

# STUDIA ISLAMIKA

**INDONESIAN** JOURNAL FOR ISLAMIC STUDIES

Volume 9, Number 2, 2002



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Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies

Vol. 9, no. 2, 2002

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STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-0492) is a journal published by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM), IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta (STT DEPPEN No. 129/SK/DITJEN/PPG/STT/1976) and sponsored by the Australia-Indonesia Institute (AII). It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies, and is intended to communicate original researches and current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contributions from scholars of related disciplines.

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STUDIA ISLAMIKA has been accredited by The Ministry of National Education, Republic of Indonesia as an academic journal.

## The Politic of Salt, not the Politics of Lipstick: Mohammad Hatta on Islam and Nationalism

**Abstraksi:** *Artikel ini mencoba mengemukakan pembahasan tentang gagasan dan pemikiran Mohammad Hatta, wakil Presiden pertama RI, yang oleh sebagian kalangan —dalam hal ini penulis mencontohkan media Suara Hidayatullah—dianggap sebagai seorang nasionalis sekuler. Hatta, dalam hal ini dianggap telah “mengkhianati” dan “menyakiti” ummat Islam karena turut mendorong dibapuskannya tujuh kata dalam Piagam Jakarta, yang menekankan “...kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya”. Hatta, menurut Suara Hidayatullah, tidak berbeda dengan beberapa tokoh nasionalis sekuler lainnya yang menolak penerapan syariat Islam.*

*Melalui pembahasan secara kronologis dan analitis terhadap gagasan dan pemikiran Hatta tentang Islam dan nasionalisme, artikel ini ingin menegaskan bahwa terlalu sederhana menganggap Hatta sebagai seorang nasionalis sekuler hanya gara-gara ia menolak tujuh kata dalam Piagam Jakarta tersebut. Sebaliknya, Hatta lebih tepat dianggap sebagai seorang nasionalis-agamis. Ia memang menolak konsep negara Islam, karena menurutnya, konsep itu “tidak bijak” jika dijadikan sebagai landasan oleh sebuah negara yang kondisi keberagaman masyarakatnya sangat plural seperti Indonesia.*

*Dijelaskan bahwa figur Hatta dibesarkan di kalangan keluarga Minangkabau yang sangat agamis, bahkan memiliki tradisi tarekat. Hatta tumbuh dan menjalani keseluruhan hidupnya sebagai seorang Muslim yang saleh, termasuk ketika ia menempuh pendidikan di luar negeri. Ia, oleh karenanya, bisa dianggap “lebih Muslim” dibanding beberapa tokoh nasionalis Muslim lainnya, seperti Soekarno, Sutan Sjahrir atau Tan Malaka. Hanya saja, dalam hal ekspresi keislamannya, Hatta adalah seorang Muslim yang lebih menekankan substansi daripada bentuk. Tak heran jika dalam beberapa kesempatan, Hatta seringkali melontarkan kritik atas sikap dan perilaku sebagian kalangan Muslim yang cenderung menonjolkan bentuk luar keislamannya. Dengan demikian, kesalehan Hatta tidak menghalangi pilihannya untuk menjadi seorang nasionalis tulen.*

Saat masa-masa awal kemerdekaan Indonesia misalnya, tanpa keraguan sedikit pun Hatta menerima Pancasila sebagai dasar negara. Menurut Hatta, Pancasila sudah dianggap akomodatif terhadap aspirasi ummat Islam, karena kalimat “Ketuhanan Yang Mahaesa” tercantum sebagai salah satu sila di dalamnya. Kalimat tersebut niscaya akan melandasi empat sila berikutnya. Apalagi, bagi Hatta, konsep Ketuhanan Yang Mahaesa “...tidak lagi hanya dasar hormat-menghormati agama masing-masing, seperti yang dikemukakan oleh Bung Karno, melainkan jadi dasar yang memimpin ke jalan kebenaran, keadilan, kebaikan, kejujuran, dan persaudaraan”. Sikap ini semakin menunjukkan jatidiri Hatta sebagai seorang Muslim yang moderat.

Bagi Hatta, tidak penting Indonesia menjadi negara Islam, karena yang lebih penting adalah bagaimana nilai-nilai Islam bisa melandasi sikap dan perilaku bernegara seorang Muslim. Pada periode tahun 1950-an, Hatta mengecam sikap tokoh-tokoh politik Islam di Parlemen yang cenderung memaksakan aspirasi untuk mendirikan sebuah negara Islam, yang akhirnya menjadi kontraproduktif terhadap keberadaan dan peran mereka sendiri dalam kancah pemerintahan. Pada periode tersebut, Hatta juga menolak, bahkan mengecam, keinginan tokoh-tokoh Muslim di beberapa daerah di Indonesia untuk memisahkan diri dari Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, menjadi negara Islam merdeka. Kendati demikian, dalam salah satu artikelnya, Hatta menegaskan bahwa negara harus menjamin dan melindungi kebebasan seseorang untuk beragama dan menjalankan kewajiban-kewajiban agamanya itu.

