellectual career, at least after his return from McGill University, in 1957.

It must be observed here, however, that the misunderstanding and confusion of some Muslims about his dialogue policy and other political expositions are basically due to the assumption that the entire religious thought of Mukti Ali is simply a product of his ministerial career, i.e., a sublimation of his political activities and intrigues between 1971 and 1978, an assumption which seems to be erroneous. Another factor which may have led to this misplace or misreading is Mukti Ali's socio-religious background and affiliation, i.e., the fact that he was raised in a traditional the N.U. *santri* social milieu and then entered and became one of the prominent figures of a puritan-modernist organization, Muhammadiyah.

As befits his religio-intellectual journey, the first assumption is obviously not valid. This means that his political career did not inspire him and his commitment to the struggle for peace among Indonesian religious communities and, accordingly, to build religious pluralism. There is no doubt, as shown by the process of his selection as Minister, that there were coincident between the New Order's po-

litical strategy of modernization and Mukti Ali's personal expertise and concern. But, even this is not a sufficient argument to assume that the political steps made by the CSIS and Muljanto Sumardi's Korps Karyawan of the Department of Religious Affairs were intended to initiate Mukti Ali into being a political agent of the New Order's religious policy. One can discern, in fact, that Mukti Ali's religious thought never exhibited a significant switch from one side to another either before or after he served as Minister of Religious Affairs. It is evidently true that his understanding of Islam and his concern with the problem of religious communities shows a constant dynamic up until today. However, there is only one possibility where we may assume a link between the New Order's political agenda and Mukti Ali's religious thought. This is in the fact that Mukti Ali, spurred by his pattern of politico-religious concepts, opened the means by which the New Order regime was able to run a policy compatible to the agenda of modernization, as we shall see later.

The second factor, Mukti Ali's socio-religious milieu, is more likely — considering the inclusive pattern of political and religious orientation articulated by most traditional *santri* organizations such as the N.U. — an important inspiration to his vision for dialogue. But, even if the second factor is correct, by itself this assumption cannot further explain the overwhelming evidence pointing to the fact that the spirit of inter-religious dialogue developed by Mukti Ali is in essence not compatible with the spirit of the revivalist-oriented fashion which is commonly expressed by puritan-modernist organizations, or, more precisely, by Muhammadiyah. Even though Mukti Ali's political attitude may not be on a par with that of more politically and religiously accomplished revivalists, such as H.M. Rasjidi and Lukman Harun, he is nonetheless a Muhammadiyah at heart.

That the Muhammadiyah movement, in which Mukti Ali had been trained, educated and brought up, possesses a revivalistic spirit in its political and religious orientation is basically true. As commonly held by observers of Indonesia, Muhammadiyah is regarded as a modernist-renewal movement which has devoted itself to the struggle against the mystical trends of Islamic rituals and Islamic syncretism which marked and marred the early growth of Islam in Indonesia. In its doctrinal preferences, this movement stresses the exclusive authority of the Qur'ân and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet in determining what constitutes Islamic belief and practices. These purifica-

tion and *salafi* (revivalist) spirit have placed Muhammadiyah among the reformist organizations that took a menacing position against sufism and sufi orders (*tarekat*). More importantly still, in its revivalist development, most notably by the rising tide of activities of the Christian Mission at the end 1960s, Muhammadiyah by and large became the leading Muslim organization in Indonesia to be a severe opponent of the works of the Christian missions, both politically and culturally.[74]

Considering all these revivalistic tendencies in Muhammadiyah, one may argue that it is impossible to find a connecting line, either direct or indirect, between Mukti Ali's concern with the problem of inter-religious dialogue and his activities in this organization. It is impossible mainly because the spirit of revivalism would not allow space for inter-religious dialogue, which requires openness, tolerance, and great appreciation.

However, even though the root of Mukti Ali's preference for inter-religious dialogue is blurred and unclear, the perceptive reader cannot help but witness his great intellectual change at the time when he stayed, studied, and befriended fellow students and professors at McGill University. Put more conclusively, it was Wilfred Cantwel Smith who gave birth to his concern with the discourse of inter-religious dialogue. From his arrival at Montreal until his return to Indonesia, he seemed to be very impressed by this professor. Mukti Ali wrote in his memoirs:

> When I went to Canada, I was surprised, because Prof. Smith himself, together with two students, picked me up at the airport. He said to me: "Welcome, Mr. Ali!" I asked my self, why did Prof. Smith come to the airport just to pick me up?.[75]

Then, his impression continued to increase when Smith introduced him a new approach to religious studies, to use his own term, a comparative approach. In addition, the method of lecturing presented by Smith made Mukti Ali lose his own criticism.

