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Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Political Parties and for all Mass Organizations; an Account of Muslims' Responses

Abstraksi: *Salah satu kebijakan penting pemerintah Orde Baru dalam proses modernisasi politik adalah ditetapkannya Pancasila sebagai satu-satunya asas bagi organisasi-organisasi sosial dan politik di Indonesia. Kebijakan yang ditetapkan pada 1985 ini, merupakan awal dari pudarnya basis legitimasi dari aspirasi politik kemasyarakatan yang berorientasi agama. Meskipun pada akhirnya kebijakan ini memperoleh sukses yang luar biasa, tidak berarti bahwa umat beragama di Indonesia menerimanya tanpa menghadapi kemelut-kemelut yang serius. Hal itu setidaknya dapat dilihat dari respon umat beragama yang dipaksa untuk melakukan tinjauan ulang atas legitimasi keagamaan dalam kehidupan sosial dan politik.*

Artikel berikut ini merupakan upaya sistematis untuk melihat hubungan antara Islam dan modernisasi politik yang didasarkan atas respon umat Islam Indonesia terhadap kebijakan pemerintah Orde Baru tentang penetapan Pancasila sebagai satu-satunya asas bagi seluruh organisasi politik dan sosial-kemasyarakatan.

Secara umum dapat dikatakan bahwa sebagian besar umat Islam menerima Pancasila sebagai satu-satunya asas bagi organisasi sosial-politik dan kemasyarakatan. Tetapi, penerimaan itu bervariasi pada tingkat alasan dan pertimbangan politis yang ditekankannya. Sebagai contoh, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), sebagai organisasi massa Islam yang paling awal menerima asas Pancasila, karena wataknya yang akomodatif dan fleksibel, mudah menerima kebijakan itu dengan alasan-alasan politis dan teologis. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) juga memperlihatkan sikap yang sama. Tetapi Muhammadiyah, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) dan beberapa tokoh Muslim modernis, karena watak mereka yang cenderung revivalis, kelihatan lebih lambat untuk menerimanya dengan kekhawatiran bahwa kebijakan itu merupakan ancaman terhadap ideologi Islam. Karena itu, pencantuman asas Pancasila telah menimbulkan konflik religio-politik yang mendasar di kalangan umat Islam modernis,

sementara di kalangan umat Islam tradisional hal itu kelihatan tidak menimbulkan persoalan. Perpecahan di tubuh HMI pada karena perdebatan tentang asas tunggal Pancasila memperlihatkan kenyataan itu.

Namun demikian, kebijakan pemerintah untuk berhadapan dengan organisasi massa Islam merupakan eksperimen politik berani yang pernah dilakukan Orde Baru. Sehingga tidak mengherankan bila sebagian besar umat Islam, baik secara individu maupun organisasi, menaruh kecurigaan atas diberlakukannya kebijakan asas tunggal Pancasila itu. Bagi semua tokoh, organisasi, dan partai politik Islam yang dibicarakan di sini, kecemasan terhadap berlangsungnya proses sekularisasi pada basis legitimasi kehidupan politik merupakan hal pokok.

Secara garis besar, kecemasan itu ditunjukkan dalam tiga hal penting. Pertama, dengan ditetapkannya asas tunggal Pancasila itu, pemerintah menganggap bahwa ia secara ideologis benar. Pendekatan ini (yang dapat dilihat dari respon beberapa tokoh Muslim modernis) jelas ada kaitannya dengan upaya pemerintah untuk mencampakkan aspirasi-aspirasi lain yang mungkin berbeda. Misalnya, aspirasi masyarakat yang berbasis pada ideologi agama. Kedua, pemerintah ingin diakui sebagai pemerintah yang mempunyai komitmen dengan sejarah perjuangan bangsa. Pendekatan ini boleh jadi merupakan cerminan dari berbagai macam latar belakang: nasionalisme, ide tentang persatuan bangsa, atau pemerintahan demokratis. Atas dasar itu, pemerintah menganggap bahwa seluruh organisasi dan paratpol politik yang tidak mencantumkan Pancasila sebagai asasnya akan dinilai sebagai tidak nasionalis. Ketiga, pemerintah ingin Pancasila diakui sebagai ideologi yang efektif. Dalam konteks ini, pemerintah menganggap bahwa Pancasila bisa menyelesaikan segala konflik politik dengan baik. Pendekatan yang pragmatis terhadap persoalan legitimasi ini sangat berpengaruh, baik pada organisasi yang bersifat keagamaan maupun yang bersifat sekuler, dalam membawa ormas-ormas Islam untuk menerima Pancasila.

Dalam kaitan itu, penerimaan Pancasila sebagai asas bagi hampir seluruh organisasi massa dan politik Islam menandai berakhirnya pola, sistem dan ideologi keagamaan Islam dalam kehidupan politik. Ideologi Islam, tidak lagi diperkenankan menjadi landasan yang kuat untuk memberikan legitimasi terhadap partai, organisasi, dan gerakan sosial-politik Indonesia kontemporer.

موقف الأمة الإسلامية نحو تقرير المبادئ الخمسة كأساس سياسى واجتماعى وحيد للدولة

الخلاصة: احدى القرارات الهامة لحكومة العهد الجديد فى إجراء التجديد السياسى هى إقرارها المبادئ الخمسة كأساس الوحيد للمنظمات السياسية والاجتماعية فى إندونيسيا. هذه القرار المقرر تنفيذها فى سنة ١٩٨٥ فى أشكالها المختلفة الأنواع وجرارية على سرعة متفاوتة، تعتبر أول ذبلان قاعدة شرعية سياسية وأمالها من المجتمع الدينى الإتجاه. ولو أنه أخيرا هذه القرار حصلت على فوز فوق العادة، ولكنه لا يعطى معنى أن الأمة الدينية فى إندونيسيا تقبلها دون حدوث مشاكل جادة.

هذه الحالة -على الأقل- يمكن النظر إليها من رد فعل الأمة الدينية المضطربة على القيام بمراجعة النظر على الشرعية الدينية فى الحياة الاجتماعية والسياسية. هذه المقالة تمثل المساعى الترتيبية لرؤية العلاقة بين الإسلام والتجديد السياسى المعتمد على رد فعل الأمة الإسلامية الإندونيسية إزاء قرار حكومة العهد الجديد بخصوص أساس المبادئ الخمسة الوحيد.

على وجه العموم يمكن القول بأن أكبر عدد من الأمة الإسلامية تقبل المبادئ

الخمسة كالأساس الوحيد للمنظمات السياسية والاجتماعية والشعبية. ولكن هذا القبول على وجوه مختلفة من ناحية الحجج والتقييم السياسي الذي يركز عليه. كمثال نهضة العلماء كمنظمة شعبية إسلامية التي هي أول من قبلت المبادئ الخمسة لأن وعيها التعاوني والمطاطي، سهل لها قبول هذه القرارة مع أدلة سياسية وعقدية. وحزب الاتحاد الأنثائي يبدى نفس الموقف، ولكن المحمدية، واتحاد الطلبة المسلمين وبعض قادة مجددى الإسلام مائلون إلى التروى لقبولها مع التخوف أن هذه القرارة قد تكون تهديدا نحو مبدأ السياسة الإسلامية. فلذلك تسجيل أساس المبادئ الخمسة من ناحية قد انتج منازعة دينية سياسية قوية الأثر فى صفوف الأمة الإسلامية التجديدية بينما فى صفوف الأمة الإسلامية التقليدية لم تحدث هذه المسألة مشكلة ما. والفرقة الحادثة فى صفوف أئماء الطلبة المسلمين إنما سبب الخلاف بخصوص أساس المبادئ الخمسة يظهر هذه الظاهرة.

رغم ذلك، أن القرارة الحكومية لمواجهة المنظمات الشعبية الإسلامية تعتبر تجربة سياسية جريئة قام بها العهد الجديد، حتى ليس من الغرابة إذا كان عدد كبير من الأمة الإسلامية سواء بصفة شخصية أو بصفة منظمة يحملون الشك من ناحية تطبيق هذه القرارة وهى أساس المبادئ الخمسة الوحيد. كل الزعماء والمنظمات والأحزاب الإسلامية الذين تتحدث عنهم هنا يوجهون الخوف من إتمام سير تطبيق العلمانية على أساس شرعية الحياة السياسية كمسألة سياسية.

من ناحية الخطوط الأساسية، فهذا التخوف يظهره فى ثلاث أحوال هامة. الأولى: من تقرير أساس المبادئ الخمسة الحكومة تعتبر أنه من الناحية المبدئية صحيح. وهذا التقريب (الذى يمكن رؤيته ورد فعل بعض عظماء المسلمين المجددين الذين يعتقدون نظريات رومانتيكية بخصوص الدولة الإسلامية) واضح وجود ارتباطه بمساعى الحكومة لنبد الآمال الأخرى التى يمكن أن تكون مخالفة. مثال ذلك، آمال المجتمع الذى يركز على المبدأ الدينى. الثانية: تريد الحكومة

الاعتراف بها كصاحبة المشاركة مع تاريخ الجهاد الوطني.. هذا التقرب يمكن أن يشكل مرآة لكثير من أنواع الخلفيات الوطنية، ونظرية الاتحاد الشعبي، والحكومة الديمقراطية وغير ذلك. على هذا الأساس، تعتقد الحكومة بأن كل المنظمات والأحزاب السياسية غير مسجلة للمبادئ الخمسة كأساس لها تقيم كأنها غير وطنية. الثالثة: تريد الحكومة أن تكون المبادئ الخمسة معترف بها كأساس فعلى. في هذه الصياغة تعتقد الحكومة أن هذه المبادئ الخمسة صحيحة/شرعية لأنها تستطيع حل كل المشاكل السياسية بالحسنى، فالتقريب العملي لهذه القضية الشرعية جد مؤثرة سواء للمنظمات الدينية أو ذات الصيغة العلمانية للسعى وراء حمل هذه المؤسسات الإسلامية لقبول المبادئ الخمسة.

بخصوص هذه العلاقة، فقبول المبادئ الخمسة كأساس لما يقرب من كل المنظمات الشعبية والسياسية الإسلامية يشير إلى تخطيط البرنامج، والنظام والمبادئ الدينية الإسلامية في الحياة السياسية. فالبدأ الإسلامي لن يكون قاعدة قوية لإعطاء الشرعية للأحزاب والمنظمات والزعماء والحركات الاجتماعية السياسية في إندونيسيا الحديثة.

Along with the promotion of national stability and economic development, the protection and fortification of Pancasila as the basis and national ideology of the state became the Indonesian New Order government's main priority. This policy seems to have been motivated by a number of factors. First, in the wake of the suppression of the PKI coup d'état attempt in 1965, the government was wary of the party's re-emergence despite an official ban. The government saw the recently-banned PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia — Indonesian Communist Party), with its millions of members, as a latent danger that could consolidate itself and re-emerge to pose a serious threat to the national ideology of Pancasila. As recently as January 1995, Dr. Suhardiman, Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Board (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, DPA), warned Indonesians of the possibility of the re-emergence of the PKI by saying that; "The 30 years since the 1965 abortive Communist coup attempt have provided enough time for former members of the Indonesian Communist Party and their followers to re-establish their power."¹ According to Suhardiman, the communists now employ a new tactic by which "they will no longer build their base from the bottom, through workers and farmers. Instead they will build it from the top through the bureaucracy, the technocracy and capitalism by supporting neo-fundamentalism, which has been widening the gap between the rich and the poor."² Furthermore, he warned people that in order to achieve their goals, the Communists "will make sure they have political security in the form of protection from power-holders and legality with which they declare themselves as the true adherers to Pancasila."³

The second factor was the rising of Muslim fundamentalist movements in various parts of the Muslim world in the 1970s, particularly Iran. Alarmed by the possible spread of sedition in Indonesia as a result of the Iranian revolution, the government moved to safeguard Pancasila. The third factors prompting the government's continued protection of Pancasila seems to have been the rise of Muslim "separatist" and "fundamentalist" movements in the country. Admiral Soedomo, in his capacity as a Commander-in-Chief of the Restoration of Security and Order, explained on behalf of the government, its policies regarding these "radical" groups to Muslim leaders such as Hamka and E.Z. Muttaqien of the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Council of Indonesian Ulama) and Chalid Mawardi and Nuddin Lubis of the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party),

at a meeting in Jakarta in April 1981. Mohammad Natsir and Prof. H.M. Rasjidi, as the leading representatives of Muslims, also attended the meeting. Soedomo's explanation of the rise of these Muslim militant movements can be summarized as follows.⁴

One of these groups was Hasan di Tiro's separatist movement which emerged in Aceh in 1977, and tried to establish an independent state called the "Free Aceh State."⁵ There was also another movement called the Komando Jihad (Holy War Command) by the military, which was led by H. Ismail Pronoto (known as Hispran). The Komando Jihad had been held responsible by the military as having committed acts of violence and terror in many areas, such as Bukittinggi, Padang and Medan; due to these actions, its leader, Ismail Pronoto, was arrested, prosecuted and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1979.⁶ Another splinter group was one led by Abdul Qadir Djaelani, who launched an anti-government movement shortly before the 1978 MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly) sessions. Vigorously advocating what he called "the Islamic Revolutionary Struggle Pattern," Djaelani was arrested and imprisoned for two and half years.⁷ The longest lasting movement was that led by Warman who, like Hispran, called his movement the Komando Jihad. This movement, operating between 1978-1980, murdered Parmanto (Vice-Rector of the State University of the Eleventh of March of Surakarta) and Hasan Bauw, a student of the IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, or State Institute of Islamic Studies) of Yogyakarta. It also stole millions of *rupiahs* (Indonesian currency) from Yogyakarta IAIN government workers' salaries and gold from West Java, killing two policemen in the Rajapolah Affair of August 22, 1980.⁸

Another rebellion was led by the Imran group, which attacked the police office at Cicendo, Bandung, on March 11, 1981, and then hijacked a Garuda DC-9 flight from Jakarta, forcing it to land at Don Muang Airport in Bangkok. Imran's movement was also named by the military the "Indonesian Islamic Revolution Council," which struggled to "overthrow the Soeharto regime and transform it into an Islamic rule."⁹ Soedomo claimed to the Muslim leaders that the government had confiscated a copy of a letter sent by Imran to Ayatullah Khomeini of Iran, requesting his spiritual and material support for the realization of the ideals of the "Indonesian Islamic Revolution Council"¹⁰ This and all the other above-mentioned movements were crushed by the armed forces. It would appear that the

rise of these Muslim splinter groups was a reaction to the government's stern political policies. However, "the Islamic organizations did not take any measures to articulate their political interests."¹¹

Soedomo, accompanied by the Minister of Religious Affairs Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, said that the above meeting was intended to clarify issues relating to these Muslim radical groups, and to abolish mutual suspicion between the government and the Muslims. According to Soedomo, this clarification had to be made since the Muslims "suspected that the Komando Jihad case, plane hijacking and other terrors [in the name of Islam] were in fact fabricated by the government in attempt to push the Muslims into a corner."¹² Soedomo, however, rejected this suspicion and once again explained the government's attitude towards these groups saying that "we distinguish between religion as a divine doctrine and its followers who have gone astray and committed violence which is contrary to both religion and the law." Without mentioning their names, Soedomo said that some of these Muslim splinter groups had as their long-term political objective the establishment of an Islamic state like the Darul Islam (DI) of the 1950s.

Furthermore, without revealing its identity, he also warned that he would not tolerate a foreign state's support for a certain Muslim splinter group, support which, in his view, could be seen as interference in Indonesia's domestic affairs.¹³ Soedomo accepted the Muslim leaders' suggestion not to use the term Komando Jihad anymore since this could destroy the image of Islam as a whole. At the same meeting the Muslim leaders also appealed to the government not to suspect the majority of Muslims, since they had in fact supported the state and did not want to make any changes to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.¹⁴ In the words of Jusuf Hasjim, a leading figure of the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, lit., the Revival of the Ulama, one of the largest Muslim organizations), one fact that the government often forgot was that in any community extremist movements always represent a minority, not the majority.¹⁵ Therefore, in his view, it was inaccurate for the government to generalize and identify these Muslim splinter group movements with the majority of Muslims, who had been loyal to Pancasila both politically and ideologically.

It is necessary to discuss very briefly the issue of the Komando Jihad, in as much as it was a crucial issue for Muslims at that time. Muslims leaders frequently asked: Who was behind the Komando Jihad movement? Who was its real sponsor? Some has asserted that

Lt. Gen. Ali Moertopo and his group were behind it. When interviewed by David Jenkins concerning the issue, Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwono, former head of Bakin (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, or State Intelligence Coordinating Body), explained that:

Ali Moertopo belongs to these groups. So, for instance, you talk about Komando Jihad. It's not a new issue. From the beginning, he has held this opinion. I had to stop that at the time. He was of the opinion that we must create issues. He said "at one time we will have to use this" and so on. Let's say it's always in his mind. I tried to stop him. But I can't stop that because he's always going to the President. He has his own Opsus.¹⁶

Based on an interview with Mohammad Natsir, David Jenkins writes:

Many in Indonesia share this suspicion, and take the view that the Komando Jihad was an operation mounted by Moertopo to discredit the Muslims. Former Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir, a prominent Muslim leader, claimed in 1978 that Ismail Pranoto, a Komando Jihad leader who was sentenced to life imprisonment in September 1979, was "an *agent provocateur* run by Ali Moertopo." People at the grass roots level were dissatisfied with conditions, Natsir argued, and were easily led. Moertopo's agents had planted rumors about the Communist comeback and had promised former Darul Islam activists weapons to fight the leftist "threat." The leaders of the Komando Jihad—Ateng Jailani, Abu Darda (a son of S. M. Kartosuwirjo, the original Darul Islam leader), Danu Subroto, Zainul Abidin, Ismail Pranoto, and Kadar Salihat—were former Darul Islam leaders who were "now in the control of Ali Moertopo and his group.... From the start they got help from the Ali Moertopo group, not from the military as a whole. That is his special hobby. Even the West Java commander, [Maj. Gen.] Himawan [Susanto], knows it is a fabrication, but no one can say it. He knows it. He was furious that everything is blamed on [West Java] as a center of the Darul Islam."¹⁷

Furthermore, Jenkins also notes that during interviews a number of army officers expressed opinions almost identical to Natsir's.¹⁸ Two important members of the Moertopo group, namely Harry Tjan Silalahi and Jusuf Wanandi, corroborated that the Komando Jihad leaders did indeed have links with Moertopo. However, according to Silalahi and Wanandi, these Komando Jihad leaders "misused" this link, with the consequence that people had come to wrongly suspect him.¹⁹ In this case, Jenkins notes that "many Indonesians, a number of prominent military officers among them, find this 'explanation' unconvincing." Jenkins added that an army general even insisted that, "It is a manufactured account."²⁰

On the basis of Juwono's explanation and the corroboration from a number of army officers as mentioned above, it is safe to say that,

to some extent, the Muslim allegations concerning the Komando Jihad and Ali Moertopo's Opsus were not entirely wrong. Muslims at that time had the feeling that the main aim of the Moertopo Opsus was—in addition to interfering in the internal affairs of the party and weakening it—to cause Indonesians to identify Islam with violence and terrorism. Under such circumstances Islam and the PPP would become politically isolated. Or, to quote *Indonesia: Muslims on Trial*, “In fact, the prime purpose of the Komando Jihad canard was to link Muslim activism in the public mind with alleged terrorist activities and to intimidate the Muslim community as a whole.”²¹ When put on trial, some members of the so-called Komando Jihad “argued in vain that they had been working as intelligence agents for Opsus or Special Operations, the intelligence outfit under General Ali Moertopo, and vehemently denied the existence of Komando Jihad.”²²

The Muslims felt that the image of their religion was damaged by the Komando Jihad movement at that time. Now, this issue needs to be investigated in more detail, especially since the demise of Ali Moertopo, against whom Natsir and other Muslim leaders have made allegations. By doing so, historical facts surrounding the Komando Jihad issue can be disclosed clearly and become known to succeeding generations, objectively and fairly.

The Government's Motives in Applying Pancasila as the Sole Foundation

In line with its continued protection of Pancasila, as illustrated above, in 1982 the government began to speak of the importance of the application of Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties and mass organizations. The government's main motive was to safeguard Pancasila as the state's national ideology, and to continue to socialize it within the life of the nation. In order to do this, the government felt that there should be no other ideology to rival Pancasila. The government's position on Pancasila as the sole basis was motivated by two factors. First, the government seemed to have learned from the experiences of the previous general election campaigns in which physical clashes (often resulting in fatalities), particularly between Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Group, Indonesia's ruling party) and PPP supporters, had frequently occurred. President Soeharto acknowledged that “there had been occasional outbursts of violence in the run-up to the election,” and that this happened due to the fact that “not all contestants had accepted

Pancasila as the single acceptable ideology to be upheld by all socio-political groups."²³

The confrontation between Golkar and the PPP was due to strong religious and political sentiments which had colored their attempts to draw wide support from the Muslims, who constitute a majority in the country. It should be noted that there is no official prohibition on raising religious issues during the election campaign. However, the use of religious issues in an excessive manner caused conflicts between the two sides. Very often in previous election campaigns, the PPP and the Golkar became involved in fierce "battles," armed with Qur'anic verses and hadith, whereas issues of economic development and social reform tended to be ignored. Learning from these facts, the government perceived religion to be a source of conflict and therefore began to put forward the sole foundation policy.

The second factor promoting the government to establish Pancasila not only as the sole basis or ideology of the state, but also for all political parties and mass organizations in the country was that, ideologically, Pancasila would occupy a much stronger position in the social and national life of Indonesians. This idea seems to have been prompted by the fact that, as far as political Islam was concerned, the PPP still maintained Islam as their basis in addition to Pancasila. The PPP's use of this "double" basis was seen by the government as proof that they were not totally committed to the national ideology of Pancasila. In an attempt to abolish this "double" basis, the government then came up with the idea of applying Pancasila as the sole basis.

This issue was in fact raised by President Soeharto himself in his welcoming speech to Rapim ABRI (Rapat Pimpinan ABRI, or Armed Forces Commanders' Meeting) held in Pekanbaru, Sumatra, on March 27, 1980). It was emphasized once again when he delivered a speech at the 28th anniversary celebration of the Kopassandha (Korps Pasukan Sandi Yudha, or Army Para-commando Unit) at Cijantung, Jakarta, on April 16, 1980. In both speeches the President referred to the national consensus that had been reached by ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces) and all socio-political forces in 1968, by which all agreed to the idea of implementing Pancasila as their sole basis. This national consensus had not yet been fully carried out, said the President, since "there was still one political party which added another principle to Pancasila."²⁴ In the eyes of the President, the attitude of this party led to "a question

mark."²⁵

It was generally believed that the President was referring to the PPP, since he connected his remarks to the PPP leaders' walk-out from the 1978 MPR general session (in reaction to the legalization of the P4 [Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Guidance for the Understanding and Implementation of Pancasila]) and also from the 1980 DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Council—Indonesian parliament) session, when changes to the general election law were to be legalized. In his first speech, which David Jenkins has called "the storm over Pekanbaru,"²⁶ Soeharto called for ABRI commanders to intensify their vigilance towards the PPP leaders, and warned that:

As long as we have not yet succeeded in bringing them to their senses, we must step up our vigilance, choose partners and friends who truly defend Pancasila and have no doubts about it. We do not mean to be hostile to a party or group which does not yet trust Pancasila 100%, no, but we are obliged to persuade them in such a way that all social and political forces will base themselves on our national ideology, Pancasila, with no addition whatsoever.²⁷

The President's speech provoked strong reactions from various Muslim leaders²⁸ and from some prominent retired military officers. On April 18, 1980, Lt. Gen. (ret.) A.Y. Mokoginta—a North Sulawesi Muslim who had served as chief of the Sumatra Command between 1964 and 1967—sent a nine-page letter to Gen. Muhammad Yusuf expressing his concern about Soeharto's address in Pekanbaru. In a tone similar to Mokoginta's, the FKS Purna Yudha (an association of prominent retired army officers) sent a letter on May 2, 1980 to the new army Chief of Staff, Gen. Poniman. The letter was signed by Lt. Gen. (ret.) H. R. Dharsono (former Commander-in-Chief of the West Java based Siliwangi division of the army and former Secretary General of ASEAN) and Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sudirman (former Commander of the East Java Brawijaya Division).²⁹

In addition, on May 13, 1980, the Petition of Fifty Group presented a one-page "statement of concern" to the Indonesian parliament, claiming that President Soeharto had falsely interpreted Pancasila. It also accused the President of using Pancasila as a weapon to attack his political rivals, whereas the founding fathers of the Republic had intended it simply as a tool to unify the nation. The group was concerned by the President's address, which invited ABRI to choose partners according to the political will of those in power and

to remain neutral towards all socio-political groups. The leading figures of this group were retired generals such as navy Lt. Gen. Ali Sadikin (former Governor of the Special Region of Jakarta), Gen. A. H. Nasution (former Chief of Staff of the armed forces and former head of the MPRS) and Gen. Hugeng (former Chief of the Indonesian Police). Former leaders of Masyumi (Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Deliberation Council—a leading Muslim party in the 50's) such as Muhammad Natsir, Sjafrudin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap, as well as Muslim activists and preachers like A.M. Fatwa joined this group.³⁰ Regardless of their political purposes, the involvement of Muslim leaders and activists in this movement contributed to the inharmonious relations between the Muslims and the government.