Dengan demikian, melalui argumen-argumen yang dikemukakannya ini, penulis mencoba menjelaskan bahwa “tuduhan” Suara Hidayatullah bahwa Hatta adalah seorang nasionalis sekuler sama sekali tidak berdasar. Tuduhan itu lebih mencerminkan sebagai “sikap gelisah” sebagian kelompok Muslim Indonesia yang menghendaki berdirinya sebuah negara Islam, ketika mereka berhadapan dengan berbagai pemikiran dan gagasan Hatta tentang Islam dan nasionalisme yang ternyata berseberangan.

Tuduhan tersebut juga menunjukkan bahwa Suara Hidayatullah pada dasarnya hanya mengikuti kecenderungan umumnya para sarjana yang secara sederhana membuat dikotomi tokoh-tokoh nasional menjadi kelompok kebangsaan—yang kemudian dicap sekuler—dan kelompok Islam, dengan parameter menolak atau menerima gagasan Islam sebagai ideologi negara, sehingga karenanya Hatta dikelompokkan sebagai tokoh nasionalis sekuler. Padahal, seperti tampak dalam pemikiran dan gagasan Hatta tentang Islam dan nasionalisme, dikotomi semacam itu sangat tidak berdasar, kalau tidak menyesatkan.



## The Politic of Salt, not the Politics of Lipstick: Mohammad Hatta on Islam and Nationalism

**خلاصة:** يعرض هذا المقال لبحث أجري حول أفكار محمد حتى (Mohammad Hatta) أول نائب رئيس الجمهورية الإندونيسية الذي يعد في نظر البعض - كما أشار إليه الكاتب نقلا عن صحيفة *Suara Hidayatullah* - انه وطني علماني واعتبر خائنا ويجرح شعور الأمة الإسلامية بإندونيسيا لموافقته على طرح سبعة كلمات من وثيقة جاكرتا وهي النص على "وجوب تطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية للمسلمين" في الدستور الإندونيسي، وطبقا لرأي صحيفة *Suara Hidayatullah* فإنه لا يختلف عن الوطنيين العلمانيين الآخرين الذين يرفضون تطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية.

ومن خلال العرض التاريخي والنقدي لآراء محمد حتى وأفكاره حول الأسلام والقومية يؤكد هذا المقال أنه من السذاجة بمكان اعتباره وطنيا علمانيا بمجرد أنه كان يرفض إدراج تلك الكلمات السبعة بل الصحيح مسلما يعتز بوطنيته، صحيح أنه كان يرفض قيام دولة إسلامية بإندونيسيا لأنه من غير الحكمة أن تطبق الدولة الإسلامية على دولة يسكن فيها مجموعات عرقية ودينية كبيرة مختلفة كإندونيسيا.

ويبين المقال منشأ وميلاده من الأسرة المينانجكابوية (Minangkabau) المعروفة بالتزامها التام للإسلام بل تنتمي أسرته إلى إحدى الطرق الصوفية، وقد ترعرع منذ عنفوان شبابه كمسلم ملتزم حتى أثناء دراسته في الخارج، ولذلك فهو أكثر التزام من الزعماء المسلمين الآخرين من أمثال سوكارنو وسوتان شهرير أو تان ملاكا؛ بيد أنه فيما يتعلق بالحياة الإسلامية كان يفضل الالتزام الحقيقي بدلا من الالتزام الصوري او المظاهر، فلا عجب أنه في كثير من المناسبات ينقد إخوانهم من المسلمين في مواقفهم إذ

يهتمون فيها بالمظاهر الإسلامية أكثر من حقائق الإسلام الجوهرية، وهكذا فإن التزامه الإسلامي الحقيقي لا يمنعه أن يكون وطنيا من الدرجة الأولى.

ففي أوائل عهد الاستقلال مثلا لم يكن يتردد في قبول البانجاسيلا أي المبادئ الخمسة لتكون أساس الدولة واعتبرها شاملة لما يطالب به الأمة الإسلامية لما نص عليه الأساس الأول منها "الوحدانية في الألوهية" وهو الأساس الذي تنبني عليه حتما الأسس الأربعة الأخرى وخاصة أنه كان يرى في الأساس الأول "... أنه لا يمثل فقط أساسا للاحترام المتبادل بين الأديان كما ذهب إليه سو كارنو وإنما هو أساس يقود إلى الحق والعدالة والخير والأمانة والأخوة" وهذا موقف يعطي مزيدا من التأكيد على حقيقته كمسلم ملتزم يتمتع بالفتح والتسامح

