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In Search of Identity:
The Contemporary Islamic Communities
in Southeast Asia

خلاصة: أثار النقاش عن المجتمع المدني (*civil society*) في سائر بلدان المسلمين في العـــالم سؤالا في غاية الأهمية وهو ما ذا نرى في حركات المسلمين ذات الاتجاه الانطوائي التي تتطور أسرع مما كان عليه في السابق في مناخ المجتمع المدني.

وغني عن القول أن حركات المسلمين ذات الاتجاه الانطوائي في بقـــاع الأرض، ولا يخلو منها جنوب آسيا الشرقي، ظهرت كرد فعل لعملية التجديد والتحديث الــتي تميل إلى طرح بعض أعضاء المجتمع جانبا سواء من الناحية الاجتماعية أم الاقتصاديـــة أم السياسية أم الدينية، فالاتجاه العلماني في حركة التجديد يمنع الحركات الإسلامية من أن تلعب دورا في حلبة السياسة القومية بمختلف الدول الإسلامية. وفي مثل هذه الظـــروف حاولت الحركات الإسلامية أن تخرج عن مسيرة التجديد، وهذا يظهر جليا في نزعتهم إلى إنشاء أفكار بديلة عن التجديد.

ومن ناحية أخرى فتعتبر الحركات الدينية ذات الاتجاه الانطوائي حركة تـــورط المسلمين في الإطار العام الذي يفسح مجالا لتقديم الآراء حريا. وظهرت مـــن خـــلال سيطرة الحكومة على حرية المجتمع الحركات المعارضة منها الحركات الدينية التي تحـــلول على نيل تلك الحرية. وبموجب ذلك، تعد الحركات الدينية ذات الاتجــاه الانطوائـــي حركات المستضعفين المعارضة للحكومة ليكون لهم حظهم في أخذ القرار السياســـي على المستوى الحكومي. ويجدر بالذكر أن هذه الحركة تؤثر على إنشاء دولة إســـلامية بدلا من أتباع الأفكار التي أدلاها الحكومة. ومن جراء ذلك إن الآراء المقابلة للســيطرة تفسح مجالا لتشكيل الأساس لتطور المجتمع المدني.

ويتناول هذا البحث عددا من الحركات الدينية ذات الاتجاه الانطوائي التي نشأت في أوائل فترة السبعينات بإندونيسيا وماليزيا. والحركات التي يتناولها هذا البحث هـــي

"دار الأرقام" (DA) و"جماعة إصلاح ماليزيا" (JIM) بماليزيا، ثم جماعة "هداية الله" بسمارندا (Samarinda) وجماعة "دار التوحيد" بباندونج (Bandung)، وجماعة "التراث الإسلامي" بيجياكرتا و"برامادينا" (Paramadina) وتزكية سجاتي (Tazkiya Sejati) بجاكرتا. وكان البحث في ذلك يستهدف إعطاء فكرة عن إسهام تلك الحركات الإسلامية في تطوير المجتمع المدني بتلكما الدولتين الإسلاميتين.

ومن الملاحظ أن للحركات المذكورة نزعتين ضروريتين: أولا، تراقب حركة دار الأرقام وجماعة هداية الله ودار التوحيد وجماعة التراث الإسلامي قضية تخلف المسلمين على الصعود الاجتماعية والاقتصادية والسياسية. ومن أجل ذلك تحاول على تقديم الآراء البديلة وتطويرها وتكافح من أجل رخاء المسلمين. ويترقب على هذا الموقف ظهور موقفهم المقاوم على الحكومة. وأما بالنسبة لجماعة الإصلاح ماليزيا وبرامادينا وتزكية سجاتي فكانت تجاهد من أجل تكوين مجتمع إسلامي متقدم وديناميكي يستطيع أن يواجه تحديات الزمان؛ وخلافا لما عليه موقف النزعة الأولى فإن هؤلاء يبدون موقفا أكثر تسامحا مع سلطان الدولة.

ونرى من خلال دراسة تلك الحركات الإسلامية ثلاث قضايا هامة. أولاها، تشير الحركات محاولة بعض المسلمين على تحقيق المجتمع الإسلامي الأصيل. وظهر هذا الاتجاه بينا في عزمهم على اتخاذ الإسلام مبدأ لحركاتهم بدلا من قبول آراء الحكومة. وعلاوة على ذلك، عملت دار الأرقام وجماعة هداية الله ودار التوحيد على إنشاء المجتمع الإسلامي المثالي. وثانيتها في الحركات النزعة الصوفية قضية هامة لحياتهم الدينية. وثالثتها، ليس من المستحيل أن تبدو من خلال الحركات حركات السياسة الثائرة ردا لسيطرة الحكومة.

ونعلم من وجهة تطوير المجتمع المدني أن ظهور تلك الحركات الإسلامية دليل على تطور حركات المجتمع المدني بجنوب آسيا الشرقي وعلى رأسها إندونيسيا وماليزيا. وتمشي الحركات الإسلامية ذات الاتجاه الانطوائي في بعض قضاياها مع ظهور الجمعيات المستقلة في المجتمع. والحركات الإسلامية وسيلة عن وسائل بعض المسلمين لعرض آرائهم المستقلة عن الحكومة. وذلك بالإضافة إلى أنها من وسائلهم للاشتراك في النقاش عن القضايا الاجتماعية والسياسية علنا ولفتح باب النقاش لغيرها من الحركات عن واقعيتهم. وبناء على ذلك كله، فمن الجدير أن تعد الحركات الإسلامية من إحدى وسائل المجتمع للاشتراك في تطوير الديموقراطية.

L   ike other parts of the Muslim world at the end of the twen-
    tieth century, Southeast Asia is witnessing a proliferation
    of contemporary Islamic movements—religious communi-
ties that are highly assertive in their efforts to implement various
"Islamic visions" in educational, social, economic and political
arenas. Particular forms of Islam, such as Sufism, puritanism and
(neo)fundamentalism, are apparently being absorbed into such
movements. There is a strong desire to imitate and revive the
'Golden Age of Islam', which is perceived to be the pure, ideal
Islam, upon which contemporary life should be based. On the
other hand, through "re-Islamization", the movements offer a new
model of modern society altogether, and a critique of the "West-
ern" way of life. To some extent, they convey a desire to advance
values distinctly different from Western models and to counter
what is perceived as rampant Westernization in traditional societ-
ies. It is interesting, however, that the movements' are concerned
with expanding economic development, adopting high technol-
ogy, and using new media as a means to communicate their vi-
sions and messages.

The advent of contemporary Islamic movements cannot be dis-
associated from the processes of modernization and globalization
that have brought about rapid social change. The spread of lit-
eracy and higher education, the development of communication
media, urbanization, as well as national political integration, un-
doubtedly have played a crucial role in this change,[1] particularly
in the production of large urban populations and new middle
classes. In the process of modernization, which is marked to some
extent by secularization, some segments of Muslim societies have
inevitably been marginalized. They have been afforded little sta-
tus or power, and have often been excluded from modern devel-
opment processes. There has been little opportunity for them to
participate in the political spheres of many nation-states. Certain
political orders have even been inclined to develop public policies
against the expression of Muslim politics. Islamic movements that
have reacted to such occurrences have further been accelerated by
the vagaries of globalization, which drives people to resent the
loss of control over their lives, over their societies, over their states,
and above all over their fate of the Earth.[2] In light of these obser-
vations then, a hypothesis can be put forward that contemporary
Islamic movements represent projects that offer not only protec-

tion from insecurity, disintegration, and tough competition in capitalist-urban environments, but also a unique response and contribution to the processes of modernization and globalization.

Elaborating on Weber's theory of modernization, which views the tendencies toward different types of rationalization at work with their own autonomous principles, Jürgen Habermas proposes a theory that highlights the significance of civil society within the process of modernization. According to him, civil society represents a novel reality and a type of freedom that is different from the past. It embodies subjective and principled freedom, which emphasizes the rational pursuit of self-interest, the equal right to participate in political decision-making, and ethical autonomy and self-realization. This principle arises from the struggle of civil society in encouraging the rise of the public sphere, a realm of social life, which allows private individuals to freely express and publish their opinions concerning various matters of general interest. Within this realm, the issues bearing on the exercise of political power by the state can be discussed openly alongside the standards of rational and critical debate.[3] Of central importance in this notion is the existence of a vibrant public sphere, which allows different voices to be heard in the context of egalitarian communication.

When the spaces for participation in the public sphere are clogged by the dominance of a state hegemony,[4] resistance from within civil society to regain those spaces appears to be inescapable. This resistance may take manifold forms, one of which is a religious movement. Contemporary Islamic movements can thus be conceived of as a site of resistance within civil society, which attempts to make marginalized voices heard in public life. Since hegemony is maintained through discourse,[5] contemporary Islamic movements often attempt to produce discourses that are different from that produced by the state, by, among others methods, criticizing the national-secular expressions of politics and advocating the formation of an Islamic state. Implicit in this argument is the idea that contemporary Islamic movements have generated a counter-hegemonic discourse, which is quite possibly shaping the foundations of civil society in many countries.