The government's idea of implementing Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties was first put forward shortly after the 1982 election. Prior to discussing this point however, it is necessary to consider the 1982 general election and its results, through which we can see the development of the political power of the PPP. As in previous election campaigns, the 1982 campaign was colored by bitter rivalries and often violent clashes between the supporters of the PPP and those of Golkar. The newspaper *Kompas* reported at the time that the supporters of the PPP and Golkar had clashed in various areas, particularly in Jakarta and Yogyakarta where numerous people were injured and a few killed. The most serious clash between the two occurred on March 18, 1982 in Lapangan Banteng, Jakarta, where Golkar held its campaign. The supporters of the PPP were reported to have challenged Golkar, leading to the outbreak of a riot which resulted in the arrest of a few hundred youths. The authorities considered abolishing all election rallies, and the Chief of Security, Admiral Soedomo, instructed the security to shoot rioters on the spot.³¹

In the meantime, religious issues became quite prominent during the 1982 election campaign. Susumu Awanohara wrote at the time that "perhaps more than in the past, religious and other primordial symbols have come to the fore in electioneering, overshadowing other political issues which might have been usefully debated."³² For example, PPP leaders and spokesmen claimed that voting for their party was tantamount to choosing Islam, while voting for other parties, especially Golkar was un-Islamic. PPP leaders even stigmatized Golkar as being similar to the Golkar³³ (*Golongan Kuraisy*, or Quraish group) referring thereby to the tribe of Quraysh which opposed the Prophet

Muhammad's efforts in spreading Islam. In response to these issues, Amir Moertono, General Chairman of Golkar, stressed in his campaign speech that the election was simply a political affairs, and not a contest about religious loyalty.³⁴ As in previous general elections, in the 1982 election the Golkar won the majority vote, receiving 62.34 percent of votes, with the PPP getting 27.78 percent, and the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party) 7.88 percent.

Based on these voting percentages, Golkar obtained 246 seats (232 in 1977), the PPP 94 seats (99 in 1977) and the PDI 24 seats (29 in 1977).³⁵ This distribution indicates that the position of the PPP had weakened (losing five seats) compared with the result of the previous election, whereas Golkar performed better and therefore become stronger, gaining fourteen seats in the 1982 election. Judging by these results, the PPP had clearly continued to suffer losses vis-a-vis Golkar in the political arena. As for the PDI, its position, like that of the PPP, had also continued to decline, as it lost five seats in the 1982 election. Both the PPP and the PDI, due to lack of funds, poor organization and the overall political system prevailing in the country, remind too weak to present a serious challenge to the government and the military-supported Golkar in Indonesian politics.

The Implementation of Pancasila as the Sole Basis

Following their political defeat, the PPP and the PDI were shocked by President Soeharto's proposal to apply Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties. The government's idea of unifying the basis of all political parties was first put forward by the President in his state speech before the DPR session on August 16, 1982. Later, this idea of the President's was incorporated into the MPR Enactment No. II/1983; it being reasoned that, in order to maintain, strengthen and implement Pancasila in the social and national life of the nation, all political parties, as well as Golkar, should make Pancasila their sole foundation. With this enactment, the government abolished the special basis and distinct characteristics upon which the PPP and the PDI were based. In the case of the PPP this was "Islam", whereas for the PDI it was "Indonesian Democracy, Indonesian Nationalism and Social Justice". This process was part of the government's policy to establish political stability and to wipe out sharp political polarization, which was believed to be caused by fanaticism, as seen in particular during previous election campaigns. This

political polarization, coupled with religious fanaticism, frequently resulted in hostility on the part of the political party towards other political groups of different basis.³⁶ By applying Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties, the government believed that ideological antagonism among socio-political forces would be eliminated,³⁷ and that under such conditions it could concentrate its full attention and energy on carrying out its national development programs.³⁸

The government's intention to stipulate Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties provoked reactions from various quarters in Indonesian society. One group which included many civil servants, agreed with the government, arguing that the stipulation of Pancasila as the sole basis would reduce political tensions among the people which in turn would strengthen national unity and facilitate the implementation of the national development program. Moeljanto Tjokrowinoto, for example, argued that this idea would fortify the position of Pancasila as a value system and as a cohesive force enabling Indonesians to overcome socio-political conflicts.³⁹ In support of their argument, this group pointed out how, in the 1950s, liberal democratic values and the multi-party system that they had generated, contributed to the nation being torn apart by ideological strife. They very existence of the nation was threatened by political conflict, particularly between the Secular Nationalists and the Muslim Nationalists. Under such circumstances, opposing sides were constantly being drawn into political battles which made it difficult to achieve political consensus.

While the government and its supporters have frequently "cursed" liberal democracy as a source of political and disorder, Abdurrahman Wahid in his article "Pancasila dan Liberalisme (Pancasila and Liberalism)", asked which aspects of liberal democracy can be accepted and which rejected on the basis of Pancasila. Wahid notes that people's opinions, which differed from the government's, especially at the grass roots level, were always regarded as being in opposition to government policies. According to Wahid, this attitude in fact "killed" democratic impulses originating from Pancasila itself.⁴⁰ In this connection, Herbert Feith also argues that the operation of liberal or constitutional democracy in Indonesia had, in fact, its own dynamics characterized by, among other things, freedom of expression and freedom of the press. As he describes it:

The operation of constitutional democracy in the period of the first four cabinets was reasonably effective. Cabinets were accountable to the parliament of the day for many of their actions, although this was not an elected body. The press was exceedingly free. Courts operated with considerable independence from the government. Demands for national loyalty were rarely used to silence the critics of cabinets. And non-political administration characterized at least some major parts of the government apparatus.⁴¹

Furthermore, according to the government and its supporters, the application of Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties would encourage every party to become "more program oriented" rather than "ideology oriented." In this way, a party's appeal would lie specifically in the quality of the programs it offered to people, not in the ideological basis it used. Thus, the major issues during an election campaign would center mainly on programs rather than ideology. In this light, it was believed that ideology would not become a source of political violence among parties, as had occurred during the previous election campaigns.⁴²

Strong disagreement with the government proposal came from the Working Group of the Petition of Fifty Group which, in its statement on September 23, 1982, accused the government of being unfair and mostly concerned with defending the political and economic interests of those in power. This group said that:

the unification of the basis of various [political] groups existing in Indonesian society, with fabricated reasons, was intended [by the government] to protect the interests of the ruling class, i.e., to defend their political power and economic interests which were not based on the historical ideals of the nation.⁴³

Furthermore, A. Rahman Tolleng warned the government to avoid the tendency to regulate and unify all sectors of social life, since this would result in a populace which "idolized the state." Tolleng urged that this tendency be curbed since it was against the basic nature of Pancasila. As he puts it:

... it should be acknowledged that the implementation of Pancasila in the life of the state was not without problems. As a [new] state which was in the process of searching for its own form, [the Indonesian government] could fall into a tendency to regulate and unify all sectors of social life. This would make the position of the state too strong vis-à-vis the [ruled] people, and would create what could be called "the idolization of the state." This tendency needed to be curbed since this was against the essence of Pancasila as a democratic ideology which respects human dignity. In this regard, I was of the opinion that the only objective way to curb this tendency was to establish independent social forces to counterbalance the state and its apparatus' force.⁴⁴

In spite these reactions, the government persisted in carrying out its plan to implement Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties. On February 19, 1985, the government, with the DPR's approval, issued Law no. 3/1985, stipulating that all political parties and Golkar adopt Pancasila as their sole basis. (This law was intended to amend Law No. 3/1975, issued on August 27, 1975, according to Article 2 of which, the political parties and Golkar were still allowed to maintain their specific bases in addition to Pancasila). The law stipulated that, within one year of its promulgation, both the PPP and the PDI, in addition to Golkar, had to conform to this new regulation. According to the law, the President, with his authority, could freeze the central boards of these political parties if they did not obey the law. It is notable that the government policy of stipulating Pancasila as the sole basis of political parties and did not pose any problem for Golkar, as it was the government party and thus had Pancasila as a part of its *raison d'être*. This meant that only the PPP and the PDI had to redefine their identities in response to the government policy. The PDI, for its part, would not have any difficulty in adopting Pancasila as its sole basis since its current basis was "secular", not religious, in nature. However, as far as the PPP was concerned, the new law was a sensitive issue since the party would have to remove any mention of Islam as its basis, and adopt Pancasila in its stead.

Four months later, on June 17, 1985, the government, again with the DPR's approval, issued Law No. 8/1985 on mass organizations, stipulating that all social or mass organizations had to subscribe to Pancasila as their sole bases. According to article 1 of the law, a mass organization is an organization established by a group of Indonesian citizens motivated by same aspirations, profession, ideals, religious interests, or belief in God, with the objective of pursuing certain goals within the state of the Republic of Indonesia. With the issuance of Laws numbered 3/1985 and 8/1985, the adoption of Pancasila as the sole basis of all political parties and all mass organizations became an absolute requirement and beyond further debate. This meant that any rejection of Pancasila as its basis by any political party or mass organization would result in its dissolution by the government. We shall see in the following section how the PPP and various Islamic mass organizations, as well as individual Muslims, responded to the policies which, like earlier ones, touched upon their religious sensibilities.

Muslim Responses

Reactions of Individual Muslims

Reaction to the government's policy to apply Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties came from many individual Muslims, such as Fachry Ali (b. 1954), Deliar Noer and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Fachry Ali maintained that religion had played a pivotal role in the development of political parties, particularly Islamic parties, from their early history to the present. He saw the government's policy of stipulating Pancasila as the sole basis of organizations in the country as the greatest political experiment ever conducted.⁴⁵ With this new policy, all political parties had to re-write their constitutions, re-establish their political orientations and re-formulate their programs in order to adjust to the new political situation. All this, according to Ali, would confuse their supporters, and in turn make them less loyal to their old leaders. Ali disagreed with the government's opinion and that of its supporters who said that religion was a source of political conflict. He maintained that using this argument for the unification of the basis of all political parties was fallacious. He argued that religion was not a source of political antagonism, but one of unification in political life. As he said:

For Indonesia people, religion gives basic values [to their lives]. Parts of [their] political actions are also justified on the basis of religious reasons. Besides, in the process of political development, religion always serves as a unifying factor. This kind of situation continues to exist in the PPP.⁴⁶

In response to the government's proposal of Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties, Deliar Noer⁴⁷ traced the issue back to the life of political parties under the Old Order regime. According to Noer, this regime tolerated any political party's special characteristics or specific basis (as its *raison d'être*) in addition to Pancasila. In other words, in this period a political party had own special basis, serving as its own specific identity which differentiated it from other parties. In the 1950s, for example, the Partai Katholik based itself on the principle of belief in "One God in general, Pancasila in particular, and action in accordance with Catholic doctrine." The Parkindo based itself on the principle of "Christianity," whereas the NU—like other Islamic parties—based itself on "Islam." As for the PNI, this was based on the principle of *Marhaenisme* [Proletarianism].⁴⁸

Under guided Democracy, Soekarno stipulated that all political parties utilize Pancasila as their "common" basis, but allowed them

to maintain their special bases.⁴⁹ Soekarno implemented this policy with the intention that all the parties had to accept and defended Pancasila. Noer maintained that Soekarno did not question this "double" basis for the parties since, in line with his speech on Pancasila on June 1, 1945, he proposed only that it be used as the philosophical basis for an independent state's philosophical basis. However, Soekarno allowed every political group to struggle for its own political aspirations in the independence era in accordance with its specific basis and goals.⁵⁰

In keeping with his second principle, Soekarno urged all political parties, including the Parkindo and Partai Katholik on the one hand, and the Islamic Parties on the other, to struggle for their political interests by obtaining as many seats as possible in the representative body which would be established in the independence era.⁵¹ These historical facts were put forward by Noer in an attempt to show that parties based on religion, such as the Catholic, Christian and Islamic parties, were encouraged by Soekarno to struggle for their own political goals in accordance with their religious aspirations. To emphasize the importance of the specific basis of a party, Noer also pointed to the case of Muhammad Hatta, former vice-president and staunch defender of Pancasila, who made great efforts to found the PDII (Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party) in 1967. In the new party's constitution, Islam and Pancasila were designated equally as its basis. Islam's inclusion, according to Noer, was intended to emphasize the importance of the party's specific identity, and to demonstrate that politics cannot be separated from religion in the teaching of Islam.⁵²

Deliar Noer disagreed with the government's and its supporters' opinion that religion was a source of political conflict or violence during the election campaigns. He argued that the main cause of the conflict did not, in fact, originate from the religious basis of parties, but from many other factors. In this respect, Noer pointed to the fact that both during the 1955 general election campaign and the election itself, in which a number of political parties with different ideological bases competed with each other, a peaceful and tranquil situation was maintained.⁵³ The cause of the political violence during the election campaign under the New Order should, according to Noer, be sought in the government's handling of developments during the election period. Thus, in Noer's opinion, the problem was not as simple as the government supposed.

Noer explained that a single party system was in fact introduced one or two months after Indonesian's independence, when President Soekarno declared the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party) to be a single party. At that time all socio-political forces opposed Soekarno's policy, and due to this opposition he allowed various groups of people to found political parties with different bases.⁵⁴ When Soekarno implemented his Guided Democracy, the regime simplified the political system by allowing only ten political parties to exist.⁵⁵ When, in 1973, the New Order launched into political restructuring, this resulted in the amalgamation of all political parties into three parties, namely the PPP, PDI and the government backed Golkar. The government then issued Law No. 3/1975 on political parties and Golkar, which acknowledged and confirmed only the existence of the PPP, PDI and Golkar, and did not allow the creation of any other political parties. However, the law still allowed the parties to use different bases, even though it encouraged them to employ Pancasila as their common basis.

Noer argued that the government's idea of extending Pancasila to serve as the sole basis for all political parties reflected a tendency to narrow or restrict people's aspirations; a practice which should not be carried out in democratic life.⁵⁶ Noer also saw this as a bid on the part of government to implement a single party system. Under such circumstances, the existence of more than one party was simply a formality. If this was to be the case, Noer continued, the implementation of democracy in Indonesia should be debated: "Did we implement a democracy which gives us opportunities to freely develop diverse ideas (with a sense of responsibility, of course), or did we implement democracy just as a formality?"⁵⁷

Despite the fact that the government did not clearly and openly state the above tendency, Noer saw the implications of its policy as appearing to point in this direction. Basically, the insistence upon a sole basis for all political parties would allow for no fundamental differences among the parties; therefore, the implementation of this policy would in fact require no more than one political party.⁵⁸ Moreover, Noer maintained that the use of Pancasila as the sole basis would not enable the parties to argue for the programs they wished to establish, since the values or criteria used to evaluate their programs were the same. This would lead the parties to be less competitive in offering programs, which would make it impossible for them to draw wide support from the people. According to Noer, the parties should

be allowed to maintain their special bases, since these would determine the platforms and goals which would make them distinct from one another.⁵⁹

In Deliar Noer's opinion, President Soeharto's idea of employing Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties would not only pose trouble for the Islam-based party, the PPP, but would also cause problems for the ex-Parkindo and ex-Partai Katholik. When fused to become the PDI in 1973, these two parties lost their special bases (Protestantism and Catholicism respectively) and agreed to accept the PDI's basis instead. According to Noer, their adoption of this new basis was due to practical political considerations, not fundamental religious reasons. As far as the ex-Parkindo was concerned, Noer based his assessment on one of the decisions of the National Conference on Church and Society, which was sponsored by the Association of Indonesian Churches and held in Salatiga, Central Java, on June 19-29, 1967. This decision stated that "the Christian faith does not accept the view stating that Pancasila is the source of all legal sources." Another Conference resolution, it is true, admits that Pancasila constitutes "a material source of Indonesian positive law." However, according to another resolution, what serves as "a source of all legal sources is nothing but the [Will of] the One God whom we know in Jesus Christ. He is also the source of Pancasila."⁶⁰ As far as the Partai Katholik was concerned, Deliar Noer pointed to the existence of the Vatican State which, in his opinion, reflects a view or faith which does not separate religion (Catholicism) from politics. In Noer opinion, the Pope is a symbol of the unity of religion and politics. On the basis of these arguments, Noer concluded that, from a theological point of view, the willingness of the ex-Parkindo and ex-Partai Katholik to accept Pancasila as their sole basis did not solve the real problem, and only served the purpose of practical politics.⁶¹

Deliar Noer went on to say that if Muslims for their part accepted the government's idea of Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties, this would pose a heavy burden on their religious conscience. It would foster dishonesty among Muslims and give rise to political hypocrisy in the face of policies launched by the government. The Muslims, he said, would say "yes" to such policies, but it was not certain that they would implement them.⁶² In his opinion, if the PPP accepted the government's idea of Pancasila as the basis for all political parties, the implication would be that the party acknowledged the following:

1. Religion and politics are separate within Islam. Thus, this [kind of acknowledgement] would place Islam in a position equal to that of other religion in relation to politics.
2. Religion, particularly Islam, is not in agreement with the demands of the era, at least in the political sphere.
3. Islam has been a source of trouble [for Pancasila] in the past; or it was in contradiction to or, at least, not in accordance with Pancasila in the field of politics.
4. Political disturbances during the last election campaigns were caused by the PPP which still maintained its special basis (Islam) in addition to Pancasila.⁶³

In addition, Deliar Noer mentioned six political implications of the application Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties. First, a single basis for all political parties would deny the diversity of society which flourishes in accordance with its convictions. Some of these convictions may originate from religious doctrine. Second, a single basis for all political parties would prevent groups of people who are deeply rooted in the same traditions from unifying and exchanging ideas based on their beliefs (including religious beliefs). In this case, the single basis contained elements of force, not freedom, which constitutes a basic characteristic of democracy. Third, a single basis for all political parties would deny the relationship between religion and politics. This, notably for Islam, was contrary to its doctrine. As a result, this would lead the parties into a process of secularization. Fourth, making Pancasila the sole basis for all political parties ignored real issues which needed to be specifically formulated by the parties when establishing their programs. This may occur because their special bases, which served as the criteria needed to assess their own programs, were not allowed to be explicitly and clearly included in their contributions. This would lead the parties to be close-minded in advancing arguments and to be hypocritical in expressing political attitudes. Fifth, a single basis for all political parties reflected a tendency to implement a single party system. In spite of the fact that this single party system would not be formally realized, it could be said that the multi-party system was in fact abolished; the multi-party system would exist in the name only. Thus, this system implied the implementation of a single party system in a disguised form. Sixth, Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties would block groups of people from developing their convictions, mainly religious, which in fact strengthened Pancasila. Consequently, people would be re-

stricted due to a lack of alternative ideas which might be very useful in the development of the state.⁶⁴

In Deliar Noer's opinion, the New Order's policy of applying Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties was not in line with the ideals of the Indonesian leaders of 1945. As mentioned above, the latter used Pancasila as the basis of the state and allowed any political party to maintain its special basis in addition to Pancasila. Noer was of the opinion that the application of Pancasila as the sole basis would have more disadvantages than advantages.⁶⁵ Why? Because this policy, according to Noer, implied—in addition to those points mentioned above—the following:

1. That Pancasila as the sole basis was an absolute right, whereas the absolute right lies with God.
2. The other bases were contrary to this sole basis, whereas it was believed that religion was in accordance with it.
3. That openness decreased because assessments of a problem were not automatically founded on this sole basis.
4. That people were hypocrites in political terms.
5. That a single and uniform interpretation of this sole basis had been established, whereas different interpretations of it did not automatically mean rejecting it.⁶⁶

Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the former Masyumi leader and former president of the PDRI (Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia, or Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia),⁶⁷ also reacted to the government policy of stipulating Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties. On July 7, 1983, he bravely sent a long letter⁶⁸ to President Soeharto, appealing to him to stop his policy. He sent copies of his letter to the Vice-President and the Justice of the Supreme Court, and to the President, Vice-President and members of the Supreme Advisory Council.⁶⁹

Prawiranegara believed that Pancasila was simply intended by the founding fathers of the Republic to be used as the philosophical basis and national ideology of the state, and not as the sole foundation for all political parties and mass organizations. He firmly criticized the President's policy as being wrong and baseless and, for this very reason, urged him to change his mind and discontinue his policy. "It is better to run back halfway than to err the whole way," he wrote.⁷⁰ In a strong emotional reaction, coupled with a feeling of frustration and anger, Prawiranegara asked:

Why must the Islamic basis of the remaining Islamic political party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), be replaced by Pancasila? After all, the Islamic basis of the Islamic political parties and social organizations has long existed and been recognized as not in conflict, but rather in accord, with the 1945 Constitution. Why only now has the Islamic foundation to be replaced by Pancasila? What crime has the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or the HMI [Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam — Islamic Association of University Students], or many Muslim organization committed?⁷¹

The PPP's Response

The PPP is a fusion of four Islamic political parties, namely the NU, PSII (Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Union Party), Perti (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Islamic Education Union) and Parmusi (Partai Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Party). Prior to the fusion, the NU was the largest party of the four, drawing its main support from rural Muslims. This can be seen, for example, from the results of the 1971 general election in which the NU won 18.69 percent of the vote (58 seats), whereas the Parmusi took only 5.36 percent (24 seats), the PSII 2.39 percent (10 seats), and the Perti 0.70 percent (2 seats).⁷² On January 5, 1973, in the wake of the New Order's policy of political restructuring, these four Islamic parties merged into a single party called the PPP, with the main objective of advancing Islamic political aspirations. The PPP, especially in its early development, often experienced political turmoil because certain elements within it, chiefly the NU and the MI (Muslimin Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslims), pursued their own political aspirations. At the same time, the government often interfered in the internal affairs of the party, supporting the leadership of those who were pro-government and pushing the non-accommodationists (particularly member of NU) out of the party. The political turmoil within the PPP, coupled with the government's intervention, resulted, for example, in the resignation of K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri, a leading figure of the NU, from the PPP leadership.⁷³

During this period, many members of the NU faction within the PPP were known as hard-liners who opposed several of the government's policies. Consequently, despite its majority position in the PPP, not one of the NU leaders ever became general chairman of the executive council of the party. This happened because the government prevented the NU leaders from holding this position, fearing that the party would be mobilized to pose a challenge to the government. The only senior and "strategic" position given to the

NU was chairmanship of the consultative or advisory councils of the PPP. While the position of the NU element within the PPP continued to be weak, that of the MI element became stronger as indicated by the fact that the chairmanship of the executive council of the PPP was always in its hands. Under the leadership of Jaelani Naro, a Parmusi activist who was supported by the government, the position of the NU element within the PPP continued to weaken.⁷⁴ However, when Ismail Hasan Metareum (a Parmusi figure who had a moderate attitude) became the General Chairman of the PPP in 1989, the position of the NU element was slightly improved, as can be seen from the fact that the position of Secretary General of the party was given to Mathori Abdul Djalil, an NU man.