وكان يرى أنه لا يهم أن تكون إندونيسيا دولة إسلامية أم لا وإنما كيف تكون القيم الإسلامية بحيث تمثل الأسس التي تنبني عليها مواقف المسلمين وسلوكهم في الدولة؛ وفي فترة الخمسينيات كان يوجه نقدا لاذعا إلى المواقف الإسلامية السياسية التي تميل إلى أن تفرض الرأي عن طريق البرلمان لجعل إندونيسيا دولة إسلامية، الأمر الذي أدى إلى أن يكون ذلك عائقا لهم لأداء دورهم في الحكومة؛ وفي الفترة نفسها كان يرفض أيضا بل يعارض رغبة بعض زعماء المسلمين في المناطق في الانفصال عن الجمهورية الإندونيسية من أجل إقامة دولة إسلامية مستقلة؛ ومع ذلك فإنه في إحدى مقالاته كان يشدد على أن الدولة يجب أن تضمن حرية الأفراد في تطبيق تعاليم دينهم . وهكذا حاول الكاتب من خلال الأدلة والحجج التي ساقها أن يرد الاتهام الموجه إلى محمد حتى بالعلمانية من قبل صحيفة *Suara Hidayatullah* وأن هذا الاتهام ليس له أساس من الصحة، وقد كان منشأ الاضطراب الذي أصاب موقف طائفة من المسلمين الذين يرغبون في إقامة دولة إسلامية إزاء آراء محمد حتى وأفكاره حول الإسلام والقومية التي لا تتوافق مع ما عليهم هم.

وهذا الاتهام يشير أيضا إلى أن الصحيفة كانت في رأيها مجرد تقليد لموقف الدارسين الذين يجوبون أن يصنفوا الزعماء إلى الثنائية بين قوميين - المتهمين في هذا الصدد بالعلمانية - وإسلاميين على أساس رفضهم أو قبولهم لإقامة دولة إسلامية مما أدى إلى تصنيف محمد حتى ضمن صفوف العلمانيين مع انه بالنظر إلى أفكاره وآرائه حول الإسلام والقومية يظهر أنه اتهم لا أساس له من الصحة وهو ضال مضل.

One of the things to be taught to the Islamic communities is that they should apply the science of salt, which is felt but not seen, rather than the science of lipstick, which is seen but not felt.

– Mohammad Hatta<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

In its edition of September, 2000, a hard-line Islamic magazine *Suara Hidayatullah* makes a strong accusation that Mohammad Hatta, former Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia, had betrayed the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*). The date of this betrayal was August 18, 1945, when, in the morning before the beginning of the session of the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* or PPKI), Hatta approached Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, A. Wahid Hasyim, Mr. Kasman Singodimejo, and Mr. Teuku Hasan for them to agree with him in replacing the words “*dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluknya*” (with the obligation to carry out Islamic *shari’at* [Islamic law] for its adherents) with the words “*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*” (Belief One God) in the preamble of the drafted Constitution. The wording later known as the seven words (in its Indonesian version) of the Jakarta Charter, while the replacement was later known as the first principle of the *Pancasila* (Five Principles).

The reason behind this change has been well known in Indonesian history, and it has also been widely accepted: it was to maintain the unity of the new-born nation. This was so because, according to Hatta’s recollection, on August 17, 1945, after the proclamation of independence, he received a Japanese naval officer who came as an envoy of the *Kaigun* (Japanese navy). The officer said that representatives of the Protestant and Catholic communities of eastern Indonesia, an area under *Kaigun* administration at the time, were “very disturbed” at the inclusion of the seven words in the preamble. They felt, the officer said, that the “the inclusion of such a requirement in such a vital part of the Constitution implied a form of discrimination against minorities.” If such “discrimination” was to be retained, they felt that they would be better off outside the Republic of Indonesia. Though he argued that there was no discrimination in the Jakarta Charter, Hatta decided

it would be wise to remove the sentence in order to prevent “splitting” the new nation. After obtaining the agreement from the four Muslim leaders mentioned above, the matter was brought to the PPKI session on the next day, where the change was unanimously approved.<sup>2</sup>

It is this recollection of Hatta that *Suara Hidayatullah* questions: how could Hatta, who was known as a very careful and thorough person, miss examining critically the information that reached him through a Japanese naval officer? “This incident,” the article continues, “has caused a deep dissatisfaction and resentment in the hearts of Indonesian Muslims, because the tireless effort to compromise that had been achieved [thus far] was cancelled by *the secular nationalists* precisely at its final stage before it was approved as the Constitution.”<sup>3</sup>