The public sphere is highly necessary particularly in the context of the legitimation crises facing many contemporary societies and modern institutions that have failed to ensure economic

growth and political stability.[6] Such crises have ironically been more articulated when the intellectuality and welfare of people at large have increased significantly. According to Habermas, the phenomenon of new social movements is related to this legitimation crisis. They are reactions against the internal colonization of the life-world and the penetration of economic and administrative rationality into everyday life produced by states in their attempt to avoid such crises. As a reaction, the new social movements provide avenues for the development of new values and identities, as well as novel interpretations of social life, and represent the main vehicles by which communicative rationality can be brought into public life. Thus, the new social movements are as much struggling to define their relationship to the emergence of new forms of instrumental and communicative knowledge as they are responding to economic and social changes.[7]

One important factor that frequently results in a legitimation crisis is the process of globalization, a term used to refer to the creation and intensification of worldwide social relations that have blurred the existing geographical, social, and political boundaries, where a growing interdependence on a global whole and cross-cultural intervention are inescapable.[8] When analyzing contemporary religious movements in the Muslim world in connection with the process of globalization, Manuel Castells argues that the advent of contemporary Islamic movements belongs to the consequences of globalization. His argument is that, when, within the global constellation, modern nation-states are incapable of integrating urban masses through economic welfare, and the Muslim clergy through official sanction of their religious power, a reaction would inevitably appears against the existing order. This resistance may take the form of a call to return back to a primary identity, constructed by working on "traditional materials in the formation of a new godly, communal world, where deprived masses and disaffected intellectuals may reconstruct meaning in a global alternative to the exclusionary global order".[9]

In the search for this primary identity, the strong emphasis of Islam on communal life and social responsibility is particularly appealing.[10] Within communal life, contemporary Islamic movements find a new force whereby they can express their notions, visions and certainly empower themselves. However, the communality pattern does not necessarily mean anti-modernity.

Although Bryan Wilson associates the disappearance of the communal system with modernity, he recognizes that modern societies often still need the language of community because there appears to be no other languages in which loyalties and goodwill can be established.[11] The communal system functions to establish and maintain the loyalties of members of a movement working toward a common goal. It is not difficult to imagine that under the umbrella of communality, a network of trust relationships can easily be established. The network might develop into a form of "social capital", which facilitates "coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit".[12]

Within this context, Sufism provides not only spiritual discourse but also the basis of communal life in some contemporary Islamic movements. However, it is not in the sense of the traditional Sufi orders, which emphasize the search for the ultimate goal of life as a result of the tension with the world, nor inward-looking mystics whose goals are geared towards achieving the highest stage of the vertical man-God relationship. Rather, it is a type of creative synthesis of the existing world order, which lies mainly in its tendencies to promote the esoteric dimension of Islam, as well as its side that shows respect for pluralism and tolerance. The elements of Sufism that have been adopted by certain contemporary Islamic movements at times have promoted a synergy that encourages the development of civil society.

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the contribution of contemporary Islamic movements to the rise of the public sphere in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia. Implicit in this idea of "contribution" is the empowerment of Muslims as once disenfranchised groups within the context of the development of civil society. This analysis includes consideration of the following movements: The most phenomenal "Darul Arqam", a Kuala Lumpur-based movement that was banned by the Southeast Asian authorities in mid 1994. With its own characteristics, "JIM (Malaysian Reformation Community)" is also interesting to study within the context of the political transformation of Malaysia. In the case of Indonesia, we encounter such contemporary movements as "Jamaah Hidayatullah" and "Darut Tauhid", two movements that exhibit a strong desire to empower Muslims in the social and economic realms. There is also a religious community known as "Jamaah Al-Turath al-Islami", that tends to with-

draw from the public sphere, yet maintains some hope to play a role in the political arena at some point. With their prominent characteristics as urban-elite Islamic groups, "Paramadina" and "Tazkiya Sejati", two religious learning centers led by two prominent Indonesian Muslim thinkers, Nurcholish Madjid and Jalaluddin Rakhmat respectively, are also to be included into this paper. Notwithstanding their great diversity, these movements constitute a site of resistance within civil society that attempts to give voice to the general interests of the marginalized within the constellation of modernization and globalization. It is recognized that in promoting something of a uniform discourse on Islam that advances an alternative to the existing world order, a certain amount of anxiety and uncertainty is generated.

The Political and Social Background
Indonesia

Contemporary Islamic movements in Southeast Asia seem to have evolved in correlation with the political and social changes arising from the acceleration of development programs conducted by the governments within the area under discussion. In the case of Indonesia, for instance, the movements began to emerge when the New Order, driven by Soeharto, came to power after bringing Soekarno down in 1966. Being aware that Soekarno's failure might have been caused by his focus on ideological and political affairs that resulted in never-ending tension between religion and the state, Soeharto decided to go focus on a strategy of development and modernization. Consequently, religious expressions were marginalized in the political process, in spite of the considerable role that was played by Muslims in bringing the New Order into existence. The quest for the revitalization of Muslim politics was rejected by Soeharto, under the shadows of his two primary advisers, Ali Moertopo and Soejono Hoemardani. Rather, a policy of, borrowing Martin van Bruinessen's term, "the regimentation of political Islam"[13] was advanced. Masyumi, the Muslim party that had placed second in the 1955 general election, did not obtain a green light to be resuscitated. Rather, as a result of the regime's intervention in the party's internal affairs,[14] Parmusi, a new party designed by Soeharto to accommodate Muslim modernists minus the leadership of former Masyumi figures, failed to draw votes in the 1971 general election. The *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU), *Persatuan*

Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti) *Persatuan Sarekat Islam Indonesia* (PSSI), other Muslim parties, were likewise ineffective in challenging the new political machine created by Soeharto's regime, *Golongan Karya* (Golkar), which gained 62.8 % of votes in that election. In short, the political struggle through Islamic-labeled parties in the 1971 general election ended with failure.[15]

After the 1971 election, the regimentation of political Islam was continued by the 'parties fusion' policy. All Muslim parties were fused into the United Development Party (PPP), as the nationalist and Christian parties were fused into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). However, with various forms of intervention into the parties' internal affairs, the regime never allowed these two parties to be powerful or to challenge Golkar. Both parties suffered various failures from one election to the next. During that time, any challenge to the development doctrine directed by the government could easily be labeled either 'right extreme' or 'left extreme'. The Subversive Act, inherited from Soekarno, was used as a powerful weapon to suppress challenges to the regime.

The peak of the regimentation of political Islam occurred when the New Order government forced all mass organizations and political parties to accept 'Pancasila' — the five principles that constitute the ideology of the state—as sole basis for their charters. For this task, the government legislated the Mass Organization and Political Party Act of 1985.[16] In reaction to this policy, NU, the largest Muslim-traditionalist organization, quickly declared its acceptance of Pancasila, while Muhammadiyah, a Muslim-modernist umbrella, took some time before doing the same.

During the period discussed above, various uprisings and riots in the name of Islam occurred. We note, for instance, the rush of a group of young people led by Abdul Qadir Djaelani, who named themselves "Pola Perjuangan Revolusioner Islam" (The Pattern of Revolutionary Islamic Struggle) to the People Consultative Council's assembly in March 1978. Two years earlier, the *Komando Jihad* (Jihad Command) actions led by H. Ismail Pranoto erupted, which were not suppressed until 1981. In 1981 a group of people loyal to Imran M. Zein carried out a series of attacks on police stations and other governmental services. The peak of these attacks was the hijacking of a Garuda Indonesia airplane on 28 March 1981. Other violence took place in 1984 in Tanjung Priok, north

Jakarta, when hundreds of people, who demanded the liberation four of their colleagues, under the command of Amir Biki, were shot by military troops. This tragedy cost dozens of lives.[17] Although religion-colored rebellions decreased after the Tanjung Priok massacre, various other tragedies including inter-ethnic riots and the burning of churches continued to break out throughout Soeharto's presidency, many of which contributed to his downfall in May 1998.

Indonesian Muslims, who found few opportunities to express themselves in the political arena under the Soeharto's regime, turned their interests toward the economic and educational spheres. This was favored by the government's policy to accelerate the process of development and modernization, which was initiated in 1969 with the *Pelita* (*Pembangunan Lima Tahun*), Five-year planned development program. The participation of Muslims in higher education significantly increased at that time in line with the rapid migration of rural masses that sought new lives in Indonesia's big cities. More and more people who came from a *santri* (Islamic student) background enrolled in modern schools and universities resulting in an intellectual boom for Muslims, which, as described by Nurcholish Madjid,[18] encouraged the growth of new Muslim middle class. At the same time, this intellectual boom resulted in the acceleration of, in Aswab Mahasin's term, the *embourgeoisement* process for *santri*, also known as *priyayinization*.[19] This phenomenon facilitated the mobility of *santri*, horizontally and vertically, marked by the spread of *santri* into various sectors of activities and governmental services, as well as modern business structures, which brought about the fading of the tri-chotomy variants of Javanese culture described by Clifford Geertz.[20]

By the end of the 1980s, the tension that had characterized Islam-state relations began to disappear. This can be seen from the tendency of Soeharto's regime to accommodate the interests of the Muslim middle class, though this accommodation was viewed by some scholars as a strategy by Soeharto to consolidate support and to seek new pillars for the continuation of his presidency. This tendency began to be articulated in the 1990s, as the phenomenon of Soeharto's *santrinization* came to the fore. At the beginning of 1990s he performed the *hajj* pilgrimage and began adopting Islamic symbols. ICMI (Association of Indonesian Mus-

lim Intellectuals), an organization comprised of many government bureaucrats, was brought into being, and the ruling party, Golkar, began to align its cloak with Islam as more and more Muslim intellectuals were absorbed into its body.

Malaysia

There are many similarities between Indonesia and Malaysia in terms of the relationship between Islam and the state. Malaysia's relationship has been marked particularly by the dominance of the secular-nationalist ruling party, UMNO (United Malay National Organization), vis-à-vis Muslim powers in the arena of political life. UMNO was the single most powerful political force in the nationalist movement, and has ruled an independent Malaysia since statehood was consolidated. National leaders coming from UMNO in their capacity as state officials effectively linked the opposition challenge as a threat to Malaysia's survival. Up until recently, the sole voice of Islamic dissent against the liberal-secular orientation of the national government was represented by PAS, which, nonetheless, was unable to counter the vast political resources employed by the ruling elite.

