

STUDIA ISLAMIKA

INDONESIAN JOURNAL FOR ISLAMIC STUDIES

Volume 9, Number 1, 2002



LITERAL TRANSLATION, SACRED SCRIPTURE
AND KITAB MALAY
Peter G. Riddell

THE THOUGHTS AND RELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING OF
SHAIKH AHMAD AL-MUTAMAKKIN: THE STRUGGLE OF JAVANESE ISLAM 1645-1740
Zainul Milal Bizawie

ANOTHER RACE BETWEEN ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY:
THE CASE OF FLORES, SOUTHEAST INDONESIA, 1900-1920
Karel Steenbrink

ON BEING A MARXIST MUSLIM:
READING HASAN RAID'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY
Ihsan Ali-Fauzi

STUDIA ISLAMIKA

Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies

Vol. 9, no. 1, 2002

EDITORIAL BOARD:

M. Quraish Shihab (IAIN Jakarta)
Taufik Abdullah (LIPI Jakarta)
Nur A. Fadhil Lubis (IAIN Sumatra Utara)
M.C. Ricklefs (Melbourne University)
Martin van Bruinessen (Utrecht University)
John R. Bowen (Washington University, St. Louis)
M. Atho Mudzhar (IAIN Yogyakarta)
M. Kamal Hasan (International Islamic University, Kuala Lumpur)

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Azyumardi Azra

EDITORS

Saiful Mujani
Jamhari
Jajat Burhanuddin
Fu'ad Jabali
Oman Fathurahman

ASSISTANT TO THE EDITORS

Heni Nuron

ENGLISH LANGUAGE ADVISOR

Chloe J. Olliver

ARABIC LANGUAGE ADVISOR

Nursamad

COVER DESIGNER

S. Prinka

STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-0492) is a journal published by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM), IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta (STT DEPPEN No. 129/SK/DITJEN/PPG/STT/1976) and sponsored by the Australia-Indonesia Institute (AII). It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies, and is intended to communicate original researches and current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contributions from scholars of related disciplines.

All articles published do not necessarily represent the views of the journal, or other institutions to which it is affiliated. They are solely the views of the authors. The articles contained in this journal have been refereed by the Board of Editors.

STUDIA ISLAMIKA has been accredited by The Ministry of National Education, Republic of Indonesia as an academic journal.

On Being a Marxist Muslim: Reading Hasan Raid's Autobiography

Abstraksi: *Artikel ini berbicara mengenai kaitan antara Islam, Marxisme dan Komunisme di Indonesia. Kasus spesifik yang diangkatnya adalah bagaimana hubungan itu tercermin dalam pikiran dan pengalaman Hasan Raid, seperti tertuang dalam otobiografinya, Pergulatan Muslim Komunis: Otobiografi Hasan Raid (2001). Hasan Raid adalah bekas pemimpin Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) yang cukup berpengaruh sejak akhir 1940-an, kelahiran Silungkang, Sumatra Barat. Pada tahun 1947, ia terpilih sebagai anggota Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP) sebagai wakil dari PKI. Kemudian, pada tahun 1957, Raid menjadi anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) Jakarta Raya, yang sejak tahun 1959 berubah namanya menjadi DPRD Gotong Royong. Sehubungan dengan latar belakang Islamnya, Raid dipercayai oleh para pemimpin teras PKI untuk membela posisi PKI dalam isu-isu yang terkait dengan agama, khususnya pada masa kampanye Pemilu tahun 1955. Setelah peristiwa Gerakan 30 September (Gestapu) 1965 meletus, Raid dipenjarakan oleh pemerintah Orde Baru selama 13 tahun, dan baru dibebaskan pada tahun 1978.*

Selain mendiskusikan sosok Hasan Raid sebagai pemimpin PKI yang penuh rasa percaya diri, artikel ini juga mencoba mengemukakan pandangan-pandangan Raid sehubungan dengan justifikasinya untuk menjadi seorang Muslim yang sekaligus Marxis dan Komunis. Selain itu, penulis juga menggambarkan bagaimana reaksi masyarakat Muslim Indonesia atas penerbitan otobiografi Hasan Raid itu. Penilaian menyeluruh terhadap otobiografi Raid ini —yang oleh penerbitnya juga dimaksudkan untuk mengawali langkah-langkah rekonsiliasi di Indonesia— diberikan di bagian akhir tulisan.

Dalam pembahasannya, penulis berpandangan bahwa Raid adalah seorang Komunis yang mencoba memanfaatkan ajaran-ajaran Islam untuk mencapai tujuan-tujuan politiknya dan bersikap netral terhadap masalah agama, atau sedikitnya Raid adalah seorang Komunis religius yang membaca ajaran-ajaran Islam menurut kecenderungan-kecenderungan Komunistnya. Inilah yang menjelaskan pandangan-pandangan normatifnya bahwa pengganggangan terhadap kapitalisme sejalan dengan ajaran-ajaran Islam, bahwa masyarakat tawhid adalah masyarakat tanpa kelas, dan bahwa pembelaan terhadap kelompok tertindas (mustad'afin) harus dilakukan dengan perjuangan kelas.

Dijelaskan bahwa setiap upaya mensintesis Islam dan Komunisme selalu berhadapan dengan sikap PKI yang ambigu, jika bukan oportunistik, terhadap agama: di satu sisi, para pemimpin PKI tetap menegaskan bahwa PKI ingin menjaga penampilan sebagai golongan yang tidak memusuhi agama, sementara di sisi lain, mereka seringkali tidak dapat menghindari dari kenyataan bahwa agama adalah anatema dalam dogma Marxisme dan Komunisme. Dalam hal ini, posisi Raid dalam tulisan ini diperbandingkan dengan posisi pemimpin PKI Muslim di era pergerakan, yakni K. H. Misbach dan Datuk Batuah. Di era kedua yang disebut terakhir ini, ambiguitas PKI telah memperlemah upaya keduanya, karena para pembesar PKI seperti Tan Malaka dan Semaun menolak tegas keyakinan Sarekat Islam (SI) bahwa Islam dapat menjadi basis pergerakan nasionalis. Di era Raid, ambiguitas yang sama juga tampak misalnya ketika PKI merasa bahwa menerima Pancasila (yang sila pertamanya adalah Ketuhanan Yang Mahaesa) adalah seperti meminum "pil pahit." Yang menarik, Raid sama sekali tidak membahas butir ini dalam otobiografinya. Apa pun alasannya, sangat sulit dimengerti bahwa hubungan Islam dan Komunisme bisa berjalan semudah seperti yang dikemukakan dalam otobiografinya.

Dilihat dalam kerangka rekonsiliasi, kenyataan bahwa Raid tidak menyinggung butir di atas amat disayangkan. Yang jauh lebih penting dari sekadar formulasi abstrak mengenai ajaran-ajaran Islam dan keyakinan Marxisme atau Komunisme adalah pengalaman hubungan umat Islam dan PKI di panggung sejarah, yang ditandai oleh banyak luka. Tanpa mengungkap hal ini, upaya untuk melupakan masa lampau dan saling memaafkan pihak lawan, yang menjadi kunci kemungkinan rekonsiliasi, akan sulit dibayangkan terjadi. Malah, jangnan-jangan luka lama itu hanya tambah diperkuat.

On Being a Marxist Muslim: Reading Hasan Raid's Autobiography

خلاصة: يتناول هذا المقال العلاقة بين الإسلام والماركسية (Marxisme) والشيوعية بإندونيسيا، والقضية التي يثيرها هي كيف كانت تلك العلاقة تنعكس في حياة حسن رائد (Hasan Raid) وآرائه كما وردت في سيرته الذاتية، *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis: Otobiografi Hasan Raid* (مقاومة المسلم الماركسي: سيرة حسن رائد الذاتية)، ٢٠٠١م. وحسن رائد هو زعيم الحزب الشيوعي الإندونيسي (Partai Komunis Indonesia/PKI) الذي كان يتمتع بنفوذ واسع في عقد الأربعينيات وكان مولده في سيلونجكانج (Silungkang) سومطرة الغربية، ويعد من أنشط الشخصيات في زمانه إذ تم اختياره عضواً في اللجنة القومية الإندونيسية (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat/KNIP) عام ١٩٤٧م ممثلاً للحزب الشيوعي الإندونيسي ثم صار عضواً في مجلس الشعب المحلي (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah/DPRD) محافظة جاكرتا الذي تحول اسمه منذ ١٩٥٩م إلى مجلس الشعب الاشتراكي (DPRD Gotong Royong)، وحيث أنه كان مسلماً فقد وكل إليه زعماء الشيوعية الدفاع عن الحزب الشيوعي فيما يتعلق بالشؤون الدينية وبخاصة في فترة الانتخابات العامة لسنة ١٩٥٥م. وفيما بعد الانقلاب الشيوعي الفاشل عام ١٩٦٥م قامت الحكومة بإلقائه في السجن وقضى ثلاث عشرة سنة فيه ثم أطلق سراحه عام ١٩٧٨م.