I will return to this accusation and discuss its historiographical meaning in the end of my paper. As for now, suffice it to say that this accusation significantly marks the uneasiness that certain groups among Indonesian Muslims, especially Muslim leaders and activists who have been working to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, have to encounter in understanding or, to be more precise, in accepting Hatta’s thought on Islam and nationalism. This uneasiness encourages them, including the editors of *Suara Hidayatullah*, to view Hatta as a “secular nationalist,” an attribution that would probably be instantly rejected by anybody who has ever read even the shortest account of the man. Compared with other Indonesian Muslim nationalist leaders such as Sukarno, Sutan Sjahrir or Tan Malaka, Hatta’s Muslim-ness was very much more apparent and publicly well known. He might be less Islamic in his outward appearances than traditional Muslim leaders in Indonesia, but he certainly was not a secularist. He always preferred substance rather than form. As a matter of fact, it was one of his criticisms of Indonesian Muslims in general that they have been too mesmerized by outward appearances.

In view of this, a refutation to the above accusation is in order. By describing chronologically and analyzing Hatta’s ideas about Islam and nationalism, this article will try to show that Hatta was consistently a religious nationalist, but one who also rejected the

idea of an Islamic state. Born in a devout Muslim family, Hatta grew and had always been a devout Muslim in his entire life. But his being a devout Muslim had never been a problem for him to be an astute proponent of Indonesian nationalism. If anything, it even encouraged his nationalist stand. When Indonesia's independence was still in its early stage of preparation in the 1940s, he made it clear that he accepted Pancasila as the basis of the future state, particularly when the "Belief in God" was finally put as the first principle of this state's basis. For him at least, this meant that this principle would become a moral ground that would color the other four principles. Later on in the 1950s, he condemned Muslim leaders who aspired to an Islamic state during the Constitutional Assembly, although they knew that their seats in the Assembly were not strong enough to support that aspiration, accusing them of causing Soekarno's turn to Guided Democracy. He also rejected, even condemned, the call for the establishment of a separate Islamic state by Muslim leaders in several parts of Indonesia during this period. The only time when he directly enhanced a formalistic form of Islamic politics was when he, in the mid 1960s, attempted to establish the *Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party or PDII). However, as I will discuss below, this unsuccessful attempt was not meant to be an Islamic party and was not meant to work for the establishment of an Islamic state.

### The Making of a Muslim Nationalist

Hatta's thinking about nationalism and Islam was deeply rooted in his childhood and family background. He was born on August 12, 1902, in the town of Bukit Tinggi, once a Padri stronghold in West Sumatra, but by the beginning of the twentieth century a Dutch administrative center and military outpost, referred to as Fort de Kock. He was named Attar, a Persian word meaning perfume, also the name of a renowned Persian poet and distinguished Sufi, Fariduddin Aththar. The speech pattern of Minangkabau people altered the sound of the boy's name into Hatta.<sup>4</sup>

Hatta came from a well-off and devout Muslim family. His grandfather had established a *surau* at Batu Hampar, a village about

fifteen miles from Bukit Tinggi. This *surau* in itself was a religious community, a *tarekat* of Naqsyabandiyah branch, the initial aim of which was to guide its followers along the pathway to a closer understanding of God. Hatta's father, Haji Djamil, who died when Hatta was an eight-month-old baby, was also an *ulama* (religious scholar). He combined trade with his religious duties, for an *ulama* was expected to be self-sufficient, and only assisted the work of the *surau*.

From the age of seven, Hatta had been spending short periods at the *surau* in Batu Hampar, where his uncle, Syaikh Arsyad, assumed the leadership on the death of Hatta's grandfather, Syaikh Abdurrahman.<sup>5</sup> Besides his education at the *surau*, Hatta was also educated in a government-run People's School (*Sekolah Rakyat*). However, in 1913, Hatta moved to Padang to continue his education in *Europese Lagere School* (ELS) and *Meer Uitgebreid Onderwijs* (MULO).<sup>6</sup>

Hatta's move to Padang had as its root the debate among his family and religious teachers concerning his future career, which deserves a discussion here. Syaikh Arsyad urged Hatta's mother to allow her son to follow in his father's footsteps and undertake religious studies in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and later at university in Cairo, Egypt. However, Hatta's mother totally rejected the proposal. The most they would support was that Hatta should receive further instruction in Arabic in case he should wish to undertake religious studies in the future. She preferred to follow the suggestion of Hatta's religious teacher in Bukit Tinggi, the modernist Syaikh M. Jamil Jambek, who had a different viewpoint on Western education from Syaikh Arsyad. In line with his modernist inclination, Jambek encouraged Hatta to learn from the West in fields of science and technology, including economics.

It was this last idea that brought Hatta to Padang. However, in spite of his happiness with being educated in modern European schools and his support for the spirit of Islamic modernism, Hatta personally felt that there was an element of conflict in the Islamic modernist viewpoint. The modernists suspected that the guidance provided by the Sufi *tarekat* leader contravened the Islamic law that a man should have a direct relationship with Allah (*ta'washshul*).

