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The Tragedy of Cimareme: The Resistance of Haji Hasan to the Colonial Power in 1919

Abstraksi: Sejarah mencatat “Peristiwa Cimareme” sebagai salah satu kejadian penting sepanjang tahun 1919 Indonesia. Peristiwa ini merupakan puncak perlawanan masyarakat Desa Cimareme, yang dipimpin oleh Haji Hasan, melawan pemerintah kolonial Belanda. Terhitung tujuh orang meninggal, termasuk Haji Hasan sendiri, dan puluhan lainnya luka berat serta ringan. Seluruh korban berasal dari pihak pribumi, dan tidak seorang pun dari pihak pemerintah yang terluka. Dari sisi jumlah korban dan rentang waktu, Peristiwa Cimareme terbilang kecil dan lokal. Namun pengaruhnya sangat luas; pemerintah pusat dan media massa nasional mengangkatnya sebagai tema bahasan yang menyita perhatian banyak pihak. Istilah Cimareme diambil dari nama desa tempat kejadian, yang sekarang masuk dalam Kecamatan Banyuwresmi, Kabupaten Garut, Jawa Barat.

Pemicu utama Peristiwa Cimareme lebih bersifat kepentingan ekonomis. Setahun sebelum kejadian tersebut meletus, pemerintah kolonial Belanda menetapkan aturan pembelian padi bagi petani pribumi. Langkah ini diambil untuk mengatasi kelangkaan bahan makanan akibat kegagalan panen serta kesulitan impor. Selama beberapa tahun sebelumnya, wilayah-wilayah pertanian di seluruh pulau Jawa sering mengalami kegagalan panen akibat musim kemarau yang berkepanjangan. Saat itu pemerintah mengatasinya dengan cara mengimpor beras dari wilayah lain di Asia. Namun upaya ini tidak berjalan mulus, karena selain kesulitan transportasi, wilayah-wilayah tersebut juga mengalami kegagalan panen.

Aturan pembelian padi yang ditetapkan pemerintah dipandang tidak adil oleh Haji Hasan. Pemerintah mewajibkan petani di wilayah lain untuk hanya menjual padi mereka sebanyak dua pikul per bau tanah, sementara petani Cimareme diharuskan menjual padi mereka dua kali lebih banyak dari angka tersebut. Haji Hasan mempertanyakan aturan ini, dan bersikeras untuk tidak menjual padinya kepada pemerintah. Sikap ini kemudian menimbulkan konflik dengan pejabat pribumi setempat, dan akhirnya pemerintah Belanda mengambil tindakan keras melalui penyerbuan.

Rangkaian kejadian Peristiwa Cimareme hanya berlangsung singkat. Tetapi bila ditilik akar persoalannya, peristiwa ini merupakan sebuah jalinan dari pelbagai macam konflik yang sebelumnya sudah muncul. Secara ekonomis Haji Hasan tergolong orang mampu. Ia memiliki tanah yang sangat luas untuk ukuran petani desa. Ia juga memiliki usaha lain, seperti peternakan kuda dan perikanan air darat. Dihitung dari seluruh jumlah kekayaannya, aturan pembelian padi tidak akan banyak mengganggu keberlangsungan kehidupan ekonominya. Dengan demikian, kepentingan ekonomis hanyalah salah satu sisi wajah dari Peristiwa Cimareme ini.

Konflik Haji Hasan dengan pejabat pribumi merupakan sisi lain dari keseluruhan konflik. Haji Hasan pada dasarnya menduduki posisi sosial yang sama dengan pejabat pribumi. Keduanya adalah elit desa yang masing-masing memiliki pengaruh besar terhadap rakyat. Bedanya, selaku pemimpin agama, Haji Hasan tidak mendapatkan legitimasi formal dari pemerintah. Tarik-menarik pengaruh antarke dua jenis kepemimpinan muncul dalam bentuk perselisihan antara Haji Hasan dengan Lurah Cikendal dan Wedana Leles.

Sejak muda Haji Hasan memang sudah menunjukkan sikap radikal. Sebagai keturunan bangsawan dan kyai, sejak muda ia sudah terlibat permusuhan dengan pejabat Belanda. Oleh orang tuanya Hasan dikirim ke pesantren, dan diharapkan dapat menggantikan kedudukan ayahnya sebagai seorang kyai. Namun ketika ayahnya meninggal, Hasan tampak kurang tertarik dengan tugas yang dibebankan sebagai pemuka agama. Ia lebih tertarik untuk mendalami ilmu kesaktian dan mengajarkannya kepada para santri dan masyarakat setempat. Ia juga memobilisasi petani dengan mendirikan organisasi sepak bola yang bersemangatkan kemerdekaan.

Melalui seluruh kegiatan tersebut, Haji Hasan muncul sebagai sosok pemimpin yang berpengaruh. Sebagai petinggi pesantren, ia mudah mendapatkan dukungan massa dan legitimasi keagamaan. Hal itu tercermin manakala ia menggunakan istilah "perang sabil" ketika mengadakan perlawanan terhadap pemerintah Belanda. Lebih dari itu, melalui kekayaan yang ia miliki, pengaruhnya juga dapat menjangkau para petani yang bekerja untuknya. Berdasarkan dukungan serta posisi ini, Haji Hassan terlihat mampu mengadakan perlawanan, meskipun kemudian kalah.

Peristiwa Cimareme hanyalah salah satu peristiwa dari rangkaian kejadian lain yang sudah berjalan sebelumnya. Pada awal abad dua puluh, misalnya, tercatat beberapa peristiwa serupa yang meletus di sekitar wilayah Jawa Barat. Maka tidak berlebihan jika dikatakan bahwa peristiwa ini merupakan cerminan dari situasi sosial-politik masyarakat Jawa pada umumnya.

مأساة تشيماريمى: مواجهة الحاج حسن أمام السلطة

الاستعمارية فى سنة ١٩١٩

الخلاصة

يسجل التاريخ حادثة تشيماريمى (Cimareme) كحادثة هامة فى إندونيسيا طيلة سنة ١٩١٩، فهى حادثة تصور قمة مواجهة مجتمع قرية تشيماريمى التى قادها الحاج حسن (Haji Hasan) لمناهضة الاستعمار الهولندى، وقد حسب أن سبعة أشخاص استشهدوا بما فيهم الحاج حسن نفسه، وعشرات غيرهم جرحوا جروحا شديدة وخفيفة. وكل الضحايا من الوطنيين الأصليين، ولم يجرح أحد من طرف الحكومة الاستعمارية. من ناحية جملة الضحايا وطيلة مدة الكارثة تعتبر حادثة تشيماريمى هذه صغيرة ومحلية فحسب بينما نفوذها واسع للغاية إذ الجهة الحكومية المركزية والصحافة الوطنية قد أعطتها من الأهمية التى جذبت انتباه كثير من الأطراف. فكلمة تشيماريمى التى أخذت اصطلاحا لهذه الحادثة إنما استحدثت من اسم منطقة الحادثة التى دخلت الآن فى مشيخة بنجورسمى (Banyuresmi). بمحافظة جاروت (Garut) بجاوة الغربية.