In 1969, a racial riot erupted that engulfed the capital city of Kuala Lumpur for four days. Hundreds of people died and several thousand were made homeless. The immediate cause of the riots was the collision between the 'victory' demonstration held by newly elected non-Malay opposition candidates, and counter-demonstrations organized by pro-government Malay leaders. This riot led the Malaysian government to realize that it had to accelerate economic growth for the Malays population in the face of largely Chinese capitalist economic dominance. The New Economic Policy (NEP), which created favorable economic opportunities for Malays, was launched in 1971 in order to limit the Chinese in their dominance of the economy. The government also encouraged Malay youth to attend universities both at home and abroad through various preferential policies. At home, new universities were opened that enforced privileged quotas for Malays. Efforts were made to ensure that more Malay students enrolled in science and engineering programs that were hitherto dominated by non-Malays. Scholarships were given to bright Malay students to pursue their studies abroad.[21] Although not all Malays succeeded in acquiring access to the benefits of these policies, many have benefited from them. As a result, the Malay Muslim middle class, con-

stituting a fast-growing new class of bureaucrats, businesspersons, academics, legal practitioners, doctors, engineers, and other professionals has increased significantly.[22]

It is worth noting that the growth of the Muslim middle class in Malaysia is also associated with the increase of the government's willingness, particularly under Mahathir Mohamad's leadership, to demonstrate its support for Islam. It must be noted, however, that there has been a tendency to accommodate Islamic symbols and rituals, rather than the expression of political Islam. Such accommodation has included the building of mosques, the upgrading of international Quran recitation contests, daily broadcast of *azan* over radio and television, and a high public profile adopted by UMNO leaders in Islamic activities and festivals. In the 1990s, the government further demonstrated its commitment to Islam by introducing various explicitly 'Islamic' policies. It sponsored such projects as the Islamic banking and financial system, the Islamic universities and colleges, and the Islamic administrative system.[23]

Some observers view these Muslim-oriented policies merely as the government's attempt to maintain its legitimacy and to prevent substantial losses of Malay votes by default to PAS.[24] Within this framework as well, we must understand the co-optation of Anwar Ibrahim, former leader of ABIM, into the ruling party of UMNO —a situation which ended tragically when Mahathir had Anwar arrested in 1999 on highly questionable charges related to an alleged sex scandal. The ambiguity of the government's support for Islam had been demonstrated previously through several of the Mahathir's political moves. The government has regularly threatened politically active groups with the controversial Internal Security Act *(Akta Keselamatan Negara)* and the Misuse of Religions Bill *(Akta Salah Ugama)*, and has frequently equated Islamic commitment with extremism and PAS.[25] These acts have restricted the sphere of Muslim political expression, and consequently contributed to the emergence of new Islamic movements in Malaysia.

Darul Arqam

The history of Darul Arqam began with the initiative of Ashari Muhammad, an Islamic religious teacher, to establish a prayer group *(kelompok pengajian)* in a residence known as "the White House" in a Kuala Lumpur suburb in 1968. Before establishing

Darul Arqam, this figure had joined the Islamic party, PAS, but resigned in the mid-1960s. The initial intention of this group was to learn, understand, and be convinced of the religious obligations of Islam, which involves the fields of theology, Islamic law, and mysticism.[26] Under the leadership of Ashari Muhammad, the prayer group evolved into a phenomenal Islamic movement.

Darul Arqam's emphasis on Sufism was remarkable. Members of the movement were enthusiastic about *Aurad Muhammadiyah*, the Mohammedan invocations, allegedly given in a vision, from the Prophet Muhammad to the founder of the Muhammadiyah order, Shaikh Muḥammad bin 'Abdullâh Suhaimî. These invocations were learned by Ashari Muhammad from Lebai Ibrahim, a disciple of the founder. Inspired by the *Aurad Muhammadiyah,* Ashari Muhammad molded a type of mystical, cult-like approach, which served as a spiritual guide for Darul Arqam's members. In 1986 he proclaimed that Shaikh MuŸammad bin 'Abdullâh Suhaimî, who died in 1925, is not dead, but is in *ghâ'ibah*, seclusion, and will reappear as *mahdi*, a messiah.[27]

At the beginning, Ashari Muhammad's call was not greeted with enthusiasm by Malay Muslims. Only a small group comprised of ten young disciples led directly by Ashari Muhammad dedicated their lives to forming the first Darul Arqam community based in the White House. These early adherents were mostly rural migrants engaged in lower middle-class occupations. As a prayer group, members' activities were limited to a series of lectures, religious chanting, remembrance of God, melodic readings of episodes from Prophet Muhammad's life, night vigil, and informal visitations. They were also taught to adhere steadfastly to the "Prophet's lifestyle", even to the extent of imitating his clothes and eating practices. For instance, the male followers donned gray or dark Arab-style shirts and turbans, and kept thin mustaches and bold beards, while the female followers wore long black dresses and covered their face with veils leaving only the eyes visible. After two years of a low-profile existence, Ashari Muhammad attempted to broaden his audience by organizing public lectures in such venues as mosques, schools, offices, and institutes of higher learning, as well as accommodating personal invitations.[28]

The name Darul Arqam was introduced in 1971 to replace the name, the White House Group. They believed that the new name reflected the dedication of one of the Prophet's companions, Al-

Arqâm ibn al-Arqâm, who used his house as a meeting place and an Islamic propagation center for early Muslims in Mecca.[29] Under the new name, the movement started to expand beyond the restricted circle of the leader's personal friends and neighbors and began to attract hundreds of students and rising middle class professionals and technocrats.

Ashari Muhammad and his followers established the first model Islamic village in Sungai Penchala, a remote area around twenty kilometers from Kuala Lumpur in 1973. Designed to be the organization's administrative center, as well as a self-contained social, religious and cultural entity, the community maintained a school, shops, audio-visual and communication facilities, workshops, a bookstore, and a health clinic. The village was intended to function as a prototype of an Islamic community, within which Islam was claimed to be practiced in a proper manner.

From its headquarters in this Islamic village, Darul Arqam expanded its activities. In 1975, it set up the Al-Arqam Foundation, which organized schools that offered an integrated curriculum different from that of government-sponsored secular and religious schools. It was also concerned with *da'wah* activities via the mass media and published the *Al Arqam* newspaper as its primary means of extending its influence. The organization was also involved in providing medical services and opened its first Medical Center in 1978. By the end of the 1970s, nearly the whole country had heard of Darul Arqam, as branches and villages were subsequently founded farther outside of its birthplace in Kuala Lumpur. Economic expansion was pursued, mainly in the food industry, and managed under the so-called *'Ummah Service'* not far from Kuala Lumpur.[30] Its expansion peaked in 1993 when it pronounced its Year of Economic Development. At that time, Darul Arqam controlled 417 economic enterprises—mostly managed and staffed by Darul Arqam members themselves throughout the production, distribution and retailing stages.[31] In order to manage this type of conglomerate, Darul Arqam established the Al-Arqam Group of Companies (AGC), which extended itself over twenty-two fields including administration and management, food and beverages, medical and health services, and high-technology businesses.[32]

The phenomenal success of Darul Arqam in Malaysia opened the way to transnational growth. The decades of the 1980s and 1990s was marked by massive expansion abroad.[33] Darul Arqam's

international branches grew rapidly thanks to Malaysian students abroad, particularly in Britain, the USA, New Zealand, France, and Australia. Meanwhile, in neighboring countries such as Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, and Thailand, Darul Arqam began more aggressively establishing its activities. The international drive took a new turn in 1988 when Ashari Muhammad lived abroad on a more or less permanent basis. The leader claimed that his extensive travel was an attempt to demonstrate the role of Islam as a global religion, not only for Malays but also for the whole mankind.[34]

In 1992, Ashari Muhammad proclaimed that the era of Islamic resurgence had come. For him, Darul Arqam was struggling to fulfill the promises according to the 'schedule of God' that the glory of Islam would be revived for Muslims of the fifteenth century of the Islamic Hijrah calendar. He predicted a great Islamic revival, starting from Southeast Asia, extending to Khurasan —an ancient region in the old map of Islam and the backbone of this revival— and ending in Mecca, where a messiah, the Imam Mahdi, would be proclaimed.[35]

Darul Arqam was introduced to Indonesia by Ir. Amal Arifin, who joined the movement when he was studying agriculture at La Trobe University, Australia in the mid 1980s. The movement grew rapidly from Jakarta to Medan, Aceh, Pekan Baru, Padang, Bandung, Bogor, Tasikmalaya, Surabaya, and Malang. Darul Arqam's ideas were mostly disseminated through universities and succeeded to attract a considerable number of students and lecturers who mostly came from technical backgrounds. The fame of the movement increased when Dr. Ing. Abdurrahman Riesdam Effendi, and his wife, Dr. Ing. Gina Puspita, who had earned doctoral degrees in France in aircraft engineering and aeronautics respectively, joined Darul Arqam.[36] In order to organize the movement, an emirate system was established, following the center in Malaysia. There was an Indonesian emirate council, which consisted of regional emirs and a national emir. All emirs, the majority of whom were engineers, were appointed by Ashari Muhammad based on the suggestions of the emirate council. Despite being introduced to Indonesia by Amal Arifin, the key person in the Indonesian Darul Arqam leadership was Abdurrahman Riesdam Effendi. He was the only leader who had the authority to receive the oath of members, and Ashari Muhammad legitimized his au-

thority.[37]

Tempo, a weekly Indonesian magazine, reported the existence of Darul Arqam's communities in Jakarta. As in its birthplace in Kuala Lumpur, the existence of the Darul Arqam in Jakarta was remarkable. In a Darul Arqam center near University of Indonesia, there was a Sayyidatina Siti Khadijah café, a female salon, a bookstore, and a cassette and video shop. There was also a graphic design room that served computer-related needs. In another branch, the Darul Arqam had a soy sauce factory and cassette record industry.[38]

