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Sufism, Power Politics, and Reform: Al-Rânîrî's Opposition to Hamzah al-Fansûrî's Teachings Reconsidered

Abstraksi: *Pertengahan abad ketujuh belas masyarakat Aceh menyaksikan horor kehidupan sosial-keagamaan yang tidak dapat dibayangkan sebelumnya. Peristiwa tersebut lazim disebut sebagai fatwa pelarangan pengikut ajaran keagamaan yang dinisbatkan pada tokoh besar Hamzah Fansuri. Buku-buku yang dijadikan pegangan pengikut Hamzah dikumpulkan oleh aparat kerajaan, ditumpuk lalu dibakar di depan umum. Para pengikutnya sendiri harus menanggung tindak kekerasan aparat yang berwenang, karena dikejar-kejar dan dipaksa 'bertobat' untuk tidak lagi mengikuti keyakinan yang kemudian dikenal dengan sebutan pengikut aliran Wujûdiyah.*

Peristiwa ini terjadi pada masa pemerintahan Sultan Iskandar Thànî, penerus Sultan Iskandar Muda yang meninggal pada 1636. Adapun perintah untuk mengikis praktek sufi Wujûdiyah sendiri datang dari seorang 'ulamâ' yang berpengaruh saat itu, Nûr al-Dîn al-Rânîrî. Hubungan antara al-Rânîrî dan Sultan Iskandar Thànî sangat dekat; terbukti langkah al-Rânîrî tersebut sepenuhnya didukung Iskandar Thànî. Meskipun demikian, kedekatan antara penguasa dan 'ulamâ' seperti ini tidaklah aneh, karena Raja sebelumnya, Iskandar Muda, juga sangat dekat dengan Hamzah Fansûrî.

Sebagai seorang 'ulamâ' ortodoks yang lebih mementingkan pengamalan syarî'ah, al-Rânîrî tidak dapat menerima praktek keagamaan sufi yang menurut dia bersifat heterodoks. Sikap ini membawanya untuk tidak segan-segan memerangi masyarakat Aceh yang saat itu cenderung pada praktek sufi ini bahkan dengan cara radikal. Ia bertindak lebih jauh, yaitu dengan menhanguskan karya dan ajaran Hamzah Fansûrî yang dipandang menjadi sumber penyelewengan aqidah rakyat.

Di kemudian hari tindakan al-Rânîrî yang kontroversial ini menjadi objek kajian yang menarik, dan pada saat yang sama juga memunculkan pelbagai analisis maupun spekulasi. Hampir semuanya mempertanyakan motivasi dan sebab-sebab yang mendorong al-Rânîrî melakukan tindakan tersebut. Sebagian analisis cenderung melihatnya secara personal, dengan meletakkan al-Rânîrî selaku aktor tunggal. Sedangkan analisis

lain lebih mendudukkan *al-Rânîrî* dalam kerangka lebih luas, yaitu dengan melihat arah dan kaitan tradisi pemikiran keagamaan yang melingkupinya.

Argumen *al-Rânîrî* sendiri atas tindakannya terhadap rakyat Aceh dan sufi *Wujûdiyah* berpijak pada kritiknya atas beberapa pemikiran Hamzah. Ia menemukan bahwa pemikiran Hamzah mirip dengan kaum filosof, pengikut Zoroaster, dan bahkan Brahmanisme. Hal ini disebabkan karena Hamzah memandang bahwa (i) Tuhan, dunia, manusia dan hubungan antarketiganya identik; (ii) zat Tuhan berada secara imanen dalam dunia, atau Tuhan berada dalam semua yang ada; (iii) Tuhan adalah wujud sederhana (*simple being*); (iv) *al-Qur'an* adalah makhluk; dan (v) dunia abadi. Kelima pandangan ini sudah cukup bagi *al-Rânîrî* untuk memandang Hamzah dan pengikutnya sesat.

Meskipun demikian, penilaian *al-Rânîrî* tersebut masih menjadi bahan perdebatan di kalangan para ahli. Dapat disebutkan bahwa Syed Muhammad Naquib *al-Attas* mewakili kecenderungan yang menolak argumen *al-Rânîrî*, sedangkan G.W.J. Drewes mewakili sikap sebaliknya. Bagi *al-Attas*, pandangan *al-Rânîrî* terhadap Hamzah sangatlah keliru. Berdasarkan kajiannya terhadap teks karya Hamzah, ia menemukan bahwa tuduhan panteistik terhadap Hamzah sama sekali tidak berdasar. Menurutnya, Hamzah tidak pernah bermaksud mengatakan identitas Tuhan, dunia, dan manusia sama. Oleh karenanya, *al-Attas* melihat bahwa *al-Rânîrî* telah sengaja menyalahartikan pemikiran Hamzah demi kekuasaan dan kepentingan pribadi lainnya.

Berbeda dari *al-Attas*, Drewes dapat menerima argumen *al-Rânîrî*. Maka analisis yang ia kemukakan lebih mengenai alasan di balik tindakan yang dilakukan tokoh ini. Bagi Drewes, *al-Rânîrî* hanyalah bagian dari arus praktik keagamaan yang lebih besar. Ia banyak dipengaruhi oleh model pemikiran yang berkembang di daerah asalnya, India. Saat itu yang berkembang adalah pemikiran Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindî yang juga cenderung menyingkirkan pola keagamaan sufistik. Keterkaitan antara Aceh dan India ini, menurut Drewes, juga terjadi pada diri Hamzah, yang pada saat hidupnya menjadi mata rantai dari model sufistik yang berkembang di India.

Silang pendapat antara *al-Attas* dan Drewes ini menunjukkan bahwa studi tentang *al-Rânîrî* masih jauh dari sempurna. Oleh karena pengaruhnya terhadap kehidupan beragama di Indonesia begitu besar, maka tidak hanya pandangan *al-Rânîrî* yang perlu ditelaah kembali, tetapi juga pandangan para ahli, termasuk *al-Attas* dan Drewes.

الرائيرى وحمزة الفانسورى: النضال بين الإسلام "الرسمى" والتصوف

الخلاصة: فى أواسط القرن السابع عشر شهد مجتمع آتشييه اضطرابا اجتماعيا دينيا لا يمكن تصويره من قبل. هذه الحادثة يمكن أن نسميها دور فناء لأتباع التعليم الدينى الذى نسب إلى الشخصية العظيمة حمزة الفانسورى. فالكتب التى يتمسكون بها جمعتها كلها سلطة الدولة ثم حرقت أمام الجميع، وهؤلاء الأتباع يجب أن يلاقوا الحكم القاسى من جهة الحكم القائم لأنهم مطاردون وعليهم التوبة وعدم الرجوع إلى ذلك المعتقد الذى عرف فيما بعد بالوجودية/وحدة الوجود.