They viewed this idea and practice as unlawful *bid'ah* (innovation) and they wanted to “purify” Muslim societies from these sort of ideas and practices. But Hatta, as the member of a family renowned for its spiritual guidance to the *surau* community, could not easily condemn the *tarekat* and its leader.

We may suspect that, as Mavis Rose noted, “this religious dilemma may have influenced Hatta’s decision to become involved in nationalist rather than Islamic brotherhoods and may explain his reluctance to identify fully with modernist Islamic political parties in the future, remaining most of his life religiously neutral in politics.”<sup>7</sup> In his memoir, Hatta seemed to identify his ideal of a religious leader with his uncle, Syaikh Arsyad, as if he wanted to suggest that the educated traditionalist would have more understanding and wisdom of the needs of the people than the urban modernist. He asserted that it was Syaikh Arsyad who taught him to be socially aware and to minister to the needs of his own people, stressing that “as God loved us, so we must love one another.” Hatta’s description of his uncle presents an Islamic leader who was puritanical and ascetic, but also considerate, balanced and humane, a man of peace rather than a religious fanatic leading a *jihad*.<sup>8</sup> It is also instructive to consider here that, in the beginning of his memoir, Hatta made a strong comment on the Padri movement:

The religious teachers, who just came back from Mecca and were influenced there by the strict and puritan attitudes of the Wahhabists, wanted to purify Islam in Minangkabau from *adat* law. ... They viewed that some parts of *adat* laws contradicted the Islamic laws. They forgot that the highest law in Islam is peace. Peace brought prosperity to all human groups and increased a sense of devotion to God.<sup>9</sup>

While finishing his secondary school in Padang, Hatta became a treasurer of the Union of Young Sumatrans (*Jong Sumatranen Bond* or JSB), a local nationalist organization, which marked the beginning of his life-long involvement with Indonesia. When he moved to Batavia in 1919, to continue his study at Senior Commercial School (*Prins Hendrik Handels Schools* or PHS), his involvement with the JSB continued. This chance made it possible for him to meet important nationalist leaders of Sumatra origin



in the city such as the two leaders of Sarekat Islam, Abdoel Moeis and Haji Agus Salim. Of special importance here was his meeting with Salim, which deepened his belief in socialism:

H. Agus Salim said that he learned about socialism from his economy teacher. ... This teacher was a social-democrat. When Salim went to Jeddah in 1906, he already had in his heart a belief in socialism. The Islam that he learned there deepened his belief in socialism. Islam was a socialism that Allah ordered. Marx's teaching [on how] to achieve socialism was different with that in its character. This teaching misleads Muslims. But what he [Marx] wanted to achieve had been rooted in Islam since 12 centuries ago. ... H. Agus Salim's description deepened my belief in socialism that had already rooted in my heart.<sup>10</sup>

In 1921, Hatta went to Holland to continue his study in Rotterdam. When he went back in 1932, he was already an experienced and renowned nationalist leader. His eleven years in Holland was an extremely productive and enriching period: he finished his study successfully, he wrote articles that were published in Holland and in home country, he involved in debates and polemics, he run an important organization, he gave lectures in many associations in Europe, and he was actively involved in international movements that attempted to end colonialism. At the center of these laborious days was his membership in and later on his leadership of the Indonesian Association (*Perhimpunan Indonesia* or PI), the Indonesian students' organization in Holland that produced would-be Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Sjahrir, Ali Sastroamidjojo, and Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, in addition to Hatta himself.

It was in his capacity as the Chairman of PI that Hatta, in 1927, was arrested on a charge of encouraging armed struggle to Dutch rule in Indonesia. After over five months in prison he was tried in Hague in March 1928 and was acquitted to the embarrassment of the authorities. Hatta used his defence speech to make a sweeping denunciation of Dutch rule and justification of Indonesian nationalism, a goal of which was openly suggested in the title of the speech: "Indonesia Free." This speech was also an important document that recorded Hatta's thinking about nationalism and the future of Indonesia, which also became the ideology of PI and, later on, Indonesian National Education (*Pendidikan Nasional In-*

donesia or PNI). The opening remark of this speech was Hatta's point of departure:

*Indonesia Merdeka* has become the voice of Indonesian Student Youth, a voice which is perhaps not yet listened to by those in power, but which will one day be heard. Not with impunity shall the voice be ignored, because behind this voice lies the firm will to continue to regain right and, sooner or later, to set up and establish in the world an *Indonesia Merdeka* (Free Indonesia).<sup>11</sup>

But what should be the substance of this would-be free country? Here the plan should be drawn and the social and political activities should be undertaken. And since the Dutch East Indies as a political reality should be totally transformed, Hatta called for the national unity and solidarity, with the non-cooperation and self-help as its uncompromised way to achieve the desired independence.<sup>12</sup> Hatta also stressed that the imagined Indonesia would be a democratic country, where *kedaulatan rakyat* (people's sovereignty) would be fully guaranteed.