In 1994, the Malaysian government, followed by Indonesian political authorities, officially banned the entire Darul Arqam sect. In fact, the Malaysian government had begun its campaign against the Darul Arqam in 1986 after unearthing allegedly deviant practices. The *Aurad Muhammadiyah,* the guidebook of Darul Arqam's members, and certain practices associated with it, as well as Darul Arqam's position with respect to Imam Mahdi constituted the center of the terrible dispute. Since then, the campaigns against Darul Arqam were expanded by involving state institutions, mass media, and mass-religious organizations. Based on a politicized allegation that the Darul Arqam had formed a 313-man 'suicide army' based in Bangkok with designs to take over power in Malaysia through militant means, the Malaysian government finally found adequate reason to finalize the Darul Arqam's affair.[39] The Malaysian government sought cooperation from neighboring governments to help suppress Darul Arqam. The request for cooperation was welcomed by the Indonesian authorities. A number of *fatwas* were issued proclaiming the sect's teachings as deviant. In many provinces of the country, it was suggested that the Head of the Provincial Office ban the organization. Finally, the national Indonesian *Ulama* council declared Darul Arqam to be deviant and proposed that the Attorney General bans it. [40]

The banning of Darul Arqam, however, did not bring the story of this movement to an end. In 1996 former members of Darul Arqam in Indonesia established "Hawariyun", which is in many respects not other than the continuation of the banned Darul Arqam. They identify this transformation with the migration of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina. For them, the banning of Darul Arqam was necessary, as was the migration of the Prophet Muhammad to Medina. They believe

that the mission of the "moral call", as that of the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca, had been fulfilled by Darul Arqam, but the mission needs to be continued. The task of Hawariyun then is to implement the moral call in real life, as was carried out by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina.

This movement believes that Muslims should rely on three Islamic strengths, which comprise *iman* (belief), *ukhuwwah* (brotherhood), and *kesefahaman* (uniformity). However, they argue that these three strengths do not make sense unless they are upheld by the main subsidiary strength, the economy. They claim that by Islamizing the economy, the household, society and state will be automatically Islamized. In other words, the victory of Islam will be won by reviving the economy within an Islamic paradigm.[41] Differing from its predecessor, the members of Hawariyun are not interested in talking about politics, state or the like. Instead, they are extremely concerned with what they call the Islamic economy and aim to present how this new model of economy works in competition with other economic systems. They believe that the essence of economy in Islam is to realize that all assets and equipment utilized in the economic field belong to Allah. Muslims, they argue, simply carry out economic activities in order to strengthen their faith and to implant the feeling of servitude towards Allah. Through economy, Muslims can gain eternal victory, by becoming truly abiding and God-fearing servants. They believe that although they may lose commercially, in the sight of Allah, they will not. Instead, Allah will reward them generously in the Hereafter.

Hawariyun has various entrepreneurial divisions, which comprise the Madinah Al-Anshar Group, which manages such businesses as training and education, healthcare, construction, agriculture, and welfare; Qatrunnada Group, which is concerned with culture, information, publication, and tourism; Technology Center, which develops human resources development and training, information technology, engineering and machinery maintenance, and engineering consultant; and Suq al-Anshar, which advances general trading, restaurant operations, and manufacturing.[42]

By developing their economic strength, Hawariyun believes that the East, namely Southeast Asia, will be the pioneer of the revival of Islam. For Hawariyun, this is the definite promise of God, and will necessarily happen. When the revival is approach-

ing reality, they believe that Asia's economy will be united to become a giant power.[43] Based on this belief, Hawariyun has established economic cooperation with its Malaysian counterpart, "Rufaqa", which was established in 1997, whose profile is not much different from Hawariyun. Rufaqa primarily produces herbal products, food and audiocassettes, and manages retail and health service.[44] This cooperation generated an international company, Zumala' Group, which manages export-import. Under this joint-venture umbrella, the former members of the Darul Arqam enunciated the year 2003 as the beginning of the Malay economic empire, which they believe, will be the backbone of the Islamic revival.

Jamaah Islah Malaysia (JIM)

JIM is an Islamic movement founded in 1991 by former activists of IRC, the Islamic Representative Council, an organization established in 1975 by Malaysian students enrolled in technical courses in Britain. Inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat al-Islami, the IRC advocated Islam as the sole possessor of the true path to a complete way of life. As its ideas were spread through the formation of small secret cells among students,[45] the IRC emerged as a radical movement that was active particularly through clandestine operations. Being critical of the government and adopting a confrontational approach, the IRC became a dynamic Islamic pressure group that was anti-establishment.[46]

In line with changes in Malaysian politics, IRC changed its name to JIM (Jamaah Islah Malaysia) claiming itself as an organization for Islamic reformation and peace, and carrying the theme of "constructing society together with Islam". JIM believes that its presence can contribute to both Islam and the development of society. Specifically the organization aims to provide support for the realization of Islamic goals and aspirations, which is accompanied by conducting *da'wah*, or missionary activities, at all levels of society. JIM also believes that the concept of unity based on the principle of Islamic brotherhood and universal values is to be highlighted in order to form a progressive and dynamic Muslim society.[47]

The movement's change of direction from its precursor and its new approach makes JIM appear more moderate and emphasizing of homeostasis in accordance with Malaysian politics. This is un-

derstandable since, as JIM admits, a change of thinking had been occurring in the administration of the country evidenced by the introduction of Islamic politico-cultural concepts. Thus, up until recently, it perceived the direction being pursued by the Malaysian State as positive, constructive and encouraging. It argues that as long as Malaysia is being led and administrated by those who are inclined to support Islam, Islamic values will automatically be internalized in society. Consequently, the question of establishing an Islamic state has ceased to be important.[48]

In order to accomplish its aims, JIM adopts and emphasizes the concept of *tarbiyah*, Islamic education, which takes the form of intensive *usrah* units, night vigils, leadership training sessions, gatherings, visitations, congregational excursions, outdoor camps, and physical fitness programs. Activities such as human resources development and management initiatives, which focus on optimizing manpower and pin-pointing motivational factors, are also introduced into JIM's programs. In the educational field, JIM operates a number of kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, and an institute of higher education, where Islamic elements are combined with the Ministry of Education's curriculum. Its course materials are commonly selected with the goal of instilling an Islamic worldview among students. Recently, JIM launched *Dakwah Digital*, an Islamic-oriented computer program accessible over the Internet. It also formed *Kompleks JIM*, a company aiming to integrate aspects of *da'wah* and business, operating on the philosophy of human welfare through business rather than being based on traditional profit motives.[49]

Hidayatullah

Hidayatullah is the name of the community associated with *Pesantren* Hidayatullah, an Islamic learning institution established by five young Muslim proselytizers: Abdullah Said, Hasan Ibrahim, Usman Palase, Hasyim and Nasir Hasan. They pioneered the establishment of the *pesantren* in 1971 in a remote area, Gunung Tembak, 32 km from Balikpapan, East Kalimantan. In this area they established an integrated Islamic village as the center of their educational, *da'wah,* social and economic activities. Presently, Hidayatullah has branches in dozens of cities in Indonesia from Medan in North Sumatra to Palu in Central Sulawesi.

Abdullah Said was the central figure among the Hidayatullah community. He was the director and manager of the *pesantren*,

and actively took part in developing the ideology and direction of the *pesantren*. Before becoming engaged in Gunung Tembak, Abdullah Said had been active in a student organization, PII (The Association of Indonesian Muslim Students) banned by Soeharto's regime in 1985. He had studied in various *pesantrens* like Bangil and Gontor before he enrolled in university education in Yogyakarta, however he never completed his college degree. During that time, he was active in various student demonstrations against Soekarno, organized by KAPPI and KAMI, two pro-Soeharto student organizations.[50]

The religious thought and activism of Abdullah Said dominated the character of Hidayatullah. He was apparently obsessed with the idea of reviving a "blessed community" based on the Islamic way of life, with its religious-social and political natures. In his opinion, in order to build an integrated form of society, Muslims should find inspiration from the Prophet Muhammad's mission. He considered this a precondition for the rise of the Muslim *ummah*, or community. The root of Muslim backwardness, he argued, lies in the lack of understanding of the *Shahâdat,* the Muslim creed regarding the oneness of God and the apostate of Muhammad. He insisted that the *Shahâdat* should be integrated into Muslim's everyday life. The five phases of the Prophet Muhammad's life, which consist of the phases of his becoming an orphan, shepherd, trader, married person, and contemplator in the cave of Hira, should be imitated in order to revitalize the quality of the Muslim's *Shahâdat.*

Centered in Gunung Tembak, Hidayatullah is perceived as a miniature in which Muslims can go through the five phases. These five phases are, according to him, reflected in 5 chapters of the Quran, i.e., *al-'Alaq, al-Qalam, al-Muzzammil, al-Muddathir,* and *al-Fâtihah* respectively, which constitute the primary guide and everyday practice of the Hidayatullah community. For these reasons, he wrote two books entitled respectively, "The Systematic of Revelation: An Alternative Method Towards the Second Resurgence of Islam" and "Shahadat: The Prime Capital and Weapon Full of Power".[51] Hidayatullah is thus assumed to be a reflection of the method of the Prophet Muhammad' struggle to build the Muslim community. By imitating the example of the Prophet, Hidayatullah claims to be able to "serve the need of society, and offer a therapy and cure their diseases. By so doing, the society

will find a straight path, full of peace and security".[52]

Hidayatullah began to flourish in the 1980s when it widened its wings into the economic, communication, and social fields. The support for its expansion came from a group of university students in East Java, particularly those of the Surabaya Institute of Technology, who opened a branch of the *Pesantren* Hidayatullah in Surabaya in 1986. In the same year, Hidayatullah started to publish a monthly journal, *Suara Hidayatullah,* whose circulation reached 35,000 copies. This journal actively raises the issues of the Muslim world, such as the bloody conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Bosnia. Essays on the Prophet Muhammad and his companions also consistently constitute the prime pages of this journal.