الواقع الأساسى لهذه الحادثة ذو صلة بالقضية الاقتصادية، فإنه قبل وقوع هذه الحادثة بسنة قد قررت الحكومة الاستعمارية الهولندية نظام بيع الأرز للزراع الوطنيين. هذه الخطة اتخذتها للتغلب على قلة المواد الغذائية نتيجة فشل الحصاد بجانب صعوبة الاستيراد الخارجى.

قبل بضع سنوات كانت الولايات الزراعية في أنحاء جزيرة جاوة قد أدركت فشلا حصاديا لسبب موسم القمط الطويل المدى. ففي تلك الآونة تغلبت عليها الحكومة الاستعمارية باستيراد الأرز من المناطق الآسيوية الأخرى، ولكن هذا السعى لم يستمر طويلا لسبب صعوبة وسائل النقل، وهذه المنطقة أصيبت بفشل الحصاد كذلك.

ونظام بيع الأرز الذي حددته الحكومة غير عادل في نظر الحاج حسن، فالحكومة في المناطق الأخرى قد أوجبت على الزراع بيع الأرز في جملة أردبين لكل فدان بينما زراع تشيمارمي فرضت عليهم بيع ضعفين أكثر من تلك الجملة، فالحاج حسن يتسائل عن هذا النظام، واتخذ خطة حازمة في عدم بيع أرزه إلى الحكومة. فهذه الخطة أدت إلى توتر بينه وبين الموظفين من أبناء البلاد المحليين، وأخيرا اتخذت الحكومة الهولندية خطة شديدة عن طريق الهجوم.

سلسلة من إجراءات حدثت في هذه الحادثة في فترة وجيزة ولكن عند التأمل عن جذر المسألة، فهذه الحادثة إنما تصور تشابكا بين مختلف المنازعات التي حدثت قبلها. ومن الناحية الاقتصادية فالحاج حسن داخل في زمرة المتيسرين، إنه يملك أرضا واسعة بالقياس على زراع القرية، ويملك كذلك مساعي أخرى مثلا تربية الأحصنة ومزرعة الأسماك. إذا حصى كل ممتلكاته، فإن نظام بيع الأرز لا يؤثر كثيرا على استمرارية حياته الاقتصادية. مع ذلك، فإن الأهمية الاقتصادية لم تكن إلا أحد جوانب حادثة تشيمارمي هذه.

إن أزمة الحاج حسن مع الموظفين المحليين من أبناء البلاد تعتبر جانبا آخر من الأزمات كلها، والحاج حسن -من أساسه- يتولى مركزا اجتماعيا مساويا لهؤلاء الموظفين المحليين من أبناء البلاد، فكل منهما من عليا القرية، إذ كل منهما يملك نفوذا واسعا لدى الشعب، ولكن الفرق من حيث الزعامة الدينية فإن الحاج حسن لا يتحصل على الاعتراف الرسمي من الحكومة، فالتنازع بين الطرفين

المذكورين فى نفوذ الزعامة ظهر على شكل نزاع بين الحاج حسن وشيخ بلد تشيكندل (Cikendal) ورئيس بلدية ليليس (Leles).

منذ شبابه، كان الحاج حسن -فى الحق- يظهر خطته المتطرفة، كورث سلالة استقرائية وعالم، فمنذ شبابه قد تورط فى عداوة مع الموظفين الهولنديين وقد أرسله والده إلى معهد دينى ورجا أن يتمكن من حل مكانه كعالم، ولكن أثناء وفاة والده، الحاج حسن فى الظاهر لم يتجذب للوظيفة التى كلف بها كزعيم دينى، وإنما هو أكثر ميولا للتعمق فى العلوم الروحانية وعلمها لطلاب المعاهد الإسلامية والمجتمع المحلى، وهو كذلك جند الزراع بتأسيس منظمة بكرة القدم الحية بروح الحرية.

عن طريق هذه الأنشطة، فالحاج حسن ظهر فى صورة زعيم ذى نفوذ، وكزعيم لمعهد دينى قد حصل على تأييد شعبى واعتراف دينى، فهذه الحالة انعكست أثناء استعماله لكلمة "الجهاد" فى الوقت الذى قام بمواجهة الحكومة الهولندية. وأكثر من ذلك، إنه عن طريق ثروته وصل نفوذه إلى التأثير على الزراع الذين يعملون على حسابه. وبناء على تأييد هؤلاء الزراع وبمقتضى وصفه هذا استطاع الحاج حسن على القيام فى مواجهة الاستعمار الهولندى وإن كان قد انتهى بانهزاه.

فحادثة تشيمارىمى لا أكثر من أنها إحدى الحوادث من سلسلة الحوادث الأخرى التى حدثت قبلها. فى أوائل القرن العشرين مثلاً، قد سجلت بعض حوادث مشابهة التى انفجرت حوالى مناطق جاوة الغربية، فإذا، لم يكن مبالغاً إذا قلنا إن هذه الحادثة تعتبر صورة عن الحالة السياسية الاجتماعية لمجتمع جاوة على وجه العموم.

This article attempts to analyze the resistance of Haji Hasan against the Dutch colonial government in 1919. The event itself is known as the Cimareme tragedy, as this movement was launched in a small enclave, Cimareme, in which Hasan resided. Cimareme was located in the village of Cikendal, Leles sub-district, Garut district, Priangan residence, West Java.¹ Cimareme is now located in the village of Sukasari, Banyuresmi sub-district, Garut district, West Java province. The roots of the incidence were mainly triggered by Hasan's conflict with local officers of the *lurah* (village head) of Cikendal and the *wedana* (sub-district head) of Leles, concerning the implementation of the government's policy on rice buying. This policy was made by the colonial government as a step to prevent famine due to harvest failures during 1918. The Cimareme tragedy started in April 1919 and reached its climax on 7 July 1919, when a fully armed squad of police and army shot dead Hasan and his followers. The tragedy occurred relatively quickly, but its implications were far-reaching. It appears that the impact of the tragedy was influential in the indigenous society as well as on the colonial government itself. On this basis, the Cimareme tragedy deserves an in-depth historical evaluation.

Java at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century was very much colored by various indigenous unrests, rebellions and resistances against the colonial power. Although some of these took the form of religious or political movements, almost all of them appeared to respond to the unjust social situation². Peasant rebellion, for instance, was basically economic, but it surfaced in terms of religious conflict. Historical records show that, prior to the Cimareme tragedy, similar rebellions had already taken place in West Java, such as in Ciomas in 1886, Cilegon in 1888 and Gedangan in 1904.³ Many themes had been elaborated in these movements, including protests against government policies of high taxation, excessive levies and forced labor mobilization.

The outburst of movements generally displayed distinctive characteristics concerning their leadership patterns, organizational forms and ideological characters. Peasant movements, for instance, are usually classified as archaic because of their simple organization, programs and tactics. Their ideology is revealed by certain eschatological views which manifest themselves in terms of milleniarism, messianism, nativism, holy war and revivalism.⁴ Each ideology often directly reflects the main goal of the movement. Milleniarism assumes the com-

ing of a golden age to replace social injustices, unrests, conflicts and miseries. Almost in parallel, messianism expects the coming of a *ratu adil*, “just king” or messiah, who is going to create a sound and prosperous society. Some social movements tend to be nativistic in character: reviving indigenous values and rejecting all foreign influences. Within the religious sphere such an idea is reflected in terms of revivalism which attempts to revive old values and religious piety within the present situation. To some extent, the idea of *perang sabil* (holy war) strengthens the effectivity of these ideologies. Taking measures towards the colonial government is not only construed as an economic principle, but also a religious calling of fighting against the *kafir* (infidels).⁵ To a large extent, Haj Hasan’s resistance falls into this latter category.