وبالإضافة إلى مناقشة شخصية حسن رائد الذي كان يبالي في ثقته بنفسه يحاول كاتب المقال أن يكشف النقاب عن آراء حسن رائد المتعلقة بتريره لمن يبقى مسلماً وهو شيوعي وماركسي في نفس الوقت. وبجانب ذلك، يستعرض الكاتب أيضاً كيف كلان

رد الفعل من المجتمع الإسلامي بإندونيسيا على نشر سيرة حسين رائد الذاتية، ويعرض المقال في النهاية ما قاله الناشر عن سبب النشر من أنه كان يستهدف تمهيدا للمصالحة الوطنية.

وخلال مناقشاته يرى الكاتب أن حسن رائد كان شيوعيا يحاول أن يستغل التعاليم الإسلامية لتحقيق مصالحه السياسية ويتخذ موقفا محايدا في الشؤون الدينية أو على الأقل كان شيوعيا يريد أن يفهم الإسلام حسبما يملئ عليه أفكاره الشيوعية، وهذا هو الذي يفسر آراءه في أن الهجوم على الرأسمالية يتمشى مع التعاليم الإسلامية وأن المجتمع غير طبقي وأن الدفاع عن المستضعفين يجب أن يتم بالصراع بين الطبقات.

ويصرح الكاتب أن كل محاولة للتوفيق بين الإسلام والشيوعية فإنما تجرّد نفاق الشيوعية أو انتهازيتهم في استغلال الدين بحيث يحاول زعماء الشيوعية أن يؤكدوا على أنهم يريدون الاحتفاظ بمظهرهم غير المعادي للدين من ناحية بينما لا يستطيعون أن يفروا من الحقيقة وبه أن الدين عند الشيوعية مخدر من ناحية أخرى.

وفي هذا الصدد هناك مقارنة بين موقف حسن رائد وموقف كل من زعيم الحزب الشيوعي في عصر الحركات التحريرية وهو الحاج مصباح وداتوك باتواه (Datuk Batuah)، وقد كان نفاق الشيوعية قد أضعف موقفهما لأن كبار الشيوعية من أمثال تان ملاقا (Tan Malaka) وسماون (Semaun) يرفضان رفضا قاطعا أي اعتقاد بإمكانية أن تمثل شركات إسلام (Sarekat Islam) قاعدة للحركة الوطنية، وكان هذا الموقف ظلها أيضا في عصر حسن رائد إذ يعتقد الشيوعيون أنهم يقبلهم البانجاسيلا (Pancasila) أي المبادئ الخمسة كإيديولوجية الدولة وفي مبدئه الأول الإيمان بالله كأنهم يشربون قرصلا مرا.

والثير هو أن حسن رائد لم يتطرق في سيرته الذاتية إلى هذا الموضوع، ومهما يكن الميراث فإن الصعوبة بمكان فهم العلاقة بين الإسلام والشيوعية والماركسية تسير بكل هذه البساطة كما صورها؛ وهذا مما يؤسف له إذا نظرنا إليه من ناحية المصالحة الوطنية. والذي يعد أهم من صياغة مجردة حول التعاليم الإسلامية والشيوعية والماركسية وهو تجربة المسلمين مع الحزب الشيوعي في حلبة التاريخ، تلك التجربة الحافلة بالجروح، فبدون الكشف عن هذه الحقيقة فإن محاولة نسيان الماضي وبناء التسامح الذي يمثل كل منهما مفتاح المصالحة الوطنية يصعب تحقيقها، بل قد يحدث العكس وهو أن تقوى تلك الجروح.

Introduction

In his recently published book, Clive Christie argues that Socialism, Marxism and Communism played a crucial role as weapons for Southeast Asian leaders in their fight against colonialism and as frameworks for them to run the newly independent nations. He also realizes that other ideologies such as those based on religion, which were older in terms of their coming into the region than the above-mentioned Western-originated ideologies, especially Islam in the Malay world and Confucianism and Buddhism in the Indo-China and Burma, also played a similarly important role. However, he provides only a dim analysis of the extremely intricate relationship between these types of ideology, especially between Marxism and Islam in the thought of leaders of movements such as the Islamic Union (Sarekat Islam or SI) in the then Dutch East Indies. Most probably for reasons of space, I believe, he makes only a slight, insignificant reference to SI.¹

This is unfortunate for at least two reasons. First of all, much more importantly than their mere appearance in the region, it was precisely the intricacy and the complexity of the relationship between those ideologies that really mattered and had a great impact in coloring the very nature of anti-colonial movements. In the thought of leaders in SI, for example, those ideologies were mixed up and sometimes even blurred, and deliberate attempts were made to synthesize them at their height. And to a significant degree, it was the unsuccessful attempt to settle this issue of the relationship between the two ideologies that split the movement into “White” SI (*SI “Putih”*) and “Red” SI (*SI “Merah”*), and hence seriously weakened it.²

The second reason relates to the longer-term impact of this intricate relationship in post-colonial Southeast Asian, about which Christie writes almost nothing. The most significant ingredient here is this: in countries such as Indonesia, while it was easier for the competing political groupings to come to a sort of synthesis or to have a common platform in the colonial era, where Dutch and Japanese colonial powers were perceived as common enemies, that same easy-going attitude among these groupings soon disappeared as the nation achieved its independence. The issue became even more complicated when many political groupings in Indonesia accused the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) of betraying the newly established republic by committing the so-called “Madiun Affair” (*Peristiwa Madiun*) in 1948.³ The survival of the PKI after that affair, its rapid growth in the 1950s, and its difficult relationship in particular with

mainstream Islamic society, makes it even more important to understand how the leaders in this party supported their existence ideologically. This difficult relationship finally ended in the bloody massacre of PKI members and sympathizers following the so-called “30 September Movement” (Gerakan 30 September or G30S) PKI, in which Muslims were heavily implicated.⁴

Considering the importance of the above reasons, this paper will attempt to begin to fill the gap that Christie leaves in his book. My intention is to portray and analyze this complex relationship between ideologies, this time between Marxism and Islam in Indonesia. However, my case does not focus on the older generation of Marxist or Muslim leaders such as those involved in SI before Indonesian independence, but the generation that grew up and played an active role in the later, post-independent period, namely the leaders of PKI. More specifically, in order to gain as deep an understanding as possible, my case study focuses on Hasan Raid’s recently published autobiography, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis: Otobiografi Hasan Raid* (“The Struggle of a Communist Muslim: The Autobiography of Hasan Raid”).⁵

Raid was among the influential PKI leaders of the 1940s and the 1950s. In 1947, he was a member of the Central National Committee of Indonesia (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or KNIP) as a PKI representative. In 1957, he became a member of the Regional People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD) of Jakarta Raya (Greater Jakarta), which in 1959 changed its name to Mutual Cooperation DPRD (*DPRD Gotong Royong*). In relation to his relatively strong Islamic background, the PKI establishment entrusted him, with the role of defending PKI’s position on the issue of religion, especially during the election period in 1955.

After the G30S affair, Raid was imprisoned by the New Order government for thirteen years and was released in 1978. In the last three years, he has been actively involved as a founding member of an organization established to collect information on the mass murders of PKI members and associates in 1965-1966.

I examine how Raid emerged confidently as a leader of PKI, his justification for being a Marxist and a Muslim at the same time, and how Indonesian Muslims reacted to the publication of his book. After this introduction, this paper will first of all detail Raid’s biography as a Marxist Muslim and his thoughts on Islam and Marxism. Indonesian Muslims’ response to his autobiography and my general

assessment of it will be provided in the last two parts of the paper.

Reading his autobiography thoroughly, I have a strong impression that Raid is a Communist who looked upon Islam as a means to an end, and is neutral toward religion, or he is at least a religious Communist who reads Islamic teachings according to his Communist inclination. Against the backdrop of a long history of tension between Muslim communities and PKI, the publication of this book in the new era of the country signified an effort to reduce the mutual distrust between these two camps and an appeal to begin a new chapter of friendly relations. However, reconciliation between them requires much more than this sort of publication.

From Silungkang to Jakarta through Solo: Becoming a Marxist Muslim

Hasan Raid was born on 1 March 1923 in Silungkang, an area in West Sumatra that became increasingly urbanized, especially after the opening of the railway between Sawahlunto and Teluk Bayur in the 1890s. People from surrounding rural areas moved to this new urban center, leaving almost no space for the peasantry. Mainly for this reason, Silungkang women spent most of their time as cloth weavers, whose end product was to be sold not only in local markets, but also throughout the Archipelago.⁶

Raid described his society as a “dynamic society.” Trading activities brought Silungkang people into constant contact and communication with people of other cities and islands, which broadened their perspectives on national and international politics. In 1915,⁷ the SI chapter of Silungkang was established, which later developed into “Red SI.” In 1924, this “Red SI” changed its name into Peoples Union (*Sarekat Rakyat* or SR), an *underbouw* () organization of PKI. It was most probably with the support of this organization and others that the PKI raised up in rebellion against the Dutch around Silungkang in January 1927. However, tight colonial control was imposed after this unsuccessful rebellion, which worsened societies’ way of life.