> Before studying in Canada, I knew nothing about the science of Comparative Religion. My specialization in Pakistan was Islamic History. Therefore, although at McGill I studied with many professors, such as Niyazi Berkes from Turkey, William Bugly from Britain, Prof. Bahy from Egypt, I paid more attention to Prof. Smith's courses. I cannot explain why. There are some reasons, of course. First is regarding the system of study that we used; and second, I liked his method of analysis...

> Most important of all is that Prof. Smith introduced me to a new approach to Islamic studies. He used the comparative analysis of religious studies, namely, trying to see a certain subject of religious phenomenon from all its aspects. I called this a "holistic approach" to religion, an approach which entirely influenced my way of thinking, or even, in a larger context, changed my attitude in understanding human life...[76]

Taking into consideration the intellectual accomplishment reflected in the last story from Mukti Ali's memoirs, the process of change depicted in his concern with the problem of inter-religious dialogue may be seen as a religio-intellectual transformation in which Mukti Ali is preoccupied with the awakening of the personal quest, i.e, the interaction between religious communities in his country. This process ended with Mukti Ali's attainment of a new horizon of religious life through his studies with W.C. Smith.

For Mukti Ali, then, W.C. Smith was not merely an intellectual inspiration, but also someone whose ideas and intellectual journey shared the same spirit and direction as his. With regards to Mukti Ali's preference for an empirical method of studying religion, for example, Smith had already emphasized the issue when he tried to explain religious phenomena among Muslim community in India. He wrote: "Academic study of a religious community must be simultaneously accepted by that community, and, of course, by the academic society as well, including those who are not involved in the research. In the science of Comparative Religion, therefore, an important task of a researcher is to formulate statements that can be accepted by two religious communities, as well as being accepted by the academic world."[77] To this end, W.C. Smith is internationally recognized as a scholar with the spirit to find a better alternative for religious studies, particularly Islam.

As is rightly claimed by noted scholars such as Mahmoud Ayoub (one of Smith's students at Harvard), Montgomery Watt, Hans Kung and John Esposito, W.C. Smith is one of the few western scholars who has sympathetic expertise on Islam and its religious system. This is because Smith believes that religion is a kind of path through which men and women 'personally' work for their lives. Religious symbols, rituals and institutions become important if we understand what those symbols mean. It is a great improvement (in the Western scholarship, at least) if an observer in religious studies realizes that what they should observe is not the system of religious belief as such, but rather the a person with a certain religion, or, more or less, something internal about their personal faith.

Smith's point that faith is something personal leads one to perceive that not only does the study of religion not result in anything without relying its argument on the adherent of that religion, but the perspective used by Smith also basically provides space for dialogue between the observer and a religious person. Consequently, it also opens up the possibility of dialogue among religious communities. In connection with this, Smith insists that there is no valid conclusion on a certain religion that we study, unless this conclusion is accepted by the people who adhere to that religion.

By this statement, Smith attempts to bring the study of religion onto a level in which an observer has to understand that the meaning of a religious symbol can be achieved by him/her through the people of that religion. The question that may be raised is how a person may perceive his own religion as truth, but at the same time, accept the truth claimed by a person of a different religion. Responding to this question, Smith wishes to argue that there is no exclusive truth in religious life. He warned Christians not to be exclusive by acting as if they alone know and possess the truth. He states:

> I warn the Christians that there is no absolute, impersonal and static truth in Christianity; Christianity will become true if you and I, as Christians, give it meaning in a profound way from day to day."[78]

This statement was followed precisely by Mukti Ali when in 1973 he delivered a speech in at A Conference of Religions and Nations: In Search of World Communities. He wrote:

> Religious adherents must have confidence that they can be good religious adherents and, at the same time, they can do good for those with different religions....
>
> There is no need for a religious group to become a good religious group by not being good to other groups of different religions.[79]

It is within this important point that one may perceive the parallel between the spirit of Mukti Ali's religious thought with that which is imagined by Ali Moertopo and his colleagues in the CSIS on the meaning of religion and systems of religious belief (aliran kepercayaan). In other words, by perceiving that faith is personal; that faith includes any system of religious belief such as Javanese spiritualism; that religion should be carried out with dialogue, and so forth, Mukti Ali actually provides some room for the New Order's government to work with this kind of "Smithian thought" towards a

modern religious policy in Indonesia. One may argue, moreover, that the coincident between the three wings of political interest at the time of re-organization of the Department of Religious Affairs in 1970 — i.e., the CSIS, Muljanto Sumardi's Korps Karyawan, and Mukti Ali — is based entirely on level of ideas; not on a political agenda.