The tragedy of Cimareme is also called the Cimareme affair (Peristiwa Cimareme) or the Garut affair, as contained in the reports and documents of the Dutch Indies colonial government. As a social movement, it is interesting to analyze it from a historical point of view. To date the affair has not been analytically dealt with, even though it has been mentioned in passing in some historical writings. The multiple dimensions of the Cimareme tragedy deserves a specific investigation in order to gain a sufficient impression of the affair.

The Regulation on Rice Buying

The early seeds of the Cimareme tragedy basically originated from a food policy determined by the colonial government in Bandung, West Java, on 17 March 1919. Among the responsible parties involved in this policy were the Director of Farming, S. Mulder, the Resident of Priangan, farming experts and members of the Food Stock Commission.⁶ They investigated the possibility of making a government decision in response to the decreasing stock of rice and to prevent the risk of starvation. In order to meet the demand for rice and the distribution of paddy rice, especially to those outside Java, the meeting decided to mobilize rice buying from farmers.⁷

In relation to this decision, on 26 March 1919 the head of the Priangan Residence sent a circular to all Resident assistants about the regulation of rice buying. The circular constituted an order to quickly mobilize rice buying in their respective areas.⁸ Resident assistants forwarded the order to the *bupatis* (district heads) to be passed to the *wedanas*, while the latter directly mobilized the farmers through the *lurahs* of all areas. The amount of rice to be bought was based on the

amount of farm land possessed by each individual farmer. In general a farmer had to sell one *pikul*⁹ of paddy rice from each *bau*¹⁰ of farm land that he possessed. Yet, those who possessed fertile wet-rice land had to sell a maximum of three *pikul* from each *bau*, compared to one *pikul* and a maximum of one and half *pikul* for one *bau* of less fertile land.

This regulation was valid for all areas, except for the farmers in the Garut district. Garut farmers, including Cimareme, had to sell their rice on quantities of at least four *pikul* from each *bau* of land, provided that they owned five *bau* or more. Only for those who possessed less than half a *bau*, was the rule on rice purchasing abandoned. The government price for each *pikul* was 4.5 guilders, which was to be paid in cash. Compared to the average price in the common market, the government price was lower. The market price was between 4 - 6 guilders per *pikul* in Cikalongkulon and Ciamis; 6 - 8 guilders in Cirebon and Majalengka;¹¹ and 7.5 guilders in the markets of Priangan Residence.¹²

The transaction was to be conducted in public centers, such as village offices, sub-districts, districts, train stations or rice-mills. To implement the regulation, the government created a special committee for rice buying down to the village level. The *wedana* had to present a list of the amount of rice to be bought ten days before the beginning of a new month, while the *lurah* had to submit such a list bi-monthly. The transport costs from the fields to the transaction sites were the farmers' own responsibility. If they failed to convey the rice, they had to sell it to the surrounding markets or shops.

In spite of this purchasing, rice stock was also accumulated by confiscation. Each family was only allowed to retain a maximum of three *pikul* of rice. The government would confiscate rice from those who stored rice more than this amount and fined them 100 guilders.¹³ Traders who retained more rice than the allowed amount were also fined. The government accelerated the process of accumulation and distribution through the allocation of 5,000 guilders for each sub-district.¹⁴ This was the government policy on food stock made between 1918-1919.

To implement the regulation, the *wedana* of Leles made an order to all farmers in his area to sell the required amount of rice to the government. To everyone's surprise, no farmers made any complaints, except Haji Hasan who gave the *wedana* and *lurah* of Cikendal a hard time. Hasan refused to receive the down-payment for 40 *pikul* of paddy

rice from his 10 *bau* of land, instead replying that he was only willing to sell 10 *pikul*. Hasan's response made these officers furious, and they threatened to take the case to the higher level of government officers. They also threatened Hasan with bringing an army squad for the confiscation of all his wealth. Unfortunately, this threat did not make Hasan step back and, ironically, he became more determined to hold onto his principles.

Having realized that the local officers had refused his proposal, Hasan sent a letter to the resident assistant on 24 April 1919. He asked the assistant to reconsider the amount of rice to be sold in Cimareme given that other areas applied such a different and more moderate regulation. He also questioned whether the regulation, which was applied in Cimareme and the penalty for rejecting it, as mentioned by local officers, were really government policy. He explained that his willingness to sell only 10 *pikul* was because all 84 members of his family were completely dependent on this land. At this time he experienced harvest failures while at the same time the rice plants were often infected by diseases. In such a situation, his land could not fully support the huge demands of his family.¹⁵

Hasan's proposal was only conveyed to the resident assistant on 10 May 1919. The assistant himself still persisted with the regulation and turned down Hasan's request. He then ordered the *wedana* of Leles to convey this decision,¹⁶ although the latter did not dare to face Hasan directly.¹⁷ Meanwhile, Hasan was waiting anxiously for the reply. He asked his son-in-law, Haji Rasadi, and his neighbor, Haji Kadir, to come before the *lurah* and the *wedana* in May 1919. They failed to get the required information, because the two officers only expressed their anger. This situation brought about more concern for Hasan that the threat of the *wedana* was going to be executed. Thus, he sent his other son-in-law, Haji Maksuri, to the resident assistant in Garut to ask for the response to his proposal. It was unfortunate that Maksuri failed to meet the resident assistant as the latter was not available.

In the meantime the *wedana* received information from his secretary that Hasan had not changed his opinion. He also heard that Hasan had already mobilized his followers and accumulated weapons to fight against the government which would confiscate his rice.¹⁸ Therefore, he sent a letter on 25 June 1919 to the *bupati* of Garut confirming this information.¹⁹ According to the *bupati*, as mentioned in his letter to the resident assistant, such a dissident deserved harsh

punishment.²⁰ Based on this report, on 3 July 1919 the assistant resident decided to arrest Hasan the next day, using the support of a police squad from Tasikmalaya.