As with most other families in Silungkang, Raid’s was, as he says, “a poor family.”⁸ His father, Raid Gelar Bagindo Marah, was a sailor who sometimes spent his time as a small vendor. Like other Minangkabau children, Raid spent most of his childhood in the *surau* (prayer-house) and at the age of ten he finished his studies of Qur’an recitation (*pelajaran mengaji*) in Surau Tanjung Medan. After finishing elementary school (1929-1933), he furthered his education in

Silungkang Diniyyah School for a year (1933-1934). It was at this school that he met Ongku Pokian Yakub whose unusual style of teaching deeply impressed him. At least two key lessons he took from this teacher he kept for life: that to seek knowledge is every Muslim's obligation in life, and that it is unlawful for any Muslim to consume forbidden meals.⁹ Raid had no formal education after that, but he enthusiastically read any material available while he was working to support his family.

In mid 1936, in line with the Minangkabau tradition of *merantau*,¹⁰ Raid departed for Surabaya, East Java, and began his new career as – somewhat like his father's part-time occupation in Silungkang – a shopkeeper and minor vendor. Prior to that, an agreement had been made through correspondence between his mother and the family of Tuk Utiah Saleh and Ongku Mudo Lilah for Raid to stay at this family's home and to work at their shop.¹¹ People's conversation at home and shop kept his enthusiasm for politics and other issues alive.

Raid was given a daily salary of 10 cents of which he spent around 2 cents for his personal requirements. He managed his salary carefully, and from his savings he sent his mother about f 1.50 each month. In addition, he used the money to take a long-distance English course from a learning institution in Bandung, West Java, and to purchase publications such as the periodical *Matabari* ("Sun") of Semarang. Reading this publication's editorial on the Japanese attack on China convinced Raid that the Chinese nationalists would finally defeat the intruders.

At about the same time, Raid met Hakam Syarif, and extended his readings to include daily newspapers such as *Soeloeh Indonesia Moeda* ("Torch of Young Indonesians"), *Fikiran Rakjat* ("People's Thought"), *Daulat Rakyat* ("People's Sovereignty"), and *Menara Merah* ("Red Minaret"). It was mainly in these publications that he began to read Sukarno's ideas on nationalism, Islam and Marxism, Hatta's ideas on the relationship between the Socialist International and Indonesian independence, as well as the debate between these two leading Indonesian nationalists regarding the strategies of cooperation and non-cooperation in the Indonesian nationalist movement. His frequent conversations with Hakam were also instructive: although an important official of the New Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia Baru or PNI-Baru) in Surabaya, his new friend was kind enough to let him read his books and magazines without insisting that he be a member of the New-PNI. Hakam also lent him

books such as Hatta's *Ke Arah Indonesia Merdeka* ("Toward a Free Indonesia"), where Raid found a convincing argument on the necessary use of violence in the nationalist movement.¹²

In December 1940 Raid received a telegram from his mother asking him to return home, as she was not well. On the ship from Batavia to Teluk Bayur, Raid was interrogated because he carried with him a novel entitled *Rol Patjar Merah Indonesia* ("The Role of Indonesian Red Lover").¹³ This direct encounter with the colonial security system multiplied his anger about colonialism.

When he arrived in Silungkang, it became clear for him that his mother's telegram was inspired more by her longing for her son and her desire for him to get marriage soon, rather than by her physical condition. After marrying Samsinar, a sister of his old friend Saman, Raid helped his father to trade "*barang muda*" ("young stuff"),¹⁴ fish and vegetables in Lubuk Landai, Jambi.

When the Japanese arrived in Silungkang, people's living standards deteriorated further. To help his father, Raid had to travel as far as Singapore and Surabaya to find woven goods. The lack of capital, however, made him virtually jobless. When, on 19 August 1945, news regarding Indonesian independence reached Silungkang, and Youth of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemuda Republik Indonesia) was established in this city, Raid joined this organization.

Although he participated in many activities of the local PRI, Raid's strong sense of activism was not fully fulfilled by this organization and he wanted to be in a bigger city. Hence he again went to Java, leaving his wife and newborn daughter at home. At first he stayed in Bandung where he joined the Hizbullah ("Party of Allah") militia. He was involved in several attacks against Japanese troops organized by this militia, but then decided to withdraw his membership. His reason deserves mention here: he thought the Hizbullah tradition of shouting "*Allah-u Akbar*" (Allah the Almighty) when they started their attack was not realistic and only made their enemy aware of their presence and impending attack.

Two days after his resignation from Hizbullah, he arrived in Solo. He stayed in and worked for the "Silungkang Shop" owned by Saman, his brother-in-law. Here he saw militias being sent to Semarang and read how *arek-arek Suroboyo* (Surabaya folks) in the neighboring city fought against the Allied Force under the banner of "*merdeka atau mati*" ("independence or death"). He then questioned himself: "Why haven't you been involved in the battle-field? When you were about

to leave Silungkang, was not it your intention to be part of the [Indonesian] struggle for independence?"¹⁵

Meanwhile, many political parties were established, especially after the release of Mohammad Hatta's *Maklumat* ("Announcement") in November 1945. As for the PKI, this party was established before this, on October 21, 1945, and headed by Mr. Mohd. Yusuf. He knew this from the first edition of *Bintang Merah* ("Red Star"), PKI's official publication, which he purchased in Purwosari Street, Solo, where he also "found PKI's program that wanted to erase the exploitation of man by other man, that wanted to bring justice to every walk of human life." Reading this publication, and reflecting upon other materials that he had read in Surabaya in around 1936-1940, said Raid, "I remembered the heroism of the old people of Silungkang, when they launched the rebellion against the Dutch colonialism in early 1927."¹⁶

Hence Raid was interested in the PKI, and in December 1945 he officially became a member of this party in Solo. On why he had not chosen an Islamic party, he said:

I decided not to subscribe to Islamic parties, such as Masyumi, because that party as an institution was established in the Japanese period and only became a political party after the release of Vice President Mohammad Hatta's Announcement in November 1945. [This historical timing meant that] the party had a certain degree of relationship with the Japanese.¹⁷

After being a member of PKI, Raid enthusiastically took courses on various issues in politics and philosophy that were given by PKI officials, including the philosophy of historical and dialectical materialism and constitutional law. As he said, he by then could better understand Sukarno's *Nasionalisme, Islamisme, dan Marxisme* ("Nationalism, Islamism, and Marxism") and other materials.

Raid then became actively involved in PKI activities. He was asked by Suprpto and Moch. Bachry, senior PKI officials in Solo, to be on the staff of the PKI Secretariat in this city. As a representative of this office, he was sent to the party conference in Cirebon, West Java, in February 1946, where others delegates of Red Militia (*Lasykar Merah*) were assembled from all parts of Java. Later on, when he returned to Solo, he heard about a clash involving Red Militia and the Indonesian military in Cirebon. The reason for the clash was that the Indonesian military prohibited the Red Militia from searching for and collecting Japanese arms that were left in Cirebon. The military finally man-

aged to crack down on their rival, and many of the Red Militia (also PKI) leaders, including Moh. Yusuf and Suprpto, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman respectively, were arrested.

Regardless of the seriousness of the clash, PKI as an organization was able to survive. The arrest of the leaders instigated PKI members of Tan Malaka inclination, who perceived the PKI of Musso to be illegal, to form what they called the "PKI Rearrangement Committee" (Komite Pemberesan PKI). Despite their loyal following, Yusuf's and Suprpto's attempts were hampered by the return of former PKI leaders from their exile in Australia, including Sarjono, Winanta, Jaetun, Sulaiman Sm., Ngadiman Hardjo Subroto, Ruskak, and H. Datuk Batuah. This internal struggle finally ended in April 1946. Through its national conference in Solo, PKI members chose Sarjono as Chairman, with Sulaiman Sm. and H. Datuk Batuah as the Secretary and Head of Information Department (respectively).

For newcomer Raid of Silungkang, these internal developments within PKI were good news. He gains inspiration from such events as the visit of Aidit, an important national PKI leader and later its Chairman, who had just been released by the Dutch government from his exile in Onrust Island; and the visit of Peris Pardede, an editor of *Bintang Merah*. More importantly, Raid and Pardede were later asked by the new PKI leadership to assist Aidit in editing *Bintang Merah*. It was with Aidit's assistance that he wrote and published his first article in *Bintang Merah*.¹⁸

Raid's political career soon skyrocketed. In 1947, he became a member of the Secretariat of the Left Wing (Sekretariat Sayap Kiri), which comprised of PKI, the Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis) and the Labor Party (Partai Buruh), and was based in Yogyakarta. Soon after that he was asked to be a member of the Central National Committee of Indonesia (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or KNIP) as a PKI representative, to replace Winata who had just passed away. Thus, representing PKI, he was among KNIP members who supported the Linggarjati Agreement (Persetujuan Linggarjati).

