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Kyai and Japanese Military

Abstraksi: Selama perang dunia kedua di Asia Tenggara, tentara Jepang berusaha mendapat dukungan dan kerjasama dari rakyat yang didudukinya. Dalam hal ini kebijakan politik Islam menjadi sangat penting di Indonesia, dan satu ciri khas yang menonjol dari politik Islam Jepang adalah mementingkan peranan para kyai. Namun sewaktu mendarat di Indonesia, militer Jepang belum merumuskan politik Islam yang perlu dilaksanakan. Maka segera dinyatakan bahwa pemerintah militer Jepang menghargai agama penduduk.

Dalam badan intel ada seorang Muslim Jepang yang sangat mengenal keadaan di Jawa, yaitu Abdul Hamid Ono. Dialah yang mengusulkan supaya Jepang mempergunakan pengaruh kyai untuk memerintah rakyat. Pada tahap pertama Jepang mengfokuskan pengumpulan informasi tentang Islam dan mengadakan pertemuan dengan para pemimpin Islam, dan juga dengan para kyai di setiap daerah.

Tokoh-tokoh Islam cepat bereaksi terhadap propaganda Jepang, terutama para pemimpin PSII yang mengambil inisiatif. Mereka mengaku sebagai wakil umat Islam yang tergabung dalam MIAI, tapi sebenarnya sudah tidak aktif lagi pada waktu itu, dan mereka berhasil ditempatkan pada badan pimpinan MIAI yang direorganisasi dan diakui oleh Jepang yang belum memahami situasi. Para pemimpin PSII ingin membentuk semacam departemen agama dengan dukungan Jepang dan mengontrol urusan agama Islam. MIAI memulai proyek baitul-mâl, namun usaha ini mengundang kecurigaan dari pihak Jepang yang segera menghentikannya. Pada waktu itu, Jepang sudah bisa menilai bahwa MIAI tidak mampu berperan sebagai jembatan antara pemerintah dan rakyat, dan karena itu MIAI dibubarkan.

Setelah mengetahui siapa yang bisa berperan untuk rakyat, Jepang mengembangkan politik Islamnya dengan fokus untuk menjalin kerjasama dengan para kyai. Banyak kyai dan ulama diikutsertakan dalam latihan militer; mereka mendapat indoktrinasi ideologi Asianisme yang dikumandangkan Jepang, dan juga diajarkan berbagai subjek. Untuk menun-

jukkan rasa hormat kepada kalangan kyai, Kyai Hasyim Asy'ari ditunjuk sebagai ketua Shūmubu dan juga dijadikan sebagai pemimpin utama Masyumi, organisasi baru Islam. Selain itu, dibentuk pula shūmuka sebagai kantor daerah Shūmubu, dan para kyai yang telah tamat dari latihan menduduki jabatan di situ. Hubungan Masyumi dengan Shūmubu sangat erat, dan Masyumi juga mendirikan cabang di setiap daerah. Organisasi-organisasi ini dipergunakan untuk menyampaikan propaganda dan perintah Jepang kepada rakyat. Ketika situasi medan perang semakin buruk, Jepang sangat membutuhkan tambahan tenaga militer, dan anak-anak kyai besar direkrut sebagai opsir PETA dan juga dibentuk Hizbullah yang terdiri dari para pemuda santri.

Ummat Islam Indonesia sebaliknya menyampaikan harapan, permohonan atau tuntutan kepada pihak Jepang lewat Shūmubu atau pada pertemuan dengan kyai. Sebagian permohonan dipenuhi pemerintah militer karena Jepang begitu menggantungkan diri pada para pemimpin Islam. Jepang misalnya mendirikan perpustakaan Islam, gedung balai Muslimin, universitas Islam, dan mencetak Almanak Jawa Baroe (kalender Islam), memulai sistem setengah hari kerja pada hari Jumat dan lain-lain. Konsesi terbesar yang diperoleh umat adalah terbentuknya shūmuka, yang sudah lama didamkan untuk memudahkan urusan administrasi agama (terutama masalah pernikahan). Ini merupakan salah satu bentuk politisasi kyai. Kyai yang dulunya terisolir dan menjauhkan diri dari pemerintah, berubah menjadi berani bersuara politik dan menuntut sistem sosial yang melancarkan hidup keagamaan.

Wahid Hasyim adalah pemimpin Islam yang paling menonjol pada akhir masa pendudukan Jepang. Tampaknya Wahid Hasyim ingin memanfaatkan kesempatan yang diberikan Jepang untuk membangun dan mengorganisasi umat Islam dengan membayangkan masa depan Indonesia Merdeka. Posisinya sebagai kyai dari pesantren yang termasyhur di Jawa menjadikan dia mempunyai jaringan yang luas dan erat dengan para kyai di seluruh Jawa, dan paling pantas berperan dalam menghadapi permainan politik pemerintah Jepang. Para alumni pesantren yang pendidikannya telah diperbaharui menjadi pemimpin Masyumi daerah, dan shūmuka dijabat kyai yang dia kenal. Hizbullah bisa juga dipersiapkan untuk memberontak terhadap Jepang.

Setelah Proklamasi Indonesia, Kementerian Agama (bekas Shūmubu dan shūmuka), Masyumi (direorganisasi) dan Hizbullah (kemudian sebagian pindah ke ABRI) merupakan landasan bagi para pemimpin Islam untuk berperan di pentas politik Indonesia. Ini salah satu jasa dari para pemimpin Islam yang bereaksi terhadap pendudukan militer Jepang.

الشيوخ والجيش اليابانى

ملخص: لقد حاول الجيش اليابانى طوال المدة التى نشبت فيها الحرب العالمية الثانية فى جنوب شرقى آسيا أن يجد من الشعب الذى يحتله تأييدا وتعاوناً، وفى هذا الصدد لا بد أن تكون السياسة الاسلامية تحتل مكانة من الأهمية فى اندونيسيا، ومن الخصائص التى ظهرت فى سياسة اليابان تجاه الاسلام هو تقدير دور الشيوخ، ولكن عندما تم للجيش اليابانى احتلال البلاد لم يتخذ خطوات عملية فى سياسته تجاه الاسلام، فهناك تصريحات من ناحية بأن القيادة العسكرية تحترم الدين الذى يعتنقه المواطنون وتقوم بإعطائهم الآمال بينما ترتكب (من ناحية أخرى) أخطاء تثير تشكك الأمة الاسلامية وغضبهم.

يبد أنه يوجد فى هيئة المخابرات يابانى مسلم وهو عبد الحميد اونو (Abdul Hamid Ono) كان له إلمام تام بالاوضاع فى جاوه، وكان هو الذى تقدم باقتراح لاستغلال نفوذ الشيوخ فى الحكم، وكخطوة أولى أخذت اليابان تركز الاهتمام على جمع أكبر معلومات عن الاسلام وعقدت اجتماعات مع زعماء الاسلام ومع الشيوخ فى كل منطقة.

وسرعان ما نشأت ردود أفعال من شخصيات اسلامية تجاه الدعايات اليابانية وخاصة قيام زعماء حزب شركات اسلام الاندونيسى PSII باتخاذ مبادرة مدعين أنهم ممثلون للامة الاسلامية من خلال المجلس الاسلامى الاعلى الاندونيسى (MIAI) الذى هو فى الحقيقة لم يعد له نشاط فى ذلك الوقت، واستطاعوا أن يثبتوا وجودهم فى الهيئة القيادية للمجلس الذى أعيد تنظيمه واعترفت به اليابان التى لم تفهم بعد أوضاعه، وكان ما يرمى إليه زعماء الحزب هو إنشاء نوع من وزارة للشئون الدينية بتأييد من اليابان بغية القيام برعاية الشئون الاسلامية اعنى الحصول على استقلالية فى ادارتها، واستهل

المجلس (مهامه) بإنشاء بيت المال ولكن هذه الجهود كانت مشار ريب لدى الجانب الياباني فتم إغلاقه وتأكد لدى اليابان حينذاك أن المجلس الاسلامي الاعلى الاندونيسي لا يستطيع أن يقوم بدور الوساطة بين الحكومة والشعب فكان لا بد من وقف نشاطه.

وتطورت سياسة اليابان تجاه الاسلام الى تركيز الاهتمام على ما عسى أن يستجلب تعاون الشيوخ، وذلك بعد التأكد ممن يستطيع أن يقوم بدور (هام) للشعب، وتم إلحاق كثير من الشيوخ والعلماء في دورات تدريبية يتم فيها تزويدهم بايديولوجية الآسيوية التي دعت إليها اليابان ضمن موضوعات أخرى، وللتدليل على الاحترام للشيوخ تم تعيين الشيخ هاشم اشعري رئيسا لشوموبو (Shumubu) أي مكتب الشؤون الاسلامية رمزا، وعين كذلك كبير رؤساء مجلس شورى المسلمين (الماشومي) الجمعية الاسلامية الناشئة حديثا، علاوة على ما تم من إنشاء شوموكا (Shumuka) أي المكاتب الفرعية للشؤون الدينية في كل منطقة وتعيين الشيوخ الذين تم تدريبهم رؤساء لها، ولقد كانت العلاقة أوثقها بين شوموبو ومجلس شورى المسلمين (ماشومي) الذي أنشأ فروعاً أيضاً في المناطق، وكانت هذه الجمعيات تستغل لترويج الدعايات اليابانية والقيام بتبليغ الاوامر من جانب اليابان الى الشعب.

وعندما تزايد سوء احوالها في الحرب اصبحت اليابان في أمس الحاجة الى مزيد من الطاقة لقواتها المسلحة فتم تجنيد كثير من ابناء الشيوخ ليكونوا مشرفين او ضباطا في (قوات) الدفاع الشعبي وتم إنشاء كذلك (قوات) حزب الله الذي يتكون أفراده من شبان المعاهد التراثية.