Before the government's application of Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties, the PPP, as an Islamic party, used the symbol of the *ka'bah* (cubicle building in the Haram mosque of Mecca toward which Muslims direct their faces in *salah* or prayers) which attracted Muslims to vote for it in general elections. The use of the symbol was proposed by K. H. Bisri Sansuri, a leading *'alim* of the NU who also served as chairman of the consultative council of the PPP. It was reported that prior to arriving at his proposal, Bisri had performed *shâlah istikhârah* (a night prayer seeking direct guidance and blessing from God), during which he had received a vision that the symbol of the *ka'bah* was suitable to be used as an emblem by the PPP. Thus, the PPP activists became convinced that their struggle for the party would be blessed by God.⁷⁵ Similarly, because the ideological basis of the PPP was both Islam and Pancasila, this meant that it struggled for Islamic political aspirations within the context of Pancasila. In the PPP's view, these two principles did not contradict each other.

According to its 1973 constitution, "the PPP is based on Islam and aims at guiding the state of the Republic of Indonesia on the foundation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, leading to the establishment of a just and prosperous society blessed by God the Almighty."⁷⁶ To achieve this goal, the PPP made every effort

- (1) to implement Islamic teaching in the life of individuals and the community in accordance with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution;
- (2) to develop Muslim brotherhood within the context of national unity and integrity; and
- (3) to stimulate the creation of a good atmosphere in which religious activities, according to Sunnism, could be carried out.⁷⁷

Also according to its constitution, the PPP based its programs upon the basic principle of “enjoying the good and prohibiting the evil,” and implemented these programs with the objective of:

1. building an Indonesian society obedient to God Almighty;
2. establishing noble moral conduct within Indonesian society by elevating its religious consciousness and responsibility;
3. defending and building the state of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila, leading to the creation of a just and prosperous society blessed by God the Almighty; and
4. struggling to develop economic life based on the principle of family spirit.⁷⁸

In 1977, four years after its foundation, the PPP modified its constitution in which its basis was stated as, “the PPP is based on Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and Islam.” In line with this modification, the PPP reformulated its goals, aiming at:

- a. attaining the nation’s ideals as laid down in the 1945 constitution which are in agreement with those of Islamic teaching;
- b. establishing a just and prosperous society blessed by God the Almighty, spiritually and materially based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in the unitary state of Republic of Indonesia.⁷⁹

From the above questions, it is clear that these three important elements, i.e., the basis, goal and program, were closely interrelated and could not be separated from one another in the political struggle of the PPP. Indeed, these three elements gave a clear and specific identity to the PPP as an Islamic party, and distinguished it from the PDI and Golkar. In line with its religious and political goals, the PPP exhibited a staunch and consistent attitude toward government policies which, in its view, were contrary to its principles. For example, in 1973 it rejected the government’s proposal of the marriage bill (which, in its view, was secular in nature) and walked out of the 1978 MPR general session held to discuss the legalization of the *aliran kepercayaan* (Javanese mysticism) and the P4.

The PPP did not react substantially to the government’s proposal to stipulate Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties. It mostly kept silent in response to this very important issue. In fact, the PPP faction in the DPR had participated in the discussion concerning the government’s proposal of Bill No. 3/1985 (in which Pancasila as the sole basis was proposed) and, together with other factions, approved it. With the government’s issuance of the law, the PPP had no choice

but to obey, meaning that it had to redefine its identity in accordance with this new regulation. In response to this law, J. Naro, General Chairman of the PPP, quickly said that the PPP had implemented it fully and completely.⁸⁰ However, Naro persisted in keeping the Ka'bah as the symbol of the PPP, refusing to replace it with another symbol for fear of losing the party's traditional supporters. This provoked disagreement with his colleague, Syarifuddin Harahap, who accused him of going back to the spirit of the Jakarta Charter.⁸¹

In the meantime, Sulastomo expressed his surprise saying that "it was unbelievable that they (Naro's group) would change the basis of party so easily, while persistently refusing to replace the election symbol. The symbol was in fact a representation of the Islamic basis, was it not?"⁸² In a tone similar to Naro's, Sudardji stated that "we should abandon all of these [ideologies other than Pancasila]."⁸³ Asked whether Islam were a narrow ideology, he answered in the affirmative.⁸⁴ Sudardji's attitude provoked criticism from Syafii Maarif (a scholar who had graduated from the University of Chicago) saying that "this is the way this PPP leader understands Islam in its relation to politics. Indeed, many of the Muslim politicians have now lost their dignity and self-respect."⁸⁵ Maarif then added that,

Here, again, we observe a shameless example where many Muslim official leaders have too easily become prey for the political game. Therefore, in view of this, a question may be raised: How can one expect to be able build a strong and attractive political party on the foundation of self-serving and irresponsible individuals? It appears to us that the Muslim "leaders" are still not clever enough to take a lesson from history. Even after a series of continuous disgraceful failures, these leaders remain incapable of benefiting from their past experiences. Perhaps, to them it is enough to present Islam by means of a number of slogans and generalities necessary for "buying" votes from the ummah in the elections.⁸⁶

It should be clear from these discussions that Muslim scholars like Noer, Maarif and Fachry Ali, as well as Muslim leaders such as Prawiranegara, felt free to express their objections to the government's imposition of Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties. They could do this because they were not PPP activists. They were Muslim figures who were concerned with the "fate" of the PPP, and who had the right to express their views on Islam and politics, particularly in relation to the PPP and Pancasila as the sole basis. As for the PPP leaders, they faced a political dilemma in the sense that their rejection of Pancasila as the sole basis would result in the party's dissolu-

tion by the government. In order to save the party, the PPP leaders had to choose a pragmatic way to accept Pancasila as the sole basis of this party.

In redefining its identity in conformity with the law, the PPP in 1985 reformulated its basis to read: "the PPP is based on Pancasila." While the PPP has permanently maintained Pancasila as its sole basis, it has changed its goals and programs in accordance with the political demands that it has faced. In 1987 the party issued a new constitution in which its political goals were formulated and designed:

1. to develop the spirit of brotherhood in all aspects of social and religious activities with the aim of strengthening the national unity and integrity of Indonesians;
2. to implement religious doctrine in the lives of individuals and the community; and
3. to stimulate the creation of a good atmosphere for the implementation of legal religious practices.⁸⁷

If we compare these reformulated goals with those laid down in its 1983 constitution, we will note the following points: (1) the PPP changed the expression "to develop Islamic brotherhood" in its 1983 constitution to become "to develop the spirit of brotherhood" in its 1987 constitution; (2) the PPP exchanged the formulation "to implement the teaching of Islam" in its 1983 constitution with "to implement religious doctrine" in its 1987 constitution; and (3) the formula "to carry out religious doctrine according to Sunnism" in its 1983 constitution was replaced by "to observe legitimate religious practices" in its 1987 constitution. In keeping with the redefining of its identity, the PPP replaced its symbol, the Ka'bah, with that of a star.⁸⁸ Thus, the PPP removed everything related to the use of an Islamic basis, identity, formulas and symbols following its adoption of Pancasila as its sole basis.

Following these "radical" changes, Ridwan Saidi, a leading activist of the PPP, warned others not to treat Islam as a "political commodity" or a "ticket which will bring them to Senayan"⁸⁹ (parliament). This clearly shows that Saidi rejected the idea of utilizing Islam as a vehicle in the pursuit of political goals, arguing that Islam should be sincerely implemented. "I do not want to throw away Islam," he explained, "I just want the Islamic formulas of the party to be removed so that the glory of Islam is not misused as a political commodity."⁹⁰ Saidi even maintained that, with the implementation

of the laws on politics, all political parties were now considered Pancasila parties in the sense that their ideology was Pancasila. In his view, PPP should be an open party which is also capable of attracting non-Muslims. Saidi's view was supported by Kyai Haji Ahmad Siddiq, a leading 'ālim in the NU circle, saying that, in the principal of openness, the PPP should be open to both Catholics and PDI supporters. "The PPP," Siddiq said, "should not be a narrow-minded party."⁹¹ Roeslan Abdulgani, one of the chief ideologues of the ex-PNI, shared this view saying that,

By accepting Pancasila, the United Development Party may well lose its Islamic character. ...But this simply means that the political aspirations of Muslims can flow through whatever channel they wish. I too am a Muslim ... I used to express my political aspirations through the Indonesian Nationalist Party. ... Now I do so through Pancasila. ... The Darul Islam [revolts] have created a terrifying image of Islam in Indonesia. The Muslim community has to dispel this image. It is very much to be hoped that the young generation of Muslims will play its role in introducing new ideas about Islam.⁹²

Commenting on the present position of the PPP, Rusli Karim (b. 1952) says that, in actual fact, the party was pushed into a political corner (*terjepit*) since it was willing to remove the use of Islam as its basis and then declared itself a non-Islamic party. This, in Karim's view, was strange and a-historical.⁹³ The idea of making the PPP an open party, however, gradually disappeared, never to become a reality.

With the adoption of Pancasila as its sole basis, the PPP was no longer an Islamic party in the real sense. However, since the PPP is an the amalgamation of the four Islamic parties (NU, Perti, Parmusi and PSII), it continues to have a spiritual and emotional tie to Muslims, from whom it has drawn its most substantial support. In the 1987 general election, which took place two years after the adoption of Pancasila as its sole basis, the PPP obtained 18.8 percent of the vote and received 61 seats (27.78 percent with 94 seats in 1982), whereas Golkar obtained 74.8 percent (299 seats) and the PDI 8.7 percent (40 seats).⁹⁴ This indicates that in the 1987 election, the PPP, without having Islam as its basis, lost 33 seats, and became increasingly weak.

The decrease in the PPP's percentage of votes in the 1987 election was caused, partly if not mainly, by a political campaign launched by many of the NU's leading figures who called for its members not to vote for the PPP.⁹⁵ This campaign, known as "*aksi pengembosan*"

(puncturing the tires), was launched by many of the NU's leaders because they were resentful of the MI element within the PPP which was always upstaging the NU. Despite this internal conflict, the PPP in the 1988 MPR general session remained active in voicing Islamic aspirations. For example, it put proposals to the MPR that:

1. the selection of the discussion on religion and that of the *aliran kepercayaan* in the GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara, Board Outlines of the Nation's Direction) be separated;
2. religious education, which has been provided at all state schools at all levels, be provided at private schools as well;
3. the pesantren as an Islamic educational institution be incorporated into the GBHN; and
4. gambling in any form be abolished.⁹⁶

As far as the first point was concerned, the PPP argued that the essences of the two are totally different: the *aliran kepercayaan* is a culture, whereas religion is a divine revelation. In support of its argument, the PPP referred to article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, and to the 1983 GBHN enactment stating the *aliran kepercayaan* is not religion.⁹⁷ In the second proposal, the PPP argued that religious education should be given to students in all schools, not only in state schools but also in private ones. In the opinion of the PPP, the dichotomy between the state and private schools lay only in administrative matters, not in teaching materials. In the meantime, the PPP saw *pesantrens* as playing an important role in educating and enlightening the public; therefore, they should be given a place in the GBHN. Finally, the PPP saw the harmful impact of gambling on society, and proposed that all forms should be abolished in order that social life be based on moral and religious principles.⁹⁸

In addition, the PPP also presented some important ideas for the completion of the government's proposal of a bill for a national educational system when this bill was debated in the DPR in 1988. One of the PPP's proposals that was accepted was that the formulation of educational objectives use the additional word *iman* (faith) along with the word *takwa* (religious devotion) previously mentioned in the bill. In the PPP's view, the emphasis on the principle of "faith" was significant in establishing an educational objective which was not secular in nature. Also, supported by Golkar and the ABRI faction, the PPP succeeded in promoting its proposal that religious courses should

be given to students by teachers embracing the same religion as that of the students.⁹⁹

All this indicated that, following the PPP's adoption of Pancasila as its sole basis, the party, in fact, continued to advocate Islamic aspirations which, of course, were placed within the context of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Although the PPP has removed its Islamic symbol, as well as the mention of its Islamic foundation and formulas from its constitution, Islamic values, which have long been integrated into the PPP, continue to be present. Also, its long spiritual and historical ties with its Muslim supporters persist. It may be correct to say that the PPP is now a Pancasila based party which voices Muslim aspirations. Or, in Chalid Mawardi's words, "The PPP is no longer an Islamic party, but a party for Muslims."¹⁰⁰

The Minister of Religious Affairs, H. Munawir Sjadzali,¹⁰¹ argued in 1992 that, with the acceptance by Muslims of Pancasila as the sole basis in their social and national lives, the government has paid much more attention to Muslim's interests and has been more successful in developing their religious life.¹⁰² As he puts it:

In 1985, all socio-political institutions, including Muslim parties, and social organizations agreed to accept Pancasila as the sole basis in their social and national lives. With this, Indonesian Muslims have given up the idea of an Islamic state, and so eliminated the possibility of the birth of an Islamic state in Indonesia. As a result, as we have seen, there has been a change in the government and the parliament have come to realize that Indonesian Muslims, being the majority of the population in this "Pancasila" state and in line with the message of democracy, are entitled to more attention to their interests, including their religious interests, without hindering the interests of other religious groups. This explains why, in the last few years, the government has listened more attentively to the wishes of Indonesian Muslims. This change of attitude on the part of the government, the legislative branch, and society in general reminds me of the popular statement by Dr. Nurcholish Madjid at the beginning of 1970 when he said: "Islam, yes; Muslim party, no."

I think we are of the opinion that the religious life of Muslims in Indonesia has developed much better at the time when Muslim parties are no longer in existence. Obviously, in Pancasila state, as long as we hold fast to the rules of the game and intelligently utilize the mechanism of democracy, Muslims political interests will be better served without having recourse to Muslim parties.¹⁰³

Sjadzali goes on to warn Muslims to take a lesson from their past and realize that they will achieve their political goals only if they struggle constitutionally and in line with national aspirations. Any Muslim

group which tries to struggle for its political aspirations through unconstitutional or exclusive means will not only fail, but will also cause Muslims as a whole, who constitute a majority in the country, to pay dearly for this failure.¹⁰⁴ On the basis of this argument, Sjadzali appeals to Muslims as a whole to “accept the state of the Republic of Indonesia, which is based on Pancasila, as the final goal of our political aspiration, not simply as an intermediate goal...”¹⁰⁵

Deliar Noer sharply attacks Sjadzali by saying that his views were not fully objective since he, as Minister of Religious Affairs, had a political mission to advocate for certain of the government’s interests.¹⁰⁶ In Noer’s assessment, Sjadzali’s views did not reflect the ideas of a scientist or intellectual, but rather those of a politician who had become the spokesperson for the New Order and saw the regime only in a positive light, not in its negative dimension. Noer assesses Sjadzali’s agreements as unbalanced, something that should be avoided by a scholar. While Noer agrees with Sjadzali with regard to the development of Muslim religious life under the New Order, nevertheless, in contrast to Sjadzali, he points out several negative developments which, in his view, have become prevalent during the New Order period such as corruption, nepotism, the spread of conglomerates, a widening gap between “the haves” and “the have-nots,” Christianization, nativism, secularism, consumerism, crime and prostitution.¹⁰⁷

Having applied Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties, next on the political agenda of the New Order was to implement Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations. For this purpose, in 1984 a mass organizations bill was prepared and submitted by the government to the DPR for approval.¹⁰⁸ The debate on the bill in the DPR lasted for one and half months,¹⁰⁹ indicating that the bill received a critical and comprehensive assessment from all factions within the DPR, including the PPP and PDI. To deal with the issue, a Special Committee and a Working Team were established to which mass organization leaders gave input and suggestions to be used in the completion of the bill. According to the “Inventory List of Problems” recorded by the Special Committee and Working Team, there were 86 points relating to the rights of mass organizations, eight of which were regarded as crucial and therefore provoked extensive debate.¹¹⁰

Objection not only came from the PPP and the PDI fractions in the DPR, but also from various socio-religious organizations which were concerned that the government, with this proposed bill, would interfere in their internal affairs. The MAWI (Majelis Agung Wali Gereja Indonesia, or Supreme Council of Indonesian [Catholic] Churches) and the DGI (Dewan Gereja Indonesia, or Council of Indonesian [Protestant] Churches) for example, objected to the bill. Their leaders argued that both the MAWI and DGI were not mass organizations, but institutions which were parts of an international institution. For this very reason, they said that the mass organizations bill could not be applied to them.¹¹¹ On the other hand, the Working Team argued that the MAWI and DGI were mass organizations to which the bill also applied.¹¹² Finally, following the government promulgation of the mass organizations law, both the MAWI and the DGI accepted Pancasila as their sole basis in 1986. After adopting Pancasila as its sole basis, the DGI was transformed into the PGI (Persekutuan Gereja-gereja Indonesia, or Alliance of Indonesian [Protestant] Churches).

As far as Muslims were concerned, as early as 1982 they had begun to express their reactions to the government's proposal of Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations. Many Muslim mass organizations at first objected to the government's idea for fear that adopting Pancasila as their sole bases could mean that Pancasila would replace Islam, or that Pancasila would be made equal to religion.¹¹³ In response to this objection, the government stated that Pancasila should be understood as a single basis regulating the civic life of Indonesians.¹¹⁴ In this case, President Soeharto guaranteed that "Pancasila would not replace religion, and it was impossible for Pancasila to replace religion. Pancasila would not be made equal to religion, and it was impossible that religion would be made equal to Pancasila."¹¹⁵ Also, as in the case of other social groups, the Muslim objection to Pancasila as the sole foundation was caused by a fear that the government would diminish the diversity flourishing in Indonesian society, and that this would restrict their socio-religious activities. In response to this objection, Dr. Suhardiman (a prominent member of the Golkar faction and Chairman of the Special Committee) stated that,

the bill did not aim at diminishing the plurality of Indonesian society which was reflected in people's creativity and freedom. [It] did not restrict freedom of association, but gave good order to all citizens in carrying out their social responsibility to build a Pancasila society. Neither did the bill deny freedom of movement to any mass organization.¹¹⁶

In a tone similar to Suhardiman's, the Minister of Home Affairs Soepardjo Rustam said that "the bill should be seen as a simple and easy issue. There was nothing complicated which would cause trouble for any mass organizations."¹¹⁷ Furthermore, he also asserted that it was up to mass organizations to redefine themselves according to this bill, and to intensify their roles and activities in line with their distinctiveness in implementing their programs. Thus, the social position of mass organizations was to be the same as that of political parties although the former were not affiliated with the latter. According to the spirit of the bill, Rustam continued, all mass organizations were free to implement their own roles.¹¹⁸ However, unlike the PPP which unanimously accepted Pancasila as its sole basis, the Muslim response to Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations can be divided into two categories: a majority which accepted it, and a minority which did not.

The NU's Response

Established by a group of 'ulamâ' in Surabaya, East Java, on January 31, 1926, the NU is known as the biggest socio-religious organization amongst the traditionalist Muslim groups.¹¹⁹ It draws support chiefly from rural Javanese Muslims, and operates thousands of *pesantrens* throughout the country. According to its constitution, the basic principles of the religious ideology of the NU are as follows:

1. The NU bases its ideology on the sources of Islam doctrine: the Qurân, hadîth, *ijmâ'*, and *qiyâs*;
2. In understanding and interpreting Islam from its sources, the NU follows Sunnism and uses the following approaches: (a) the teachings of Abû Hasan al-Ash'arî and Abû Mansûr al-Maturidî in theology; (b) one of the four *madhâb*: the Hanafî, the Mâlikî, the Shâfi'î, or the Hanbâlî *madhhab* in Islamic law; and (c) the teaching of al-Junayd al-Baghdâdî, and al-Ghazâlî and their like in mysticism.¹²⁰

When the Masyumi was founded in November 1945 in Yogyakarta to serve as the only Islamic party, the NU joined it. However, due to political conflicts that occurred between NU and Masyumi leaders, the former declared itself an independent political party at its national congress of 1952 in Palembang, South Sumatra.¹²¹

Together with the PSII and Perti, the NU under Soekarno's Guided Democracy vigorously struggled for Islamic political aspirations.

Critics often accused the NU of being opportunistic under Guided Democracy since it showed its readiness to cooperate with the PKI and demonstrated accommodating attitudes toward the regime. Others have, however argued that the NU in fact struggled from within, facing the PKI directly in the political arena: sometimes it showed a readiness to cooperate with the PKI, while at other times it maintained distance *vis-à-vis* the latter.¹²² Some said that it was not fair to label the NU only as being opportunistic since the PSII and Perti had done the same thing. The NU's political attitudes towards the PKI became clear when the latter staged its revolt in 1965. It was the NU which "first" demanded that the PKI be dissolved, and it was also the NU, supported by its mass organizations such as the Banser (Barisan Serba Guna, or Multi-use Front) and the Gerakan Pemuda Anzor (Helpers Youth Movement), which made an important contribution to the New Order forces in their destruction of the rebellion.¹²³

In the early development of the New Order, the NU exhibited a "radical" attitude towards the regime. Nakamura is correct when he states that the NU in the 1970s emerged the boldest and most defiant critic of the New Order government.¹²⁴ When the NU, together with the Parmusi, Perti and PSII, fused in 1973 into a single Islamic party called the PPP, its critical attitude remained. It was the NU element within the PPP which most strongly objected to the legalization of both the P4 and the *aliran kepercayaan* in the 1978 MPR general session. The same attitude was taken by the NU when changes to the election law were legalized by the DPR in 1980. In the 1977 election campaign, K.H. Bisri Sansuri (a leading figure of the NU and chairman of the consultative council of the PPP) issued a *fatwâ* saying that every Muslim was legally obliged to vote for the PPP. From this it could be deduced that voting for Golkar, the government party, was prohibited under Muslim law.

