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Greg Barton

Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual *'Ulamâ'*: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in neo-Modernist Thought

Abstraksi: *Wacana pemikiran Islam Indonesia moderen mencatat Nurcholish Madjid dan Abdurrahman Wahid sebagai dua tokoh utama bagi berkembangnya sebuah gerakan pembaharuan yang dikenal dengan gerakan neo-Modernisme Islam. Gerakan ini, yang pada mulanya diperkenalkan oleh Fazlurrahman ketika ia berkunjung ke Indonesia di awal tahun 70an, menunjukkan perhatian yang serius pada satu hal, yakni: keinginannya menghidupkan kembali cita-cita liberal Islam—yang ditunjukkan dalam khazanah tradisionalnya—dalam kaitannya dengan usaha menjawab tantangan-tantangan masyarakat moderen. Dalam konteks Indonesia, kemunculan gerakan neo-Modernisme Islam seringkali diidentikkan dengan munculnya arus pembaharuan pemikiran keagamaan yang dipelopori kelas terpelajar Muslim yang, meskipun berlatar belakang pesantren, memperoleh akses kepada dunia pendidikan moderen.*

Bila dibandingkan dengan berbagai gerakan pemikiran yang pernah tumbuh dalam sejarah Islam, neo-Modernisme Islam menawarkan suatu paradigma baru dalam memahami ijtihâd. Untuk menyebut beberapa contoh, neo-Modernisme berbeda dengan gerakan-gerakan seperti tradisionalis, revivalis dan, bahkan, modernis sendiri. Setidaknya, menurut penulis, ada beberapa perbedaan yang bisa dicatat untuk melihat ciri-ciri pemikiran ini.

Pertama, berbeda dengan umumnya gerakan tradisionalis, kalangan neo-Modernis bisa dipandang sebagai sebuah gerakan yang progresif: mempunyai sikap yang positif terhadap modernitas dan pembangunan. Kedua, meskipun merupakan respon terhadap modernitas, gerakan neo-Moder-

nis tidak melihat Barat-modern sebagai ancaman atas Islam dan umatnya. Sebaliknya, ia justru melihat dan 'menemukan' Islam untuk berperan sebagai penyempurna peradaban Barat-moderen. Ketiga, gerakan neo-Modernis membuka peluang terjadinya suatu bentuk tertentu 'sekularisme' dalam berbangsa dan bernegara. Hal itu terbukti dengan penegasan sikap mereka atas Pancasila untuk dijadikan acuan ideologis bersama, di mana kepentingan-kepentingan agama harus dibedakan dengan kepentingan-kepentingan bangsa dan negara. Keempat, neo-Modernisme menunjukkan sikap pemahaman Islam yang terbuka, toleran dan inklusif (seperti yang ditunjukkan Islam tradisional), sekaligus membuka peluang adanya pluralisme sosial dan keagamaan.

Keempat ciri pemikiran itu telah membawa gerakan neo-Modernisme ini pada suatu pola gerakan yang berupaya mengintegrasikan antara keagungan Islam klasik (tradisional) dengan semangat modernisme. Tulisan ini menggambarkan bahwa Nurcholish dan Abdurrahman adalah tempat di mana pemikiran Islam tradisional dan cita-cita modernitas bertemu. Agenda-agenda pemikiran yang mereka canangkan, dengan demikian, juga merefleksikan keprihatinan generasi intelektual terhadap keterbelakangan umat Islam vis-à-vis *peradaban Barat. Pada tingkat itu, neo-Modernisme Islam tidak hanya mengadvokasi cita-cita ideal Barat seperti demokrasi, hak-hak asasi manusia dan pemisahan 'gereja dari negara', tetapi juga menegaskan bahwa Islam mempunyai kepedulian yang sama besarnya dengan Barat.*

Pertanyaan yang patut untuk diajukan adalah: mengapa pemikiran neo-Modernisme Islam ini begitu mendapat tempat di kalangan umat Islam Indonesia? Bukan suatu kebetulan bahwa, kemunculan gerakan neo-Modernisme ini bersamaan dengan tumbuhnya kelas terpelajar Muslim yang, meskipun berlatarbelakang pesantren, mempunyai kesempatan menikmati pendidikan moderen. Di samping itu, umat Islam Indonesia yang terbukti tampil lebih terpelajar, menikmati kehidupan ekonomi yang lebih baik, dan lebih siap menerima berbagai bentuk pemikiran baru semakin memberi peluang gerakan neo-Modernisme untuk berkembang. Bersamaan dengan bangsa Indonesia yang sedang menuju proses perubahan penting pada abad 21, pemikiran neo-Modernisme yang progresif inilah yang diharapkan dapat menentukan arah perjalanan bangsa: apakah Indonesia akan terus mempertahankan persatuan antara kelompok agama, ataukah ia akan jatuh akibat berkembangnya sikap-sikap sektarianisme. Apabila kenyataannya terjadi pada yang pertama, maka pemikiran neo-Modernisme Islam Indonesia akan menjadi batu loncatan terhadap bangkitnya kejayaan Islam di abad yang akan datang.

جريج بارتون

نورخالص مجيد وعبد الرحمن واحد زعيما العلماء المثقفين الإندونيسيين: التقاء بين التقليدية والعصرية في الأفكار العصرية الإسلامية المحدثة

الخلاصة: لقد سجل تاريخ الفكر الإسلامى الإندونيسى الحديث نور خالص مجيد وعبد الرحمن واحد كزعيمين بارزين فى تطور حركة تجديدية تعرف بالحركة العصرية الإسلامية المحدثة (Islamic neo-modernism).

وهذه الحركة عرفها للمرة الأولى فضل الرحمن حينما يزور إندونيسيا فى السبعينات تهتم كثيرا بإحياء تطلعات الإسلام التحررية من جديد، كما أشارت إليها خزانته التقليدية استجابة للتحديات التى يواجهها المجتمع المعاصر.

وبالنسبة لإندونيسيا، فإن هذه الحركة كثيرا ما يماثلها ظهور تيار التجديد للفكر الدينى الذى تقدم به طبقة المثقفين المسلمين الذين كانوا يتمتعون بالتربية الحديثة، رغم أن خلفياتهم التربوية من المعاهد الإسلامية التقليدية (pesantren).

وإذا قارنا الحركة العصرية الإسلامية المحدثة مع الحركات الفكرية المختلفة التى ظهرت فى تاريخ الإسلام، فإنها تعرض نموذجا جديدا فى فهم

الاجتهاد حيث يختلف عن الحركات الفكرية الأخرى، مثل الحركة التقليدية والإحيائية بل العصرية ذاتها، وعلى الأقل هناك بعض الاختلافات التى يمكن ذكرها لمعرفة سماتها الفكرية.

أولا: خلافا لمعظم الحركات التقليدية فإن الحركة العصرية المحدثة يمكن أن تعتبر حركة تقدمية، لها موقف إيجابى من التجديد والتنمية.

ثانيا: رغم أن هذه الحركة استجابة للتجديد إلا أنها لا تعد الغرب الحديث تهديدا للإسلام والمسلمين، وعلى عكس ذلك فإن الإسلام فى نظرها يقوم بتكملة الحضارة الغربية الحديثة.

ثالثا: تقوم الحركة العصرية المحدثة بتوسيع المجال لنشأة نوع معين من العلمانية فى المعاملة بين الشعب الإندونيسى والممارسة الحكومية. وذلك بتأكيد موقفها من البنتشاسيلا لتكون مصدرا إيديولوجيا مشتركا حيث إن المصالح الدينية يجب تفريقها من مصالح الشعوب والحكومة.

رابعا: تظهر الحركة العصرية المحدثة فى فهم الإسلام موقفا مفتوحا ومتسامحا ومشتملا (كما أشار إليه الإسلام التقليدى)، كما أنها توسع المجال لوجود التعددية الاجتماعية والدينية.

وقد وصلت هذه السمات الأربع بالحركة إلى نموذج من الحركة يسعى إلى التوحيد بين مجد الإسلام القديم (التقليدى) وروح العصرية.

وصورت هذه المقالة أن كلا من نور خالص مجيد وعبد الرحمن واحد ملتقى الأفكار الإسلامية التقليدية وتطلعات التجديد. ولذلك، كانت الأفكار التى قاما بإعلانها تعكس حزن الأجيال المثقفين على تخلف المسلمين تجاه الحضارة الغربية.

ففى هذه المرحلة لا تقتصر الحركة على تأييد تطلعات الغرب المثالية، مثل الديمقراطية وحقوق الإنسان والانفصال بين الدين والدولة وإنما تؤكد أن

الإسلام له اهتمام كبير لا يقل عن اهتمام الغرب.

والسؤال الذى يمكن تقديمه، لماذا يرحب المسلمون الإندونيسيون بالأفكار التى تقدمت بها الحركة العصرية الإسلامية المحدثة ؟. وليس من المصادفة أن ظهور هذه الحركة فى وقت تنشأ فيه طبقة المثقفين المسلمين، ورغم خلفياتهم التربوية من المعاهد الإسلامية التقليدية إلا أنهم تناولوا الفرصة للتمتع بالتربية الحديثة. إضافة إلى ذلك أن المسلمين الإندونيسيين الذين يتقدمون وهم فى حالة أكثر ذكاء، ويتمتعون بحياة اقتصادية أفضل، وأكثر استعدادا لقبول الأفكار الجديدة المتنوعة، كل ذلك يؤدى إلى ازدهار الحركة العصرية المحدثة.

وبالنسبة إلى الشعب الإندونيسى الذى يخطو نحو التغيرات فى القرن الحادى والعشرين فإن الأفكار التى تقدم بها تلك الحركة التقدمية ترجى أن تتمكن من توجيه الشعب. هل ستدافع إندونيسيا عن توحيد الفرق الدينية أو ستسقط بسبب انتشار الموافق المذهبية ؟، فإذا تحققت الأولى فستصبح الأفكار العصرية الإسلامية المحدثة وسيلة لنهضة مجد الإسلام فى القرن القادم.

Introduction

This paper examines two of Indonesia's leading Islamic intel lectuals, Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid and the movement of thought with which they are associated, neo-Modernism, a new movement in Islamic thought in Indonesia that emerged amidst much controversy in the early 1970s and has since been of considerable influence on the development of Islamic thought, particularly amongst younger Muslim intellectuals. The paper argues that this new movement of thought represents the coming together of Islamic traditionalism, modernism and Western education in the persons of a generation of thinkers from traditionalist backgrounds, who as youths obtained a *pesantren* (traditional religious boarding school) religious education and then went on to undertake modern, Western-style, higher education. In doing this it focuses on the life experiences of two of the most outstanding thinkers to emerge from this generation: Nurcholish Madjid, a respected scholar and public figure, and one of Indonesia' s leading Islamic intellectuals, and Abdurrahman Wahid, currently serving his third term as chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the leading traditionalist organization (and, with a claimed support base of 35 million, Indonesia's largest Islamic organization).

Both Nurcholish and Abdurrahman are prominent public intellectuals in a society with a strong culture of the public intellectual. Both can also be said to be 'ulamâ' (religious scholar/s; in Indonesia 'ulamâ' are traditionally associated with *pesantren*) in the broadest sense of the word.[1] Abdurrahman, despite his eccentricities (or indeed some might say because of them) is well credentialed to claim the title of 'ulamâ' within the context of the traditionalist culture of NU. His extensive, albeit slightly unconventional, studies at Indonesian *pesantren* and Arab universities, and his long involvement with *pesantren* teaching and leadership, qualify him, whatever his detractors might otherwise say about him, to be an 'ulamâ', and this is confirmed by his extensive knowledge and thorough command of traditionalist scholarship. Nurcholish is in a somewhat different category. Like Abdurrahman, he has a solid *pesantren* education and a masterly command of Islamic scholarship. Since his youth, however, he has had comparatively little contact with the world of rural *pesantren*, being clearly more at home in a modern, urban, setting. Nevertheless, as a lecturer at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah he has taught numerous graduates of *pesantren*, many of whom have gone on to appoint-

ments in the Department of Religious Affairs but others of whom have returned to positions of leadership in the *pesantren* world. Moreover, in his academic post at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah and in his intellectual leadership of the Islamic educational organization Paramadina he is, arguably, functioning as an 'ulamâ', albeit in a modern, urban, middle class, setting. Both men then, can be said to be intellectual 'ulamâ', scholars who combine the best of classical scholarship and intellectual leadership with modern learning, 'both secular' and 'Islamic', and who take their place amongst other public intellectuals in the forums of Indonesia's developing civil society.

Islam in Indonesia

Although located geographically on its periphery Indonesia can no longer objectively be said to be of peripheral importance to the Islamic world. With a population in 1996 of approximately 200 million, of which around 175 million (87-88 percent) are Muslim, Indonesia commands attention as the world's largest Muslim nation. It is also increasingly the case that the quality of Islamic thought and scholarship in Indonesia means that they warrant the serious attention of the rest of the Islamic world. For a variety of reasons, however, not least of which being the barriers of language and Arab prejudice, this will be slow to develop.

