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Depicting the Other Faith: A Bibliographical Survey of Indonesian Muslim Polemics on Christianity

Abstraksi: *Dalam diskursus studi agama-agama, hubungan Islam-Kristen di Indonesia merupakan kajian yang 'kurang mendapat' perhatian serius. Padahal kontak-kontak kedua agama Ibrahim ini di kepulauan Nusantara bukanlah sebatas relasi sosial semata, melainkan juga pertemuan yang sangat kompleks dan rentan antara dua sistem peradaban.*

Secara historis, selama kurang lebih empat abad, dimulai dari abad keenambelas sampai penghujung abad keduapuluh, adalah masa transisi dimana rakyat di kepulauan ini menyaksikan sebuah 'episode' panjang perseteruan antara dua komunitas yang disebabkan oleh kepentingan politik, ekonomi dan agama. Betapapun alasan politik dan ekonomi kerap menjadi pemicu bagi ketegangan sosial, namun isu penyebaran agama (proselytization) tak pelak merupakan faktor utama yang mengantarkan kedua kelompok ini ke depan gerbang pertikaian yang berlarut-larut. Keduanya sama-sama meyakini bahwa hanya agama merekalah yang membawa pesan ilahi yang paling relevan bagi masyarakat, dan karena itu keduanya melihat bahwa misi (dalam Kristen) atau darwah (dalam Islam) merupakan kewajiban individual untuk menyelamatkan umat manusia dari kegelapan. Ide penyelamatan inilah kemudian yang menjadi 'ramuan' penting bagi perseteruan antara dua komunitas agama ini di tanah air.

Tulisan ini merupakan survey bibliografis awal tentang respon kaum Muslimin di tanah air terhadap agama Kristen secara kronologis historis. Adalah penting juga dikemukakan bahwa respon-respon kaum Muslimin Indonesia terhadap ajaran dan doktrin Kristen tidaklah monolitik. Isu-isu penting seperti hubungan missionarisme dan kolonialisme, masalah Trinitas dan Keilahiaan Yesus, pseudo-biografi Yesus, sejarah dan otentitas Alkitab serta prediksi munculnya Nabi terakhir yang diyakini juga termaktub dalam Alkitab, disikapi secara berbeda dan beragam oleh kaum Muslimin. Perlu

dicatat bahwa bentuk respon yang dihasilkan tak bisa dilepaskan dari tingkat historisitas seperti kapan dan dimana seorang Muslim menulis, dan juga tingkat pendidikan serta pemahaman mereka atas ajaran-ajaran Kristen itu sendiri. Menjadi penting untuk disebutkan, bahwa sebagian besar dari mereka tidaklah mendapatkan pendidikan format studi agama-agama. Kebanyakan dari mereka, walaupun tetap saja ada pengecualian bagi beberapa penulis, hanya mempelajarinya secara otodidak dari bahan-bahan bacaan yang ditulis kaum Muslimin sendiri.

Secara tipologis dapat disebutkan bahwa sebagian sarjana secara tradisional berusaha memahami tema-tema penting —seperti Trinitas, pseudo-biografi Yesus, sejarah dan kanonisasi Alkitab—dalam kacamata Islami. Sebagian yang lain berupaya memahami ajaran-ajaran Kristen dengan pendekatan logika secara modern. Di sini, secara logis tanpa mengutip satupun ayat al-Qur'an, para penulis itu mendemonstrasikan bagaimana inkonsistensi' ajaran Kristen jika dihadapkan dengan logika. Sementara itu, beberapa sarjana Muslim lain lebih tertarik menjelaskan hubungan simbiose mutualisme antara umat Kristiani dan para kolonialis pada masa penjajahan atau kegiatan neo-kolonialisme pada awal-awal kemerdekaan Indonesia.

Lebih lanjut, beberapa sarjana Muslim lainnya, Joesoef Sou'yb misalnya, menggunakan pendekatan kritis terhadap Alkitab (Biblical-criticism yang pernah populer pada abad ke-18 yang melihat secara skeptis terhadap ajaran-ajaran Alkitab). Dengan kata lain, dengan berbekal tulisan-tulisan dan sumber-sumber 'kritis' yang dihasilkan oleh beberapa sarjana Kristen sendiri, para sarjana Muslim ini berupaya memotret otentisitas ajaran-ajaran Kristen. Dengan landasan yang hampir sama, beberapa sarjana lain juga mendasari respon mereka pada temuan-temuan mutakhir Naskah-naskah Laut Mati (Dead Sea Scrolls) pada akhir 1930an sebagai ajaran otentik kaum Essenis yang diidentifikasi banyak kalangan sebagai Komunitas Kristen Awal.

Secara umum dapat disimpulkan bahwa respon-respon kaum Muslimin Indonesia terhadap ajaran-ajaran Kristen tidak terlepas dari pengaruh narasi besar respon-respon kaum Muslimin di dunia Islam lainnya. Dengan kata lain, pengaruh sarjana-sarjana Muslim baik klasik dan kontemporer dari dunia Islam memberikan corak tersendiri atas respon kaum Muslimin di tanah air. Karena itu, sangat dimaklumi bahwa sebenarnya tak ada hal 'baru' yang dihasilkan kaum Muslimin Indonesia jika dilihat dari sifat dan bentuk respon itu sendiri. Tetapi, tak dapat dipungkiri bahwa apa yang dilakukan oleh kaum Muslimin di Nusantara ini adalah suatu bentuk respon yang unik atas gerakan intrusif Kristenisasi di masa modern. Untuk itu, bagaimanapun bentuk respon kaum Muslimin di tanah air tadi harus dilihat dalam konteks hubungan yang kompleks antara kedua komunitas itu di Indonesia.

Depicting the Other Faith: A Bibliographical Survey of Indonesian Muslim Polemics on Christianity

خلاصة: من الأمور الملتفتة للنظر أنه في دراسة الأديان تعاني الدراسات الخاصة بالعلاقة بين الإسلام والمسيحية والحال كذلك مع الدراسات الخاصة بالإسلام في جنوب شرقي آسيا عموماً من قلة الاهتمام، مع أن الاتصالات بين دينك الدينين المنتمين إلى إبراهيم عليه السلام في الأرخييل لم تقتصر على العلاقات الاجتماعية فحسب بل التقاء معقداً بين حضارتين.

فالفترة الممتدة من القرن السادس عشر الميلادي حتى أواخر القرن العشرين تعد من الناحية التاريخية فترة تحول حيث شهد المجتمع في الأرخييل صراعاً بين الجماعتين من أجل الفوز بمصالح سياسية واقتصادية ودينية. وعلى الرغم من وجود عوامل سياسية واقتصادية كانت تقف وراء كل صراع بينهما إلا أن قضية الدعوة والتبشير ظلت ولا شك العامل الأساسي والحاسم. فكل واحد منهما على يقين تام بأن دينهم هو الذي أتى بالوحي الصادق والشريعة الحققة من الله تعالى، ولذلك فقد رأى كل منهما أن الدعوة بالنسبة للمسلمين والتبشير بالنسبة للمسيحيين من الواجبات الدينية التي يجب إنجازها فرادى حتى

تحقق النجاة والخلاص للبشرية. لقد كانت هذه العقيدة حول النجاة والخلاص محوراً هاماً لنشوء الصراع بين الجماعتين في هذه البلاد.

تعرض هذه المقالة نظرة عامة ومحاولة أولية لإلقاء الضوء على موقف المسلمين إزاء المسيحية من خلال متابعة الترتيب الزمني للأحداث. ومن الأهمية بمكان الإشارة إلى أن موقف المسلمين تجاه العقائد المسيحية لم يسر على غرار واحد، ففضايا العلاقة بين التبشير والاستعمار وعقيدة التثليث ثم ألوهية المسيح وخيالية قصة المسيح وكذلك قضية تحريف الكتاب المقدس وأخيراً التبشير. بحسب نبي أشار إليه الكتاب المقدس كان موقف المسلمين منها مختلفاً فيما بينهم. ومن الجدير بالملاحظة أيضاً أن هذا الاختلاف لا يمكن فصله عن الجوانب التاريخية حول متى وأين ألف العلماء كتبهم، ولا يمكن فصله كذلك عن كفاءتهم في فهم النصوص والعقائد المسيحية، فمعظمهم - وإن كان الاستثناء وارداً - كانوا يدرسون المسيحية بالاعتماد على القراءات الشيخية للكتب التي ألفها المسلمون أنفسهم.

ويمكن أن يقال - من الناحية الرمزية - أن بعض العلماء يحاولون فهم القضايا الرئيسية تقليدياً مثل التثليث وخيالية قصة المسيح وتاريخ تحريف الكتاب المقدس من خلال منظور إسلامي، أعني يحاولون أن يكشف النقاب عن هذه القضايا استناداً على القرآن والسنة النبوية. والبعض الآخر يحاول فهمها باستخدام المنطق الحدث كما يقوم به أحمد حسان، حيث يستعرض "عدم سلامة" العقائد المسيحية إذا ما عرضت أمام المنطق. بينما يذهب آخرون إلى بيان العمل المشترك بين رجال التبشير المسيحي وسلطات الاستعمار في العهد الاستعماري أو الأنشطة الاستعمارية في صورتها الجديدة بعد الاستقلال.

وهناك من يقوم "بأسلمة" كتاب المقدس كما فعله حسب الله بكرى (Hasbullah Bakry) وعمر هاشم (O. Hashem) بأن يبحث في النصوص التي يمكن

تفسيرها من جديد بحيث تتمشى مع روح الاسلام. بالاضافة إلى ما يقوم به عالم آخر مثل يوسف شعيب (Ioeseof Sou'yb) من دراسة نقدية لنصوص الكتاب المقدس تؤدي إلى الشك والتشكك في صحة العقائد المسيحية. وبعبارة أخرى فباستخدام الدراسات النقدية التي عرضها الكتاب المسيحيون أنفسهم حاول المسلمون تصوير العقائد الأصلية للمسيحية؛ ومن نفس المنطلق استند بعض الدارسين للنصوص التي تم اكتشافها في البحر الميت في أواخر الثلاثينيات واعتبارها نصوصا تحمل طيها العقائد الأصلية التي اعتنقها حواريون أو المسيحية الأوائل.

وعلى العموم يمكن التخلص إلى نتيجة هي أن مواقف المسلمين الاندونيسيين من العقائد المسيحية لم تنفصل عن تأثير المصادر والمراجع المتداولة في الدول الاسلامية الأخرى. ولذلك فليس هناك شيء جديد بالنسبة للدراسات في هذا المجال باندونيسيا من حيث الشكل والمضمون. ولكن مما لا شك فيه أن موقف المسلمين في الأرخييل كان فريدا في نوعه إذ صارح الحركات التبشيرية. وبالتالي فإنه كيفما يكون موقفهم فإنه لا بد وأن ينظر إليه من ناحية العلاقة المعقدة بين الجماعتين المتوراث عليها منذ قرون مضت.

علاوة على أنه نظرا لوضوح الهدف الذي يرمى إليه المسلمون وهو القيام بالبرهنة على حقائق الاسلام وأباطيل المسيحية وسعيها في سبيل منع "المسلمين بالاسم" أن يتحولوا إلى المسيحية فإنما قاموا به هنا يعد منهجا مثاليا في سبيل ترسيخ العقيدة وتقوية الصفوف الاسلامية من الداخل. بالاضافة إلى أنه لو كانت هذه المواقف تمكن لغير المسلمين أي الجماعة المسيحية أن يسلموا بأصالة العقيدة الاسلامية وكمالها فإن من المؤمل أن تستطيع هذه المحاولات أن تجلبهم إلى اعتناق الاسلام.

A. Ethical Policy, Evangelization and Muslim Responses to Christianity in the Colonial Era

The demise of the Cultural Policy (*cultuurstelsel*) in the mid-nineteenth century inevitably changed the narrative history of the Indonesian archipelago.¹ It was obvious that the policy generated immense profits for the Dutch colonial administration, allowing it to make a profit in addition to balancing its budget. Much of the surplus was sent to the Netherlands itself and was used for public expenditures, thereby subsidizing the Dutch taxpayer. However, for the indigenous population of the East Indies, excepting those who were close to the colonial agents, *cultuurstelsel* soon came to mean exploitation and impoverishment.

Due to internal problems and strong pressure from liberals in the Netherlands, the authorities inaugurated a new policy by the early 1860's, known as the Liberal Policy, which gave private enterprise new opportunities to enter and to do business in Indonesia, particularly in the Outer Islands. This encouraged Europeans to come to Indonesia in large numbers to pursue economic gain. Not only did the Europeans bring with them an enthusiasm for trade but they also brought their way of life, including their religious beliefs and practices. The number of churches and schools increased dramatically as the migrants sought to provide education for their children and to meet their own religious needs.