Late in 1947 Raid was sent to Sumatra to strengthen PKI's power base. This trip was the first time he had flown in a plane: "It was my involvement with the revolution that made it possible," said Raid.¹⁹ He was now an important PKI cadre. This was also the first time he had meet his family after a long separation.

Back in Solo around August 1948, Raid was asked to spread the PKI resolution entitled "The New Way for the Republic of Indone-

sia” (*Jalan Baru untuk Republik Indonesia*). Based mainly on Musso’s criticism of current PKI performances, this resolution appealed for the PKI to be more assertive in its political strategies and decisions, to be more decisive in leading left-wing parties, and to be more integrated into the international socialist revolution.

Raid’s activism, however, was interrupted by the kidnapping of a PKI member in Solo, which was followed by the disappearance of Lieutenant Colonel Saherman of the Panembahan Senopati Military Unit. This incident ended in the well-known “Madiun Affair.” According to Raid, the incident was a mere provocation to realize the Indonesian military’s desire to crackdown on the PKI. The fact that the PKI took the provocation seriously justified the Indonesian military’s action in the first place. Sukarno appealed to Indonesian citizens to choose between himself and Hatta (representing the Republic of Indonesia) and Musso (representing the Soviet government) as their leader, which increased the tension. Regarding Musso’s response, Raid said:

Musso’s answer reflected that he was temperamental and did not think carefully about the implication of his answer.... Had he discussed [his answer] with his friends he would first of all have stated that there was no coup in Madiun, there was no Soviet government in Madiun. What happened in Madiun was an attempt to reduce colonial and feudal elements. And it was unfair to ask people to choose either Sukarno-Hatta or PKI-Musso, as it meant to destroy the unity of nation....²⁰

In the aftermath of the Madiun Affair, Raid remained a fugitive for about a year. In December 1949, Aidit again asked him to strengthen the PKI in Sumatra. Hence, from March 1950 to July 1951, he was the High Commissioner of Sarbupri (Indonesian Plantation Labor Union or Serikat Buruh Perkebunan RI) of North Sumatra. In August 1952, he began editing *Warta Sarbupri* (“Sarbupri News”) in Jakarta, and in 1954 he became a member of the Sumatra Cities Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Kota Sumatera or DPKS). In 1957, as a result of the 1955 General Election, Raid became a member of the Regional People’s Representative Council of Jakarta Raya. At the same time, from 1958, he edited *Suara Ibukota* (“Voice of the Capital City”), the official publication of PKI of Jakarta Raya.

In July 1962, Raid was sent for seven months to Moscow to further his studies at the Moscow Institute for Social Studies. When he returned, he began his teaching career at Aliarcham Academy for Social Sciences (Akademi Ilmu Sosial Aliarcham or AISA), in particular on

the topic of "Principal Issues in Indonesian Revolution." At around the same time, Raid also taught courses on politics at Buchtarudin Political Academy (Akademi Politik Buchtarudin), People's University (Universitas Rakyat or Unra), and the University of Respublika (Respublika University). As he was more interested in education than practical politics, Raid resigned from his membership of DPRD-GR of Jakarta Raya in January 1964.

On March 1965, Raid was assigned to go to the People's Republic of China to study the peasant movement. He, like many others, was stunned by the success story of the land reform program in China, in comparison with the one he saw in Indonesia. On his return he continued at AISA. Beginning in 29 September 1965, he was assigned by AISA to be a member of the Evaluation Team of Kontrar's Political Education.²¹

It was during his busy days at AISA that the G30S broke out. He was frequently interrogated by the military after the alleged Communist coup, about which he says he knew virtually nothing. He finally was imprisoned in the Special Detainee Camp (Rumah Tahanan Khusus) of Salemba on 9 October 1965. Without any due process of law, he was exiled to Nusakambangan. His wife and daughter were also interrogated and imprisoned, although they were not involved in PKI activities.

In retrospect, Raid believed that rather than a G30S PKI, what happened that day was the G30S Suharto. He based this belief on the fact that Suharto was not on the list of army Generals to be killed and that he actually knew of Untung's plan from Latief but did not take any action to prevent it. Raid also believed that the 11 March Letter of Order (Surat Perintah 11 Maret or Supersemar) was orchestrated by Suharto to justify the banning of the PKI.

Raid was freed on 27 July 1978. However, like other PKI-related political prisoners, he could not yet enjoy full citizen's rights. To attend his family's wedding in Padang, for example, he had to apply for a special permit from the office of Military Regional Command (Komando Daerah Militer). His status as a former political prisoner prohibited him from applying for his pension as other former members of parliament could. And as he was already 55 years old when he returned to his family, he helped his wife cook meals for trade for a living. He also wrote articles using a pen name, and sometimes was asked to write books.

In the last three years, Raid has been actively involved as a found-

ing member of Foundation for the Research of 1965/1966 Massacre (Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965/1966 or YPKP). This foundation was established on 7 April 1999 to collect information on the mass murders of PKI members and associates in 1965-1966. Ny. Sulami, the former Second Secretary of Indonesian Women's Movement (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia or Gerwani), headed this foundation. In addition to Raid, prominent figures of the former left-wing movement such as Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Sumini Martono, and Suharno, are among its founder members.²²

Tawhid Society as Classless Society: Raid's Islamic Justifications

In 1946, Hasan Raid was invited by H. Datuk Batuah to come to his office. Batuah asked for his opinion on the relationship between PKI and Islam. Raid began the conversation by saying that Muslims all over the world had been oppressed for over fourteen centuries. He also said that Muslims were yet to leads themselves (as they were promised in the Qur'ân [al-Qaṣâṣ 5-6]),²³ because they had ignored the dictates of the Almighty Allah. Hence Raid blamed traditional Muslim leaders:

"I almost never heard of *ulema* (religious leaders) or those who claimed to be Muslim intellectuals that took deliberate action to teach the *musta'afin* (the oppressed) to organize themselves to get rid of the chains of oppression and exploitation that were forced upon them by the *mustakbarin* (oppressors)," said Raid.

"Yes, and now here we are," said H. Datuk Batuah, "as Muslims in PKI, taking serious actions to liberate the oppressed from the Islam that has been left by *ulema* and Muslim intellectuals. With PKI, we practice Islamic teachings about the liberation of the *umat* (the Muslim community)."²⁴

When he was convinced that Raid was the right man for the job, Batuah asked him to give a speech on the subject on Indonesian Republic Radio (Radio Republik Indonesia or RRI), Surakarta. Raid accomplished the task well.

Some ten years later, in 1955, Raid remained deeply involved in the job of "defending the PKI". This was so especially before the General Election, (i.e. in the campaign period), when many Muslim groups accused the PKI of being anti-religion and atheistic, and its members of being unbelievers (*kafir*). On that accusation, which he perceived to be based on Karl Marx's statement that "religion is the opium of

the oppressed,” Raid stated that this statement should be put in its proper context. What Marx criticized was not the religion *per se* but its misuse by corrupt religious institutions in Europe. Raid again said, “religion is not the issue for PKI.”²⁵

His role of “defending the PKI” brought him to be involved in “the battle of verses” (*perang ayat*), especially against Masyumi politicians. As Masyumi leaders were in power at that time and were supposed to be responsible for policies such as the removal of certain residences in Jakarta, in his campaign, Raid mentioned this verse to discredit Masyumi: “Do you know who are among you that lie about religion? Those are people that drive out the orphans and do not encourage people to feed the poor” (al-Mâ’ûn 1-4).