هذه الواقعة حدثت أثناء حكم السلطان إسكندر الثانى (Sultan Iskandar Thānī) المكمل لحكم السلطان إسكندر مودا (Sultan Iskandar Muda) المتوفى سنة ١٦٣٦. فالحكم الصادر لمحو تطبيق هذه الوجودية الصوفية جاء من أحد العلماء ذى نفوذ فى تلك الآونة وهو نور الدين الرائيرى (Nuruddin al-Raniri). فالاتصال بين الرائيرى والسلطان إسكندر الثانى كان فى غاية الوثاقفة، وذلك بدليل أن حطة الرائيرى تلك يحتضنها السلطان بأسرها، رغم ذلك فإن الاتصال

بين السلطان والعلماء مثل هذا ليس بغريب ولا عجيب لأن السلطان قبله وهو إسكندر مودا كان وثيق الصلة بحمزة الفانسوري.

كأحد العلماء المتزمّنين الذي أكثر اهتمامه بتطبيق الشريعة، فلم يقبل الرانيري التطبيق الديني الصوفي الأكثر اتصافا بالانحرافية. هذا هو الذي جعله غير توان في محاربة مجتمع آتشييه الذي كان في ذلك الوقت أكثر ميولا إلى تطبيق تلك النظرة الصوفية. فكانت محاربه لها في أوسع نطاق، مما أدى إلى هجومه إلى تحطيم جذور الحركة بإفناء وحرق كل أعمال الفانسوري وتعاليمه التي تعتبر انحرافا للعقيدة الشعبية الإسلامية.

وأخيرا صارت خطوات الرانيري المعارضة موضوع دراسة جدّاب، وفي نفس الوقت، ظهر مختلف التفاسير والتحليل كاد كلها يتساءل عن الدوافع والأسباب التي دفعت الرانيري لاتخاذ هذه الخطوة. فقام بعض المحللين بالنظر إلى مثل هذه الأمور شخصيا بجعل الرانيري كمثل وحيد، بينما المحللون الآخرون يجعلون الرانيري كهيككل أكثر تشعبا بمعنى أنهم يرون اتجاهه وارتباطه بالتفكير الديني التقليدي الذي يعيش به.

دليل الرانيري ذاته على خطته هذه في مواجهة الشعب الآتشوي الوجودية الصوفية على حد سواء منطلقه من نقده وانتقاده على بعض آراء الفانسوري وقد لقي أن فكرة الفانسوري مماثلة لآراء الفلاسفة كأنه من أتباع زروستر (Zoroaster) بل البرهمانية (Brahmanisme). وسبب ذلك أن الفانسوري يرى أولا بأن الله والدنيا والإنسان والاتصال بين هذه الثلاثة مماثلة، وثانيا أن الذات الإلهية موجودة على وجه العموم في الدنيا أو الإله موجود في كل الموجود، وثالثا الإله هو الوجود المتواضع ورابعا أن القرآن مخلوق وخامسا أن الدنيا خالدة. هذه التقريبات الخمسة كافية للرانيري إعطاء فكرة بأن الفانسوري وأنصاره ضالون.

ورغم ذلك أن تقييم الرانيرى ذلك مازال موضوع بحث فى الأوساط المتعلمة. ويمكن القول بأن السيد محمد نقيب العطاس (Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas) قد مثل الميل الذى يرفض دليل الرانيرى بينما ج. و. دريوس (G.W.J. Drewes) ممثل الطرف الآخر. بالنسبة للعطاس أن نظرية الرانيرى نحو حمزة الفانسورى فى غاية الاضطراب. فبناء على دراسته كمنسوخ تأليف الفانسورى فوجد أن التهمة الوجودية نحو الفانسورى ليس لها اساس. فعلى هذا يقول بأن الفانسورى لم يقصد أبدا بالقول إن ذاتية الله والدنيا والإنسان واحدة، فكذلك يرى العطاس أن الرانيرى قد قصد بتغيير معنى فكرة الفانسورى لقوة ومصالحة الآخرين.

مخالفا للعطاس، قبل دريوس حجج الرانيرى، فلذلك التحليل الذى قدمه قد نال حجة أكثر فى مناهضة تلك الفكرة التى تقدم بها العطاس، وبالنسبة له أن الرانيرى ما هو إلا جزء من التيار السياسى الدينى الأكثر فعالية. فالرانيرى أكثر تأثيرا بنوعية التفكير المنتشرة فى بلدة أصله: الهند. ففي تلك الآونة كان الأكثر انتشارا هى فكرة الشيخ أحمد سيرهندي (Syekh Ahmad Sirhindī) المائل إلى تنحية الفكرة الصوفية، فالرابطة بين آتشييه والهند -على حسب رأى دريويس- أثرت كذلك على شخصية الفانسورى الذى فى أثناء حياته كان حلقة السلسلة ونوعية التصوف المنتشر فى الهند.

إن تعارض الرأى بين العطاس ودريويس يبرهن على أن الدراسة عن الرانيرى مازالت بعيدة عن الكمال. لأجل نفوذه على الحياة الدينية فى إندونيسيا كبير فليس رأى الرانيرى فحسب يجب دراسته من جديد بل آراء المتقنين بما فيهم العطاس ودريويس،

Introduction

Mid-seventeenth century Indonesia witnessed a period of religious inquisition hitherto unknown in Islamic lands. This period, though short-lived, was nevertheless brutal and frightening. It was during this time that believers observed with some horror. Muslim religious books destroyed and Muslims persecuted, tortured, even killed, and all this done in the name of Islam, the religion of peace. The orders for such actions were issued by a Muslim scholar by the name of al-Rânîrî who had come to Indonesia from a far away land, India, and who had brought a religious and spiritual vision of Islam at variance with the beliefs and practices prevailing in the Aceh court. The thrust of al-Rânîrî's religious purge was directed against the then influential followers of Hamzah Fansûrî and his Wujûdiyyah brand of mystical Islam.

To some al-Rânîrî, as an orthodox reformer, appeared as "a champion of the Islamic faith."¹ Yet, on the whole, his actions were not viewed favorably, and thirty years after his departure from Aceh a religious decree (*fatwa*) was issued against him by an important member of the 'ulamâ' of Medina.² Furthermore, even al-Rânîrî's motivations have been criticized, and it has been argued that he was spurred on by a selfish desire for power and domination. In scholarship this view has been expressed by Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, who has devoted several works to this issue and has discussed al-Rânîrî's accusations against Hamzah Fansûrî at length. In al-Attas' view, al-Rânîrî deliberately twisted and manipulated material in order to present Hamzah's teachings as heretical. However, G.W.J. Drewes puts the conflict between al-Rânîrî and Hamzah Fansûrî in the larger context of the Muslim intellectual developments in India which, via al-Rânîrî, filtered through to Indonesia. Drewes argues that al-Rânîrî's actions were consequent to what was occurring in India at that time, without necessarily involving personal or egotistical motivations on al-Rânîrî's part.