During his stay in Europe, Hatta remained a devout Muslim. This was suggested by his friends. Subardjo described him as "a true nationalist and an anti-Communist because Islam had provided him with a strong faith based on the firm belief in Allah and His messenger Mohammad." Ali Sastroamidjojo described Hatta's lifestyle as "ascetic."<sup>13</sup> That Hatta was an ascetic and a simple person was also implied by Sunario when he said: "Once Hatta came, any discussion about dance with Dutch girls and about other nonsenses would suddenly be disappeared, to be replaced with discussion about cooperation and non-cooperation or other political issue."<sup>14</sup> Hatta's other friend, Ichsan, wrote that many foreign girls were attracted to Hatta. A beautiful polish student was asked by her friends to tempt Hatta, "but she couldn't make it, and came back with the total failure."<sup>15</sup> And Hatta, as Burhanuddin suggested, was a man with a rare smile. Nevertheless, when he smiles, his was a "prophet smile."<sup>16</sup>

To the best of my knowledge, other than in those friends' recollections of his personality, which included Hatta's Muslim-ness, there were only in two occasions that we can find his mentioning of issues related to religion and state. One is in the so-called Semaun-

Hatta “Convention”. The outbreak of the rebellion in November 1926 made Hatta feel the urgent need to replace the banned Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or PKI) with a new party where religion and foreign ideology must be subordinated to Indonesian nationalism. According to his memoir, it was this intention to ensure the supremacy of nationalism that he entered, on December 5, 1926, into this “convention” with the exiled PKI leader, Semaun, informing only a few PI members about his strategy.<sup>17</sup>

Another hint of his thinking on religion from this period was found in an article published in 1931. Here Hatta said:

The freedom of religion and the freedom to advance [each group’s] culture should be protected. Each group should be free to practice their religion and to organize it. They must also be free to establish their own schools to improve their cultures. ... The schools the government would build should be based purely on scientific consideration, without religious interference.<sup>18</sup>

Back to his home country, Hatta was entrusted to lead the Indonesian National Education (*Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia* or PNI), a political party that stressed on political education in order for people to understand their sovereignty. Although the party was established in 1931, when he was still in Holland, its character and goal were heavily influenced by his ideal of a party struggling for the Indonesian independence. After two years of active participation in this party (1932-1934), he was exiled for seven years (1935-1942).

From his articles published during this period, we know that Hatta learned much from world affairs that happened during the period, as if all of it were a thick and colorful textbook from where he could compare and contrast to finally make his own. We also know that, while editing *Daulat Ra’jat*, the official publication of PNI, Hatta continued to contribute articles to various journals, including the journals published by Muslim groups such as *Pedoman Masyarakat* of Medan and the Muhammadiyah journal *Adil* of Solo. However, here again we find no single treatment on the relation between Islam and state in these publications.

This is an intriguing puzzle especially given the fact that the subject was hotly debated during that period, between the so-called *kelompok kebangsaan* (nationalist group) and *kelompok Islam* (Islamic group).<sup>19</sup> Deliar Noer suggested that Hatta did not want to be involved in discussing problems such as this for it was too controversial at the time.<sup>20</sup> This is a reasonable suggestion, especially considering Hatta's priority on the people's unity against the Dutch.

Nevertheless, we can infer his thinking about nationalism and Islam from the editorial note of *Daulat Ra'jat* which he edited. On January 10, 1933, this note suggested that PNI, from its inception, had always tried to make religion a personal matter.<sup>21</sup> In another article published in 1939, Hatta read as if he was a reformed Sufi, where a call for peace was coupled with a call for activism:

This world is created by God for us to make it better, a place where we use our reason and heart to bring about a better life for Allah's *ummat*. [It is] not to be left out simply in order to obtain the happiness in our own souls. Let's try our best to make this world a better place, as a stair way to the hereafter, so that the real peace could be attained, which is a real demand of Islam. Isn't peace the highest law in Islam?<sup>22</sup>

And finally, in 1940, Hatta published an article where he openly stated his inclination toward socialism and Islam's compatibility with it:

The foundation of Islam, had it thought consequently, will undoubtedly incline toward socialism. For if he think that he would follow the will of God, a Muslim will devote his life and his struggle to the brotherhood of human being and the justice among them. Since this could only be achieved through a socialistic structure of society, the struggle for socialism for Muslims is like Allah's order that they couldn't deny.<sup>23</sup>