The implementation of the Liberal Policy eventually also encouraged European social liberals and humanists in their calls for the improvement of economic and educational opportunities for the indigenous peoples. This policy inevitably had a two-fold impact, being both practical and humanitarian. The former represented an interest in economic aspects, while the latter, inspired by liberal humanitarian ideals, showed a lively interest in the welfare of the people. The liberals accepted economic venture as natural, but believed as well, that as far as possible, the indigenous people should be protected from oppression by Europeans who engaged in enterprise and the native chieftains acting as agents of the planters.²

The widespread dissatisfaction with the plight of the local population that was articulated by European liberals gained momentum with the inauguration of the Ethical Policy in 1880. Theoretically, this new policy was aimed at the betterment of the lives of the indigenous population through both economic and social reform.³ Although the Ethical Policy was designed to promote emancipa-

tion and equality, it was, unfortunately, unable to fulfill its stated objectives.⁴ Education remained the privilege of a particular indigenous elite, while the level of literacy in general population remained static.

The Ethical Policy also proved fragile in withstanding pressure stemming from unprecedented religio-political developments in the Netherlands. At the time the policy was officially promulgated, there was a sudden shift in the Netherlands from the established church (*hervormde kerk*) which had shown general tolerance, over to a breakaway or reformist church (*gereformeerde kerk*) which was radical, less tolerant and more orthodox.⁵ This shift greatly influenced the application of certain colonial policies, including that of the Ethical Policy, due to the fact that reformist church members became politically dominant in the Dutch parliament. The result was that in case of Indies policy, the promulgation of the Ethical Policy was to some extent reshaped and colored by Christian interests, particularly that of the reformist church.

The reformist church gained increased political power by winning a majority position in the parliamentary election of 1901. This enabled them to put Abraham Kuyper into the prime ministership and Alexander Idenburg into the governor general's office. Some have seen this as a major factor in the increased support given to missionary works in Indonesia at that time, much of which was manifested in generous subsidies to Christian institutions. Accordingly, Idenburg once stated that:

As a Christian nation the Netherlands have a duty to improve the condition of the native Christians in the archipelago, to give Christian missionary activity more aid, and to inform the entire administration that the Netherlands have moral obligations to fulfill as regards the population of those regions.⁶

Although preaching the Gospel was initially meant to serve the religious needs of the European residents, missionary activists from the reformist church began a more active campaign to convert the indigenous people to Christianity. They hoped to precede Islam in regions where Islam and Christianity had not yet penetrated. Consequently, they created "Christian buffer zones" in Tengger (East Java) and the Batak area (North Sumatra) against the Muslim zones in East Java and Aceh, respectively.⁷ By the tactics of consolidating their hold on remote areas, missionaries had great success in converting animists to the religion of Christ.

Traditionally, however, when the missionaries tried to "introduce" Christianity to people in predominantly Muslim areas, the endeavor has always been arduous and slow. Like in other Muslim zones throughout the world, efforts to convert the Muslim community, particularly in Java, were met with fierce political resistance engendered by theological as well as cultural reasons.⁸ This resistance acquired an anti-foreign hue and was portrayed as an indigenous effort to preserve the native cultural identity from the onslaught of foreign influences. As Kraemer pointed out, public opinion still considered converts to Christianity to be converts to the service of Dutch culture and interests. This, according to him, was reinforced by the origin of the evangelists in the archipelago who were all Europeans.⁹

The Dutch government had officially advocated "neutrality" in its religious policies, and clearly maintained that some areas were closed to missionary works, or at least restricted. Experience had proven that missions to Muslim areas often created tensions that were bad for trade.¹⁰ The reformist church's challenge to this policy is noteworthy. Knowing that missionaries could not freely work in Muslim areas, they often maintained that Java in particular was not a Muslim area but a center of *kejarwen* (a mixture belief of animism, Hinduism-Buddhism and local customs). Therefore, because *kejarwen* was not included in the policy, the government should allow them to work in Java. To forbid such activities, they argued, would intentionally abuse religious freedom.¹¹

The government's subsequent acquiescence in its turn, at least in Muslim eyes, showed a clear bias in favor of Christian interests. Evidence of this is the disproportional amount of subsidy that was given to Christian missionaries as opposed to Muslim activities. The unfair manner in which civil servants were recruited, and the differing salaries paid to Europeans and Indonesians for the same profession, further raised the ire of the Muslim community. Of one thousand prospective employees accepted, not a single Muslim was among them. Moreover, the salary of a European clergyman was ten times higher than that of a Muslim *penghulu* (judge).¹² Colonial government preference for Christianity was also manifested in the issuance of a decree requiring Muslim teachers to obtain a special government teaching license and to submit the names of their students, as well as their curriculum. Although this decree, known as the *guru ordinantie* (the teaching ordinance) was designed to improve the quality of Islamic education as defined by the European system, for some Muslims it

was an effective tool for the colonial government to curtail the movement of teachers, and to hamper the progress of Islam and to control the activities of Muslim teachers, many of whom had been educated in the Middle East, and had long been suspected of coming under the influence of reformists ideas from Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries.¹³

In Muslim's eyes, it was evident that there was a close relationship between the colonial government and the church. Accordingly, the intimate relationship between missionaries and official Dutch representatives led to the former becoming an effective arm of colonialism.¹⁴ Both missionaries and the colonial government gained reciprocal benefits from religio-political cooperation. The colonial powers, as Shihab asserted, saw the colony as an arena for financial profit, while the missionaries saw it as a place bestowed upon them by God in their campaign to enlarge the domains of Christendom.¹⁵

Although the functions of Christian missionaries in colonial apparatus have been well described in other geographical settings, a closer and more careful examination of the issue is still needed to understand inter-religious dynamics in Indonesian history. More comparative research would be welcomed as the Christian presence in Indonesia cannot after all be dealt within complete isolation from patterns commonly exhibited in other parts of the Muslim world. This period marked the time after which Muslims believed that missionaries were part of the colonial system.¹⁶ For this reason the Muslim response to expanding Christian influence in the late 19th should be understood as a reaction against an exploitative economic system and an oppressive regime, and not merely a reactionary polemic staged by members of a threatened clerical class.

1. *A. Haanie and Intellectual Response to Kraemer*

The relations between various Muslim and Christian communities in the vast Indonesian archipelago were certainly not homogenous, however. At the grass-root level, social interaction between the two tended to be harmonious and peaceful. This general condition did become strained at times when members attempted to depict the other while comparing differences in their religious doctrines, or even apologetically tried to prove that one community was better than another. Some religious leaders, furthermore, acted to "intensify" friction between communities by publishing works containing harsh and critical statements toward their counterpart. Examples of

these from the Christian side, included the works of Hendrik Kraemer and J.J. Ten Berge.

Kraemer portrayed Islam as a religion lacking respect for other forms of spiritual life, particularly Christianity, and as lacking a spiritual dimension. He argued that reformation in Islam does not at all imply "a deepening of its spiritual life but, political and social reform."¹⁷ For Kraemer, Islam was a "medieval and radically religious form of that national-socialism with which we are familiar in Europe at present in its pseudo-religious form."¹⁸ Insofar as missionary efforts were concerned, his paradoxical expressions of disdain and admiration for Islam are noteworthy:

Islam is a mission problem: there is no religion for which mission has worked itself to the bone with less result and on which it has scratched its fingers till they were bloody and torn than Islam. The riddle of Islam is that, though as religion it is shallow and poor in regard to content. It surpasses all religions of the world in the power of which it holds those who profess it.¹⁹

He then depicted non-Christian opposition to Christian proselytization as follows:

Everywhere -Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhism, etc.- there is manifest in the Eastern world today, along with the general national realisation a movement towards the heightening of religious consciousness embodying itself in movements for reform, reorganisation, propaganda, consolidation and concerted opposition to Christian mission.²⁰

This hostile attitude towards Islam is also manifest in Kraemer's *The Religion of Islam* published in 1928, a book designed as an instructional manual for Christian teachers and claimed to enhance Christian knowledge of Islam.²¹ The work was criticized by Muslims because it claimed that Muhammad did not have a clear claim to major religious status but really had only instituted a small religious sect.²² Muslims also disliked its conclusion on Muhammad's human weakness²³ and its contention that it was his change in sentiment toward the Jews that persuaded Muhammad to alter the direction of prayers from Jerusalem to Mecca, not God's command.²⁴

Not surprisingly, Muslims reacted with considerable anger at the publication of this book. Demonstrations were held in several such big cities as Jakarta and Bandung in 1929, and some rebuttals offered by urban Muslims appeared in Islamic journals and magazines.²⁵ Nevertheless, for Indonesian Muslims at that time, no other subjects were treated as fully as these two fundamental issues: the relationship be-

tween the state and Islam which Kraemer had criticized, and the *gharanic* (satanic verses) affair, both of which are accordingly seen as an insult and humiliation to Islam. A skillful response was made by A.D. Haanie, a prominent Muhammadiyah leader, who in 1929 published a book entitled *Islam Against Kraemer*.²⁶

In his book, Kraemer held that the unification of religion and politics in Islam was an ordinary phenomenon for all ancient religions, which regarded religion as their basic way of life. However, the development of modern politics, according to him, demanded that the two should be separated, and for the state to operate on a secular basis. To achieve a modern lifestyle, Kraemer inferred Muslims should discard the traditional unity between Islam and politics.²⁷

Hannie's response to Kraemer's position was sharp and to the point. Islam, he replied, is a union of the political and religious; and it would be conceptually unsound to equate what might be called Islamic politics with theocracy in the Christian tradition. Islam, he explained, does not carry religion into the temporal realm, but carries religious law into political life and determines the structural form of the state. Haanie expressed that there is no evidence to suggest that Islam demands the reign of a caliph. He believed that an Islamic state could be ruled either by a caliph or a president as long as it safeguarded religion, respected all other religious adherents, and oversaw the implementation of the religious law. Hence, being mutually interdependent, religion and politics are strongly inclined to complement another. He stated:

The power of the state, in this light, may not be called religious power, but rather reliance on religion; the government does not have the power to intrude in private religious affairs, rather it stands on the foundation of religion, nothing more. Thus people can understand that while Islam combines the power of religion and the law, it does not combine the power of religion and the state. Instead the government stands above religion; there is no religious power in Islam.²⁸

Haanie then concluded that Kraemer's challenge to Indonesian Muslims to separate their religion from their political life heralded nothing less than a defeat for Muslim civilization, an attempt to weaken the Islamic community after which Christians could defeat Muslims with ease.²⁹

The second matter that Haanie took issue with was Kraemer's analysis of the "satanic verses". According to Kraemer, Muhammad, under considerable pressure from Meccan leaders to compromise with

the religious system of the time, once acknowledged three Meccan idols: Allat, Uzza and Manat, as standing next to Allah. This statement was the so-called "satanic verses" which appear repeatedly in history, even in the current era, usually brought forward by detractors of Muhammad. However, if the Meccan leaders were at all happy with the statement, the followers of Muhammad were more unhappy about this compromise and much debate ensued over the issue. Obviously Muhammad himself had difficulty with the statement, and not long after uttering it, recanted it stating that acceptance of those "three idols was not God's revelation but evil thought from satan."³⁰

Haanie's response was simplistic, however. To him, Kraemer's purpose in raising the issue was to shed doubt on the authority and honor of the Prophet. Haanie's rebuttal denied that the story circulated in Muslim circles and attributed it to the *zindik*s who aimed to mock the Prophet. He hypothesized that the pagans had knelt in prayer with the Prophet, not because the latter had acknowledged their gods, but because he had read a chapter of the Qur'ân. It was, Haanie argued, the virtue of the Prophet that made them bow in worship and not because the Prophet had named and bowed to the three idols of Mecca. It was unthinkable, to Haanie, that God who had protected the Prophet from sins could even have abandoned him to Satan's temptations.³¹

2. *Muhammad Natsir, Colonial Government and Christian Teachings*

Another case in point which triggered Muslim hostility towards Christianity has come to be known as the Ten Berge affair, after a Jesuit priest named J. J. Ten Berge who published two articles in the journal *Studiën* which appeared in 1931. These articles dealt specifically with the Qur'ânic verses speaking about the prophecy of Christ. After quoting the Qur'ânic verses (5: 75), Ten Berge said:

One can see that according to Muhammad, Christians conceive of a father and a mother and a son in a sexual sense. How would it have been possible for him, the anthropomorphist, the ignorant Arab, the gross sensualist who was in the habit of sleeping with women, to conceive of a different and more elevated conception of Fatherhood.³²

In response, more demonstrations were held by the Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), the Muhammadiyah and the Partai Sarekat Islam in cities such as Bandung and Surabaya in 1931 and a number of articles were written, particularly in the periodical *Pembela Islam*.³³ Among

those who responded to Ten Berge was Muhammad Natsir, a prominent member of the Persatuan Islam in Bandung, who was later to become Prime Minister of Indonesia and chairman of the Masjumi political party.