In this paper I will attempt to reconsider the controversy surrounding this issue by first examining the accusations raised by al-Rânîrî against Hamzah,³ and trying to determine whether al-Rânîrî acted dishonestly as al-Attas has suggested. I will then present al-Attas' and Drewes' on the controversy, as they each offer varying arguments and conclusions. At the end, and in the way of a conclusion, I will discuss some of the errors and inconsistencies which have come to my attention in the works of al-Attas and Drewes. The fact that

Drewes' conclusion sharply contrasts with al-Attas' interpretation already points to the need for further investigation into the subject. The present study offers a humble contribution in this direction by clarifying some of the specific problems and points of inconsistency in the previous works, indicating the areas where more research is needed, and occasionally suggesting alternative explanations of factors and events.

Biographical Sketch of Fansûrî and al-Raniri

Hamzah Fansûrî lived in Barus (Fansûr) on the North West coast of Sumatra between Singkil and Sibolga. It has been assumed that Hamzah was born there as well; however al-Attas argues that whereas Hamzah regarded Barus as his ancestral home, he was actually born in Shahr Nawî in Siam.⁴ Drewes, however, considers this view to be improbable.⁵ Hamzah's exact dates of birth and death are unknown, but he lived some time in the latter half of the sixteenth century, preceding and during the reign of Sultan 'Alâ' al-Dîn Ri'âyat, the shah of Aceh from 1588 to 1604.⁶ After receiving his Islamic schooling in Barus, Hamzah set out for Mecca to "seek God." He was initially disappointed in his quest and later was initiated into the Qâdiriyyah order in Baghdad. However, it was in Shahr Nawî, as the foreigners called the Siamese capital Ayuthia, that Hamzah found the spiritual enlightenment he was seeking and of which experience he writes "Hamzah is originally of Fansûr, he acquired his existence in the Land of Shahrnawî.⁷ Shahr Nawî hosted a large and ethnically diverse Muslim trading community, and it was undoubtedly from the Indian Muslim contingent that Hamzah acquired both his mystical orientation of *wahdat al-wujûd*, the then prominent current in Indian Sufism, as well as his familiarity with the Persian language and mystical poetry, as Persian was the language of court and of literature among Indian Muslims at that time.⁸

Hamzah wrote a number of mystical works expressing his admiration for, and adherence to the doctrine of *wahdat al-wujûd*. His main works are as follows: *Asrâr al-'ârifîn* (The secrets of the gnostics), *Sharab al-'âshiqîn* (The drink of lovers), and *Al-muntahî* (The adept), all of which are written in Malay. He apparently died in Barus and was succeeded by his disciple Shams al-Dîn of Pasai, who continued in his master's line of teachings, with some modification.⁹

Nûr al-Dîn ibn 'Alî bin Hasanjî ibn Muhammad Hamîd al-Rânîrî was born in al-Rânîrî (Rander), located in Gujerat, India, probably

towards the end of the sixteenth century. His father was of Arab and Indian descent, and his mother Malay. He came to Aceh after the death of Sultan Iskandar Muda (d. 1636 C.E.), a ruler who had lent strong support to Shams al-Dîn of Pasai and his followers. Iskandar Muda's successor, Iskandar Thâni (d. 1664), however, possessed a much more sober religious outlook and it was during his reign and the later reign of his widow, the Sultanah, that al-Rânîrî enjoyed a position of royal favour.¹⁰ Al-Rânîrî was an initiated sûfî, an adherent of the Rifâ'iyyah order.¹¹ He also seems to have had a strong leaning towards "orthodoxy,"¹² as was increasingly the tendency within Indian Sufism, particularly the Naqshbandiyyah order, following Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindî's teachings and reforms.

Having secured a prominent position in the Aceh court, al-Rânîrî turned immediately to condemn what he viewed as the un-Islamic doctrines of the "false" *wujûdiyyah*. He proclaimed the works of Hamzah Fansûrî to be heretical and ordered these works, as well as the works of Hamzah's successor Shams al-Dîn, to be burnt, and even condemned some of the *wujûdiyyah* adherents to be burned at the stake.

Al-Rânîrî's victory over the "false" *wujûdiyyah* and his position of royal patronage, however, were not permanent. After a Minangkabau scholar from Surat, Saifurrijal, arrived at the Aceh court backed by the influential figure Mahrajalila, al-Rânîrî lost the support of the Sultanah and returned to al-Rânîrî.¹³ Drewes, however, concurs with the suggestion of Takeshi Ito that the doctrinal controversy between al-Rânîrî and Saifurrijal "was a contest for influence with the Sultanah."¹⁴ The bitter memory of al-Rânîrî's influence survived his downfall, and thirty years after his departure from Aceh a *fatwâ* condemning al-Rânîrî was issued by Mullâ Ibrâhîm in Medina, probably at the request of the latter's pupil 'Abd al-Ra'ûf of Singkil.¹⁵ Yet despite this, left his mark not only on Islam in Indonesia, but on Malay literature as well. In the latter area, his work *Bustân al-Salâtîn* holds a place of lasting importance, and in the former his theological works such as *Sîrât al-Mustaqîm* and *Akhhâr al-Âkhirah* have been widely circulated. The fact that the present-day State Institute for Islamic Studies at Banda Aceh¹⁶ bears Rânîrî name is yet another indication of the continued reverence accorded him by Indonesian people.

Al-Rânîrî Refutation of Hamzah Fansûrî

According to al-Attas, al-Rânîrî condemned Hamzah Fansûrî's teachings and ideas as heretical, finding particular points of contention scattered in Hamzah's writings supposedly "disguised...in the garb of true Sufism."¹⁷ Al-Attas has summarized al-Rânîrî's accusations along five points:

- (a) That Hamzah's ideas regarding God, the World, Man and the relationship between them, in short, Reality, are identical...with those of the Philosophers, the Zoroastrians, the Metempsychosists, the Incarnationists, the Brahmins.
- (b) That Hamzah's belief is pantheistic in the sense that God's essence is completely immanent in the World; that God permeates every thing that is seen.
- (c) That, like the Philosophers, Hamzah believes that God is a Simple Being.
- (d) That Hamzah, like the Qadariyyah and the Mu'tazilah, believes the Qur'ân to have been created.
- (e) That, like the Philosophers, Hamzah believes in the eternity of the World.¹⁸

Al-Attas argues that following al-Rânîrî's denunciation, scholars have assumed Hamzah to have been a "heretical pantheist," and his works "heresies," yet prior to al-Attas' own research, none had compared al-Rânîrî's charges with Hamzah's actual works.¹⁹ Thus al-Attas devotes much attention to discussing al-Rânîrî's five points of accusation, mentioned above, with reference to the related passages or concepts within the context of Hamzah's own writings. In this way, al-Attas attempts to demonstrate that al-Rânîrî's refutation is not based on what Hamzah actually wrote and taught, but rather on what al-Rânîrî twisted and construed from his works. As al-Attas is convinced of the unethical nature of al-Rânîrî's attack, and al-Attas' own tone tends to be polemical,²⁰ it would be preferable to have an independent translation and study of al-Rânîrî's refutation of Hamzah Fansûrî,²¹ as al-Attas presents al-Rânîrî's refutation within the framework of his own perception of al-Rânîrî's dishonesty. However, since no such independent work is available or accessible as yet, I will try to assess al-Attas' charges on the basis of the material presented.