In the absence of a reply, Hasan again sent a letter to the resident assistant on 4 July 1919. He expressed his admiration and submission to all government officers, including the *wedana* and *lurah*, who were going to seize his wealth.²¹ Regardless of this expression, he had basically prepared himself to face all possible action from the government. His followers began to wear amulets which were believed to increase their bravery and to protect their bodies against weapons. Hasan also distributed white fabric to function as a war uniform and coffin to be used for the burial ceremony if anyone died in the struggle. The deceased's body would not necessarily be covered by a new coffin as this costume was also to function as a coffin. Each person received six meters of fabric to be made into a long shirt called a *jubah* (coat).²² Coincidentally, this event occurred in the month of Ramadan, in which Muslim communities focused their attention on spiritual activities. Such a moment was very conducive to firing up the Muslims in the spirit of anti-*kafir* as well as for the dissemination of the idea of perang sabil. Religious gatherings, such as night prayers (*taraweh*) during the month of Ramadân, became effective moments to express the grudges of the masses.²³

The *bupati*, the resident assistant, the controller and 20 armed police officers finally went to Cimareme to meet Hasan on Friday 4 July 1919. On behalf of the government, the *bupati* explained in length the intention of the government in making the regulation on rice buying. Hasan was quite surprised as the way the *bupati* explained the problem was different from the *wedana's* attitude. He used this opportunity to express his aversion to the *wedana*, whom he called Si Jendil (lit. moles on eyelid), instead of his real name.²⁴ He uncovered the attitude of the *wedana* before the officers, while explaining the reason for his rejection of the regulation. Unfortunately, Hasan's request was not reconsidered, these officers rejected it outright.

The two parties did not reach a satisfactory deal. The officers were of the opinion that they could not give any privileges to Hasan, since all farmers obeyed the government order.²⁵ At the same time, the resident assistant felt that he had had a bad time during the meeting: he was overwhelmed by the presence of a crowd around Hasan's house. The fact was that the meeting coincided with Friday prayers, in which Muslims gather together to conduct a communal service.

Some people wore long shirts which are usually worn in other Islamic religious rituals. Such a phenomenon, however, gave the impression to the resident assistance that Hasan was ready to fight against the existing government. This meeting took place in a very tense atmosphere, even though it did not involve any violent acts. All the government officers agreed to postpone Hasan's arrest, giving him an opportunity to reevaluate his opinion during the next three days.

In the following days, a rumor was circulated in Cimareme that the government had made an apology to Hasan. This presumably might have been an unexpected consequence of the postponed arrest. Belief in the potent power of amulets, for instance, increased as the government was regarded as having retreated. Three days was sufficient to turn the people's anxiety into the potential power of radicalism. However, on 6 July 1919, the *bupati* sent a letter to the resident assistant, telling him that there were some bad indications in Hasan's resistance: a crowd of people in white shirts had proclaimed a holy war in Hasan's house. As a consequence, the resident assistant requested the resident to ask for military back up to the army commander in Cimahi, Bandung. Forty soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Hillen and 30 police officers under Commander Raes finally went to Garut on Sunday 6 July 1919 to support the government operation the following day.²⁶

The operation of Hasan's detention was conducted on 7 July 1919. The delegation of indigenous officers was divided into two parties. The first group consisted of the vice *bupati*, the *wedanas* of Bungbulang and Tarogong, the *penghulu* (head of religious affairs) of Garut and two police agents. The second group consisted of the vice *penghulu*, a Garut religious adviser, the *wedanas* of Kadungora and Nangkaruka, six police agents and two government trusted-*hajjis*.²⁷ This delegation, which was supported by a police squad under Commander Raes, arrived in Cimareme before the delegation of the Priangan resident, which was backed up by the soldiers under the command of Major Van der Bie.

As they arrived in Cimareme, the vice *bupati* ordered Hasan out of his house. Hasan went out to the yard followed by Gadjali and 13 other people. There were about 40 people in the yard, all of them wearing long white shirts and carrying traditional weapons such as axes, daggers and curved blades, while no one was found to be hiding rifles.²⁸ The vice *bupati* started to speak to Hasan politely and asked him to come along with him to the town of Garut to resolve his

problem. Hasan replied that he and his followers would not surrender to the government. While the vice *bupati* continued to try to convince Hasan, officer Darga tried to grab a weapon carried by one of Hasan's followers. The people around the place automatically raised up ready to fight. It was quite fortunate that the vice *bupati* could handle the situation. He ordered them to enter the house and take off their white clothes, but only some of them obeyed him.²⁹

Vice *bupati* continued to speak to Hasan and his followers. However, they replied that they were about to undertake a holy war, because the *wedana* of Leles wanted to confiscate their wealth. As the dialogue between the two parties was going on, the resident of Priangan delegation arrived at the site. They entered Hasan's yard, except for the soldiers who waited in the nearby village street.³⁰ At this moment the crowd increased to about 1,000-1,500 people, but no one was seen carrying weapons.³¹ The resident asked the *bupati* to question the intention of Hasan's confrontation. Again, Hasan did not say a word. He left the place and entered the house followed by all the people, except Gadjali, who was detained by an officer. He closed all the doors and windows and started to chant *dhiker* (remembrance of God) from inside the house. The Bupati made a last-ditch attempt to ask Hasan to come out of the house. He even used Gadjali to deliver the message three times. Hasan only came out of the house once, but he said nothing and quickly returned inside. All the windows and doors were tightly locked.³²

Hasan and his followers chanted *dhiker* together amidst the shouts of orders to come out of the house. Major Van der Bie was of the opinion that the greater amount of time given, the worse the safety of the officers might become. Chanting voices were getting higher and higher. Finally, the resident ordered the commander to arrest them by any means necessary, including, if required, the use of firearms.³³ As a warning, the police shot their guns over the roof of the house. The *dhiker* chant continued in higher tones, without caring about the order yelled by the *bupati*. The second shots were then executed, but there was still no reply from the house except the sound of the *dhiker* chant. The third round of shots were then directed towards the house several times. The chanting stopped and all was still. A view seconds afterwards, people heard children and women's cries.³⁴ The last shots were ordered to be directed at the doors and windows of the house, which were believed to be the sites of hiding.

The resident then ordered the soldiers and police to break into the house by force. Women and children were asked to leave the house, but no one obeyed the order. Only after Major Van der Bie and his squad, together with the police entered the house, were all the unwounded people forced to leave. According to the government reports, there were only four dead, including Hasan, and 20 people were wounded. All the victims were found to be holding daggers and amulets to their bodies. Hasan himself was shot precisely in the head, in which his amulet was located.³⁵ However, other sources maintained that the number of victims was seven: Hasan, Bakar, Intasim, Sukanta, Engko, Udin and Saedi. Bakar's body was taken away by the soldiers and his burial site is not known to this day.³⁶ The government reported that they detained 25 people; meanwhile Cimareme people said that the total number was 36, of which 33 were jailed and 3 were released.³⁷

Pribumi, Guntai and Batur

Seen simply, the tragedy of Hasan and his followers was an economic and local problem. On the one hand, the colonial government wanted the farmers to sell their paddy rice and Hasan suffered from this policy. However, it seems that the Cimareme tragedy was not only about economic and local quests. After the outburst, indigenous people in this area did not stay away. Attempts to launch rebellions against the government intensified. The model of the movement was no longer archaic, adopting traditional channels, but instead adopted more sophisticated organization. The Afdeling B movement, for instance, which was identified by the government in the aftermath of the tragedy, organized its actions through carefully controlled secret communications. The scope of the movement stretched to all areas of West Java. The government itself was curious as to whether Hasan had been involved in this movement. This assumption was based on evidence that some of Hasan's followers were in fact involved in the Afdeling B movement. However, no historical records show that Hasan was involved in this secret organization.