Hatta realized that many "dogmatic" *ulama* would have other viewpoints. But he maintained, "who carefully analyzes the social circumstances and position of those *ulama* will find the truth in Marx's suggestion, i.e. that the level of their societies will determine their consciousness – in this case, their religious consciousness."<sup>24</sup>

## Pancasila as a Moral Ground

Hatta's thinking about Islam and nationalism was further developed in a more detailed fashion during his active involvement in the preparation of Indonesian independence. As Anthony Reid noted in his study of the Indonesian revolution, Muslim representatives in the PPKI had "always argued the need for a Muslim state in which religious law would be enforceable."<sup>25</sup> As I mentioned earlier, this had as its roots in the debates between leaders of the so-called *kelompok kebangsaan* and *kelompok Islam* during the thirties. However, with the approach of independence in 1945, the place of Islam became the subject of an intense debate particularly within bodies and committees established for the preparation of independence. In addition to the sessions in PPKI, these issues were also debated in the sessions of the Adviser's Council (*Dewan Penasihat*).<sup>26</sup> This time the subject of the debates included issues as detailed as whether the president should be a Muslim, whether or not Islam ought to be the state religion, the necessity of having the state apparatus and agencies relevant for the implementation of Islamic law, and the possibility of Friday becoming a national holiday instead of Sunday.<sup>27</sup>

This time Hatta could not remain silent. In one of the sessions of the Adviser's Council, he addressed his thinking about the relation between religion and state, and the possible contribution of Muslims in a national state:

The Qur'an is especially the basis of religion, not a book of law. The various legal needs of today find no regulation in the Qur'an. ... Of course the Qur'an establishes a basis for justice and welfare, which must be followed by Muslims. But this basis ... is only a guiding goal. ... The people of the state themselves must establish orderly law by their mutual deliberations. Of course every person will express his conceptions based on his religious convictions. But the resulting law will be state law, not religious law. Possibly it will be state law much influenced by religious spirit. ... We will not establish a state with a separation of religion and state, but a separation of religious affairs and state affairs. If religious affairs are also handled by the state, then the religion will become state equipment and ... its eternal character will disappear. State affairs belong to all of us. The affairs of Islam are exclusively the affairs of the Islamic *ummah* and Islamic society.<sup>28</sup>

This quote implied that Hatta positioned himself in the side of the *kebangsaan* group; he rejected the idea of an Islamic state and proposed the creation of a national unitary state in which affairs of the state should be separated from affairs of religion. However, in spite of his strong preference to a national unitary state, he maintained that such a state would not be an irreligious one. In the later years of his life, reflecting on the opening session of the PPKI, Hatta recalled: "At that time, I said that if we established a free state, don't let us just have the same basis as European states; there is no need to repeat the history of Western countries which experienced opposition between religion and state."<sup>29</sup>

This remains us of his belief in Islam as a system that penetrates every corner of a person's life, his thinking about the relation between Islamic law and *adat* law in Minangkabau, and his criticism of the Padri movement. In traditional Minangkabau society, Islam and *adat* had constituted separate yet interlocking system, Islam providing the spiritual buttress required to enhance *adat*. This case could be broadened into the national context. In the opening chapter of his memoir, Hatta commented that "the Prophet Mohammad permitted the use of customary law in Arabia which ensured public well-being,"<sup>30</sup> implying that it would be perfectly in order to have a separate state and religious legal and governing systems.

In the PPKI, which convened from late May to mid August 1945, this issue was debated in its full-fledged fashion. Hatta recalled that, in the beginning, the majority of the members were reluctant to answer directly the question raised in the chairman's opening address: "What will be the foundation of the state which we are about to shape?"<sup>31</sup> If Islam was not directly designed as the basis, what was the alternative?

The breakthrough came firstly from Soekarno, whose position, which had been outlined in his famous Pancasila speech of June 1, 1945, was that the state should be based on "five basic principles," later known as Pancasila. The five principles proposed were: *kebangsaan* (nationalism), *internasionalisme* or *perikemanusiaan* (humanitarianism), *mufakat* or *demokrasi* (democracy), *kesejahteraan sosial* (social welfare), and *ketuhanan* (belief in God). Soekarno

hoped that the Muslims could accept this formula. If they wanted more than this, he said, they were free to struggle for it through the democratic process.

Hatta, according to Saifuddin Anshari, was not present at the fourth and final day of the session when Sukarno delivered his speech.<sup>32</sup> However, many years later, in 1975, when reviewing the committee's deliberations, Hatta acknowledged that he had always approved of the Pancasila. He pointed out that as long as "Belief in God" was written into the basic principles of the state, the Islamic tenet that God must be at the center of every Muslim's activities was ensured: "Belief in God is not just a way of respecting each other person's creed, as was first suggested by Bung Karno, but is a basic principle which leads towards truth, justice, goodness, honesty, and brotherhood."<sup>33</sup> It might be suggested here that, for Hatta, the broad concept of "Belief in God" also allowed an escape route from any obligation, as an orthodox Muslim and the son of an *ulama*, to support the Islamic state.