The first category of al-Rânîrî's accusations (a): al-Attas selects a passage from al-Rânîrî's work *Tibyan fi Ma'rifat al-Adyan* in which Hamzah is likened to the Zoroastrians. Al-Rânîrî first mentions the Zoroastrian practice of worshiping light in the belief that all forms of light

originated from one light before the beginning of creation. The Zoroastrians thus believe that all light is, in actual substance, the Light of God. Al-Rânîrî connects Hamzah to these beliefs, writing that in *Asrâr al-ârifîn* Hamzah says, "the first light to separate from the Essence of God is the Light of Muhammad."²² However, al-Attas refers to Hamzah's concept of the light of Muhammad within the context of the latter's works. According to Hamzah, the light of Muhammad marks the distinction between Knower and known, in other words the distinction between God in His Absolute Essence and in His manifestation through which He becomes known. Al-Attas rightly points out that Hamzah's use of the term light is metaphorical and does not indicate, as al-Rânîrî alludes in his reference to Zoroastrian practice and belief, that Hamzah worships light itself.²³

The second category of al-Rânîrî's accusations (b): Concerning Hamzah's belief in pantheism, al-Attas quotes a passage, again from al-Rânîrî's *Tibsan*, in which Hamzah is associated with the Tanâsukhiyyah school whose adherents believe that the Divine Spirit has been partitioned and distributed among the phenomenal beings of the world. Al-Rânîrî writes:

"They [i.e. the Tanâsukhiyyah adherents] say that all spirits and every single thing are parts of God by virtue of His doing and creating them all. His doing and the like come from...Him and return to Him. This is the strayed opinion of Hamzah Fansûrî and Shams al-Dîn al-Sumatrânî. Some of the Tanâsukhiyyah say that the Production...and the producer..., the Doer...and the Thing Done.... are identical. Likewise is the opinion of Hamzah Fansûrî and Shams al-Dîn al-Sumatrânî."²⁴

To clarify the discussion of pantheism, al-Attas points out the distinction between pantheism as the notion that God is completely immanent in the world and exhausts Himself in this manifestation, and pantheism, more properly termed "panentheism", in which God still retains His transcendence yet the phenomenal world cannot be separated from Him, for since God is the sole ground of being, the world depends on Him for its existence; in this sense the world is inseparable from Him. The latter type of "pantheism" is that of Ibn 'Arabî, whom al-Rânîrî regards as a "true Sûfî." However, al-Rânîrî categorizes Hamzah with the followers of the Tanâsukhiyyah school, with those who adhere to the first, more materialistic type of pantheism, implying that according to Hamzah, God's "being" is literally present in and identical with the sum parts of the phenomenal world.

In charging Hamzah with pantheism, al-Rânîrî also refers to a statement in the former's work *Muntabî*:

"...[Hamzah writes: '] the meaning of ('Whosoever knows his self knows his Lord') and knowing one's self is [this:] that the Self of the Hidden Treasure is none other than one's self, and every thing is in God's Knowledge; like the seed and the tree; the tree resides in its completeness within the seed."

Al-Rânîrî adds:

"It is clear from this saying of that [false] Wujûdiyyah that the World together with all its parts actually resides, existing in its completeness in the Truth Most Exalted. The World proceeds from Him like the tree proceeding from the seed. Such belief is infidelity."²⁵

Al-Rânîrî interprets Hamzah's analogy of the tree within the seed literally, implying that in Hamzah's conception the world is actually present within God's Essence and proceeds from His Essence out of necessity, without God's act of will, just as a tree unfolds itself from the seed. This concept of necessary emanation in which God is denied the creative power of will, is precisely one of the heretical doctrines of the philosophers condemned by al-Ghazâlî. However, al-Attas shows that al-Rânîrî has taken Hamzah's analogy out of context, as it had not been intended as a literal description of the origin of the created world. Al-Attas finds the same seed tree symbolism in Hamzah's work, *Asrâr*; yet ironically in this second reference the analogy of the seed and tree is used to describe God's *irâdâh*, His creative will, when He wills into being the potentialities that exist within His Knowledge:

"...As the Holy Tradition says: 'I was a hidden treasure and I desired to be known', that is, the World together with all its potentialities in His Knowledge is related within [His Knowledge] as the hidden treasure about to bring forth the things known from within His Knowledge. ...The treasure...is likened to a tree within its seed. The seed is the treasure, the tree within it is the content of the treasure; hidden in its completeness: its roots, trunks, branches, boughs, twigs, leaves, flowers, fruits, all complete within the seed. The seed wants to bring forth the growth of the tree within itself on a field of vast expanse. The seed says: 'I was a hidden treasure and I desired to be known.' All this is an allusion to [God's act of] willing. Further, God the Most Exalted, says: Verily His command is, when He is in the state of willing a thing, to say to it 'Be thou!', and it becomes. This too is an allusion to [God's act of] willing .²⁶

Although it can be argued that Hamzah's original statement concerning the seed and the tree can be misinterpreted as a literal description of the world within God's Essence, it is clear from the second passage that Hamzah's concept of creation depends on God's creative power of will, and that the existence of the world within God's Knowledge is only the world in potentiality, not in actuality as al-Rânîrî implies. Al-Attas relates several more examples concerning Hamzah's alleged "pantheism," all conveying a similar point: whereas Hamzah does maintain a perspective typical of a *wajûdî sûfî*, a perspective that God is the sole and ultimate Being, and thus the only true reality behind every worldly manifestation, he does not confess to the more literal type of pantheism which posits that God is completely immanent in the world and identical with the sum total of all its parts. Consequently, al-Rânîrî's charge against Hamzah of the issue on pantheism appears to be false and unsubstantiated.

The third category of al-Rânîrî's accusations (c): Al-Rânîrî contends that Hamzah, like the "misguided philosophers," views God as a Simple Being. Al-Attas speculates that this accusation is based on Hamzah's concept of God as the Absolute Being without attributes, Being to which Hamzah refers as what or *huwa*.²⁷ However, al-Attas clarifies the difference between the philosophers' concept of God as a Simple Being, which is based on their "arguments against the attributes and the division into genus and specific difference"²⁸ and a concept prevalent within Sufism, according to which God is not denied specific attributes, but in His Essence is considered unknowable and beyond relations and assertions, and according to which it is only by using the concept of relationality that one can describe God's Attributes.²⁹ Al-Attas mentions that the concept of an attributeless Being unknowable in His Essence is held by acknowledged sufis such as Ibn 'Arabî and al-Jîlî, and in the case of Hamzah, the latter does not deny the reality of God's Attributes, but considers them the same as His Essence.³⁰

The fourth category of al-Rânîrî's accusations (d): Al-Rânîrî associates Hamzah with the Qadaris and the Lafziyyah sect of the Jahmiyah (and the Mu'tazilah), saying that he, like the adherents of these sects, holds the Qur'ân to be created.³¹ Al-Rânîrî emphasizes this denunciation by referring to hadîth and the Qur'ân to the effect that whoever views the Qur'ân to be created is an unbeliever. Al-Rânîrî bases his accusation on a passage from Hamzah's *Asrâr*:

"...This is the belief of Hamzah Fansûrî's ...Wujûdiyyah. He says in the book *Asrâr al-Ârifîn* that the speech of God conveyed by Gabriel may be regarded as a thing created. Such a belief is infidelity, for God says: 'We have sent down an Arabic Qur'an conveyed by Gabriel [and]

Al-Attas, however, quotes the original passage from Hamzah's *Asrâr* as reading:

"According to the Mu'tazilah and the Râfidî and the Zindiq, the speech of God is created. According to the sharî'ah, whosoever says that the speech of God is created is an unbeliever, may God preserve Us from such! God's speech is as His Essence; eternal, together with the accompanying seven [attributes]. As for the speech of God conveyed by Gabriel to the Prophet Muhammad the Messenger of God, which is written in pages, it may be said to be created for the judgement concerning it is that it is already separate, from the point of view of expression, from the Essence. However in reality only God knows."³³

Ironically, in Hamzah's original statement he distances himself from one of the heretical sects (i.e. the Mu'tazilah) with which al-Rânîrî associates him, and furthermore he distances himself on the basis of their heretical understanding of the Qur'ân as created. Hamzah does concede, however, that the speech of God conveyed by Gabriel which can be written in pages may be considered as created, in the sense that the particular spoken and written words are obviously not residing, in undifferentiated form, within God's Eternal Essence but have become separate, hence manifest in the created world. However, even in this case he leaves the final judgement to God. Al-Rânîrî fails to mention any of these distinctions between the Qur'ân in essence and the Qur'ân in spoken and written form, and further confuses the issue by mistranslating the Qur'ânic verse 39:28. According to Yusuf Ali's translation, this verse should read: "(It is) a Qur'ân in Arabic, without any Crookedness (therein): in order that they may guard against evil." The central point in this, and previous related verses,³⁴ as al-Attas rightly observes, is that the Qur'ân is a perfect book intended for the guidance of humankind. The issue of whether the Qur'ân, in the specific form it assumed at the time of its transmission through the angel Gabriel, is created or uncreated is not even touched upon in these verses, nor in any other portion of the Qur'ân.³⁵

The fifth category of al-Rânîrî's accusations (e): al-Attas considers the issue of the eternity of the world, unlike the previous four categories, to be al-Rânîrî's only accusation with a possibly credible basis. Yet

even in this instance al-Attas contends that al-Rânîrî has missed the real point of the issue: for if al-Rânîrî could have proven that, as the logical consequence of accepting the eternity of the world, Hamzah did deny the power of God's creative will, then al-Rânîrî could have legitimately accused him of heresy.³⁶ However, al-Attas observes that instead of pursuing an authentic philosophical argument, al-Rânîrî resorts to his usual pattern of making false associations between Hamzah and heretical groups and misrepresenting Hamzah's actual concepts.³⁷ Al-Attas discusses in much detail the underlying concept of being held by both al-Rânîrî and Hamzah Fansûrî. What he concludes is that the philosophers (Ibn Rushd, and so on) have considered God as eternal and existent (being self-subsistent) and the world as eternal and non-existent (meaning contingent); since they have granted non-existence consideration as a real category of being, the philosophers have been guilty of conceiving of God and the world as two eternal beings, which is heresy. Hamzah, however, has no such conception, and considers the world as possessing no independent reality, not even as a non-existent, thus viewing the world as inseparable from the One Reality of God. Furthermore, although the world has no independent reality apart from God, the reverse of this equation is not true, as God exists infinitely above and beyond the created world. As for Hamzah's view concerning God's creative will, al-Attas has established in earlier passages Hamzah's belief in God's Will, through which He brings the potentialities in His Knowledge into actuality. In terms of al-Rânîrî, al-Attas argues that al-Rânîrî himself holds a conception of the relation between God and the world similar to that of Hamzah though according to al-Attas, al-Rânîrî expresses it with much less clarity and makes a false interpolation between the view of the *Mutakallimûn* and the Sufis on this issue.³⁸

From the examples provided by al-Attas, it again is clear that whereas Hamzah does hold the perspective of a *wujûdî* Sûfi, he does not assert the co-eternal existence of the phenomenal world in the same sense as the philosophers. What is also apparent is that although al-Rânîrî identifies himself with both the *Mutakallimûn* and the "true Sufis," his views would also be included within the perspective of *wahdat al-wujûd*, as he holds that God is the Sole Reality and the universe belongs to God, and though not identical with God, the world is not separate from Him.³⁹ In fact, when explaining the beliefs of the "true Wujûdiyyah which represent the Sufis," al-Rânîrî inserts "may God count us from amongst their group"⁴⁰

The Factors Giving Rise to al-Rânîrî's Refutation: The Views of Two Leading Scholars (Naguib Al-Attas and G.W.J. Drewes)

The view of Naguib al-Attas: As was mentioned earlier, al-Attas considers al-Rânîrî to have been motivated purely by his desire for political gain. He writes, "It fails to convince me to say that the motivation underlying al-Rânîrî's attack was one of sincere attempt at intellectual and religious reform, untainted by bias and personal interest. Indeed, the contrary seems to have been the case.,"⁴¹ As evidence of al-Rânîrî's insincerity, al-Attas presents many examples in which al-Rânîrî clearly has twisted, misinterpreted or taken out of context the actual teachings and concepts of Hamzah Fansûrî, or made unsubstantiated associations between the latter's beliefs and those of heretical groups. Al-Attas concedes that by al-Rânîrî's time, the court and the general religious environment of Aceh had deteriorated and that "pseudo mystics and charlatans had taken hold of the minds of the people."⁴² However, al-Attas argues that we cannot excuse al-Rânîrî's mistreatment of Hamzah's teachings simply by pointing to Hamzah's disciples "who may have distorted [his teachings] through lack of proper understanding," as al-Rânîrî had access to the original writings of Hamzah and his successor Shams al-Dîn of Pasai.⁴³

In addition to al-Rânîrî's mistreatment of concepts, al-Attas offers a number of other arguments that also may indicate al-Rânîrî's insincerity, such as the fact that he waited until the death of Shams al-Dîn of Pasai before entering the court of Aceh. Al-Attas reasons that this was in order to avoid possible refutation by such an eminent opponent as Shams al-Dîn, and thus al-Rânîrî sought to capitalize on the immediate lack of competent rivals.⁴⁴ Al-Attas also speculates that al-Rânîrî timed his court appearance to coincide with the ascension of Iskandar Thànî, who, unlike the previous ruler, was not sympathetic to the more "heterodox" *wujûdiyyah*, but favored al-Rânîrî's more "orthodox" perspective.⁴⁵ Finally al-Attas suggests that al-Rânîrî may have lacked an adequate mastery of the Malay language and thus was incapable of truly understanding the mystical subtleties and paradoxical language of Hamzah Fansûrî's works.⁴⁶