In reply to Ten Berge, Natsir wrote an article *Islam, Catholicism and the Colonial Government*, which expressed his contempt for Ten Berge's treatment of the prophet Muhammad and called on other Muslims to defend their religion against slander. Written in a concise popular style, it provides general information on the issue, trying to convey to Muslims the dangers of evangelization, which he termed "the strange way of propagation" employed by missionaries. In Natsir's view, the articles represented a crude conspiracy and a systematic assault on Islam.³⁴ In this article, Natsir also called on the government to review its policy if it wished to promote religious harmony. Specifically, he criticized the double standard whereby Muslims were being punished for hate literature while Christian polemicists, like Ten Berge, were protected from a formal trial. Official "neutrality", he charged, was an excuse for government inaction when Islam was the object of slander. He denounced the government's inconsistency in enacting the policy by comparing it to what would happen in Netherlands law. According to Natsir, in the Netherlands, a religious slander of this type would be subject to legal sanction.³⁵

Apart from his rebuttal of Ten Berge, Natsir wrote other articles between 1930 and 1940 that appeared in various magazines and journals dealing with Christianity. These were intended to defend Islam, not only from the Christian missionary's offensive but also the critical comments of secular-nationalists and followers of Javanese mysticism.³⁶ His articles entitled *Qur'an en Evangelie* and also his *Moehammad als Profeet* for instance, appeared in response to the work of Protestant Domingus Christoffel who wrote article on Islam and the biography of the Prophet which Muslims regarded as an insult to Islam and slander against the Prophet.³⁷

Natsir counterattacked with charges that Christians have themselves distorted their own teachings and brought their religion into disrepute. This was the theme of his article entitled the *Holy Spirit*.³⁸ He explained that what he called modifications and alterations of the Bible had produced contradictions and inconsistencies among verses of the Bible. For example, in dealing with Jesus' crucifixion, Natsir compared John 19: 17 stating that Jesus was bearing his cross himself with Mark 15:21 citing that someone else was bearing Jesus' cross. In

the same manner he analyzed the resurrection of Jesus in Luke 24:4 stating that there were two men standing at the tomb dressed in shining garments and Matthew 27: 56 saying that there were three people at that place.³⁹ Such differences in text raised the question in Natsir's mind whether other parts of the message were also not reliable.

3. *Ahmad Hassan and Logic Refutation*

Following Ten Berge's essay, in late April of 1931, Oei Bee Thay wrote an article in the periodical *Hoakien* characterizing Muhammad as insane and a latent murderer and a robber.⁴⁰ In 1937 Muhammad's character was further attacked in the periodical *Bangun* by Siti Sumandari and Soeroto. The writers attributed Islamic views on polygamy and marriage to the prophet's wanton sexual desires and jealousies.⁴¹ Here, of course, the matter was compounded since the writers were not Dutch missionaries but local Chinese converts to Christianity. Apparently, however, Muslims saw little distinction. Among noteworthy responses made to the second article was Ahmad Hassan's, a prominent modernist Muslim who belonged to the Persatuan Islam.⁴²

Hassan's book, *the Divinity of Jesus according to the Bible*, was written at the behest of the MIAI (Majelis A'la Islam Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim Supreme Council). It presented what Federspiel has called "scholarly and logical arguments" with easily understandable terms in refuting the divinity of Jesus.⁴³ In doing so, he based his entire logical and lexical argument on the Bible, without ever referring to the verses of the Qur'ân. Hassan's objective was to draw a simple comparison between Jesus and Muhammad. Furthermore, he claimed that Christians had, throughout the centuries, misunderstood the position of their own doctrine on the mission of Jesus. To him, Jesus, like other prophets in the Semitic tradition, would not have been abandoned to crucifixion by his God for saving humankind from sin, nor would there have ever be a personified God in a purely monotheist tradition. If he truly was His son, he asks, "does God not know any other way to save humankind except by the sacrifice of flesh and blood?" "Would it not have been easier for Him [God] to forgive humankind without shedding the blood of His son?"⁴⁴

There is, of course, little new criticism in his arguments as they follow a blue-print borrowed from age-old Muslim polemics against Christianity. Thus, his belief that, "we [Muslims] do not believe in Jesus as God, nor as part of the divine, nor as the son of God, nor as

a form combining God and man,"⁴⁵ was an old proclamation. However, some of his arguments were original and not in the usual Muslim line of attack, such as the claim that the notion of "the son of God" which is attributed to Jesus was, according to Hassan, a title of respect not exclusively referring to Jesus. This argument, which is also found in his *Jesus and his Religion: an Answer to the Book of Jesus in the Qur'an*,⁴⁶ has been adopted and elaborated by O. Hashem, whose book will also be discussed at some length below.

The questions which arise from Haanie's rebuttal, and that of other Muslims, are numerous. Why was Haanie so offended by the idea of separating Islam from politics? Why did Haanie concentrate on the *gharanic* affair (satanic verses) to the exclusion of other issues which appeared in Kraemer's book? Why did Natsir and Hassan respond so vehemently to attacks on Muhammad character? The answers are not simple. For one, the Indonesian debate over state ideology has always disputed the manner and extent of the role Islam should play in the makeup of the state. In light of the ideological position of most Muslim activists, Kraemer's challenge to the idea of political Islam was a challenge to their very ethos. In this "religio-political" struggle, Kraemer's call for secularism was a blow to Islam's integrity as a social order.

In fact, Kraemer's early works, as well as those of medieval western orientalisks, are prototypical of the attitudes that have characterized ideological confrontation with Islam in a period of political change.⁴⁷ Islam is depicted in such works as a religion of evil or at least as inimical to Christian values, and the Qur'ân described as a man-made production. The common pattern of denunciation depicts Muhammad as a selfish liar possessed of several evil characteristics.⁴⁸ In this framework, Haanie's second of concern, i.e., the satanic verses, and Natsir's rebuttal of Ten Berge's comments regarding Muhammad, may be explained differently. For the Muslim community, an attack directed at the prophet Muhammad is deeply injurious. It is not only intolerable, but it also requires an immediate response. Islamic teachings clearly recognize Muhammad as the model *par excellence* whose life (*sîrah*), sayings (*hadîth*) and practices (*sunnah*) stand as the ultimate paradigm for them to follow.

Hence, Haanie and Natsir's responses were understandably driven by the urge to protect the honor of the prophet Muhammad against disparagement by non-Muslims. As well, considering the longstanding theological differences between Islam and Christianity, their rebut-

tal should be contextualized in terms of the protection of “monotheistic” Islam against its purposeful misdirection toward “polytheistic” ways. If the implications of the *gharanic* affair are accepted, the theological consequence of the infallibility (*ismah*) of Muhammad, a strongly-held belief among Muslims, is brought into question, and it as well implies that Muhammad was tempted to set up a polytheistic religion that associated certain idols alongside Allah.⁴⁹ Thus, with respect to Haanie and Natsir, the issue is not one of apologetics, but rather, whether they have responded according to the established academic and intellectual dictates of their own religious beliefs.

B. Muslim-Christian Encounter in the Old Order Era, 1945-1965

The political orientation of modern Indonesia after independence in 1945 can be seen as bifurcated. On one side were the so-called secular nationalists comprised of some prominent Christians and nominal Muslims who promoted *Pancasila* as the state ideology.⁵⁰ On the other were Muslim nationalists who urged the establishment of a so-called Islamic state in Indonesia. Thus, the questions of whether a secular or Islamic state should come into being and of whether Islam would be the official religion of the state or the president should be a Muslim, defined and widened the rift between these two groups.⁵¹

Not only did the debate on state ideology create a division between Indonesians, but so did the proposal by Achmad Subardjo to establish a Ministry of Religious Affairs at the meeting of the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence on August 19, 1945.⁵² Although the proposal was rejected at the meeting, strong pressure mostly from traditional ‘*ulamâ*’ had persuaded the government to found such a ministry on January 3, 1946, in accordance with a proposal to the central Komite Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Committee) on November 11, 1945.⁵³ Its existence, however, was viewed with mixed feelings by Christian politicians as well as by some Muslims. The latter, mostly urban Muslim politicians believed that the establishment of the ministry was no more than an attempt by the government to win the full support from Islamic groups which had been disappointed that the stipulation concerning the Islamic *shari‘ah* had been dropped from the Jakarta Charter, and that the ideal of a state based on Islam was no longer possible.⁵⁴ For Christian leaders, on the other hand, this institution was seen as a way for Muslims to recall their dream of an Islamic state in

Indonesia. It was viewed as a means for Muslims, as constituting the largest religious group, to promote Islam as the state's sole religion, which accordingly would threaten the freedom of religion and religious tolerance. It was therefore seen as important for the government to establish the boundaries between state authority and religion.⁵⁵ Latuharhary, for instance, declared that the ministry would only create "uneasy feelings" and "disunity" among the people. To him, if the minister were a Christian, the Muslims would naturally be dissatisfied. Conversely, if the minister were a Muslim, the Christian community would be unhappy.⁵⁶ Moreover, Christians already felt that their needs were served by similar institutions, e.g., the Indonesian Council of Protestant Churches and the Indonesian Supreme Council of Catholic Churches, which were financially sound and well organized.⁵⁷ Others believed that the establishment of the ministry would indeed contradict the noble idea of *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (God's Divine Omnipotence), as is stated in the first principle of the *Pancasila*. Sidjabat, speaking at a later time put the issue in the following terms:

Closer examination shows that the contradiction is in the application of Divine Omnipotence. As the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs is an attempt to apply this principle of Divine Omnipotence, a valid question may be raised, namely, whether the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs basically is not a deviation from the general concept of Deity as contained in the Constitution of the Indonesian Republic. Knowing that the proportional majority of the population having a religious affiliation will exert a prevailing influence in the most areas of the national life, is it not contradictory for freedom among the inhabitants of the country, to create any scheme in the government that will endanger the application of the principle of Divine Omnipotence? Any administrative organ which gives room in the society for the prevailing influence of one single social group will ultimately be a tool that helps foster a social pressure upon other groups in the society. Therefore, if the government itself helps to create an atmosphere of this kind through a government scheme, this way of working - that is, the way of applying the principle of Divine Omnipotence in the society through a government organ - will eventually be a definite scheme to contradict the religious tolerance that government wants to preserve as the main pillar of the state. These facts lead us to an observation that the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs conditions the majority of the people on Indonesia to a way of life in which Islam is considered to be the religion of the state, even if it is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.⁵⁸

As far as practical Muslim-Christian relations are concerned, political developments brought the two communities to espouse a com-

mon cause, i.e., the struggle for independence. Despite Muslim activists' dream of an Islamic state and indigenous Christian concerns about their place in a new Indonesia, both Muslim and Christian communities joined the diplomatic and military struggle for Indonesian independence. Muslim-Christian antagonisms were transformed into a feeling of unity due to the urgency of the task at hand. Both groups saw their cause as a struggle for the country as well as for religion.⁵⁹ It was the right time for Indonesian Christians to show that they were not part of Dutch colonialism, and many Christians wanted to fight on the side of the independence movement, not so much for protecting the interests of Christians in the country, but rather to serve as a symbol of Christian participation and responsibility in the national struggle.⁶⁰ At this juncture, the relations between the two communities turned toward a more cordial direction.

As soon as the situation was more stable, religious polemics and debates, which had been muted during the revolution, were re-ignited. This time, however, the principal Muslim protagonists were mostly urban-based Muslims educated in modern schools and familiar with Dutch, German and English literature. These urban-educated Muslims were, ironically, indirect products of the Ethical Policy that improved educational opportunities for some Indonesians. Consequently, those who gained access to this system and stayed with the system through higher education emerged as the modern Indonesia elite. Among them were a number of devout Muslims such as Muhammad Natsir and Agus Salim.