The sequence of the Cimareme tragedy did not cease with the death of Hasan and his close followers. The Volksraad (the People's Representative) paid full attention to these bloody affairs. Nationwide newspapers focused their reports on the Cimareme tragedy for several days. As a result, the government doggedly created a fact-finding team, led by P. de Roo de la Faille, to investigate the proce-

dural requirements of Hasan's execution.³⁸ The team was sent to the field to collect data on the tragedy. The government also sent Dr. G.A.J. Hazeu, a government adviser for the indigenous and Arab affairs, to investigate the religious and political impacts of the same tragedy. Reports by de la Faille affirmed the procedures of the government action, while Hazeu's report noted contradictory findings. These two different reports triggered heated debates at the national level. However, the government eventually, indirectly admitted the truth of Hazeu's report, by sanctioning some local officers who were regarded to have been responsible for the tragedy. Within this context, the aftermath of the Cimareme tragedy went beyond its locality as it became a nation-wide concern.

Historical records show that there had been ongoing misery among the indigenous people. Some resentment had erupted in West Java before the Cimareme tragedy indicated this social situation. Harvest failures during 1918 had resulted in severe economic conditions for the Priangan people. The long drought and late rainy season had brought about crop delays of up to one and half months by the end of the year. This economic crisis had in turn raised social anxiety and the frantic situation of worrying about the possibility of famine. Therefore, the government obliged the farmers to sell their paddy rice in specific amounts to meet the demand. However, the case of Cimareme, where the obligation was heavier than in other areas, made the situation unbearably depressing.

A broader impression of the people's economic situation can be seen from the food stocks of Javanese society in general. Rice consumption in nineteenth century Java had risen in conjunction with the growth of the population. As a result, rice production could not fulfil all the demands. The Javanese population grew from 28,121,000 to 34,433,476 between the years of 1900 and 1920,³⁹ while there was no significant increase in rice production. On average rice production was only 79,880,000 pikul per year at that time.⁴⁰ This meant that each individual received only 146,3 kilos of rice per year. At the same time, legumes and tubers only provided 30 and 33 kilos respectively for each individual.⁴¹

As a consequence of this high population growth, farmers had to intensify their usage of land. Intensification included, on the one hand, the use of extensive labor in the process of production and the multiplication of planting at the same sites. Planting rice, for instance, was conducted twice, instead of once, a year.⁴² Such land usage led to

unexpected consequences: retardation of fertility, decreasing crops, increasing plant diseases, which together were the main cause of harvest failures since the nineteenth century. After 1900, rice production could not match the population growth, even though the number of wet-land farms increased during 1870-1900 as a result of the national irrigation program.

In order to overcome the food shortage, the colonial government had actually imported rice from neighboring countries such as Burma, Thailand or Indo China since 1870. Unfortunately, during 1891-1892 harvest failures had swept all areas of North Asia. The same fate occurred again between 1916 and 1919, which led to the worsening economic situation in Indonesia. Apart from harvest failures, there were also some important factors that made the situation even harder. Firstly, sea transport was difficult due to the limited number of ships. This was, in part, a consequence of the outbreak of the World War I. Secondly, almost all nations in Southeast Asia were subject to regulations banning rice exports. As Indonesians were dependent on exported rice, they were the ones who suffered the most.⁴³ They could not turn to local production since it could not support the increasing demand.

Food shortage occurred again in 1918, when the government could not handle this problem satisfactorily. Unrest about famine spread widely among society at all levels. In particular in Garut, no rice was available in the free markets; people had to obtain it from the government office headquarters.⁴⁴ In this matter, the *bupati* acted as a rice trader. Even so, the people still often faced difficulties getting food supplies; the government was not always able to provide rice for the people's demands.⁴⁵

Proponents of socio-political organizations severely criticized the inability of the government in handling the food problem. The head of Sarekat Islam (SI), Tjokroaminoto, and his fellows met the Governor General in Bogor in 1918 to request that the government reduced sugar cane plant and increased paddy rice farming.⁴⁶ The area of sugar cane planting in Java was about 210,000 *bau*, some of which was utilizing wet-rice irrigated land.⁴⁷ Prioritizing sugar cane planting, instead of paddy rice, was to become one of the causes of food shortages. Meanwhile, the government's policy on the intensification of legume and tuber planting, in order to diversify food demands, failed to overcome the shortage.⁴⁸ The average shortage of rice between 1914 and 1917 was about 400,000 tons or 13 per cent of the

total rice production in Java.⁴⁹ Unfortunately, the proposal of reducing sugar cane plants by up to 50 per cent was not implemented, the Governor General instead applied a 25 per cent reduction. Ironically, this agreement was still opposed by the capitalists' circle. At the same time, the motion of reducing sugar plants as proposed by Radicale Concentratie through its representatives in the Volksraad in February 1919 failed, being supported by only 10 votes, while 20 votes opposed it.⁵⁰

In general the Priangan people had good economic conditions. They did not face significant difficulties in making money, whether by utilizing their own lands or being laborers in commercial agricultural enterprises. The total number of plantations in Priangan was 1,440 while in Garut itself it was 182. Most of these enterprises were tea, quinine and rubber planting, not to mention cocoa, cotton, coconut, pepper and coffee.⁵¹ However, small farmers often suffered from economic crises and were compelled to sell their paddy rice before the crop was due. This means of selling was called *ijon* (lit. green), while the buyer was called *tukang borong* or *tukang pak*.⁵² The government tried to solve this problem by providing small-scale credit for the farmers, but this went beyond expectations.

Among the crucial problems of Priangan society were land ownership and the means of exploitation. Land was mostly owned as private property; some of it was owned by virtue of *turunan* (inheritance), and some of it was by *yasabanda* (purchase). Selling inherited land was not common since Sundanese people were proud of their land property. One of the social factors in Priangan society was that certain official village positions were inherited. Instead of a salary, the village officers were entitled to a piece of land during their official terms. This meant that this kind of land eventually became the family's property. Therefore, excessive land ownership in Priangan became a crucial problem among the farmers.⁵³ The government was not able to prevent such ownership. Many indigenous officers became landlords; they bought land when they still held certain official positions and they invested it for pension reserves. They usually rented out their lands at quite high prices, which caused small farmers to suffer from minimal produce.⁵⁴

Modest ownership of land was between three to four *baus*. Land utilization was usually through renting, crop-sharing or employing laborers. The rent system using paddy as the means of exchange was called *nnglanjak*, while that using money was *nyewa*. This system was

only applied to wet-rice field renting, not to dry land or plantations.⁵⁵ The more common system of land production was crop-sharing, which was applied to all kinds of land. Meanwhile, some landlords also utilized paid laborers, mostly landless or small farmers, to work their land.

The relationship between a landlord and his laborer was relatively permanent, resembling a patron-client relationship. If both parties received half of the total crop, the system was called *neungabkeun* or *mamaro*. Land tax was generally the landlords' responsibility, while the cost of production was shared by the laborer (*panyarwah*). Another system, called *mertelu*, *pertiga* or *jujuran*, maintained that crop and production cost were to be divided on the basis of two thirds for the owner and one third for the laborer. Meanwhile, the *ceblok* system determined that the owner received four-fifths, while the laborer acquired one fifth of the crop. Tax and seeds were provided by the owner, while the laborer was free to utilize the empty space between the main plants, e.g. for fish ponds. However, the most popular system of crop sharing in Priangan society was *mamaro*. In 1900, tax and production costs generally became the laborer's responsibility.