وينتهز المسلمون (من ناحية أخرى) الفرصة ليتقدموا بمطالب إلى اليابان من خلال مكتب الشؤون الدينية او عند الاجتماعات مع الشيوخ، واستجابت اليابان - نظرا لما آلت اليه من تعليق آمالها على زعماء الاسلام وضرورة استعطاف المسلمين - لبعض تلك المطالب ومنها إنشاء المكتبة

الإسلامية العامة، وبناء قاعة اجتماعات المسلمين، وإنشاء الجامعة الإسلامية، وطمع التقويم الهجرى، وتطبيق العمل بنصف النهار يوم الجمعة وما الى ذلك من المطالب، وكان أكبر التعويضات التى حصل عليها المسلمون هو إنشاء شوموكا أي المكاتب الفرعية للشئون الإسلامية حيث طال انتظارهم لمثل هذه المكاتب تسهيلا لهم فى ادارة الشئون الدينية وخاصة احوال الزواج، وهذا دليل على الاستغلال السياسى لمكانة الشيوخ وقد كانت تلك المكانة منعزلة وبعيدة عن الحكومة واصبحت الآن بحيث تشجع على الشيوخ ان يصرحوا بأرائهم السياسية ويطالبوا بنظام اجتماعى يضمن تحقيق الحياة الدينية.

ولقد كان وحيد هاشم ابرز القادة المسلمين الذين ظهروا فى أواخر عهد الاحتلال اليابانى، ويبدو أنه كان يريد ألا تضع الفرصة دون استغلالها لبناء صفوف المسلمين وتنظيمها فى إطار الرؤية المستقبلية لاندونيسيا المستقلة، وكان وضعه كنجل لشيخ أكبر المعاهد التراثية وأشهرها فى جاوه يجعله واسع النفوذ ذا علاقة وثيقة بالشيوخ فى جاوه كلها، فكان أحق زعيم يستطيع أن يواجه المناورات اليابانية، وأصبح خريج المعاهد التراثية التى تم تجديدها رؤساء لماشومى فى المناطق الفرعية مع رئاسة الشيوخ الذين عرفهم للمكاتب الفرعية للشئون الدينية، وتم كذلك إعداد (قوات) حزب الله للثورة على اليابان.

وبعد الإعلان عن استقلال اندونيسيا كانت وزارة الشئون الدينية (شوموبو وشوموكا سابقا) ومجلس شورى المسلمين (سيتم إعادة تنظيمه) وكذلك قوات حزب الله (سيتم ضم بعض افرادها إلى القوات المسلحة الاندونيسية) كل ذلك يمثل قواعد انطلاقا لزعماء المسلمين أن يسهموا بدور فى مسرح السياسة الاندونيسية، وذلك هو احدى الخدمات التى جاد بها زعماء الاسلام فى مواجهتهم للاحتلال العسكرى اليابانى.

Introduction

During the course of the Second World War, Japan occupied the lands which constitute the present Indonesia, from whence it conscripted forced labor, and commandeered rice and other materials to further Japanese war efforts. One of the most important tasks for the Japanese military was to propagandize Japan's war aims, i.e. to build 'the Greater East Asia', and to win over its inhabitants to its side. In this strategy, Islamic policy was pivotal since more than ninety percent of the inhabitants of Indonesia were Muslims. Soon after the war, the Dutch intelligence agency wrote a report concerning Islam during the Japanese occupation, in which it was pointed out that "Japan made use of religion, especially *kyai*'s great influence over people."¹ *Kyais* are religious teachers who usually keep a *pesantren* (traditional Islamic boarding school) in rural areas in Java, and they never appeared on the political scene during the Dutch colonial period. The Dutch authorities, who had to withdraw from Indonesia for three and a half years, were seriously concerned when they realized what changes this Japanese Islamic policy had wrought.

In this field of study Harry J. Benda's work² is well-known and is still esteemed as the most valuable even though his research was conducted more than 40 years ago. Benda concluded that Islamic leaders were more affected by the Japanese occupation than any other group such as nationalists and *priyayi* (bureaucrats), and that they came to develop their bargaining power in the political arena, from which they were largely isolated under the Dutch colonial administration, and that they gained political power as a result of the Japanese mobilization policy during the war, which greatly influenced the direction of Indonesian politics after independence. Benda approached this problem with regard to the development of Islam, presenting three points which still provide inspiration for those studying Indonesian Islam. First, he emphasized the dynamism of Islam, and said that *santri* (pious Muslim) civilization was more developed in Java when Japan surrendered, than it was before the war. Secondly, he showed that the Japanese military realized the influence of *kyai* and *ulama*,³ and regarded 'the traditionalist Muslims' as more important than 'the modernist Muslims'⁴ because they did indeed have great potential in rural societies. Benda himself also rated their role highly. Thirdly, he pointed out that Islamic leaders had consistently demanded the establishment of social institutions or systems enabling Muslims to practice *syariat* (Muslim law) in every day life, since the Dutch colonial period.

Since Benda's work gained its considerable reputation, we have had very few academic publications in this field⁵ until Kurasawa published her Ph.D. thesis,⁶ in which she succeeded in adding to existing knowledge by finding actual cases of *latihan kyai* (courses for *kyai*) and in showing how the Japanese military tried to make use of *kyai* as a bridge between the military government and Javanese peasants. It must be remembered that the maneuvering of *kyai* was the core of Japanese Islamic policy, and *latihan kyai* was the longest project of training courses and also the most important in that it was expected to expand "its influence over the whole population".⁷ Kurasawa questioned Benda's assertion of the existence of a Japanese 'divide and rule' policy among Indonesian elites, and emphasized that Japan tried to unite them in order to proceed with the war, and that the *priyayi*'s role in the administration was not replaced by Islamic groups. In this respect Kurasawa's assertion is right, however, the point at issue seems not quite that raised by Benda. Benda attached great importance to the fact that the gateway to the political stage was firstly opened for Islamic leaders and they gained an influential voice therein; he recognized that the role played by them or that expected by Japan was different from that of other elites.

The present author also wishes to study the period of the Japanese occupation from the point of view of the development of Islam. This article will endeavor to focus on how Indonesian Muslims reacted to or against Japanese propaganda; it will also try to find out how they visualized the future of Muslim society, on the supposition that they based their actions on their own visions. Benda could not describe these problems of Muslim self-direction thoroughly enough because of the limited materials available in his day. My treatment of this topic is based on materials written by Islamic leaders, and Japanese documents of the time, and is limited in scope to Java, where Japanese Islamic Policy was most thoroughly carried out and Muslim movements were specifically developed.

Before the Occupation: Japanese Islamic Propaganda and Indonesian Muslim Movements

The Beginning of the Manipulation of Muslims

It was in the mid-thirties, only a few years before Japan landed in Indonesia (called the Dutch East Indies at that time) that Japan first turned her eyes to Muslim territories. With the front in China dead-

locked after the China Incident, and also stimulated by the Chinese Muslim movements, Japan began to pay attention to Muslims. Furthermore, almost at the same time Nanshin (southward advancement) fever grew gradually in Japan and as Nanshin policy came to be increasingly supported, preparations were made for the coming invasion of Muslim countries.

First, several Japanese, supported by the army, were sent to the Middle East to study Islam or to perform a pilgrimage.⁸ They were expected to grasp the situation in the Muslim world, and moreover to become mediators between Japan and Muslims. Second, some events were held to attract Muslim sympathy to Japan. For example, a mosque was built in Tokyo and 45 Muslim delegates from abroad, including a prince of Yemen attended its inauguration ceremony in May, 1938.⁹ Furthermore, an Islamic exhibition was held in Tokyo and Osaka. 41 Muslim guests who were largely from China and Central Asia were invited to it, and were requested to attend a Muslim conference at the same time (November 1939).¹⁰ Third, Dai-Nippon Kaikyô Kyôkai (the Greater Japanese Islam Association) was founded with the support of the army in September 1938. The fact that General Hayashi Senjûrô was installed as its president made it clear that this association was not a purely religious one, but was meant to further the strategy of the forthcoming military occupation of Muslim regions. According to its bulletin, its activities were to promote fraternity and trade with Muslim areas, to undertake research and cultural propagation, to train staff and to support and contact various Islamic organizations. It emphasized the need of a Muslim policy to further Japan's southward development and clearly its purpose was to contribute to the Nanshin policy.¹¹ The above mentioned Islamic exhibition was organized by this association.

Furthermore, full-scale Islamic studies began in Japan, although late in the day. Kaikyôken Kenkyûjo (the Institute of Islamic Studies) was newly established and other existing institutes also set up a section specializing in Islamic studies. Enormous energy was spent in order to understand Islam. As for Islam in Indonesia, a number of articles appeared just after Japan finally turned to the Nanshin policy in 1939. However, as far as can be ascertained from the above mentioned work, it should be concluded that what Japan knew about Indonesian Muslims was rather limited before the invasion. Islamic studies had just begun and were still in the process of gathering basic knowledge. Very few referred to the influence of *kyais*, to whom

great importance was attached during the occupation. It is almost impossible to hit on an idea to make use of *kyai* without first obtaining deep insight into Javanese Muslim society. Furthermore, Japan directed attention to Muslim movements only because it vaguely understood they represented one type of nationalist movement, not caring about religious aspects. Therefore, this pre-war Japanese attempt to influence Muslims was sympathetic towards movements opposed to Western colonialism rather than to Islam as such.

Indonesian Muslim Movements before the War

Before we look into the Indonesian Muslims' reaction to Japanese propaganda, we should assess the situation of Muslim movements before the war. In Indonesia there were two large religious organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, Renaissance of 'ulamâ'). Muhammadiyah was a reformist or modernist movement, founded in Yogyakarta in 1912 and developing mainly in cities, with its activities concentrated on religion, education and social welfare. On the other hand, NU was founded in 1926 and was an association of 'ulamâ' who defended the authority of the four orthodox *madhhab* (school of law). So NU is usually considered as a 'traditionalist' movement. Contrary to Muhammadiyah, NU was based in rural areas, but was not yet organized well and was influential only in East Java. These two displayed competing religious doctrines, but neither of them was involved in politics. Moreover, there were several other Islamic organizations which were concerned with political issues. The most vociferous was Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII, Indonesian Islamic Union Party). This was continuation of Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association), which had once been a great vehicle for Indonesian nationalist activity but split repeatedly, then declined into a small political party without any mass support. However, PSII was trying to make an impression with its determined noncooperation policy towards the Dutch government.