During this period, NU supporters within the PPP were known as the so-called hard-liners and were disliked by the government regime. In order to appease the latter, Naro, chairman of the executive board of the PPP, began to "purge" these hard-liners from the party. Without consulting any NU members, he presented on October 27, 1981 a list of candidates for the 1982 election to the General Election Committee in which he belittled and pushed out 29 prominent figures (including the so-called hard-liners) of the NU. Among those pushed aside by Naro were K.H. Masjkur, K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri,

Rahmat Muljomiseno, Jusuf Hasjim, Chalik Ali, Imron Rosyadi, Mahbub Djunaedi, Aminuddin Aziz, T. Jafizham and Hasjim Latief. In the light of its dissatisfaction with Naro's action, the NU element, led by Jusuf Hasjim and his friends, submitted another list of candidates to the General Election Committee, but it was rejected. However, the Minister of Home Affairs, Amir Mahmud, unhesitatingly accepted the first list as valid. As a result, these prominent leaders and the so-called hard-liners of the NU were not elected as members of the DPR/MPR.¹²⁵

However, the NU showed a cooperative attitude in response to the government's idea of Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations. It may be that the NU wanted to abandon its confrontational attitude towards the government, and make efforts to establish better relations with it. In spite of the fact that the mass organizations law had not been officially promulgated by the government, the NU expressed its agreement to accept Pancasila as its sole basis. Later, this agreement was formalized by a decision made by the NU at its 27th National Congress held on December 8-12, 1984 at the Salafiyah Syafiiyah *Pesantren* in Sukorejo, Situbondo, East Java. Another important decision made by the NU was its declaration that it would return to the spirit of 1926, serving again as a socio-religious organization, and abandon practical political and sever all links with any political party.¹²⁶

In line with this decision, the NU reformulated its constitution to read (in article 2) that it is "based on Pancasila." In keeping with its character as an Islamic mass organization, the NU, in article 3 of its constitution, states that it "follows Islamic doctrine according to the teaching of Sunnism (*ahl sunnah wa al-jamâ'ah*) and follows one of the four *madhhab*: the Hanafî, the Mâlikî, the Shâfi'î, or the Hanbâlî *madhhab*. By stating its position in this way, the NU did not abandon its nature as an Islamic social movement, while clearly acknowledging Pancasila as its sole basis. The way in which the NU defined itself in relation to Pancasila as the sole basis became a "model" which, as we shall see later, was adopted by Islamic mass organizations. It is worth mentioning that the NU was known as the "first" to accept Pancasila as its sole basis.¹²⁷

The decision taken at the 1984 National Congress was made easier by the groundwork performed at a national meeting held one year earlier in very same location. At this meeting a number of prominent NU 'ulamâ', including K. H. Ahmad Siddiq, discussed the signifi-

cance of the NU's return to the spirit of 1926 and also issued a declaration on the relationship between Pancasila and Islam. This declaration read:

1. Pancasila, as the basis and philosophy of the state of the Republic of Indonesia is not a religion; neither can it replace religion nor be used to replace the position of religion.
2. The principle of "Belief in One God" as the foundation of the Republic of Indonesia, as stated in article 29 paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution which gives life to all other principles, reflects "monotheism" (*tawhîd*) in accordance with the notion of belief (*imân*) in Islam.
3. For the NU, Islam, which teaches *'aqîdah* and *sharî'ah* encompasses aspects of the relationship of a human being with his/her God and the interrelationship between human beings.
4. The acceptance and observance of Pancasila constitutes a realization of Indonesian Muslims' aspirations to carry out their *sharî'ah*.
5. As a consequence of this creed, the NU has an obligation to maintain the true notion of Pancasila and its correct and consistent observance by all.¹²⁸

This declaration was used by the NU as a religious justification to accept Pancasila as its sole foundation at the 1984 congress mentioned above. Furthermore, the 'ulamâ' of the NU said that the question of Pancasila had been finalized long ago when it was agreed on August 18, 1945 that it be used as the basis and national ideology of the state.¹²⁹ In view of this, the NU called for all groups to maintain a correct and consistent perception of Pancasila according to the form in which it had been laid down in the 1945 Constitution. The NU's acceptance of Pancasila as its sole basis also had a historical precedent in the fact that K. H. Wahid Hasjim (1914-1953),¹³⁰ a leading figure of the NU, actively participated in formulating Pancasila and the preamble of the 1945 Constitution along with other Muslim nationalist leaders. Because of this, its formulation was regarded by the NU as acceptable to Muslims. Similarly, in its view, Pancasila as the basis of the state is not contrary to the teachings of Islam, and should not be opposed.¹³¹

A number of NU 'ulamâ' also advanced arguments in favor of Pancasila which were based on traditional sources. Referring to the Qur'ân (*sûrah* Ali 'Imrân: 64), K. H. Ahmad Siddiq,¹³² general chairmen of the Consultative Council of the NU, viewed Pancasila as a

kalimatın sawâin (an equatable proposition) which unified all segments of Indonesian society.¹³³ An expert in Islamic law, in 1984 Siddiq made a legal analogy (*qiyâs*) stating Pancasila, which had been used as the basis and national ideology of the state for forty years, was like a fruit which was eaten everyday by Muslims. The question of whether eating the fruit was lawful or unlawful for Muslims was strange and illogical.¹³⁴ Siddiq seemed to say that any Islamic mass organization which questioned whether Pancasila was acceptable to be used as its sole foundation was not only mistaken but irrelevant and a-historical. In this connection, he claimed that the acceptance of Pancasila by Muslims as the sole basis in socio-political life was a legal obligation. Thus, other bases could not become alternatives or rivals to Pancasila.¹³⁵ Siddiq even asserted that, for Muslims, the establishment of Pancasila-base state of Indonesia was the final goal of their political aspirations, not simply a transitional goal.¹³⁶ This meant that any idea of establishing an Islamic state cannot be considered part of Muslim political aspirations, and any attempt to do so by any Muslim group would not represent the aspirations of the entire community. In similar tone to Siddiq's, Abdurrahman Wahid,¹³⁷ General Chairman of the Executive Council of the NU, also said in 1993 that religion could no longer question the position and legality of Pancasila.¹³⁸ He argued that this view had become the final political decision of the NU, which did not treat religion as a ideological tool, but saw its political function as one which provided prosperity to people in a board sense, including religious freedom.¹³⁹

Siddiq's legal reasoning was often referred to by the Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Sjadzali, in his efforts to convince Muslim mass organizations to accept Pancasila as their sole foundation. In a similar tone to that of other top government officials, he tried to convince Muslim mass organizations "the acceptance of Pancasila as the sole basis does not diminish the integrity of Islamic belief."¹⁴⁰ He was of the opinion that the idea of Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties and mass organizations was not intended by the government to replace religion, nor to make Pancasila equal to religion.¹⁴¹ The government's only motivation was to finalize the question of the sole foundation for political and social organizations before the running of the state was transferred from the 1945 generation (which was then in power) to the next generation. In this way, national crises which occurred in the past in relation to the basis and ideology of the state (Pancasila), such as the Gestapu/PKI affair and other occa-

sions of political turmoil, would not be repeated.¹⁴²

Munawir Sjadzali expressed his satisfaction that many Islamic mass organizations had accepted Pancasila as their sole basis, and their decision to accept it, in his opinion, was made consciously. As far as the NU was concerned, he rejected the accusation that its acceptance of Pancasila as its sole basis was simply political opportunism, and claimed instead that it was based on a deep political and religious consciousness. He then raised the question, "If there are many Muslim groups which still object to Pancasila as the sole basis, who do they represent?"¹⁴³ Sjadzali seemed to be addressing this question to Muslim individuals or minority groups as well as the PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim Students) which, as we shall see, firmly opposed Pancasila as the sole basis.

The Response from the Muhammadiyah

The Muhammadiyah,¹⁴⁴ founded by K. H. Ahmad Dahlan¹⁴⁵ (1868-1923) on November 18, 1912 in Yogyakarta, is known as the largest socio-religious organization amongst the modernist Muslim groups. In establishing the Muhammadiyah, Dahlan was inspired by the teachings of the Qur'ân, notably verses 104 and 105 of sûrah Ali 'Imrân:

And from among you there should be a party who invite to good and enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong, and these it is that shall be successful.

You are the best of the nations raised up for the benefit of men; you enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong and believe in Allâh ...

The Muhammadiyah has traditionally been supported in particular by members of the urban Muslim middle class, who work as traders, businessmen, teachers, religious preachers, intellectuals, and as government employees. Stressing the importance of *ijtihad*, it claims that it does not subscribe to any particular *madhhab*, but instead follows the opinion of one or another when, according to investigation, it is proved to be in agreement with or close to the basic spirit of the Qur'ân and Hadîth.

Organizationally, the Muhammadiyah has no formal ties with any political party established by modernist Muslim groups. However, it has had close relationship with the Masyumi in the past, and maintains a close link with the MI element within the PPP at present. In fact, individually, many members of the Muhammadiyah were previously active in the Masyumi, and are currently involved, through the MI element, in the PPP. Some leaders of Muhammadiyah took the ini-

tiative in establishing the PPP in the late 1960s and became prominent leaders in its early development. This close relationship was made possible because of their similarity in religious outlook, which is deeply rooted in what they claim to be the ideas of Islamic modernism.

Influenced by the puritanical teaching of Wahhâbism, the Muhammadiyah is concerned with the purification of Islam by ridding it of what is regarded as *bid'ah* (unwarranted religious innovation).¹⁴⁶ Adopting Afghânî's and 'Abduh's ideas of Islamic modernism,¹⁴⁷ the Muhammadiyah has also been concerned with the reformation of Islamic thought. According to Mukti 'Ali, the main goals of the Muhammadiyah can be summarized as a call for:

- (1) the purification of Indonesian Islam from corrupting influences and practices;
- (2) the reformulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern thought;
- (3) the reformulation of Muslim education; and
- (4) the defense of Islam against external influences and attacks.¹⁴⁸

As a Muslim modernist movement, the Muhammadiyah gives special attention to reform, which from the outset it has made every effort to achieve. "It has carried on much of its work through auxiliary organizations such as youth and women's associations, clinics, orphanages, and above all, a large school system which presented academic subjects and taught Islam not merely by recital and exegesis but also as a basic system of religious, ethical, and social beliefs."¹⁴⁹

Many have said that the Muhammadiyah succeeded in modernizing Islamic thought in its early development, and in some later periods, by calling for its members to exercise *ijtihad* and independent Islamic rational thinking. Recently however, some have criticized the Muhammadiyah for not playing a role in the renewal of Islamic thought. For example, Prof. Rasjidi (himself a respected scholar and prominent figure in the Muhammadiyah circle) has complained that "most Muhammadiyah leaders have become monuments,"¹⁵⁰ due, perhaps, to their concerns with running their institutions, without undertaking serious reflection, rational contemplation and intellectual thinking in relation to scientific and religious matters.

In response to the government's proposal stipulating Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations, the Muhammadiyah took calm and careful steps. At the very beginning, the Muhammadiyah—like many other mass organizations—believed that the principle of

Pancasila as the sole basis stated in the 1983 GBHN enactment was intended by the government to be used only by all political parties. After consulting with the President, the Junior Minister of Youth and Sport Affairs, Abdul Gafur, on August 30, 1982, clarified that this policy also applied to all mass organizations, without exception.¹⁵¹ He also said that for this purpose the government, after gaining the DPR's approval, would establish a law stipulating that all mass organizations must subscribe to Pancasila as their sole foundation. Despite the government's clarification, there was still much confusion over the issue, resulting in different opinions or interpretations of the 1983 GBHN enactment regarding the matter. For example, Hardi, former Vice-Prime Minister and Chief of the ex-PNI, was of the opinion that, based on a correct interpretation of the contents of the 1983 GBHN enactment, the stipulation of Pancasila as the sole basis did not apply to mass organizations, but only to political parties and Golkar.¹⁵² In fact, it is true that no clear mention was made in the 1983 GBHN enactment that the adoption of Pancasila foundation should also apply to all mass organizations. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara reacted to this move by the government by saying that the law could be easily produced since "the Peoples' Representative Council more often express 'His Master's Voice' [sic] than giving voice to its feelings."¹⁵³

Before moving on to discuss the Muhammadiyah responses to the government's plan applying Pancasila as the sole basis, it is first necessary to recognize the very strong position of the Indonesian political system. The 1945 Constitution does not follow J. J. Monstesquieu's theory of *trias politica* which divides powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, through which "checks and balances" can be maintained. Instead, the 1945 Constitution distributes powers between different but cooperative organs of government which individually or collectively serve national interests. In practice, however, much of the power is in hands of the president.¹⁵⁴ This situation allows him to "act beyond his capacity as the head of the executive branch of the government."¹⁵⁵ In such a political culture, any proposal or policy from the president (including his idea of Pancasila as the sole basis) will readily receive approval from the DPR because this body (and the MPR), according to Amien Rais, a leader of the Muhammadiyah, is in fact the president's institution, since its members are screened by the government and must be approved by the president.¹⁵⁶ In other words, as critics point out, it is

clear that the DPR and the MPR have functioned as a “rubber stamp”¹⁵⁷ to legitimate the president’s political culture. As Adnan Buyung Nasution has noted, according to the Constitution of 1945, the People’s Consultative Assembly has the greatest power. It also elects the president for a period of five years, and in theory it can recall the president. However, in practice approximately 60 percent of members of the People’s Consultative Assembly are appointed by the president, while only 40 percent are elected through a general election.¹⁵⁸ In all general elections to date the Government party, Golkar, has obtained about 70 percent of the vote. Although every five years there is a ritual of presenting a report by the president to the newly elected and appointed People’s Consultative Assembly, it is obvious that the public accountability of President Soeharto is as ineffective as was that of President Soekarno during the era of Guided Democracy. His frequently used title *Mandataris* (proxy) of the People’s Consultative Assembly denotes his unlimited authority rather than his subordination to the People’s Consultative Assembly. President Soeharto’s continuous augmentation of power beyond any constitutional limit is due the absence of any significant countervailing power.¹⁵⁹

Having made this assessment, Nasution stated that President Soeharto’s continuous augmentation of power beyond any constitutional limit is based on the concept of the family state and supported by the Javanese aristocratic philosophy of the monarch.¹⁶⁰ He based his opinion on Soemarsaid’s book, which describes the concept of power of the old Javanese kings:

The [ideal] king’s power was unlimited. He could not be regulated by worldly means, but within himself there was a force reflecting, or higher still, identical with the Soul (*Hyang Sukma Karwekas*), which checked his individual will. Divine Guidance expressed itself in the *kewatjaksanaan* (wisdom) of the king ... which not only endowed [him] with the widest possible range of knowledge but also the awareness of realities and a sense of justice.¹⁶¹

On the other hand, President Soeharto has argued that he has done his best to execute policies and actions (of course, including his policy of stipulating Pancasila at the sole foundation) which are in the best interests of his nation as a whole. The president has like firmly stated that he has carried out the will of the people, as expressed to him through their representatives in the MPR and the DPR, after seeking God’s guidance, to the best of his ability. As he said:

Thank God, until now I have not failed in fulfilling my duty... I have never felt that I have committed a failure... What has been assigned to me, I have executed as best as I can, praying to God for guidance and direction.

Concerning faults, I think: "Who will measure them? Who is to blame me? For instance, I have done my duty, it is going well and succeeds according to my criteria. If there are other people who see the results of my works from a different angle, and then blame me or consider them a failure, I will say: "That is their business." I do believe that what I have done, after I prayed to God for His guidance and direction, is the result of the guidance of God.¹⁶²

The government's idea of stipulating Pancasila as the sole basis prompted the Muhammadiyah to hold a *tanwir* session (its second highest legislative forum after the congress) in May 1983, which passed three resolutions:

First, the Muhammadiyah agreed to include Pancasila in its constitution, without changing the presently existing Islamic basis.

Second, since the problem of Pancasila as the sole basis was a national problem for the Muhammadiyah, it was to be faced by its central board on a national scale; therefore, those on the regional boards and below were not allowed to express any opinion or adopt any attitude relating to this problem.

Third, the discussion of the matter would be held at the coming 41st national congress.¹⁶³

Not all Muhammadiyah figures demonstrated the same attitude in response to the issue of Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations. Some hard-liners within the Muhammadiyah circulated pamphlets objecting to the sole basis plan on the grounds that it would pose a threat to Islam. Among the Muhammadiyah hard-liners was Malik Ahmad, Vice-Chairman of the organization and well-known scholar from West Sumatra, who "was prepared at one point accept the disbanding of Muhammadiyah"¹⁶⁴ by the government. In addition, "one Muhammadiyah leader from that part of the country [West Sumatra] was forced to resign after he bowed to pressure from local officials and declared his acquiescence to the *azas tunggal* (sole foundation) policy."¹⁶⁵

While the mass organizations bill was being discussed in the DPR, the Muhammadiyah was active in providing input and suggestions which it hoped would be included in the bill. In the meantime, the leaders of the central board of the Muhammadiyah consulted and exchanged views with the ABRI faction, some Ministers (for example, the Ministers of Religious Affairs and Home Affairs) and other related government officials who were involved in drafting the bill. In line with the resolutions passed in its *tanwir* session, the Muhammadiyah's early attitude toward the issue was as follows:

First, the Muhammadiyah was born into Islam, without which this organization would not be Muhammadiyah anymore.

Second, Pancasila was not a problem with the Muhammadiyah since its leaders, i.e., Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Prof. Kahar Muzakkir and Kasman Singodimedjo, participated in formulating Pancasila and accepted it [as the basis and national ideology of the state] on August 18, 1945.

Third, based on this fact, the Muhammadiyah could include Pancasila in its constitution without changing the basis of Islam which it used so far.¹⁶⁶

The Muhammadiyah's concern with the issue prompted K. H. AR. Fachruddin (its General Chairman) and its other prominent leaders to meet and consult directly with president Soeharto on September 22, 1983. In this consultation, the president informed Fachruddin that the best course of action for the Muhammadiyah to take in relation to Pancasila as the sole basis was to wait until the mass organizations law was promulgated. Regarding the nature of the Muhammadiyah as an Islamic social movement, the President said to Fachruddin that this nature could be clearly expressed in its program outlined in its constitution, but that Pancasila had to be included it as its sole basis under the chapter on its foundation.¹⁶⁷ Other steps taken by the Muhammadiyah were to hold meetings with the MUI, the NU and some members of the PPP, exchanging views on the matter. As far as its input and suggestions to the DPR were concerned, the Muhammadiyah claimed that about 60 percent of its proposals were accommodated and incorporated into the mass organizations bill.¹⁶⁸ Five of the Muhammadiyah's most important proposals read:

- (1) The president's statement that "Pancasila will not replace religion, and it is impossible for Pancasila to replace it. Pancasila will not be made a religion, and it is impossible that religion will be made equal to Pancasila," should be included in the mass organizations bill.
- (2) Socio-religious organizations should be given the right to include their own specific characteristic and identities.
- (3) Socio-religious organizations should be given the right to develop their activities in accordance with their own religious teachings.¹⁶⁹
- (4) Socio-religious organizations should be given the right to develop their activities in the affairs of women, youths and students in an effort to incorporate them as cadres. Also, they should be given the right to develop their activities in the field of religious propagation, as well as in the field of education, health and other social programs.

- (5) The freezing and banning of a mass organization should be executed only after the Supreme Court has issued a legal decision [stating that the mass organization concerned violated the law].¹⁷⁰

Waiting for the official promulgation of the mass organizations law, the Muhammadiyah decided to postpone its 41st national congress, which had been scheduled to be held in Surakarta, Central Java, in February 1984. Almost two years later, the congress finally took place in Surakarta from December 7-11, 1985. At the invitation of the central board of the Muhammadiyah, President Soeharto attended the congress and delivered a welcoming speech saying:

The assertion of Pancasila as the sole basis not only means upholding its principles, which are basically in agreement with the teaching of our religion, but also strengthening our unity and integrity as a nation. We are a pluralistic nation in terms of ethnic group, religion, race and social group. Without a common philosophy such as Pancasila, we will be in conflict with each other which will lead us to disunity...

The declaration of Pancasila as the sole basis not only means including it in the constitution of an organization, but also obliges us to develop it in our social and national programs. We must endlessly make every effort to make Pancasila color all aspects of our social and national life.¹⁷¹

Having stressed the strategic role of Pancasila in the life of the nation and its position vis-a-vis religion in the country, as well as his intention of stipulating Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations, the president then directed his remarks specifically to the Muhammadiyah. Of course, his message also applied to all other mass organizations in the country. Soeharto said:

The Muhammadiyah can develop many more activities in the life of the nation. A great number of the members of the Muhammadiyah, who are widely scattered in the country, have long made a valuable contribution to the nation in various fields. Keep going in these efforts, and keep competing with other mass organizations. The assertion of Pancasila as the sole basis is not intended to minimize the wide range of efforts by the Muhammadiyah, but rather to encourage it to be more advanced in carrying out its efforts on a wider scale.¹⁷²

It was at the Surakarta congress that Muhammadiyah formally accepted Pancasila as its sole basis. It should be noted that before this acceptance had been made, pamphlets by Malik Ahmad objecting to the imposition of Pancasila as the sole basis as being a threat to Islam surfaced again in the dormitories where most Muhammadiyah delegates were accommodated during the congress. Some cynics described the acceptance by the Muhammadiyah of Pancasila as its sole basis as

constituting "political suicide."¹⁷³ However, thanks to the efforts of Lukman Harun (b. 1937), who was known for his "persuasive powers", the hard-liners within the Muhammadiyah were finally convinced to accept Pancasila foundation.¹⁷⁴

According to article 2 of its reformulated constitution, the Muhammadiyah is "based on Pancasila." However, in keeping with its character as a mass Islamic organization, article 1 of the Muhammadiyah constitution states "it is a socio-religious movement with the objective of enjoining the good and prohibiting the evil, subscribing to the Islamic creed in conformity with the teachings of the Qur'ân and the Sunnah of the Prophet." The acceptance by the Muhammadiyah of Pancasila as its sole basis, according to H. A. R. Fachruddin, was like a motor-cyclist wearing a "safety helmet."¹⁷⁵ Dr Amien Rais also asserted that the Muhammadiyah "easily" accepted Pancasila principle,¹⁷⁶ on the grounds that "Pancasila is a valid ticket with which we could take the "bus" of Indonesia. Without this ticket, we could not take that bus."¹⁷⁷

The whole process illustrated above demonstrates that, despite objections by some hard-liners at the beginning, the Muhammadiyah, in adopting Pancasila as its sole basis, faced the problem calmly and patiently, proposing ideas and suggestions, and conducting negotiations and consultations in government circles in an attempt to influence the mass organizations bill. This meant that, on the whole, the Muhammadiyah as an organization body preferred consultation and avoided confrontation with the government in any form. The President's guarantee that it could retain its nature as an Islamic social movement, and that Pancasila as the sole foundation was not intended to minimize or restrict its activities, prompted the Muhammadiyah to officially acquiesce at the Surakarta congress. Thus, the theological issue surrounding Pancasila and Islam was resolved by the Muhammadiyah in such a way that the latter, like the NU, did not abandon its nature as a socio-religious movement.

The Responses of the MUI, HMI, PII and Others

Founded on July 26, 1975, MUI¹⁷⁸ plays an intermediate role between Muslims and the government. As indicated by its name, the council serves to exercise *ijtihad* and provides *fatwâs* to Muslims or to the government on relation to social problems whose legal status cannot be founded in either the Qur'ân or hadîth. The MUI at first faced a dilemma in response to Pancasila as the sole basis, since it

considered both religion and nation to be important. In 1982, together with other associations, it met in the Consultative Body of Religious Communities to discuss the issue fully. At the meeting, the MUI, the MAWI, the DGI, the (Parishada Hindu Dharma Pusat, or Representative Council of Indonesian Hindus) and the Walubi (Perwalian Umat Budha Indonesia, or Representative Council of Indonesian Buddhists) issued a declaration that "the religious council and organizations, each of which possesses a basis of conformity with its respective religion, appeal to their adherents to be loyal to their own religion and at the same time to be good Pancasilaists."¹⁷⁹ This statement attempted to reconfirm religion as the basis of their respective associations, while in the same breath it declared their obedience to the national ideology of Pancasila. As Yunan Nasution, one of the chief leaders of the MUI, puts it:

They appealed to the government: "Let us utilize own basis in our respective constitutions as laid down since we were born in the land of Indonesia, that is our respective religions. This is our way of life here and guidance for life in the Hereafter. Our basis does not pose a threat at all to Pancasila. On the contrary, while we are developing the Islamic community in concert with our religious basis, we are also leading it to perform the five principles of Pancasila in order to be Pancasilaists. Thus, in developing the Indonesian nation, as we are doing now, our religious basis can be a "partner" to Pancasila."¹⁸⁰

A year later, at the Consultative Body's meeting held in November 1983, the MUI, the Walubi, the PHDP, the MAWI and the DGI still defended their position in relation to Pancasila as the sole basis. They stated that "religious associations and mass religious organizations continue to use their respective religions as their organizational basis."¹⁸¹ Later, they all accepted Pancasila as their sole foundation after the law had been formally promulgated by the government. As far as the MUI was concerned, it formally adopted Pancasila as its sole basis at its national congress held in Jakarta in July 1985. The MUI clearly made Pancasila its sole basis in article 2 of its reformulated constitution, while its nature as an Islamic organization was expressed in article 1.

The HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Association of Islamic Students)¹⁸² also had a response to Pancasila as the sole foundation. Established by Lafran Pane on February 5, 1947 in Yogyakarta, the HMI is known as an independent organization which is not affiliated with any political or social group in the country. However, thanks to its religious outlook, which may be described as Islamic modernism, it currently

close ties with the Muhammadiyah, and in the past was associated with the Masyumi. A militant and well-organized institution, the HMI played an important role, as may be seen in the fact that;

Under Soekarno, the HMI established a tradition of opposition to the government and became the most powerful students organization in the country. Many leading Muslim personalities and intellectuals in Indonesia today come from HMI ranks. In the later years of Guided Democracy, the HMI came under frequent attack from the left, though efforts to have it outlawed along with the Masyumi were unsuccessful. After Soekarno seized power in 1965, the HMI was in the vanguard of the Student Action Front (KAMI) which rallied support in the big cities for the army in its anti-communist crusade.¹⁸³

With good programs and well trained staff, the HMI has provided national leadership. This can be seen from the fact that in the present Indonesian cabinet (Sixth Development Cabinet) there are some HMI alumni who have been appointed as Ministers by the President, two of whom are Mar'ie Muhammad (Finance Minister) and Akbar Tanjung (Minister of Housing). In addition to this, the HMI has played an important role in developing and elevating the intellectual capacity of its members. Dr. Nurcholish Madjid (b. 1939), who graduated from the University of Chicago, is just one of the HMI members who have benefited from this development. While being actively involved in and leading the HMI for many years, Madjid has also made every effort to further the education of the organization's members. As a result, a large number of HMI alumni have become intellectuals and scholars holding important positions and acquiring impressive reputations.