Paid laborers usually prepared the ground for cultivation, did the plowing, hoeing and fitting of irrigation. Rice planting and harvesting were mainly done by the women. They worked in the fields from 6:30 a.m to 10:00 a.m with a salary of 0.20 - 0.30 guilders. Women laborers were considered as equivalent to only one third of men's services.⁵⁶ They also only received a fifth to a third of the total paddy which they picked in the harvest.

These kinds of land production directly influenced the process of social stratification. The two general tendencies of the Priangan social stratum were: village elites and lower stratum, which consisted of small-scale farmers, paid laborers and so forth. Social stratification was mainly based on land possession,⁵⁷ as is common to agrarian societies, in which land functioned as a crucial resource. This was apparent in the three detailed categories of Priangan society: indigenous, newcomers and lodgers (*num pang*). Indigenous people were called *pribumi*, *jalma bumi*, *bumen wantok*, *kuren tani* or *tani cekel*. They were the core citizens, the forefathers of whom were the village founders, and they inherited land and houses. As village members, they were subjected to government regulations and had full rights and duties, such as paying tax or contributing unpaid services to the state. In general, the indigenous people became the backbone of the

peasant economy and emerged as the elite stratum among the villagers. Meanwhile, the newcomers were commonly called as *bumen*, *guntai* or *tatah wadung*. People of this category only possessed a piece of land or a house, not both. The third category was lodgers, which the Sundanese called *wwwungan* or *batur*. They originated from poor families who gained a living from the *juragan* (indigenous) as compensation for the services they provided.

Based on such an ownership system, Priangan society recognized the term *tani sentana* which was attributed to wealthy peasants who owned huge amounts of land. Various village leadership positions, such as village head, secretary or common officers, were usually held by people from this category. Hajjis and *kyais*—both revered as religious figures—also fell into this category. They were called the *ajengan* stratum who, based on their religious positions, enjoyed particular respect from the community and were regarded as charismatic leaders. They were rich and their wealth was often more abundant than the wealth of a village head.⁵⁸ They had a close relationship with the common peasants and were not restricted to religious matters. *Ajengan* often lent money or paddy seeds to the poor peasants, and in return they received rice at the time of harvest. Such a relationship caused the common peasants to be very loyal to the *ajengan* and to view the latter as having charismatic authority. As rich people, *tani sentana* also became the source of help for most poor peasants, especially at the time of famine. Therefore, both *tani sentana* and *ajengan* people held responsibility for providing living expenses for other people besides their own families. Meanwhile, their families were generally extended, in which the members of the family were not confined to the nuclear members but also included more distant relatives.

The lowest category of the village social strata was landless or homeless people. Some of them built houses on the land of other people, especially rich farmers, or lodged with rich families. In exchange, they gave their services as maids or paid laborers working on their employer's land. As paid laborers, usually called *panyawah* or *pangebon*, they were only requested to provide services as the main capital. Most of them stayed in the houses of rich farmers who guaranteed all their living expenses. The main task of these people was to work in farming areas with payment of 25 *gedheng* rice per year for the unskilled and 150 *gedheng* for skilled labor.⁵⁹ As well as farming, they also had to help their masters with various household duties. Within this context, the landlords appeared to be patrons who had

all pervasive influence over the *panyawah*. At the same time, the latter had a very close personal relationship with the former as manifested in the degree of their loyalty.

Based on this kind of social stratification, small-scale farmers and paid laborers were the ones who suffered most from the economic situation at that time. *Tani sentana* and *ajengan*, who possessed relatively large amounts of land, could easily overcome harvest failures. Most of them retained sufficient stocks of either rice or cash. The number of *tani sentana* was certainly much lower than the number of paid laborers or small peasants.

There were at least three factors which caused small peasants to suffer the most. They did not gain valuable amounts of crop because of their limited land; their land contributed almost nothing at the time of harvest failure; and, their dependence on the *tani sentana* did not result in sufficient income, since, in such a situation, the latter preferred to meet their own needs. As a result, people were susceptible to negative feelings, such as anxiety, uncertainty and alienation. Moreover, the colonial government itself could do nothing to sort out this very fundamental problem. Such a social fragility would indeed lead to conditions, in which fanaticism and radicalism would easily emerge. Within such a situation, the presence of a central figure could accelerate the explosion of the whim of the masses. Hence, it is apparent that such a socio-economic condition might endorse Haji Hasan's leadership and the ideology of *perang sabil*.

Ajengan and Formal Leaders

Haji Hasan himself was in the high social stratum. He was the son of Kyai Tubagus Alpani, the head of the *pesantren* (Islamic traditional school) in Cimareme. His mother, Jamilah, was the daughter of Raden Kartaningrat. The mother of Kartaningrat was Gan Ahiyem, while his father was a *dalem* or a *bupati* in Garut. Gan Ahiyem asked for a divorce and then resided in Cimareme instead of accepting her husband taking a second wife. She sent Kartaningrat to Shaykh Haji Abdul Mukhyi of Pamijahan, Tasikmalaya, to undertake religious studies.⁶⁰ Having succeeded in his studies, Kartaningrat became a *kyai*, a prominent religious intellectual, and his master renamed him Kartanuddin. He then returned to Cimareme and set up a *pesantren*, in which he himself was the master. The genealogical tree of Hasan's father indicated that he was a descendant of the nobility of the Banten Sultanate. He originated from Banten in the western tip of Java, then

travelled to Priangan land and married a Cimareme woman. Therefore, Hasan was a descendant of admirable persons from both sides of his ancestors. He was heir to the blood of nobility as well as 'ulamâ', which thus placed him in a high social stratification rank.

Hasan's early education was as a *santri* (student of the *pesantren*) at his father's own *pesantren*. When he reached 15 years of age, he proceeded to a more advanced *pesantren* in Pamijahan, Karangnunggal, Tasikmalaya. Having stayed in this school for five years, his father asked him to return to Cimareme, even though he was still willing to stay for a couple of years longer. He was prepared to lead the *pesantren*, replacing his father, who was getting on in his years. Hasan was accompanied by Haji Nur, a close companion of his father, in running the *pesantren*. When his father died, the *pesantren*'s activities passed to the hands of Haji Nur, because Hasan himself paid greater attention to deepening his knowledge about mysticism and magic.⁶¹

Hasan taught this knowledge to the students of the Cimareme *pesantren*. Apart from this, the students were also trained in the skill of martial arts by his close friend, Haji Makbul of Rancabango. These skills and knowledge were also compulsory for all members of his family. To organize this activity, Hasan set up a new organization called Pencak Silat Gerak Cepat (lit. High Response Martial Art). The organization was led by Haji Gadjali of Cikajang and Haji Sobandi of Rancabango, who later became Hasan's sons-in-law. The popularity of the Cimareme *pesantren* was evident, since the number of students was more than a thousand in 1912. They came not only from the surrounding areas of the Garut district, but also from other areas in Java. Hasan appeared not only to insist on the significance of religious knowledge, but also the meaning of physical defense. On this basis of this frame of thought, Hasan also introduced another organization, Kumpulan Voetbal Merdeka Tani (lit. Free Peasants' Football Association), which was devoted to his fellow villagers.