Insofar as Muslim-Christian relations were concerned, education allowed this new group of scholars to familiarize themselves with the course of Christian theology over the previous century. Despite the strong spirit of evangelization that had characterized Christianity, religious doctrine had also become a subject of much analysis and criticism. During the nineteenth century, Biblical criticism and emphasis on rational analysis of religion, influenced by the spirit of the Enlightenment, had been pursued in European universities and churches.⁶¹ Davidson outlined the results of the Biblical Criticism as follows:

The story of Adam and Eve, upon which most people believe the Christian doctrine of original sin to depend, could no longer be regarded as historical. The early chapters of Genesis, which were generally taken to be an authentic account of the origin of the human race, and of civilization, and of the activities of some outstanding personalities early in the history of the Jewish people, were

dissolved into a medley of legends, folk-myths, primitive sagas and remnants of early cults comparable to similar material observable in other cultures. It became impossible to believe in the miracles recorded in the Old Testament. The prophets were transformed from being mysterious predictors of the life of Jesus Christ and the early Church into political commentators upon the events of their own day. The theology of the epistles of the New Testament, and especially those of Paul, was rigorously scrutinized and the question was raised sharply as to whether the great classical dogmas of the Church—the doctrine of the Trinity, of the Incarnation and of the Atonement—could honestly be based upon the witness of the New Testament. In short, the whole question of the authority of the Bible was raised anew and forced upon the attention of thinking people in the most radical fashion.⁶²

Not surprisingly, some Muslims took advantage of this critical trend, and voiced their own doubts in support. They affirmed that Islam was the true interpretation of God's message and that Christianity had been corrupted over the course of time. Consequently, from that time on, Muslims no longer bothered to defend Islam simply by evaluating Christian doctrine in the traditional way, but took advantage of the recent developments in Biblical criticism which had introduced a more open and historical approach to the study of Christianity. A glaring example of this trend is to be found in the writings of a prominent Indian apologist, Rahmat Allah al-Hindî al-Kairânâwî (d. 1891) in *Izhâr al-Haqq* (Approval for the Truth).⁶³ Indeed, the influence of erudite Muslim writers, from all parts of the Muslim world, can be discerned in the arguments of fellow Indonesian Muslims concerning the presence of Christianity in the archipelago. For Indonesians, the possibly of easy access to such works, written either by Muslim scholars or Christian theologians, represented a new tool with which to combat missionary activity.

Hasbullah Bakry, O. Hashem and the Use of Biblical Criticism

The new attitude towards the use of Biblical criticism is well represented in the work of Hasbullah Bakry, *Jesus Christ in the Qur'an Muhammad in the Bible*,⁶⁴ which was a rebuttal to F.L. Bakker, a prominent native-Dutch scholar, who wrote *Lord Jesus in the Religion of Islam*, which appeared in 1957.⁶⁵ His method of interpretation was hardly regarded as novel, his extensive quotations from the Bible and his straightforward analysis of its verses, was seen as an interesting and new development in the history of polemical inter-faith writings.⁶⁶ This was then followed by O. Hashem who publishes *Monotheism: A Scientific Explanation*.⁶⁷

Hashem too focused on the divinity of Jesus to the exclusion of other important subjects such as the “fabrication” of the Bible,⁶⁸ or the “influence” of Hindu and Buddhist tenets on Christianity.⁶⁹ He began his work by expressing admiration for the development of science and for a rational approach to religion and the consequent appraisal in the light of scientific discoveries. Religion, he believed, should be parallel with the sciences, and vice versa. One would be guilty of an intellectual fallacy if, Hashem reasoned, one takes what religion says and avoids what science discovers. The same is true when the opposite occurs. Quoting Sheen’s *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy*, Hashem went further in asserting that a denial of the intellect is a denial of the infinitely perfect God, and a denial of the infinitely perfect God a denial of the intellect. The two problems are accordingly inseparable.⁷⁰ Hence, he believed that science could prove what is contradictory to the senses and would disprove the fallacy of “polytheism”.

On the basis of this, Hashem began examining the doctrine of the Trinity and concluded it to be a hopelessly obscure doctrine and contrary to reason. It was not, he said, quoting Crane Brinton’s *The Shaping of Modern Mind* (sic!),⁷¹ a respectably arithmetical system, since it accepted that three could be three and at the same time one.⁷² To Hashem, it is not a tenable mathematical proposition to suggest that three can also equal one.

Hashem’s analysis of the doctrine of the Trinity reiterated the common Muslim view that Jesus was not the son of God and that an abundant number of biblical verses maintained that divinity was not an attribute of Jesus. He mentioned Luke 3: 38 which names the son of Enoch, the son of Seth, and the son of Adam as a son of God; Hebrew 7: 3 which considers Melchizedek, king of Salem, without father, without mother, without genealogy, having neither beginning of days nor end of life but made like the Son of God; Jeremiah 31: 9, which names Ephraim as God’s firstborn; John 1: 12 which proclaims all believers as children of God; and Exodus 4: 22 naming Israel as God’s firstborn son.⁷³ For Hashem, these biblical verses posed serious problem for the consistency of the sonship of Jesus as a dogma.

Logically speaking, Hashem could not reconcile himself to the divinity of Jesus. He doubted the claim that, since Jesus had no human father, Jesus must be the son of God, stating that God would never have had occasion to initiate biological contact with human beings. Furthermore, since Jesus had mortal attributes such as asking

God for help (Matthew 27: 46), and felt sadness (Matthew 26:38), cried (John 11:35), felt fear (Luke 22: 24) and hunger (Matthew 21: 18), these proved that Jesus could not have been divine. As such, according to Hashem, to consider Jesus both man and God at the same time is to adhere to a logical paradox and an anomaly.⁷⁴

Hashem's disavowal of the doctrinal integrity of the divinity of Jesus is rooted in Islamic rationality and its strict monotheistic doctrine. The biblical verses he quoted were meant to convince his audience that Christian doctrines were themselves not strongly enough rooted in Christian scripture. As Bakry had done, Hashem did not limit his strategy to simple devaluation of Christian doctrine and praise of Islamic tenets, but invited his audience to consider the newly discovered Dead Sea Scrolls as authentic and scientific evidence of the original Christian doctrine. He simply agreed with Potter in *The Lost Years of Jesus Revealed* who once reported that:

One thing is emerging from the study of the Scrolls - namely, that the believers, teachings, and practices of Jesus himself, although not identical in all aspects with those of the Essene school that he [Jesus] probably attended during the silent years, were apparently closer to those of the Essenes than to those of the bishops of the ecumenical council which determined the Nicene Creed of orthodox Christianity. Jesus called himself Son of Man; they called him the son of God, the second Person of the Trinity, Very God of Very God. It is most doubtful if the Essenes or Jesus himself would have agreed with that [doctrine].⁷⁵

Hashem tried to convince his readers of the authenticity of the Scrolls even though their reliability was still in question. Agreeing with Potter, he claimed that the discoveries would result in major corrections to the Old Testament and that other important doctrines were also due to be changed radically and eventually eliminated, including the doctrine of the Holy Spirit of the Trinity.⁷⁶ Accordingly, argued Hashem, the doctrine of the Trinity was an invention of the early Christians since no valid scriptural evidence can be found to support it. The one verse which does, however, is 1 John 5: 7, which, he hypothesized, was inserted at a later date by early Christians to support the existence of the dogma.⁷⁷

C. Islam and Christianity in the Beginning of the New Order Era

There is sufficient evidence that the markedly hostile relations between Islam and Christianity in Indonesia date back to their earliest contacts and reached their peak at around the time that the New

Order government came to power in Indonesia. In the early 1960s, there was a pamphlet that circulated among Muslims warning them about a scheme to Christianize Java within twenty-five years and Indonesia in fifty.⁷⁸ The journal *Suara Muhammadiyah* included excerpts from this “blueprint”, which was claimed to be a paper delivered to a conference held by the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches held in Malang, East Java. The alleged blueprint described how missionaries should achieve their goal. Some of the measures listed were to increase the number of Christian schools; to accept only Christian students for secondary and high schools; to open seminaries in the Muslim cities; to encourage Christian males to marry Muslim females; to ask devout Christian females to marry non-practicing Muslim males; to invite the children from nominal Muslim families to attend Christian schools; to build Christian clinics, hospitals and orphanages; to supply copies of the Arabic version of the Bible for those familiar with the Arabic language; to provide money and important positions for Muslim politicians; to build churches close to mosques in order to challenge the Muhammadiyah and Persis; and to suspend any regulation appealing Christian students to attend state schools.⁷⁹

Although the authenticity of this pamphlet is questionable,⁸⁰ some Muslims responded with clear hostility. A notable Islamic journal, *Panji Masjarakat*, launched a detailed report on the pamphlet, while cynically lamenting it as an inept effort by *saudara sebangsa* (brothers of the same nation), with full support from foreign evangelists intent on continuing colonialism under the banner of religion.⁸¹ Various Islamic organizations released some publications on this issue aimed at increasing awareness among Muslims concerning the threat of Christian missionary activities in Java.⁸² The pamphlet had undoubtedly far-reaching effects throughout the Muslim countries. In 1978, at the congress of the Rabîthah ‘Alam al-Islâmî in Pakistan, the general secretary of the organization, wrote a letter to Buya Hamka, a prominent Indonesian Muslim scholar who was the first chairman of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (“MUI”, or Indonesian ‘Ulamâ’ Council) questioning the authenticity of the pamphlet and inviting him to give a clear explanation.⁸³

The conflict that flared up between Muslims and Christians was fueled by the growing social, economic and political chaos. By late 1965, there was an attempted coup, best known as the Gerakan 30 September (“G30S” or Movement of September 30th). In that coup,

six top-ranking generals of the Indonesian army's central high command were brutally murdered.⁸⁴ An anti-communist faction of the army, together with Muslim youth groups, then successfully crushed the Partai Komunis Indonesia ("PKI" or Indonesian Communist Party), which they accused of having been the main actor in the coup. They also in turn forced the first President of Indonesia, Soekarno, who had long been criticized for sympathizing with communism, to hand authority over to General Soeharto. Soeharto then took advantage of this limited conferment of authority to dissolve the PKI and its affiliated organizations, and to ban the party altogether from the country.⁸⁵

After this incident in 1965, the army-backed government and Muslim circles formed an alliance to eradicate communist influences from every aspect of Indonesian life. In this anti-communist atmosphere, religion was the important identity for everyone, since religion distinguished "good Indonesians" from the PKI. To be non-religious at that moment was to run the risk of being penalized for death or imprisonment.⁸⁶ Consequently, many ex-members of the communist party and others believed to be communist sympathizers sought to save themselves and their families by joining any religion but Islam; and they readily found shelter in the Christian churches.⁸⁷ Their choice of Christianity seemed logical, since they knew that Muslims and the army were working together in hunting down communist party members. Therefore, as Geertz adduced, among the leftists in general, there was then "a fairly deep anti-Muslim reaction, which had been strengthened by the fact that Muslim youth groups had been so active, whether autonomously or as agents of the army, in the killing."⁸⁸ By the same token, for some *abangans* (nominal Muslim) who had supported communism, or at least were religiously neutral, and the animists who had no official religion, going over to Christianity seemed more appealing than returning to or professing Islam.⁸⁹

The rise of Soeharto under the New Order was endorsed by Muslim political leaders, whose parties had been banned by Soekarno. Their hope was that the President Soeharto would share power with them and restore their religiously-based parties. However, Soeharto was reluctant to make another alliance with Muslim circles. Two things at least are certain. The first is that the army that had backed him had predominantly Christian generals and, as Mody pointed out, *abangans* (nominal Muslims) belonged to the Javanese cultural tradi-

tion who regarded the *santris* (devout Muslims) as hostile to their syncretic cultural tradition. The second is that Soeharto called for political stability to address the high inflation, heavy foreign debt and collapsed economy left by Soekarno regime.⁹⁰

Soeharto believed that some Muslim leaders played a significant role in creating turmoil under the previous regime, as in the cases of the Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia ("PRRI", or Indonesian Revolutionary Government), from 1958 to 1961;⁹¹ Kartosoewirjo's Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia ("DI/TII", or Islamic State/Indonesian Islamic Army) during the 1950s and the 1960s,⁹² and what was known as the half-rebellion of Kahar Muzakkar's Permesta in South Sulawesi.⁹³ This led him to suspect that if he restored their parties, these religious parties would someday again acquire enough sympathizers to challenge the government with similar tactics. Soeharto thus decided against reinstatement of Masjumi, the leading Muslim party of the 1950's that had been banned by Soekarno in 1960. This was logical, given his fear that the return of Masjumi and influential Muslim political figures to the political arena would create ideological disputes and ultimately civil strife. He knew that this party had strong, uncompromising, grass root support among urban Muslims.⁹⁴

Instead of reviving mass political participation, Soeharto, not surprisingly, concentrated on economic development for Indonesia. Henceforth, he insisted that Pancasila be accepted as the sole ideology and brought pragmatism, depoliticization, and economic development into the new vocabulary of Indonesian life.⁹⁵ To achieve its goals, his government held that it needed the absolute loyalty and support of the society and promoted Pancasila as a "civil religion" for Indonesians.⁹⁶

Concerned with building a society able to withstand a renewed communist assault as it had experienced in 1965, the Soeharto government implemented a religio-political policy that encouraged all Indonesians, including ex-members of the moribund communist party, to adhere to one of the five state-recognized religions, namely Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. It was, as William Liddle put it, the beginning of the era in which Soeharto promoted personal piety but opposed the politicization of religion, a policy which resembled, to some extent, Snouck Hurgronje's proposal to the colonial government for limiting Islamic activities.⁹⁷

The policies taken by the new government had multiple impacts,

however. The decision to repudiate the rehabilitation of Masjumi, on the one hand, allowed the government to control the return of Muslim leaders into the political arena. The policy encouraging personal piety, on the other one, became a matter of "religious" conflict among religious activists in Indonesia, particularly between Muslims and Christians. As far as the relations between the two communities are concerned, Muslims had to deal directly with more sophisticated methods adopted by missionaries whose activities were encouraged by the government's policy, even to the extent that it seemed to many Muslims that there was a plan to Christianize Indonesia.