As a Muslim, Raid was of the opinion that politics was a matter of worldly affairs and that Islam gives no detailed teachings on how to deal with these matters specifically. As a universal religion whose teachings should be eternal, what Islam provides for Muslims are general principles for social justice and equality among people. He believed that this is also the bottom line of the saying of the Prophet Mohamad: “If I give you an order on religion, follow it; and if I order you on something that came from my personal point of view, please remember that I am none but an ordinary person.” Raid’s journey along the road of the PKI was based among other thing on this prophetic saying, which he interpreted as encouraging Muslims to use independent reasoning and consciousness in matters related to worldly affairs:

I traveled along the road of PKI because PKI openly stated that what they questioned is the relation between men and other men.... According to PKI, after the disintegration of men into classes, into groups, there have been abnormal relations between human groupings. [In this relationship], one group exploited another group and drank the blood poured in their bodies. It is this abnormal relationship that PKI wants to diminish. In other words, what PKI has been questioning was mere worldly affairs.²⁶

However, Raid believed that there were similarities between Islamic teachings and PKI goals and programs. Islam’s condemnation of those who collect wealth and do not take care of the poor was in line with the PKI program to destroy the capitalists. The fact that Islam prohibits Muslims from eating or drinking the blood poured in another’s body suggested, in Raid’s view, its support for PKI condemnation of capitalist’s exploitation of labors. And finally, Islam’s promise that the *mustad’afîn* (the oppressed and the poor) will be

chosen as leaders on earth run side by side with the PKI goal of eliminating capitalism and replacing it with socialism. Hence he could say strongly in his campaign for the PKI: "Is PKI anti-religion because of its intention to uproot the *umat* from poverty? Is PKI anti-religion because it is against the exploitation of man by other men? Against anybody who wants to eat or drink the blood poured in other's body? Is PKI anti-religion because it wants to bring justice in society?" Here he mentioned a verse from the Qur'ân: "O believers! Do not make any judgment before you God and the prophet make theirs on it" (al-Hujurât: 1).²⁷

Raid also suggested that the PKI principle of class struggle did not contradict Islamic teachings. First of all, he cites the Quranic verse al-Nisâ' 75²⁸ to suggest that the Islamic doctrine of *jihâd* is stronger than the PKI's appeals for action such as demonstrations, strikes, and even revolution to bring about social changes. However, his favorite verse to justify class struggle is al-Ra'd 51 which states, "Verily, Allah will never change the fate of a group unless they change by themselves what is inside them." For Raid, this verse signified the truth of one of the PKI's basic principles, i.e. that the oppressed should end the power of the oppressors since the latter would never give it up voluntarily. Here the Quranic term "*qawm*" was interpreted as "class," and hence Islam justified class struggle. It was in this context that Raid suggested the resemblance between PKI's appeal for a classless society and Islam's urge for Muslims to establish the *tawhid* society, the unified society.

After his release from prison, Raid remained a firm believer in his old ideas about the relationship between Islam and Marxism and the role of the PKI. If anything, he found new bases for those old ideas in the writings of young Indonesian Muslim intellectuals such as Masdar F. Mas'udi. A non-governmental organization activist of traditional Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) background, Mas'udi is of the opinion that Quranic interpretations have been, and will always be, heavily dependent on the social basis of those who interpreted it. Raid took this argument further to suggest that what is badly needed is a Quranic interpretation that supports the struggle of the oppressed against the oppressors.

The Remaining Stigma: Muslims' Reactions

Given the historically difficult relationship between the PKI and the Muslim community in Indonesia, it is natural to expect that the publication of Raid's book would prompt strong reactions. However, surprisingly enough, there have been only a few reviews of this book in the Indonesian media since its publication in February 2001, and these reviews have been generally welcoming. To the best of my knowledge, there is no review of this book in the so-called "hardliner" Islamic publications in Indonesia such as *Sabili* ("My Way") and *Suara Hidayatullah* ("Voice of Hidayatullah"), which have been well-known for their harsh treatment of ideas and actions they perceive as threatening Indonesian Muslims' interests and survival, especially those of leftist inclination.

There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. The first one is that the issue is no longer a sensitive and controversial one among Muslims in Indonesia, and an appeal should be made for national reconciliation. Considering the facts that I will describe and discuss below, this is extremely unlikely: the majority of Indonesian Muslims still view the PKI as a dangerous enemy and they still watch with extra cautions any thought and action by former PKI members or their associates with leftist inclination. Hence the second explanation seems to me more realistic: this relates to the timing of this book's publication, i.e. in the middle of the re-emerging high tensions between militant Muslim groups in Indonesia and their old leftist activist rivals. This last phenomenon is reflected in the open intention of many militant groups to burn leftist books, of which Raid's autobiography is perceived as only one among many.

Let me first elaborate the first reason. It is important to consider here that the Institute for Human Resources Research and Development (Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia or LKPSM), an autonomous body within Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) of Yogyakarta, and the *Santri* Society for People's Advocacy (Masyarakat Santri untuk Advokasi Rakyat or Syarikat) jointly published Raid's book.²⁹ According to Iip Dzulkifli Yahya, a staff member of the publishing house, the publication was made under a program that aims to "strengthen Indonesian democracy and peace through reconciliation and rehabilitation of civil and political rights."³⁰

For the publisher, Raid's autobiography deserves publication for at least two reasons: (1) it is a depiction of a unique revolutionary

spirit of the course of religion and politics in Indonesia; and (2) it is a reflection of the ups and downs of the political struggle and its implication that reached its peak in the tragedy of 1965-1966. Considering that “the human tragedy of 1965-1966 has been a dark side of Indonesian past,” notes the publisher,

This publication is not intended to be a mere *pleidoi* [for Raid]. Rather, and more importantly, this [is to mean] that Raid and his colleagues have the same rights [as other Indonesians] to think and to express their thoughts and feelings freely. If this [publication] could become the basis of the process of reconciliation, it is actually what is expected.³¹

Given this fact, we can safely conclude that this publication is a part of the larger initiative by young NU activists for reconciliation with the PKI, a phenomenon that was recently recorded in a book by the American anthropologist Robert W. Hefner.³² In addition to discussions on this issue of reconciliation as Hefner recorded, with topics as controversial as “The Role of Muslims in the Mass Killings of Communists during 1965-1966,” larger initiatives include for example to bring All Useful Ranks (Barisan Serba Guna or Banser)³³ into active participation in digging up the mass graves of PKI members who were killed in 1965-1966. Young NU activists such as Ulil Abshar Abdalla view this participation as a good start for national reconciliation.³⁴ It is important to note here that this activity was undertaken in cooperation with YPKP, a clearly leftist organization of which Raid is a founding member.³⁵

It is basically this message of reconciliation that is put forward by Miftahuddin, a graduate student at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, in his review of Raid’s book in *Kompas*. He begins his review with this strong statement:

G30S affair is more than 35 years old now. There have been many witness statements written and published. Some of these witnesses proudly relate that they were involved in the heroic act of re-strengthening the Pancasila by “sweeping” out members of PKI. The more the members of PKI they killed, the more heroic they were.

Now in society there is a well-established perception that the people of PKI are necessarily bad, uncivilized, and cold-blooded murderers. Put shortly, people of PKI “are people that deserve no right to life in Indonesia.”

The implication is that any idea contradictory the above-mentioned perception, or that simply questions its legitimacy, is soon to be judged as defending the “atheists,” or to be put in the camp of those suspected as being “communist agents.”

It is about time to think more clearly, in a more mature and responsible way. It

is about time to question many things related to that dark history of the past: is it true to say that all people of PKI are atheist and bad? Is it true to say that all PKI members was responsible and was involved in the G30S affair?³⁶

He then goes on to say that Raid's autobiography is an important historical account that proves otherwise and provides other picture of PKI members and leaders.³⁷

But this appeal for reconciliation has been challenged by other appeals for Indonesian Muslims to be on guard against the return of PKI. Abdul Qadir Djaelani, former chairman of the Muslim Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Islam or GPI) and the author of *Komunisme: Musuh Islam Sepanjang Sejarah* ("Communism: Islam's Eternal Enemy"), for example, has this to say:

In our history, the so-called Marxists, Leninists, or Communists have rebelled twice and have destroyed (*menghancurkan*) Indonesian Muslims. So it is only natural that Muslim people treat this group in a harsh way. If later on this treatment is perceived as something that abuses human rights, [it can be said] that Indonesian Muslims also have a right to defend their dignity and [guarantee] their survival.³⁸

Djaelani was interviewed on the occasion of the high tension in Jakarta and other cities in Indonesia following threats by militant Muslim groups to sweep and to burn books they perceived as being of leftist inclination.³⁹ Organized by the Anti-Communist Alliance (Aliansi Anti-Komunis or AAK), this threat forced bookstores to take books such as those written by Pramoedya Ananta Toer and Franz Magnis-Suseno off their shelves. At about the same time, other anti-Communist activities also emerged. Using the area around the National Monument (Monumen Nasional or Monas) as center stage for demonstrations and carrying huge posters that read, for example, "Total Jihad: Fighting Against the Permanent Enemy of Muslims" (*Jihad Semesta: Melawan Musuh Abadi Umat Islam*), these activities were organized by the National Anti-Communist Committee (Komite Nasional Anti-Komunis or KNAK).⁴⁰

All these activities signify the remaining stigma among Indonesian Muslims concerning the troubled history of their relations with Communists or leftists. This stigma was best exemplified in the "Special Edition" of *Suara Hidayatullah* about Communism and its possible return to Indonesian politics. Its editorial section said,

Anybody can say that Communism and PKI are old and fading issues in the era of democracy. On the other hand, if there are other people that are worried about the activities of former PKI members recently, it is also understandable. The truth is, the era of Reformation has provided the freedom to any individual or group of people to act, to express their opinion, and to defend their human rights, including PKI people.