The view of G.W.J. Drewes: In his introduction to *The Poems of Hamzah Fansuri*, and in his article, "Nûr al-Dîn al-Rânîrî's Charge of Heresy against Hamzah and Shamsuddin from an International Point of View," Drewes sets out to interpret Rânîrî's refutation from the perspective of the co-terminus religious and political developments in Mughal India. Drewes, following an earlier remark by A.H. Johns, considers al-Rânîrî's "repressive measures as consequent on developments in India,"

although there is no direct connection shown between the developments in India and al-Rânîrî's particular actions.⁴⁷ This suggests that the general atmosphere of religious and political reform present in India, under the influence of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindî, had also spread to other areas within the Islamic world, to Aceh in particular. Drewes goes further, suggesting that even the earlier development in Aceh, developments associated with the figure of Hamzah Fansûrî, could represent the transmission of *wujûdî Sûfî* doctrines that characterized the religious and spiritual outlook of India in the generations prior to Sirhindî.⁴⁸ In support of this idea, Drewes refers to the Indian Muslim presence in Shahr Nawî, the place of Hamzah's spiritual enlightenment.

As for al-Rânîrî, he arrived in Aceh in 1636 and certainly could have been exposed to the influence of Sirhindî (d. 1624), whose sweeping reforms brought a complete turn around in the religious and political life of India and replaced Akbar's self-styled Ilahi religion—a mixture of extreme *wujûdî Sufism* and esoteric beliefs—with an orthodox form of mystical Islam and strict enforcement of the shar'ah. Drewes does not describe the exact nature of Sirhindî's reforms, other than mentioning the distinction between *wahdat al-wujûd*, the perspective of unity of being characteristic of Ibn 'Arabi, and *wahdat al-shuhûd*, the unity of witnessing of Sirhindî and his followers. Drewes writes that al-Rânîrî explains Ibn 'Arabi's *wujûdî* concept of the relationship of God and the world in an "orthodox" fashion, based on Kashani's commentary on *Fusûs al-Hikam*. However, Drewes remarks that al-Rânîrî "is straining the truth" when he claims that all the *wujûdiyyah* adherents of India followed this orthodox view. Instead Drewes groups the *wujûdiyyah* of India, from as early as the thirteenth century, with the heretical *wujûdiyyah* denounced by al-Rânîrî. Thus despite al-Rânîrî's own differentiation between the true and false *wujûdiyyah* and despite his clear defence of and identification with "true [*wujûdiyyah*] Sufis," Drewes applies Sirhindî's distinction between *wahdat al-wujûd* and *wahdat al-shuhûd* as a description of the situation in Aceh, in particular al-Rânîrî's condemnation of the doctrines of Hamzah and Shams al-Dîn as heretical.⁴⁹ Drawing a further parallel, Drewes remarks that just as the Mughal court and even many followers of Sirhindî reverted back to a *wujûdî* perspective after the shaykh's death, so too the "former doctrine [of *wahdat al-wujûd*] had certainly not been universally abandoned, as al-Rânîrî would have it."⁵⁰ In other words, according to Drewes al-Rânîrî was striving to altogether abolish any trace of *wahdat al-wujûd* from the Aceh court.

Conclusion: A Re-Evaluation of Factors Contributing to al-Rânîrî's Refutation

Al-Attas has correctly identified the discrepancy between al-Rânîrî's charges and Hamzah's actual teachings in reference to five categories of accusations. Al-Attas argues that as a result of al-Rânîrî's refutation, Hamzah has been unfairly regarded as an extremist. As evidence of this biased view in scholarship, al-Attas quotes R.O. Winstedt and A.H. Johns, both of whom describe Hamzah as a pantheist of extreme and literal persuasion.⁵¹ In response to this bias, al-Attas demonstrates that al-Rânîrî has misrepresented Hamzah's teachings, concerning pantheism in particular, and shows that the latter's view of creation is not the crude form of extreme pantheism but rather is in line with the more "panentheistic" Sufis such as Ibn 'Arâbî. Yet although al-Attas vindicates Hamzah of the charge of extreme pantheism, H.J. De Graaf speaks of another type of esoteric extremism. According to De Graaf, Hamzah "declared that prayers and fasting were unnecessary; [yet] wanted to maintain the *salat* (ritual prayer) as a pedagogic expedient to achieve unification with God."⁵² Without doubt this type of extremism is heretical. However al-Attas makes no mention of this or any similar charge, and thus it is unclear whether the second charge of extremism is unfounded or has been ignored by al-Attas.

Another point of uncertainty arises in al-Attas' presentation of the conditions in Aceh under the respective reigns of Iskandar Muda and Iskandar Thâñî, and the nature of the ensuing doctrinal conflicts in the Aceh court. Al-Attas notes that Iskandar Muda was sympathetic to the teachings of Hamzah Fansûrî and the *wujûdiyyah*. In fact Hamzah's successor, Shams al-Dîn of Pasai, held favor in court until his death in 1630, and there after his disciples continued to enjoy royal support and to "control the spiritual life in Aceh."⁵³ At the same time al-Attas notes that the "spiritual climate" in Aceh had been "heterodox" since the time of Hamzah Fansûrî, and this "spiritual climate" "during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda...was rather unhealthy for an exponent of 'orthodoxy' such as al-Rânîrî...."⁵⁴ What is more, al-Attas writes that this "heterodoxy" later deteriorated into outright pseudo-mysticism and spiritual charlatanism. However al-Attas argues that the earlier heterodox doctrines and tendencies may have been due to the distortions of later wujûdiyyah followers and not to the specific teachings of Hamzah and Shams al-Dîn.⁵⁵ Thus al-Attas not only admits that the religious climate of Aceh prior to al-

Rânîrî's arrival was characterized by heterodoxy and even mystical charlatanism, he himself cannot completely discount the possibility of extremism or heterodox tendencies in Hamzah's original teachings.

As for al-Rânîrî, we learn from al-Attas' presentation that he was also a self professed *wujûdî Sufi*. The significance of this consideration should not be obscured by his orthodox leaning and affiliation. Although al-Attas regards al-Rânîrî more as a religious official than a Sufi,⁵⁶ al-Rânîrî himself writes that he hoped to be counted among the "true" *wujûdiyyah Sufis*, and in his writings he is shown to hold views in line with a *wahdat al-wujûd* perspective. Thus al-Rânîrî's reforms do not represent a simple conflict between the *wujûdiyyah* and orthodoxy, nor even a conflict between *wujûdî* Sufism and the more orthodox Sufi perspective of *wahdat al-shuhûd* (c.f. Sirhindi). Rather it follows that al-Rânîrî's reforms remained within the basic context of a *wujûdî* perspective, and thus would represent a shift from extremism to a more orthodox position within this perspective. Al-Attas claims that Iskandar Muda gave support to the "heterodox" *wujûdiyyah* and would have had little sympathy for al-Rânîrî, we should add despite al-Rânîrî's *wujûdî* perspective, because of the latter's "orthodox" leanings. This again suggests that when al-Rânîrî arrived at the Aceh court he confronted an atmosphere of mystical extremism and encountered heterodox and heretical teachings supposedly based on the teachings of Hamzah and Shams al-Dîn; these conditions have been described by al-Attas as pseudomysticism and spiritual charlatanism. Thus whatever the motivation may have been for al-Rânîrî's actions, he would, on some level, have to be considered as an Islamic reformer, in the positive sense of this title.