Until relatively recently there existed a widespread misunderstanding that Islam in Indonesia, especially in Java where more than 60 percent of all Indonesians live, was merely a thin veneer over a substrate of pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhist/animist belief. To a considerable extent this misreading of Indonesian Islam was exacerbated by scholarly writing on Islam in Indonesia by area specialists who were inadequately familiar with Islam in other societies. Perhaps the classic example of this is to be seen in Clifford Geertz's influential book *The Religion of Java*. In this book Geertz provided a wonderfully thick description of village life in East Java in the 1950s but also made some serious errors in analysis. In particular Geertz suggested that Javanese Muslims could be identified as belonging to one of three groups: *santri*, *abangan* and *priyayi*. The *santri*, he argued, denoted those Muslims who were orthodox in both their belief and practise. Whereas the Islam of the *abangan* and *priyayi* was, he implied, profoundly heterodox in nature. The religion of the latter being strongly influenced by pre-Islamic belief, whether Javanese animism or Hindu-Buddhist belief, with the latter being a significant element in the

courtly culture of the *priyayi* who are members of the Javanese aristocracy. Whilst the analysis behind Geertz's paradigm was significantly flawed it was not by any means entirely wrong. In particular, Geertz's delineation of *santri* and *abangan* religious orientations accurately reflected the polarized nature of Indonesian society in the latter half of the Old Order regime, in which the 'nominal Muslims' Geertz identifies as *abangan* were more likely to support the PKI, or Indonesian Communist Party, and the *santri* Muslims more likely to support either Masyumi or Nahdlatul Ulama, the two leading Islamic parties of the 1950s.[2] Whatever its failings, Geertz's *Santri-Abangan-Priyayi* paradigm has become standard usage in Indonesia (though the term *priyayi*, in Geertz's sense, is less used than are the terms *santri* and *abangan*).

A number of Indonesian scholars have taken issue with the inference that *abangan* culture is essentially pre-Islamic and have sought to show that Javanese culture, even *abangan* culture, is far more Islamic than has long been supposed.[3] In part the confusion regarding the Islamicity of Javanese culture arises out of another fundamental division within Muslim society in Indonesia, the division between Islamic modernists and Islamic traditionalists. Traditionalist Islam in Indonesia has long been deeply imbued with a Sufi sensibility, and many traditionalist *pesantren* have given *tasawwuf* a place of central importance in their teaching programs. Connected with this, traditionalist Islam in Indonesia, as in most Muslim countries, has been nurturing of, or at least open to, many aspects of 'folk Islam', or the Islam of the 'little tradition'. For this reason traditionalist *santri* culture has maintained closer links with *abangan* culture than has modernist *santri* culture.

The Indonesian modernists, on the other hand have tended to be deeply suspicious of many aspects of traditionalist culture, in particular its Sufi aspects, and, if they have been open to mysticism at all, have rejected outright traditionalist practises such as *ziyârah* (pilgrimages to the tombs of Sufi saints) and prayers for the dead. As a consequence, the relationship between modernists and traditionalists in Indonesia has been at best uneasy. Pressed for an answer on what distinguishes them from the traditionalists, the modernists will invariably reply that they are not bound by *taqlîd*, by a dependence on the *madhhab*, and are free to make up their minds for themselves on issues through the practice of *ijtihâd*. In practise, for reasons we will see shortly, Indonesian modernists are hardly more likely to

practice genuine *ijtihâd* than their '*madhhab* bound' compatriots. Instead, what really marks them off from the traditionalists is their deep aversion to traditionalist mysticism: its 'un-Islamic' practises and its enchanted world view.[4]

Because modernists in Indonesia, as a group, have been better educated, more middle-class and more urban; they have, until relatively recently, dominated the discourse on Indonesian Islam, both through their own writings, and through their friendships with foreign scholars who have, with few exceptions, come to see Indonesian Islam through modernist eyes.

This 'modernist prejudice' has had a deleterious effect on our understanding of Muslim society in Indonesia, particularly in Java. In the first instance it has tended to sustain a jaundiced view of Indonesian Islam in general. Secondly, it has contributed to a serious misreading of *abangan* culture, one that sees it is as essentially unique in the Islamic world and fundamentally different from folk-Islam culture in the Middle East and continental Asia. Thirdly, it has fostered the view that traditionalist Islam in Indonesia is compromised and exceptionally syncretistic. As a result the modernists, apprehensive about the spiritual impurity all around them, have tended to see themselves as an embattled minority fighting the good fight for religious truth, a fight that, from the late 1950s onwards, came to be understood almost exclusively as a political fight.

Unfortunately, this siege mentality has also contributed directly to the stagnation of modernist scholarship. It has done this in two significant ways. Firstly, it has contributed to an obsession with party-political achievement and a burning ambition to 'make the Indonesian state more Islamic'. This concern for political reform has taken a variety of forms. At one extreme some Muslim leaders have called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, arguing that the *Sharî'ah*, or Islamic law, should be written into the constitution and codified in Indonesian law. At the other extreme many Modernist leaders in the 1950s simply argued for the reinstatement of the 'seven words' of the so called Jakarta Charter, the original preamble to the 1945 Constitution, stating that: 'it is obligatory for Muslims to practise the *Sharî'ah*'. Amongst those who took this second position there was also a wide variety of views. Some saw the Jakarta Charter in purely symbolic terms, with its hoped for re-inclusion in the constitution representing official recognition (by the left-leaning Sukarno regime) of the status of Indonesia as a Muslim country. Others clearly

saw it as a mechanism for the further Islamization of Indonesian society, pushing *abangan* Muslims to comply with *santri* expressions of piety.

By any measure the modernists met with resounding failure in their quest to gain greater state recognition of Islam. Not only did they experience constant frustration in the Old Order period of Sukarno, culminating in the banning of their party, Masyumi, in January 1960, but even after helping Soeharto and the Indonesian army to 'crush Communism' in 1965 and 1966 they continued to meet with suspicion and opposition from the government. Early in the New Order period the modernist community held high hopes that Masyumi would be readmitted to the political forum in the form of the new modernist party Parmusi. It soon became clear, however, that Soeharto's new military backed regime was even less willing to give ground to political Islam than was the previous regime of Sukarno. Instead, the modernists' aspirations for Parmusi were systematically undermined. Firstly, the regime announced that it would not countenance former Masyumi leaders being given leadership roles in Parmusi. Next, it blocked the appointment of the moderate Mohamad Roem as leader of the party and instead engineered the appointment of the more compliant John Naro. Finally, in 1973 it merged all Islamic parties together to form the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan—PPP) at the same time merging all the other parties together to form the Democratic Party of Indonesia (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia).

Over the next few years the government did make some concessions to Muslim interest in the form of the Islamic Marriage Bill and other minor, largely symbolic, pieces of legislation. The greater aspirations of the modernists, however, were effectively stymied. Having expended an enormous amount of energy and resources in party-political activity over two decades the modernists had ultimately achieved very little.

The second way in which modernist scholarship suffered was that in rejecting Islamic traditionalism they effectively rejected traditionalist scholarship. Far too few modernist children were taught classical Arabic and even less mastered more than the rudiments of classical Islamic scholarship. As a consequence, the modernist movement failed to produce a new generation of Islamic scholars. In rejecting the traditionalist, and essentially rural, world of the *pesantren*, the modernists had also cut themselves from the classical heritage of Is-

lam and from an educational system that, whatever its failings, was able every year to produce a small elite of *pesantren* graduates who continued on to tertiary Islamic studies, of whom a small, but significant, proportion graduated to became true Islamic intellectuals (and not merely Muslim intellectuals).

The Split between Traditionalism and Modernism

The 1950s saw traditional Islam, and traditionalist leaders, steadily pushed from the limelight by more 'modern' elements. In a period in which party political activity was ostensibly conducted along modern Western lines those leaders who had a modern education possessed an unassailable advantage. By comparison, those who were largely products of the *pesantren* world stood little chance of being taken seriously. (There were odd exceptions to this, of course, such as Wahid Hasjim[5], where the sheer brilliance of the individual won out over their 'inferior' education, but there were not many).

At this point very few 'ulamâ', or even ordinary graduates of a *pesantren*, had any further education beyond their traditional Islamic education. Similarly, few modernist figures had much in the way of a classical Islamic education (aside from a few outstanding individuals such as Muhammad Natsir, Mukti Ali, Deliar Noer and Harun Nasution). One consequence of this was that neither side felt at ease in crossing over to the world of the other. Their two worlds remained very much separate. The 1950s preoccupation with modernity only served to accentuate this situation. This happened in two main ways. Firstly, and perhaps more obviously, the rupture between traditionalists and modernists, ostensibly over the issue of leadership positions within Masyumi, meant that NU 'ulamâ' and teachers largely withdrew into a world of their own, at least as far as interchange with modernist scholars went. (Abdul Madjid, Nurcholish's father, a farmer and founder of a traditionalist *madrasah*, was an exception to this general rule, but his difficulties, as a traditionalist who remained in Masyumi after the departure of NU, illustrate clearly the sort of social pressures at work). Having been forced to work together during the Japanese occupation in a united Islamic council, and then having fought side by side during the struggle for independence, the modernists and traditionalists had entered the post-independence era politically united in Masyumi. This political unity, however, did not last long and in 1952 the traditionalists split from Masyumi and established NU as an independent political party.

Secondly, the managerial ability that the modernists displayed in dealing with the apparatus of multi-party democracy ultimately served to trap them into a fixation with politics. This fixation, ironically, became perhaps even stronger after the era of multi-party democracy had come to a close. So embittered were the Masyumi leaders by their summary exclusion from the political arena that the issue of regaining their place in politics became an obsession. That their hopes were first raised then dashed by the appearance of Parmusi in the beginning of the New Order period only served to further fix their gaze upon the elusive goal of political success.[6]

In this matter it is hard not to sympathize with the plight of the Masyumi leaders. Muhammad Natsir's memorable aphorism 'They have treated us like cats with ringworms' is hard to dismiss.[7] Under the circumstances the bitterness is entirely understandable. Similarly the obsession with political recovery seems altogether reasonable given that Masyumi was a political party. The problem for the modernist side of the *ummat* (religious community) in general, however, was that for many of the *ummat*'s best and brightest, Masyumi, the political organization, became the paramount concern. Every other aspect of community life was subordinated, so many would argue, to this obsession with the political rehabilitation of Masyumi.

As a result of these developments there was little scope for Islamic thought, as such, to develop in Indonesia during this period. In more recent decades the interchange of ideas between traditionalism and modernism has been one of the key factors behind the creativity and vigor evident at the cutting edge of Islamic thought in Indonesia. Such interchange did not really recommence in earnest, however, until well into the New Order period. Perhaps if Wahid Hasjim had not been killed in an automobile accident in 1953 the situation might have developed differently.[8] At the very least Wahid Hasjim may have been able to keep open the channels of communication between the modernists and the traditionalists. As it happened, the NU break with the Masyumi modernists meant that the exchange of ideas that might otherwise have taken place between classically trained traditionalist scholars and modernist intellectuals largely failed to occur. Many of NU's best minds were kept busy with politics; both the external party-politics of the various phases of Indonesian political life and the internal politics of NU as an organization striving to survive in difficult times.

Similarly, on the modernist side intellectuals who might otherwise have fostered the development of Islamic thought became bogged in the mire of *Realpolitik* Thinkers such as Deliar Noer and Mukti Ali did, to some extent, break new ground in Islamic thought during this period. It is significant, however, that both of these men felt the need to leave Indonesia as the political situation deteriorated and tensions heightened.

Pesantren Graduates and Higher Education

It has always been the case that the modernists, as a group, have been comparatively well educated and very much committed to education. Indeed one of the chief fields of social endeavor of modernism in Indonesia has been the extension of education to as many people as possible. Modernist organizations such as Muhammadiyah have a proud history of establishing schools and extending educational opportunities at a time when it was very difficult to do so. Up until the 1970s, however, very few modernist intellectuals in Indonesia had received a classical Islamic education grounding them in Qur'anic Arabic and the classical canon of Islamic scholarship. Consequently, despite their theoretical support for *ijtihâd* (individual interpretation of Scriptures) very few modernists had sufficient scholarly apparatus to be able to carry it out. Not only were they insufficiently familiar with classical writers and classical Islamic scholarship, few of them had full command of classical Arabic. Unfortunately for the cause of modernist thought, men who were both committed to the modernist vision and who had the necessary scholarly skills to carry it out, were very rare.[9] Beyond the figures mentioned above (Muhammad Natsir, Mukti Ali, Deliar Noer and Harun Nasution), there were very few modernist intellectuals whose education, in this sense, was wholly adequate.[10]

It was not until the 1960s that students from the traditionalist/*pesantren* milieu began to enter the world of modern western education. The generation of Nurcholish, and Abdurrahman was the first generation in which the two strands of scholarship within the *umat* - classical Islamic scholarship and modern, Western, learning - were brought together to a significant degree. Half a century or more earlier this same combination of learning had made possible the emergence of the Islamic Modernist movement.[11] In the late 1960s and 1970s it gave rise to a new wave of modernist thought, neo-Modern-

ism, with those in the vanguard of this movement being mostly products of the traditionalist *pesantren* or *madrasah* system.