When Japan began to pay attention to Muslim areas in the mid-thirties, Muslim movements in Indonesia had come to a turning point. Firstly, the rivalry between Muhammadiyah and NU was declining, not only because of the personal appeal of Kyai Haji Hasyim Asy'ari, the supreme leader of NU, but also because of the tense situation both inside and outside the country. They turned their eyes from conflict among Muslims themselves to the common issues. The most serious problem was the interference with Muslim law made by the

Dutch colonial government with the renewal of marriage laws in 1937. Furthermore, trials concerning problems of inheritance were transferred from *raad agama* (Muslim law courts) to *landraad* (secular courts). Faced with this crisis, Islamic organizations convened and decided to protest in unison, and the Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia (MIAI, Supreme Indonesian Council of Islam) was founded in Surabaya in September, 1937. MIAI tried to unite all Muslim political efforts, and organized Kongres Al-Islam/Kongres Muslimin Indonesia (the Indonesian Muslims' Conference) where various religious problems were discussed and action was decided on. MIAI declared support for the Palestinian Muslims, and also demanded that the Dutch government aid Indonesian pilgrims stranded in Mecca in returning to Indonesia in 1941. Moreover MIAI joined the federation of political parties, Gabungan Politik Indonesia (the Political Federation of Indonesia), founded in 1939, and spoke and acted together with the other members, on various political issues such as the establishment of parliament and conscription.¹² In short, at the time when Islamic groups had just entered the political arena, Japan began its efforts to win Muslims' support.

Now we may see how Indonesian Muslims reacted to Japanese propaganda. Muhammadiyah was invited to the above mentioned inauguration ceremony of the mosque in Tokyo. However, Muhammadiyah declined this invitation for the following reasons as published in its bulletin, "firstly, we the Muhammadiyah did not dare to upset Chinese Muslims by sending a delegation to Japan because the China Incident was not yet resolved; secondly, Muhammadiyah cannot understand what Japan means by this invitation, and would not like to become a propaganda tool of the Japanese government; thirdly, it is difficult to prepare even if Japan invites us in friendship as Muslims and has no other ambitions, because time is so limited".¹³ It seems it was very hard for Muhammadiyah to judge the real intention of Japan. After all, only one Indonesian Muslim attended, and he was an unknown member of Sarekat Sumatera (Sumatran Association).¹⁴ MIAI showed a rather different attitude by appointing three people to the section for organizing relations with foreign countries, at the second congress. Two of them had been to Japan before.¹⁵ The next year MIAI sent a delegation of five members to 'the Muslim Exhibition', but there they were bewildered to see an Indonesian national flag *merah-putih* (red and white) displayed, which was still forbidden by the Dutch East Indies government. They refused to attend 'the World Conference of Muslims', which was held at the same time,¹⁶

showing that they would not easily fall into a propaganda trap.

Some responses to Japanese policy can be found in Indonesian Islamic magazines. In NU's bulletin *Berita Nahdlatul Ulama* (September 1 and September 15, 1938), there appeared an article titled 'The Voice of Japan' which was a translation of Japan's propaganda. It emphasized Japan's respect for Islam and anti-Western tendencies. The editor commented that it was published to obtain an unbiased understanding of the international situation since only voices proclaiming open hatred of Japan had been heard.¹⁷ In Muhammadiyah's bulletin, *Mutiara*, there once appeared an 'anti-Japan' news item in October 1938, mentioning that there was a secret agreement between Japan and Germany to divide the Dutch East Indies.¹⁸ On the other hand in 1940, news of quite a different tone appeared in the same periodical, entitled 'The Japanese Help to Islam'.¹⁹ The situation was changing.

Before the Japanese invasion, Indonesian nationalists advocated Western democracy and tried to gain concessions from the Dutch government by calling for the forming of a common front against Facism. On the other hand, Islamic groups were rather sympathetic to the Axis powers partly because the Palestinian Muslim leader, Amîn al-Husaynî had just gone into exile in Berlin, and also partly because they came to have a vague notion that Japan was benevolent to Islam. It is said that pro-Japanese sentiment prevailed among *pesantren* people just before the war.²⁰ Furthermore, Dutch unwillingness to meet the political demands of Indonesians disappointed even those advocating co-operation.

Formation of Japanese Islamic Policy and MIAI

Abdoel Chamid Ono's Suggestions

Japanese forces landed in Java on March 1, 1942 and immediately began to organize the administration. There were two sections concerned with Muslim affairs in the Japanese military government, Shūmubu (the Religious Affairs Office, Kantor Urusan Agama), and Kaikyô-kôsakuhan (Islam Maneuvering Section) of Beppan (Separated Office). The former was set up at the end of 1941 before the invasion of the 16th army, and on arrival in Java it came under Gunseibu (since August 1942 Gunseikanbu: the Military Administration office), and was in charge of religious administration, propaganda and

the supervision of Muslim leaders. This was something like a continuation of the Dutch colonial *Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken* (Office for Native Affairs), whose Indonesian staff were indeed assigned to this new organization with Japanese officers under Colonel Horie Chozo.²¹

To a large extent the activities of Beppan were still unknown since it was a *bōryaku-kikan* or *tokumu-kikan* (destabilizing organization or intelligence office), and its existence was kept clandestine. The name of *Kaikyō-kōsakuhan* of Beppan cannot be found in the reports made by the Allies' intelligence agents after the war, nor in works dealing with the Japanese occupation of Java, including Benda's. They could not differentiate between the activities of *Kaikyō-kōsakuhan* and those of *Shūmubu* because *Beppan's* organization was not officially announced. *Kaikyō-kōsakuhan* was organized in November 1942 and headed by Captain Maruzaki Yoshio who was a graduate of Nakano school (a school for espionage training), and consisted of intelligence officers and army civilian employees.²² Its tasks were gathering information and political maneuvering. Although the relationship between *Shūmubu* and *Kaikyō-kōsakuhan* was vague enough, the latter was much involved in decision making with regard to Islamic policy. Several Japanese Muslims were assigned to these two sections.²³

Six days after the invasion of Java, Japan issued its first communique declaring her 'respect for religion'. However, the Japanese army did not have any concrete plans to carry out although the importance of an Islamic policy was fully recognized. Thus, they merely made gestures of sympathy towards Islam and tried to attract Muslims' attention. Mosques were issued with papers guaranteeing that as religious buildings, they would not be used for military purposes.²⁴ Some Japanese soldiers' clothing resembled the costume of *haji* (a person who has undertaken a pilgrimage to Mecca) which roused enthusiastic expectations that Japanese Muslims had arrived on Java. Also, Japanese soldiers prayed at mosques.²⁵ On the other hand, their superficial understanding of Islam caused the Japanese to make fundamental errors at the same time. Firstly, Japan forbade the use of foreign languages except Japanese but including Arabic at school.²⁶ Secondly, K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari of Pesantren Tebuireng, the most venerable *kyai* in Java was imprisoned.²⁷ Thirdly, the Japanese enforced *saikereitō*, a salute towards Tokyo with a low bow as a token of obedience to the emperor which marked the commencement of every official Japanese function and which rather resembled one of the

bodily movements of Islamic worship.²⁸ All this provoked resentment of and suspicions against the Japanese among Javanese people.

Harsh criticism of these blunders came from within the Japanese army itself. It was Ono Shinji that criticized the Japanese for their lack of understanding of Javanese Muslims. He had long been resident in Java, had converted to Islam and married a Javanese woman who was from a family of *juru kunci* (tomb guardians) of Sunan Kalijaga, one of the Javanese Islamic saints. He had an Islamic name, Abdoel Chamid, and ran a *toko Jepang* (Japanese shop) near Surabaya. He returned to Japan in December 1942, but five months later, on his way back to Java he was recruited by the army as a civilian employee and was later assigned to Kaikyô-kôsakuhan.²⁹ His views on Islam can be found in his three essays which appeared in two Japanese periodicals.³⁰

Ono said that Muslims in Java sometimes had different customs from those of the Middle East because of a different historical background, but basically they cleaved to the Islamic doctrines. He emphasized that Javanese were also pious Muslims, and denounced those Japanese who did not consider Indonesian Islam worth serious attention.³¹ He explained Muslim affairs in Java, and mentioned just two representative Muslim organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, aptly pointing out that the former influenced the greater number of Javanese Muslims.³² He further introduced *kyai*'s unique life style,³³ and laid emphasis on people's implicit reliance on *kyai*,³⁴ and said, "A *kyai* is like a king and is also a favorite with God, so he lives well and his influence is great regardless of the number of his followers."³⁵ He pointed out the mechanism of Javanese Muslim society which revolves around human relationships. From these essays we can see that Ono had indeed experienced life among Javanese Muslims, and was far more knowledgeable about the Muslim world than any other Japanese Islamic experts.

He suggested the following five points with regard to Islamic policy:

1. Leave the Javanese completely free to believe in their religion, Islam.
2. In the case of conservatives (note; NU), trust a *kyai* entirely because of his popularity and make him a puppet.
3. In the case of progressives (note; Muhammadiyah), set up a Japanese department in their schools.
4. Introduce Japanization by means of military discipline (can be done rapidly).