The position of the churches in the political upheaval after the abortive coup of the PKI is clear in the eyes of Muslims. Although some Christians acknowledged that it was their religious duty to see that "the Gospel be preached to all men" (Matthew 28:19), what they had done was not strictly theological. They acted in accordance with noble humanitarianism to save human beings from unjust Muslim persecution or execution without trial.⁹⁸ Since this resulted in a tremendous growth of church membership, some missionaries argued that mass conversion should be seen as a logical consequence of the government's policy to encourage every single citizen to adhere to or to tolerate changing their beliefs whatever and whenever they wanted.⁹⁹ On the contrary, Muslims viewed the protection offered by the churches to ex-communists and *abangans* on the condition they changed their belief, as equivalent to "fishing in troubled water" thereby taking took advantage of political turmoil at the expense of Islam.¹⁰⁰

Consequently, a stream of apologetic and polemical works from both communities began to re-appear. These works supported the theological legitimacy of the actions of their respective communities. The Muslim response, in the form of books, pamphlets and articles, varied considerably. It ranged from direct answers to the missionaries' arguments in the justification of Christian doctrine, to uncovering their proselytizing methods. Since their goal was to make a theological defense, not surprisingly, many of these works depended heavily on sources which were unrecognizable and unacceptable to Christian circles.¹⁰¹ For instance, many made use of the Gospel of Barnabas, which they claimed to be a more authentic record of Jesus' life and teachings than that offered by the four canonical Gospels.¹⁰² The translation of this gospel had a great impact on the Indonesian public and was intended "to cease fanaticism in searching [religious]

truth; to assure the authenticity of Islam; and to cast-off the notion that all religions are true and same; and the differences among religions are only in their practices.”¹⁰³

Thus, to fulfill their primary apologetic function, many of these popular books were unfortunately ineffective and questionable. Some were too emotional in tone, some cited no sources, and some made use of “third-hand” sources, while others depended exclusively on the works of fellow Muslims paying no particular attention to works on the same issues by Christian writers. However, many works were written in a more readable style, such as those of Joesoef Sou’yb, Djarnawi Hadikusuma and Sidi Gazalba. Most of them concentrated on depicting the life of Jesus, the origin of the Trinity, the codification and abrogation of the Holy Scriptures and the foretelling of Muhammad in the Bible.

1. *Joesoef Sou’yb, the Early Christian Community and the Dead Sea Scrolls*

Basing himself on the Dead Sea Scrolls and the works by modern thinkers like Ernest Renan, Joesoef Sou’yb wrote *On the Dead Sea Scrolls: The Most Important Discoveries in the Twentieth Century*. It provided a comprehensive construction of the early life and the teachings of Jesus.¹⁰⁴ His position regarding Jesus is noteworthy. He quoted, on the one hand, excerpts from Powell Davies’ *The Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls* which suggested that Jesus had never actually existed,¹⁰⁵ an odd statement that was not only rejected by Christians for obvious reasons but also by Muslims since the Qur’ân confirms the life and teachings of Jesus. On the other hand, Sou’yb stated that Jesus was only a “Teacher of Righteousness” who paved the way for the coming of the “Messenger of God”, who would bring a new order into the world.¹⁰⁶ He held that Jesus joined the Essenes, an ascetic group sworn to celibacy, and became one of its leaders.¹⁰⁷ The Essenes, Sou’yb adduced, never considered him to be a messenger or even a Divine being, but rather an ordinary person.¹⁰⁸ According to Sou’yb, during his life, Jesus had limited influence; his twelve followers attracted a following of only five thousand.¹⁰⁹

Sou’yb then divided Christians into two categories: the *early Christians* who received the religious teachings of Jesus directly and who were not familiar with philosophical thinking; and the *gentile Christians* whom Sou’yb called the followers of Jesus living in Judea

and Galilea. The latter group were part of a sophisticated community marked by good education and a high development of philosophical concepts.¹¹⁰ The latter, Sou'yb said, were responsible for the changes in Christian doctrine, since foreign elements infiltrated Christianity when it was practiced in this region and resulted in the formation of numerous Christians sects.¹¹¹

However, some discrepancies appeared in Sou'yb's treatment of Christian sects and teachings. He seemed to confuse sects (*aliran*) such as Arianism or Athanasianism with teachings (*paham*) like celibacy and infallibility. According to Sou'yb, historically, the number of Christian sects and teachings were seventeen.¹¹² It is interesting that Sou'yb believed that as a teaching, celibacy was part of the Petrine theory of Pope Celestine I (422-432 AD). This theory, Sou'yb argued, made the Bishop of Rome not a mere bishop among other bishops (*episcopus inter episcopos*) but a chairman of all bishops (*episcopus episcoporum*). As a result, the Bishop of Rome had an organic right of control other Christian bishops, and eventually this view was generally accepted in the Western Church. It was finally legalized by the Vatican Council, but only in December 8, 1869.¹¹³

Discussing Christian doctrine, Sou'yb preferred to make use of the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls as his basic point of departure, rather than the four canonical Gospels. He came to the conclusion that although the Scrolls also mentioned baptism, the eucharist and celibacy, the Scrolls were silent on the divinity of Jesus, his incarnation, his crucifixion and his resurrection.¹¹⁴ In Sou'yb's mind, not surprisingly, the Scrolls were more authentic than the canonical Gospels, since they were not corrupted by the (Gentile) Christians.¹¹⁵

To the Bible itself, Sou'yb gave considerable attention. Before 325 AD, he argued, there were many sects and teachings that resulted in the production of numerous Gospels. The Nicaean Council (325 AD) finally chose four among them and declared the rest to be unauthorized. Anyone discovered circulating them was to be punished, and perhaps ex-communicated if the usage contradicted church policy. These four Gospels, according to Sou'yb, were modified in accordance with the *credo* of the Council.¹¹⁶ Sou'yb did not deal with the Christian doctrines of divine guidance given the early church councils, so naturally he concluded that any "change" could only be wrong. This parallels the usual Muslim approach.

2. *Djarnawi Hadikusuma and the Nature of Gospels*

Continuing on the last theme of Sou'yb, Hadikusuma's work *On the Old and New Testaments*, made a detailed description of the origin of the Bible.¹¹⁷ He began by praising Christians as a religious community who believed in God and received the Holy Book, and went on to discuss the origin of the Old Testament and the New Testament. He maintained that no one knew who compiled the Old Testament, or when it was codified. In the year 515 BC, however, a Jewish council examined and verified all the biblical manuscripts; and then in the year of 300 BC, seventy linguists began to translate forty-eight manuscripts into Greek, which were known as the "*Septuagint*" (the seventy). The process of translation, he added, took place in Alexandria for a period of over two hundred years, and the complete translation appeared for the first time in the year 100 BC.¹¹⁸

Hadikusuma stated that all the books of The Old Testament were written directly by the prophets through revelation from God.¹¹⁹ He gave references to the writers of all the books in the Old Testament. For instance, the book of Genesis was written by Adam, Noah and his descendants, Ishmael, Isaac, and Jacob, respectively. Moses then condensed all these into one book called Genesis, and wrote Exodus, Numbers, and others.¹²⁰ To Hadikusuma, some contradictions appeared in the Old Testament simply because many different people were involved with recording them.¹²¹

On the codification of the New Testament, Hadikusuma claimed that it originally contained twenty-seven books, but that only twenty-one were authorized by church councils.¹²² The remainder were excluded because of their inauthenticity, because the material was not considered a genuine part of revelation, contradicted the divinity of Jesus, or contradicted the church doctrine.¹²³ Nevertheless, Hadikusuma stated that the New Testament was more important than the Old Testament for Christians. If God in the Old Testament sent his prophets to all human beings, he argued, in the New Testament, God himself came down to the earth for human salvation. Therefore, according to Hadikusuma, the New Testament should rather be called "the book of history" since it covered the story of God from His birth to His resurrection.¹²⁴

Hadikusuma's description of the history of Bible, such as in the process of its compilation, was, however, characterized by generalization and reduction. He, like many apologists, saw that many

hands were involved in bringing the Bible into existence, and believed, therefore, that much "non-revelatory" material was included in the Bible.

3. *Sidi Gazalba, the Gospels and Adventism*

The other works worth examining are Gazalba's *Dialogues Between Christian Propagandist and Logic*,¹²⁵ *Dialogues Between Christian Adventist and Islam*,¹²⁶ and *The Answers to Christian Critiques of Islam*.¹²⁷ Approaching the issues in conversational style and often using the statements of the writer he refuted, Gazalba covered many important aspects of both Christianity and Islam. The first two books are responses to Adventists¹²⁸ on the nature of Islam, its teachings and the Qur'ân. The last book answers some crucial statements made by Verkuyl in *On Christian's Faith Interpretation to Muslims*.¹²⁹

Like many Muslim apologists, Gazalba was interested in examining the Gospels on everything from their codification to their reliability. He analyzed the history of the four canonical Gospels and many times expressed his objection to them because he judged that they were human-made.¹³⁰ He mentioned that initially the Gospel of Matthew was written in the Arabic language, but that no one knew who translated it into Greek or when it was done.¹³¹ He strongly doubted that Mark himself wrote the Gospel of Mark and surmised it that was probably written by Peter, Mark's teacher. Furthermore, Luke was a private doctor and student of Paul who wrote a Gospel named after himself.¹³² On the last Gospel, Gazalba provided more ample information. John, he said, wrote his Gospel in 96 AD in response to a request by some Christian monks who complained to him that many Christians regarded Jesus only as the Messenger of God and not as His Son. The monks begged him to write a gospel justifying how Jesus was truly God, and so he wrote his Gospel supposedly through revelation.¹³³

Concerning the abrogation of the Bible,¹³⁴ Gazalba's argument is rather interesting. While he believed that abrogation over time occurred intentionally, he also maintained that it was the immediate result of translation, since many words had no equivalents in other languages.¹³⁵ Using foreign words with different connotations, he argued, caused the Bible to be abrogated.¹³⁶ He also argued that there were seven Biblical doctrines which caused Muslims to regard the Bible as inauthentic. Those seven doctrines were the Trinity, the

doctrine of original sin, the crucifixion of Jesus to save humanity, the Christian rejection of Torah teachings, the spreading of Christianity to non-Israelites, the unnecessary of circumcision, and the resurrection of Jesus Christ.¹³⁷

Furthermore, Gazalba's *Dialogues Between a Christian Propagandist and Logic* consisted of fifteen conversations between him (sometimes with his wife in attendance) and Christian preachers from the Church of the Adventists, the Salvation Army and the Jehovah's Witnesses who visited his home. In this book, he subtly revealed and showed his objection to the methods which missionaries used to convert people to Christianity; some went door-to-door, visiting Muslim houses and pretending to be sellers of books on medicine or of Christian books on Darwinian theory, and preaching salvation through Christianity.¹³⁸

Several fruitful discussions were held on topics ranging from the origin of the Bible, the Trinity, and the Omnipotence of God, to life after death. The following is quoted from his hypothetical discussion with a Christian on the bodily resurrection after death, particularly that of sinner:

Adventist (A): Those who commit sin will die forever. Death is the reward for sinners and only through Jesus Christ can someone be resurrected and come to the Kingdom of God.

Gazalba (G): Then, there are many wrongdoers who will not come to hell and many right-doers who will not come to heaven.

(A): Actually there is no heaven and hell. What exists is either eternal death or eternal life in the Kingdom of God.

(G): So, what we commonly call heaven is living in the Kingdom of God?

(A): It may be so. And this [salvation] will only be achieved if we believe in Jesus Christ.