Conclusion

The forgoing discussion has attempted to understand adequately and to evaluate fairly Mukti Ali's preference for inter-religious dialogue. It has revealed several significant facts about him and his activities, most of which have never been treated seriously. At the same time, it has dispelled some popular misunderstandings regarding the inspiration or the original insight of his concern. Thus it can be said Mukti Ali's religious thought is not a direct product of his political career, in which he shared the same religious policy as that of the New Order government. Nor is it not inspired by his activities in the revivalist organization of Muhammadiyah. Rather, it issues more from Mukti Ali's own deep religious bent and his intellectual quest.

We can discern the following identifiable qualities in the religious thought of Mukti Ali: 1) it represents a modern Islamic discourse that has been produced as part of the dynamics of Indonesian intellectual history; 2) it is a cross-religious movement which brings the existing Indonesian religious communities closer together, both politically and religiously; 3) it tries to prevent the basic premises of Indonesian religious pluralism; 4) it has reinterpreted the Islamic thought in a way that lends itself to a functional meaning.

Endnotes

1. *Ensiklopedia Indonesia*, "Cepu," (Jakarta: PT. Ichtiar Baru and Van Hoeve: 1989).
2. Abdurrahman, Burhanuddin Daya, Djam'annuri (eds.), *Agama dan Masyarakat: 70 Tahun H.A. Mukti Ali*, (Yogyakarta: IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Press, 1993), p. 7. I have based my biographical section of this research mainly on this book. No complete biography of Mukti Ali has been written.
3. Boedjono was the fifth of seven children in the family: four males and three females. See, *Ibid.*, p. 9.
4. *Pondok* is a traditional Islamic boarding school. In Indonesia, this institute of learning devotes itself to studying Islamic religious knowledge by using traditional methods of study in terms of its instruction, systems and program of study. Usually a *pondok* is led by a religious teacher, 'ulamâ', from whom the students seek their knowledge. For a comprehensive study of this issue, see Karel Steenbrink, *Pesantren, Madrasah dan Sekolah* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987).
5. *Agama*, p. 13.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 16
8. *Ibid.*, p. 11. According to Mukti Ali, the innovations made by these three *kyais* were uncommon. The innovations were not only in the system that they used, but also the instructions that were read in the class. For example, as Mukti Ali states, for the instruction for Islamic stories, they used *Qirâ'at al-Rashîdah* which contains pictures.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
11. Bennedict R.O.G.. Anderson, *Revolusi Pemoeda* (Trn.), (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1989), p. 2.
12. *Agama.*, p. 24.
13. I regret that I must say here that we have no clear information as to whether Mukti Ali gained a Ph.D degree from the University of Karachi. Some of his colleagues doubt his Ph.D achievement. H.M. Rasjidi, for example, always uses a question mark whenever he cites Mukti Ali's name and degree (Dr. ?) to indicate that he personally doubts Mukti Ali's completion of the doctoral program.
14. Ahmad Wahib, *Pergolakan Pemikiran Islam* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1984), p. 63.
15. *Agama*, p. 28.
16. M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981). p. 246.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 247
18. *Agama*, p. 18.
19. Ricklefs, *Op.Cit.*, p. 246. Two people who were known as PKI sympathizers are Choirul Saleh (1916-67), Minister for Veterans' Affairs and Subandrio (1914-) Secretary to the Prime Minister.
20. Mukti Ali, *Pelbagai Persoalan Islam di Indonesia Dewasa Ini* (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Nida, 1971) p. 11.
21. *Agama*, p. 30.
22. The program itself was known before 1960 by the *Jurusan Hubungan Antar Agama* (Department of Inter-Religious Relations). But it was ineffective due to a lack of instructors. After Mukti Ali came from McGill, the Department was filled effectively. See, *Agama.*, p. 31.
23. *Agama*, p. 31. See also, *Ilmu Perbandingan Agama dan Perkembangannya di In-*

donesia (Bandung: Mizan Press, 1989) p. 5.