In response to Pancasila being made the sole foundation for all mass organizations, the HMI held a series of discussions at its 15th national congress held in Medan, North Sumatra, in late May 1983. Through the Junior Minister of Youth and Sport Affairs, Abdul Gafur, (himself a former chairman of the HMI of the Jakarta branch), the government pressed the HMI to endorse Pancasila as its sole basis, even though the mass organizations bill was still being prepared and was in the process of being submitted by the government to the DPR. According to Gafur, the HMI's adoption of Pancasila as its sole basis would not uproot the specific nature of its movement, since this nature could clearly be included in its programs.¹⁸⁴ The participants at the HMI congress split into two groups: the first wanted the HMI to accept Pancasila as its sole basis, while the second objected and in-

sisted that the HMI postpone its decision on the issue until the law was formally promulgated.

Ahmad Zacky Siradj, former HMI National Chairman, in defending the organization's position in relation to Pancasila as the sole basis at the time, said that for the HMI Pancasila was not a new thing since one of the goals of its establishment was to defend the state of the Republic of Indonesia with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as its basis.¹⁸⁵ This can be interpreted as an assertion that Pancasila as the basis of the state was not a problem for the HMI; therefore, it accepted and defended it. However, at its Medan congress, the HMI showed some hesitance toward the government's idea of Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations. One objection expressed by many prominent figures of the HMI was that Pancasila as the sole basis would eliminate its specific Islamic identity and that it would abolish the basically diverse nature of Indonesian society in general.¹⁸⁶ For the HMI, this condition would in turn pose a threat to the development of the nation. An argument similar to this was also voiced by General Abdul Haris Nasution:

Pancasila stresses harmony between diversity and unity. One cannot exist without the other. To emphasize diversity alone will destroy unity. On the other hand, to centralize unity through losing diversity will lead us to regimentation of our lives as a nation, as citizens and as ordinary people, closing room for initiative, creativity and dynamism.¹⁸⁷

The opinion of the second group at the congress was so dominant that it eventually became the HMI's position on the problem of the sole basis; a development with which the government circles were disappointed. Due to this attitude, the HMI was seen by the authorities as refusing to endorse Pancasila as its sole basis. In 1984, a year after the Medan congress, the central board of the HMI issued a booklet entitled *Pandangan Kritis terhadap RUU Keormasan*¹⁸⁸ (A Critical View of the Mass Organization Bill) in which it evaluated the bill as having a potentially negative impact on mass organizations in general and on Islamic mass organizations in particular. Why? Because the bill, according to the HMI, was part of a government politically engineered project which was intended to establish a monolithic system, designed to place the government in a very strong position. With this as its aim it did not see the need for dialogue in settling issues. Referring to the 1945 Constitution which guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, the HMI questioned the proposed

bill which, in its view, would give full authority to the government to dissolve mass organizations. The HMI was of the opinion that if a mass organization indeed violated a law issued by the state, it was the Executive Board, not the organization itself, that should be disbanded.¹⁸⁹

The HMI saw that the mass organization bill would give strong powers to the government, with which it could restrict and even interfere in the life and activities of a mass organization. In turn, this situation would make mass organizations apathetic in the face of national affairs. If this situation continued to exist, the HMI stated, Indonesia's political life in the future would become undemocratic.¹⁹⁰ Holding this view, the HMI argued that,

Pancasila as the sole basis is acceptable and valid only in the context of the state's life. This is in agreement with the correct notion of Pancasila mentioned in the 1945 Constitution. In line with the nature of the plurality of Indonesian society, which is rooted in religion, the basic nature of this religious society cannot be uprooted. This means that Indonesian society, as individuals or groups, should receive legal protection to lead their lives according to the teachings of their religions and according to their rights as citizens.¹⁹¹

The basic spirit of the above argument was in fact the same as that of the HMI's decision at the Medan congress held the year before. However, at its meeting on April 1-7, 1985, held at Ciloto, Jakarta, the Working Committee of the HMI resolved this matter by issuing a statement that the HMI now agreed to adopt Pancasila as its sole basis.¹⁹² This decision was later ratified by the HMI at its 16th national congress held in Padang, West Sumatra, in 1986.¹⁹³

Not all branches of the HMI, however, felt able to accept the decision made by both the Working Committee and the congress of the HMI in Padang; consequently, open reactions and protests came from several of its branches. They were firmly united, and challenged the Executive Board of the HMI by establishing a body called the MPO (Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi, or Council to Save the Organization), led by Eggie Sudjana. This conflict became more serious when the MPO claimed to take over the Jakarta office of the executive board, and establish its own executive board which was completely separate from the "official" one. The MPO-established board became known as the "rival" HMI which firmly retained Islam, rather than Pancasila, as its sole organizational basis. The rival HMI claimed to be consistent with the original ideals of the HMI, and called itself the "true" HMI. It bitterly accused the official HMI of deviating from the true spirit of 1947 when the association was established. On the

other hand, the official HMI accused the "rival" one of violating the organization's constitution.¹⁹⁴ While the official HMI held its 17th national congress in Lhokseumawe (Aceh) in July 1988, the rival one did the same thing in Yogyakarta, indicating the two sides remained bitterly divided. The government, however, did not recognize the upstart HMI.

In adopting Pancasila as its sole basis, the HMI put forward the following argument: that Islam and Pancasila were not in conflict, as long as the latter was placed within its true historical context. It also believed that the values of Pancasila would become rich, strong and dynamic if it were based on Islamic norms and values which emanate from divine revelation. This meant that Pancasila would become meaningful and safe in the cradle of Islam.¹⁹⁵ Starting from this premise, the HMI then reaffirmed its position, role and commitment to Pancasila in the life of the nation:

- (1) the HMI, as an Islamic organization, should always show its capacity to make the best contribution to the nation in line with its sincere ideals;
- (2) as a student organization, the HMI should implement Pancasila in a rational and realistic way;
- (3) as part of the nation, the HMI should play an important role and set a good example in carrying out Pancasila; and
- (4) as an organization for the younger generation, the HMI should be a pioneer in socializing Pancasila, and should take responsibility to prevent any deviation from its true values as established in 1945.¹⁹⁶

Nurcholish Madjid commented that the HMI's acceptance Pancasila as its sole basis was a good decision since, by doing so, it put Islam and Pancasila on the right path within the context of "Indonesianness". Its acceptance of Pancasila, Madjid said, would not diminish or abolish its specific Islamic identity, or the special characteristics which had been with the HMI since its birth.¹⁹⁷

The PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Students Union),¹⁹⁸ established on May 4, 1947 in Yogyakarta, took a different road in response to Pancasila as the sole basis. Like the HMI, the PII was an independent organization which was not affiliated to any political or social Islamic organization. However, the PII had close links with the HMI and other Muslim Modernist organizations due to its religious outlook, and subscribed to Islamic modernism. An organization for Muslim students of senior high schools, the PII persisted in defending

Islam as its sole basis and firmly refused to replace it with Pancasila. Due to this attitude, the Minister of Home Affairs, through his decisions numbered 120 and 121 of December 10, 1987, banned the PII on the ground that it did not comply with the fundamental principles of the mass organizations law.¹⁹⁹ As far as the Islamic mass organizations were concerned, this government ban applied only to the PII.

General Chairman of the PII, Mutammimul Ula, defended the position of his organization by saying that the PII was legally obliged to use Islam as its sole basis, to the exclusion of all others. Ula claimed that the decision of his organization not to subscribe to Pancasila as its sole basis was made by the PII after deeply and thoroughly examining Pancasila from legal, sociological and philosophical standpoints in the light of Islamic doctrine.²⁰⁰ With the banning of the PII, it could be said that the Muslim community, particularly the circle of Muslim modernist groups, lost one of its national assets, in which young Muslim cadres had been trained as skillful and capable leaders. To a great extent the PII had contributed to the strength of the HMI, since the former's alumni mostly joined the latter shortly after they finished senior high school and continued their studies at various universities.

Thus, joining the NU in adopting Pancasila as their sole basis were the Muhammadiyah, the HMI, the MUI and all other Islamic mass organizations (except the PII) such as the Persis, the Perti, the Syarikat Islam,²⁰¹ the PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim University Student Movement) and others. This action was taken by Islamic mass organizations because the government allowed them to maintain the nature of their movements and activities, and allowed them to continue to observe their socio-religious activities according to their religious aspirations and ideals, as they had done so previously. In this light it appeared that the government would not diminish or abolish the plurality of Indonesian society, but would allow social and religious aspirations to flourish; a situation which worried the Muslim mass organizations, as it did other mass organizations throughout Indonesia.

The Responses of Individual Muslims and Splinter Groups

Opposition from certain individual Muslims and Muslim splinter groups to the government's proposal of applying Pancasila as the sole basis was strong and bitter. They firmly rejected this proposal on the grounds that Pancasila would become a religion, and that reli-

gion would be Pancasilaized. They feared that, with the stipulation of Pancasila as the sole basis, Muslims would no longer be allowed by the government to establish, maintain or develop religious and social organizations according to Islamic aspirations. This kind of fear can be seen, for example, in the feelings of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, as said earlier, who bravely sent a long letter, dated July 7, 1983, to President Soeharto expressing his strong objection to Pancasila as the sole basis. In his letter, Prawiranegara first underlined Soeharto's statements made in the *Nuzûl al-Qur'ân* commemoration of June 27, 1983, that "Pancasila and religion are not in opposition to each other and must not be made to oppose each other" and "Pancasila is not a religion and cannot ever replace religion."²⁰²

In essence, Prawiranegara agreed with Soeharto's statement, but was afraid of the government's policy of stipulating Pancasila as the sole basis. For this reason, he expressed his fear to the President saying, "However, even if Pancasila is not a religion, with the power that lies in your hands and with the support of the People's Representative Council—which reflect more the sovereignty of the president than of the people—Pancasila is *de facto* put into effect and is being enforced as a comprehensive religion, that touches on all aspects of the lives of those human beings who are Indonesian citizens."²⁰³ In a similar tone to this statement, Prawiranegara said further, "If Pancasila, rather than being the foundation of the state has to be turned into the basis of human life, then this means that the religions revealed by Almighty God (or perceived) have to be exchanged for an ideology, which does not call itself a religion, but in its behavior seems to wish to replace existing religions."²⁰⁴

In expressing his objection to the President's idea of applying Pancasila as the sole basis, Prawiranegara also underlined certain opinions expressed in the editorial of the *Kompas* newspaper of July 4, 1983, which had discussed the mass organizations bill when it was being prepared. The editorial said,

If the issue is viewed solely from the standpoint of practical politics, the government, with the support of majorities in the representative bodies and the surfeit of power it possesses can, as it were, enforce anything it pleases, and the community will acquiesce, at least formally, and for as long as the power structure supporting it remains effective.

Still, because what is to be achieved and preserved is essentially a political infrastructure and a political culture which is to unify the nation and the state, mere formal acquiescence, without the process of dialogue, cannot suffice.

A statesmanlike political approach will at the same time strive to implant strong roots and build a firm structure, so that not only formal acquiescence and enforcement are achieved but rather a form of dialogue that is national oriented, so that, even though it may take some time, a national consensus will ultimately be attained.²⁰⁵

Prawiranegara was of the opinion that replacing an Islamic foundation with a Pancasila foundation would not only be contrary to Islamic teachings, but also to the 1945 Constitution in which the "official" Pancasila is mentioned. He said that Muslim people in general were afraid to express their true feelings in the face of the government's idea of Pancasila as the sole basis for fear of losing their positions, offices, or salaries, or being considered confrontational dissidents.

Taking moral responsibility for the Islamic cause, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara seemed to establish himself at the forefront of those who voiced Muslim feelings in the face of the issue of Pancasila as the sole basis. He said that the objections in his letter were not intended to provoke a confrontation with the President, but rather were an expression of his rights and duties as an Indonesian citizen in conformity with freedom of opinion and expression, freedoms guaranteed and protected by the constitution. Prawiranegara was of the opinion that

Replacing an Islamic foundation with Pancasila foundation conflicts with a constitution which is based upon Pancasila, and thus is in contravention with Pancasila itself. This is the original Pancasila, which formed the basis of the 1945 constitution. What is plain in that to exchange this basis contravenes the freedom of religion and worship guaranteed by article 29, paragraph (2) of the Constitution. Because, according to Islamic teachings, the establishment of an Islamic association whose membership consists of Muslims who want to practice Islamic teachings together—that is an association which is based upon Islam—is in itself an act of worship which is blessed by Allah. For, according to the teachings of Allah, all Believers are brothers. And therefore it is good for them to establish organizations consisting of Muslims, in whatever field.²⁰⁶

From the above quotation, it is clear that Prawiranegara was afraid that, with the stipulation of Pancasila as the sole basis, the government would contravene freedom of religion and worship as well as freedom of association and assembly, and would also abolish the specific identity of Islamic organizations. In his view, this situation, would in the end, result in the restriction and even prohibition of Muslims establishing and running Islamic organizations; consequently, Islam would become simply a private matter, which would have nothing

to do with social and political life. The sole basis plan, he said, was a systematic attempt designed and launched by the government not only to depoliticize but also to “kill” Islam through Pancasila. As he puts it:

If Muslims are no longer allowed to establish Islamic organizations—whether political organizations or social organizations—then Islam will come to be regarded as a private matter, which is completely contrary to Islamic teachings. The Islamic religion is not merely a private matter, but is also, primarily, a matter of the *ummah* [community]. ...if the Indonesian Muslim community is to be prohibited from establishing and maintaining Islamic associations, whether in the political field or in other social fields, this is not only in contravention of the 1945 Constitution, and thus in contravention of Pancasila itself, but in practice means an attempt to kill Islam—through Pancasila!²⁰⁷

In keeping with the above arguments, Prawiranegara was of the view that the President’s idea of applying Pancasila as the sole basis would pose a serious danger to the continued development of mass organizations, particularly Islamic mass organizations, and to the basic nature of cultural pluralism flourishing in Indonesian society. Espousing this view, he warned Soeharto in his letter that “making Pancasila the sole foundation for all social organizations may, at first glance, appear to be the way to bring about national unity and social improvements. But believe me, you will only achieve the opposite. I hope that you, Mr. President, are aware of the dangers threatening our country and people if the sole foundation plan should be implemented.”²⁰⁸ Having warned the President, Prawiranegara then appealed to him by saying “...after you have read this letter of mine, you will agree at the very least to halt the enforcement of Pancasila as the sole foundation,”²⁰⁹ and closed by requesting of him that

...all citizens be allowed to establish any organization whatsoever, so long as the aim of these organizations is to work for the benefit of Indonesian society, and in pursuit of their objectives they refrain from all illegal actions, especially the use of force. This would be in accordance with article 28 of the Constitution which guarantees the principles of freedom of association and assembly, and of the expression of opinion both spoken and writing, as laid out by Bung Karno in his address at the end of the BPUPKI’s session on June 1, 1945, and also in accordance with the promises of the New Order at the beginning of its career—namely your promises to implement the 1945 Constitution in a pure and principled manner.²¹⁰

The President, however, did not respond specifically to Prawiranegara’s letter. While repeating his guarantee not to make Pancasila a

religion and not to make religion equal to Pancasila, the President persisted in his idea of stipulating it as the sole basis in the belief that this policy would be strategically meaningful and provide great advantages to the life of the nation as a whole.

Objections to the Pancasila foundations plan were also raised by *katib* (sermon deliverer) on the occasion of their *khutbahs*, especially in the country's political center (Jakarta) where dissent became particularly heated at the time. For instance, in a *khutbah* given after *shalat Id al-Fitr* of 1983, H. M. Yunan Nasution said that Muslims, who constitute a significant majority of the Indonesian population, had accepted and advocated Pancasila as the foundation of the state and had implemented it in their daily life in conformity with the basic spirit of each principle mentioned in Pancasila. He said that Pancasila as the foundation of the state had been finalized long ago when Muslims accepted it on those terms; therefore, Pancasila was no longer a problem for them.²¹¹ This stance can be seen, for example, in the following statement made by Muhammad Roem, one of the founding fathers of the Republic and a former leading figure of the Masyumi: "I accept Pancasila because I am a Muslim."²¹² Thus, for Muslims, Pancasila and Islam are not in conflict and must not be made to oppose each other. Opposition was voiced, however, by various segments of the Muslim community when the government made its initial attempt to apply Pancasila as the sole foundation for all mass organizations. In response to this attempt, Yunan Nasution for one questioned why the government would extend the role of Pancasila in this fashion. This move, in Nasution's view, would replace an Islamic foundation with a Pancasila foundation, giving the impression that Islam was disliked and distrusted in the social and national life of Indonesians. To quote his own words:

Why should there be an idea [held by the government] not to allow mass organizations to use their own specific bases, Islam for example, in their constitutions? Does not this idea give the impression that the religion of Islam is disliked and distrusted in the social and national life of our country?

If the idea of Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties is to be extended to be applied to all mass organizations, and this process is finally enforced in the name of democracy, a fear will arise and will be felt, by Indonesians in general and Muslims in particular, like a bone skidded in flesh which props up the body. The fear will become more widespread if there is a certain group [in the government circle] which accuses those who have different opinions [regarding Pancasila] of being anti-Pancasila...²¹³

Furthermore, in a *khutbah* delivered after the observance of the *salât 'Id al-Fitr* of 1983 in a district of Jakarta, A. M. Fatwa sternly opposed the idea of Pancasila as the sole foundation, and called for Muslims to advocate "the basis of Islam until the last drop of their blood."²¹⁴ Abdul Qadir Djaelani echoed the same view as Fatwa when he called for Muslims to firmly and consistently subscribe to "the sole basis of Islam."²¹⁵ Like Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who saw the idea of the sole foundation as a dangerous attempt to "kill" Islam through Pancasila, Djaelani was of the opinion that the mass organizations bill was political engineering systematically designed by the government "to bury all Islamic organizations in Indonesia. Therefore, it is forbidden for us to agree to this bill, and obligatory for us to reject it."²¹⁶

In response to this opposition, the government censored the text of *khutbahs* to be delivered by Muslims at prayer services such as *'Id al-Fitr* and *'Id al-Adha*. As a result, vigorous opposition to the mass organizations bill mounted from a small group of militant Muslims. Sirajuddin Syamsuddin (b. 1958) described this explosive situation as follows:

...there was restlessness in the Muslim community regarding the issue of Pancasila as the sole foundation.. Many Muslim leaders were concerned that the process of Pancasilaization would mean de-Islamization. Many preachers used the Friday prayer forum and other religious gatherings to raise the issue and evoke Muslims' religious sentiments to reject Pancasila becoming the sole constitution. For them, Muslim acceptance of Pancasila as a national consensus should not be understood as a theological statement, but only as a political statement.²¹⁷

Signing a statement rejecting Pancasila as the sole basis for mass organizations, many of those who made up this splinter or militant Muslim group claimed to be prepared to die as martyrs for the cause of Islam.²¹⁸ For them, Islam was their sole ideology and distinct identity. They believed that it should not be replaced by or subordinated to any other ideology, such as Pancasila. Moreover, according to this group, the replacement of Islam with another ideology would mean de-Islamization, which they viewed as contrary to the basic teaching of Islam. In response to this wave of opposition, the government repeatedly guaranteed that the stipulation of Pancasila as the sole basis was not intended to replace religion, and that it was impossible for Pancasila to replace it. The government continued to lay emphasis on the fact that Pancasila would not become a sort of religion or rival to it.²¹⁹ This firm guarantee, however, did not appease the militants' heated feelings.

The tension between this Muslim splinter group (comprising of about 1,500 people) and the government's security forces finally reached a climax with the outbreak of the bloody confrontation, known as the Tanjung Priok affair, which took place in port area of Jakarta on September 12, 1984.²²⁰ This confrontation was sparked by the actions of these Muslim hard-liners in burning a motorcycle belonging to Sergeant Hermanu, a member of the *Babinsa* (*Bintara Pembina Desa*, or non-commissioned officers responsible for the supervision of villages). They did so in response to a report that he had entered the mosque of al-A'raf without taking off his shoes; this is a mosque where sermons had frequently been given by Muslim preachers calling for the rejection of Pancasila as the sole basis. The crowd was very resentful of Sergeant Hermanu's action and regarded it as an affront to the sacred house of Allah. The crowd also demanded the release of four of their members who had been detained by the security forces.

In contrast to the government's version, which claimed that a preliminary warning was given to the rioters, another report stated that "the rally was fired on without warning by heavily armed troops."²²¹ According to an official report released by the government, nine people were shot to death and 53 were injured in this incident.²²² Some unofficial reports, however, cited by Syamsuddin, stated that "hundreds of Muslims died at the hands of the Indonesian army,"²²³ figure far greater than that reported by the government. Amir Biki, known to be one of the prominent leaders of this group, was one of the victims in the Tanjung Priok riot. The place where the conflict occurred was quickly cleansed by the security forces of blood and other evidence, to make it seem that the tragic incident had not taken place at all.

Long after the Tanjung Priok incident, families of the victims did not know where the bodies of the slain were buried, and yet chose to keep silent because they were afraid to question the government on the matter. Later, it was reported that the bodies of all the victims, except the remains of Amir Biki (which were sent to his family to be buried), were interred by the security forces in a mass grave in the village of Jeger, Kampung Rambutan (East Jakarta).²²⁴ The meantime, those people who were suspected to have been leaders of the riot or of having opposed Pancasila as the sole basis were arrested and brought to trial by the government on the accused of launching subversive actions. Along them were H. Oesman al-Hamidy (rector of the PTDI, Perguruan Tinggi Dakwah Islam, or College for Islamic Propagation), Abdul Qadir

Djaelani, Tony Ardie and Mawardi Noor. All of them were imprisoned after the courts found them guilty in connection with the Tanjung Priok riot or for their rejection of Pancasila as the sole basis.²²⁵ Al-Hamidy, to mention just one example, was jailed for eight years.

H. R. Dharsono and A. M. Fatwa were also arrested and imprisoned. Together with their friends in the Petition of Fifty Group, Dharsono and Fatwa called for the establishment of a national "independent" fact-finding commission to investigate the Tanjung Priok affair thoroughly and fairly, including the real number of victims.²²⁶ Their appeal, however, did not receive any response from the government. A retired army general who was critical of government policies, Dharsono once bravely attacked the government by saying that "there is a basic contradiction between the tolerant nature of Pancasila and its actual intolerance in practice."²²⁷ Thus, according to Dharsono, there was a gap between ideals and reality, or between what should be and what is, in the implementation of Pancasila by the New Order government.

Following the eruption of the Tanjung Priok riot, a series of violent actions were launched between 1984 and 1985 by Muslim political splinter groups in many parts of the country. Some of these disturbances, which posed a threat to the order and stability of the government, took the form of bombings at the Bank Central Asia (BCA)²²⁸ in Jakarta, the Borobudur Buddhist temple at Muntilan (Central Java)²²⁹ and the Marine Base at Cilandak (Jakarta). These "militant" or "fundamentalist" movements did not however, win the support of the majority of Muslims as a mainstream political force. As far as the Tanjung Priok incident was concerned, many Muslim leaders regretted the way the government's armed forces handled the affair in causing such loss of life. The number of victims in that incident, Muslims argued, could in fact have been minimized if the situation had been handled differently. Many people in Muslim circles tended to put the blame on General Benny Moerdani, Commander-in-Chief of ABRI at the time and a Christian. They considered him to be the person most responsible for the Tanjung Priok incident.