The contribution of the IAIN system to the reform of Islam is of enormous significance. The formation of the IAIN, beginning with IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, in Ciputat, Jakarta, and IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, in Yogyakarta, in 1960, meant that, for the first time, large numbers of *pesantren* graduates were able to undertake university level studies.[12] It should be pointed out however, that the IAINs in Jakarta and Yogyakarta were not exactly 'universities' for *ulama* along the lines of Cairo's Al-Azhar. Al-Azhar University had indeed been an inspirational model for the architects of the Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute for Islamic Studies) but the IAIN themselves, particularly IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta and IAIN Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta, have developed into institutions that in many ways are much broader than Al-Azhar. During the 1960s, however, these IAIN remained close to the Al-Azhar model and suffered from a shortage of well trained staff. It was not until the 1970s that a serious, but gradual, process of reform saw the transformation of the IAIN into institutions that combined traditional Islamic scholarship with modern approaches to learning. But even in the late 1960s significant individual members of staff, such as Harun Nasution at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah and Mukti Ali at IAIN Sunan Kalijaga were exerting a progressive influence over certain students, pushing them to think through the basis of their convictions and approach the study of Islam in a critically informed fashion.

As the Old Order gave way to the New Order, a new generation of Islamic thinkers came to the fore. Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid are leading representatives of that generation. Born in 1939 and 1940 respectively, these men entered adulthood as Soeharto came to power.[13] As such their entire careers, first as student activists then as public intellectuals, were products of the development orientated New Order.

Neo-Modernism

Neo-Modernism, then, developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s chiefly amongst students of traditionalist backgrounds who, through the expansion of education that occurred in post-colonial Indonesia, were the first generation of traditionalist Muslims to have access to higher education in significant numbers. Through their tertiary studies

they became involved in the leading modernist oriented Muslim student organization Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI — Association of Muslim Students). Originally the movement was referred to simply as the Renewal of Islamic Thought movement (Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam), or the Renewal (*Pembaruan*) movement.[14] Later, invoking Fazlur Rahman's paradigm of modern reform movements, the movement came to be known as neo-Modernism .

The Renewal Movement developed independently in Indonesia in the early 1970s without any of its leading figures being aware of strikingly similar ideas formulated by the late University of Chicago Pakistani-American Islamic intellectual Fazlur Rahman. When Rahman and his University of Chicago colleague Leonard Binder visited Indonesia in 1974 however, Nurcholish became acquainted with Rahman's thought and later went to study under Rahman at the University of Chicago. By the 1980s Rahman's works had been translated into Indonesian and had become reasonably well known. And the movement of thought that began as the Renewal Movement was increasingly being referred to as the neo-Modernist movement.[15]

The Renewal Movement inadvertently achieved sudden notoriety following a private seminar in January 1970 by Nurcholish Madjid, then in his second term as National Chairman of HMI, in which he spoke of the moribund state of modernist thought and the need for renewal, Nurcholish's bold use of terms such as desacralising (*desakralisasi*) and secularising (*sekularisasi*) in this paper meant that it was easy for his infuriated critics (in particular certain senior modernist leaders who were inflamed by his suggestion that their movement had become intellectually stagnant and in need of reform) to publicly castigate him and charge him with heretical inclinations. It is important to note however, that the emergence of the Renewal Movement centered around Nurcholish also marked the beginning of a more widespread shift in the Muslim community in the direction of both renewed interest in Islam and in inclination towards liberal understandings of Islam.[16] Thus, whilst he came under heavy fire from senior modernist figures, his ideas were increasingly meeting with acceptance in broader Indonesian society. The Renewal Movement, then, was both a catalyst for a broader change in societal attitudes and a beneficiary of those changes.[17]

The seminal figures associated with the Renewal Movement at the time were Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi and the late Ahmad Wahib. Other figures associated with the movement include Dawam

Rahardjo, Syu'bah Asa and Utomo Dananjaya. Following his return from studies in the Middle East, Abdurrahman Wahid quickly aligned himself with the movement. Partly as a consequence of this, many of the youth associated with Nahdlatul Ulama, and a significant number of the organization's 'ulamâ', share an intellectual outlook strongly influenced by neo-Modernist thought.

To a considerable extent this is due to the influence of Abdurrahman Wahid, but it is also due in large part to the process of reform occurring in the tertiary level State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negeri) first established in the late 1950s to train staff for the Department of Religious Affairs. Beginning in the 1970s at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, under the influence of Harun Nasution, (who was later joined in the 1980s by like-minded younger academics such as Nurcholish Madjid, Quraish Shihab and Azyumardi Azra), and later extending to IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, and other IAIN, a process of liberal educational and intellectual reform has been occurring over the past twenty years. This process of reform, which in its essentials is congruent with the ideas of neo-Modernism, has been greatly assisted over the past two decades by the influential tenures of two liberal-minded Ministers of Religious Affairs (particularly significant because it is the Department of Religious Affairs, rather than the Department of Education, that is in charge of the IAIN).[18] The result is that this extensive religious education system, although initially modelled on the conservative Al-Azhar University in Cairo, is today at the leading edge of Islamic education, in many respects surpassing Middle Eastern Institutions (through, admittedly still inferior in regard to subjects such as Arabic language and literature and *usûl fiqh*).

One final factor needs to be mentioned here with respect to the formative environmental factors that were at work in the growth of neo-Modernism. This final factor, in part a product of their times, is that Nurcholish and Abdurrahman know nothing of the 'inferiority complex' felt by so many Muslim intellectuals toward the West. Earlier generation of Islamic intellectuals had struggled with this ironically unjust and unfortunate legacy of European colonialism. Many denied that it even existed but gave constant, though unconscious, expression to it in their work. Some few earlier intellectuals had perhaps even managed to escape its insidious influence but most did not. The generation of Nurcholish and Abdurrahman, however, was the

first generation for whom this was truly not a problem. This generation had not fought in any wars of independence and could not remember a time when society was structured around a European elite. Precisely how this fact influenced their thought, to what extent and in exactly what ways, is difficult to determine. Equally, however, it is clear that this was a most significant factor in shaping their thought. Where so much of earlier writing had been essentially apologetic in nature (being generally concerned with showing that whatever the west had now Islam had from the very beginning) their writing was bold and confident. It was about moving on, not looking back.

Nurcholish Madjid

Whilst Nurcholish and Abdurrahman are remarkable intellectual pioneers they are also very much products of their immediate family environments and can be said to have inherited a tradition of reform. In several important respects Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid are strikingly like their fathers, Abdul Madjid and Wahid Hasjim. Abdul Madjid and Wahid Hasjim were close friends (and also happened to be related through marriage). Both were prominent figures in traditionalist Muslim society in Jombang, East Java, an important NU centre, and both were remarkable for the manner in which they transcended the traditionalist-modernist divide. Abdul Madjid remains to this day a Jombang farmer-cum-religious teacher little know outside the small city of Jombang, East Java, but Wahid Hasjim, following in the footsteps of his father, Hasjim Asy'ari, became a national figure through his leadership of NU. Wahid Hasjim had a vision of a united Masyumi that was big enough for both modernists and traditionalists and of Indonesia as a new nation in which diversity was celebrated. Abdul Madjid was a close friend of Wahid Hasjim and shared in his vision. When Wahid was killed in a car accident in 1953 NU had already split from Masyumi, to Wahid's deep regret, but Madjid continued on in Masyumi out of respect for his late friend's wishes. The decision to remain in Masyumi after the 1952 split meant that Abdul Madjid was not able to become active in NU and caused him to experience a certain degree of hostility from some quarters within NU. His traditionalist orientation, however, meant that he was not at home in modernist organizations such as Muhammadiyah either. Such was his knowledge of Islam and traditionalist scholarship, however that had he been active within NU, Abdul Madjid would probably have been considered an 'ulamâ' and

been given the title *kyai*, particularly as he had founded, and taught in, his own *madrasah* in Jombang.

Nurcholish was born in Jombang in March 1939. As a child, his father sent him to study at the local Public Elementary School (Sekolah Rakyat) in the mornings to obtain a secular education and then to Madrasah Al-Wathaniah, his father's madrasah, in the afternoons to obtain a religious education. At the age of 14 he moved to the NU affiliated Pesantren Darul 'Ulum Rejoso, also in Jombang. He studies there for two years and was academically very successful, winning a number of school prizes. At the *pesantren* he also encountered many difficulties, however, on account of his father's involvement with Masyumi. Partly as a consequence of this his father sent him to the well known progressive pesantren in Gontor, East Java, Pondok Modern Gontor. Nurcholish was at Gontor from the age of 16 through to 22 and was strongly influenced by this remarkable pesantren that was one of the first to seek to synthesize traditional pesantren learning with modern education.[19]

When Nurcholish had begun his tertiary studies in the early 1960s multi-party democracy was suspended, Masyumi was banned and many of the Masyumi leadership were either in exile or under house arrest. By the time he was nearing the end of his studies, and entering the senior ranks of HMI, 'Masyumi' had died a second death[20]. The great hopes that had been held for Parmusi as a Masyumi reincarnate crumbled as it became clear that the military backed New Order government was no more a supporter of political Islam than was its predecessor. Consequently, Nurcholish entered the world of serious student activism just as the great dream of reformist Islam taking its place in the governing of Indonesia was ending. Nurcholish, having been elected to the national chairmanship of HMI in 1966 (and therefore enjoying a close relationship with the former Masyumi leaders), had worked for the success of Parmusi. But by 1967 he could see the writing on the wall. With the effective demise of Parmusi an era had ended. No longer, he decided, was it sensible for the energies of Islamic intellectuals to be focused narrowly upon politics.

Not only was it clear that the New Order regime intended to leave no space for serious political opposition from Islamic groups it was also doubtful whether such opposition, were it possible, would be in the best interests of society anyway. Heading an organization that was, for the most part, far less progressive in its thinking than himself, Nurcholish at first kept such thoughts to himself. By the

time of his January 3rd 1970 address, however, he felt it time to speak out.[21] What the Indonesian public wanted, he suggested, was Islam without the politics. The cry: 'Islam yes! Islamic parties no!', he argued, summed up the general sentiment of the *ummat*. To continue to focus upon politics, then, was both foolish, in that the real chances for success were slim, and unwise, in that party political activity was not the best way for Islam to serve society. In large part the antipathy felt by Nurcholish and his friends for Islamic party-politics arises from their theological convictions. Neither the Qur'ân nor the Sunnah, they argue, give a blue-print for an Islamic state. In fact the whole idea of establishing an Islamic state in the modern period is, they suggest, far more an apologetic response to the West than it is a rational interpretation of Islamic teaching. This view is frequently articulated throughout Nurcholish's work, as it is in the writing of Abdurrahman Wahid.[22]

Together with his leadership of HMI Nurcholish was also active in the leadership of a number of other student organizations in the region. In the late 1960s he served as Deputy Secretary General of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO) and from 1967 to 1969 he was president of the Union of Southeast Asian Muslim Students. It is interesting to note in passing that it was through the latter that he met Anwar Ibrahim, then a prominent Malaysian youth leader and currently a senior minister and the man considered most likely to become the next Prime Minister. The two men have maintained their friendship and Anwar is known to take more than a passing interest in Nurcholish's reformist ideas and in Indonesia's experiment in Islamic liberalism.

In 1968 Nurcholish was given a chance to visit the USA. The visit left him deeply impressed by many aspects of American society and no doubt contributed to the growing sophistication of his thinking about the links between culture and religion. This was compounded by the fact that he had taken the opportunity to visit the Middle East on the way back from the USA. His two months in the Middle East, he recalls, had an even greater effect upon him than this five weeks in America. This is significant because it is often asserted that Nurcholish underwent an overnight conversion to a pro-Western position following his first visit to the USA. In fact he had fully expected American society to be impressive in certain respects, he recalls. What he had not expected, however, was for Arab society to be quite as disappointing as he found it to be. Nurcholish returned to Indonesia more sure than ever that a radical renewal of Islamic thought was required.