(G): So, one who commits sins but believes in Jesus Christ could come to the Kingdom of God?

(A): According to the Bible, yes.

(G): How about one who does not believe in Jesus Christ?

(A): He will die forever and will never live again.

(G): It seems that your religion does not teach ethics nor does it seek right doing and forbid wrong doing. It is lucky for the sinner because he will not be punished for his wrongdoing.

(A): But, he would die forever, would never be resurrected and would never alive again.

(G): That's what a sinner really wishes. After committing many sins in the world which give him some benefit and satisfaction, he would be glad not to be punished for his sins.¹³⁹

4. *Mohammad Rasjidi and Missionary Methods in Indonesia*

An equally important scholar who wrote influential books and articles on the fragile relationship between Islam and Christianity in Indonesia is Mohammad Rasjidi. He was the first Indonesian Ambassador to Egypt and the first Minister for Religious Affairs who later graduated from Sorbonne University (Paris) and had taught at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University (Montreal).¹⁴⁰ In his spirited defense of "the faith of ummah", he paid little attention to actual Christian doctrine, but rather concentrated on discovering the sophisticated methods adopted by missionaries in bringing new converts to their fold.

Rasjidi stated that his intention was not only to open the eyes of Muslims to what was really happening, but also to uncover how missionaries accordingly tore Indonesia apart.¹⁴¹ He voiced his concern to remind all Indonesians that the development strategy initiated by the government would never be successful as long as religious conflicts remained unsolved.¹⁴² Religious conflict, he argued, would only pave the way to a return to godless communism and would drive the two communities into mutual hostility and theological opposition.

It is my considered opinion that in the last round this will only pave for the anti-God and secularist forces to cast their spell over a people who are still attached to a universal religious tradition. If this happens then let me say frankly, neither it would only Muslims, but also Christians would suffer. There would be no victors nor losers amongst us; Muslims and Christians alike might turn out to be losers and our common enemies gain at our cost.¹⁴³

Rasjidi believed that freedom of religion is one of the basic rights of human beings.¹⁴⁴ At the same time, he also believed that between Islam and Christianity, there were some potential catalysts for change and cooperation, since both are revealed religions which trace their origins to Abraham. Therefore, religious tolerance between the two communities should form the basic foundations of both religious doctrines. Islam, he explained, does not approve of hostility towards other religions; it proclaims religious freedom and forbids religious coercion. In his lifetime, the Prophet was very kind to his neighbors of other faiths. He even married a Jewish woman, Safiyah, and a Christian slave, Mary, who was given by an Egyptian ruler. When he heard that the Christian Abyssinian Emperor had died, he prayed for him in recognition of the help he had rendered to Muslims during the

early days of Islam.¹⁴⁵

Rasjidi held that the spirit of tolerance was also intrinsic to Christian doctrine as found in the Documents of Vatican II, a revolutionary document for its time that saw other religions with esteem and full recognition.¹⁴⁶ He quoted extensively from the Documents stating that "the Church strictly forbids forcing people to convert by unworthy techniques. By the same token she [the Church] also strongly insists on a person's right to be deterred from the faith by unjust vexation on the part of others."¹⁴⁷ According to Rasjidi, the Church had alerted missionaries that "in spreading religious faith and introducing religious practices, everyone ought at all times to refrain from any manner of action which might seem to carry a hint of coercion or of a kind of persuasion that would be dishonorable or unworthy, especially when dealing with poor or uneducated people."¹⁴⁸

Rasjidi agreed that respect and recognition for coexistence between the Muslim and Christian communities had been justified by the Documents of Vatican II, which stated that "upon the Moslems too, the Church looks with esteem. They adore one God living and enduring, merciful and all-powerful, maker of heaven and earth and speaker to men. They strive to submit whole-heartedly even to His inscrutable decree, just as did Abraham with whom the Islamic faith is pleased to associate itself".¹⁴⁹

On this basis, Rasjidi argued that the aggressiveness, ignorance and antipathy of missionaries with respect to Muslim objections to their ongoing evangelization in the Muslim community contradicted not only the noble spirit of the Documents, but also the basic human right to adhere to one's own religion.¹⁵⁰ He regretted that the sacred mission of Christianity to spread love in Indonesia had been carried out in a spirit of superiority and sectarianism. For that reason, in his presentation on religious tolerance at an inter-religious seminar held in Tokyo in 28 October 1968, Rasjidi first quoted the long ethical code for proselytizing proposed by Daniel J. Fleming, professor at the Union Theological Seminary of New York. The code stated that missionaries should pay serious attention to the mission target and that conversion should not be undertaken in an uncivilized manner, such as by denigrating the personalities and beliefs of other people.¹⁵¹

Thus, he discussed the nature of missionary efforts in Indonesia which exploited the people's poverty by distributing rice, clothing, money and medication among the poor and unemployed on the condition that they allow their children to be educated in Christian and

missionary schools.¹⁵² He also asserted that Christians built churches and schools in areas where no Christians lived. In many cases, they eagerly paid two or three times above the market price of land or bought land by using people who had no connection with the church but who later sold it to the church.¹⁵³

In the same spirit, he objected to the system of so-called “foster parents”, whereby students at lower-level schools were encouraged to change their religious belief. He also regretted how Christian youths tried to convert Muslim youths through covert sex or presenting generous gifts and then asking them to come to the church.¹⁵⁴ Another case in point, he outlined, was that uneducated and poor migrants were being targeted and forced to go to churches to get vegetable and rice seeds, foodstuffs, and water pumps on the condition that they would shift their faith into the religion of Christ.¹⁵⁵ According to Rasjidi, to achieve their goals, missionaries did not hesitate to make temporary alliances with vested interest groups, including colonialists. In Rasjidi’s mind, there is no doubt that missionaries worked in Indonesia within a colonial framework which was not religious, but economic and political.¹⁵⁶ Therefore, their mission was always identical to colonialism.¹⁵⁷

Rasjidi concluded that what came to be called the “white man’s burden” maxim, which saw neo-colonialism as a *mission sacree* to enlighten uncivilized cultures was not very religious in spirit.¹⁵⁸ One of its main goals, Rasjidi argued, was to Westernize the Muslim world and to create the conditions whereby Muslims could accept a Western mentality and reject the fundamental tenets of Islam or at least to raise doubts about Islamic principles.¹⁵⁹

Since these efforts jeopardized Muslim belief, he criticized the Indonesian government’s leniency towards evangelization throughout the country.¹⁶⁰ Rasjidi also exhorted his audience to be more thoughtful in discerning the slogan of “modernization” or “being a modern man” which some prominent missionaries and Christian leaders touted in order to attract Muslims. He saw that:

Modernization is used as a plea for Christianizing Muslim people; so also the fundamental human rights. In rehabilitating our country and modernizing it we encounter an obstacle in the mentality of the Christian missionaries who do not respect the faith of the people in the present pluralistic society.¹⁶¹

Rasjidi, however, believed that modernization was essential for the betterment of Indonesian life. What he rejected and strongly criti-

cized was how some missionaries labeled themselves as modern and their religion as modern, while perceiving Muslims as a primitive people with a backward religion.

The missionaries then said: "Oh we really came to Indonesia in order to modernize the Indonesian people who are lagging behind in education and various other spheres of life." In fact it is not only in Indonesia that Islam is compatible with modernism; everywhere else it is not only not incompatible with, but in itself contains the principles of modernism. Among the terms they [Christian missionaries] propagated were modernism and toleration. Just now we heard that word [modernism] mentioned by Dr. Tambunan as a Christian mission. This gives the impression that which is un-Christian [sic] is not modern. Christian represented progress, implying that what is non-Christian is unprogressive. But Christians use the word 'modern' mainly as a means of enticing people to discard Islamic qualities. When we are about to enter the month of fasting, there are people who say that fasting impedes progress and the efficiency of labor, let us be 'modern' and forget fasting.¹⁶²

Moreover, to Rasjidi, the missionary claim of bringing Indonesia into the modern life in accordance with Western values was in fact misleading. This is because many Westerners today no longer consider their way of life as absolute. He agreed with Wilfred Cantwell Smith who once said in *The Faith of Other Men*¹⁶³ that if everything should be in accord with the Western pattern, it would not work but would be resented.¹⁶⁴

Rasjidi's candidness in criticizing the missionary efforts in Indonesia, however, could not be separated from his religious and intellectual milieu. Although he had received his doctoral degree from a Western university, with its "liberal" view of religion, the intellectual discourse in Cairo had influenced Rasjidi more than that of either Paris or Montreal. In this, he resembled Sayyid Qutb, a well-known Egyptian who also obtained a Western education but then went on to be a leading opponent of Western tradition and culture. Rasjidi has been called "fundamentalist" by some young Indonesian Muslims modernists. Interestingly, he welcomed this label and regarded it as a title of honor.¹⁶⁵

Muslim-Christian polemics in Indonesia were greatly influenced by similar discussions in other parts of the Muslim world. Indeed, the influence of erudite Muslim writers, from all parts of the Muslim world, can clearly be discerned in the writings of Indonesian Muslims. Written for a Muslim audience and at a particular point in time, the works described above sought to prevent loss of faith among In-

donesian Muslims. They represent a particular response to Christian proselytization in their respective eras. Their reaction should be understood in the context of the complex relationship existing between the two communities over the centuries. Their response should also be seen as an attempt at asserting equality and an attitude that “we are as good as you” and that “our religion is as important as yours”, a response that was prompted by the world's political condition that gave the West (i.e. Christian) a “superior” position through colonialism and imperialism. There was also substantial response made by Muslims to Christian writers, whose works were very critical of the prophet's life and the origin of the Qur'ân itself --the works that were regarded by the Muslim community as an insult to Islam. Although Muslim responses probably were not convincing to Christians, Muslims, at least, felt better about having responded and convinced themselves that appropriate answers had been given to those attacking works.

End Notes:

1. Initially, this policy was designed as voluntary participation which set aside agrarian land for the plantation farming of certain crops. The villages were divided into four groups; one to grow the crop, one to reap it, one to transport it to the factory for processing, and the last to provide labor for the factory. Payment was made for all labor and the work of European officers in this economical chain was to ensure that cultivation was on time and suitable. However, when the Netherlands experienced serious economic difficulties after 1830, the application of the Cultural Policy was significantly changed. It no longer rested on a voluntary basis but introduced "compulsory cultivation" in which local produce was sold to the colonial government at fixed low prices by way of monopoly. In this manner, Java was gradually transformed into a state-owned plantation in which certain cash crops were cultivated through forced labor. J.S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 117-119. See also, M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 114-119.
2. J.S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (New York: New York University Press, 1956), 223-224.
3. On the economic side it aimed at promoting development with a view to providing financial assistance for the extension of health, education and agricultural services to the population. On the social side, it was intended that the welfare of the villages would be improved, and that democratic self-governance would be promoted, in accordance with the liberal tradition. It also introduced the liberal doctrine of equal law for all people from which some Ethical leaders advocated a unified system of administration, with Europeans and natives together administering uniform law. See Robert van Neil, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1960), 32; 36-38. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 227.
4. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 225.
5. E.G. Singgih, "Contextualisation and Inter-Religious Relationship in Java: Past and Present," *The Asia Journal of Theology* 11, no. 2 (October 1997): 250-252.
6. Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1945* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 162-166; Alwi Shihab, "The Muhammadiyah Movement and its Controversy with Christian Mission" (Ph.D. dissertation Temple University, 1995), 52.
7. Shihab, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 41-44. See Stephen Neill, *A History of Christian Missions*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), 192. More extensive information on missionary activities in the Batak lands is found in Kipp's anthropological field research. See Rita Smith Kipp, *The Early Years of a Dutch Colonial Mission: The Karo Field* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1990), 25-26.
8. An extensive historical description of missionaries activities in Java can be found in Th. Sumartana's *Mission at the Crossroads: Indigenous Churches, European Missionaries, Islamic Association and Socio-Religious Change in Java 1812-1936* (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1993).
9. Hendrik Kraemer, "Sending di Hindia Belanda," in *Politik Etis dan Revolusi Kemerdekaan*, eds. H. Boudet and I.J. Brugmans (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1987), 335. See Neill, *A History of Christian Missions*, 192.