5. Pay heed to those issues which cause hatred towards infidels (foreigners [sic]).

“For example, give them time for prayer (only ten minutes) and prepare separate tableware for their own use.... If such things can be permitted, they accept employment from foreigners even though they are unbelievers.”³⁶

There are no documents revealing the Japanese military government's reaction to Ono's views. However, considering that no one other than Ono was well informed about the Javanese Muslims, and also that *kyais* were regarded as very important after that, it can be said that his suggestions became a principle guide in the formation of Islamic policy. Ono could mention several famous *kyais* whom he had met.³⁷ In fact NU leaders appealed for help to Ono, who was their old acquaintance, and K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari was released in August 1942.³⁸ Ono's name was still well remembered by *pesantren* people after the war. He was thought to be a key person in the development of Japan's strategy with regard to *kyais*.

In the first period of the occupation, Japan placed stress on selling her policy of 'respect for Islam' and collecting data and information. Shūmubu staff visited Islamic leaders and made speeches at mosques and schools citing phrases from the Qur'ān.³⁹ Moreover, the office organized meetings with *kyais* in each residence from December 1942 until February, 1943, and Ono and other Japanese Muslims accompanied Horie. Arrangements were made to explain Japanese war aims, to call for collaboration, and to hear the local 'ulamā's voice.⁴⁰ In the capital, too, Japan showed its attitude clearly. The supreme commander received Muslim leaders in audience, and K. H. Mas Mansur, Muhammadiyah's chairman, was appointed to a position of *Empat Serangkai* (the four executive staff) of Putera (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat; Center of People's Strength) in December, 1942. Furthermore, it was announced that planning to found an Islamic university and a Muslim library was underway, and the latter actually was set up.⁴¹ As a result Muslims were beginning to be reconciled to Japan.

In the meantime all political parties were dissolved including Islamic organizations. There was still one crucial assignment left for Japan, namely, how to set up a Muslim organization and whom to choose as leaders. It was still difficult for Japan to decide and so as a compromise, the pre-war association MIAI was officially recognized as a representative Muslim union, and was reorganized, mostly by

PSII leaders. Its headquarters were moved from Surabaya to Batavia (Jakarta) in September, 1942. However, after collecting information from Islamic leaders, and also the producing of a research report under the heading *Zen Jawa Kaikyô Jôkyô Chôshasho* (Survey on the Situation of Islam in Java), by Osamushûdan Shireibu (headquarters of the Osamu Group [16th Army]),⁴² in February, 1943, Japan gradually grasped the situation and understood who could play a vital role in her policy. In July 1943 the first *latihan kyai* was started, an indication that Japan had made up her mind to make specific use of *kyais*.

MIAI's Plan for the Ministry of Religious Affairs

How did Muslims see Japanese appeasement? Islamic groups reacted quickly. Shûmubu, to which it was thought Japanese Muslims had been assigned to take care of Muslim affairs, was visited by a flock of Muslim leaders from the beginning of the occupation. As a post-war Dutch report put it "Indonesian officials of mosques, leaders of religious organizations, and a number of Arabs thought it wise to go and pay a visit of respect to their Japanese co-religionists, and to congratulate them on the occasion of the Japanese victories".⁴³ Also in one Japanese document it was recorded "everyday more than a hundred persons came to Shûmubu either as representatives of Muslims or individually, in the expectation that their requests would be accepted".⁴⁴ Among these people the leaders of PSII took the initiative.

On May 7, 1942 MIAI leaders, Wondoamiseno (former chair of PSII), Mas Mansur and Faharuddin al-Hairi (an Arab Indonesian) visited Colonel Horie for discussions. After that these three accompanied Horie to Surakarta and Surabaya. In Surakarta a *pesantren* teacher protested to Horie about the prohibition of the use of the Arabic language in Islamic education, and later he was forced to cancel this ban.⁴⁵ Their journey continued to Surabaya, where a large meeting was held with Muslim leaders in which Horie was introduced by Wondoamiseno.⁴⁶ It was the beginning of Japanese contact with Islamic leaders.

We can follow the movements of Muslims in the first period of the Japanese occupation from the letters written by Wondoamiseno, who began to distinguish himself as a leader of PSII in the 1930's and was one of the Islamic nationalists who insisted on the non-cooperation line before the war. Probably he was captured as a suspected war collaborator after the war and his files were confiscated. They provide the materials I use here.⁴⁷

What Wondoamiseno and his group were thinking can be found in a draft titled "Rentjana: Pendjelasan Permohonan MIAI (Plan: Explanation of the requests of MIAI)". This draft consists of typed papers with memoranda on them and also notes handwritten in pencil. This seems to be a manuscript of request which was going to be submitted to Gunseikanbu. It is not dated, but it can be deduced from the contents, which refer to the meeting with Horie in Jakarta and also to his speech in Surabaya, that this was written at the earliest at the end of May, 1942 or at the latest before the reformation of MIAI in September of that year.

It is clear that Muslims rather welcomed the Japanese policy of 'respect for religion'. At the meeting with Horie MIAI leaders said they were ready to cooperate with the Japanese military. Furthermore, the draft mentioned the desire of *ummat* Islam (the Muslim community) to administer religious affairs themselves. It said, "MIAI would like to tell the head of Shūmubu and Your Excellency, the commander-in-chief of the Japanese military, the problems pertaining to Muslims which have been on our minds during this period" and went on to refer to several issues touching on religious administration, namely, 1. marriage affairs, 2. succession and inheritance matters, 3. mosques, 4. *waqf* (pious endowment), 5. religious education 6. *zakat* (yearly religious tax), 7. Mecca pilgrimage. In each case present difficulties were pointed out, and improvements proposed. The inconvenience concerning marriage affairs caused by the colonial administration system came under particular attack, and demand was made to transfer marriage registration from the supervision of regent (the administrative head of the regency) to an especially designated office. So the need to set up a new *badan oeroesan agama Islam* (a religious office) headed by a Muslim to be appointed by the Japanese Military was stressed. Furthermore, it was proposed that Departemen Agama Islam (a Ministry of Muslim Religious Affairs)⁴⁸ be formed to cover and control the whole spectrum of religious problems relating to the practice of Muslim law. The intention was to establish an institution devoted to Muslim affairs managed by Muslims in the government organization, in short to win autonomy for religious administration.

It cannot be ascertained whether this request was submitted to the Japanese military government. Even if it had been, it was quite impossible for the Japanese to meet this request and to manage to set up within their military government an organization devoted to the

administration of Muslim affairs, not only because Japan had only just arrived in Java, but also because originally Japan had no intention of dealing with such a religious administration.

Perhaps it was after this draft was written that Wondoamiseno sent a letter dated August 6th, 1942, to a colleague of the Pare-pare (South Sulawesi) branch of PSII, in which he displayed a cautious attitude of waiting and seeing what action the Japanese would take. This letter seemed to be written with an eye on the censor since the Japanese Imperial calendar dating was used, and also some sentences which fawned on Japan, for instance, "thanks to the guidance and protection of our big brother Japan...". Nevertheless, we can discern some of his real intentions in it. For example, he said "we, those who have been in Java, have been facing radical changes of the times, from March 8, 2602 (note: 1942) until today, that is, since the Japanese military entered and began to rule our country". He particularly mentioned his shock at seeing the decline in the lives of Dutch people. Moreover, he mentioned the foundation of Persiapan Persatoean Oemmat Islam (the Preparation for the Union of Muslims) led by Abikusno as chairman and Harsono Tjokroaminoto as secretary (both were leaders of PSII), saying that in practical terms it was not yet very active. So he cautiously advised restraint and said, "we PSII members must keep *diam* (silent)".

On the other hand, on the very same date Wondoamiseno wrote a report to a Japanese official named Hashizume of the Gunseikanbu in which he provided information on Islamic organizations in Java. In this he mentioned 15 organizations belonging to MIAI, and explained the specific aims and gave the total number of members and location of the branches of PSII, Muhammadiyah and NU. Naturally, Wondoamiseno provided special details of his own party, PSII, and emphasized that it was a nationwide organization. Clearly he was trying to promote his own party. On the contrary, concerning NU he said, "(compared with Muhammadiyah) NU consisted of people who are illiterate and still fanatical *kyai*, that is to say, not educated yet".

His rather low opinion of NU might have been shared by other Indonesian parties of the time. Also, possibly he tried to distract Japanese attention from NU, for there is still one more letter explaining NU's organization, which is dated one day before the above-mentioned report, and begins with the sentence, "In response to your request, I answer your questions as follows". The addressee is not given, but clearly this letter was written to a Japanese official and

suggests that the Japanese military had inquired specifically about NU. Wondoamiseno and probably the PSII members associated with him pretended to wait and see while they were trying to grasp the initiative for the forthcoming Muslim federation.

It is not certain to what extent Wondoamiseno influenced the Japanese but in the following month of September, MIAI, which had been inactive, was recognized as representative of Indonesian Muslims and began its activities anew. Wondoamiseno was appointed to the chair, with an executive committee largely consisting of other PSII leaders. MIAI's organ *Soeara MIAI* No.1 (January 1943) carried on its last page the party's program, entitled 'MIAI's Aims'.

- a. To safeguard and maintain the dignity and advancement of religion and believers in this world and also in the hereafter.
- b. To build a new society among Muslims which can maintain peace and order, and also the prosperity of community life.
- c. To improve all matters of vital importance to believers, namely,
 1. Marriage affairs
 2. Succession and inheritance matters
 3. Mosques
 4. Religious endowments
 5. Payment of religious tithes
 6. Instruction and education
 7. Publicity and propaganda
 8. Social affairs (aid)
 9. Mecca pilgrimage
- d. Under Japanese guidance to work together with all our might for Greater Asia.

Of these items a. and b. were expressions of the basic ideology of the Muslim organization. What attracts our attention is the contents of clause c items which show concrete demands, and are closely correlated with the above mentioned Wondoamiseno's draft. It can be said that point d. was mere diplomatic language to soothe Japan, and MIAI was expecting to attain its initial goals.