From the above discussion, it can be seen that the Muslim community in general accepted Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties and for all mass organizations. It seems that the government was satisfied with the Muslim attitude, despite the fact that certain dissenters objected to and rejected Pancasila as the sole basis. In spite of this fact, the government tended to ignore these objections, and laid

strong emphasis on the significance of the majority of the Muslim community's acceptance of this new role for Pancasila. Seen in this political context, the government felt that its policy of applying Pancasila as the sole basis was successful. Following these historical events, many Muslim leaders commented that Muslims' acceptance of Pancasila as the sole foundation constituted a sound development which promised a positive result for Islam and Muslims in the future. Lukman Harun (former Secretary General of the Parmusi and former Chairman of the Muhammadiyah), for example, said that, with Muslims' acceptance of Pancasila as the sole basis, the government's long and bitter suspicion of them had ended, just as the negative image of Muslims as opponents of the government had disappeared.²³⁰

Syahirul Alim (a senior lecturer at Gajah Mada University of Yogyakarta and a prominent Muslim preacher who has periodically been detained by the government for months at a time) said something similar to Harun, and added that any attempt by any individual or group to compare Islam with Pancasila was simply a game of political manipulation and aimed to destroy the good and harmonious relations between the Muslims and the government.²³¹ Echoing this statement, Imaduddin Abdulrahim (likewise once detained for fourteen months because of his "severe" criticism of the government) said that there was no longer a dichotomy between the ruler and the ruled since there was no longer a boundary between Muslims and the government. "The government is Islamic too," he stressed with confidence.²³²

In the meantime, in order to convince the government of their loyalty, many prominent Muslim leaders repeatedly stated that an Islamic state in Indonesia was not the goal of Muslim political aspirations. Jusuf Hasjim, for his part, stated that at none of the meetings held by the PPP (when it still served as an Islamic party) was the idea of an Islamic state ever considered.²³³ According to E.Z. Muttaqien (a former Masyumi leader and one of the prominent figures of the MUI), the idea of an Islamic state, politically speaking, was not as important, for Indonesian Muslims, as was the implementation of Islamic teachings to the fullest extent possible within Muslim social life. In his view, Islamic teachings were gradually being implemented by the government, as could be seen, for instance, from the fact that it had issued regulations on *zakat fitrah* (alms) and that it had banned all forms of gambling. Muttaqien further asserted that, in fact, the issue of an Islamic state had been exaggerated by anti-Islamic elements who wanted to create a situation in which the government and Muslims

would distrust and oppose each other.²³⁴

Furthermore, according to the opinion of Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Muslims were very happy with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, believing that if both were implemented in a just and pure manner, they would provide a good atmosphere in which Islamic ideals could be actualized.²³⁵ Saifuddin Anshari (b. 1938) was of the view that the issue of an Islamic state in Indonesia was an old song that should never be sung again. According to Anshari, the label "Islamic state" should be in agreement with Islamic values.²³⁶ In this connection, Nurcholish Madjid also said that Pancasila was advantageous for Muslims since it provided them with the opportunity to materialize Islamic values in the lives of Muslims in Indonesia. For this reason he strongly believed that the primary goal for the Muslims should not be to establish an Islamic state, but to implement Islamic values in their collective social lives.²³⁷

Government Policies towards Muslims in the Aftermath

As a consequence of Muslims' acceptance of Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties and mass organizations and their repeated claim that they have abandoned the idea of an Islamic state, relations between Muslims and the government have improved, and the latter has fundamentally changed its policies towards the former. A new era of co-operation between two sides began in the late 1980s and a friendly atmosphere has continued to develop. Many people in Muslim circles have commented that an intimacy or honeymoon condition between the government and Muslims has arisen, and that it is not expected to end soon.

The government has abandoned the "severe" and "strict" policies which it had imposed upon Muslims for almost twenty years. However, it should be noted that this change in policy has been restricted to the "cultural" Islam, to the exclusion of the "political" Islam. In the light of this, critics say that the government has in fact followed a policy similar to that advocated by Christian Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) when he served as an expert advisor to Dutch colonial officials in Indonesia. As Ira M. Lapidus puts it :

The policy of the Soekarno and Soeharto governments toward Muslim movements was an echo of the policies introduced by the Dutch towards the end of the nineteenth century. The Dutch distinguished between the religious and the political aspects of Islam, tolerating the former and repressing the latter.²³⁸ Following the same line of thought, the Javanese military and bureaucratic elite has broken down the political power of the Muslim parties.²³⁹

In words that echo those of Lapidus, Mohammad Atho' Mudzhar (b.1948), a Muslim scholar and a graduate of UCLA, also points out that "although officially the government policy towards Islam is sympathetic just as it is towards any other religion, in practice it is sympathetic only towards cultural Islam, and remains suspicious of political Islam."²⁴⁰

In spite of this, Muslims in general seem to be satisfied with government policy, as can be seen, for example, in Nurcholish Madjid's statement in the 1970s, "Islam, Yes! Islamic parties, No!" This statement implied that Islamic parties should be rejected because they are no longer important tools to pursue Muslim political interests. On the other hand, the Muslim community has been encouraged to strengthen and develop its social, cultural and intellectual foundations in an effort to achieve the progress and glory of Islam in a future Indonesia. This encouragement seems to have been stressed because, as Dr. Imaduddin Abdulrahim has argued, "the government is also Islamic in character," and has in fact struggled for the interests of Muslim. Indeed, as Munawir Sjadzali argued in some of his statements referred to above, the government has served Muslims' interests better in the absence of Islamic parties.

Changes in Government Policies Regarding Socio-Religious Affairs

Actually, prior to the Muslims' acceptance of Pancasila as the sole basis, the government had demonstrated some of its "positive" policies towards them. In 1975, the government moved to help a group of "ulamâ" establish the MUI in view of their important position in the Muslim community and of their significant role in the process of the implementation of national development. Fulfilling a strategic role, the MUI was expected to "translate" the government's ideas and policies on the national development program into "religious" language so that all segments of the Muslim community, particularly at the grassroots level, could understand them and then participate actively in the national development process. At the same time, the MUI served to transmit Muslim aspirations and interests to the government and to the People's Legislative Body. In addition, the MUI has also provided religious guidance and legal opinions to the government and to the legislative, executive and judiciary branches in order that they do not violate the shari'ah and other Islamic teachings.²⁴¹ In short, the MUI has played an important role in bridging the gap between the Muslim community and the government, and bringing the two sides closer together.

In relation to the other religious communities existing in the country, the MUI has acted as a Muslim representative body consulting with community members to resolve the religious issues faced in their common social life. In this way misunderstandings among religious communities have been avoided. In fact, the establishment of the MUI has provided advantages to both Muslims and the government. The success of the government's family planning and transmigration programs, for example, have been partly due to the role of the MUI in particular and the 'ulamâ' in general. On the issue of family planning, for instance, the MUI issued a fatwa saying that it was permitted and encouraged by Islamic doctrine; therefore, Muslims have practiced family planning and, as a result, the program has greatly contributed to the success of the government's efforts to reduce the population growth rate.

On February 17, 1982, Soeharto (in his capacity as a Muslim citizen and not as President) established a foundation called YAMP (*Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila*, or Foundation for the Dedication of Pancasilaist Muslims) with himself as Chairman. According to Sjadzali, the foundation of YAMP was motivated by the fact that the Muslim community still needed much more funding in order to establish or renovate houses of prayer and mosques throughout the country.²⁴² Usually the Muslim community itself, rather than the government, is encouraged to establish or renovate its mosques. However, realizing that Muslims still needed much more money for this purpose, Soeharto, as a member of the Muslim community took the initiative to raise funds through the YAMP. By July 1990, the YAMP has succeeded in establishing almost 400 mosques of varying sizes in various parts of the country, each at a cost of between 110-130 million *rupiahs*.²⁴³ To raise funds, all Muslim government employee and all Muslim members of ABRI, according to their ranks, were strongly encouraged to contribute a certain amount of money to the YAMP each month. By the end of 1991, the YAMP had funds totalling 83 billion *rupiahs*.²⁴⁴ By this means, the YAMP continues to finance its activities.

In cooperation with the YAMP and with Soeharto's consent, the MUI sent 1,000 Muslim preachers to provide Islamic instruction to Muslim settlers in various parts of the country. This program was carried out because many of them needed spiritual and moral guidance in the resettlement areas where they had begun their new lives. These Muslim preachers received from the YAMP a certain amount of money

every month to support them during their stay in these areas.²⁴⁵ In addition to the YAMP, President Soeharto supported Muslim efforts to establish the *Bank Muamalat Indonesia* in 1991. Professionally administered by Muslim entrepreneurs, businessmen and bankers, this bank opened for business with capital of 100 billion rupiahs. The establishment of this bank was intended to provide loans, in particular to Muslims, to develop economic activities and businesses in order to achieve prosperity which, in turn, would contribute to improving the welfare of the Muslim community as a whole. Unlike public banks, this Islamic bank operates without charging its borrowers any interest.²⁴⁶

The government has been very much concerned with the continued improvement of the infrastructure and administration of the *hajj*. This concern is always presented within the GBHN as one of the most important national policies. Munawir Sjadzali (Minister of Religious Affairs and responsible for the administration of the *hajj*) reported that the Saudi Arabian government was very impressed with the Indonesian government's administration of the *hajj*, which is conducted by the Department of Religious Affairs. According to the Saudi Arabian government, Sjadzali also reported, the Indonesian government's administration of the *hajj* is one of the best when compared with that of other Muslim countries.²⁴⁷ It is important in this context to mention that over twelve hundred Indonesian *hajjis* died in an accident in Mecca in 1990. To commemorate this national tragedy, Muslims, strongly encouraged and supported by President Soeharto, established memorial hospitals at the *hajj* embarkation ports in Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan and Ujung Pandang. Soeharto also supported a group of Muslims in the establishment of the IPHI (*Ikatan Persaudaraan Haji Indonesia*, or Association of Indonesian Hajjis).²⁴⁸

In addition, as Sjadzali also notes, in 1980 President Soeharto also instructed that a large new building be erected for the Department of Religious Affairs in a part of the complex situated on Lapangan Banteng Barat Street, which had previously belonged to the Kodam (*Komando Daerah Militer*, or Military District Command) of Jakarta. Sjadzali explained that, apart from in Saudi Arabia, he had never, in any other Muslim country, seen a *waqf* and Islamic affairs building as large as the one designed for the Department of Religious Affairs in the Republic of Indonesia.²⁴⁹ More importantly, the location of the Department of Religious Affairs building is very strategic because its close to the Istiqlal Mosque of Jakarta, a great mosque constructed

during the Soekarno era in commemoration of the independence struggle in which many Muslims died as martyrs to Islam and their country. In connection with this, it is also worth mentioning that, for the same purpose, a mosque called the Syuhada Mosque was also built by Muslims in Yogyakarta during the Soekarno era.

Another of the government's national policies that reflects Islamic values and Muslim interest is the continuation of the national Qur'anic reading competition (*Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur'an Tingkat Nasional*). This competition, which costs billions of rupiahs and takes place in different provincial cities, is officially opened by the President as a major event and is broadcasted on national television to Muslims through out the country. The funding for the competition mostly comes from the government, while the rest is made up of contributions from Muslim entrepreneurs and private businesses. In addition to this, since the late 1980s, Arabic language instruction has been provided to Muslims once a week through the government national television. This program had long been requested by Muslims, but only in the late 1980s did the government meet their request and allow it to be included among national television programs. Almost at the same time (1991), with the support of the Soeharto government, Muslims held an Islamic cultural exhibition called the Istiqlal Festival which was viewed as a success since it attracted a large audience. More importantly, this festival was held in the Istiqlal Mosque complex in Jakarta, and can be seen as the only great Islamic cultural festival to have been held thus far in the history of Indonesian Islam.

In the meantime, at the beginning of the 1990s, the government finally abolished the SDSB (*Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah*, or literally, social contribution with reward) which, in practice, was considered by Muslims to be a form of lottery, and therefore, in their opinion prohibited according to Islamic Law. Before its abolition, Muslims were very concerned about the negative impact of the SDSB on the moral life of Muslims and on society as a whole. Despite their stern opposition, the SDSB, having obtained formal permission from the government (the Minister of Social Affairs), continued to be carried out under the government's national plan. It was only after Muslims' acceptance of Pancasila as the sole basis that the SDSB was abolished. Understandably, the Muslim were very pleased with this governmental policy.²⁵⁰

The Restructuring of the IAIN's and Improvements to the National Educational System

In the field of education, the New Order government continued its efforts to improve the national education system from which Muslims' have naturally benefited. The government endeavored to improve and develop the status of the fourteen IAINs in the country. For this purpose, in 1985 it issued Government Regulation No. 33 which, among other things, gave the IAINs which are officially administered by the Department of Religious Affairs, the same status, organizational structure, facilities and treatment as the universities which are formally administered by the Department of Education and Culture. Government Regulation No. 33 was then confirmed and elaborated upon by Presidential Decree No. 9 of 1987. With the issuing of this decree, the existence, status and organizational structure of the IAINs were improved and developed, while they achieved the same legal status as the state universities in the country.²⁵¹ In the meantime, on February 16, 1991, the government (through the Director General of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools in the Department of Education and Culture) issued the letter of decision No. 100/C/Kep./D/1991 whereby it allowed female Muslim students of junior and senior state high schools through out the country to wear the *jilbab*. As we saw in the second chapter, the government had formerly prohibited them from wearing this article of clothing, although due to strong opposition from Muslims it gave them the opportunity to move to private schools.

In 1989 the government issued Law No. 2 on the national educational system which, among other things, confirms and emphasizes that religious teaching constitutes a sub-system of the national educational system. The law also confirms that religion constitutes an obligatory subject which must be taught in all public schools from the elementary to university levels, and it also acknowledges the important role of religious educational institutions in the process of national character building.²⁵² It should be noted that, at the beginning, the national educational system bill aroused reactions and criticism from the Muslim faction. Lukman Harun, a leader and spokesperson for the Muhammadiyah, criticized the bill as deviating from the stipulation in the GBHN that religious instruction should be compulsory at all levels of education. Harun stated that in the draft version of the proposed national curriculum, religious instruction is not mentioned except for the primary school level. In his view, the bill was secular in nature.²⁵³ Many

people in Muslim circles saw that the status of the *madrasah* (Islamic schools) was left unclear. According to one of its articles, the bill states that acceptance of a student in an educational unit might not depend on religion, sex, race, social status or economic capacity. As far as the issues of religion and sex were concerned, the bill implicitly affected some *madrasahs*, such as those run by the Muhammadiyah, which were only for men or only for women.²⁵⁴ Muslim criticism of the national educational system bill “also reflects a tendency among Muslim institutions to suspect the government of eroding the role of Islam, under the state ideology of Pancasila.”²⁵⁵ However, after revisions were made based on substantial suggestions from Muslims in particular, the bill was finally modified and passed by the DPR, thus satisfying the Muslims and benefiting them at the same time.

The Restructuring of the Religious Courts

Islamic law, strangely enough, was one field in which Muslims and the government were able to co-operate in introducing reforms, and from an early date too. It is generally accepted, particularly in Muslim circles, that Islamic law constitutes a sub-system of the Indonesia national legal system. Also it is a historical fact that Islamic courts had existed in and been attached to many Islamic kingdoms long before the establishment of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. Along with the establishment of this rule, the Dutch restricted the role and authority of the Islamic courts in an attempt to weaken Islam and the Muslims at that time. Despite the fact that during the independence era improvements needed to continue in order to fully serve Muslim interests in this field. In an effort to achieve this, in 1985 President Soeharto took the initiative of establishing the Project for the Compilation of Islamic law, with the aim of composing standardized legal books to be used by Islamic judges in settling legal problems and cases arising among the Muslim community.

The idea of establishing the Project was motivated by the fact that the legal writings upon which Indonesia's Islamic judges based their decisions were products of the ‘ulamâ’ of the medieval period, and were no longer suitable because of the demands of modern times. The Project succeeded in drafting three standardized books on Islamic law: the first dealing with marriage, the second inheritance, and the third endowments. The composition of these three drafts, which involved prominent ‘ulamâ’ and many leading experts in Islamic law, was completed in 1987. At the final stage, these three drafts

were critically and thoroughly discussed in a workshop attended by many 'ulamâ' and experts in Islamic law and, on the basis of their suggestions, the drafts were then completed. With the government's promulgation of Law No. 7 of 1989 on Islamic religious courts (which will be discussed), these three standardized books on Islamic law were ready for use. By referring to these three books, legal decisions on similar cases made by Islamic judges in Islamic courts throughout the country could be standardized, thus avoiding situations where different decisions were produced by different Islamic courts.²⁵⁶

The promulgation by the government of Law No. 7 of 1989 can be traced back to the issuance of Law No. 14 of 1970, which stipulates that the decisions of the public courts, Islamic religious courts, military courts, and administrative courts must be carried out by the courts concerned. However, according to the judicial system in Indonesia, the decisions implemented by these four courts defer to the Supreme Court. As a follow up to Law No. 14 of 1970, on December 29, 1989, the government promulgated Law No.7 of 1989 regulating the status, role and authority of the Islamic religious courts. With the promulgation of this law, important fundamental improvement and a substantial restructuring of the Islamic courts were carried out. Sjadzali said that in 1945 an Islamic party had proposed that the KNIP (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*, or Central Indonesian National Committee), which served as the provisional parliament at that time, improve the position of the Islamic courts, but all factions in the Committee strongly rejected its proposal.²⁵⁷ According to Sjadzali, it was only in the New Order period, when the Islamic parties no longer existed, that improvements were made in the Islamic courts. These improvements, as Munawir Sjadzali has noted as below, had a special strategic meaning for Muslims in relation to the government's policies towards them. Sjadzali mentioned four important points in relation to the restructuring of the Islamic religious courts.

First, all Islamic religious courts, of which there are number 304 throughout the country, are regulated by and follow only a single law, that is, Law No. 7 of 1989. This law marks the end of all restrictions imposed by the Dutch upon the Islamic religious courts in Java and Madura since 1882, and on the Islamic religious courts in South Kalimantan since 1937 (these restrictions were not substantially changed until the promulgation of this law). Second, legal decisions made by the Islamic religious courts are final in the sense that they do not need to be confirmed by the public courts as had previously

been the practice. Decisions are executed by the Islamic religious courts themselves, no longer by the public courts. For this reason, the position of bailiff was established in the Islamic religious courts. Third, judges in the Islamic religious courts system, like state judges, are appointed by the President, no longer by the Minister of Religious Affairs. The position, rights and facilities given to Islamic judges by the state are the same as those given to other judges in other courts. The possibility exists, at least in theory, for an Islamic judge to be appointed by the President to serve as head of the Supreme Court. Fourth, the positions of judge, secretary and bailiff in the Islamic religious courts system are given exclusively to Muslims.²⁵⁸

According to Sjadzali, with these substantial improvements and restructuring, the position of the Islamic religious courts in Indonesia is very solid and even prestigious when compared with that of Islamic courts in many other Muslim countries. Even in Muslim countries which have Islam as their constitutional basis, the position of Islamic courts is not as strong or prestigious as it is in Indonesia. This, according to Sjadzali, can be seen from the fact that Islamic courts in these countries exist only in certain states or regions, have limited authority, and have no standing within the central government.²⁵⁹

It should be noted that when the Islamic religious courts bill was proposed, and then formally submitted to the DPR by the government for approval, the PGI began to voice strong opposition. The PGI sent a statement to the executives and factions of the DPR in which it expressed its objections that (a) in line with the "Archipelago Insight" (*Wawasan Nusantara*), only one national law should be applied to serve the national interest; (b) a bill on the Islamic religious courts was beyond the DPR's jurisdiction, since it was the responsibility of the entire nation to lay down a basic framework in the legal field; and (c) the bill was in "contradiction" with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in a pure sense.²⁶⁰

Through their magazine *Hidup* (Life), Christians charged that the proposed bill on Islamic religious courts constituted an attempt to revive the Jakarta Charter and was discriminatory towards non-Muslim groups in the legal domain.²⁶¹ Indeed, this issue became so sensitive that it aroused strong opposition from the Protestant and Catholic elements in the Golkar faction during the DPR sessions. In the face of this issue Golkar, which was usually solidly united, was almost split. In response to this opposition, President Soeharto firmly

stated that the government intended the proposed bill to protect the rights of Muslims to perform the entire range of their *ibadat* (which consist of far more than just prayers, fasting and the paying alms) as proposed in article 29 paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution.²⁶² In the meantime, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Sjadzali, appealed to the DPR to approve the bill, arguing that Muslims urgently needed a new law on Islamic religious courts due to the process of national legal development. Sjadzali believed that this law, which would be exclusively applied to Muslims, would not disturb, let alone violate, the interests of other religious groups in the country. He asked that the birth and execution of the law to be understood by non-Muslim communities and that they accept this development.²⁶³ Thanks to the ABRI faction's lobbying of its opponents in the DPR, the bill was finally passed.

The Establishment of ICMI and the Rise of Muslim Participation in Politics

Another of the government's policies which was considered to be in line with Muslim aspirations was its official support for the establishment of ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*, or Association of Indonesia Muslim Intellectuals). ICMI was established in Malang, East Java, following a symposium on "Developing Indonesian Society in the 21st Century" held at the University of Brawijaya on December 6-8, 1990 by a group of Muslims concerned with the development of Muslim intellectual activities in the country. President Soeharto himself, accompanied by a number of his Ministers such as Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie and Emil Salim, delivered an important speech in which he encouraged Muslims to play an active role in enlightening the nation and in developing its abilities in the face of the challenge of modernity in the 21st century. B.J. Habibie (b. 1936), State Minister of Research and Technology, a graduate of the University of Aachen in West Germany and internationally known as an expert in the construction of aircraft, was elected as the General Chairman of ICMI.

It was reported that Habibie's appointment to the Chairmanship of ICMI was supported by the President, who considered him capable and suitable for the position. At a symposium prior to the establishment of ICMI, Habibie presented a paper entitled "The Role of Science and Technology in the Process of Social Transformation" in which he stressed, among other thing, that Indonesians should

work to free themselves from illiteracy in science and technology, because only a country with the ability to develop new technology and science in concert with its culture can survive.²⁶⁴ Quoting a statement by the President, Habibie called for Muslims to make "Indonesia's Second long-term Twenty-five Year Development Program" a starting point for "the second phase of national awakening."²⁶⁵ The establishment of ICMI was widely welcomed, and a number of branches or organization units both, within the country and abroad, were established by Muslim students and intellectuals.

According to its constitution, one of the goals of ICMI is to improve the quality of Muslim intellectual life and to encourage the participation of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals in the national development process in order to create a peaceful, just and prosperous community blessed by God in the spirit of the 1945 Constitution.²⁶⁶ The ICMI also established a comprehensive program of activities, consisting of 13 points, the most significant five being:

- (1) To participate actively in the development of education and human resources with the aim of developing the intellectual capacity of the nation, especially that of the Muslim community;
- (2) To improve the quality of its members and to develop their expertise through coordination of information and communication networks among intellectuals, institutions and organizations within the country and abroad;
- (3) To promote ideas, research and studies which are innovative, strategic and anticipative; and to make serious attempts in solving local, regional and national problems;
- (4) To promote library and documentation centers, and to develop integrated communication and information networks with the objective of collecting, storing, processing, and distributing information in the fields of science, technology and human resources, as well as social, economic, legal and cultural affairs; and
- (5) To promote Islamic economic and financial institutions through, among other means, the mobilization of funds, management of financial capital, banks, cooperatives, small businesses, alms, and other legal means.²⁶⁷

In view of its program, it is clear that ICMI has taken a strategic step and has shown itself to be an intellectual movement which is concerned with developing the nation and Muslim intellectual abilities, and elevating the nation's scientific capacity at the eve of the 21st century.

Observing the new relationship between Muslims and the government, Kuntowijoyo (b.1943), a well-known historian teaching at Gadjah Mada University, has voiced the opinion that this development will change the political discourse in Indonesia. In his view, if ICMI is any indication, new trends in cooperation are taking place in the life of the Muslim community. Firstly, the cultural dichotomy between *abangans* and *santris* has ended. Thanks to the realization of Islamic religious education in the state schools, the children of the both *abangans* and *santris* receive an identical program of religious education. Meanwhile, the new curricula, introducing non-religious subjects, are taught in *pesantrens*, the center of traditional Islamic education. Thus, cultural exclusivism is no longer the norm.

Secondly, according to Kuntowijoyo, a dichotomy no longer exists between traditionalist Muslims and Modernist Muslims. Religious education at all levels has altered fundamentally due to the use of the government's standardized text which put aside the issue of religious distinctions. Furthermore, the publication and circulation of a great number of religious book representing various religious viewpoints has made Muslims face complex ideas and choices, resulting in a blurring of the differences between the two positions.

Thirdly, the dichotomy between the 'ulamâ' and Muslim intellectuals, who, by 1952, had become so polarized that it caused the NU to leave the Masyumi, is no longer felt. Today, the 'ulamâ' sit together with Muslim intellectuals in various discussions, conferences and seminars, both sides contributing fully.