Now more people of this old banned party are “singing,” straightening the history according to their own version. They conduct press conferences, join political parties, form foundations to investigate the victims of the G30S / PKI Affair, and publish books. Tens of books are appearing: some are on the Communist teachings and movement; while others are biographies of PKI leaders. Non-fiction works by Lekra (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat* or Institute for People’s Culture), an *underbouw* organization of PKI, are flooding and extremely marketable.⁴¹

One of the press conferences that *Suara Hidayatullah* mentions took place on 17 April 1999, in the office of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia or YLBHI), where the YKPK was officially announced and was saluted by noisy young people shouting “Long life, PKI!” Among the results of this foundation was Perempuan-Kebenaran dan Penjara (“Women-Truth and Prison”), a book written by YKPK Chairwoman Sulami who, writes *Suara Hidayatullah* cynically, “used no clear methodology, with no references, and is extremely subjective.”

The concluding part of the article accuses those old PKI members of using the strategy of the “guerilla” to “wash their bloody, dirty hand” in order to gain a clean reputation and a good image in the eyes of Indonesian public. “Unfortunately,” writes *Suara Hidayatullah*, “there are yet very few people that take this guerilla action seriously. More people are of the opinion that it is a part of the discourse of democratization and of human rights. What is worse, anyone who cautions against of the reemergence and the return of PKI is quickly judged as [having] a New Order style of thinking.”

To make a long story short, it is safe to say that Muslim-Communist tension and distrust is still very much alive in contemporary Indonesia and reconciliation between them is unlikely to happen soon. Reading militant Muslims’ publications on Communism and PKI such as the one published in *Suara Hidayatullah*, I have the strong impression that some Muslim groups feel threatened by the political opportunity that the new era in Indonesian history provides for anybody to express his or her ideas. With the outburst of leftist publications in the last four years, of which Raid’s autobiography is only

one, they feel that they are now being encircled, even besieged, by their old and permanent enemy.

Some Remarks on Raid's Autobiography

Let me begin by discussing Raid's type of Islam-*cum*-Marxism. In his study on Marxism and early Indonesian Islamic nationalism, Fred R. von der Mehden once suggested four types of Muslim leaders that were attracted to Marxism and Socialism: (1) *hajis* and merchants who supported a type of national-socialism as a weapon against capitalism; (2) religious Communists who used the Qur'ân to support radical Marxist dogma; (3) Communists who looked upon Islam as a means to an end and were either neutral or antagonistic toward religion; and (4) the leadership of SI which accepted many of the tenets of Marxism but at the same time reshaped socialism to the local scene.⁴²

Using this categorization, I would suggest that Raid mostly fits the second or third category: he is a religious Communist who reads Islamic teachings according to his Communist inclination or he is a Communist who looked upon Islam as a means to an end and is neutral toward religion. Since his autobiography does not provide us with further information about his religiosity, or his "Islam-ness", we are unable to be more specific than that in describing Raid's type of Islam-*cum*-Marxism. However, one thing is clear: Islam played a crucial role in his being a Communist. It is so either because of his background as a Muslim coming from a strong Islamic community in West Sumatra or because of his use of Islam in his being a Communist leader.

In either case, his being a Communist Muslim was smoothed by the fact that in Silungkang, where he was born and grew up, PKI had a strong tradition of membership and activism. Thus, in the beginning, religion was not the main issue for Raid. The PKI revolutionary zeal and well-stated intention of liberating the oppressed convinced him to be in this party rather than subscribing to Islamic parties such as Masyumi. It was later on, especially when he was asked to defend the PKI position with regards to the issue of religion, that he developed Islamic justifications for the PKI ideology. Here, Raid's case is different from the cases of PKI leaders such as Tan Malaka, Darsono and Semaun in the 1920s who, as I will discuss soon, not only did not base their being Communists on Islam, but also find in Islam, as well as in any other religion, elements that hampered their Communist goals.

In this case, Raid has predecessors in Communist leaders such as K.H. Misbach and Datuk Batuah – interestingly enough, in cities where he spent most of his formative periods: Padang and Solo. Using these old PKI leaders' experiences to evaluate Raid's experience comparatively would be instructive. Misbach was at the center stage of the heated debate between "Red SI" and "White SI" in the 1910s and 1920s. Meanwhile, among others Natar Zainoeddin, Datuk Batuah were actively involved with Misbach in an attempt to synthesize modernist Islam demands with Marxist dogma, which brought him into the "battle of the verses" against the *adat* leaders in West Sumatera in the 1920s. In this case, nothing is really new in Raid's experience as a Marxist Muslim.

The more interesting point of comparison between the three cases is the point of PKI's position on religion generally and Islam especially, and the implication it brought to these individual attempts at synthesizing Islam and Communism. On this point, the PKI position had been at least ambiguous, if not opportunistic: although they often asserted that it was necessary to maintain an outward appearance of religious conviction, they also believed that religion was, and will always be, incompatible with Marxist dogma. In the era of Misbach and Batuah, this ambiguity had weakened their attempts since the inner elite of the PKI such as Tan Malaka and Semaun did not accept SI's belief in Islam as the basis for the nationalist movement. In addition, they also did not see in Islam a means to achieve their goals: the idea of the unity of *ummah* as forwarded by "White SI" leaders such as Tjokroaminoto destroyed a fundamental Marxist principle, i.e. class struggle.⁴³

For the same reason, the PKI elite also took up the same ambiguous policy in Raid's era. In 1945, and again in 1957, it was only in an attempt to contain an appeal by Islamic parties to the establishment of an Islamic state that PKI accepted "Belief in God" as one of political basis of the Republic. But this acceptance, also well-known as the "bitter pill" (*pil pahit*) that PKI leaders had to swallow, was never enough for Islamic party leaders to manipulate this issue of religion to discredit PKI. This was so difficult for PKI elite to handle that Aidit, in a speech in November 1962, and in a very strange manner, had to use the philosophy of materialism to defend PKI's acceptance of Pancasila:

Materialism is the world outlook that starts from objective facts.... It is undeniable that if viewed from the situation in Indonesia and the process of development of Indonesian history, the influence of religion is great in Indonesia, and it is an objective fact that, viewed from the angle of religion, the majority of those professing a religion in Indonesia adhere to the belief of there being One Divine Omnipotence or monotheism (believing in one God) and not polytheism (believing in more than one God).⁴⁴

In his autobiography, surprisingly enough, Raid does not mention this part of the PKI view of religion in his era and the implication it had for his attempt at synthesizing Islam and Communism. It might be that he did not experience any implication of it personally; or that he did experience it but then decided not to share it with his readers. Whatever the case, it is unlikely that he did not realize this complexity in the relationship and that this mixing up of Islam and Marxism took place as smoothly as his book wants us to believe. The above-mentioned statement by Aidit, his close associate, indicates that the heart of the problem of Islam-Communist relations was no less than each other's incompatibility, if not mutual satanization.⁴⁵ Political expediency might ease this incompatibility, but not their basic doctrines. This was so in the time of Misbach and Batuah, as it was in Raid's era.

My suspicion is that Raid did not want to share his personal experience of this specific issue of PKI-Islam relations with his readers. This is because it is a dark side of his personal history, a story of a failed attempt to synthesize Islam and Communism, the very part that destroyed his conviction of being a Marxist and a Muslim at the same time. When he was asked to provide an insider's point of view on some concrete implications of the PKI policy of unilateral action (*aksi sepihak*) in the early 1960s,⁴⁶ for example, we see the same mute reaction. Instead of looking at this historical experience critically and asking whether there was some thing wrong within the PKI actions and/or strategies in the past, he strongly defended his old party's position by quoting his self-imposed Islamic justification on it. He accused the Muslim *hajis* who owned land of indirectly plundering poor people's property and not the PKI.⁴⁷

Another possibility would be that Raid is not much of an intellectual and does not have the required understanding of Communism and Islam. His defense of Marx's atheism is at least debatable. As Turner suggested, in his confrontation with Hegel and Feuerbach, Marx came to formulate a general theory of religion that went be-

yond a limited criticism of institutional Christianity. Religion as such was seen as a reflection of a corrupt world in which men are alienated from each other. In a condition of alienation, religion became “a reversed world-consciousness, because they are a reversed world. Religion is the general theory of that world. ... The struggle against religion is therefore immediately the fight against the other world, of which religion is the spiritual aroma.” Here it functions as an ideological expression of the contradiction in human relations and therefore the criticism of religion unmasks the problem at the root of social relations. But religion also provides consolation in such a world, as Marx said: “Religion is a sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people.”⁴⁸

Besides, it is important to note that the verses of the Holy Qur’an that Raid mentioned are verses that have no direct justification for his Communist standpoint, such as al-Mâ’ûn 1-4 or al-Ḥujurât 1, or they are at least verses that are used selectively or subjectively. On the last point, his interpretation of “*qawm*” in al-Ra’d 51 as “class” is questionable. This term was used to refer to any group of people with a variety of criteria in mind. As Abu Khalil suggested, there is no verse in the Qur’an that refers to a special income group. The closest term to it is *daraja* or *ṭabaqa*, which refer to social work, as in al-An’âm 165: “And we have created you into several ranks over other ranks.” The Qur’an accepts the multiplicity of social groups in society, and *zakat* (charity or almsgiving) constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam. Islam rejects neglect of the poor and the orphans, and the *umma* (Islamic community) as a whole is considered responsible for the improvement of their lives. Islam did not impede the evolution of classes, because it did not reject on principle the institution of private property. Class conflict is to be avoided, and the notion of *umma* implies the unity of all Muslims—regardless of class and ethnic background—under the banner of Islamic solidarity.⁴⁹