No documents show whether MIAI tried to set up an office for religious affairs in the government body. On the contrary, Shūmubu sometimes bypassed MIAI, and contacted *kyai* and *ulama* directly.⁴⁰ Since MIAI was rather made light of by Japan, MIAI tried to assert its existence. The *bayt al-mâl* (Islamic treasury) campaign might be the first and the last trial to realize its ideal although its designed function was limited to collecting religious tithes and aiding poor people with

the proceeds. *Soeara MIAI* spared a larger space for the *bait al-mâl* campaign from February 1943. The MIAI executives succeeded in setting up *bait al-mâl* in more than half of the regencies on Java, and tried to organize a network among them, that is, to take over a part of the religious administration.⁵⁰ However, the Japanese anticipated this and the project was forced to cease. Japan had already more or less grasped the Islamic situation in Java and was intending to discard the rather useless MIAI headed by its PSII leaders, and to found a new Muslim federation instead.

Politicalization of *Kyai*

Development of Strategy towards Kyais

After concentrating on promoting Japanese war aims and spending over one and a half years in understanding the Muslim situation, the Japanese recognized that “(*kyais* and ‘*ulamâ*’) have not only religious, but also to some extent, local political influence.”⁵¹ The military government started various projects aimed at *kyai* to make use of their influence. Shūmubu was in charge of this task, and in preparation for it, its office was twice reorganized and enlarged in October 1943 and July 1944. At the same time its head was changed to symbolize its reorganization. Horie’s successor, Hoesain Djajadiningrat was from a famous *priyayi* family of Banten, West Java. He was a protege of the late Snouck Hurgronje, a Dutch Islamologist, and the first Indonesian to win a Ph.D. (in Oriental History) from Leiden University. He was also the first non-Japanese to occupy a vital position in the military government. However, he was brought up in a Western milieu, and was isolated from Islamic leaders.⁵² In that sense, the installment of K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari as the third head of Shūmubu showed how importantly *kyai* were regarded. However, naturally the position was merely symbolic and for all practical purposes Shūmubu was controlled by the Japanese. After August or September 1942, Japanese projects touching on their Islamic policy were roughly divided into four categories, i.e. unification of Muslim organizations, training, recruitment of manpower (laborers and soldiers), and propaganda activities.

First, in November 1943 Japan founded a new Muslim federation, *Madjelis Sjoera Moeslimin Indonesia* (Masjoemi, or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) in place of MIAI. The preceding

official recognition of Muhammadiyah and NU foreshadowed the new foundation. K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari was installed as chair of Masyumi, but in practice Mas Mansur (Muhammadiyah), Wahid Hasyim (Hasjim Asy'ari's son, NU), Zainul Arifin (NU) and Anwar Tjokroaminoto (PSII) were in charge of the practical administrative affairs of the body. Later these four leaders were named 'collaborators' in the Dutch intelligence report,⁵³ an indication of their apparent close connection with the Japanese military government. In April, 1944, Shūmuka (a local religious office) was installed in each residency government, and influential *kyais* or 'ulamâ' were appointed to this office in each area. Through these local offices Shūmubu would come into close contact with local Muslims, on the other hand the supervision of religious administration was trusted to the Islamic leaders.⁵⁴ Shūmuka were linked to branches of Masjoemi, and thus Masjoemi could begin their involvement in local government.⁵⁵ *Kyais* or 'ulamâ', who were isolated from political authority during the Dutch colonial era were thus brought into in the process of administration.

Another project produced local staff needed at the lowest level of Masyumi to enforce its organization. As mentioned before, in July, 1943 *latihan kyai* started. This was intended to re-educate *kyais* and to make them pro-Japanese, and they were expected to convey Japanese wishes and intentions to the local inhabitants. "The Japanese thought that such a course was like a mirror in which people's lives was reflected".⁵⁶ This project lasted for almost two years, the longest of all, and the training course was held seventeen times so that more than one thousand students were trained. Candidates were recommended not only by each resident government but also sometimes by local branches of Masyumi because more or less local, influential *kyais* or 'ulamâ' had relations with Islamic organizations which were under the influence of Masyumi. NU members were especially dominant amongst those attending. Many of the *kyais* and 'ulamâ' who completed this training were appointed to Shūmuka offices.⁵⁷ Besides this, *latihan guru madrasah* (training for Islamic schools' teachers) was organized with young Muslim leaders as its target. However, it was held only two or three times.⁵⁸

Until that time Japan depended much on Islamic leaders, especially in the mobilization of manpower. In October, 1943 Pembela Tanah Air (PETA, Fatherland Defense Force), an Indonesian unit, was organized to reinforce the Japanese military, which was sorely needed by Japan. This force was under Indonesian command, and

the sons of influential *kyais* were recruited and appointed as battalion commanders.⁵⁹ Furthermore, in February 1945, a Muslim army Hizbullah (the Ranks of God), was founded, composed of Muslim youths, mainly *santri* (pupils) from *pesantren* under the guidance of Masyumi. Zainul Arifin became the commander-in-chief, and about twenty *kyais* were involved in training, including Wahid Hasjim.⁶²

As for propaganda, *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, Masyumi's organ, was published every month to bring home to people the significance of the war and to win their co-operation. Besides this, a twice monthly magazine *Assjoe'lah*, which was written in Indonesian in Arabic script, was published from (?), 1944.⁶¹ It was expected that the message would be further carried through *kyai* to the people. To facilitate this task, religious teachers were allowed to "give guidance more than scriptural instruction to people," (January, 1944)⁶² that is, to provide political instruction. In this way *kyais* were indeed changing into local politicians.

Muslims' Demands to the Japanese Military Government

Benda regarded the Japanese Islamic policy thus, "Nippon (Japan), then would not make Indonesia a Muslim State, but it would bequeath to its successors a more truly Islamic Java, a Java closer to the ideals of the *santri* civilization, than had existed in March 1942".⁶³ However, many of the Japanese policies towards Muslims seem to have been suggested by Indonesian Muslims themselves, indicating that the Japanese side more or less grasped what Indonesian Muslims desired.

I have not yet found any documents which provide evidence of exchanges between Japanese and Indonesians, nevertheless there is one record that testifies that Japanese policy was not always a one way process. That is, *Jawa Gunsei-ka ni Okeru Kaikyôto Kôsaku Jôkyô* (The situation regarding the manipulation of Muslims in Java under the military government), written by a certain Miyamoto Hideo. This is a hand-written document, dated February, *Shôwa* 19 (1944). Miyamoto was a member of Dai Nihon Kaikyô Kyôkai, and he was rather critical in his report, of Japanese policy towards Islam.⁶⁴ One part of this document describes the demands Indonesian Muslims submitted to Japan. They were made at the above mentioned meeting with *kyais* which were held throughout Java from December 1942 to March, 1943, or through Japanese Muslims of *Kaikyô Kôsakuhan*. This part was titled, "Muslims' requests directed towards the military government,"⁶⁵ and first, Miyamoto explains several problems

arising from the Japanese inability with the Indonesian language or difference of customs. For example, Japan ordered those who worked in the government to doff their headwear, but Indonesian Muslims resisted because religious propriety demanded they wear the *topi* (Muslim hat). Also it was protested that in newspapers the honorific title *nabi* (the prophet) was omitted before the name of Muhammad. After these introductory paragraphs, Miyamoto itemized 98 requests.

He classified these into two categories, namely, 'requests concerning instruction in collaborating to prosecute the war' (13 items) and 'zeal for the furthering of religion' (85 items). The former demanded information and explanations concerning the war situation, and was rather vague about what was really intended, indicating, perhaps, that these requests were submitted only to show an opportunistic pro-Japanese attitude. On the contrary, the latter consisted of concrete and practical requests, so they were more realistic or serious. It was not written when, where and from whom these requests were submitted. So it may be rather difficult to treat them evenly since the requests varied, depending on the time, situation and the position of the supplicants. However, the requests listed in 'zeal for the furthering of religion' have nothing to do with the war effort, and are frank opinions in which the Japanese bias is hardly recognized. Therefore, we are able to see through these requests what Muslims really desired.

Miyamoto again classified those 85 items into 12 categories; 'affairs of religious teachers' (5 items), 'religious educational affairs' (9), 'propagation and propaganda' (3), 'the enlargement of *kyai*'s influence' (28), 'requests on administration affairs' (12), 'the Friday issue' (1), 'training for youth' (1), 'religious publications' (3), 'religious administration affairs' (7), 'issues concerning religious policy' (6), 'problems of national development' (6), 'problems that need reconciliation' (4). The number of items does not always reflect their seriousness, nor the urgency of the problem. However, demands concerning the position and activities of *kyais* can be found in another 6 items beside 'affairs of religious teachers' and 'the enlargement of *kyai*'s influence', so requests concerning *kyais* occupy more than 40 percent of the total. Partly this was caused by the fact that this information was gained through meetings with *kyais* or through influential individual *kyai*. Even so, what attracts our attention is that most of the requests listed in 'the enlargement of *kyai*'s influence' can virtually be categorized into 'religious administration affairs'. For example, "Oust prostitutes from the cities and villages", "Mosque fund should be

used for relief”, “Allow public servants to attend Friday prayers”, “Equate the position of *kyais* with Christian preachers”, etc. Probably Miyamoto interpreted these requests as the way in which *kyai* demanded administrative competence or a sort of authority of supervision. This view suggests that *kyais* engaged in political discourse with the Japanese, and gives us rather a different image of *kyais* from that of the Dutch colonial period, when *kyais* were informal leaders of the Muslim society and proud of not being involved in politics. However, viewed from another perspective, it shows how *kyais* were frustrated by the colonial administration of religious affairs, and that channels for expressing their opinions were completely denied to them.