Given the central importance of the meeting of Western and Muslim educational and intellectual cultures in neo-Modernism some might be surprised to learn that Nurcholish did not move directly from the Pesantren Modern in Gontor to a modern, secular university such as Universitas Indonesia or Gadjah Mada. He went instead from Gontor to IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta, from secondary Islamic education to tertiary Islamic education. Institutionally at least Nurcholish had not left the realm of Islamic theological education. Nevertheless Nurcholish wanted to acquire a modern, Western, education and, in effect he did just this, albeit initially by informal rather than formal means. This occurred in a number of ways. Firstly he read broadly. Although not enrolled at a secular university, simply being a student in Jakarta gave him ready access to the milieu and facilities of the surrounding universities. Thus, amongst other things, he had easy access to numerous modern libraries. Even as a secondary student he had been an avid reader. As a student at Gontor Nurcholish had been encouraged to read much and to read broadly. By the time that he settled down to studies in Jakarta Nurcholish was reading not just in Indonesian and Arabic but also in English and French. Secondly, Nurcholish mixed widely with secular university students in a variety of formal and informal student discussion groups. As he became increasingly involved with HMI this process of exchanging ideas with students from secular universities intensified greatly. (As an IAIN student he was something of a rarity within HMI, particularly within the HMI leadership.) It is also significant that at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Nurcholish chose to study in the Faculty of Cultural Studies, the faculty that was closest in its orientation to a faculty of humanities or arts in a secular university. A decade later Nurcholish did undertake formal studies in a modern Western university, when he completed doctoral studies at the University of Chicago from 1978 to 1984. But clearly by the time Nurcholish graduated from IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah in 1968 he was already deeply influenced by modern Western thought.

Nurcholish's IAIN studies reinforced his command of Qur'ânic Arabic and laid a foundation of critical knowledge in Arab culture, literature and in classical Islamic thought, a foundation upon which all of his later work, including his Chicago doctoral studies, depends. His mastery of Arabic by the end of his studies is illustrated by the fact that a speech he gave whilst in the Middle East in 1968 so impressed his audience that he was invited to return to Saudi Arabia in

1969 to undertake the *hajj* as an official guest of the Saudi government.

Nurcholish's January 3rd paper marked a watershed in his public life. No longer was he free to seek to quietly 'reform from within'. Public outrage from conservative modernists meant that he and his friends were obliged to set forth and defend the basis for their ideas in seminars, discussion groups and articles in the print media. From 1971 to 1974 Nurcholish directed the publication of *Mimbar Jakarta*, a magazine with a small but influential readership intended as a vehicle for the presentation of the thinking behind the Renewal Movement. Many of those associated with *Mimbar* also met regularly to discuss reformist ideas as members of the Samanhudi discussion group. Aside from Nurcholish, the leading members of this group were Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib, Dawam Rahardjo, Syu'bah Asa, Utomo Dananjaya, and later, Abdurrahman Wahid. Later in the decade the Samanhudi group gave way to the Reboan (literally: Wednesday's) forum which continues to meet today, albeit normally only during the month of Ramadân.

In 1974 Fazlur Rahman and Leonard Binder visited Jakarta as part of a Ford Foundation funded long term research project. Apart from their own research, they had come in search of an Indonesian participant to take part in a half year seminar program at the University of Chicago. Initially they had intended to invite the senior modernist leader H.M. Rasjidi, who at the time was one of Nurcholish's most virulent public critics.[23] Ironically, Rahman and Binder decided that Rasjidi was 'too old' and choose Nurcholish instead. As a consequence Nurcholish spent seven months at the University of Chicago in 1976 participating in an international research seminar program on Islam and social change. Rahman and Binder were clearly impressed with their young charge for they asked him to stay on at Chicago for postgraduate studies. Nurcholish accepted but requested that he not take up work at Chicago until 1978 in order to allow him to take part in the 1977 election campaign.

It is interesting to note that in the 1977 election Nurcholish campaigned for PPP, the amalgamated Muslim party, despite his criticism of linking religion and party politics. He explained his support for PPP at the time by saying that Indonesia needed strong opposition parties, and that consequently, PPP and PDI needed to be strengthened in order to provide some sort of match for the dominant Golkar. Indonesia democracy, he said, is like a *becak* (a three-

wheeled pedicab), at the moment one of the three wheels has a flat tire, his job is simply to 'pump up a flat tire' (*memompa ban kempes*) so the *becak* can be on its way again.

Nurcholish has often been criticized for being too a-political, and not sufficiently engaged in political issues. His involvement with the 1977 election suggests that this is an inaccurate assessment, at least in the 1970s. In the 1980s it is true that he focused his energies on educational and intellectual endeavors. In the 1990s, however, Nurcholish has become steadily more outspoken about political issues. One indication of his enduring concern for socio-political issues has been his involvement in Human Rights issues as a member of the National Human Rights Commission of the Republic of Indonesia. Initially criticized as being a mere exercise in 'window dressing' by a regime facing increasing international pressure to lift its game, the Human Rights Commission has proven itself capable of independent and incisive criticism. A recent example of this was the Commission's sharp criticism of official measures to 'control' the large-scale rioting that broke out in Jakarta on 27 July 1996 following the military's storming of the PDI headquarters occupied by PDI members loyal to recently ousted PDI leader Megawati Sukarnoputri.

Nurcholish arrived at the University of Chicago in 1978 expecting to undertake a doctorate in political science with Leonard Binder. Instead, he was persuaded by Fazlur Rahman to undertake research in Islamic Studies on the grounds that the Muslim world needed modern scholars of Islam more than it needed political scientists. Nurcholish's 1984 doctoral dissertation was entitled *Ibn Taymiyya on Kalam and Falasifa*. In it he argued that Ibn Taymiyya, much vaunted by modernists as a conservative, was in actual fact far more reform-minded than many had previously allowed.

When Nurcholish returned to Indonesia in 1985 he joined the teaching staff at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah and became a key figure in the process of reform with the IAIN that had been initiated by Harun Nasution. His friends from the Renewal Movement days, however, were keen to see him have a broader influence upon Indonesian society. After much deliberation, Utomo Dananjaya and others resolved to establish a socio-educational organization aimed at influencing Jakarta's middle classes as a vehicle for establishing Nurcholish in a broader social ministry. The organization that they established, Paramadina, was initially criticized for being too narrowly focused on the middle and upper middle class *abangan*, or non-*santri* Jakartans.

Paramadina has, however, by any measure, been a solid success. It currently has two offices, employs around twenty full time members of staff and is in the process establishing first a modern *pesantren* and then a private university. In many respects, the seminars and discussion groups of Paramadina represent a continuation of the Samanhudi and Reboan discussion groups of the 1970s. Since the mid 1980s Paramadina has run a regular schedule of public lectures, study cells, weekend seminar programs and so forth. The organization continues to attract criticism for its deliberate focus on influencing Jakarta's elite, but few can deny that the strategy has been successful in turning urban *abangan* professionals, business people, civil servants and students towards a stronger religious faith, a deeper knowledge of Islam and a progressive outlook on the role of religion in society. Though some may bulk at the comparison, it could be said that Paramadina, as an religious educational institution, is functioning as a late twentieth century analogue of the traditional *pesantren* or *madrasah*.

Some sense of the ethos of Paramadina, and indeed of neo-Modernism more generally in Indonesia, can be obtained from the brief 'mission statement' that the organization inserts in the back of each of its books. This statement reads as follows: "YAYASAN PARAMADINA is a religious institution which is wholly convinced that as the universal values of Islam are made concrete in the context of Indonesia's local traditions, Islamness and Indonesianness are profoundly integrated. Yayasan Paramadina is designed to be a centre for Islamic religiosity which is creative, constructive and positive, for the purpose of the advancement of society, without being defensive or reactionary in attitude. For this reason its core activities are directed towards the building up of society' s capacity to answer the challenges of this age and to contributing towards its growing intellectual tradition. This means investing considerable resources in developing the quality and authority of scholarship. As a consequence, the core program of activities revolves around initiatives to raise up and disseminate an understanding of Islam which is broad in scope, profound, and imbued with a spirit of openness, together with disseminating ideas which support justice, openness and democracy."[24]

If one measure of Paramadina's success is the way in which it has succeeded in establishing a strong following amongst sections of the Jakarta elite, with hundreds attending its seminars and programs on a regular basis, another must be its marshalling of Nurcholish's intel-

lectual resources for writing. One of the main mechanisms by which this has occurred has been Paramadina's monthly KKA (Klub Kajian Agama - Religious Studies Club) seminar series. The first KKA meeting, was held in October 1986, not long after the founding of Paramadina. KKA seminars have been held on the evening of the third Friday of every month since then. For some years now the seminars have taken place at Hotel Kartika Chandra, a large international hotel in South Jakarta. The several hundred, mostly regular, attendees are composed of a mixture of students, intellectuals and members of the city's upper middle classes. Each seminar sees two papers being presented. The papers normally address some aspect of religion and modern life and the second paper is normally presented by Nurcholish Madjid. Copies of the two papers, in booklet form, are available at the light buffet dinner before the commencement of the seminars.

In 1992 Paramadina published an anthology of Nurcholish's KKA papers entitled *Islam, Doctrine and Culture: A Critical Study of Faith, Humanism and Modernity.* [25] The attractively produced paperback, widely available in Indonesian book stores, is over six hundred pages long and contains thirty three articles with titles such as 'The human dimension in initiatives to understand religious doctrine'; 'The strengths and weaknesses of Asy'ârî's understanding as a basis for Islamic belief and doctrine'; and 'Re-actualising cultural and spiritual values in the process of transforming society'. This was followed in 1995 by two similar, though shorter, anthologies from Paramadina entitled *Islam - the Religion of Humanism: Developing a New Tradition and Vision for Islam in Indonesia;* and *Islam—the Religion of Culture: Developing a Sense of Islamic Doctrine in History and its Relevance* [26] The first book contains fourteen articles and is divided into two sections: Part One: Islam and the Islamic Tradition in Indonesia; and Part Two: Islam, Humanism and Justice. The eighteen articles in the second book are arranged in three sections: Part One: The Historical Approach to Understanding Islamic Doctrine and Culture; Part Two: Various Conceptions of Religiosity; The Meaning of Islam in the Experience and Ritual Practice of Religion. As with *Islam, Doctrine and Culture*, the articles in these two books are written in a scholarly fashion but pitched at an intelligent lay reader. Nurcholish's approach is rigorously rational and logical and builds upon a contextualised reading of the Qur'ân and Sunnah together with a deep knowledge of classical Islamic scholarship. The text is rich with quotations from

the Qur'ân and the Hadîth, and from both classical Islamic scholars and contemporary Western writers. Nevertheless, the narrative style in the body of the text is clearly framed with a non-specialist in mind and many of the intricacies of his argument are taken up in example endnotes. (A fifteen page article, for example, might typically have three or four pages of endnotes.)

In 1994, the year before the publication of these last two books, Paramadina had published another anthology of Nurcholish's writing: *Gates on the Path to God.*[27] The articles in this book however, were drawn not from Paramadina seminars or lectures but from Nurcholish's writing in the popular press. Consequently, the articles are short and the style light and easy. It is perhaps not surprising then, that this title has become Paramadina's best seller.

In addition to his Paramadina publications Nurcholish has three other books published by Bulan Bintang and Mizan, two of the leading Islamic publishing houses in Indonesia, prior to Paramadina's foray into book publishing. Whilst working on his PhD in Chicago Nurcholish decided to act on his conviction that Indonesian Muslims needed to become better acquainted with classical Islamic scholarship. In 1979 he began translating key passages from the works of Islam's leading scholars from Arabic into Indonesian. This work came to fruition in 1984 when Bulan Bintang published *The Intellectual Treasury of Islam.* [28] This volume of almost four hundred pages incorporates excerpts from the works of the classical scholars: al-Kindî, al-Asy'arî, al-Farabî, Ibn Sînâ, al-Ghazâlî, Ibn Rusyd, Ibn Taymîyyah, Ibn Khaldûn, and the early modernists: Al-Afghânî and Muhammad 'Abduh. These passages are prefaced by Nurcholish in two long essays: 'The Intellectual Heritage of Islam' (fifty seven pages in length) and 'A Brief Overview of Islamic Modernism' (twenty four pages length).