24. See, *Ilmu Perbandingan Agama* (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Al-falah, 1965), p. 7.
25. The book is considered to be the only text book for the Comparative Religions students at the IAIN. It introduces the history, methodology and development of Comparative Religion.
26. Mukti Ali, *Ilmu Perbandingan Agama*, p. 3
27. *Ibid.*, p. 3
28. *Ibid.*, p. 5
29. *Ibid.*, p. 6. See also, Mukti Ali, *Perkembangan di Indonesia*, Op.Cit., p. 12. It is worth noting that not only was this science introduced in Middle Eastern Islam, but there were also many works in the seventeenth century Malay-Indonesia archipelago which presented the varied images of non-Islamic religions, especially of Christianity and Judaism. They can be considered as, in my opinion, "a legitimate Comparative Religion, or a science which is outside the mentioned religious tradition." Nuruddin al-Raniri, for example, wrote an exposition on Christian scripture in his effort to respond to an intellectual debate among the Acehnese *'ulamâ'* on the sacredness of the Bible. See, Karel Steenbrink, *Kitab Suci Atau Kertas Toilet* (Yogyakarta: n.p., 1986).
30. Mukti Ali, *Ilmu Perbandingan Agama*, p. 6
31. *Ibid.*, p. 10
32. Mukti Ali, *Perkembangan Di Indonesia*, p. 14.
33. Mukti Ali, *Ilmu Perbandingan*, p. 15.
34. *Ilmu Perbandingan*, p. 38.
35. For a review of the benefits of studying Comparative Religion, see Muin Umar, "Mukti Ali dan Kerukunan Umat Beragama," in Abdurrahman et al.. *Agama*, pp. 31-7.
36. *Ibid.*, p.20
37. Wahib, *Pergolakan*, p. 6
38. *Agama*, p. 37.
39. I have based my story on Mukti Ali's road to power on interviews with Dr. Muljanto Soemardi on December 14 and 17, 1995.
40. Interview with Muljanto Soemardi, December 14, 1995. The embryo of this forum was an open discussion club often held in Muljanto Soemardi's house in Ciputat during 1968. It became the people's political apparatus mainly due to the intervention of the CSIS in order to work for co-optation to the Department of Religious Affairs.
41. Interview with Muljanto Sumardi, December 14, 1995. According to Muljanto Sumardi, following this decision, the CSIS then contacted Mukti Ali in Yogyakarta to inform him about the selection. It was Soedjono Humardani and Ali Moertopo themselves who went to his house and brought him to Jakarta to meet President Soeharto.
42. "New Order" is a term to characterize the government, emerged in 1966 after the failure of a bloody coup by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The term distinguishes this government from the "Old Order" of Soekarno's period. The New Order has tried in essence to adopt the liberal-capitalistic model of modernization in terms of politics and economy, and, above all, attempts to establish a clear differentiation between political and religious authority.
43. Mukti Ali, *Memahami Beberapa Aspek Ajaran Islam* (Bandung: Mizan, 1989) p. 149. See also his article, written earlier, "Indonesia Tidak Negara Sekular dan

Tidak Teokratis," in Bahrun Kayo, *Agama dan Pembangunan di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Departemen Agama, 1973) pp. 61-67.