On the other hand, demands which directly concerned the Japanese Islamic policy were listed in ‘problems that need reconciliation’ like; “The Japanese military government and native officials (note: regent) are required to learn Islam”. “*Saikeirei* is quite anti-Islam”, “Regulations on saluting should be relaxed”, and “The salute of Muslim students should be altered in an Islamic way”. These demands show how frustrated Muslims were because of the Japanese lack of understanding of Islam, and also how they felt repelled by the enforcement of militaristic customs. As mentioned before, *saikeirei* caused an especially bitter denouncement, and is still remembered as a symbol of the Japanese lack of sympathy towards Islam. Furthermore, practical demands were made like; “Oil should be provided for Islamic lectures”, and “White cotton should be provided for winding sheets”; “Rises in prices and difficulties of obtaining commodities should be regulated” which had, in fact, nothing to do with religious affairs, but together with the above mentioned demands testify that people were suffering from hardships caused by the Japanese occupation. Discontent with the military government was rising.

If we analyze these 85 items according to the above-mentioned classification of religious administration affairs which appeared in the ‘MIAI’s aims’, we can see that although some redundancies cannot be avoided, two items belong to ‘marriage affairs’, one to ‘succession and inheritance matters’, seven to ‘mosques (including religious officials)’, two to ‘payment of religious tithes’, 14 to ‘instruction and education’, six to ‘publicity and propaganda’, four to ‘social affairs (aid)’, 31 to other general religious administration affairs, 15 to problems concerning the position of *kyais*, and 13 other political demands which were brought about specifically under the Japanese occupation. In these demands, the first two categories account for only a few items, but strong demands had

earlier been made that “exemption from marriage registration fee” and “trials of succession and inheritance matters be transferred back to *sōryō-hōin* (*raad agama*: Muslim law courts)”. Demands were also made concerning ‘instruction and education’; “Improvement of facilities of *pesantren* and religious schools”, “non-religious education at *pesantren* and religious schools”, “religious education at national schools”, reflecting the trend towards innovation in religious education. As for general religious administration affairs, “exemption from slaughtering tax on the feast day of sacrifice”, “the Friday off issue”, and “fixing of the beginning and the end of the fast: who should determine it, the government or Muslims?” were listed. These were problems which would inevitably occur in a Muslim society. In summing up these demands, it can safely be said that what Muslims desired or demanded was the formation of a new social system which would enable and secure the practice of Muslim law, that is to say, a better organization of the religious affairs administration. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the formation of a new office, which would take charge of religious administration was expected. The demand said, “an institution dealing with Muslim affairs should be set up in each residency, government office or city hall”, implying a local religious office, as was suggested in the above mentioned MIAI’s request. Here again the idea of forming *shūmuka*, a local branch of *Shūmubu*, was suggested by Muslims themselves.

Some of the above mentioned requests were met by the Japanese military government. *Saikeirei* was not enforced any longer from October, 1943(?), the slaughtering tax on the feast day of sacrifice was exempted in December 1943, *shūmuka*, was set up in April, 1944, the introduction of Friday afternoons off was begun in May 1944, the Qur’ān was printed in June, 1945. Besides all this, in September, 1943, a special distribution was made on the occasion of the celebration marking the end of *Ramadān* (the fasting month) and a subsidy was provided to Islamic schools, *Almanak Jawa Baroe* (a Muslim calendar) was printed in late 1943(?), and finally in July, 1945 a Muslim assembly hall *Balai Moeslimin Indonesia* was opened and a Muslim university was set up. Thus Japan tried hard to appease Muslims. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that wearing a hat is a religious custom, and also that fresh consideration should be given to the Japanese habit of beating because it was quite alien to Javanese.⁶⁶ This might indicate that the Japanese had a deeper appreciation of Islam, but it is more precise to say that there was no other course open to Japan save to yield to Muslims’ demands. The worsening of the military situa-

tion caused enormous difficulties, and Japan depended more and more on Muslims' collaboration in the civil administration, conscription of laborers and the commandeering of rice paddies.

Wahid Hasjim and Masyumi, Shūmuka, Hizbullah

After the proclamation of independence, three organizations, which were created or formed during the Japanese occupation, became the basis for Muslims' political voice in Indonesian society: Masyumi, Shūmubu, and shūmuka (the forerunner of the Ministry of Religious Affairs) and Hizbullah.⁶⁷ Wahid Hasyim was the Islamic leader involved in these three organizations. Benda called him "perhaps the most prominent representative of Indonesian Islam at the close of the Japanese era".⁶⁸ Who was this Wahid Hasyim, who was regarded as the leader of Indonesian Muslims when he was only about thirty years old?

As mentioned before, Wahid Hasyim was a son of K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari, the supreme leader of NU. He was born in Jombang, East Java in 1914 and was educated at his father's Pesantren Tebuireng. He did not undergo what is called formal education, but he taught himself to become familiar enough with Western tongues to be able to read Dutch and English. Later he went to Mecca and studied there (1932-33). After his return to Java, he formed a *madrasah* (Islamic school with Western-style instruction) at Tebuireng, and introduced secular subjects, including the Indonesian language to a *pesantren* where previously only religious subjects had been taught. He edited an educational magazine, *Suluh Nahdlatul Ulama* (The Torch of NU), and in the *pesantren* milieu he was known as an innovator of *pesantren* education. At the end of the 1930's, about 1,500 *santris* were studying at Pesantren Tebuireng where newspapers and magazines written in Indonesian, Arabic and Dutch could be read. Wahid Hasyim himself subscribed to these, but this was out of the ordinary in a setting where ordinarily the only field of study was religious works in Arabic. He had led not only NU, but also its youth organization Ansor (Helper) since before the war, and he served as chairman of MIAI from September 1940 for one year. During the Japanese occupation, he successively held various posts in the military government, such as member of Chuo Sangi-in (Central Advisory Council, October 1943), vice-chairman of Masyumi (November 1943), member of the Central Office of Jawa Hōkōkai (People's Service Association on Java, March, 1944), and an adviser of Shūmubu (July 1944?).⁶⁹ The

above-mentioned Ono seems to have been in close contact with Wahid Hasyim. On the Indonesian side, it was thought of Ono that "his task was to accompany or (to be more precise) to follow Wahid Hasyim like a shadow",⁷⁰ in a Dutch document after the war it was recorded that "Wahid Hasyim was a secretary of Ono".⁷¹

As usual, with a son of a *kyai*, Wahid Hasyim was called 'Gus Wahid', and was well known among the pesantren people. Not much is known about Gus Wahid's activities during the Japanese occupation, and it is hard to confirm whether some of them are fact or fiction. As far as I can tell, he himself did not leave any records about this period although he was an excellent writer. His essays appeared sporadically in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, but naturally he could not express his opinions frankly under the threat of the censorship of the military government. We can only ascertain some part of his thought through people who had contact with him. Saifuddin Zuhri was one of these, and he recorded some of Wahid Hasyim's words of this time in his autobiographies.⁷² According to Saifuddin Zuhri, Wahid Hasjim possessed a FIAT and drove it himself.⁷³ He was very active and contacted many people. He always gained much information and he also sent his opinions about the situation to many *kyais*. Saifuddin Zuhri was one of the *santris* who worked as his messengers. Some confusion of time and memory are found in these books, but they still prove useful material for investigating how Wahid Hasyim tried to deal with the Japanese occupation.

First, concerning the collaboration with Japan, when he was asked if his principle was to help Japan, he said, "...In any struggle mutual deception goes on. ...Among *santris* 'Nippon' which is the Japanese pronunciation, must be pronounced 'Nippong'. It means *nipu wong* (in Javanese: to deceive a person). They say they want to liberate us from Dutch colonialism. Probably it's true we shall not be colonized by Holland again, but they don't tell us whether we will become independent or if they will colonize us after we are freed from Holland. This is just a deception. Why don't we deceive them?".⁷⁴ Then he answered the question, "Our principle is to help ourselves. We help ourselves through opportunities which they give us. Possibly, they will make use of us as their tool. But we are not silent tools. What is important is to use opportunities which they give us, as much as possible...".⁷⁵ Indeed Japan badly needed Indonesians' help, so he thought this was a good chance to become free from colonialism.

As for concrete strategy, he seemed to have an idea concerning an

organization to mobilize people. He observed that Pergerakan 3 A (the Triple-A Movement)⁷⁶ did not succeed because of the lack of popular support. He said, "If a new body is formed, we will ask Japan, or to be precise, we will persuade Japan to form an organization specifically consisting of members of *ummat Islam*".⁷⁷ He was designing an Islamic Union before MIAI was formed.

He had more to say about the creation of *shūmuka*. "...*Hadhratus Syaikh* (Hasjim Asy'ari) and I have been asked to form Kantor Jawatan Agama Pusat (the Central Office for Religious Affairs; *Shūmubu*). I have already offered my opinion to *Saikō-shikikan* (the Supreme Commander) that it is impossible if local branches of that office are not created throughout Java and Madura. My opinion was accepted by Japan..."⁷⁸ He admitted that he himself suggested the creation of *shūmuka* in each residency. Moreover, he had suggested appointing '*ulamā*' to head them, i.e., *shūmukachō*, because they would take charge of religious affairs and there were no Islamic experts other than '*ulamā*'. He continued his words with a note of some relief, "I feel grateful that we have brought innovation into the *pesantren* system before. ...As you know, many years ago, we organized the learning of reading and writing of Latin letters, the Indonesian language, geography, Indonesian history, and arithmetic. Afterwards, other *pesantren* followed this. *Santris* who have graduated from Tebuireng have been scattered. This will certainly make our efforts to form local offices of religious affairs easier".⁷⁹ He foresaw and expected that graduates of the reformed *pesantrens* would be appointed to *shūmuka* offices, apparently thinking that *Shūmubu* and *Masyumi* would uphold a stable network of local *shūmuka* which were occupied by *kyais* and '*ulamā*', or their disciples.