In July 1987 Mizan published Nurcholish's first anthology, *Islam, Modernity and Indonesianness.* [29] This book is a compilation of Nurcholish's writing from the 1970s and early 1980s. Three hundred and forty four pages in length, the book is divided into six sections: Section One - Islam and Political Aspirations in Indonesia; Section Two - Islam and Aspirations for Social Justice; Section Three - Islam and Modern-Industrial Society; Section Four - Modernism and the Ideas for the Renewal of Islamic Thought; Section Five - Islam and Learning; and Section Six - Prospects for Islam. The genesis for the book lay with its editor, Agus Edi Santoso. He had conceived of the

idea of making a compilation of Nurcholish's writing whilst working in the Department of Information at the National Office of HMI during the period 1984-1986. After the publication of *Islam, Modernity and Indonesianness* he decided to put together a second volume of Nurcholish's writing, drawing on material that had been passed over in this first book. The result was the *Thought of the 'Young' Nurcholish : Islam, Democracy and Indonesianness*, published by Mizan in 1993.[30] The material in this second, somewhat slimmer, volume is drawn entirely from the early 1970s and consists of short essays written for *Mimbar Jakarta* and for Jakarta newspapers such as *Tribun* and *Post Bangsa*. Like the early volume this book is divided into topical sections, but in this case the section titles are drawn directly from the titles of certain essays and reflect the more popularist tone of these essays: Section One Is Long Hair an Extravagance?; Section Two - Workers of Indonesia Unite!: Examining Initiatives to Improve the Quality of Life for Indonesia's Masses, Section Three Discovering Indonesianness: Examining the Progress Made by Indonesia's Rising Generation; Section Four - Heroes from the Village of Parakan: Examining National Leadership Styles; and Section Five - Pak Haji and the PKI Thesis: Examining Religion as One Variant in Discussion.

Aside from publishing Nurcholish's writing, Paramadina has also published a number of titles by other progressive Islamic intellectuals, many with social science PhD s from Western universities. *The Contextualisation of Islamic Doctrine in History*, a 1994 Paramadina publication, illustrates well the intellectual and social concerns of Nurcholish and his organization.[31] This anthology of scholarly writing by leading Indonesian intellectuals is over seven hundred pages in length. Aside from fifteen articles by Nurcholish there are articles by old friends who were with him in the Renewal Movement during the 1970s such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Djohan Effendi as well contributions from older scholars such as Harun Nasution (the person who, more than anyone else, is responsible for the progressive reform of the IAIN system in the 1970s and 1980s) and NU 'ulamâ' Kiai Ali Yafie, as well as from neo-Modernists of the next generation such as Jalaluddin Rahmat (the Bandung based activist/intellectual regarded as controversial because of his interest in Shi'ah thought), Masdar F. Mas'udi (who, as a student leader, worked closely with Abdurrahman in the reform of NU), and Komarudin Hidayat (re-

cently returned from doctoral studies in Turkey). The fifty two articles are thematically organized into six chapters as follows: Chapter One - Concerning Problems in the Interpretation of the Qur'ân; Chapter Two - The Fundamental Concepts of the Qur'ân; Chapter Three Traditional Islamic Intellectual Traditions: Theology, Philosophy, Tasawwuf and Hadîth; Chapter Four - Fiqh in the Reality of the Muslim Community; Chapter Five - The Esoteric Dimension of Worship in Islam and its Implication for the Development of a Social Ethic; and Chapter Six - The Social Dimension of Islamic Teaching. It is interesting to note that the volume was edited by Paramadina staffer Budhy Munawar-Rachman. Budhy belongs to a generation of younger Islamic intellectuals born in the 1960s, a decade after Jalaluddin Rahmat, Masdar F. Mas'udi, and Komaruddin Hidayat, and two decades after Nurcholish and Abdurrahman. It is amongst up-and-coming intellectuals of Budhy's generation that the neo-Modernist thought of Nurcholish and Abdurrahman has been most influential. Many are graduates of either IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, in Jakarta, or IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, in Yogyakarta. In Jakarta they are frequently associated with either Nurcholish Madjid's Paramadina, Dawam Rahardjo's LSAF (Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat - Institute for the Study of Religion and Philosophy) and the associated journal, *Ulumul Qur'an*, or P3M (Perhimpunan Perkembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat - The Association for the Development of Pesantren and Society) the NGO run by Masdar F. Mas'udi. In Yogyakarta many of these younger proponents of neo-Modernism are active in LKiS, an NGO that acts as a forum for NU youth who support the reformist thought of Abdurrahman Wahid.

Abdurrahman Wahid

Abdurrahman was born in Jombang in 1940. Because of his family's connections and his father's activities he grew up interacting with a wide range of people. His parents made a deliberate effort to ensure that he mixed not only with NU *kyai* and politicians but also was exposed to people from across a broad range of society, including many non-Muslims. As a child, for example, he was often left in the care of a German friend of his father, an adult convert to Islam, from whom he gained a love of classical European music. From 1953 to 1957 he studied at a Junior Economic High School (SMEP). During this time he boarded in the home of the modernist leader Kiai Haji Junaid, a Muhammadiyah 'ulamâ' and a member of the Muhamma-

diyah Majlis Tarjih (Religious Advisory Board). From 1957 to 1959 he studied at Pesantren Tegalrejo at Magelang, where it is said that he was such a gifted student that he was able to complete his studies in half the time ordinarily required. From 1959 to 1963 he taught at Muallimat Bahrul Madrasah at Pesantren Tambak Beras, Jombang and at the same time studied at Pesantren Krapyak in Yogyakarta. In 1964 he left for Cairo, where he began attending classes at Al-Azhar Islamic University. Having completed his *pesantren* education Abdurrahman went to first Al Azhar University in Cairo and then to Baghdad. The true nature of Abdurrahman's tertiary education, like that of Nurcholish, can not be appreciated without consideration of its informal as well as formal aspects.

From 1964 to 1966 Abdurrahman studied at Al Azhar University. At least that was ostensibly the case. Abdurrahman himself explains that he quickly become frustrated with the narrowness of views that he encountered at Al-Azhar. Before long he began skipping classes at Al-Azhar and spending time instead at the American University Library. Apart from extensive reading he spent his time attending seminars, engaging in discussion and generally pursuing a rather informal education. This process also included developing a love for soccer and French cinema, passions that have remained with him to the present.[32] In 1966 Abdurrahman transferred to the Faculty of Arts at the University of Baghdad where he studied Arabic literature for four years. Through all of this time, in fact since his days in Pesantren Tambak Beras in Jombang, Abdurrahman devoured the work of a wide range of writers. Apart from a wide range of fiction in four languages (Indonesian, Arabic, English and French, leaving aside the question of Javanese) Abdurrahman read critical works on social theory, philosophy, religion and politics. He had hoped to formalize this education through completing a Masters degree in Europe, but was unable to find an institution that recognized his Middle Eastern studies.

Encouraged by news of interesting developments in the *pesantren* scene in Indonesia, and unable to study in Europe, Abdurrahman returned home in 1971. He immediately immersed himself in the *pesantren* world, holding a number of positions at various *pesantren*. From 1972 to 1974 he was Dean of the Faculty of Theology (Ushuluddin) at the Hasjim Asy'ari University (in effect an Islamic college) in Jombang. From 1974 to 1980, he was secretary-general of the Tebuireng *pesantren* in Jombang. From 1978 Abdurrahman took up

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the leadership of Pesantren Ciganjur in South Jakarta. Having moved to Jakarta in 1978 Abdurrahman become increasingly involved with the national leadership of NU. Then in 1979 he was made First Secretary (*Katib Awal*) of the NU Supreme Religious Council (*Syuriah*) in 1979, in Jakarta. In 1983 Abdurrahman teamed up with KH Achmad Siddiq to contest the leadership of NU in the wake of the forced resignation of KH Idham Chalid in May 1982, who had been General Chairman of NU since 1956. In December 1984, at a five yearly National Congress Abdurrahman was elected General Chairman (ie. head of the *Tanfidziyah*, the Executive Board) and KH Achmad Siddiq his *Rois Aam* (ie. head of the Syuriah).

In the early years of his chairmanship of NU the government welcomed Abdurrahman's presence as a voice for moderation and stability. In recent years, however, Abdurrahman has increasingly been seen as an annoying and embarrassing oppositional figure. A significant element in this has been the fact that in March 1995 Abdurrahman, together with Djohan Effendi and 43 other leading public intellectuals and community figures, representing a broad spectrum of Indonesian society, launched the ginger-group Forum Demokrasi to campaign for democratic reform. Where once his outspoken comments about the need for democratic reform were quietly tolerated he is now seen to have gone too far in his public criticism of the president and as a result is being placed under considerable political pressure. Whereas in 1989 he was re-elected chairman without significant opposition in December 1994 he only narrowly escaped defeat because of powerful, government backed opposition as he was re-elected to a third, five year term of office.

It is completely misleading, however, to describe Abdurrahman as simply an oppositional figure - as a Muslim activist whose very popularity marks him as a threat to the regime. His relationship with the regime is rather more complex. In the 1970s and early 1980s the Soeharto regime jailed a number of radical Muslim activists and placed hundreds of others under surveillance, fearful lest Indonesia should follow the path of other Muslim countries such as Egypt and Pakistan and find itself locked in an impossible struggle with the hydra of grass-roots fundamentalism. A fear driven home all the more by the surprising turn of events in Iran in 1979. Moreover, the Indonesian government claimed that it had reason to fear radical fundamentalism even within the national capital itself. The military's harsh suppression of rioting in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta's seedy port district, in

September 1984 sent a clear message that it would not tolerate Islamic extremism.[33] When Abdurrahman was elected Executive Chairman of NU in December 1984, however, he was greeted warmly by the regime much as was Nurcholish and the Renewal Movement in the early 1970s. Like Nurcholish he was seen by the regime to be a positive change-agent, a moderate, modern Muslim leader who would help bring the *ummat* into the late modern age. During his first five year term as Executive Chairman of NU this assessment was proved true, exceeding government expectations. Early in his second term, however, the relationship began to sour. Not because Abdurrahman failed to remain a progressive influence but rather because he became increasingly outspoken at what he saw to be the regime's short-sighted opportunism in exploiting Islamic sentiment.

As Executive Chairman of NU Abdurrahman has enjoyed enormous popularity and a public profile unmatched by almost any other figure outside of the Indonesian military and government. His elevation within this largely rural and very traditional organization, however, was not the achievement of a single brilliant individual, even if his later notoriety with the regime is. The previous Executive Chairman, Idham Chalid, had held the post since 1956. As is to be expected, such a long tenure ensured that Idham had built up considerable patronage within the organization and he was not easily dislodged. By the early 1980s, however there was mounting disaffection with his leadership within NU. In many respect he had not served the organization well, and there seemed little prospect of reforming and modernizing NU whilst Idham remained in office. In May 1982 a small delegation of senior 'ulamâ' visited him at his home and persuaded him to step down 'on account of his health'. This he did, but not without strong regrets. The 'quiet coup' was a success, but it left NU divided between two faction: those who supported Idham were dubbed the Cipete group and his reforming opponents were dubbed the Situbondo group.[34] Many were critical of the way in which Idham was asked to resign but on balance the Situbondo group had the backing of the NU Syuriah, the Supreme Religious Council consisting of senior 'ulamâ' to which the Tanfidziah, or Executive Board was ultimately responsible.

A *munas*, or national consultation *(musyawarah nasional)*, was convened in December 1983 in Situbondo. This *munas* in generally regarded as marking the beginning of reformation within NU. [35] A series of important decisions were made that set the path for ongoing

reform. The most important decisions was that NU would return to the 'Khittah of 1926'. Returning to the *Khittah* (literally the 'charter' or 'strategy', but in effect the 'spirit' or tacit 'guiding principles') on which NU was originally founded in 1926 was generally understood to mean three thing. Firstly, NU would leave party politics to concentrate on its original task of being a socio-educational organization. Secondly, real leadership of the organization would be restored to the 'ulamâ' (rather than the politicians, of whom Idham was the prime example). Thirdly, NU would return its focus to assisting the social, economic and educational development of its members. In practise no clear consensus existed on what returning to the Khittah of 1926 actually meant in concrete terms, and different parties chose to emphasize one aspect above all others. The second important decision made was that NU acknowledged that Pancasila (the 'five principles' that form the normative ideological foundation of the Indonesian state) was compatible with Islam, a decision that paved the way for the latter adoption of Pancasila as the ideological basis of the organization. Thirdly, it was decided at the 1983 *munas* that NU officials not be allowed to be simultaneously officials of political parties or organizations.

The group that formulated and lobbied for these reforms came to be known as the Majlis-24, or Council of 24, after the number of its members. The Majlis-24, which had begun meeting in mid 1983, consisted mainly of young NU activists and intellectuals, such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Masdar F. Mas'udi, Muchith Muzadi, and Fahmi Saifuddin and supported by several of the more progressive 'ulamâ', such as KH Musthofa Bisri, KH Sahal Mahfudz, and, most importantly, KH Achmad Siddiq. From this larger group a working party of seven, the so-called Tim Tujuh, of which Abdurrahman was a member, was assigned the task of formulating what was meant by the 'Khittah of 1926'. The material formulated by the Tim Tujuh (the Team of Seven) was, for the most part, concerned with matters of social welfare, economic development and responses to modernity. This material was combined with material of a more specifically religious nature already formulated by KH Achmad Siddiq in a short book published in 1979 entitled *Khittah Nahdliyah*.