Regarding the true motive behind al-Rânîrî's reforms, al-Attas emphasizes the latter's quest for power which, for the purpose of his own advancement, led him to deliberately twist Hamzah's teachings to the discredit of the influential but false *wujûdiyyah*. Yet al-Attas has also suggested that al-Rânîrî lacked complete mastery of the Malay language and did not fully grasp Hamzah's mystical teachings. Thus one could argue that al-Rânîrî traced the manifestations of mystical heresies, heresies that were evident in the Aceh court, back to the teachings of Hamzah, which he incorrectly understood to be the original source of esoteric extremism; and this process may have been based on genuine misunderstanding rather than deliberate misrepresentation of Hamzah's views. In other words, due to an insufficient

knowledge of Malay, al-Rânîrî may not have fully grasped the subtleties of Hamzah's writings, and thus gained a false and superficial understanding of the latter's thought. This, combined with the fact that the pseudo-Sufis of Aceh claimed to be following Hamzah's teachings, may have brought al-Rânîrî to the conclusion that Hamzah's teachings were the source of extremism prevalent in Aceh. However, it must be observed that the explanation of genuine misunderstanding does not fully account for al-Rânîrî's habit of making unsubstantiated associations between Hamzah and heretical groups, nor does it account for al-Rânîrî's mistranslation of the Qur'anic passage concerning the "uncreated" nature of Gabriel's transmission. Also al-Rânîrî's work *Bustân al-salâtîn*, though not written in the complexity of mystical prose, is counted as one of the classics of Malay literature, indicating that al-Rânîrî had a fairly substantial grounding in the Malay language, a factor which further weakens the theory that he did not fully grasp Hamzah's thought.

Drewes' argument, like that of al-Attas, presents a number of inconsistencies in interpretation. The orthodox reaction to extreme esotericism that swept Mughal India, following Sirhindî's instigation, is, in its general form, similar to the developments in Aceh under al-Rânîrî's leadership. Yet this similarity is limited to the level of generalities and does not extend to the specific content of orthodox criticisms and reforms. In the case of Sirhindî, he makes a distinction not only between *wujûdî* and *shuhûdî* views, but even between the *wujûdî* perspective of Ibn 'Arâbî, to which he grants some authenticity, and other perspectives ranging from the erroneous concepts of Ibn 'Arâbî's later followers to the outright spiritual eclecticism of Akbar's Ilahi religion: the latter categories he condemns without qualifications. Sirhindî actually credits Ibn 'Arâbî with having achieved a relatively high degree of spiritual rank and insight; yet this level of attainment Sirhindî considers to be intermediate on the mystical path. Consequently Ibn 'Arâbî's understanding of the unity of being does not ultimately reflect the true nature of reality, according to Sirhindî. Thus despite Sirhindî's acceptance of Ibn 'Arâbî as an authentic Sufi, he views the latter's perspective as false according to the higher insight of *wahdat al-shuhûd*. According to Sirhindî's *shuhûdî* perspective, God is utterly and completely transcendent, He bears no relation to the phenomenal world and shares nothing in terms of Being.⁵⁷

With Sirhindî's teachings in mind, we can say that Drewes is correct on implying that Sirhindî ultimately rejects all forms of *wujûdî*

doctrine:⁵⁸ this rejection would include even the more “orthodox” readings of Ibn ‘Arâbî, let alone the more extreme variations of the *wujûdî* perspective. Yet Drewes fails to note Sirhindi’s distinction between the limited truth of Ibn ‘Arâbî’s views and the errors of later disciples and other adherents among the *wujûdîyyah*, a distinction similar to al-Rânîrî’s differentiation between the true and false *wujûdîyyah*. Furthermore Drewes identifies the entire *wujûdîyyah* perspective in India and, by implication, the *wujûdîyyah* in Aceh with the type of literal pantheism described by al-Rânîrî as the false and heretical *wujûdîyyah*. Yet this type of literal, materialistic pantheism is clearly not the view of Ibn ‘Arâbî, or even of his followers, who despite having gone astray from lack of actual experience (c.f. Sirhindi) nonetheless based themselves on Ibn ‘Arâbî’s teachings. Ironically, Drewes fails to account for the fact that al-Rânîrî himself is a *wujûdî* Sûfî following the line of Ibn ‘Arâbî, and holds views concerning the relation of God and the world that are typical of a *wujûdî* perspective. Thus al-Rânîrî, falling within the overall category of the *wujûdîyyah*, holds views that are incompatible with *wahdat al-shuhûd* and hence would have been rejected by Sirhindi. Consequently it cannot be argued that al-Rânîrî’s reforms are typical or representative of the orthodox reaction in Mughal India, or that al-Rânîrî hoped for the general doctrine of *wahdat al-wujûd* to be “universally abandoned” in the same sense as Sirhindi, as Drewes suggests.⁵⁹ Rather, al-Rânîrî himself would have come under the scrutiny of Sirhindi’s reforms.

In conclusion, al-Attas has demonstrated that al-Rânîrî has misrepresented Hamzah’s views, particularly concerning his view of creation and God’s relation to the world. Thus Hamzah is not guilty of the type of extreme pantheism with which, in the eyes of scholarship, he previously has been associated. Yet from the material available to me, it is not possible to tell whether or not Hamzah was prone to other forms of esoteric extremism, particularly in considering the *fard* (mandatory) practices of prayers and fasting unnecessary.⁶⁰ Al-Rânîrî’s refutation is also tinged with uncertainty. Although he has misrepresented many of Hamzah’s views, it is not clear whether this misrepresentation was completely deliberate, as al-Attas suggests, and done for the sake of personal gain; or whether it was based on genuine misunderstanding; or whether it was done with some measure of conscious misrepresentation with the idea of cleansing the spiritual environment of Aceh from deviant, heretical and heterodox

beliefs; or whether al-Rânîrî's motive involved a combination of several of these factors.

In terms of the international character and implications of al-Rânîrî's actions, they bear some outward similarity to the reforms in Mughal India, but only in so far as they represent a movement away from spiritual extremism towards orthodoxy. The conflict in the court of Aceh was not between the orthodox perspective of *wahdat al-shuhûd* and *wahdat al-wujûd*, but rather centered on the tension between extremism and relative orthodoxy within this latter perspective. Al-Rânîrî's perspective, though "orthodox" in comparison to the ideas prevalent in the Aceh court, was fundamentally different, even incompatible with that of Sirhindî. Thus the "international" influence on al-Rânîrî's actions is limited to the general atmosphere of orthodox reform directed towards the vulgar spiritual excesses of the time. Although this international influence is less substantial than indicated by Drewes (and Johns), it should nonetheless be given some consideration. Al-Attas, in his emphasis on al-Rânîrî's egoistic aspirations, seems to leave this consideration aside, remarking only on the surprising absence of reference, on al-Rânîrî's parts to Sirhindî's criticism of Ibn 'Arâbî and the doctrine of *wahdat al-wujûd*.⁶¹ Yet certainly this absence is due to the fact that al-Rânîrî himself falls in line with the teachings of Ibn al-'Arâbî, not those of Sirhindî. This point al-Attas, like Drewes, fails to properly specify.