Furthermore, with regard to the formation of Hizbullah, Saifuddin Zuhri was by chance present when Ono visited Wahid Hasyim at *Saikō-shikikan*'s request. At first, the Japanese military demanded that *santris* youth should also join Heiho (the Auxiliary Forces), but Wahid Hasyim submitted another opinion and asked Japan to give military training to Indonesian youths. He answered, "... Entrust national defence to the sons of the homeland, while Japanese soldiers here should be sent to the war front and to face the Allied Forces".⁸⁰ He also suggested to Japan, through Ono, that a Hizbullah especially for *santri* youth like PETA should be formed. Ono accepted this offer, requested a detailed plan from him.⁸¹ According to Saifuddin Zuhri, Wahid Hasyim kept in mind the idea that this military training for

santris would be a part of the preparations for an insurrection against Japan.⁸² *Pesantrens* were changed into the headquarters of Hizbullah.⁸³

According to the Japanese survey, there were 18,466 religious teachers who were called *kyais* or 'ulamâ' in Java.⁸⁴ There may be some exaggeration in Saifuddin Zuhri's account. However, as a son of Tebuireng which was amongst the first of the *pesantren*, Wahid Hasyim had a close relationship with many influential *kyais*, and he was in a position to gather information and mobilize manpower by using the *pesantren* network. Was there any other leader who was more capable of recruiting persons for Masyumi, Shūmuka and Hizbullah than Wahid Hasyim? Clearly he aimed at organizing *ummat* politically, administratively and militarily. He reacted to the Japanese occupation with his own prospects for the future Indonesian Muslim society, that would be independent and self-determined *ummat*.

Conclusions

The Japanese military landed in Indonesia in the guise of sympathizers towards Islam. Its Islamic policy was one of the measures required to keep peace and order in Indonesia, and also to obtain materials and labor. The Japanese obtained knowledge of Islam by contacting Muslims directly, so much manipulation of Muslims took place, largely in the latter half of the occupation. However, faced with such a situation, Islamic leaders tried to take advantage of the opportunities offered them. The leaders of PSII took the first initiatives and succeeded in grasping the leadership of MIAI, a Muslim federation. They tried to deal with the Japanese with expectations of autonomy of religious administration, and failed. On the other hand, the NU leaders perceived the falseness of the Japanese military government, and won considerable concessions by seeing its weaknesses. The most significant result of their bargaining was the establishment of shūmuka, which was an indispensable and long desired office for better religious administration. Wahid Hasyim and other leaders were laying the foundations of the future Muslim society. As a result of this process, *kyais*, who had been thought not to be involved in government affairs, were politicized, and traditionalist Islamic leaders assumed considerable political power.

They took independent action beyond Japanese expectations. Not only Japanese but also other Indonesian politicians and Dutch colo-

nial who had long dominated Indonesia, had failed to perceive their political ability. Van der Plas, an experienced Dutch colonial bureaucrat, famous as an expert in Indonesian Islam before the war, could not give appropriate advice any longer after he left Indonesia. When he came back to Java with the Allied Army, he was unable to deal with the new situation and fell short of the Dutch government's expectations.⁸⁵ This testifies to how radical a change took place during those three and a half years.

After the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence, Masyumi was reorganized into a political party, and became a foothold from which Muslims could speak out in politics. Although Masyumi split repeatedly after that, it offered a parent organization from which new Muslim parties developed. Hizbullah was also reformed and played a role in the revolution, and later, many of its personnel joined the national armed forces. Shūmubu and shūmuka became the Ministry of Religious Affairs and its local offices, and when Wahid Hasyim was its minister (1950-1952), the organization became innovative and the long desired dream was finally realized. Later its name was changed into the Department of Religious Affairs, and it has continued to develop to the present day. It is a most unusual administrative office to find in a non-Islamic state, and it safeguards people's religious life.

As for *kyais*, some obtained positions in Muslim law courts or in religious offices, others went back to the *pesantrens*. However, those established as before in villages were now also expected to serve as bridges between the central NU and the villagers, as NU consolidated its organization. In the first half of the 1950's, an American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, observed *kyai's* activities in explaining the policies of the NU along with religious preaching. Geertz pointed out that *kyais*, whose main role was once to transmit the great traditions of Islam to the Javanese peasantry, were also expected to play the role of local activists.⁸⁶ Although Geertz did not refer to it specifically, the seeds of the changing role of *kyais* were firstly planted in the Japanese occupation policy which regarded *kyais* as potential local politicians.

In modern Indonesia, the rivalry between the government and Muslims has in a sense advanced. When the government, realizing Muslim potential, tried to win them over to its side, the Muslims reacted independently. Arguing from this, we can see that the three-and-a-half years of the Japanese occupation was the time during which that process developed most dynamically.

Notes:

1. Soeria Santosa, Maj. R.S. "De Japansche propaganda en de Islam", *Nota van het Politiek Bureau, Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch*, 2 February 1946, p. 1.
2. Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun; Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-45* (The Hague and Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1958). In this article I use the reprint from Foris Publications Holland, 1983.
3. 'Ulamâ' is an Arabic loan word which means a scholar of religious sciences in Islam. *Kyais* are grouped under 'ulamâ', but they are especially engaged in religious education. In practice *kyai* is a title given to an 'ulamâ' who is highly respected by the surrounding people. However, there are no clear criteria which apply. Probably because of this the Japanese military often used these terms together without differentiation.
4. Concerning the difference between 'modernist' and 'traditionalist', see discussion below.
5. Only the following has given a rough sketch of Indonesian Islam in this period: R. de Bruin, *Islam en Nationalisme in door Japan Bezet Indonesie 1942-1945* (s-Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1982).
6. Kurasawa Aiko, "Mobilization and Control; A Study of Social Change in Rural Java, 1942-1945", Ph.D. (Cornell University, 1988).
The Japanese edition is *Nihon Senryô-ka nô Jawa Nôson no Henryô* (Tokyo: Sôshi-sha, 1992). The Indonesian edition is: *Mobilisasi dan Kontrol; Studi tentang Perubahan Sosial di Pedesaan Jawa 1942-1945* (Jakarta: Rasindo, 1993).
7. C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, *What the Japanese did to Islam in Java, Batavia, May, 1947* (unpublished, p. 13).
8. Kobayashi Tetsuo (Omar Faisar), who was later engaged in Islamic policy in Sulawesi, was sent to Cairo, and Suzuki Tsuyoshi (Muhammad Saleh) who also worked in Java during the war, was sent to Mecca. Concerning their experiences see: Kobayashi Tetsuo, *Indoneshia no Kaikyô* [Islam in Indonesia] (Tokyo: Aikoku Shinbun-sha, 1941). Suzuki Tsuyoshi, *Mekka Junrei-ki* [Memories of a pilgrimage to Mecca] (Tokyo: Chihei-sha, 1943). Several other Japanese Muslims were sent to Mecca repeatedly. Wakabayashi Han, *Kaikyô-sekai to Nippon* [The Muslim World and Japan] (Tokyo: Dainichi-sha, 1938).
9. At the reception after the inauguration ceremony, *Kimigayo* (the national anthem of Japan) was sung, and the exclamation *Banzai* (all Hail or Live Forever) was made to the Emperor and also to Islam. *Kaikyô Jijô* [Muslim Affairs], Vol. 1 No. 2, August, 1938, p. 97. *Kaikyô-ken* [The Muslim Sphere], Vol. 1 No. 1, July, 1938, p. 48. The business community contributed a fund and land for the building of this mosque. Kawamura Mitsuo, "Senzen Nippon no Isuramu Kenkyû Shôshi [A Short History of Islamic Studies in Japan]", *Nihon Chûô Gakkai Nenpô*, No. 2 1987, 423-424.
10. At the conference it was decided to exchange students between Japan and Muslim countries, and again the exclamation *Banzai* was made this time to *Dai Nippon Teikoku* (The Greater Japanese Empire) and to Islam, also. *Kaikyô Sekai* [The Muslim World], Vol. 1 No. 9, December, 1939, pp. 87-101.
11. *Dai-Nippon Kaikyô Kyôkai, Waga Nanyo Boeki to Kaikyoto* [Our Trade in the Southern Seas and the Muslims], 1939.
12. Concerning the Indonesian Muslim Movements before the war, see the following; Benda, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-99. Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-*

- 1965 (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1987), pp. 1-21, Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES), Martin van Bruinessen, *NU; Tradisi Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru* (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1994), pp. 17-45.
13. Miyatake Masamichi, "Ranryō Higashi Indo no Kaikyōto [Muslims in the Dutch East Indies]", *Kaikyō-ken*, Vol. 4 No. 6, June, 1940, pp. 454-455.
 14. G.H. Bousquet (translated. by Takei Juro), "Shina Jihen to Ranin Minshū [The China Incident and the People of the Dutch East Indies]", *Kaikyō Sekai*, Vol. 2 No. 2, February 1940, pp. 20-21.
 15. Nieuwenhuijze, *op. cit.*, p.26.
 16. Gotō Kenichi, *Shōwa-ki Nihon to Indonesia* [Japanese Relations with Indonesia in the Shōwa Era] (Tokyo: Keiso-shobo, 1986, pp. 507-509).
 17. *Berita Nahdlatul Oelama*, Vol. 7 No. 21, September 1938, p. 2.
 18. *Mutiara*, Vol. 6 No. 11, pp. 158-160.
 19. *Mutiara*, Vol. 8 No. 2, No. 3, 1940, pp. 6-9, pp. 66-69.
 20. Saifuddin Zuhri, *Guruku; Orang-orang dari Pesantren* (Bandung: Almaarif, p. 19). Just before the war the Dutch government also tried to appease Muslims. *Idem, Berangkat dari Pesantren* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1987), pp. 167-169.
 21. Initially there were two more sections concerned with Muslim affairs, Bunkyō-kyoku Shūmuka (the Religious Affairs Section of the Educational Affairs Office) and Sōmubu Chōsa-shitu (the Research Section of the General Affairs Office). Both of them came under Gunseikanbu. The former did almost nothing and was merged into *Shūmubu* in October, 1943, and the latter had no Islamic specialists nor did it touch on administration. These four offices were detailed in *Miyamoto Hideo* (Dai-Nihon Kaikyō Kyōkai), "Jawa Gunsei-ka ni okeru Kaikyoto Kosaku" [The Development of the Strategy towards Muslims on Java under the Military Government], February, 1944, pp. 1-20.
 22. Concerning the organization of Beppan, see: Nakano Koyu-kai [Nakano Alumni Association] ed., *Rikugun Nakano Gakko* [Nakano Army School] (Tokyo, 1978, p. 505).
 23. Although Benda mentioned 6 Japanese Muslims (Benda, *op. cit.*, p. 233), there were only five that could be identified. Those were Mohammad Abdul Munim Inada, Abdul Munier Watanabe, Abdul Hamid Ono, and Muhammad Saleh Suzuki. At first, Inada was assigned to Shūmubu, but later he was transferred to Kaikyō-kōsakuhan when it was set up in Beppan. Miyamoto, *op.cit.*, pp. 16-18. Nishijima Shigeta and Kishi Koichi, et. al., *Indonesia ni okeru Nihon Gunsei no Kenkyū* [Studies on the Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia] (Tokyo: Kinokuniya Shoten, 1959), p. 237.
 24. Nieuwenhuijze, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
 25. *Ibid.*, p.6. P.R. van Alderwerelt van Rosenburgh, *Kort Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling der Godsdienstige Beweging tot en met den Japanschen Tijd*, Neftis (Batavia, September, 1946), p. 3.
 26. Nieuwenhuijze, *op. cit.*, p. 11. Rosenburgh, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
 27. It was said that K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari was suspected of having instigated an anti-Japanese movement, but it was not certain. On the capture of K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari, see: H. Aboebakar ed., *Sedjarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar* (Jakarta: Panitiya Buku Peringatan, 1957), pp. 112-113; Saifuddin Zuhri, *Guruku*, pp. 169-170. *Idem, Berangkat...*, pp. 201-202.
 28. On the *Saikerei* problem, see: Benda, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-126. Hamka, *Ayahku; Riwayat Hidup Dr. H. Abdul Karim Amrullah dan Perjuangan Kaum Agama di*