In December 1984 an NU National Congress was held at Situbondo. This congress built on the achievements of the *munas* the year before, discussing, and securing some sort of consensus on, what was meant by 'returning to the Khittah of 1926' in practical terms. As is usual at National Congress', it also saw the election of a new Execu-

tive Board, to which eleven of the members of the Majlis-24 were elected. More importantly, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as Executive Chairman and Achmad Siddiq was elected as Rois Aam, or head of the Syuriah. A new era had begun for NU.

The Siddiq-Abdurrahman team proved a formidable alliance. The two men naturally complemented each other and Abdurrahman benefited greatly from Siddiq's mentoring, though the relationship was not without its ups and downs. Born in Jember in 1926 into a leading NU family Siddiq had acted as personal secretary to Wahid Hasyim, Abdurrahman's father, when he was Minister for Religious Affairs (1949-52). He later enjoyed a term as an NU member of parliament during the Old Order (1957-9 and then again in 1971) followed by a long and successful career in The Department of Religious Affairs. His religious learning, independent frame of mind and long experience with NU politics and religious affairs in Indonesia proved invaluable to that task of reforming NU that he and Abdurrahman undertook in their first five year term. In 1989, at the 28th NU National Congress at Krapyak, East Java, the Siddiq-Abdurrahman team was re-elected, but not without facing significant opposition. Many of the older *kyai* were concerned about statements made by Abdurrahman and reported in the press, and by his seeming willingness to overturn dearly held traditions. A case in point was Abdurrahman's suggestion that greeting fellow Muslims with *'selamat pagi'* ('good [blessed-peaceful] morning') was just as appropriate as using the traditional Arabic greeting of *'as-salamu alaikum'* ('peace be upon you'). The latter was, after all, he argued, a traditional Arab language greeting, one used by Arab Christians as well as Muslims and therefore not intrinsically Islamic. Moreover, the Indonesian word *selamat* is a cognate of the Arabic *salam* (and the Hebrew *shalom*), so saying *'selamat pagi'* should be understood to be a perfectly acceptable Indonesian equivalent to *'as-salam alaikum'*. Many at the congress were also upset with Abdurrahman's general outspokenness and voiced concern that he might endanger NU if he upset the government. Others were alarmed at the apparent disharmony within the NU Board, in part a product of enduring disaffection from Idham Chalid's supporters. For the most part, Abdurrahman was able to answer his critics and win over at least some of them, with the end result that he was elected by acclamation.

The Siddiq-Abdurrahman team clearly had the president's support at both the 1984 and the 1989 National Congresses, but, as al-

luded to above, by 1990 the relationship had begun to deteriorate. In part this was a product of Abdurrahman's bold and, on occasion, possibly unwise, speaking out about Indonesian politics. Achmad Siddiq's death in 1991 is perhaps also a significant factor, for it left Abdurrahman without anyone to hold him in check. The main reason, however, for the souring of relations between the palace and Abdurrahman was the president's determination to win over support from conservative Muslims even at the expense of 're-confessionalising' of Indonesian politics.

In 1990 the president made the *hajj* pilgrimage for the first time, amid much fanfare and publicity, returning to Indonesia from the Holy Land with a new first name (Muhammad) and new respect from many *santri* Muslims. In 1989 and 1990 he allowed the passing of various legislative measure designed to buttress the standing of religious courts. Then in December 1990 he gave his official blessing, considerable amounts of money, and his right-hand-man, Prof. B.J. Habibie, to the new Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals, or ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslimin se-Indonesia). As a consequence ICMI became an organization of major importance, and avoiding any association with it for a *santri* public servant became a matter no less easy than refusing any part in Golkar (the government political party to which all public servants are considered automatic members). Moreover a number of Islamic activists, whose views had previously been considered dangerously sectarian, suddenly found themselves not only back in government favor but also being offered senior positions within ICMI.

Whilst others suspended judgement, or felt too intimidated to speak out (the majority of prominent Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia felt obliged to join ICMI, at least in a nominal fashion, or, as in the case of Nurcholish, allow their a names to 'remain on the roll' without actually attending meetings), Abdurrahman was forthright in expressing his concerns about ICMI. His concerns revolved around three issues. Firstly, he was concerned that the president was using religion as a political tool. Secondly, he was worried that the exclusive nature of ICMI would, in itself, foster sectarianism. And thirdly, he was alarmed that ICMI might prove to be a "Trojan Horse", and that a small, radical, element within ICMI would later seek to launch a Masyumi style Islamic party committed to a platform of seeking to make Indonesia into an Islamic state.[36]

In March 1991, several months after the founding of ICMI Abdurrahman, Djohan Effendi (one of the few, apart from Abdurrahman,

to publicly speak out against the danger of sectarianism inherent in ICMI) and 43 other well known intellectuals drawn from across the faith communities founded Forum Demokrasi. The group was founded not simply in reaction to ICMI, but rather in reaction to what they perceived as growing sectarianism across Indonesian society.

A particular catalyst was the violent demonstrations that accompanied the so-called Monitor Affair. *Monitor,* a popular weekly tabloid magazine had run a 'tongue in cheek' popularity poll in which the Prophet Muhammad came in at eleventh in the popularity ranking, behind President Soeharto (first), Habibie (second), Saddam Hussein (seventh) and Arswendo Atmowiloto, Monitor's Christian editor (tenth). What alarmed Abdurrahman and Djohan was not that the Islamic *ummat* was outraged (for Arswendo had given great offence, and for no good reason) but that this sentiment expressed itself in a disturbingly violent fashion. Shortly after the results of the poll were published the office of *Monitor* was surrounded by an angry demonstration of stone throwing youths. In fact conservative elements within the *ummat* were so vigorous in their denunciation of Arswendo that he was forced to seek police protection. Arswendo was then charged with, and later found guilty of blasphemy, and sentenced to five years in jail, the maximum sentence. The severity of the sentence suggested that the public outrage expressed by some sections of the *ummat* had been of considerable consequence in influencing the court.

As the name suggests, Forum Demokrasi was intended to be a forum for discussing liberal democratic ideals and ways in which they might be realized in Indonesian society . It was intended to be a small but influential think-tank and lobby group that would work towards engendering liberal, democratic ideals within Indonesian society. Quite deliberately Forum Demokrasi is comprised of religious leaders and intellectuals representing a wide range of religious traditions and groupings in Indonesian society. The disproportionately high number of Christian members is not, they explain, the result of deliberate policy so much as the failure of many within the Islamic *ummat* to respond.

In late 1991 and early 1992 Abdurrahman and NU came under increasing pressure to publicly endorse Soeharto standing for a further five year term in the 1993 presidential elections. The majority of large organizations in Indonesia eventually succumbed to pressure and made public statements in support of a further Soeharto presidency, a matter

which was, in any case, a foregone conclusion. Abdurrahman resisted the mounting pressure and instead stated that NU would celebrate its sixty sixth anniversary by holding a large rally, or *Rapat Akbar*, to pledge its ongoing loyalty to Pancasila. On the 1st of March 1992 several hundred thousand NU members gathered in the car park of the Senayan Sports Stadium in Jakarta. Whilst the *Rapat Akbar* was the largest non government mass gathering in twenty five years in Indonesia, Abdurrahman was deeply disappointed at the size of the turn out.[37] He had earlier predicted a turn-out of up to two million. Part of the reason that attendance had not been greater, he claimed, was that the military had stopped people boarding buses bound for the rally. Disappointed, the next day he wrote a frank letter to the president, pointing out that the president was foolish to have opposed NU's rally as NU is a mass organization thoroughly committed to Pancasila and to peace and harmony, and as such ought to be encouraged. By failing to support pro-Pancasila groups such as NU, he argued, the president was giving succor to reactionary and divisive elements in Indonesian society. If these elements were to continue unchecked, he wrote, Indonesian was in danger of becoming like Algeria.

More recently there are signs that the relationship between Abdurrahman and the palace are improving. In any case, with all attempts to date to topple Abdurrahman as head of NU having failed, and with no obvious contender to the NU leadership in the wings, the regime is obliged to work with him. As Indonesia's largest grass-roots, non-government, organization NU is far too significant a body to be ignored. There are also signs that ICMI is on the wane, though it is too early to write it off yet. What will happen over the next three to five years is impossible to predict, for at the moment everything hangs on the question of presidential succession and the looming transition to the post-Soeharto era. Whatever the course of events, however, it is likely that NU and Abdurrahman Wahid will play a significant role in working to maintain social stability and inter-communal harmony. Abdurrahman may be a rather maverick figure much given to bold criticism of government figures. But there is no doubting his commitment as a moderate and a liberal to maintaining social harmony in Indonesia's plural society.

Islamic neo-Modernism and the Thought of Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid

The above discussions about Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman have been rather disjointed and, at best, present little more than an

overview of their thought and public lives. Nevertheless they should have been sufficient to indicate that in the Indonesian context, with its current heightened interest in religion and significant general interest in intellectuals, both men function very much as public intellectuals. In an important sense they act as cultural brokers between the world of the *santri* and the 'ulamâ' and that of 'secular' intellectuals, being simultaneously 'ulamâ' and public intellectuals.

In many ways, in their commitment to rational inquiry and to *ijtihâd*, in their commitment to progress and modernization, particularly in the area of education, and in their generally positive view of the future, they resemble the early modernists. Whilst they have, undoubtedly, been profoundly influenced by Islamic modernism, it is important to note, however, that they have come from a traditionalist background. But to describe them as being either Modernist or traditionalist is wholly inadequate for, in an important sense, they are neither.

At this point in time no clear consensus exists on how to label these remarkable intellectuals and the new movement of Islamic thought that they represent. Moreover, many of their followers are inclined to accentuate the differences in their thought, or at least in their social engagement and cultural styles. Abdurrahman, not surprisingly, remains strongly orientated towards the rural and traditionalist world of Nahdlatul Ulama, and has highly developed political skills. Whilst Nurcholish is a big-city academic very much at home in Jakarta's sophisticated urban milieu, but not particularly interested political life.

Some have described Abdurrahman, and even Nurcholish, as being 'neo-traditionalist', and not without reason. Up to a certain point the term neo-traditionalist, as used by scholars of the Middle East such as William Shepard, does have a certain applicability in the Indonesian context.[38] Nevertheless, there are profound differences between the Middle East, especially the Arab world, and Indonesia, particularly regarding, the relationship between 'ulamâ' and 'modern' intellectuals. Neither Nurcholish or Abdurrahman, or in fact anyone closely involved with them, really conforms to the Egyptian notion of an 'Islamist'. Indeed, in many respects, Nurcholish and Abdurrahman more closely resemble Egypt's so-called 'secular' intellectuals, but that label is of little use in the Indonesian context, least of all with figures such as these.

The most useful label to describe the liberal, progressive, thought

of Nurcholish and Abdurrahman, of Paramadina and the younger generation within NU is the one that derives from Fazlur Rahman's paradigm of modern reformist movements in Islam: neo-Modernism.[39] Rahman delineates four distinct movements from amongst the reformist movements that have emerged over the past two centuries. The first movement he refers to as Islamic Revivalism, and in conjunction with this he mentions the Wahabis and the Sanusis. The second movement, he suggests, was the Islamic modernist movement, which he sometimes refers to as Classical Modernism. The third movement, to which he gives the label neo-Revivalism (or occasionally, neo-Fundamentalism) was, he argues, a direct product of the second. In effect, Classical Modernism degenerated into neo-Revivalism as succeeding generations of modernists turned their backs on Islamic scholarship and occupied themselves with various social and political activities. In broad terms, the political thought of Rashid Rida became more important than the Islamic scholarship of Muhammad 'Abduh and the modernist movement became increasingly cut-off from its theological and scholarly roots. Intellectually the movement stagnated and socially it became increasingly narrow and defensive in its outlook, until a reactionary and apologetic mindset ultimately came to dominate. Finally, the forth movement, which Rahman calls neo-Modernism, arises amongst younger intellectuals, many of them theologically trained, whom have become disenchanted with modernism/neorevivalism. This last movement marks a return to the spirit of earlier modernism, but seeks to combine it with the rich heritage of classical Islamic scholarship.

Rahman was not particularly thinking of the Indonesian situation when he first conceived of this paradigm. His model was clearly meant to be of universal applicability and was framed in broad terms. As an optimist he hoped for the emergence of neo-Modernism but admitted to having seen little evidence for it. As it happens, in the Indonesian context, Rahman was remarkably prescient. Not only does his model accurately describe the stagnation of modernism in Indonesia, it also provides a remarkably accurate description of the movement that succeeded it.

In describing Nurcholish and Abdurrahman as neo-modernists it is argued that the differences between them are far less consequential than is the essential congruence of their thought. Indeed, it can be said that most of the points of difference between the two men are

matters of style, rather than content, and can be explained in terms of differences in social milieu and personal temperament. The essential similarity of their thought is evident in the following five-point precis of Indonesian neo-Modernism in that five points relate equally to both thinkers.