44. *Agama*, p. 47 See also, *Religion and Development*, Yogyakarta: Yayasan Nida, 1978).
45. Mukti Ali, "Religions, Nations and the Search for A World Community," in Bahrun, *Op.Cit.*, p. 9
46. Ali Moertopo, *Strategy Pembangunan Indonesia* (Jakarta: Center for Strategy and International Studies, 1980) pp. 51-64.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 68
48. *Strategi*, pp. 267-8,
49. B.J. Bolland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 126-7
50. *Agama*, p. 42. For a review of Mukti Ali's dialogue policy, see Boland, *The Struggle*, p. 172.
51. For a good account of the issue, see Avery T. William, *Indonesian Revival: Why Two Million Came to Christ*, (South Pasadena; William Carey, nd).
52. *Ibid.*, p. 8
53. Mukti Ali, *Memahami, Op.Cit.*, pp. 56-8.
54. Mukti Ali, "Dialogue Between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia," in Mukti Ali (ed), *Dialogue Antar Agama* (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Nida, 1971) p. 37.
55. Mukti Ali, "Peranan Lembaga Keagamaan Dalam Modernisasi," Bahrun, *Agama*, p. 145.
56. The forum was actually introduced in 1968 by K.H. Muhammad Dahlan, the Minister of Religious Affairs. But, it did not work as expected. Abdurrahman, *Agama*. p. 16
57. Mukti Ali, "Peranan," p. 148. There were many projects of the Department of Religious Affairs between 1973 and 1976 with regards to the dialogue policy. Among them were dialogue among religious groups 23 times in 21 cities, Inter-Religious Dialogue Workshop in 16 cities, 2 International Conferences of Religions, and so forth. For a review of Mukti Ali's policy, see Djohan Effendi, "Kerukunan Hidup Beragama," in Imam Ahmad, *Agama dan Tantangan Zaman* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987), pp. 168-175.
58. Mukti Ali, *Memahami*, pp. 134-6. In connection with the Islamic spirit of inter-religious dialogue, Mukti Ali based his ides on the Qur'ân S. 2:115, S. 5:111, S. 5:44. With regards to Christianity, he referred to Jesus' sermon on the mountain, and for Hinduism he referred to a story of Mahabarata.
59. Mukti Ali, "Orang Yang Sudah Beragama Jangan Sampai Jadi Sasaran Penyiaran Agama,", in Bahrun, p. 39.
60. For a comprehensive review of the issues, see Azyumardi Azra, "The Indonesian Mariage Law: An Institutionalisation of the *Sharî'ah* for Social Change," in *Istiqra Journal* No. 6/VI (Bandung: IAIN Sunan Gunung Jati, 1992) p. 25. However, the number of points may vary according to the legal perspectives on which a Muslim bases his/her view. A study done by the students of the IAIN of Yogyakarta, for instance, concluded that there were 16 points; whereas a meeting among the *'ulamâ'* of Denanyar, Jombang, concluded there were 168 points. See, Amak F.Z., *Proses Undang-undang Hukum Perkawinan*, (Bandung: PT Al-Ma'arif, 1976) pp. 16-17.
61. For a detailed description of this, see Mitsuo Nakamura, "The Emergence of the Islamizing Middle Class and the Dialectics of Political Islam in the New Order

of Indonesia: Prelude to the Formation of the ICMI" cf. Saiful Muzani, Kultur Kelas Menengah Muslim dan Kelahiran ICMI, in *Studia Islamika*, vol. 1 no. 1, 1994.

62. *Agama*, p. 18.
63. Mukti Ali, *Dialogue Between Men of Living Faith* (Beirut: Paper Conference, 1973).
64. *Ibid.* p. 7
65. Rasjidi, *Sikap Umat Islam Terhadap Ekspansi Kristen* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1975).
66. Quoted from, Ibrahim Abu Rabi', *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*, unpublished paper (Hartford: n.p., 1994).
67. Rasjidi, p. 17
68. Mukti Ali, *Dialogue*, p. 9
69. To mention some examples of the Muslim struggle for an Islamic state through military revolt are *Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia* (Islamic State/Divine Armed Forces of Indonesia) in Java (1949-1964), Aceh, Sumatra (1950-1962) and South Sulawesi (1951-1963).
70. Mukti Ali, *Inter-Religious Dialogue in Indonesia and Its Problems*, World Conference on Religion and Peace" (Tokyo: Paper Conference, 1970).
71. Moertopo, *Strategi*, p. 322
72. *Ibid.*, p. 323.
73. H.M. Rasjidi, "Pergolakan Pemikiran Islam; Suatu Tragedi," in *Panji Masyarakat* 346 (1 Januari, 1982) pp. 42-3. Cf. Azyumardi Azra, Guarding the Faith of the Ummah: Religio-Intellectual Journey of H.M. Rajidi, in *Studia Islamika*, (vol. 1. No. 2, 1994). p. 117.
74. For an encyclopedic work on the encounter between Muhammadiyah and the Christian missions in Indonesia, see Alwi Shihab, *The Muhammadiyah Movement and Its Countroversy With the Christian Mission in Indonesia*, Ph.D. dissertation (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1995).
75. *Agama*, p. 34
76. *Ibid.*, p. 35
77. For a comprehensive article on W.C. Smith, see Abduh Hisyam, "Islam dan Dialog Kemanusiaan: Menyimak Metode Studi Agama Welfred Cantwel Smith", in *Ulumul Qur'an*, vol. III, No. 2, 1992. pp. 107-111
78. W.C. Smith, *The Questions of Religious Truth*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons) 1976. Cf. Abduh, *Islam dan Dialog*, p. 109
79. Mukti Ali, *World, Nations*, p. 22

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