Finally, yet another possibility would be that Raid’s venture is a venture of a politician who will use any means to justify his dogmatic acceptance of Communist ideology. If this is the case, then Raid perfectly fits the third category of Mehden: he is a Communist who looked upon Islam as a means to an end. As with his reaction to issues such as *aksi sepihak*, I believe this is also the case in his use of Mas’udi’s transformative ideas about Islam. To the best of my knowledge, although radical in his interpretation of Islam, Mas’udi did not go as

far as to suggest that revolution or the use of violence is a necessary means to achieve Islamic ideals, let alone to imply that *tawhid* society is classless society that should be achieved through a class struggle.⁵⁰

Whatever the case, considering the urgency for Indonesian citizens to undergo reconciliation, which the publisher expects to achieve by publishing this book, it is especially unfortunate that Raid's autobiography does not touch on the basic issue of Islam-Communist relations, and the conflicting viewpoints of the two on how human society should be organized and how social justice should be achieved. Much more importantly than its mere abstract formulation of Islamic faith and Communist dogma is the experience of Indonesian Muslims and Communists themselves in each other's relations. A true reconciliation would only be achieved through an honest treatment of this past experience from both sides. Without this, the act of forgetting the past and forgiving former rivals is unlikely to occur; indeed, the remaining stigma will in this way only be strengthened.

Endnotes

1. Clive Christie, *Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia 1900-1980: Political Ideas of the Anti-Colonial Era* (London: Curzon Press, 2001), p. 8.
2. Established in 1912 to defend the interests of Muslim merchants against Chinese rivals, SI at first heavily relied on Islamic appeals and soon achieved a mass following especially in Java. As it gained followers, however, ideological strife weakened this movement: "White" SI consisted of members committed to the conventional Muslim politics under the leadership of H.O.S Tjokroaminoto and H. Agus Salim; and "Red" SI comprised of members inclined toward Marxism and secularism under the leadership of Haji Misbach, and Semaun. In 1921, the rivalry between the two camps came to its height with the expulsion of left-wing leaders from the organization. See Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942* (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 112-129; and George Mc. T. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 65-77. For an analysis of this ideological strife in Solo, East Java, see Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
3. "Madiun Affair" refers to the PKI rebellion in September 1948 against the republican leadership, accusing it of selling out to the Dutch. Madiun is a city in East Java where Musso and the PKI leadership announced in a radio broadcast that the republican government headed by Sukarno and Mohamad Hatta had been replaced with a new government of national revolution. On this rebellion, see M. C. Ricklefs, *A Modern History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300*, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 227-230.
4. This is one of the most controversial issues in Indonesian history, and scholar's opinions regarding it have been deeply divided. Initiated by the *Dewan Jenderal* (Council of Generals), which asserted that certain leaders in the Indonesian army would take power from Sukarno by force, the army Colonel Untung of Cakrabirawa led a group of people affiliated with PKI to kidnap and then kill seven army generals, including Achmad Yani, Army Chief of Staff. This was early on 30 September 1965. In his announcement, Untung said that this was undertaken to save the republic and the president from ill-intentioned Generals. This announcement was supported by PKI. Suharto, then the second in the line of command to Yani, surprisingly enough to some scholars, was not on the list of Generals to be killed. A day after that, he began to take action in cracking down on what he has referred to since then as the G30S PKI's attempt at a coup. It appeared that he managed to control the army and to win the people's heart. After that, PKI members and sympathizers were massacred in many parts of the country. For a rather neutral presentation of this bloody accident, see Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978), especially Chapter 4, pp. 97-134.
5. Hasan Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis: Otobiografi Hasan Raid* (Yogyakarta: LKPSM-Syarikat, 2001). My detailed description below of Raid's biography and his thought on Islam are based on this source. Footnote will only be made in relation to other sources or where specific citations from Raid's book are made.
6. Raid said that weavings made by Silungkang people were advertised in many newspapers in the country from at least 1918. Datuk Sati & Co., Mochtar & Co., and

- Sulaiman Labai & Co made these advertisements among others. In addition, in 1910, Ande Basenah of Kampung Melayu, Silungkang, participated in an international affair in Brussel, Belgium. See Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, pp. 17-18.
7. Considering the context and the establishment of SI in other cities, instead of 1945 as was printed in Raid's book, this year is more realistic. See *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 18.
 8. Raid said, "In Silungkang, the number of rich people is countable: only one or two." See Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 17.
 9. In his manhood, Raid connected the second lesson to his understanding of the Islamic rejection to capitalism, as this system necessarily implicates the exploitation of man by other man. I will return to this point when discussing Raid's justification for being a Marxist.
 10. That is to leave your hometown area to make your way in life in other cities or islands.
 11. Tuk Utiah Saleh and Ongku Mudo Lilah are a larger family (*serumah gadang*) of Raid's mother. In the tradition of Minangkabau migration or *merantau*, it was to this sort of larger family that a new traveler came and stayed for a while.
 12. "That argument by Bung Hatta had impressed me much, especially [his statement] that the use of violence would be necessary to achieve independence. [It was so] because there was no record in world history that told how a colonial power deliberately given up their power to the people they colonized. The colonized people should win it by the use of violence, by force." Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 41.
 13. The novel depicted how Ibrahim El Morca, Alminsky, and Musotte helped the Palestinian people to achieve their independence. Given their names in the novel, and the title of the novel itself, Indonesian readers generally perceived those roles to be reflected to some degree by the roles played by three PKI leaders (Ibrahim Tan Malaka, Alimin, and Musso) in Indonesia. Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 43.
 14. I have no idea on what Raid really means by this "young stuff." Did he mean "young prostitute"? See Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 47.
 15. Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 65.
 16. Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 65. I will return to this point when discussing Raid's social background as a factor responsible for his being interested in the PKI.
 17. Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 66.
 18. This was also the occasion where he used his family name "Raid." He had actually received his *adat* (traditional custom) title Sutan Maharaja in 1943, but he only used it in traditional *adat* ceremonies. Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, pp. 71-72.
 19. Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 88.
 20. See Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 98. Raid recorded Sukarno's speech as follows: "Last night Musso and PKI launched a coup. A Soviet government under Musso was established in Madiun. Sukarno asks people to decide whether to give their loyalty to Sukarno-Hatta, who lead a free country of Indonesia, free from foreign domination, or Musso, who will destroy ideals of independence." Meanwhile, this is his record of Musso's answer: "It have been three years that people boring and loathing to Sukarno-Hatta, who maintained capitulation politics to the

- Dutch and the British. Now they are laboring to once again to give Indonesian peoples into the American imperialist. Musso believes that Indonesian people will stand at his side and not in the side of 'betrayers' and *romusha* brokers Sukarno-Hatta."
21. Kontrar is short for *Komando Tertinggi Retooling Aparatur Revolusi* (The Highest Command for Revolution Apparatus' *Retooling*).
 22. For a sympathetic account on this foundation, see Stanley, "Opening that Dark Page," *Inside Indonesia*, No. 63, July-September, 2000, pp. 23-31. I will return to this point when discussing Muslim responses to Raid's autobiography.
 23. The verses from the Holy Qur'an read as follows: "And we wished to do a favor to those who were weak (and oppressed) on the earth, and to make them rulers, and to make them the inheritors. And to establish them on the earth, and we let Pharaoh and Haman and their host receive from them that which they feared."
 24. Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, pp. 78-79.
 25. Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 538.
 26. Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 538.
 27. Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. 133.
 28. "And what is wrong with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah, and for the weak, ill-treated and oppressed among men, women, and children, whose cry is: "Our Lord! Rescue us from this town whose people are oppressors, and rise for us from You one who will protect, and rise for us from You one who will help."
 29. "Santri" is a term used to describe a devout Muslim, as opposed to "abangan," which describes nominal Muslims.
 30. Iip Dzulkifli Yahya, personal communication, 28 February 2001. According to Iip, LKPSM-Syarikat's main focus is reconciliation at the grassroots level of society, where NU people were heavily involved in PKI-Islam tensions in 1965-1966. For the same purpose LKPSM-Syarikat also published *Buletin Ruas* ("Internode Bulletin") and now are preparing the publication of "*Pergumulan Santri Marxis: Otobiografi Ahmadi Mustahal*" ("The Struggle of a Marxist *Santri*: The Autobiography of Ahmadi Mustahal"). Mustahal is a *santri* from Pati, Central Java, and former political prisoner in Buru Island. Meanwhile, Ahmad Suaedy, a young NU activist and a staff member of the Asia Foundation (TAF), Jakarta, informs me that LKPSM-Syarikat has also translated and published Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey's controversial *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia* (well-known as the *Cornell Paper*), which originally was published in 1966 by Cornell University Press. Suaedy writes, discussions of this book is campuses such as the University of Gadjah Mada (*Universitas Gadjah Mada* or UGM) and IAIN (The State Institute for Islamic Studies), in Yogyakarta and at many *pesantren*, instigate hot debates. Ahmad Suaedy, personal communication, 28 February 2001.
 31. "Pengantar Penerbit," in Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis*, p. vi.
 32. See Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), especially pp. xi-xv.
 33. Banser is a part of Ansor Youth Movement (*Gerakan Pemuda Ansor*), an *underbouw* organization of NU. With regards to the conflict between Muslims and Communists, it is widely believed that in East Java it was chiefly this youth