In order to advance the independence of its members, the Hidayatullah community developed an agricultural industry manned by the students and members of the *pesantren* Hidayatullah themselves. In the economic field, the community established Hudaya, a corporation active in merchandise, production and distribution. Subsequently the economic expansion of Hidayatullah involved such services such as transportation, construction, and banking. The Sakinah group of companies was established in Surabaya, which was at the beginning only a small shop selling everyday needs, but has now become a large company maintaining a number of supermarkets and other retailed business. Besides that, Hidayatullah established several companies offering transportation services such as CCM Cargo, which provides cargo services to many cities in Java, Sumatra and Bali. Intan Travel operates as a travel agency in several cities in Java, while Intan Tour provides exclusive travel packets for pilgrimage to Mecca. In the construction field, Hidayatullah maintains Citra Cipta Madina company, which operates not only as a contractor, but also as a real estate developer. Recently Hidayatullah also initiated the establishment of Baitul Mal wat Tamwil, *Mashraf al-Madîna,* which is small-scale Islamic-banking initiative.[53]

Darut Tauhid

Darut Tauhid is a religious community closely related with the figure, Abdullah Gymnastiar, born on 29 January 1962. Abdullah Gymnastiar pioneered the establishment of Darut Tauhid in 1987 in a location near Bandung, West Java, where he began to

run an entrepreneurial effort within the domain of the Association of Entrepreneur Muslim Students. The profit of this pioneering business was use to supporting *da'wah* activities. In line with the growth of the business, Abdullah Gymnastiar's religious teachings became increasingly popular and attracted hundreds of people to attend them regularly. Anticipating this growth, the Darut Tauhid Foundation was established in 1990.[54]

Abdullah Gymnastiar enrolled in technical course at Padjadjaran University, Bandung Institute of Technology, and Ahmad Yani University, however, being more interested in Islamic knowledge, and he never finished his degree. He claims that he obtained Islamic knowledge and spiritual guidance from Choer Affandi, a traditional *'âlim* in Garut, West Java. His powerful oratory style made Abdullah Gymnastiar quite popular, particularly among university students. In daily life, he often wears a long white shirt, sarong and turban —a style that become the norm within the Darut Tauhid complex, which is inhibited by hundreds of permanent members and thousands of non-permanent ones.

The basic doctrine of Darut Tauhid includes *zikir* (confession of faith), *fikir* (thinking), and *ikhtiyar* (free choice). Among Darut Tauhid members, *zikr* is the primary principle on which Muslims should rely, in the sense that God is the only focus and target in Muslim activities. Whatever happens, the Muslim belief in God will never be eliminated. *Zikr* developed by Abdullah Gymnastiar, according to his own explanation, derives from the *zikr* created by Hassan al-Banna, the prominent Ikhwanul Muslimin figure.[55] Gymnastiar, however, argues that *zikr* alone is not enough; Muslims should also think and optimize their ability to think in order to find the truth. By thinking, Muslims can come to the proper and strategic way to overcome various challenges confronting the *ummah*. Free choice is then intended to optimize Muslim initiatives and efforts to compete in a challenging era. *Zikr, fikr,* and *ikhtiyar* are thus the three key principles that should be taken into account by all members of Darut Tauhid's community.

Darut Tauhid claims that its primary mission is to facilitate the development of Islamic educational, economic, social, and cultural activities. It aspires to become a miniature of society where Islamic teachings can be practiced and its benefits can be felt by the Muslim *ummah*. By so doing, Darut Tauhid believes that it can exhibit the beauty of Islamic teaching, Islamic ethos, Islamic man-

agement, Islamic professionalism, and, above all, Islamic solutions for various problems facing Muslims. Moreover, Darut Tauhid has become a model demonstrating how Islamic activities can be enriched by education, training, management, arts and culture, economy and technology initiatives.[56]

Darut Tauhid declares that its mission is to fill the 'spiritual void' of the urban masses by developing Islamic activities that will affect people in their daily lives. This method is called by Darut Tauhid as "Manajemen Qalbu" (the management of heart). The basic notion is to manage and maintain purity of heart in the way of knowing God. Darut Tauhid believes that spiritual values such as patience, generosity, resignation and honesty, once nurtured, will pour out of peoples' hearts. The organization asserts that this method will be able to meet many societal needs, and at the same time offer Islam as an alternative to answer various contemporary problems.

In order to respond to Muslims needs regarding their preparedness to face the challenges of the present age, Darut Tauhid introduced various forms of psychological training, such as Achievement Motivation Training, Outward Bound Training, Team Building Training, and also Heart Management Training. As in military training camps, Darut Tauhid members often undertake mountain climbing training and other challenges in order to toughen them mentally. Moreover, Darut Tauhid is very much concerned with the problems of morality, particularly being aware of the impact of drugs on the young Muslim generation. In response to this concern, Darut Tauhid opened a rehabilitation center for drug victims. Its concern with morality has even stimulated Darut Tauhid to mobilize thousands of people outfitting them with black uniforms and providing them with accessories resembling those used by military troops named *Santri Serba Guna*, "Multiple-purposes Muslim Students", in order to attack gambling centers in Bandung.[57]

Since the early 1990s, the growth of Darut Tauhid's center has taken place rapidly. Starting in a rented house with 20 rooms, the organization moved to a permanent building with 3 floors in 1993. From this new building the economic activities of Darut Tauhid community began to develop and gradually expanded into such fields as garment production, supermarket, publishing, and Islamic banking. Since 1997, the area of Gegerkalong has changed to be-

come a Darut Tauhid village; full of Islamic symbols, including an Islamic cottage named Darul Jannah, The House of Paradise, which offers a sort of spiritual vacation for executives.

The acceleration of the development of Darut Tauhid is apparently a function of the support of a number of rich professionals from Jakarta and Bandung who have become dedicated members of the organization. Of five advisory board members, four are engineers and one of them is chief president of Astra International—one of Indonesia's giant conglomerates, and president commissioner of several other large companies. Darut Tauhid itself has a number of economic joint venture counterparts, such as Astra Mitra Ventura, Bumi Daya Bank, Dharma Bhakti Astra Foundation, Indomacro Adi Prima, Train Public Company, Smart Corporation, Anugrah Pharmindo, Maspion, Prasetya Mulya and Post Indonesia. The names behind these companies are commonly conglomerates that play a crucial part in the Indonesian economy.

The economic activities of Darut Tauhid are divided into four main divisions: merchandise, manufacturing, public service, and information management systems. The merchandise division includes such units as supermarket supplies, basic commodities, and electronics. Under the division of manufacturing there are Islamic handicraft units, garment, and cassette recording, which has produced dozens of Abdullah Gymnastiar's *da'wah* speeches and song recordings. The public service division has a mini Islamic bank, sound system maintenance, and communication shop. The division of information management systems deals with software, MIS & networking, advertising and production. For these purposes, Darut Tauhid has even announced that economic development is the primary pillar of devotion to God. According to the latest data, Darut Tauhid's economic assets have reached eight billion Indonesian Rupiah.[58]

Jamaah Al-Turath al-Islami

The religious community of Al-Turath al-Islami was pioneered in 1987 by a group of young people led by Abu Nida, who initiated a small religious teaching program in the area around Gadjah Mada University and the Teachers' Training College in Yogyakarta. Their religious teachings gradually evolved and attracted a number of followers, particularly university students. In 1994, they decided to establish a foundation called 'Majlis al-Turath

al-Islami', with which the religious teachings and their followers are associated.[59]

Abu Nida is a highly central figure in Al-Turath al-Islami. He is not only the founding father of this movement, but also its leader up to the present day. His original name is Chamsaha Shofwan, and he was born in East Java on 7 July 1954. Abu Nida studied at *Pesantren* Karangasem, through which he made contact with DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia*), Islamic Missionary Council of Indonesia, which is led by a number of former Masyumi leaders. He was one of the proselytizers sent by DDII to West Kalimantan in its program to disseminate Islam among isolated tribes there. Via DDII, Abu Nida went to Saudi Arabia to study at Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud University. After finishing his undergraduate degree, he did not go back directly to Indonesia but went to Afghanistan to join the Mujahidin troops. Back in Indonesia, he was asked to teach in several *pesantrens* including "Al-Mukmin", Ngruki, Solo, Central Java, and "Ibnul Qayyim", Sleman, Yogyakarta, before he established the Al-Turath al-Islami community.[60]

The Al-Turath al-Islami calls itself a puritan movement, since it believes that Muslims nowadays have abandoned the understanding of Islam and Islamic values taught by the early-dedicated generation, *Salaf al-Ṣâliḥ*. According to them, this abandonment has brought about the collapse of the glory of Islam. The movement is worried about the emergence of heretical teachings, split groups, and misleading *fatwa*s issued by incompetent persons, which, in their belief, should be challenged by revitalizing the puritan way, *manhaj salafiah*, claimed as an infallible way, free from deviation, solely based on the Quran and the Sunna. The movement believes that the early-dedicated Muslims were the best generation produced by Islam.[61] A prominent factor that encouraged Abu Nida to establish the movement derives from his observation that many young Muslims have been exposed to the negative effects of modernization, since they do not have adequate knowledge of Islam. This problem is aggravated by the inability of existing Muslim organizations to deal with the problems of the *ummah*.[62]