Fourthly, the dichotomy between the religious group and the "secular" faction has also ended. Today, there are many Muslim intellectuals who are concerned with secular matters, from population control and the environment to literature, art and sports. The boundary between secularity and religiosity in the life of an Indonesian Muslim has become blurred and is in danger of disappearing.

Lastly, Kuntowijoyo states that the application by the government of the mass organizations law of 1985 terminated the distinction between Islamic and non-Islamic parties. This can be seen from the fact that the 'ulamâ' gave permission to members of the Muslim community to vote for any political party they wanted to in general elections.²⁶⁸ Pointing to the composition of the central board of ICMI, Kuntowijoyo notes that its membership varies and consists of individuals who are affiliated with various political streams. Thus it can be said that Islam and bureaucracy go hand in-hand-in Indonesian

politics, and that this development, in Kuntowijoyo's view, marks the end of the myth of Muslims as trouble makers and protesters in Indonesia.²⁶⁹

While the majority of Muslims enthusiastically show their support and sympathy for ICMI, there are some Muslim individuals who are opposed to it. Abdurrahman Wahid, for example, who refused an important position on the Advisory Board of ICMI, claimed that many who joined ICMI were opportunistic, and were just looking for positions and rewards from the government through participation in this organization. Wahid was even "suspicious of the project (read: ICMI) because it had the stamp of Soeharto."²⁷⁰ Deliar Noer, who has been critical of government policies from the very beginning, viewed the establishment of ICMI and other events, which are seen by Muslims as reflecting good relations between them and the government, as being good in appearance only, and intended by the government to serve only a temporary purpose.²⁷¹ Chalid Mawardi (a parliamentary member from the PPP faction) questioned the political interests behind the foundation of ICMI.²⁷² Answers to these doubts may vary depending on who responds to it and his/her political views and background. One can argue that one of the political interests behind the establishment of ICMI (and other government-sponsored Islamic activities and programs) was to legitimize, strengthen and perpetuate the power of the regime by providing more services to Muslims. Furthermore, one can also argue that the regime is very much concerned with Muslims since they constitute a significant majority of the population (87 per cent), and are thus deserving of much more attention and services than other groups.

Such are the new developments which, in the eyes of the majority of Muslims, reflect an improved relationship between Islam and the regime. It was in view of these developments that President Soeharto, his wife (Mrs. Tien Soeharto) and other members of his family, accompanied by some of his Ministers, performed the pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca in 1991, a year before the implementation of the 1992 general election and two years before the Presidential election. The timing of this event prompted observers, both within the country and abroad, to observe that Soeharto's pilgrimage to Mecca was political, and that he was thereby seeking to obtain Islamic legitimacy in order to be re-elected. However, it was widely reported that his pilgrimage to Mecca had nothing to do with politics, but was

purely a religious impulse to seek God's favour.²⁷³ Muslims showed their support for the President's decision to finally make the *hajj*,²⁷⁴ having previously only performed the *'umrah* in 1977.

Although Soeharto's pilgrimage did not appear to have a political motivation, it did have a political implication, which increasingly convinced Muslims to support him in his bid for re-election as President. This can be seen, for example, in the case of Kyai Badri Masduki, the head of the Badridduja *pesantren* at Probolinggo, East Java, who collected more than 1,000 signatures from influential *kyais* and 'ulamâ' in East Java supporting Soeharto's re-election as President in the 1993 MPR general session.²⁷⁵ In the meantime, Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara (a retired army general and former Minister of Religious Affairs) who later became known as the leading figure of the Group of Twenty-One also campaigned for Soeharto's re-election, as noted by Michael R.J. Vatikiotis:

Alamsjah's chief weapon in persuading the Muslim faithful ... highlights the extent to which individuals rather than social forces dominate the political scene. Alamsjah spread alarm among the Muslim clergy by casting Benny Moerdani [Minister of Defense] as the only alternative. Moerdani's Christian faith, tied to his implication in the brutal suppression of a Muslim riot in Tanjung Priok in September 1984, was effective in persuading many Muslims that Soeharto had to remain in power to prevent the Republic being ruled by an "infidel".²⁷⁶

In the 1992 general election, the PPP obtained only 17 percent of the vote, while Golkar received 68 percent and the PDI 15 percent.²⁷⁷ In spite of this, more interestingly, the PPP unanimously supported Soeharto's re-election as President (and nominated Try Sutrisno as Vice-President); its support had been voiced before other parties announced their Presidential candidates. The re-election of Soeharto became a reality when the MPR, in its 1993 general session appointed him again a President, granting him his sixth term to end in 1998. Soeharto is currently accompanied by Try Sutrisno (former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) as Vice-President.

It is interesting to note that, of the 40 ministers who sit on the sixth development cabinet which he established after his most recent re-election, 38 are Muslim.²⁷⁸ Commenting on this, K.H. Hasan Basri of the MUI said that the cabinet's composition reflect the real situation existing in the country, where Muslims have become more advanced in politics, economics, the military, and other fields.²⁷⁹ Dr. Juwono Sudarsono, an expert in political science and a prominent

lecturer at the University of Indonesia, has said that the Muslims are now truly represented in the cabinet, and that they now have a great opportunity to take part in state affairs as policy-makers.²⁸⁰ Unlike in the past, when the President appointed his Ministers from among socialist technocrats, secular nationalists and Christians, in the Sixth Development Cabinet he has now turned to Muslims to fill strategic positions. K.H. Hasan Basri appealed to the Muslims who sit in the cabinet to carry out their duties as effectively as possible, to prove themselves capable of meeting their responsibilities and not to disappoint the President who had entrusted these positions to them.²⁸¹

The rise in the participation of Muslims in Indonesian politics has generated concern in Christian circles. An anxious Christian Indonesian once told Donald K. Emmerson, a professor in political science at the University of Wisconsin, that "if things keep going this way, there is a 50% to 60% chance my country could be an Islamic state by 2010."²⁸² Emmerson believes that such concern is simply an exaggeration since "militant Muslims will not dictate the direction of Indonesian politics anytime soon — if ever. Islam's emergence in Indonesia, a country I have been visiting and studying for a quarter of a century, is an understandable consequence of the nation's political stability and economic growth."²⁸³ Thus, according to Emmerson, the increasing role of Muslims in Indonesian politics should be viewed as a natural growth in line with their continued success in improving the quality of their social, educational and economic life. Due to this success, many Muslims are now highly educated in science and technology, and this should be recognized by the government by appointing them to appropriate positions in the state. In Emmerson's view, the assumption that a Muslim officer will place the interests of political Islam over those of the armed forces is baseless. As he puts it:

Times have changed. After two decades of stable government and average annual economic growth of 6%, Islamic identity is now peacefully on the rise. In the shadow of factories, mosques have sprung up. In traffic-jammed cities like Jakarta, Muslims messages circulate with frequency in popular magazines and newspapers, on audio and video tapes...

Into these signs of Islamic identity some Indonesians might read a serious threat to religious harmony in the country. But such a reading seems alarmist to me. Militant Islamists are not taking over Indonesia. The proportion of top echelon officers in the armed forces who are Muslims, for example, has gone up. But in a country where nearly nine out of every 10 people acknowledge Islam as their faith, this should come as no surprise. The assumption that a Muslim officer would put the interests of political Islam above those of the armed forces as a national institution is unfounded.

The same logic holds true, I believe, when it comes to Mr. Soeharto's government. In the 41 person Cabinet installed last March, only three Ministers are Christian, down from six in the previous government. But the new proportion, at 7%, is not much less than the 10% of the population that is Christian. By naming two Christians to high posts outside the Cabinet, moreover, Mr. Soeharto seems to have tried to reassure Western governments and Christian Indonesians that he is not about to exclude religious minorities from representation, let alone countenance an Islamic state. The academic Johannes Sumarlin and Adm. Sudomo, Catholics who held posts in the last cabinet, now head the Audit Board and Supreme Advisory Council, respectively. The appointment of a Hindu-Balinese General, Ida Bagus Sudjana, as Minister of Mining and Energy further undercuts the notion that Jakarta is tilting toward political Islam.²⁸⁴

From the above quotation, it can be said that in spite of the increased participation of Muslims in Indonesian politics, it should not be concluded that Indonesia is leaning toward political Islam. Emmerson is correct when he says that President Soeharto "gave no indication that he might be reorienting his ship of state toward Mecca. The country's constitutional guarantee of religious freedom remains intact."²⁸⁵ Emmerson's argument found a solid basis when President Soeharto in 1993 reaffirmed that "Indonesia is neither a religious nor a secular state. ... The government will not meddle in people's internal religious beliefs, including their understanding, perception and institutionalization of their religions. Religious faith is a matter of inner consciousness of respective religious followers, and the state therefore respects and fully guarantees the practice by the people of this fundamental right."²⁸⁶

Commenting on Habibie's appointments the Chairman of ICMI and the role of the organization itself, Emmerson says that Habibie's greatest concern is economic and that he, together with ICMI, does not want, nor will he encourage, any project to Islamize Indonesia. Furthermore, as far as President Soeharto is concerned, he supports ICMI since he wants the support of ICMI thinkers and leaders in return:

Mr. Soeharto's decision to allow his Minister of Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie, to head—and thereby legitimate—ICMI has also worried the alarmists. ICMI is known to have in its ranks members who favor a greater role for Islam in Indonesian life. But Mr. Habibie, in my estimation, does not want, and will not encourage, an extension of this agenda into a project to Islamize the state. His goal is largely economic: Mr. Habibie hopes to mobilize ICMI and its Muslim scholars' influence behind advanced industrial development and leap-frog his country into a high-tech future. My guess is that the organization has received Mr. Soeharto's support be-

cause he wants the support of Muslim thinkers and leaders, and also because Mr. Habibie is an old friend.²⁸⁷

The greater role of Islam in Indonesian politics should be seen as a reflection of the importance of the position of Muslims as a majority group, whose abilities have become increasingly advanced in various fields. Emmerson puts this perspective into context by observing that, in fact, "Indonesia's gains are Islam's, too."¹⁸⁸

Conclusion

Under Soeharto, the implementation of the national development program intensified, and achieved strategic momentum when Indonesia declared itself to be entering the "take-off" stage. Indonesia formally began its Long-Term 25 Year Development Program in 1969, and is now entering a new era in which it is implementing its second Long-Term 25 Year Development Program. In 1994, Dr. Amien Rais, a graduate of the University of Chicago, lecturer at Gajah Mada University and an expert in political science, presented an assessment of Soeharto's leadership mentioning five achievements and five weaknesses.¹⁸⁹

Soeharto's first achievement in Rais's view was his success in maintaining financial stability, which resulted in economic growth. In 1967 Indonesia's GNP per capita was 70 US dollars, but today it is 600 US dollars. In 1970, 60 percent of Indonesians lived below the poverty line, but today this has decreased to 15 percent. Thus, Indonesia's average annual economic growth has been between 6.5-7 percent under his leadership. Second, Soeharto has also succeeded in preserving national security and political stability. Under his leadership there have been no major disturbances or serious separatist movements, and only minor upheavals, such as in Dili (East Timor) or in the Tanjung Priok affair, all of which are now under control. Third, Soeharto has succeeded in strengthening the unity and integrity of his nation, which is pluralistic in religion, ethnicity, culture and tradition. The national motto "*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*" (Unity in Diversity) exists not only as a slogan, but also in reality. This situation is very important in view of the many foreign countries which have undergone serious political turmoil because of ethnic conflicts or political rivalry. A few examples are Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and India. Fourth, under Soeharto, Indonesia has succeeded in carrying out its agricultural program as witnessed by the fact that it has achieved self-sufficiency in food (rice). Fifth, the image of Indonesia in the eyes of the

international community is good, as indicated by the fact that, for instance, it has been entrusted with the Chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Block. Also, Indonesia played a strategic role as intermediary in settling political conflicts in Cambodia and the Philippines.

On the other hand, according to Rais, the Soeharto government's first weakness lies in the fact that under its leadership the gap between "the haves" and "the have nots" has remained very wide. The condition of those who live below the poverty line is very serious, while the conglomerates enjoy to an excessive degree the country's wealth and the fruits of its development. Second, the rate of corruption in the government is high. Rais points to Prof. Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo's (a prominent economist) estimation that about 30 percent of development program funds are wasted or diverted by corrupt officials. Third, protection for laborers is very poor. Laborers do not have the right to launch strikes against their employers' policies. Fourth, in settling many land disputes between the haves and the have-nots, the government often takes the side of the haves. In many cases, the have-nots are not sufficiently protected. Fifth, there is chronic nepotism in the country. This is a situation which is not easily corrected. Rais has urged that regeneration of the government must take place in the immediate future if this nepotism is ever to be overcome.

The strength of Soeharto's leadership lies in the fact that it combines three key elements: the enforcement of national ideology (Pancasila), political stability and economic growth. These three key elements are closely interrelated and cannot be separated from one another. With the application of Pancasila as the basis and national ideology of the state, the socialization of P4 and the stipulation of Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties and mass organizations, the position of Pancasila has become very strong in the lives of Indonesians. Ideologically speaking, this condition will persist long into the future, alongside the continuous process of social transformation which has been taking place in the life of the Indonesia people. Dr. Alfian, an expert in political science and a graduate of the University of Wisconsin, has analyzed Pancasila in relation to social change in Indonesia life. He describes the elements which are essential to any successful ideology. His conclusions on the matter will be summarized here.²⁹⁰

First, an ideology should have the "dimension of reality." This is necessary since an ideology reflects a real situation existing in a particular society, it being most important when that ideology is first

formulated and introduced to people. Pancasila, according to Alfian, clearly reflects this kind of real situation. When the Indonesia political leaders in 1945 discussed what kind of ideology should serve as the basis for the independent state of Indonesia, they first tried to understand the basic nature of Indonesia society, which is pluralistic with regard to religion, ethnicity, culture, tradition and politics. Alfian says that Pancasila embraces all these values and ideas, as is indicated by, for example, its first principle (Belief in One God). This central principle serves as a point of agreement for all segments of Indonesian society, regardless of their religious beliefs. With this principle, as well as the other four, Pancasila is made acceptable to all the diverse groups in Indonesian society, allowing it to regulate their national life and bring them together in harmony and peace. To borrow A. H. Johns, "Pancasila is the answer to such diversity."²⁹¹ In Alfian's view, Pancasila, as an ideology, has the capacity to continue to survive and can be developed for the sake of togetherness in the life of the nation.

Second, an ideology should have the "dimension of idealism." What Alfian means by this is that an ideology should contain clear aspirations and firm ideals from which its supporters may draw the motivation, capacity and strength to work together to build a better life. Alfian is of the opinion that Pancasila meets this requirement. However, he sees that there has been a tendency in Indonesia society, especially during the Old Order regime, to put special emphasis on one of the five principles of Pancasila over the others. For example, one group emphasized the importance of democracy or humanitarianism, while other groups stressed the significance of Belief in One God. This kind of approach does not see Pancasila as a whole, or as an interrelated set of values. This tendency was recognized by the New Order government, and for this reason it felt the need to establish P4 to elaborate fully all the principles of Pancasila.

Third, an ideology should contain the "dimension of flexibility." This dimension reflects the ability of an ideology to adapt itself to the process of social change and growth in which it finds itself. While adapting itself, at the same time it colors and directs the process of social change in accordance with the ideals of the society or nation in question. Alfian explains that since the process of social transformation is always taking place in the life a society, continuous and accurate interpretations of an ideology are imperative. In his view, theoretically and formally speaking, Pancasila meets this requirement. For example, he points to the "Explanation of the 1945 Constitu-

tion" which states that the Constitution, which contains only 37 chapters, is brief and elastic in nature. The issues not covered in the constitution can be dealt with by the government by issuing laws, bills, regulations and decrees based on the principles of Pancasila in accordance with the demands and needs of the nation. Here it should be added that the President and government officials have, since 1985, begun to speak of Pancasila as an open ideology, in the sense that its basic spirit and values as well as its fundamental ideas are unchanged, but that these values and ideas can be developed creatively and dynamically.²⁹² Within this context, Pancasila can accept other values coming from other nations as long as they do not challenge the basic values of Pancasila itself. In this way, Pancasila, according to the President and government officials, will not become frozen, but will always be creative, dynamic and relevant in response to the process of social transformation taking place in the lives of Indonesians.²⁹³

With the acceptance of Pancasila as the ideology to be applied in state and social affairs, there seem to be no further major ideological issues relating to Pancasila which Muslims (or other groups) can challenge. The central issue surrounding Pancasila, which has now become the main concern of the government, is how the nation as a whole can fortify its loyalty to the state ideology. In line with this concern, President Soeharto, in a speech delivered in 1993 inaugurating the new campus of Pancasila University of Jakarta, urged the nation to strengthen its allegiance to the state ideology in order to be able to face the future challenges of modernization. Without loyalty to Pancasila, he emphasized, the Indonesia nation will be bewildered amidst dynamic and radical global changes. Stressing the importance of each principle of Pancasila *vis-à-vis* the radical and dynamic changes resulting from rapid globalization, Soeharto said that if the Indonesia people did not believe in God (the first principle of Pancasila), ethics, morality and spirituality would be ignored. Without the values of just and civilized humanitarianism (the second principle of Pancasila), progress in economics, technology and sciences would deteriorate. Echoing the third principle of Pancasila, he said that the nation could be split by internal conflicts if it did not adhere to the principle of national unity. In addition, authoritarian forces would emerge and bring the nation down if the values of democracy—the fourth principle of Pancasila—were ignored. Finally, economic progress could widen the social gap and create unrest if people neglected the values of social justice, the fifth principle of Pancasila.²⁹⁴

Endnotes

1. *Jakarta Post*, January 12, 1995.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. For more details, see *Tempo*, April 25, 1981, pp. 13-4.
5. *Ibid.*, 13. Hasan di Tiro wrote a diary of this period which was published as *The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary of Tengku Hasan di Tiro* (n.p.: National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra, 1984).
6. *Tempo*, April 25, 1981, p. 13.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. According to Soedomo, the letter, written in English, was authentic. When asked whether Imran did send this letter to Khomeini or not, Soedomo quickly responded, "I have no idea. Ask Imran himself." See, *Ibid.*
11. M. Sirajuddin Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics in Indonesia: The Case of the Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order," (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1991), p. 104.
12. *Tempo*, April 25, 1981, p. 13.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-4.
14. *Ibid.*, 14.
15. *Tempo*, June 14, 1980, p.9.
16. David Jenkins, *Subarto and His General: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, 1984), p. 57.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.* See footnote 13.
19. *Ibid.* pp. 57-8. See also page 59.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
21. *Indonesia: Muslims on Trial* (London: Tapol/Indonesian Human Rights Campaign, 1987). p. 15.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Susumu Awanohara, "A Change in the Law?," *Far Eastern Economics Review*, vol. 117, no. 35 (August 27, 1982), p. 20.
24. Peter Rodgers, "Indonesia's Faithful Flex Their Political Muscle," *Far Eastern Economics Review*, vol. 110, no. 49 (November 28, 1980), p. 37. See also *Tempo*, June 14, 1980. p. 9.
25. *Tempo*, June 14, 1980, p. 9.
26. Jenkins, *Subarto and His Generals*, p. 157.
27. Rodgers, "Indonesia's Faithful," p. 37.
28. Detailed reactions from Muslim leaders to the President's speech are described elsewhere.
29. David Jenkins, "Marching with Golkar," *Far Eastern Economics Review*, vol. 108, no. 27 (June 27, 1980), 25.
30. Syamsuddin Haris, "PPP and Politics under the New Order," *Prisma*, no. 49 (June, 1990), p. 20; Jenkins, "Marching," p. 25; see also P. Bambang Siswoyo, *Sekitar Petisi 50* (Solo: Mayasari, 1983).
31. *Kompas*, April 28, 1982 and May 1, 1982.
32. Susumu Awanohara, "Islam on Hustings," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 116, no 17 (April 23, 1982), p. 24.
33. See Donald K. Emmerson, "Islam in Modern Indonesia: Political Impasse, Cul-

- tural Opportunity," in Philip H. Stoddard et. al., eds., *Change and the Muslim World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), p. 168.
34. *Kompas*, April 22, 1982.
 35. Panitia Pemilihan Umum, *Penetapan Anggota DPR Tahun 1982: Daftar Perhitungan Pembagian Jumlah Wakil untuk Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (Jakarta: n. p., 1982), pp. 96-7.
 36. M. Rusli Karim, *Perjalanan Partai Politik di Indonesia: Sebuah Potret Pasang Surut* (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1983), p. 219.
 37. Fachry Ali, "Pancasila Sebagai Kritik Realitas Kekuasaan dan Sosial Politik" in his *Islam, Pancasila dan Pergulatan Politik* (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1984) p.225.
 38. According to Alfian, these are indications of the New Order's ideology of "development" or "modernization," adopted in the late 1960s partly in order to distinguish it from its predecessors. In his view it constituted a symbol of political legitimacy, winning it the political support and participation of the people. See Alfian, "Suharto and the Question of Political Stability," *Pacific Community*, vol 2, no. 3 (April 1971), pp. 536-57.
 39. See Muljanto Tjokrowinoto, "Peranan Identitas dalam Partai Politik," *Kompas*, October 2, 1983.
 40. See *Kompas*, July 21, 1987.
 41. Herbert Feith, "Dynamic of Guided Democracy," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., *Indonesia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 314.
 42. Karim, *Perjalanan*, p. 220.
 43. See *Ibid.*, pp. 225-26.
 44. A. Rahman Tolleng, "Mencari Sistem Politik yang Selalu Menumbuhkan Alternatif," in Imam Walujo et. al., *Dialog Indonesia Kini & Esok*, Book II (Jakarta: Leppenas, 1981), pp. 137-38.
 45. See *Kompas*, September 3, 1982.
 46. *Ibid.*,
 47. George McTurnan Kahin writes of Deliar Noer: "He is the author of *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Oxford University Press, 1973). After securing his Ph.D. in Political Science at Cornell University, he served as a lecturer at the University of North Sumatra, the Jakarta IKIP, where he was also Rector, the University of Indonesia, and at Griffith University in Australia. Under both the Soekarno and Suharto regimes he has won the reputation of being a principled scholar unwilling to compromise his honesty and objectivity—despite the pressures exerted by government. It was because of such pressure that in 1974 he was prevented from delivering his professional address, *Partisipasi Dalam Pembangunan* (Participation in Development). This was a valuable contribution to the pool of ideas of his country's development, and for this infringement of academic freedom his country is the poorer." See Kahin. "Preface" to Deliar Noer's *Administration of Islam in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1978), p. v.
 48. Deliar Noer, *Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984), p. 52.
 49. *Ibid.*
 50. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
 51. *Ibid.*
 52. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
 53. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
55. They were the NU, PSII, Perti, PNI, PSI, Murba, IPKI, Partai Katholik and Parkindo.
56. Noer, *Islam*, pp. 59-60.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 60
58. *Ibid.*, p. 58
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
61. *Ibid.*
62. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-1.
65. *Ibid.*, 78
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-9.
67. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara took the initiative to establish the PDRI in Sumatra after Soekarno, Hatta and many of the leaders of the central government in Yogyakarta were captured by the Dutch following their second military action in December 1948.
68. Prawiranegara's letter was reproduced by the DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council) of Jakarta, chaired by Muhammad Natsir, under the title *Perihal Pancasila Sebagai Azas Tunggal*. His letter was translated into English and published under the title "Pancasila as the Sole Foundation," in *Indonesia*, no. 38 (October 1984), pp 75-83. All quotations relating to this issue are taken from that translation.
69. In addition to these state institutions, he also sent copies of his letter to (1) the Chairman and members of the State Finance Control Board, (2) the speakers, vice-speakers and the factional leaders in the MPR and DPR and other members, (3) the Attorney general, (4) the Central Council of 'Ulama' in Indonesia, (5) the press and other mass media, and (6) Islamic social organizations. See Prawiranegara, "Pancasila", p. 83.
70. *Ibid.* p. 79.
71. *Ibid.* pp. 79-80.
72. Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, *Daftar Pembagian Kursi Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Tahun 1971* (Jakarta: n. p., 1971).
73. See Slamet Effendy Yusuf et. al., *Dinamika Kaum Santri* (Jakarta: CV Rajawali, 1983), p. 73. On pages 61-76 this book gives an account of the conflicts between the MI and NU elements within the PPP.
74. For more details on the PPP, see, for example, Sudarnoto Abdul Hakim, "The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: The Political Journey of Islam under Indonesia's New Order 1973-1987" (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1993). See also Syamsuddin Haris, "PPP and Politics under the New Order," *Prisma*, no. 49 (June 1990) pp. 31-51.
75. Haris, "PPP and Politics," p. 40.
76. DPP PPP, *Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga PPP 1973* (Jakarta: Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1973), article 1 paragraph 2.
77. *Ibid.*, Article 3 paragraph 1, 3 and 6.
78. DPP PPP, *Program Perjuangan dan Urgensi Program Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 1973* (Jakarta: Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1973) pp. 73-4.
79. DPP PPP, *Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga PPP 1977* (Jakarta:

- Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1977), article 2 and 3.
80. *Kompas*, July 13, 1985.
 81. *Tempo*, March 23, 1985, p. 19.
 82. *Ibid.*
 83. See Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima, "Asas Lain, Sebab Kebringasan", *Panji Masyarakat*, no 370 (September 1, 1982), p. 20.
 84. *Ibid.*
 85. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of the State: A Study of Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia," (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1982), p. 305.
 86. *Ibid.*, pp. 305-6.
 87. DPP PPP, *Anggaran Dasar PPP 1987* (Jakarta: Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1987), article 5.
 88. The symbol of a star was chosen because of the five symbols of Pancasila this was the one which represented the principle of 'Belief in One God'.
 89. *Tempo*, August 25, 1984, p. 29.
 90. *Tempo*, August 30, 1986, p. 12.
 91. *Tempo*, August 25, 1984, p. 14.
 92. Quoted and translated by Anthony H. Johns, 'Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism,' in John L. Esposito, ed., *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 222.
 93. Rusli Karim, *Nuansa Gerak Politik Era 1980-an di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Media Widy Mandala, 1992), p. 25.
 94. See *Prioritas*, April 27, 1987; *Tempo*, April 18, 1987; see also Rusli Karim, *Islam dan Konflik Politik Era Orde Baru* (Yogyakarta: MW Mandala, 1992), p. 55.
 95. On this development see A. Zuhdi Mukhdlor, *NU dan Pemilu* (Yogyakarta: Gunung Jati & U., 1986), p. 19.
 96. See Afsari Jaya Bakri, 'PPP: Pergumulan Identitas dalam Kancan Orde Baru,' *Pesantren*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1991), p. 19.
 97. See *Jawa Pos*, March 2, 1988.
 98. Bakri, "PPP: Pergumulan Identitas," p. 19.
 99. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
 100. *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 306 (March 21, 1983), pp. 51-2.
 101. Born on November 7, 1925 in Klaten, Central Java, Munawir Sjadzali obtained his M. A. from Georgetown University, Washington DC., in 1957. He served as Ambassador to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (1976-1980), and was Director General for Political Affairs of the Department of Foreign Affairs (1980). He was appointed Minister of Religious Affairs for two terms (1983-1988 and 1988-1993).
 102. This point will be developed in the last section of this writing when we discuss the Muslim acceptance of Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations.
 103. Munawir Sjadzali, *Muslims' Interests are Better Served in the Absence of Muslim Parties* (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 1992), pp. 9-10.
 104. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
 105. H. Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara* (Jakarta: UI Press, 1990), p. 236.
 106. Deliar Noer, *Islam dan Pemikiran Politik: Bahasan Kitab 'Islam dan Tata Negara' oleh H. Munawir Sjadzali, M. A.* (Jakarta: LIPPM, 1990), p. 20.
 107. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

108. The government submitted the mass organizations bill to the DPR together with four other bills in one package. The other four bills consisted of the election amendment bill, the DPR/MPR amendment bill, the political parties and Golkar amendment bill and the referendum bill. The mass organizations bill was the last one debated in the DPR and became the most controversial issue.
109. According to Dr. Suhardiman, Chairman of the Special Committee, the length of the debates on the mass organizations bill was unusual compared with those on other bills which usually lasted for only three weeks. Since the mass organizations bill was approved in the month of Ramadân, the Minister of Home Affairs Soepardjo Rustam, on behalf of the government, congratulated all factions, saying that Ramadân was indeed a month filled with blessing. "It was also during Ramadân that our independence took place," said Rustam with confidence. See Uf Saimima, "RUUK, Setuju di Bulan Suci," *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 407 (June 11, 1985) pp. 14 and 15.
110. The eight crucial points were the title, guidance of the mass organizations, the relation between Pancasila and religious life, the freezing of the board and dissolution of the organizations, the general regulation and its clarification, clarification of the term "basis", clarification of the transitional regulations, and the consideration of the bill. See Uf Saimima, "RUUK", p. 15.
111. Abu Jihan, "Undang-Undang Keormasan," *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 470 (June 11, 1985), p. 13; Saimima, "RUUK," pp. 16-17; *Tempo*, June 8, 1985, p. 12. See also "MAWI, PGI dan Asas Tunggal," *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 469 (June 1, 1985), p. 13.
112. *Ibid.*
113. Saimima, "RUUK," p.17.
114. *Ibid.*
115. *Ibid.*
116. See *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 470 (June 11, 1985), p. 20.
117. *Ibid.*
118. *Ibid.*
119. Among the 'ulamâ' who took the initiative to establish the NU were K. H. Hasyim Asy'ari, K. H. Abdulwahab Khasbullah, H. Abdul Ubaid, Abdul Halim, K. Ma'sum, Alwi Abdul Aziz, Abdullah Faqih and K. H. Nakhrowi. See Saifuddin Zuhri, *Kyai Haji Abdulwahab Khasbullah: Bapak dan Pendiri NU* (Yogyakarta: Sumbangsih, 1983), pp. 28-9.
120. *Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali ke Khittah 1926* (Bandung: Risalah, 1985), p. 118.
121. Before the NU, the PSII had separated from the Masyumi in 1947. In 1960, the Masyumi was dissolved by Soekarno due to its "radical" opposition and the involvement of many of its leaders in the PRRI revolt in 1958. The remaining three Islamic parties under Guided Democracy were the PSII, the Perti and the NU. Abdurrahman Wahid was of the opinion that the split of the NU in particular from the Masyumi was a blessing in disguise in the sense that, if the NU and other Islamic political parties in 1958 had acted like the Masyumi (launched radical opposition to the regime), all of them would have been dissolved by Soekarno. See Abdurrahman Wahid, "Kata Pengantar," in Einar Martahan Sitompul, *NU dan Pancasila* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1989), p. 17.
122. Yusuf et. al., *Dinamika*, p. 48.
123. *Ibid.* p. 50.
124. See Mitsuo Nakamura's article, "The Radical Transformation of the Nahdlatul

Ulama in Indonesia: A Personal Account of the 26th National Congress, June 1979, Semarang," *Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 19, no. 2 (September 1981), pp. 187-204. His article was translated into Indonesian by Al Ghozie Usman under the title *Agama dan Perubahan Politik: Tradisionalisme Radikal Nahdlatul Ulama di Indonesia* (Surakarta: Hapsara, 1982).

125. For further discussion and studies of the recent developments of the NU, see for example, Yusuf et. al., *Dinamika*; Chairul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama* (Sala: Jatayu, 1985); Abu Jihan, ed., *PPP, NU dan MI: Gejala Wajah Politik Islam* (Jakarta: Integrita Press, 1984); Sitompul, *NU dan Pancasila*; Chairul Fathoni et. al., *NU Pasca Khittah* (Jogyakarta: MW Mandala, 1992).
126. For more details, see *Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali*.
127. Mahbub Djunaedi, "Tentang Penerbitan," in *Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali*, p. 1.
128. *Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali*, pp. 50-1.
129. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
130. He served as Minister of Religious Affairs from 1949-1952. Together with his father, K. H. Hasjim Asy'ari, he was recognized as a national independence hero by the government in honor of his struggle during the independence war between 1945-1949. For a further account of his life, career and ideas, see H. Aboebakar, *Sejarah Hidup K. H. A. Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar* (Jakarta: Panitia Buku Peringatan K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957).
131. *Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali*, p. 57.
132. One of the prominent 'ulamâ' in the NU circle, Kyai Haji Ahmad Siddiq devoted himself to teaching in his own *pesantren* called "Ash-Shiddiqiyah" in Jember, East Java. Due to his broad religious knowledge, charisma and skillful leadership, he was elected General Chairman of the Consultative Council of the NU for two terms (1984-1989 and 1989-1994). He was born on January 24, 1926 and passed away in the Dr. Sutomo hospital in Surabaya on January 23, 1991.
133. See K. H. Ahmad Siddiq, *Islam, Pancasila dan Ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Jakarta: Lajnah Ta'lif wan Nasyr PBNU, 1985), p. 15.
134. See Sjadzali, *Asas Pancasila, Aspirasi Umat Islam dan Masa Depan Bangsa* (Jakarta: Harian Pelita), p. 1.
135. *Kompas*, September 30, 1982.
136. See Siddiq, *Islam, Pancasila dan Ukhuwah*. See also Abdurrahman Wahid, "In Memoriam Kiai Ahmad Shiddiq," *Kompas*, January 26, 1991.
137. Born in 1940 in Jombang, East Java, Abdurrahman Wahid is the son of K. H. Wahid Hasyim, a prominent leader of the NU and Minister of the Religious Affairs in the 1950s. Wahid is also the grandson of K. H. Hasyim Asy'ari, one of the founders of the NU. He has served as General Chairman of the Executive Council of the NU for three terms (1984-1989, 1989-1994 and 1994-1999). Known as one of the founders of the Forum for Democracy, Wahid is active in seminars and conferences both within Indonesia and abroad.
138. See *Kompas*, September 17, 1993.
139. *Ibid.*
140. See *Panji Masyarakat*, no 512 (August 11, 1986), pp. 30-3.
141. Sjadzali, *Asas Pancasila*, p. 3.
142. *Ibid.*
143. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

144. Recent studies of the Muhammadiyah are numerous. See, for example, Ahmad Jaenuri, "The Muhammadiyah Movement in Twentieth Century Indonesia: A Socio-religious Study," M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1992); Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics"; Yusuf Abdul Puar, *Perjuangan dan Pengabdian Muhammadiyah* (Jakarta: Pustaka Rakyat, 1989); M. T. Arifin, *Muhammadiyah: Potret yang Berubah* (Surakarta: Institut Gelanggang Pemikiran Filsafat, Sosial Budaya dan Kependidikan Surakarta, 1990)
145. Dahlan, together with his wife (Nyai Ahmad Dahlan), was recognized as a national hero by the Indonesian government due to his dedication and contribution to the nation. For detailed accounts of Dahlan, see, for instance, Junus Salam, *Riwayat Hidup K. H. A. Dahlan: Amal dan Perjuangan* (Jakarta: Depot Pengajaran Muhammadiyah, 1989); Muhammadiyah Idris, "K. H. A. Dahlan: His Life and Thought" (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1975).
146. On this issue see, for example, James Peacock, *Purifying the Faith: The Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesia* (California: The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, 1978).
147. According to H. A. R. Gibb, the modernist ideas of 'Abduh can be summarized as an appeal for: (1) the purification of Islam from corrupting influences and practices; (2) the reformation of Muslim higher education; (3) the reformulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern thought; and (4) the defense of Islam against European influences and Christian attacks. See Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (New York: Octagon Books, 1981), p. 33.
148. 'Abdul Mukti 'Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1957), p. 56. It seems that the way 'Ali summarized the Muhammadiyah's goals was inspired by H. A. R. Gibb's summary of 'Abduh's modernist ideas mentioned above.
149. David Joe Steinberg, ed., *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), p. 290.
150. See Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State," p. 117.
151. *Sinar Harapan*, August 30, 1982.
152. *Kompas*, July 1, 1983.
153. Prawiranegara, "Pancasila," p. 80.
154. See Soerjadi's statement in *Amanah*, no. 221 (January 20, 1995), 7.
155. Nur Fadhil Lubis, "Institutionalization and the Unification of Islamic Courts under the New Order," *Studia Islamika*, vol 2, no. 1 (1995), p. 12.
156. Amien Rais, "Suksesi itu Sunatullah," *Suara Masjid*, no. 233 (February 1994), p. 18. See also his article, "Suksesi 1988: Suatu Keharusan," *Media Dakwah*, no. 237 (March 1994), p. 36.
157. See, for example, David Jenkins, "The Aging of the New Order," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol 108, no. 27 (June 27, 1980), p. 22.
158. In giving this percentage Adnan Buyung Nasution refers to Ismail Sunny's book, *Mencari Keadilan: Sebuah Otobiografi* (Jakarta: Ghalia Indonesia, 1982), p. 517.
159. Adnan Buyung Nasution, *The Aspiration of Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1059* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992) p. 429.
160. *Ibid.*
161. *Ibid.* The book by Soemarsaid Moertono to which Nasution referred is *State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1981), p. 39.

162. Soeharto, *My Thoughts, Word and Deeds* (Jakarta: PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), p. 563.
163. Lukman Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas Pancasila* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1989), p. 38.
164. *Asiaweek*, vol. 12, no. 3 (January 1986), p. 15.
165. *Ibid.* See also Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas*, p. 43.
166. Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas*, p. 41.
167. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
168. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
169. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-4.
170. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50. Other proposals can be seen in *ibid.*, pp. 49, 50, 53 and 54.
171. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
172. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-3.
173. *Asiaweek*, vol 12, no. 3 (January 19, 1986), p. 15.
174. *Ibid.*
175. See Amin Rais, "Kata Pengantar," in M. Rusli Karim, ed., *Muhammadiyah dalam Kritik dan Komentari* (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1986), p. ix.
176. Rais, "Kata Pengantar," p. ix.
177. See M. Bambang Pranowo, "Which Islam and Which Pancasila?: Islam and the State in Indonesia (A Comment)," in Arief Budiman, ed, *State and Civil Society in Indonesia* (Clayton, Victoria: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), p. 488.
178. A good study of the MUI was undertaken by Mohammad Atho Mudzhar. See his "Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia 1975-1988," (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1990).
179. Yunan Nasution, *Islam dan Problema-Problema Kemasyarakatan* (Jakarta: Bulau Bintang, 1988), p. 132.
180. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
181. *Ibid.*
182. For more details on the HMI, see, for example, Agussalim Sitompul's works, *Sejarah Perjuangan HMI 1947-1975* (Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1976); *Pemikiran HMI dan Relevansinya dengan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa Indonesia* (Jakarta: Integrita Dinamika Press, 1986); Victor Tanja, *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam: Sejarah dan Kedudukannya di Tengah-tengah Gerakan Muslim Pembaharu di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1991).
183. *Muslims on Trial*, p. 15.
184. See *Tempo*, June 4., 1983, p. 13.
185. *Ibid.*, 12.
186. *Ibid.*
187. Cited by Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto* (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 104.
188. Pengurus Besar Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, *Pandangan Kritis terhadap RUU Keormasan* (Jakarta: n.p., 1984).
189. *Ibid.*,
190. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
191. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
192. The declaration of the Working Committee of the HMI to accept Pancasila as its sole basis was confirmed by its decision no. 1/Kpts/MPK-2/071/1405 of April 4, 1985.

193. Saimima, "RUUK," p. 17.
194. *Tempo*, July 16, 1988, pp. 28-9. See also "Inside Story on Official Manipulation: Split in Islamic University Students Organization (HMI)," *Indonesian Report*, no. 36 (November 1988), pp. 8 and 16-7.
195. Pengurus Besar HMI, "Memori Penjelasan tentang Pancasila Sebagai Asas Organisasi HMI," (issued by the Central Board of the HMI in connection with decision no. 1/Kpts/MPK-2/07/1405 of April 4, 1985 made by its Working Committee), p. 2.
196. *Ibid.*
197. See *Tempo*, February 13, 1988, p. 29.
198. A brief history of the PII can be read in *Suara Masjid*, no. 243 (December 1994), 7-8.
199. In addition to the PII, the GPM (Gerakan Pemuda Marhaen, or Marhaenist Young Movement) was also banned. See *Tempo*, February 6, 1988, p. 24. See also "PII and GPM Banned by the Government for not Complying with Social Organizations Law," *Indonesian Report*, no. 30 (May 1988), p. 27. The GPM was formerly affiliated with the PNI before the latter merged with several other parties to form the PDI in 1973.
200. See *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 470 (June 11, 1985), p. 17.
201. For a discussion of the recent development of the Syarikat Islam, see M. A. Gani, *Cita dan Pola Dasar Perjuangan Syarikat Islam* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984).
202. Prawiranegara, "Pancasila," p. 79.
203. *Ibid.*
204. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
205. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
206. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
207. *Ibid.*, p. 80-1.
208. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
209. *Ibid.*
210. *Ibid.*
211. See the excerpt from the text of his *khutbah*, "Azas Tunggal Pancasila," in Prawiranegara, *Perihal Pancasila*, pp. 20-1.
212. See Mohammad Roem, *Saya Menerima Pancasila Karena Saya Orang Islam* (Jakarta: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, n.d.), p. 1.
213. Nasution, "Azas Tunggal," p. 20-1.
214. See the text of his *khutbah*, *Azas Islam Hingga Titik Darah Terakhir* (Pegangsaan Timur, Jakarta: Panitia Pelaksana Hari-Hari Besar Islam, 1403/1988).
215. Abdul Qadir Djaelani, *Azas Tunggal Islam* (Bogor: n.p., 1403/1983).
216. Translation of Abdul Qadir Djaelani's speech in *Indonesia Report-Culture & Society Supplement*, no. 13 (1985), p. 5.
217. Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics," p. 102.
218. Translation of Djaelani's speech in *Indonesian Report-Culture & Society Supplement*, no. 13 (1985), pp. 2-3.
219. Susumu Awanohara, "At First Warning Shot," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 125, no. 39 (September 27, 1984), p. 15.
220. For details, see *Muslims on Trial*. See also Awanohara, "At First Warning Shot."
221. *Muslims on Trial*, p. 17.
222. Awanohara, "At First Warning Shot," p. 14.

223. Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics," p. 102. See also *Muslims on Trial*, p. 17.
224. This account was revealed to the *Tempo* magazine by HMA. Sampurna, an assistant in the intelligence body of the Kodam (Military District Command) in Jakarta when the Tanjung Priok affair took place, who later served as Vice-Governor of West Java. See *Tempo* (October 16, 1993), p. 39.
225. *Muslims on Trial*, pp. 56-5. This book gives detailed reports concerning their trials and the length of their imprisonment.
226. In 1993, an appeal was again voiced in many circles, including the Petition of Fifty Group, for the establishment of a fact-finding commission. This call was made because many Muslim families complained that they had lost relatives in connection with the Tanjung Priok affair and did not know where their graves were. See *Tempo*, October 16, 1993, p. 30.
227. See Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics*, p. 191.
228. On the bombing of the BCA, see *Tempo*, January 19, 1985, pp. 12-9. See also *Muslims on Trial*, p. 71-9.
229. See "Pengadilan Borobudur," *Tempo*, November 17, 1990, p. 26. See also *Straits Times*, May 1, 1991, p. 15.
230. See *Tempo*, July 6, 1991, p. 35.
231. *Ibid.*
232. *Ibid.*
233. *Tempo*, May 2, 1981, p. 15.
234. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
235. *Ibid.*
236. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
237. *Ibid.*
238. For further discussions, see, for instance, H. Aqib Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985); Harry J. Benda, "Christian Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia," *Journal of Modern History*, no. 30 (1958), pp. 338-47; C. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*, trans. by A. W. S. O'Sullivan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1906).
239. Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 773.
240. Mudzhar, "Fatwas", p. 53.
241. Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, p. 203.
242. *Ibid.*, p. 202
243. *Ibid.*
244. *Ibid.*
245. See *Tempo*, November 9, 1991, p. 23.
246. Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, p. 203.
247. Sjadzali, *Muslims' Interests*, pp. 5-6.
248. Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, p. 203.
249. See *Media Dakwah*, no. 234 (December), pp. 10-12.
250. Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, p. 202.
251. *Ibid.*
252. See Michael Vatikiotis, "Faith in Teaching," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 141, no. 30 (July 28, 1988), p. 25.
253. *Ibid.*
254. *Ibid.* See also "National Education Bill roused widespread suspicion within devout Muslim community leading establishment Muslim organizations go on

- offensive to modify it," *Indonesia Report*, 36 (November 1988), p. 11.
256. Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, p. 202.
257. Sjadzali, *Muslims' Interests*, p. 3.
258. Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, p. 200.
259. *Ibid.*, pp. 200 - 1. In this case, Sjadzali did not mention the names of the Islamic states whose Islamic courts he compared with those of Indonesia.
260. The PGI's letter, dated May 10, 1989, to the speakers and chairmen of factions in the DPR, as referred to by Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics," pp. 257- 158.
261. *Hidup*, no. 7 February 1989. Their charge was discussed by Muslims in their mass media. See for example, *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 616 (July 10 1989), p. 10.
262. See Syamsuddin "Religion and Politics," p. 259.
263. See *Tempo*, February 4, 1989, pp. 77-8.
264. B.J. Habibie's speech on this matter was widely quoted by the Indonesian mass media. See, for example, *Surya*, December 7, 1990.
265. The first "National Awakening" was associated with the establishment in 1908 of the Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavour), which promoted the emergence of various nationalist movements against colonialism in Indonesia. Thanks to these nationalist movements Indonesians succeeded in freeing their country from colonialism.
266. See ICMI's constitution (chapter 3 article 5) in Abrar Muhammad, ed., *ICMI dan Harapan Umat* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pendidikan Islam Ruhama, 1991), p. 269 (appendix).
267. "Apa dan Bagaimana ICMI," *Suara Masjid*, no. 199 (April 1991), pp. 16-7.
268. Kuntowijoyo, "Kiblat Baru Politik Kaum Santri," *Pesan*, no. 1 (1992), pp. 23-4
269. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
270. Michael Vatikiotis, "Suharto Courts Islamic Intellectuals: The Muslim Ticket," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 150, no. 51. (December 20, 1990), p. 10.
271. Deliar Noer, "Dibayangi Kesemuan," *Tempo*, December 28, 1991, p. 27.
272. "Harus Dibuktikan ICMI Bukan Barisan Politik," *Media Indonesia*, December 6, 1990.
273. See *Tempo*, July 6, 1991, p. 25.
274. Detailed coverage of the President's pilgrimage to Mecca was documented by Tim Penyusunan dan Penelitian Buku Perjalanan Ibadah Haji Pak Harto, ed. *Perjalanan Ibadah Haji Pak Harto*, (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 1993).
275. *Tempo*, October 19, 1991, p. 26.
276. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics*, p. 163.
277. See *Inside Indonesia: Bulletin of the Indonesia Resources and Information Programme*, no. 31 (June 1992), p. 5.
278. See *Media Dakwah*, no. 226 (April 1993), p. 48.
279. *Ibid.*
280. *Ibid.*
281. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
282. Donald K. Emmerson, "Indonesia's Gains are Islam's Too," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1993.
283. *Ibid.*
284. *Ibid.*
285. *Ibid.*
286. *Indonesia Times*, October 19, 1993.
287. Emmerson, "Indonesia's Gains."

288. *Ibid.*
289. See his article, "Suksesi itu Sunnatullah," *Suara Masjid*, no. 233 (February 1994), pp. 17-8. Similar assessments can be read in his article, "Suksesi 1988: Suatu Keharusan," *Media Dakwah*, no. 237 (March 1994), pp. 34-5.
290. See Alfian, "Pancasila dan Perubahan Masyarakat" in his book, *Politik, Kebudayaan dan Manusia Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980), pp. 104-33.
291. Johns, "Indonesia," p. 224.
292. See Safoedin Bahar, "Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Kehidupan Pertahanan Keamanan," in Oetojo Oesman et. al., eds., *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi* (Jakarta: BP 7 Pusat, 1991), p. 350.
293. Moerdiono (State Secretary) wrote an article on the matter, entitled "Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Terbuka," in Oesman et. al., eds., *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi*, pp. 397-421.
294. *Jakarta Post*, April 23, 1993.

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