Indonesian neo-Modernism

The first point to note about neo-Modernism is that, unlike many Islamic movements, neo-Modernism can be said to be progressive. That is to say, it has a positive attitude towards modernity, progress and development. This is not to say that neo-Modernist thinkers are uncritical of aspects of development, for they are often very critical, particularly where matters of social justice are concerned, but rather that they are generally optimistic about the direction in which humanity is currently progressing and accept the need for rapid social change. This progressive outlook is illustrated by the fact that rather than looking back transfixed upon the 'golden age of Islam' in the 7th and 8th centuries CE., and grieving for the lost past, they look forward excitedly to the 21st century in the expectation that it will be Islam's best century yet.

Secondly, neo-Modernism, like 'fundamentalism', is, in part, a response to modernity, and the globalising encroachment of Western civilization and culture on the Muslim world. Unlike 'fundamentalism', however, neo-Modernism does not see the West as an 'occidental other' in which it does not have, and can not have any part. It does not feel the need to constantly proclaim its difference from the West, or to insist upon a wholly separate identity for itself. On the contrary, neo-Modernism wishes for Islam, and to some extent finds in Islam, that which is 'good' and 'noble' in Western civilization. Whilst this echoes the position of Islamic modernists one hundred years ago, the position of neo-Modernists with respect to the west is altogether more expansive, reflecting the natural confidence of a generation of intellectuals who have grown up in a post-colonial age. Whereas earlier Modernists were careful to make a distinction between western technology and Western culture, accepting most aspects of the former but rejecting many elements of the latter, the neo-Modernist position is arguably much more sophisticated in its approach to Western culture and learning, particularly in the social sciences and humanities. It is, of course, critical of certain aspects of Western culture but it does not accept the commonly voiced argument that West-

ern culture and Islamic culture are profoundly irreconcilable. Neo-Modernism not only advocates 'Western' liberal ideals such as democracy, human rights and the separation of 'church' and state but argues that in these ideals Islam shares a common heritage with the West.

Thirdly, building on the above points, neo-Modernist thought in Indonesia affirms the particular kind of secularism set forth in the Pancasila and in the Indonesian constitution, in which sectarian religious interests are kept separate from the interests of the state, separating, as it were, church and state. In arguing that this is a natural and right development in Muslim society that is not in any way contrary to the interests of religion, the neo-Modernists argue that the Qur'ân and the Sunnah neither contain a blue print for an Islamic state nor stipulate that a religious state is necessary, or even possible. All that was stipulated, they argued, were general principles by which Muslim society should be guided. This point has been the most controversial aspect of neo-Modernism since Nurcholish Madjid first publicly spoke of *sekularisasi* and *desakralisme* in a watershed paper addressed to a gathering of Muslim students on the 3rd of January 1970 And, ironically, whilst it earned him and his movement the instant opprobrium of his former mentors in the modernist movement, this aspect of neo-Modernism has been of great influence within broader Indonesian society today.

Fourthly, neo-Modernism presents an open, inclusivistic, liberal understanding of Islam that is accepting, indeed affirming, of social pluralism and stresses the need for tolerance and harmony in intercommunal relations.

Fifthly, neo-Modernism begins in the spirit of turn of the century modernism, picking up Muhammad 'Abduh's concern for rationality and for *ijtihâd*, or individual endeavours in interpretation. It expands upon 'Abduh's approach to *ijtihâd* however, and argues for the development of a more systematic hermeneutics, a contextualised *ijtihad (ijtihad kontekstual)*, that is sensitive to the peculiarities of 7th century Arabian culture and society and enlightened as to the cultural needs of late 20th century Indonesian society. Unlike the earlier modernists in Indonesia, however, the neo-Modernists argue for the synthesis of traditional Islamic scholarship with the modernist concern for *ijtihâd*, and with modern 'Western' learning in the social-sciences and humanities. In this regard it is very significant that the seminal thinkers within the movement come from a traditionalist background and, as youths, were *pesantren* or *Madrasah* (religious

day school) trained and hence had fluency in classical Arabic and familiarity with the classical heritage of Islamic scholarship. Neo-Modernism, then, can be said to be simultaneously a 'return to the basics' of modernism (affirming the original thought of Muhammad 'Abduh over later understandings of modernism, in particular the politically orientated thought of 'Abduh's disciple Rashîd Ridâ that has been so influential in Indonesian Modernism) and a synthesis of traditionalist, modernist, and 'Western' learning.[40]

Conclusion

In summary, it is clear that for Nurcholish and Abdurrahman the opportunity to undertake studies in modern, Western, learning was a vital element, next to their *santri* backgrounds perhaps *the* vital element in their intellectual development. In many ways the emergence of neo-Modernist thought in Indonesian Islam can be explained simply in terms of the coming together of classical Islamic scholarship, the rationalist and progressive spirit of Islamic modernism, and modern, Western, learning. To a large extent the emergence of this movement is a direct outcome of the growing opportunities for modern education amongst rural *santri*, and the process of reform that has taken place amongst *pesantren* and IAIN. It is also clear that in a variety of ways the political and social environment of the New Order was a formative influence. And, just as importantly, the political dynamics of the New Order afforded them a degree of protection from their peers and allowed them to 'think aloud' in a way that few other Islamic intellectuals anywhere in the Islamic world were able to.

As Indonesia readies itself for the transition to the post-Soeharto era, this progressive movement of thought with its emphasis on pluralism, humanitarianism and non-sectarianism will be sorely tested. To the extent that it is able to continue to influence Indonesian society it will be a major factor in determining whether Indonesian society continues to be marked by inter-communal harmony or whether it slides into increasing sectarianism. If it passes the test then Indonesian neo-Modernism may indeed point the way to Islamic renaissance in the new century.

Endnotes

1. In order to avoid confusion, Arabic words here are transliterated and employed in accordance with the standard Indonesian convention. As a consequence the word 'ulamâ', for example, is both singular and plural, in accordance with standard Indonesian usage. Similarly, Indonesian names are used according to Indonesian convention. In Indonesia the central figures in this study are referred as Nurcholish and Abdurrahman rather than Madjid and Wahid because the latter are the names of their fathers rather than their own personal names (most ethnic groups in Indonesia have not traditionally employed a convention of using surnames, or family names).
2. For a good introduction to the issues raised by Geertz's paradigm, as well as a careful case-study of the complex relationship between Javanist, or *abangan* Islam, and orthodox Islam in Java refer to Robert W. Hefner, 'Islamising Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 3, August 1987, pp. 533-54.
3. For examples of scholarship along these lines refer to: R.M Koentjaraningrat, 'Review of the *Religion of Java*', *Majalah Ilmu-ilmu Sastra Indonesia*, No. 2, 1963, pp. 188-91; Zamakhsyari Dhofier, 'Santri Abangan dalam kehidupan Orang Jawa: Teropong dari Pesantren', *Prisma* 7, 1978, pp. 48-43; Bambang Pranowo, *Creating Islamic Tradition in Rural Java*, PhD thesis, Department of Anthropology, Monash University (Clayton, 1991); 'Menyingkap Tradisi Besar dan Tradisi Kecil', *Pesantren*, No. 3/Vol. IV/1987, pp. 31-42; Nurcholish Madjid, 'Islamic Roots of Modern Pluralism, *Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies*, Volume I, no. 1 (April-June)1994, pp. 55-77. In this last article Nurcholish quotes from Marshall G. Hodgson's *The Venture of Islam* "...but Geertz stands out in the field. For one who knows Islam, his comprehensive data - despite his intention - show how little has survived from the Hindu past even in inner Java and raises the question why the triumph of Islam was so complete." (Nurcholish Madjid, 'Islamic Roots, p. 61)

   Refer also to M. C. Ricklefs, 'Six Centuries of Islamization in Indonesia' , in N. Levtzion (ed.) *Conversion to Islam*, pp. 100-28 (New York, 1979); William R. Roff, 'Islam Obscured? some Reflections on Studies of Islam and Society in Southeast Asia', in M. Bonneff, H. Chamber-Loir, Denys Lombard and Christian Pelras (eds) *L'Islam en Indonesie*, I, 1985, Paris: Association Archipel, pp. 7-34; Robert W. Hefner, *Hindu Javanese: Tengger Tradition and Islam*, Princeton University Press (Princeton, 1985); and Mark R. Woodward, *Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta*, The Association for Asian Studies Monograph No. XLV, The University Or Arizona Press (Tucson, 1989).
4. For an informative discussion of these issues in the Indonesian context refer to: Martin van Bruinessen, 'Traditions for the Future: the Reconstruction of Traditionalist Discourse within NU ', in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds), *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, Monash Asia Institute (Clayton, 1996), pp. 163-71.
5. Wahid Hasjim was the father of Abdurrahman Wahid. He was one of the few NU leaders to exert considerable influence in Masyumi before NU exited NU in 1952.
6. Sukarno banned Masyumi in January 1960 in the wake of involvement by Masyumi leaders in the PRRI regional uprising in west Sumatra in 1958.

7. Quoted in Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to 'New Order' Modernization in Indonesia*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1980), p. 125.
8. KH Wahid Hasjim died tragically in a car accident in April 1953. At the time of his death 38 year old Wahid was essentially running NU at a national level. Abdurrahman Wahid, who was travelling in the car with him at the time, had been greatly influenced by his father. The circumstances of his death left a deep impression on him and contributed to a strong sense of mission in later life.
9. This is not to say that Indonesian Islam as a whole lacked classically trained scholars. On the contrary, since the days of the sultanates of Mataram and Malaka more than five centuries ago tens of thousands of scholars had left the archipelago for sojourns, often very long sojourns, in the Arab world. There they often obtained a very high level of mastery of the language, the sources and the writings of classical Islam. Returning to Java or Sumatra these scholars contributed to the ongoing process of raising up a new generation of *'ulamâ'* and ensuring that Islam in the region, for all its inadequacies and divergent tendencies, had at its core a solid body of reliable scholarship (for a careful and detailed discussion of Indonesian scholarship in the Middle East, and other matters relating to this issue, refer to Anthony H. Johns, 'Islamization in Southeast Asia: Reflections and Reconsiderations with Special Reference to the role of Sufism', *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol.31, No.1, June 1993, pp. 43-61). Naturally, not every *'ulamâ'*, or every *pesantren*, was thoroughly scholarly but over the centuries Islamic scholarship in Indonesia grew increasingly stronger. And with the advent of cheaper and faster travel to the Middle East the volume of Malay, Javanese and other Southeast Asian scholars travelling to the great institutions of learning in the Islamic world increased all the more. The Indonesian *ummat* then, though for the most part poor and not well educated (we are talking here about the period up until the late 1960s - in the 1990s the situation is significantly different), did have a considerable number of well educated scholars. These scholars however, were generally of two kinds. Like the *ummat* itself they were split into two camps - the Kaum Muda, or modernists, and the Kaum Tua, or traditionalists. One group gained a reasonable degree of mastery in Classical Islamic scholarship and the other achieved high levels in modern western education.
10. It is significant in the context of this discussion to note that two of the first modernist intellectuals to undertake higher level studies in classical Islamic scholarship, Harun Nasution and Mukti Ali, went on to play important roles in the development of IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah and IAIN Sunan Kalijaga respectively. Mukti Ali began a long career lecturing in comparative religion at IAIN Sunan Kalijaga in the late 1960s. Harun Nasution similarly began his academic career at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah where he continues to lecture, even after his 'official' retirement. Amongst other responsibilities during his tenure there he was Rector for eleven years and then Dean of the Faculty of Postgraduate Studies. Both men were very influential in developing a new kind of Islamic scholarship in Indonesia, a kind of scholarship that draws both from the world of classical Islamic learning and from the world of modern, western learning.
11. The most outstanding Islamic intellectuals amongst the early modernists, those who contributed most to the development of Islamic thought, were *'ulamâ'* by training. Foremost amongst these being Muhammad 'Abduh in Egypt, and in the Indonesian context, KH Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah.