The initiative of Abu Nida to establish At-Turath al-Islami was greeted by his friends who also studied in Saudi Arabia with enthusiasm. Ahmad Fais, Rofik, Asmuji and Hambali fleetly joined Abu Nida. More support came from Gadjah Mada University stu-

dents, most of who were Jamaah Shalahuddin[63] members, a missionary group associated with Gadjah Mada University. Abu Nida's access to Jamaah Shalahuddin was provided by DDII Yogyakarta, which had good relations with Jamaah Shalahuddin. The students who joined Al-Turath al-Islami mostly come from a technical background, particularly from schools of medicine, forestry, engineering, mathematics and natural science faculties. Subsequently, many university graduates who have earned the title of engineer are involved in this movement.[64]

At the beginning, the activities of Al-Turath al-Islami were still integrated with those of other movements such as Indonesian Ikhwanul Muslimin,[65] and NII, the Islamic State of Indonesia.[66] Their activities like *daurah*, a type of workshop, were full of political flavor. The group quickly expanded its influence not only throughout Java but also in other islands like Sumatra and Kalimantan. The intimacy of Al-Turath al-Islami with Ikhwanul Muslimin was not sustained, however, because of the strong desire of the latter to be involved in political Islam. However, the loss of Ikhwanul Muslimin was quickly replaced by Ja'far Umar Thalib, who later established the Ihya al-Sunnah community,[67] — the backbone of the *Laskar Jihad* group currently fighting in Maluku.[68]

The movement of Al-Turath al-Islami chose Wirokerten, a village a few kilometers to the south of Yogyakarta, as its center. In this village Al-Turath al-Islami bought a tract of land, some 1 ha, on which a mosque, Islamic boarding school and the housing of its teachers and proponents were subsequently built. At the beginning, the presence of the movement was suspected by locals and nearly evicted, but it survives up to the present day. Thanks to the support of the government of Kuwait, an Islamic center associated with al-Turath al-Islami was also established, in an area not far from Wirokerten. According to Abu Nida, this Islamic center is to be used as an educational center for elementary to advanced levels within the Islamic boarding school system.[69] In Wirokerten, the presence of Al-Turath al-Islami community is fairly remarkable. Its members can easily be distinguished from their pattern of dress and male-female relations. Besides allowing their beards to grow long, male members wear long shirts, trousers above ankle and white hats, while female members wear long black dresses and cover their faces with veils. The female mem-

bers are secluded from the men, and are only allowed to make contact with male members with the presence of their husbands or *muhrim*s. Their space in social interaction is highly restricted. The community adamantly condemns what they call *ikhtilât,* the mixing of males and females in one place without any clear boundary.[70] Therefore, they are perceived and labeled by people outside their group as an exclusive and fanatic community.

Besides developing learning centers, the Al-Turath al-Islami community has attempted to open a number of entrepreneur services such as motorcycle and auto repair shops, computer, agriculture, and home industries, though there has been only limited success as of yet. The movement has been publishing *da'wah* magazines and bulletins, produced 'Islamic cassettes', established a mini Islamic bank, and opened a mini-market.[71] Some of the movement's activities are apparently supported by outside funding institutions, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The existence of this movement is even partly determined by such financial supports.[72]

Paramadina and Tazkiya Sejati

Recently, there has been a new trend in Indonesian Islam. Many executives and upper middle class people have become interested in sufism, which has gradually become a new symbol of elitism. This trend appeared toward the end of 1980s, but has become more clearly articulated in the last few years, particularly after the eruption of the economic crisis in Indonesia in 1997. Nowadays, it is common to find sufi religious teachings being held at starred hotel and other luxurious venues in such cities as Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya, where executives and members of the upper middle class engage in reciting the Quran, chanting *dhikr*, and the likes. The coming of this new trend seems to be related to the presence of Paramadina and Tazkiya Sejati, two urban Muslim elite movements that have launched programs of understanding and practicing sufism, which are quite popular with executives.

Paramadina was established by a number of progressive Muslim intellectuals in collaboration with Muslim entrepreneurs who mostly came from HMI, a Muslim student organization that generated a number of outstanding figures in various arenas within the Indonesian nation-state. Some prominent Muslim leaders such as Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo, Utomo Dananjaya, Abdul Latief and Fahmi Idris, the last two being successful entre-

preneurs, constitute the locomotive of Paramadina that has evolved into an urban-elite religious institution. Paramadina was founded in anticipation of a boom in the ranks of the educated Muslim middle-class, a phenomenon that contributed to the generation of substantial numbers of Muslim intellectuals. Through Paramadina, Indonesian Muslims have had an avenue to conduct dialogue and produce creative and innovative ways in which to build their understanding of their religion.[73]

As a religious movement, Paramadina embodies three primary characteristics: independence, openness, and cultural orientation. Independence means that the organization has no single political alliance by which it is dominated. In regards to its commitment to openness, Paramadina maintains that its members can receive inspiration from any source. This open character goes hand in hand with the cultural orientation upheld by Paramadina, in the sense that it is a movement that is not inclined to politics, but rather asserts Islam as a cultural power that can provide alternatives and answers to contemporary challenges, without falling into the trap of exclusivity.

Paramadina maintains an approach that can be characterized as nationalistic-Islamic. It promotes Islamic revivalism within the context of Indonesia where Islam has been accepted and practiced broadly as a primary source for building common values. Islam is thus presented as a main source of Indonesian values, yet also as a culturally productive force that can aid the development of constructive alternatives for the nation. The unity of Islamic and Indonesian values is the hallmark of Paramadina. Islam, as a cultural and national force, is hoped to become an alternative for the growing numbers of people that are experiencing difficulties amidst the often alienating processes of development and globalization.[74]

In order to realize these aims, Paramadina created a number of Islamic learning programs specifically designed for executives, professionals, practitioners, functionaries and other middle class professionals. It also provides pure Islamic studies and research aiming to develop sciences and Islamic understanding. "Paramadina Eksekutif", which emphasizes sufism, is one of the organization's primary programs belonging to the first category. Such a program offers 'sufism packets' which consist of a dozen gatherings. In these sessions, executives can be active in chanting *dhikr,* without being involved in certain sufi orders—although they do spend signifi-

cant amount of money for the service.

Paramadina is not the only movement that handles this type of urban-elite religious teachings. Tazkiya Sejati, led by Jalaluddin Rakhmat, also works in the same field. It has an office based in Patra Kuningan, an elite area of Jakarta. This group and its well-known leader are closely associated with the Muthahhari Foundation, which espouses the theme "For the enlightenment of Islamic thought". Like Paramadina, the success of Tazkiya Sejati is partly determined by the support of some prominent businessmen and executives such as Tantyo P. Sudharmono, the son of the former vice-President of Indonesia, Sudharmono, and Haidar Bagir, a Muslim businessman who has long advocated *Shî'a* to Indonesian Muslims.

In Search of Identity and the Public Sphere

Many contemporary Islamic communities are first and foremost social movements that are ultimately directed towards the realization of an authentically Muslim community, the *ummah*, which is often defined as the community that resembles the early generation of Muslims. This direction represents the search for authenticity, which conveys puritanical ideals. Such a search might appear in manifold expressions, ranging from the revitalization of the lost glory of Islam to the construction of an Islamic space of life. Yet, there is a common view that Islam is to be recalled in order to face the increasingly present challenges.

The quest for authenticity is normally associated with a crisis of identity, which represents a source of meaning for social actors. Identity organizes meaning, in the way that the purpose of certain actions is symbolically identified.[75] In the so-called network society, the search for meaning is normally organized around a primary identity, which is self-sustaining across time and space. Within this context, religion often takes part in organizing the meaning and appears to be strong and influential as a source of identity.

There are two themes recurring in the contemporary Islamic movements that I deal with: "Muslim backwardness caused by internal weaknesses", and the quest "to form a progressive and dynamic Muslim society". These two themes clearly represent two different, but related, tendencies. The theme of Muslim backwardness is more remarkably related to marginality, and thus connected

with the deprived situations of urban masses. Movements advocating this theme often represent resistance against marginality. The appearing expressions and languages among the communities of Darul Arqam, Al-Turath al-Islami, Hidayatullah, and Darut Tauhid, with different nuances, exhibit most strikingly the voices of marginality.

The Darul Arqam came into being in 1968, not long before the upheaval of the racial Malay-Chinese riots in 1969. At that time, the dominance of UMNO was unquestionable, as the superiority of Chinese in the economy brought jealousy to a boil. Such a politico-economic situation was not so different from that of Indonesia during nearly the entire length of Soeharto's presidency. In the case of Indonesia, the position of the single-majority was in the hand of Golkar, the giant ruling party that was prepared to swallow all Muslim political powers. At the same time, Indonesian-Chinese businesspersons, being aware that the economy was the only avenue that they could employ to negotiate power, succeeded in controlling more than three-quarter of the Indonesian economy. The emergence of Hidayatullah at the beginning of the 1970s signifies the withdrawal of Muslims from the political arena, although also the beginning of gradual attempts to seek compensation for marginalization through the development of economic power. For a long period, Muslims did not have any significant power *vis-à-vis* the state, which continuously imposed its webs of power on all spaces within civil society. This resulted in the frustration of Indonesian Muslims in regards to the obstruction of Muslim political expression, which reached a culmination when Soeharto's regime imposed Pancasila as the sole foundation for all-social organizations and political parties.[76] Al-Turath al-Islami and Darut Tauhid, which emerged in the late 1980s, strikingly exhibit this frustration, though the latter attempted to compensate its frustration by building economic power.

On the other hand, JIM, Paramadina and Tazkiya Sejati, which were established in the 1990s, represent a different mainstream. They place more emphasis on forming a progressive and dynamic Muslim society that is able to face contemporary issues. They show to some extent the belief in and hope for the ability of Muslim society to deal with current challenges. The emergence of these movements is as closely related to the political transformation of both Malaysia and Indonesia, which increasingly demonstrated

their accommodation of Muslims, as to the shift of Muslims them-
selves into a more accommodative position vis-à-vis the states.