- Sumatera*, 3rd print (Jakarta, Umminda, 1982), pp. 219-222.
29. Etô Shinkichi and Kurusawa Aiko, *Intabyû Kiroku; Nihon no Nanpô-kanyo* [Interview Records: Japanese Relations with the South] (Tokyo: Tokutei Kenkyû Bunka Masatsu Interview Series, 1980), pp. 3-11.
 30. Ono Shinji, "Java Kaikyoto no Shinkô [Beliefs of Javanese Muslims]", *Shin Ajia* [New Asia], April, 1942, pp. 110-116. *Idem*, "Java Kaikyô Jijô; Kiyai Morudato no koto [The Situation of Javanese Islam; On Kiyai Mordatu]", *Kaikyô-ken*, Vol. 6 No. 6, June 1946, pp. 39-43. *Idem*, "Indonesia Kaikyô Kôsaku ni tsuite [On the Strategy towards Indonesian Islam]", *Shin Ajia*, June 1942, pp. 23-35.
 31. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
 32. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-30.
 33. *Idem*, "Kaikyô Jijô".
 34. *Idem*, "Kaikyô Kôsaku", pp. 27, 33.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
 36. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.
 37. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.
 48. Aboebakar, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
 39. Nieuwenhuijze, *op.cit.*, p.7.
 40. Miyamoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102. *Jawa Gunseikanbu, Jawa Nenkoan 2604* [Java Almanac] (Jakarta, 1944), Reprint, Tokyo: Biblio, 1973, p. 145. Soerio Santosa, *op. cit.*, p. 2. Nieuwenhuijze, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
 41. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
 42. A reproduction of this report was published recently. Osamushudan Shireibu, with an introduction by Nakamura Mitsuo, *Zen Jawa Kaikyô Chôsasbo* (Tokyo: Ryûkei-shosha, 1991).
 43. Nieuwenhuijze, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
 44. Miyamoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 73.
 45. Nieuwenhuijze, *op. cit.*, p. 11. Rosenburgh, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
 46. Nieuwenhuijze, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.
 47. This material is kept in "Het Archief van de Procureur Generaal bij het Hoogerechtshof van Nederlands-Indie, 1945-1949", <1007 >, the National Archives, The Hague. Wondoamiseno was born in Wonosalam, Eastern Java, in 1895. He went to Europeesch Lager School (European Primary School), and got a job at the water supply office in Surabaya where he began his political career in a trade union. Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonesia yang Terkemocha di Jawa* (Jakarta: 1944), Reprint, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1986, p. 446. *Merdeka*, September 7 1947(?)
 48. This term 'Departemen Agama Islam' can be found in a handwritten paper. MIAI's desire to form a Ministry of Muslim affairs is mentioned by Deliar Noer without showing its source. Deliar Noer, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
 49. Benda, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-143.
 50. Perhaps the core of the *bayt al-mâl* problem was that MIAI created its independent institution apart from the government. It is clear that this project tried to take over some functions of the government as pointed out by Bruinessen, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
 51. Osamushudan Shireibu, *op. cit.*, p. 341.
 52. According to Ono, Djajadiningrat was disgusted by *kyais*. Eto and Kurusawa, *op. cit.*, p. 14. It was only four months after Djajadiningrat's appointment that Miyamoto wrote, "...this appointment proved quite a failure on the part of the

- Japanese headquarters. It was already regarded as only a question of time before it would be dismissed". Miyamoto, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
53. Soerio Santoso, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
 54. Instructions of Gunseikan to the heads of *shūmuka* included the supervision of *penghulu* (religious officials). *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, Vol. 2 No. 9, May 1944, p. 1. Hitherto, *penghulu* had been under supervision of *priyayi*.
 55. Soerio Santoso, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
 56. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
 57. Concerning *latihan kiyai*, see: Kurasawa (1992), pp. 382-418, and (1993), pp. 291-340.
 58. Gunseikanbu, *Jawa Nenkan*, p. 145. Soerio Santoso, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
 59. Saifuddin Zuhri, *Guruku*, p. 192.
 60. Soerio Santoso, *op. cit.*, p. 6. Rosenburgh, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
 61. This bulletin was for *kyais* and '*ulamā'*' who did not read the Roman alphabet. In the *pesantrens* of the time the major subject was learning Arabic works, so a large part of *pesantren* people were not accustomed to reading the Roman alphabet.
 62. Gunseikanbu, *Jawa Nenkan*, p. 154. *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, Vol. 2 No. 5, March, 1944, pp. 9-10.
 63. Benda, *op. cit.*, p. 187.
 64. It is rather a puzzle why Miyamoto had access to this information obtained from Beppan. Perhaps he communicated with the head quarters of the military government. At this time, Dai-Nihon Kaikyō Kyōkai seemed to be trying to enlarge its organization and establish a new institution for the furthering of Japan's Islamic policy. Clearly Miyamoto's report was intended to give data which would testify to the defects in the present system. This is kept in the library of Waseda University, Tokyo.
 65. Miyamoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-106. I have not given the actual page reference of each of these requests but all may be found in this section.
 66. Gunseikanbu, *Jawa Nenkan*, pp. 150-151.
 67. Boland shows acute insight into this problem. B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 9-13.
 68. Benda, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
 69. For Wahid Hasyim's life, see: H. Aboebakar, *op. cit.*, Concerning Pesantren Tebuireng in the Pre-war Period, see: Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982), pp. 103-107.
 70. Saifuddin Zufri, *Guruku*, p. 190.
 61. Rosenburgh, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
 72. Saifuddin Zufri was one of the NU leaders, and once served as minister of religious affairs (1964-1967). He was born in Sokaraja, Central Java, and had been close to Wahid Hasyim since 1939. Saifuddin Zufri, *Guruku*, pp. 87.
 73. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.
 74. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
 75. *Ibid.*
 76. The 'Triple-A Movement' was the first large-scale Japanese-sponsored organization, launched in March 1942. This new mass movement was intended to seek Indonesian support for the new regime, and was set up to embrace all Asians.
 77. *Ibid.*, pp. 176-177.
 78. *Ibid.*, pp. 172. In this part, Saifuddin Zuhri has confused the time. He mentioned the creation of *shūmuka* (March 1944) as if it had happened before the formation

- of MIAI (September 1942). Also, in another part, he mentioned Wahid Hasyim's words, "Horie was entrusted with the task of supervising Shūmubu, which was headed by Hasjim Asj'ari". (*Ibid.*, p. 180) However, when Hasyim Asy'ari was appointed to this position, Horie had already gone back to Japan.
79. *Ibid.*, pp. 172-173. Concerning the process of innovation of the pesantren education system, see: Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-122. Karel A. Steenbrink, *Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986).
 80. Saifuddin Zuhri, *Guruku*, pp. 190-192. It seems Saifuddin Zufri again partly confused the formation of PETA with that of Hizbullah. He thought the beginning of 1944 came four months after Hizbullah's formation. (*Ibid.*, p. 200) However, counting backwards, it was PETA that was founded around that time. Hizbullah was formally formed in December, 1944.
 81. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
 82. *Ibid.*, pp. 195-196.
 83. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
 84. As mentioned before, the criteria for determining between *kyais* and '*ulama'*' are vague. So it can safely be said that this number is quite a rough estimate.
 85. Van der Plas had associations with *kyais* before the war. Just before the Japanese military landed on Java, he escaped to Melbourne, Australia, where he wrote reports on Muslim affairs for the Allied Forces. Although he was still able to obtain information from his agents on Java, he seems to have lost track of political developments in Indonesia. Probably the situation changed so rapidly that he was hardly able to assess it. See: Het Archief van Ch.O. van der Plas (1891-1977), over de Periode 1941-1973', no. 113 (the National Archive, The Hague). About Van der Plas's career, see William H. Frederick, "The Man Who Knew Too Much: Ch.O. Van der Plas and the Future of Indonesia, 1927-1950", in Hans Antlov and Stein Tonnesoon eds., *Imperial Policy and Southeast Asian Nationalism 1930-1957* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1994), pp. 34-62.
 86. Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 2 No. 2, 1960, pp. 228-249.

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