10. Singgih, "Contextualisation and Inter-Religious Relationship in Java," 254.
11. Singgih, "Contextualisation and Inter-Religious Relationship in Java", 254.
12. Chalil, for example, listed the fee differences in amounts given to religious communities as follows: in 1936 the subsidies given to Protestants amounted to f. 686,100, to Catholics f. 286,500, and to Muslims only f. 7,500. In the following years, subsidies to Protestants and Catholics abruptly increased to f. 844,000 and f. 335,700, respectively, and remained at f. 7,600 for Muslims. See Moenawar Chalil, "Pemandangan Sepintas Laloe," *Sinar Baroe*, (July 1943), n.p., as quoted by A. Mukti 'Ali ['Abdul Mu'ti 'Alif], "The Muhammadiyah Movement: A Bibliographical Introduction," (M.A. thesis McGill University, 1957), 56; 80-81. Sidjabat did not agree with Chalil because, according to him, the large sums of money the Christians received were collected by churches abroad and not from the Dutch government. On the contrary, Neill admitted that since "in most cases the village teacher served also as a catechist, the rapid expansion of the work of the church was to a large extent made possible by government money". See Bonar Sidjabat, *Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith: A Study Concerning the Concept of Divine Omnipotence in the Indonesian Constitution in the Light of Islam and Christianity* (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1965), 61-62; compare to Neill, *A History of Christian Missions*, 322-396. See also Aqib Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), 26-28.
13. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia*, 165-175; Shihab, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 53; Suminto, *Politik Islam*, 35. The best analytical description of the ideas which motivated the Islamic reformation is to be found in Azra's work. See Azyumardi Azra, "The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian 'Ulamâ' in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1992). According to a government report issued in 1911, after performing the pilgrimage most of the *hajis* returned to their daily work with no special attention to that of the reformation ideas. This report was seemingly designed to counter Hurgronje's advice to the colonial government to control the *hajis'* activities in the archipelago. See G.F. Pijper, "Politik Islam Pemerintah Belanda," in *Politik Etis dan Revolusi Kemerdekaan*, 240-241.
14. William Montgomery Watt, *Muslim-Christian Encounters* (London: Routledge, 1991), 104-105. See van Neil, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite*, 83-84.
15. Shihab, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 45-46.
16. It is important also to note that if some Muslims questioned the neutrality of the colonial government on matters of religion because it had a negative effects on Islam, by the same token some Christians regarded themselves as victims of the same policy, for it restricted their religious activities by declaring some regions to be off-limits to missionary work. See von Wendelin Wawer, *Muslims and Christen in der Republik Indonesia* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1974), 323.
17. Carl F. Hallencreutz, *Kraemer Towards Tambaram*, 161. See also Mikha Joedhiswara, "Hendrik Kraemer and Inter-religious Relations in Indonesia," *Asia Journal of Theology* 9, no. 1 (1995): 92.
18. The reference is, of course, to the appearance of fascist regimes in Italy, Spain and Germany. Hendrik Kraemer, *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World* (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1938), 353. See B.J. Boland and I. Farjon, *Islam in Indonesia: A Bibliographical Survey 1600-1942 with Post-1945 Addenda* (Dordrecht The Netherlands: Foris Publication Holland, 1983), 46.

19. Kraemer, *The Christian Message*, 220; Shihab, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 41.
20. Kraemer, *The Christian Message*, 46.
21. Hendrik Kraemer, *Agama Islam*, 1st ed. (Bandung: N.V. u/h A.C. Nix & Co, 1928; 3d ed. reprint, Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Kristen, 1952).
22. Kraemer, *Agama Islam*, 41.
23. Kraemer, *Agama Islam*, 43.
24. Kraemer, *Agama Islam*, 31.
25. Muhammad Natsir, *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia* (Bandung: CV Bulan Sabit & CV Peladjar, 1969), 37-39. See also Sumartana, *Mission at the Crossroads*, 329-330.
26. A.D. Haanie, *Islam Menentang Kraemer* (Yogyakarta: Penyiaran Islam, 1929).
27. Kraemer, *Agama Islam*, 48; Sumartana, *Mission at the Crossroads*, 329; 348.
28. Haanie, *Islam Menentang Kraemer*, 85.
29. Haanie, *Islam Menentang Kraemer*, 82; see Sumartana, *Mission at the Crossroads*, 329.
30. Kraemer, *Agama Islam*, 26.
31. Haanie, *Islam Menentang Kraemer*, 82; and Sumartana, *Mission at the Crossroads*, 331.
32. As cited by Karel Steenbrink in *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam* (Amsterdam: Rodopy B.V., 1993), 118-119.
33. Steenbrink in *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam*, 118-119.
34. Muhammad Natsir, "Islam, Katholiek, Pemerintah," *Pembela Islam* 33 (1931): 2-7. See Natsir, *Islam dan Kristen*, 37-43.
35. Natsir, *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia*, 41.
36. According to Ihza, Natsir felt a strong religious responsibility to draw Islamic teachings directly from original sources since too many depreciative works on Islam had been launched by his fellow Indonesians and he felt that they were critical of the interpretation of Islam in common life rather than the actual teachings themselves. See Yusril Ihza, "Combining Activism and Intellectualism: The Biography of Muhammad Natsir," *Studia Islamika* 2, no. 1 (1995): 132.
37. Natsir, *Moehammad als Profet*, reprinted by Persatuan Islam (Bandung: Penerbit Persatuan Islam, 1930). See Ihza, "Combining Activism," 133.
38. See Natsir, "Ruh Suci," *Pembela Islam* 13 (1930): 5-10. Reprinted in *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia*, 18-23.
39. Natsir, *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia*, 21-23.
40. As cited by Howard M. Federspiel in *Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, 1970), 107-108.
41. Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam*, 108.
42. The *Persatuan Islam* was a modernist organization established in 1923 in Bandung West Java. Among its most prominent leaders was Ahmad Hassan, a Singaporean by origin who was born in 1887, and was a former journalist in the *Utusan Melayu* newspaper in Singapore. For an account of his life and his modern *ijtihad*, see Tamar Djaya, *Riwayat Hidup A. Hassan* (Jakarta: Mutiara, 1980) and Akh. Minhaji, "Ahmad Hassan and Islamic Legal Reform in Indonesia, 1887-1958" (Ph.D dissertation, McGill University, 1997).
43. Ahmad Hassan, *Ketochanan Jesoes Menoeroet Bijbel* (Bandung: Persatuan Islam, 1940). See also Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam*, 108.
44. Hassan, *Ketochanan Jesoes*, 34-35. See Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam*, 110.
45. Hassan, *Ketochanan Jesoes*, 5. Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam*, 109.

46. Hassan, *Isa dan Agamanja: Djawaban Terhadap Buku 'Isa didalam Alquran'* (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1958). This book was a response to that of an adventist Rifai Boerhanoe'ddin, *Isa didalam Alquran* (Bandung: Indonesia Publishing House, 1956).
47. Carl F. Hallencreutz, *Kraemer Towards Tambaram* (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells, 1966), 160.
48. An excellent analysis of the common Western view of Islam is found in Norman Daniel's, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1960; reprint, Oxford: One World, 1997).
49. For more information on the issue see W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad at Mecca* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 101-109. See also Karen Armstrong, *Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 108-133.
50. Significantly, a number of devout Muslims belonged to this first group, for they believed that Islam is a religion for basic human personal beliefs and not an ideological system. See BJ Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal, -Land- en Volkenkunde, 1982), 8. Like Boland, Noer believed that the idea of the separation of religion and state held by these "religious" politicians resulted from the educational system introduced by the Dutch, which produced secularly-oriented intellectuals. See Deliar Noer, "Islam as a Political Force in Indonesia," *Mizan* 1, no. 4 (1984): 35-36.
51. An extensive study of this gentleman's agreement, which later was given the title of the "Jakarta Charter" was conducted by Ashari. See [Endang] Saifuddin Ashari, "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the Gentleman's Agreement between the Islamic and the Secular Nationalists in Modern Indonesia," (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1976). See Azyumardi Azra, "The Long Struggle of Islam's Largest Nation," *Mizan* 1, no. 1 (January 1984): 74-75; Nurcholish Madjid, "Islam in Indonesia: Challenges and Opportunities," *Mizan* 1, no. 3 (1984): 74-75.
52. Deliar Noer, *Administration of Islam in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, 1978), 11.
53. Noer, *Administration of Islam*, 8-9.
54. Noer, *Administration of Islam*, 12-13.
55. Wawer, *Muslime und Christien*, 144-145.
56. Muhammad Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1 (Jakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1959), 457 as is quoted by Noer, *Administration of Islam*, 11.
57. Noer, *Administration of Islam*, 14.
58. Sidjabat, *Religious Tolerance*, 60.
59. Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1958), 176.
60. Victor Tanja, "Islamic Resurgence in Indonesia and Christian Response," *The Asia Journal of Theology* 2, no. 2 (1991): 364-365.
61. Christine Schirrmacher, "Muslim Apologetics and The Agra Debates of 1854: A Nineteenth Century Turning Point," *The Bulletin of the Henry Martyn Institute of Islamic Studies* 13, no. 1 (1) (January-June 1994): 78-79.
62. Robert Davidson and Leaney, *Biblical Criticism*, ed. R.P.C. Hanson (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1970), 11-12.
63. Rahmat Allah al-Hindî al-Kairânâwî, *Izhâr al-Haqq*, ed. Aÿmad Hijazî al-Saqqâ (Al-Qâhira: Dâr al-Turâth, 1977).

64. Hasbullah Bakry, *Isa dalam Qur'an Muhammad dalam Bible* (Solo: Siti Syamsiah, 1959).
65. F.L. Bakker, *Tuhan Yesus dalam Agama Islam* (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1957).
66. See my writing on Hasbullah Bakry. Ismatu Ropi, "Muslim-Christian Encounter in Post-Colonial Indonesia," *Hamdard Islamicus* XXI, No. 2 (April-June 1998): 49-54; see also Ismatu Ropi, "Muslim-Christian Polemic in Indonesia Islamic Literature," *Islam Christian Muslim Relations* 9, vol. 3 (July 1998): 217-229
67. O. Hashem, *Keesaan Tuhan: Sebuah Pembahasan Ilmiah* (Surabaya: JAPI, 1962).
68. Hashem, *Keesaan Tuhan*, 56-60.
69. Hashem, *Keesaan Tuhan*, 18-28.
70. Fulton J. Sheen, *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy* (London: Longmans, 1930). See Hashem, *Keesaan Tuhan*, 4-5.
71. The original title of Crane Brinton's book was *The Shaping of Modern Thought* (New York: Spectrum Book, 1963).
72. Hashem, *Keesaan Tuhan*, 29-30.
73. Hashem, *Keesaan Tuhan*, 32-33.
74. Hashem, *Keesaan Tuhan*, 33.
75. Charles Francis Potter, *The Lost Years of Jesus Revealed* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1958). See Hashem, *Keesaan Tuhan*, 76-77.
76. Hashem, *Keesaan Tuhan*, 78.
77. Hashem, *Keesaan Tuhan*, 79.
78. Umar Hasyim, *Toleransi dan Kemerdekaan dalam Islam Sebagai Dasar Menuju Dialog dan Kerukunan Antar Agama* (Surabaya: PT. Bina Ilmu, 1977), 270.
79. *Suara Muhammadiyah* 25, no. 35 (1963): 5; Wawer, *Muslime und Christien*, 218-219; Bisjron A. Wardy, *Memahami Kegiatan Nasrani* (Jogjakata: Muhammadiyah, 1964); and Umar Hasyim, *Toleransi dan Kemerdekaan*, 270-273.
80. In general Christian leaders questioned the authenticity of this pamphlet and regarded its assertions as far-fetched. See Wawer, *Muslime und Christien*, 235.
81. *Panji Masyarakat* 17, no. 1 (1967): 4; Wawer, *Muslime und Christien*, 234-235.
82. Hasyim, *Toleransi dan Kemerdekaan*, 272.
83. Hasyim, *Toleransi dan Kemerdekaan*, 272-273.
84. There are many versions of who the real actors of this attempted coup were. The public in Indonesia saw the PKI as the main actors, while some saw it as an internal conflict within the Indonesian army. See Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1978); Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth McVey, *Preliminary Analysis of the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971); Caldwell and Utrecht, *Indonesia: An Alternative History* (Sidney: Alternative Publishing Cooperative Limited, 1979); and Brian May, *The Indonesia Tragedy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).
85. Hamish McDonald. *Soeharto's Indonesia* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1980), 66-67.
86. Clifford Geertz, "Religious Change and Social Order in Soeharto's Indonesia," *Asia* 27 (Autumn 1972): 68-69.
87. Some tried to join Islam as many Chinese became Muslim at this point in time. However, the number was very minimal. See Martin Goldsmith, *Islam and Christian Witness* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1982), 144-145. Compare to Avery T. William Jr., *Indonesia Revival: Why Two Million Came to Christ* (California: William Carey Library, 1978), 102-104.