Within the framework of analysis provided by Castells, the first
tendency related to marginality might be categorized as a type of
resistance identity. This is normally "generated by those actors
that are in position devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of
domination". This tendency is distinguished from the second ten-
dency, the project identity, which appears "when social actors build
a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by do-
ing so, seek the transformation of overall social structure".[77]

Within the context marked by power relationships, an attempt
to distinguish these two different tendencies is highly important.
In general, marginality seems to be generated by authoritarian
political regimes, which for reasons of economic progress or po-
litical stability tend not to allow any different opinions to appear,
and bring everything into their very strict political controls. As a
result, a movement that appears out of this marginality is inclined
to proclaim commitment to a revolutionary and absolutist ideol-
ogy, so that its political nature is more remarkable. However, if a
political regime exhibits accommodation, albeit at a symbolical
level, such a tendency shifts into a collaborative stance requiring
participation in the existing secular-political institutions, its po-
litical nature then, at least for a while, is brought aside. It is im-
portant to note that this outline is not to be applied in a sweeping
manner.

As mentioned earlier, the crisis of identity cannot be disassoci-
ated from rapid social change and globalization. When the mod-
ernizing projects succeeded, they on the one hand, generated ur-
ban masses and middle class, and on the other hand, introduced
secularization and new forms of communicative knowledge. All
of these effects of modernization inevitably brought about the loss
of meaning for certain segments of society- economically, socio-
culturally, and politically. Economically, there are many people
who have lost their jobs or are threatened with unemployment.
This threat is particularly felt by those whose hopes have been
inflated by the promises of development voiced by the govern-
ment. There are those who have enrolled in university education
or taken part in other higher educational institutions. Socially,
the collapse of community and traditional society certainly com-
pels people to find new meaning, in line with the loss of the role

of social actors in the community, simply because there is no longer community in its traditional meaning. The hardest struck are the key players in the traditional hierarchy of the community like the *ulama,* whose powers have been disrupted by the processes of modernization. Culturally, many people are not prepared to face the expansion of the modern and global culture, which make them feel shocked and frustrated. Politically, due to modernization, spaces for participation in the political arena are reduced, but at the same time, the modern nation-states fail to accomplish the promises of modernization. In short, there are those who are excluded in the currents of modernization and globalization.

On the other hand, the development of the new Muslim middle class brought its own consequences. Those involved in business activities or absorbed in big modern companies often could not separate themselves from business games and the interests of capitalists. Those who worked as academicians in universities could often not apply the principle of academic freedom, nor depend on their limited incomes for adequate sustenance. Meanwhile professionals like lawyers, journalists and other practitioners could not be totally independent and needed to obey the various restrictions and regulations made by the regime.[78] Another consequence is that when the new Muslim middle class took over the initiative to direct Muslim societal discourse, the traditional hierarchy that centered on *ulama* could no longer monopolize religious discourse. More and more people from different backgrounds became involved in discussing religious matters bringing in a variety of sources of knowledge and various interpretations of truth. As a result, anxiety and worry started to appear among those who were marginalized within the process of social mobilization.

Within the majority of the movements that I examine, the presence of key actors in defining and organizing meaning within the movements is highly important. Without them, the movements might not have come into existence. Ashari Muhammad, Abdullah Said, Abu Nida, and Abdullah Gymnastiar played pivotal roles in the construction of their own movements and the meanings by which they are animated. With formulations that are occasionally messianic in nature, the hopes to become the best *ummah,* whereby Islamic glory will be revived, were demonstrated clearly by Ashari Muhammad and others. Such a hope was also present in the rhetoric of Abdullah Said, who emphasized the revitalization of Islam

through the practice of returning back to the model of the prophet Muhammad in propagating Islam. The same thing was highlighted by Abu Nida, who saw the need for revitalizing the example of *Salaf al-Ṣâliḥ,* the early dedicated generation. A more accommodating hope came from Darut Tauhid, which, despite being conscious of the fact that many Muslims are in a weak position facing modern challenges, offered a new model of Islamic society.

The actors of those movements constructed a new meaning within the boundaries of new communality created to challenge the existing order. There is a similarity of rhetoric between Darul Arqam, Al-Turath al-Islami, Hidayatullah, and Darut Tauhid, that an Islamic space is to be created by imitating the foundation of the early Muslim community built by the prophet Muhammad, although the last two more clearly exhibit their accommodation of the existing order. Sungai Penchala, Gunung Tembak, Gegerkalong Girang, and Wirokerten are conceived to be Islamic villages, within which people who are not associated with them are excluded. This is the tendency called by Castells "the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded".[79] By so doing, they can freely define new meanings, whereby identity can be regained.

Since economic disadvantage is an important factor in the loss of identity, movements that advocate resistance identity attempt to regain economic power. This was highly significant within the communities of Darul Arqam, Hidayatullah, Darut Tauhid, and Al-Turath al-Islami. Success in achieving economic power has been demonstrated by, at least, the first three movements, which have been able to organize various economic enterprises on a large scale. This achievement reminds us of Weber, who suggested that religious beliefs are directly related to economic conduct. This thesis arose from his observation of the economic progress of Europe in the hands of the bourgeois during the rise of the puritanical ideals. Based on this observation, he came to the conclusion that the puritanical ideals advocated by Protestantism contributed to progress.[80] The presence of the puritanical ideals in these movements seemingly corresponds to the emergence of new networks of trust relationships among movement actors. The widespread relationships of trust provide the basis for the development of informal communication networks, interaction, and mutual support needed to expand various enterprises.

The presence of people within the movements who enjoyed

the results of modernity, particularly the upper middle class of technocrats and professionals, sheds light on the significance of communality. Economic success, without being balanced by the warmth of communality, does not seem to be entirely fulfilling for many in capitalist-urban society that has individualized individuals. The absence of social roles for the upper middle class, as opposed to simply economic roles, constitutes one reason for them to seek a primary identity. The level of ones economic welfare can increase dramatically, but it does not necessary provide psychological welfare.

One remarkable feature of these movements is that sufism normally constitutes an important component. Both the movements that uphold resistance identity or of project identity did not flourish without the presence of sufism, which is often represented by the internalization of certain *dhikr*s. As a ritual component, *dhikr* plays an important role in the production of identities. It represents forms of symbolic expression whereby communications concerning social relationships are passed on, in stylized and dramatized ways. Through this ritual, power identity and collective feelings of belonging are reinforced.[81] Within these movements, sufism is related very much to puritanical notions: a consciousness that the purity of Muslims has been stained, and so requires purification. *Dhikr* constitutes the way to perform the purification. Different from a common assumption that sufism cannot necessarily go hand in hand with puritanism, this fact implies otherwise. Another explanation is that sufism can provide a cooling mantle for the economically marginalized as well as the disaffected middle class within a communal or quasi-communal life.

It is worth noting that the communication media contributes to the proliferation of these movements. Cassettes and videos containing *da'wah* messages of the key figures of the movements constitute one of the ways they attract new members. Recently, these channels have been supported by the use of cyberspace media of communication. The use of the new media enables these movements to involve more people from different backgrounds and various levels of religious competence to participate in discussing and revitalizing various religious discourses. This transformation creates a public sphere in which wider portions of Muslim society can participate in the discussions about Islamic values and practices.[82] Through new media, educated people who are not reli-

gious scholars can increasingly contribute to the discussion of legal issues and create alternative sites for religious discourse and representation.

Finally, these facts highlight the development of civil society in the Muslim world as reflected by the proliferation of contemporary Islamic movements. Their presence can be paralleled with the spread of autonomous civil associations, which encourages the development of democracy. Such associations can be a means for Muslims at large both to achieve common purposes and to maintain their independence of government. They also provide opportunities for contesting and debating the legitimacy of the system, the elite running the system, and the operation of the system itself.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to show the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic movements within the context of the development of civil society in Indonesia and Malaysia, the two largest Muslim countries in Southeast Asia. These movements exhibit three significant features: (1) they commonly express hopes for the realization of an authentically Muslim society—an objective relating to puritanical ideals, (2) within these movements, puritanical ideals go hand in hand with the practice of sufism, which constitute an important relationship-building element supporting the achievement of communal goals, and (3) since the search for authenticity is often challenged by the national-secular nation-state power, frustration with the existing world order occasionally spawns the eruption of revolutionary political activity.

The movements imply a site of resistance from within civil society, as they represent an attempt to make disenfranchised voices heard above the currents of social change that has left some segments of society marginalized. The process of marginalization has inevitably resulted in the loss of meaning networks in social relations. Such movements attempt to restore a primary identity for marginalized social actors and provide new meaning and a new interpretation of their world.

One striking fact is that contemporary Islamic movements are foremost a phenomenon of urban life, which directly experiences the impacts of modernization and globalization. Different from rural life where communality still exists, life in urban-modern envi-

ronments often obstructs the communality that was formerly an important source of identity. When contemporary Islamic movements emerged to offer the warmth of communality, assisted by the practice of sufism, many of the urban masses and new middle class were attracted. Within the boundaries of communality, the common goals advanced by contemporary Islamic movements could be struggled for and maintained.

The political context within which contemporary Islamic movements emerged also demonstrates the correlation between changing political forms and the way in which contemporary Islamic movements exhibit themselves. This explains the relevance of contemporary Islamic movements within the development of civil society in the area under discussion. These developments constitute a sign of the growth of democracy, following the development of economy and social welfare, as an inevitable impact of the state's policy to accelerate economic welfare in order to maintain control over the society.