12. For an extensive discussion of the formation of the IAIN refer to B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia,* Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague, 1971), pp.l 18-23. As Boland points out, there were a number of institutions referred to as 'Islamic Universities' prior to the establishment of the IAIN, these institutions, however, were essentially colleges for the training of *'ulamâ'*.
13. In Indonesia, particularly in earlier decades, it is only when a person attains the age of 25 years or so that they are regarded as being fully adult, as opposed to adolescent. In terms of public life the age of 30 is probably a more significant milestone. Of course in real terms age itself is not so important as achievement. To be adult in Indonesian society is to be married with children and working rather than studying (something which happens much earlier in rural communities than it does in the urban middle class environment). In the case of the generation being discussed here the political situation during the mid 1960s meant that education, marriage and working life were all delayed. Nurcholish for example was still leading HMI, the Islamic student organization, at the age of 32. All four thinkers did not commence their working life until the early 1970s when they were in their 30s.
14. The literal meaning of *pembaruan,* the Indonesian term used, is renewal, but it is often used in a more general sense to speak of matters for which the English equivalent is reform. For example the various movements within Islam that are referred to in English language publications as being 'reform' movements (eg. the Wahâbî reforms within 18th century Arabia) are invariably referred to in Indonesian as being *gerakan pembaruan* (reform movements).
15. For an introduction to Fazlur Rahman's thought, refer to: Fazlur Rahman, *Islam,* 2nd ed., Univ. of Chicago Press, (Chicago, 1979), *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition,* the Univ. of Chicago Press, (Chicago, 1982), *Islamic Methodology in History,* Central Institute of Islamic Research, (Karachi, 1965), *Major Themes of the Qur'an,* Bibliotheca Islamica, (Chicago, 1980). Rahman outlines his thesis regarding the need for a new Islamic reform movement, which he dubbed 'neo-Modernism' in: 'Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge', *Islam: Challenges and Opportunities,* Edinburgh University Press, (Edinburgh, 1979), pp. 315-30.
16. For general overviews of the broadly liberal developments in Indonesian Islam over the past two decades refer to: Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, 'Religion and Politics in Indonesia Since Independence', in *Religion and Social Ethos in Indonesia,* Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, (Melbourne, 1977), Harold Crouch, The *Politics of Islam in Southeast Asia,* Flinders Asian Studies Lecture 18 (Adelaide, 1987) and 'Indonesia', in Mohammed Ayoob, *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion,* Croom Helm (London, 1981) pp. 190-207, Anthony Johns, 'Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism', in John L. Esposito (ed.), *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society,* Oxford University Press, (New York, 1987), Clifford, Geertz, 'Culture and Social Change: The Indonesian Case', *Man: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, New* Series, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 1984, pp. 511-32. Ruth McVey, 'Faith as an Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics', in James Piscatori (ed.), *Islam in the Political Process,* Cambridge Univ. Press, (Cambridge, 1983), Nurcholish Madjid, 'Indonesia in the Future: Sophisticated and Devoutly Religious', *Prisma,* No. 49., June 1990, pp. 77-82, Aswab Mahasin, 'The Santri Middle Class', *Prisma,* No. 49., June 1990, pp. 91-6, M. Amien Rais, 'International Islamic Movements and Their Influence Upon the

Islamic Movement in Indonesia', *Prisma*, No 35, March 1985, pp. 27-48, Martin van Bruinessen, 'Indonesia's Ulama and Politics/Caught between Legitimizing the Status Quo and Searching for Alternatives', *Prisma*, No. 49., June 1990, pp. 52-82, and Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, 'A Propagation Problem', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 31 December 1987, (Jakarta, 1987), pp. 21-2, 'A Surge in Muslim Activity Despite Extremist Scares: Faith Without Fanatics', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 June 1990, pp. 25-32, 'One Code for All Courts', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22 September 1988, pp. 28-30, 'Thoroughly Modern Muslims', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 December 1987, (Jakarta, 1987), p. 30. For a comparative study refer also to: Chandra Muzaffar, Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Siddique (eds.), 'Islam and Society in South East Asia', *Islamic Resurgence: A Global View*, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, (Singapore, 1986), pp 5-39

17. For discussion of the Renewal Movement/Neo-Modernism refer to: Awad Bahasoan, 'The Islamic Reform Movement: An Interpretation and Criticism', *Prisma*, No. 35, March 1985, pp. 13140, Greg Barton, 'Neo-Modernism: a Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', *Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies*, Vol 2, No. 3 (Jakarta 1995), pp. 1-75; 'The Impact & Islamic neo-Modernism on Indonesian Islamic Thought - The Emergence of a New Pluralism'; in David Bourchier and John Legge (eds), *Indonesian Democracy - 1950s and 1990s*, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, (Melbourne, 1994), pp. 143-50; and 'The International Context of the Emergence of Islamic Neo Modernism in Indonesia', in M. C. Ricklefs (ed.), *Islam in the Indonesian Social Context*, Annual Indonesian Lecture Series #15, CSEAS Monash University, (Melbourne, 1991), Djohan Effendi, 'Islam and the Industrial & Post Industrial Era', Iqbal Society For The Development of Religious Thought, Jakarta, 1985; 'Men's' Limitations, Freedoms and Responsibilities, 'The Contextual Understanding of the Holy Qur'an', Iqbal Society For The Development of Religious Thought, (Jakarta, December 1983); pp. 1-5, and 'Towards a Theology of Harmony', Iqbal Society For The Development of Religious Thought, Jakarta, 1986, Muhammad Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to 'New Order' Modernisation in Indonesia*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, (Kuala Lumpur, 1982), Anthony Johns 'An Islamic System of Values? Nucleus of a Debate in Contemporary Indonesia', in William R. Roff (ed.), *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning*, Croom Helm, (London, 1987), pp. 254-87, R. William Liddle, 'Changing Political Culture: Three Indonesian Cases', unpublished paper, 1990, 'The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: a Political Explanation', unpublished paper, 1996, Madjid, Nurcholish, 'An Islamic Appraisal of the Political Future of Indonesia', *Prisma*, March 1985 No. 35, pp. 11-26, 'More on Secularization', in M.Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to 'New Order' Modernisation in Indonesia*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, (Kuala Lumpur, 1980), pp. 198-210, 'Reinvigorating Religious Understanding in the Indonesian Muslim Community', in M.Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to 'New Order' Modernisation in Indonesia*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, (Kuala Lumpur, 1980), pp. 216-33, Nurcholish Madjid, 'The Issue of Modernisation among Muslims in Indonesia: From a Participant's Point of View', in Gloria Davis, *What is Indonesian Culture*, 'The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the Ummat' , in M. Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to 'New Order' Modernisation in Indonesia*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka,

(Kuala Lumpur, 1980), pp. 187-97, 'The Perspective of Renewal of Thought in Islam', in M.Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to 'New Order' Modernisation in Indonesia*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, (Kuala Lumpur, 1980), pp. 211-15, Martin van Bruinessen, 'New Perspectives on Southeast Asian Islam?', in *Bijdragen*, Deel 143, Afl. 4e, 1987, pp. 519-37, and Abdurrahman Wahid, 'The Islamic Masses in the Life of State and Nation', *Prisma*, (Jakarta, 1985). pp. 3-10.

18. From 1971 through to 1978, a critical time in the development of the neo-Modernism movement, Mukti Ali was Minister for Religious Affairs. In this role he was able to encourage the transference of this new approach to Islamic scholarship to broader society. Similarly, Munawir Sjadzali, as Minister for Religious Affairs from 1983 to 1993 encouraged the development of progressive thought generally, and specifically encouraged Harun Nasution and his colleagues in their program of reform within the IAIN system.
19. For a contemporary account of Gontor refer to Lance Castles, 'Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor', *Indonesia*, No. 1, 1996.
20. Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI), the Islamic Student's Association, is Indonesia's largest Islamic student organization. Regarded in the 1950s and 1960s as being a modernist organization with strong links to Masyumi, today HMI remains largely modernist but draws members from a variety of backgrounds. Whereas members who were graduates of a *pesantren* were comparatively rare during Nurcholish's tenure as chairman (especially in senior leadership circles) they are now rather more commonplace, though still a minority. In recent years HMI has experienced something of a decline in influence, especially on the campuses of the leading institutions, and has become increasingly more conservative.
21. This paper is reprinted in: Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesian*, Mizan (Bandung 1987), pp. 204-20; an English translation of the paper is available as: 'The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the Ummat', in M.Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to 'New Order' Modernisation in Indonesia*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, (Kuala Lumpur, 1980), pp. 187-97.
22. For translated excerpts, and commentary, of the writing of Nurcholish and Abdurrahman refer to: Greg Barton: 'Neo-Modernism: a Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', *Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies*, Vol 2, No. 3 (Jakarta 1995), pp. 1-75; and 'The liberal, progressive roots of Abdurrahman Wahid's thought', in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds) *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditionalist Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, Monash Asia Institute, (Clayton, 1996), pp. 19()226.
23. In the early 1970s Rasjidi published a series of critical essays with titles such as 'A Correction of Nurcholish Madjid', and 'A Further Correction of Nurcholish Madjid' and 'A Total Correction of Nurcholish Madjid' .
24. This is a translation of a statement appearing on page 299 of Nurcholish Madjid, *Pintu-pintu Menuju Tuhan*, Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina (Jakarta,1995).
25. Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam, Doktrin dan Peradaban: Sebuah Telaah Kritis tentang Masalah Keimanan, Kemanusiaan, dan Kemodernan*, Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina (Jakarta,1992), pp.614.
26. Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam - Agama Kemanusiaan: Membangun Tradisi dan Visi Baru Islam Indonesia*, Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina (Jakarta, 1995), pp. 224; and

Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam - Agama Peradaban Membangun Makna dan Relevansi Doktrin Islam Dalam Sejarah*, Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina (Jakarta, 1995), pp. 328.

27. Nurcholish Madjid, *Pintu-pintu Menuju Tuhan*, Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina (Jakarta,1994) .
28. Nurcholish Madjid, *Khazanah Intelektual Islam*, Bulan Bintang (Jakarta, 1984), pp.382.
29. Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesian*, Mizan (Bandung 1987), pp.344.
30. Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam, Kerakyatan, dan Keindonesiaan: Pikiran-pikiran Nurcholish 'Muda'*, Mizan (Bandung, 1994), pp. 266.
31. Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah*, Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina (Jakarta, 1994), pp.731.
32. During the 1990 Soccer World Cup Abdurrahrnan appeared on national television as a sports commentator. His love of cinema, French or otherwise, has found expression also in his involvement with the Indonesian Film Board. For public figures generally such activities and interests may not seem particularly noteworthy, but when the public figure is the Chairmen of Indonesia's largest Islamic organization they are important indicators. Clearly Abdurrahman Wahid is no ordinary 'ulamâ'.
33. On the 12th of September 1984 a group of approximately 1500 marching protesters in Jakarta's poverty stricken port district of Tanjung Priok rounded a corner only to be met, without prior warning, with automatic weapons fire from a group of heavily armed soldiers. At the time it was estimated that around 60 people were killed and 100 injured, later estimates were even higher. The protest was ostensibly the result of community anger that four members of a local mosque community were being detained by police without explanation. The government initially claimed that only 6 people had been killed when the troops had opened fire and that the troops had been called in because the incident was a violent demonstration led by Islamic fundamentalists. There is strong evidence (including audio tapes made during the incident and later played by the BBC) to suggest that the incident was in fact deliberately engineered by government *agent provocateurs*. In any case the government clearly used the incident to warn off Islamic groups from any public displays of dissent.
34. Idham lived in the Jakarta suburb of Cipete, Kiai As'ad, leader of the delegation of four 'ulamâ' who had called on Idham to step down, led a *pesantren* in the East Java town of Situbondo.
35. For detailed discussion and analysis of this process of reform within NU refer to Mitsuo Nakamura, 'NU's Leadership Crisis and Search for Identity in the Early 1980s: From the 1979 Semarang Congress to the 1984 Situbondo Congress', in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds) *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, Monash Asia Institute (Clayton, 1996), pp. 94-109; and Martin van Bruinessen, 'Tradition for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist Discourse within NU' in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds), *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, Monash Asia Institute (Clayton, 1996), pp. 163-89.
36. For a detailed discussion and analysis of Abdurrahman's commitment to Pancasila, his reaction to ICMI the founding of Forum Demokrasi, presidential

succession and the Rapat Akbar NU rally of March 1992 refer to Douglas Ramage, 'Democratisation, Religious Tolerance and Pancasila: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid', in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds) *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, Monash Asia Institute (Clayton, 1996), pp.225-56.

37. The Jakarta press spoke of a crowd of between 150,000 and 200,000, NU argued that the total number of people in attendance was closer to 500,000.
38. Refer to Shepard, William, *Towards a Typology of Modern Islamic Movements*, Working Paper No 2, AMESA Working Papers (Christ church, 1982); 'Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 19, 1987, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 307-36; and 'The Doctrine of Progress in Some Modern Muslim writings', *The Bulletin of the Henry Martyn Institute of Islamic Studies*, Vol 10, No 4, Oct-Dec 1991, pp. s 1-64.
39. Refer to Fazlur Rahman, 'Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge', *Islam: Challenges and Opportunities*, Edinburgh University Press (Edinburgh,1979), pp 315-30. For an early application or this to the Indonesian context refer to: Awad Bahasoan, 'The Islamic Reform Movement: An Interpretation and Criticism', *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator*, No 35, March 1985, pp. 131-60.
40. It is significant that Harun Nasution declares himself to be an "Abduhist" and maintains that the majority of Indonesian modernists, to the cost of progressive and rational thought, have come too strongly under the influence of Rashîd Ridâ (personal interview, 24 October 1996, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta).

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