These organizations became effective instruments for the dissemination of the influence of the Cimareme *pesantren*.⁶² Hasan's position was growing stronger as the number of his followers was increasing all the time. They provided a source of legitimation for Hasan's leadership and social mobilization for the proposed activities. In fact, the *pesantren* community not only provided social support, but, through religious language, also strengthened the position of Hasan's leadership. This was proven by the effectiveness of the

ideology of *perang sabil* in the fanatic attitude of Hasan's followers in the Cimareme tragedy. They did not regard their conflict against the colonial government as merely economic or political in character, but also religious. In other words, their militant attitude was more to do with religious sentiment than economic disappointment or political friction.

Haji Hasan had expressed his hatred of the Dutch colonial government since he was young. His father was always insistent on avoiding any kind of cooperation with the colonials. Hasan himself became involved in a conflict with a Dutch controller, when the Cimareme people were forced to work for the government, building a road between Sindanglangon and Cibudug. He was irritated by the rude attitude of the controller towards the indigenous citizens. On another occasion, he also rejected the government's offer of a position as a formal religious leader in the local office.⁶³ Such a rude response was very unlikely from lay people. Those who were economically and politically dependent upon the government would at least have made certain compromises. However, Hasan, with the social support that he had, whether on the basis of his traditional status or his leadership capability, could state his rejection and resistance towards the powerful colonial government.

Apart from his position as a member of the elite and a religious leader, Hasan also had pervasive influence over the people who worked on his lands.⁶⁴ He was a member of Goena Perlaja, a revolutionary movement, led by Kyai Abdullah of Tegalgubuk, Cirebon. This organization was assumed to have a close relationship with some proponents of radical political and social movements, such as Surjopranoto of the Adhi Darma organization, Semaun of ISDV[], Alimin and Abdul Muis of the Batavia branch of Syarikat Islam (SI—Islamic Association).⁶⁵ It is understandable then if the colonial government was suspicious of Hasan's influence over the indigenous people.

In economic terms, Hasan was well off. His land was abundant, more than ten *baus*, which was planted with paddy rice and tobacco. Such a huge amount of land could produce 250 *pikul* of paddy rice or more than 15 tons each harvest. His tobacco, "Bako Cimareme" (Cimareme tobacco), was known to be of high quality. Meanwhile, Hasan was also well-known as a talented horse farmer. The *bupati* of Garut, R.A.A. Wiratanudatar (1871-1916), often bought tobacco and horses from Hasan's farm. This farming business caused Hasan to

became a close friend of Dr. Hubenet, a veterinarian, from Bandung, West Java. Hasan's friendship with Hubenet was because of his farming, although the horses themselves were a source of prestige. Apart from horses, Hasan also owned a fishery which resulted in a large harvest every six months. Last but not least, he also owned a coconut plantation of more than 500 trees which provided him with very significant income. This enormous amount of wealth must have affirmed Hasan's leadership. In other words, Hasan's property could easily ensure the loyalty of his followers in the implementation of his progressive ideas.

The government regulation on rice compelled Hasan to sell about 40 *pikul* or 2.4 tons of his paddy rice. Although he understood the government's intention in issuing such a regulation, he still felt burdened by the amount of paddy rice that he had to surrender. The main reason for his objection was that, though he was wealthy, he felt responsible for financing the 84 members of his family. He also had to provide for the economic demands of his laborers who planted his fields. Therefore, he was only able to sell about ten *pikul* of rice to the government. He felt that this amount was modest and in line with the government regulation that was applied in other areas.

The obligation of selling paddy rice in such a bad economic situation automatically threatened the peasants' life, because of the decreasing rice production. In response, Hasan, as a charismatic leader, felt responsible for ensuring the survival of his community. The situation became more complicated when the *wedana* of Leles threatened to seize Hasan's property, which was in fact not basic government policy, should he resist the government regulation. Such a rude attitude made Hasan even more stubborn and his followers more militant, which in turn triggered the Cimareme tragedy. The outbreak had already happened, even though the government fired the *wedana* of Leles on the eve of the Cimareme tragedy, 5 July 1919.⁶⁶

The conflict between the people and indigenous officers was not a new issue. This problem arose as a logical consequence of the political polity that existed at that time. Indigenous officers were expected to be able to bridge the relationship between the colonial government and the indigenous people. Such an expectation was, however, difficult to meet, since the aspirations of the people were not always in accordance with government policies and vice versa. Within such a context, the indigenous officers preferred to be on the side of government interests as they were very dependent on the government's

power. This was a common tendency and had been happening for some times so many conflicts did not involve only two parties, the government and indigenous people, but also the third party of the indigenous officers.

The problem became more knotty with the existence of dualism of leadership at the village level. The colonial government officially appointed certain village elite people to posts in the local administrative polity as its representatives. However, not all the elites held these positions, especially those who were higher religious elites or spiritual leaders. In fact, the latter group had a pervasive influence on the people and were closely attached to them as they often created their own community through the establishment of pesantren. They were economically well off and could also be classified as an elite stratum in a broader sense. Their informal pattern of leadership engendered a closer and a more emotional relationship with the lay people, while the formal leaders tended to have a formal relationship. Moreover, the position of formal leadership was based more on government legitimation rather than on recognition by the people. This leadership dualism could, at times, create sharp friction. The Cimareme tragedy exemplified clear evidence of the political friction within the pattern of leadership at the village level.

Closing Notes

The wider context of the Cimareme tragedy reveals the common socio-economic condition of the Javanese people at the beginning of the twentieth century. The economic problems of local people appeared to be an inseparable part of the same problem faced by the Javanese in general. Harvest failures caused by long droughts, epidemic plant diseases and intensification of land use were common phenomena in all areas of Java. It was evident that the problem concerning the basic demands of the people became a common denominator for the increase in social protests. Although protest movements might, in their mature process, might adopt various forms, arguably, economic interest was still the dominant motivation for the crystallization of such events. It was also predictable that economic motives also enabled the success of social mobilization among peasant communities. This was especially so for those who lived at a subsistence level; the peasant community suffered the most. Therefore, within the context of the Cimareme tragedy, the regulation on rice buying was only a trigger in a bad situation that had been ongoing for some time.

Social unrest in the lower social strata was unlikely to be sufficient to result in the emergence of social protest. Within the context of the Cimareme tragedy, for example, the peasants, who suffered the most from the rice regulation, tended to be submissive before government policy. They expressed their aspirations only in terms of support and attention to Hasan's attitude, even though the latter did not experience the same fate as theirs. To a large extent, therefore, Hasan's position became crucial in motivating the realization of such a protest. In economic terms, Hasan could not be classified in the peasant stratum, but his position before the officers made him a peer of this unfortunate community. In the end he not only emerged as the leader of this group but also as a facilitator to express the peasants' aspirations.