- movement of NU that undertook the extermination of the presumed PKI members or their associates. See among others B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 145, and Hermawan Sulisty, *Palu Arit di Ladang Tebu: Sejarah Pembantaian Massal yang Terlupakan (1965-1966)* (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2000), especially Chapter V, "Ganyang Kaum Revolusioner," pp. 157-201.
34. See "Pembongkaran Kuburan Massal Korban Peristiwa G30S: Kerja Sama Banser adalah Mukadimah yang Penting," *Kompas*, 13 December 2000. In their attempt to dig up those mass graves in Wonosobo on 16-18 November 2000, they found 24 skeletons in an overlapping position.
 35. See footnote number 22 above.
 36. Miftahuddin, "Perjuangan Seorang Muslim Komunis," *Kompas*, 29 Juni 2001.
 37. Also appealing for reconciliation and welcoming Raid's book are the reviews in *Tempo* and *Gamma*. Raid's book is an important contribution, writes Nor Hiqmah, a non-governmental organization activist in Jakarta, "to understand and re-find alternative thoughts in defining Islamic teachings. The New Order government had created theological prison (*penjara teologis*). Religion was alienated from its practical tradition to defend the oppressed. This book can provide a good introduction to understand Islam in its revolutionary tradition, as a tool for the liberation of man." Nor Hiqmah, "Dengan PKI Menuju Masyarakat Tauhidi," *Tempo*, 11-17 June 2001. Meanwhile, Islah Gusmian, a graduate student at State Institute for Islamic Studies (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri* or IAIN) Yogyakarta, seeks Raid's resemblance in the history of the "Red" SI and asks, "Were not people such as Kiai Misbach a devout Muslim? Was not his firm belief and action in defending the interest of the oppressed, which was identified as Communist claim, inherently compatible with Islamic teachings?" Islah Gusmian, "Komunis, tapi Agamis," *Gamma*, 1 April 2001.
 38. "Kita Juga Berhak Menghancurkan Mereka," *Koran Tempo*, 4 May 2001.
 39. "Aksi Aliansi Anti Komunis Hantui Toko Buku," *Gatra*, 10 April 2001.
 40. See among others "Demo Anti Komunis Berlangsung di Monas," *Gatra*, 10 April 2001 and "Ulama Diminta Memberi Fatwa Menyejukkan," *Koran Tempo*, 30 April 2001.
 41. "Tokoh-tokoh PKI 'Bernyanyi,'" *Suara Hidayatullah*, Special Issue, Mid September, 1999. My description in the next three paragraphs is based on this source.
 42. Fred R. von der Mehden, "Marxism and Early Indonesian Islamic Nationalism," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 1958), pp. 338-341.
 43. Mehden, "Marxism and Early Indonesian Islamic Nationalism," p. 340.
 44. Quoted in Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 92.
 45. It may be useful to put forward some important facets in this mutual satanization relationship. During the Madiun Affair in 1948, a number of prominent Muslims were murdered, particularly civil servants and school teachers.. Besides, there had always been agitation against "religious capitalists," where the ownership of the land by a number of families of religious leaders was always a useful theme for the PKI to provoke poor peasants to turn against the *kyais* especially in East Java. On the other hand, considering them as atheists and archenemies of Islam, Muslims

- considered the fight against the Communists as an aspect of *jihād*, the holy war. See for example Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, p. 3000, and Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, pp. 144-146.
46. In the early 1960s, the PKI launched a campaign of “unilateral action” in the countryside in which the peasants were mobilization to force the implementation of the new Agrarian Law (*Undang-undang Pokok Agraria* or UUPA) and Sharecropping Law (*Undang-undang Pokok Bagi Hasil* or UUPBH), which set legal limits on landholdings and a landlord’s share of the harvest in tenancy. In line with its interest in expanding its mass support base, the PKI was the most enthusiastic party to press for implementation of this legislation. On this issue, see among others Aminuddin Kasdi, *Kaum Merah Menjarah: Aksi Sepihak PKI/BTI di Jawa Timur 1960-1965* (Yogyakarta: Jendela, 2001), especially Chapter II, and Sulistyono, *Palu Arit di Ladang Tebu*, pp. 143-156.
 47. This is on the occasion of the publication of Aminuddin Kasdi’s *Kaum Merah Menjarah*. Based on his PhD. dissertation in Gadjah Mada University (UGM), in this book Kasdi depicts some examples of the horrible implications of the PKI-led “unilateral actions” in areas of East Java, which instigated Muslim-Communists tension. On Raid’s reaction, see Hasan Raid, “Siapa Menjarah Siapa?, in Kasdi, *Kaum Merah Menjarah*, pp. xliii-lv.
 48. Bryan S. Turner, *Weber and Islam: A Critical Study* (London & Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 179.
 49. As’ad Abu Khalil, “Concepts of Class,” in John L. Esposito (Ed. in Chief), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Modern Islamic World* (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), Vol. I, pp. 293-294.
 50. On Mas’udi’s ideas see his book, *Agama Keadilan: Risalah Zakat (Pajak) dalam Islam* (Jakarta: P3M, 1991).

Bibliography

- “Aksi Aliansi Anti Komunis Hantui Toko Buku,” *Gatra*, 10 April 2001.
- Boland, B.J., *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).
- Christie, Clive, *Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia 1900-1980: Political Ideas of the Anti-Colonial Era* (London: Curzon Press, 2001).
- Crouch, Harold, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978).
- “Demo Anti Komunis Berlangsung di Monas,” *Gatra*, 10 April 2001.
- Hefner, Robert W., *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001).
- Hiqmah, Nor, “Dengan PKI Menuju Masyarakat Tauhidi,” *Tempo*, 11-17 June 2001.
- Gusmian, Islah, “Komunis, tapi Agamis,” *Gamma*, 1 April 2001.
- Kahin, George Mc. T., *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952).
- Kasdi, Aminuddin, *Kaum Merah Menjarah: Aksi Sepihak PKI 1962-1965* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2000).
- Khalil, As’ad Abu, “Concepts of Class,” in John L. Esposito (Ed. in Chief), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Modern Islamic World* (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), Vol. I, pp. 293-295.
- “Kita Juga Berhak Menghancurkan Mereka,” *Koran Tempo*, 4 May 2001.
- Mas’udi, Masdar Farid, *Agama Keadilan: Risalah Zakat (Pajak) dalam Islam* (Jakarta: P3M, 1991).
- Mehden, Fred R. von der, “Marxism and Early Indonesian Islamic Nationalism,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 1958), pp. 335-351.
- Miftahuddin, “Perjuangan Seorang Muslim Komunis,” *Kompas*, June 29, 2001.
- Mortimer, Rex, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974).
- Noer, Deliar, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942* (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973).
- “Pembongkaran Kuburan Massal Korban Peristiwa G30S: Kerja Sama Banser adalah Mukadimah yang Penting,” *Kompas*, December 13, 2000.
- “Pengantar Penerbit,” in Hasan Raid, *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis: Otoniografi Hasan Raid* (Yogyakarta: LKPSM-Syarikat, 2001), pp. v-vi.
- Raid, Hasan, “Siapa Menjarah Siapa?” in Aminuddin Kasdi, *Kaum Merah Menjarah: Aksi Sepihak PKI 1962-1965* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2000).
- , *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis: Otoniografi Hasan Raid* (Yogyakarta: LKPSM-Syarikat, 2001).
- Ricklefs, M.C., *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300*, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).
- Shiraishi, Takashi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
- Stanley, “Opening that Dark Page,” *Inside Indonesia*, No. 63 (July-September 2000), pp. 23-31.

Suaedy, Ahmad, personal communication, 28 February 2001.

Sulistyo, Hermawan, *Palu Arit di Ladang Tebu: Sejarah Pembantaian Massal yang Terlupakan (1965-1966)* (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2000).

“Tokoh-tokoh PKI ‘Bernyanyi,’” *Suara Hidayatullah*, Special Issue, Mid September, 1999.

“Ulama Diminta Memberi Fatwa Menyejukkan,” *Koran Tempo*, 30 April 2001.

Yahya, Iip Dzulkifli, personal communication, 28 February 2001.

Ihsan Ali-Fauzi *is a graduate student at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, USA.*