The explanation and analysis of the responses of these movements towards sociopolitical change, particularly along with the tensions between the state and religion in the area under discussion, are crucial in understanding the dynamics of Islam and modernity. The dynamics demonstrate parallel moves between Islam and modernity, though the way of the former to react often uses different expressions and sentiments. If this is accepted, it can be used as a starting-point to re-examine comprehensively the thesis arising from the European Enlightenment that religion does not necessarily go hand in hand with modernity.

Endnotes

1. Said Amir Arjoman has demonstrated the contribution of these factors to the proliferation of the movements of revitalization in contemporary Islam. See Said Amir Arjoman, "Social Change and Movements of Revitalization in Contemporary Islam", in James A. Beckford, *New Religious Movements and Rapid Social Change* (London: Sage, 1988), pp. 87-107.

2. Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Vol. II, *The Power of Identity*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 69.

3. Jürgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere", *New German Critique* 3 (1974), pp. 45-46.

4. Hegemony is a concept that refers to an order in which a certain way of life or thought is made dominant while the alternative ways of one or more groups are subordinated. This concept was invented by the Italian theorist and founder of the communist party, Antonio Gramsci, who borrowed and elaborated on Marx's concept of class struggle. It derives from Gramsci's concern with the failure of Marxism to change the world. See, for instance, Richard Bellamy, "The Social and Political Thought of Antonio Gramsci", *The Polity Reader in Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 33.

5. On relations between power and discourse, see Michel Foucault, *Power/ Knowledge*, edited by C. Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1972), p. 31.

6. See Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 363-370.

7. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), pp. 391-396.

8. For the meaning of globalization, see Donatella della Porta and Hanspeter Kriesi, "Social Movements in a Globalizing World: an Introduction", in Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi and Dieter Rucht (eds.), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 3-4.

9. Castells, 1999, pp. 19-20.

10. See, for instance, J.P. Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 30-31.

11. Bryan Wilson, *Religion in Sociological Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 163.

12. Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1995, p. 67.

13. See Martin van Bruinessen, "Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of State-Islam Relations in Indonesia", in Ingrid Wessel (ed.), *Indonesien Am Ende Des 20. Jahrhunderts: Analyses zu 50 Jahren unabh?ngiger Entwicklung – Deutsche in Indonesien* (Hamburg: Abera, 1996), p. 22.

14. As for the intervention of Soeharto in Parmusi, see Abdul Aziz Thaba, *Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Order Baru* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), pp. 246-252.

15. See van Bruinessen, 1996, p. 22; see also Thaba, 1996, pp. 251-252.

16. See van Bruinessen, 1996, p. 22.

17. See Ibnu Qayyim Kertayudha, *Gerakan-Gerakan Radikal Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia: Sebuah Kronikel*, unpublished paper (Jakarta: LIPI, 1986), pp. 1-5; see also van Bruinessen, 1996, pp. 26-27.

18. See M. Syafi'i Anwar, "Negara dan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia Orde Baru", in Saiful Muzani (ed.), *Perkembangan dan Kebangkitan Islam di Asia Tenggara* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1993), pp. 134-135.
19. Aswab Mahasin, "The Santri Middle Class: An Insider's View", in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds.), *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia* (Victoria: CSEAS Monash University, 1990), pp. 139-140.
20. Geertz divided the variants of Javanese culture into three categories: Priyayi (bureaucrats), Santri (urban-merchants), and Abangan (rural-farmers). See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976).
21. See Hussin Mutalib, *Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 58-59.
22. M. Kamal Hasan, *Towards Actualizing Islamic Ethical and Educational Principles in Malaysian Society: Some Critical Observation* (Selangor: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1996), p. 88.
23. See Muhammad Syukri Salleh, "Recent Trends in Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia", *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1999, p. 48.
24. See, for instance, Mutalib, 1990, p. 154.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
26. Darul Arqam, *Darul Arqam 25 Tahun: Perjuangan Abuya Syeikh Imam Ashaari Muhammad* (Kuala Lumpur: Bahagian Pengeluaran Minda Syeikhul Arqam, 1993), p. 31.
27. See Anne Sofie Roald, *Tarbiya: Education and Politics in Islamic Movements in Jordan and Malaysia* (Malmoe: Lunds Universitet, 1994), p. 262.
28. See Ahmad Fauzi bin Abdul Hamid, *Islamic Resurgence in the Periphery: A Study of Political Islam in Contemporary Malaysia with Special Reference to the Darul Arqam Movement 1968-1996*, unpublished Ph.D thesis (United Kingdom: University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 1998), p. 148; see also Arqam, 1993, pp. 17-22.
29. Abdul Rahman Haji Abdullah, *Gerakan Islam Tradisional di Malaysia: Sejarah dan Pemikiran Jamaat Tabligh dan Darul Arqam* (Kuala Lumpur: Kintan, 1992) , p. 71.
30. As for the successful story of the Darul Arqam's economic expansion, see Darul Arqam, 1993, pp. 179-204.
31. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, "New Trends of Islamic Resurgence in Contemporary Malaysia: Sufi-Revivalism, Messianism, and Economic Activism", *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1999, p. 7.
32. For the detailed list of the Darul Arqam enterprises, see Darul Arqam, 1993, Supplement.
33. Hamid, 1999, pp. 8-9.
34. Darul Arqam, 1993, p. 126.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 171-178, in which Darul Arqam proclaimed the so-called "The Ascension of Eastern Supremacy".
36. See Imron Arifin and Agus Sunyoto, *Darul Arqam: Gerakan Mesianik Melayu* (Malang: Kalimasahada Press, 1996), pp. 90-93.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
38. *Tempo*, "Beragam Jalan Menempuh Dunia", No. 5, XIII, 3 April 1993.
39. For a detailed account of the conflict between the Darul Arqam and Malaysian government, see Hamid, 1999, pp. 11-13.

40. Johan Hendrik Meuleman, "Reactions and Attitudes towards Darul Arqam Movement in Southeast Asia", *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1996, pp. 57-58.

41. Interview with Abdurrahman Umar, public relations of Hawariyun, 13 July 2000; see also *Hawariyun Profile 2000*, "Hawariyun: God's Promise is Definite".

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Kebenaran*, "Potensi Penggabungan Ekonomi Bangsa Timur", No. 11, Year II, 2000, p. 11.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

45. Roald, 1994, p. 279.

46. See Muhammad Syukri Salleh, "Recent Trends in Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia", *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1999, p. 46.

47. See Jamaah Islah Malaysia, http://www.jim.org.my.

48. See Salleh, 1999, p. 48.

49. See Hamid, 1998, pp. 183-184.

50. See *Amanah*, "KH. Abdullah Said: Membangun Pesantren Karena Kecewa", No. 41, 29 February 1988, p. 48.

51. See Sirojudin Abbas, "Al-Ma'had al-Turâthî wa Takwîn al-Jamâ'ah: Tajribah Ma'had Hidâyatullâh", *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1998, pp. 152-153.

52. See the profile of the Pesantren Hidayatullah, http://www. hidayatullah.com/ponpes.

53. For detailed information, see www.hidayatullah.com/ponpes/surabaya/ekonomi.

54. Daarut Tauhiid, *Profil Pesantren Daarut Tauhiid Bandung,* (booklet); see also http://members.muslimsites.com/daarut-tauhiid/sekilas.

55. See Tempo, 1993, p. 19.

56. For the detailed information, see http://members.muslimsites.com/daarut-tauhiid.

57. See *Suara Hidayatullah*, "Abdullah Gymnastiar: Gerebeg Perjudian", January 2000.

58. See *Gatra*, "KH Abdullah GymnastIar: Dengan Manajemen Qalbu, No. 07, VI, 1 January 2000.

59. See Majlis Al-Turots Al-Islamy, *Selayang Pandang Yayasan Majlis At-Turots Al-Islamy Yogyakarta* (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Majlis Al-Turots Al-Islamy, n.d.)

60. For the detailed biography of this figure, see M. Sabaruddin, *Jamaah At-Turats al-Islami Yogyakarta*, unpublished M.A. thesis (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University, 1999), pp. 33-40.

61. Al-Turots al-Islamy, n.d., pp. 1-2.

62. Sabaruddin, 1999, p. 41.

63. As for Jamaah Shalahuddin and other similar communities mostly associated with universities, see Abdul Aziz, Imam Tholkhah and Soetarman (eds.), *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1989).

64. Sabaruddin, 1999, pp. 42-44.

65. After the fall of Soeharto's regime, this movement's desire to be involved in the political arena was manifested in the founding Partai Keadilan (PK), Justice Party.

66. The network between these movements and their counterparts at home and

abroad, which began being identified after the New Order era, would be an excellent topic for future research

67. Sabaruddin, 1999, pp. 47-51.
68. For detailed information about the Ihya al- Sunnah movement and the sect developed by the proponents of this movement, *Manhaj Salafy*, see http:/ www.salafy.net/org.
69. See Sabaruddin, 1999, p. 62.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
71. Al-Turots al-Islamy, n.d., pp. 4-9.
72. See Sabaruddin, 1999, p. 132.
73. See http://www.paramadina.or.id
74. See again http://www.paramadina.or.id/pd3.
75. Castells, 1999, p, 7.
76. Martin van Bruinessen has suggested in an interview with *Tempo*, that the emergence of exclusively religious communities in the mid-1980s had to do with the acceptance of Pancasila by Indonesia's two largest Muslim organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah. See Tempo, No. 5, XIII, 3 April 1993.
77. Castells, 1999, p. 8.
78. Cf. M. Syafi'i Anwar, 1993, p. 135.
79. Castells, 1999, p. 9.
80. Marx Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Boston: Unwin Hyman), p. 180.
81. See Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 98.
82. Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson, "Redefining Muslim Publics", in Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson (eds.), *New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 1-16.

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