Of course Hasan's tough line against the government was also sustained by other factors. As a religious leader, he had good communication with his people through religious language. The idea of *perang sabil*, which then became the main ideology of the movement, strengthened the pervasive influence of Hasan's leadership and, at the same time, affirmed his self-reliance. His position as a traditional elite member also enabled him able to lead the people and to face local officers as well as the colonial officers. There were at least two possible answers to the conflict between Hasan and local officers. Such a conflict could firstly be understood as the result of village elites' rivalry, in which each party had a different source of legitimation. However, this might also merely be a reflection of a wider conflict between the colonized and the colonial, which took its form in local events. Indigenous officers were only the object of the people's loathing of the colonial government. Only their limited sources of power and weapons made them unable to directly face the unbeatable and powerful colonial arms.

Endnotes:

1. For detailed information about the profile of the area, see C. Lekkerkerker, *Aangevende De Nieuwe Administratieve Indeeling Van Java en Madoera* (Amsterdam: J.H. De Busy, 1928), p. 16; also see *Het Nieuws Van Den Dag voor Nederlandsch Indie*, 16 January 1919.
2. See Henry A. Landsberger, "Peasant Unrest: Themes and Variations" in *Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Changes* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1973), pp. 29-33.
3. Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Ratu Adil* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984), p. 30.
4. Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movement in Rural Java* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 8-11.
5. Hasan himself believed that his resistance was a holy war. See Report of De Commissie P. de Roo de la Faille, G.K. Dykstra and Wolterbeek Muller to the governor general, 10/20 July 1919, Mr. 510 X/1919.
6. *Oetoesan Hindia*, 17 and 18 March 1919.
7. *Soeara Rakjat*, 22 February 1919.
8. See the circular sent by resident De Stuers to the assistant resident of Garut, 26 March 1919, Mr. No. 510 X/1919.
9. 1 pikul = 61.76 Kilos.
10. 1 bau = 7096 meter square.
11. *Oetoesan Hindia*, 10 March 1919.
12. *Soerabajaasch Handelsblad*, 14 July 1919.
13. *Soeara Rakjat*, 5 April 1919.
14. The circular, *Op. Cit.*
15. See the letter sent by H. Hasan Arief to the assistant resident of Garut, 24 April 1919, Gedeeltelijk Geheim, Eenige, Tjimareme Stukken a' 1919, H. 474,74, KITLV.
16. Report of the Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken, R.A. Kern, to the governor general, 26 November 1920, Mr. No. 43 X/1921.
17. Report of Dr. G.A.J. Hazeu to the governor general, 29 August 1919, Gedeeltelijk Geheim, Eenige, Tjimareme Stukken a' 1919, H. 474,54, KITLV.
18. *Ibid.*
19. See the letter sent by the *wedana* of Leles, Soeria Natamihardja, to the *bupati* of Garut, 25 June 1919, Mr. No. 510 X/1919.
20. See the letter sent by the *bupati* of Garut to the assistant resident, 2 July 1919, Mr. No. 510 X/1919.
21. See the letter sent by H. Hasan to the resident assistant of Garut, 4 July 1919, Gedeeltelijk Geheim, Eenige, Tjimareme Stukken a' 1919, H. 474, KITLV.
22. Panitia Penulisan Peristiwa Pemberontakan H. Hasan Arief, *Peristiwa Pemberontakan H. Hasan Arief Tahun 1919 di Cimareme*, Garut, p. 18.
23. Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 324.
24. Report of Dr. G.A.J. Hazeu, *Op. Cit.*, H 474,56.
25. Report of De Commissie P. de Roo de la Faille, *Op. Cit.*
26. Report of resident De Stuers to the governor general, 17 July 1919, No. 72/Z.G, Mr. No. 510 X/1919.
27. Information from R. Muh. Djanbi, vice *penghulu* of Garut, 29 August 1919, Gedeeltelijk Geheim, Eenige, Tjimareme Stukken a' 1919/H.474, 72, No. 456, KITLV.
28. Report of resident De Stuers, *Op. Cit.*
29. Report of Dr. G.A.J. Hazeu, *Op. Cit.*, H. 474,60.
30. Report of De Commissie P. de Roo de la Faille, *Op. Cit.*
31. Information from R. Muh. Djanbi, *Op. Cit.*

32. Report of resident De Stuers, *Op. Cit.*
33. Report of De Commissie P. de Roo de la Faille, *Op. Cit.*
34. Information from R. Muh. Djanbi, *Op. Cit.*
35. Report of resident De Stuers, *Op. Cit.*
36. *Padjadjaran*, 12 July 1919. See also the letter written by Nji Eroem, Hasan's wife, on 5 November 1919 in *Algemeene Secretarie Ingekomen*, No. 47388, 8 November 1920.
37. *Algemeene Secretarie Ingekomen*, ANRI, 1921.
38. *Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad*, 15 July 1919.
39. J.C. Breman, *Djawa: Pertumbuhan Penduduk dan Struktur Demografis*, translated by LIPI (Jakarta: Bhratara, 1971), p. 63.
40. P. van Der Elst, "De Crisis in de Padiculture op Java" in *Koloniale Stuijen* (Eerste Deel, 1924), p. 173.
41. Clifford Geertz, *Involusi Pertanian: Proses Perubahan Ekologi di Indonesia*, translated by S.S. Supomo (Jakarta: Bhratara, 1983), p. 101.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Kebijaksanaan Pemerintah Hindia Belanda di Bidang Perekonomian*, a joint project between KITLV and LIPI (Jakarta, 1978), pp. 32-35.
44. *Padjadjaran*, 1 March 1919.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Soeara Rakejat*, 22 February 1919.
47. P. van Der Elst, *Op. Cit.*, p. 171.
48. *Padjadjaran*, 29 March 1919.
49. *Neratja*, 19 March 1919.
50. *Padjadjaran*, 19 March 1919.
51. *Memori Serah Jabatan 1921-1930* (Jawa Barat) (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional RI, 1976), p. 75.
52. "Beantwoording Van De Bij Missive Van Den Gouvernements Secretaris ddo. 3 Maart 1903 No. 731 Gestelde Vraagpunten Nopens Het Landbouwcrediet Voorzoover De Residentie Preanger-Regentschappen Betreft" in *Tijdschrift Voor Het Binnenlandsch Bestuur*, Deel No. 1-6 (Batavia: G. Kolff & Co., 1903), p. 400.
53. C. Van Vollenhoven, *Het Adatrecht Van Nederlandsch Indie* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1931), p. 736.
54. *Memori Serah Jabatan 1921-1930* (Jawa Barat), *Op. Cit.*, p. 84.
55. C. Van Vollenhoven, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 742-747.
56. *Tijdschrift*, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 404-407.
57. Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Pemberontakan Petani Banten 1888*, translated by Hasan Basari (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1984), p. 56.
58. *Tijdschrift*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 406.
59. 25 *gedheng* = 99 - 125 kilos; 150 *gedheng* = 594 - 750 kilos.
60. Panitia Penulisan, *Op. Cit.*, p. 2.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
62. Tatang Sumarsono, *Pemberontakan di Cimavene* (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1986), pp. 13 and 41.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
64. Report of Dr. G.A.J. Hazeu, *Op. Cit.*, H. 474, 51, KITLV.
65. Report of resident De Stuers, *Op. Cit.*, H. 474, 51, KITLV.
66. Report of Dr. G.A.J. Hazeu, *Op. Cit.*, H. 474, 57.

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