88. Clifford Geertz, "Religious Change and Social Order in Soeharto's Indonesia," 68. The estimate of communist members and their supporters killed varied greatly ranging from 160,000 to 500,000 depending on which sources were cited. See Brian May, *The Indonesia Tragedy*, 120.
89. John Roxborough, "Context and Continuity: Regional Patterns in the History of Southeast Asian Christianity," *Asian Journal of Theology* 9, no. 1 (1995): 41. See also Wawer, *Muslims*, 221-222.
90. Nawaz B. Mody, *Indonesia under Soeharto* (New York: Apt Books, 1987), 151-153.
91. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, 99-105.
92. An extensive study is well done by Karl D. Jackson, *Tradition Authority, Islam and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesia Political Behavior* (California: University of California Press, 1980). See also Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, 54-62.
93. See Barbara S. Harvey, *Permesia: A Half Rebellion* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1977).
94. Alan A. Samson, "Army and Islam in Indonesia," *Asian Survey* 4, no. 4 (Winter 1971-1972): 545-547. Although Soeharto later permitted the initiation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia ("Parmusi" or Indonesian Muslim Party), for some Muslim politicians, it was no more than a government-oriented party that voiced government interests. See K.E. Ward, *The Foundation of Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970).
95. Harold Crouch, "The Trend to Authoritarianism: The Post-1945 Period," in *The Development of Indonesian Society From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*, ed. Harry Aveling (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980): 166-204.
96. For a detailed and comprehensive analysis, see Susan Seldon Purdy, "Legitimization of Power and Authority in a Pluralistic State: Pancasila and Civil Religion in Indonesia" (Ph.D. dissertation Columbia University, 1985). See also Eka Darmaputera, *Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988).
97. R. William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 55, no. 3 (August 1996): 621-622.
98. R.A.F. Paul Webb, "The View from Australia: Christian and Muslim in Contemporary Indonesia," *Asia Journal of Theology* 2, no. 2 (1988): 396-397.
99. As Roxborough noted, the membership of churches after the political chaos grew tremendously by more than 2.5 million new adherents in five years. Within forty years, the statistical portion of Christian population increased from 2.8 percent to 7.4 percent. Roxborough, "Context and Continuity," 41.
100. Alwi Shihab, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 306-307. Compare to Webb, "The View from Australia," 397. Bambang Pranowo found in his recent research on the ex-communist home-base in the surrounding Merapi-Merbabu villages that the conversions to Christianity and Hinduism were not always permanent, for many of them returned to their previous religious orientation, especially Islam. Most were uncomfortable with the way of Christians conducted their "religious performance", such as singing. Bambang Pranowo, "Islam and Party Politics in Rural Java," *Studia Islamika* 1, no. 2, (1994): 3-19.
101. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, 228-229.
102. This Gospel originated as an Italian manuscript discovered in Amsterdam in the eighteenth century. It was translated into Arabic earlier in this century, probably, by the Indian Raḥmat Allah al-Kairânâwî (d. 1891), or by the Eyp-

- tian Rashid Ridâ (d. 1935). Kate Zebiri, *Muslims and Christians Face to Face* (London: OneWorld, 1997). 45-46. See also Christine Schirrmacher, "Muslim Apologetics and The Agra Debates of 1854: A Nineteenth Century Turning Point," *The Bulletin of The Henry Martyn Institute of Islamic Studies* 13, no. 1 (1) (January-June 1994), 79; and Jean-Marie Gaudéul, *Encounters and Clashes: Islam and Christianity in History*, vol. I (Rome: Pontificio Istituto di Studi Arabi e Islamici, 1990), 207-208.
103. *Indjil Barnabas* (Bandung-Surabaya: Pelita-JAPI, 1970). See K.H. Anwar Musaddad, *Kedudukan Indjil Barnabas Menurut Islam* (Bandung: Pelita, 1970).
 104. Joesoef Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls: Penemuan Terbesar Dalam Adab Ke-XX* (Medan: Penerbit Intisari, 1967).
 105. A. Powell Davies, *The Meaning of the Dead Sea Scroll* (New York: New American Library, 1956). See Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls*, 18.
 106. It is clear, as Sou'yb argued, that the Messenger of God mentioned is the Prophet of Muhammad. Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls*, 7.
 107. Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls*, 20-23; 30-34.
 108. Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls*, 8; 24.
 109. Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls*, 24.
 110. Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls*, 15-16.
 111. Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls*, 16.
 112. According to its historical chronology, those sects and teachings, were Arianism, Athanasianism, Adoptionism, Apollinarianism, Donatism, Decetism, Euty-chianism, Gnosticism, Novatianism, Nestorianism, Sabellianism, Iconism, Iconoclasm, Monotheletism, Simonism, Celibacy and Infallibility. See Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls*, 58-68.
 113. Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls*, 68-69.
 114. Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls*, 6; 24.
 115. Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls*, 15.
 116. Sou'yb, *Sekitar Dead Sea Scrolls*, 47.
 117. Djarnawi Hadikusuma, *Di Sekitar Perjandjian Lama dan Perjandjian Baru* (Jogjakarta: Penerbit Persatuan, n.d.).
 118. Hadikusuma, *Di Sekitar Perjandjian Lama*, 6.
 119. It is unclear whether this statement is his own or based on another source since the bibliography is absent from his book. In the text, he only mentioned one book: *New Heaven and a New Earth* (New York: International Bible Student Association, n.d.).
 120. Hadikusuma, *Di Sekitar Perjandjian Lama*, 11-12.
 121. Hadikusuma, *Di Sekitar Perjandjian Lama*, 16-28.
 122. Hadikusuma, *Di Sekitar Perjandjian Lama*, 48.
 123. Hadikusuma, *Di Sekitar Perjandjian Lama*, 29.
 124. Hadikusuma, *Di Sekitar Perjandjian Lama*, 29.
 125. Sidi Gazalba, *Dialog Antara Propagandis Kristen dan Logika* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1971).
 126. Sidi Gazalba, *Dialog Antara Kristen Advent dan Islam* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1972).
 127. Sidi Gazalba, *Djawaban Atas Kritik Kristen Terhadap Islam* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang 1971).
 128. Adventism, or Seventh day Adventism, is one of the most vigorous evangelical Christian denominations founded in 1782 by William Miller. This denomina-

- tion, initiated to anticipate the imminent Second Coming of Christ, gives a very special interpretation to the apocalyptic visions found in some books of the Bible, notably Revelation. See William Sims Bainbridge, *The Sociology of Religious Movement* (London: Routledge, 1997), 89-119. Adventism has been introduced in Indonesia since 1920's and the main center of its activities is in Bandung, West Java.
129. Verkuyl, "Tentang Interpretasi Iman Kristen Kepada Orang-Orang Muslim," *Buletin Lembaga Penyelidikan Pekabaran Indjil*, jubilee number (n.d.).
 130. Gazalba, *Dialog Antara Kristen Advent*, 14.
 131. Gazalba, *Dialog Antara Kristen Advent*, 40.
 132. Gazalba, *Dialog Antara Kristen Advent*, 41; *Dialog Antara Propagandis Kristen*, 60.
 133. Gazalba, *Dialog Antara Kristen Advent*, 41.
 134. In Muslim polemical literature, "abrogation" refers to the idea that earlier religions such as Judaism and Christianity were abrogated by God after the coming of Islam. In the case of the Bible, in spite of some of Biblical verses were revealed, many Muslims believe that some verses of the Old and New Testaments were concealed and deleted as well as distorted and rewritten in order to support the church doctrines. See Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, *Intertwined Worlds: Medieval Islam and Bible Criticism* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 20-21; 35-40.
 135. Gazalba, *Djawaban Atas Kritik*, 44.
 136. Gazalba, *Dialog Antara Kristen Advent*, 37. See also his *Djawaban Atas Kritik*, 44-46.
 137. Gazalba, *Djawaban Atas Kritik*, 20-21.
 138. Gazalba, *Dialog Antara Propagandis Kristen*, 33; 38-47; 50-51.
 139. Gazalba, *Dialog Antara Propagandis Kristen*, 68-69.
 140. His biography is found in a special book commemorating his seventieth birthday. See, Endang Basri Ananda, ed., *70 Tahun Prof. Dr. H.M. Rasjidi* (Jakarta: Harian Umum Pelita, 1985).
 141. Mohammad Rasjidi, "Christian Mission in the Muslim World: The Role of Christian Missions The Indonesian Experience," *International Review of Mission* 65 (1976), 430.
 142. See Azyumardi Azra, "Guarding the Faith of the Ummah: The Religio-Intellectual Journey of Mohammad Rasjidi," *Studia Islamika* 1, No. 2 (1994): 108; Rosihan Anwar, "Prof. Dr. H.M. Rasjidi Pengungkap Gamblang," in *70 Tahun Prof. Dr. H.M. Rasjidi*, 161.
 143. Rasjidi, "Christian Mission in the Muslim World," 434-435.
 144. On his views concerning religious freedom, see his *Kebebasan Beragama* (Jakarta: Fajar Shadiq, 1979).
 145. Mohammad Rasjidi, "Unity and Diversity in Islam," in *Islam: The Straight Path*, ed. Kenneth W. Morgan (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958): 427.
 146. Mohammad Rasjidi, *Dari Rasjidi dan Maududi Kepada Paus Paulus II* (Surabaya: Penerbit Documenta, 1971).
 147. Rasjidi, *Dari Rasjidi*, 20. See also Walter M. Abbot S.J., ed., *The Documents of Vatican II* (New York: Guild Press, 1966), 600.
 148. Rasjidi, *Dari Rasjidi*, 21 and Abbot, *The Documents*, 682.
 149. Rasjidi, *Kebebasan Beragama*, 17-18. See also Rasjidi, *Dari Rasjidi*, 18 and Ab-

- bot, *The Documents*, 682.
150. Rasjidi, "Christian Mission in the Muslim World," 435.
 151. Daniel J. Fleming, "A Code of Ethics," in *Relations Among Religions Today* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1963). See Anwar, "Prof. Dr. H.M. Rasjidi Pengungkap Gamblang Hubungan Antar Agama di Indonesia," 157-164.
 152. Muhammad Rasjidi, *Mengapa Aku Tetap Memeluk Agama Islam* (Jakarta: Huda-ya, 1968), 15; "Christian Mission in the Muslim World," 429-430. Compare to Azra, "Guarding the Faith of the Ummah," 106-109.
 153. Rasjidi, *Mengapa Aku Tetap*, 15.
 154. Rasjidi, "Christian Mission in the Muslim World," 430.
 155. Rasjidi, "Christian Mission in the Muslim World," 431. Like Rasjidi, Noer shows that there were, in migrant areas, some Christians who pretended to be Muslims. They established contact with a nearby church and then sent the petitions to the local government to establish their own churches. See, Deliar Noer, "Contemporary Political Dimensions of Islam," in *Islam in South-East Asia*, ed. M.B. Hooker (Leiden: E.J. Brill. 1983), 198.
 156. Mohammad Rasjidi, *Sikap Umat Islam Terhadap Ekspansi Kristen* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1975), 16.
 157. Mohammad Rasjidi, *Sidang Raya Dewan Gereja Sedunia di Jakarta 1975 Merupakan Tantangan Terhadap Dunia Islam* (Jakarta: Dewan Da'wah Islamiyah Indonesia, 1974), 11-14.
 158. Rasjidi, *Sidang Raya Dewan Gereja*, 11.
 159. Rasjidi, *Sikap Umat Islam*, 17.
 160. Anwar, "Prof. Dr. H.M. Rasjidi Pengungkap Gamblang," 161.
 161. Wawer, *Muslims und Christien*, 265.
 162. Mohammad Rasjidi, "Usaha Mengkristenkan Indonesia dan Dunia," *Suara Muhammadiyah* 1-2 (January 1968): 3-4, as quoted by Azra, "Guarding the Faith of the Ummah," 111.
 163. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Faith of Other Men* (New York: New American Library, 1963).
 164. Mohammad Rasjidi, "Modernisme dan Toleransi," in *Toleransi dan Kemerde-kaan*, 401-411. See also his *Kebebasan Beragama*, 21-23.
 165. Azra, "Guarding the Faith of the Ummah," 109. Concerning Rasjidi's critiques of missionaries, some moderate Christians like Ihromi who wrote a *festschrift* for his book, admitted that he, like Rasjidi, disagreed with the way that mis-sionaries tried to attract Indonesians to Christianity. To him, "it is disgraceful to Christianize people by way of rice, medication, schooling and employment". See, Ihromi, "Hubungan Antaragama," in *70 Tahun Prof. Dr. H.M. Rasjidi*, 167-171. Azra, "Guarding the Faith of the Ummah," 109.

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