Considering all of the factors mentioned above, it is clear that the controversy between al-Rânîrî and Hamzah Fansûrî cannot be reduced to a matter of mere ambitiousness on al-Rânîrî's part, nor can it be abstracted into an international paradigm of religious developments based on Sirhindî's reforms in Mughal India. The present investigation underlines the fact that still more original research needs to be undertaken concerning this great controversy. Until then, it seems that terms such as orthodox, extremist and *wujûdiyyah* can be employed only with caution, in reference to either side of the controversy; and the latter term specifically (*wujûdiyyah*), cannot be used to indicate any generalized or all-inclusive categorization of *wujûdî* Sûfis. Beyond this, a complete vindication or condemnation of either of these two important religious figures has yet to be substantiated; hence, for the time being, al-Rânîrî's motivation should be granted at least the benefit of the doubt.

Endnotes

1. G.W.J. Drewes (and L.f. Brakel), *The Poems of Hamzah Fansuri* (Dordrecht-Holland/Cinnaminson-U.S.A.: Foris Publications, 1986), 18.
2. *Ibid.*, 15.
3. Due to my unfamiliarity with the Malay language and in the absence of any other work where al-Rânîrî's accusations against Hamzah are explained in detail, I have had to rely exclusively on al-Attas' presentation of al-Rânîrî's views.
4. See Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, "New Light on the Life of Hamzah Fansuri," in *JMBRAS* (Kuala Lumpur, July 1967), Vol. 40, Part 1, No. 211, 42-51.
5. Drewes, *The Poems*, 5.
6. *Ibid.*, 2. See also al-Attas, "New Light," 42-51.
7. Drewes, *The Poems*, 5.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, 1-3.
10. Al-Attas, *al-Rânîrî and the Wujûdiyyah of 17th Century Aceh* (in Monographs of the Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society, III), (Singapore: *JMBRAS*, 1966), 14-15.
11. *Ibid.*, 13.
12. *Ibid.*, 11.
13. Drewes, *The Poems*, 15.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*, 17-18. See also T. Iskandar, "Three Malay Historical Writings in the First Half of the 17th Century," in *JMBRAS* (Kuala Lumpur, July 1968), Vol. 40, Part 2, 52-53.
17. Al-Attas, *The Mysticism of Hamzah Fansuri* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1970), 31.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, iv.
20. *Ibid.*, 32, 48, 52, 53.
21. In his work "al-Rânîrî and the Wujûdiyyah" (98-113), al-Attas has given a translation of al-Rânîrî's *Hujjat al-Siddiq li daft al-Zindiq*, which is a refutation of the false *wujûdiyyah*, but not of Hamzah specifically.
22. Al-Attas, *The Mysticism*, 32. In the selected passage Hamzah is also related to the other heretical or non-Muslim groups such as the philosophers, Brahmins, incarnationists and the Tanâsukhiyah school.
23. *Ibid.*, 32-33.
24. *Ibid.*, 33-34, c.f. al-Rânîrî, *Tibyân*.
25. *Ibid.*, 35-36, c.f. al-Rânîrî, *Tibyân*.
26. *Ibid.*, 36-37, c.f. Hamzah Fansûrî, *Asrâr*. The Qur'ânic reference "Be! and it [is]," is to verse 36:82 [in Yusuf Ali's edition, *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an* (Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-Masrî, 1938), Vol. 2].
27. Al-Attas, *The Mysticism*, 51, c.f. Hamzah's *Asrâr*.
28. *Ibid.*, 51-52, c.f. al-Ghazâlî, *Tahafut*.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*, 52-54.
32. *Ibid.* 53 c.f. al-Rânîrî, *Tibyân*, The Qur'ânic reference is (Yusuf Ali's edition).

33. Al-Attas, *The Mysticism*, 53, c.f. Hamzah's *Asrâr*.
34. See also Qur'ân 39: 22, 23, 27 (Yusuf Ali's edition).
35. Al-Attas, *The Mysticism*, 53-54, including of, 101.
36. *Ibid.*, 55, c.f. Ghazâlî's *Tahafut*.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*, 54-65.
39. See *ibid.*, 54-65, and also al-Attas, "Rânîrî and the Wujûdiyyah," 98-113 which is the English translation of al-Rânîrî's *Hujjat*.
40. Al-Attas, "Rânîrî and the Wujûdiyyah," 106.
41. *Ibid.*, 17.
42. Al-Attas, "Rânîrî and the Wujûdiyyah," 11.
43. *Ibid.*, 17.
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.* Al-Attas suggests in several places that al-Rânîrî simply may not have understood Hamzah's mystical writings. (See also al-Attas, *The Mysticism*, 31-65.)
47. Drewes, "Nûr al-Dîn al-Rânîrî's Charge of Heresy against Hamzah and Shamsuddin from an International Point of View," in C.D. Grijsns and S.O. Robson, editors, *Cultural Contact and Textual Interpretation* (Holland: Foris Publications, 1986), 54.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*, 56.
50. *Ibid.*, 57.
51. Al-Attas, "Rânîrî and the Wujûdiyyah," v.
52. H.J. De Graaf, "South-East Asian Islam to the Eighteenth Century," in P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, Bernard Lewis (editors), *The Cambridge History of Islam* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), Vol. 2, 141.
53. Al-Attas, "Rânîrî and the Wujûdiyyah," 14.
54. *Ibid.*, 11, 14.
55. *Ibid.*, 11, the emphasis is mine.
56. *Ibid.*, 35
57. Nur Ahmad, editor, *Maktubat-i Imam-i Rabbani Hadrat Mu'addid-i Alf-i Thani al-Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi* (Pishawar Pakistan: University Book Agency, n.d.), Vol. 1, Section 3, letter 160, 3640. More general references to Sirhindî's view of *wahdat al-shuhûd*, his understanding of Ibn 'Arâbî, and his criticism of the perspective of *wahdat al-wujûd* held by Ibn 'Arâbî and others run throughout both volumes 1 and 2 of the *Maktubat*.
58. Drewes, "Nûr al-Dîn" 56-57.
59. *Ibid.*, 57.
60. See note 52 above. Al-Attas himself can only concede that Hamzah "may" not have been responsible for the original heterodox tendencies in Aceh (al-Attas, "Rânîrî and the Wujûdiyyah," 11).
61. Al-Attas, "Rânîrî and the Wujûdiyyah," 13.

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