However, the Muslim leaders in the committee were offended by the fact that Soekarno treated Islam as merely one religion among many.<sup>34</sup> To bridge the gap between Islamic and *kebangsaan* groups, a subcommittee was set up, whose members consisted of Soekarno, Hatta, Achmad Subardjo, Muhammad Yamin, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, A. Kahar Muzakkir, Agus Salim, A. Wahid Hasyim, and A. A. Maramis.<sup>35</sup> This subcommittee drafted a "gentlemen's agreement," which provided in one centrally important passage that Indonesia would be a republic founded not only on the basis of unity, a righteous and civilized humanity, democracy, and social justice, but also on the belief in God "with the obligation to carry out Islamic *syari'ah* for its adherents."

It was soon apparent that the formula was much easier to formulate than to sell. When the draft was debated in the PPKI, the Islamic group maintained that it was not strong enough to uphold their aspiration. For this reason, Wahid Hasyim suggested that Islam be adopted as the state religion. He also suggested that "only Muslims could be elected as Presiden or Vice-President of the Republic."<sup>36</sup> In addition to that, in order to push further toward the direction of Islam as the basis of the state, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo



demanded that the theological principle be stated as “Belief in God with the obligation to carry out Islamic *syari’ah*,” without the condition that it was only applicable to Muslims.<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, however, the *kebangsaan* group, particularly those with non-Islamic origins, objected to this compromise. Encouraged by their fear of possible discrimination against other religions and the growth of religious fanaticism, they demanded that the state must be unconditionally neutralized from being associated with any religion.<sup>38</sup>

It was only after Soekarno’s appeal to both sides to make great sacrifices that the debates cooled down. The PPKI “agreed” that the future independent state would be based on the principle of “Belief in God with the obligation to carry out the *syari’ah* Islam for its adherents.” They also “accepted” Islam as the state religion and that the President of the Republic must be a Muslim.<sup>39</sup> This decision was incorporated into a special document entitled the Jakarta Charter, which was to serve as a Preamble to the Draft Constitution. “Although well short of Muslim hopes,” as Reid notes, “this was to prove the highest point in their pursuit of an Islamic state.”<sup>40</sup>

However, soon it became obvious that the compromise was basically founded on unstable ground. As stated in the beginning of this paper, encouraged by the information he received from a Javanese naval officer, Hatta approached four Muslim leaders and they agreed to replace the Jakarta Charter with “Belief in One God.” Here, said *Suara Hidayatullah* as quoted above, lay Hatta’s betrayal of Indonesian Muslims.

Whether Hatta had betrayed the Muslims or not is a difficult question to answer, if not impossible. But one thing is definitely clear. In contrast with the accusation above, Hatta knew the circumstances surrounding the coming of the Japanese officer. In his memoir, Hatta said that he wanted to meet the officer because this officer was brought to him by Nishijima. The latter was the assistant to Admiral Maeda, and Hatta knew him well as someone, like his superior, sympathetic to the Indonesian independence.<sup>41</sup> As to his meeting with the four Islamic leaders, Hatta has this to say:

If a serious problem, and a problem that could endanger the national unity, can be resolved in a small discussion that took only about 15 minutes, it meant that those leaders at the time really prioritized the national unity and its future fate.

At that moment we realized that the spirit of the Jakarta Charter did not necessarily disappear by the delete of the sentence “with the obligation to carry out the *Shari`a* Islam for its adherents,” and its replacement with “Belief in One God.” In a country that later on established under the motto of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity), any law in the context of Islamic *Shari`a*, which will only be enforced upon Muslims, could be proposed as a drafted law. After its being accepted by the House of Representatives, the proposed law could be enforced upon Muslims.<sup>42</sup>

There were various explanations as to why the four leaders of the Islamic group so quickly accepted Hatta’s proposal. However, the reasons they suggested were mostly close to Hatta’s recollection of the event. Besides the inclusion of the word “Belief in One God” in the Pancasila, they felt that the circumstances following independence required them to stand united in facing other problems. In addition to that, there was a sense of electoral optimism in their side: they believed that through a general election, to be held soon in the future, they would have another chance to struggle for their aspiration of an Islamic state in Indonesia. For this reason, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (at the encouragement of Kasman Singodimejo) reluctantly agreed to accept Hatta’s proposal.<sup>43</sup>

I would suggest that Hatta committed no betrayal at all. First of all, he knew and trusted the channel through which he received the information on how the Protestant and Catholic leaders in the eastern part of Indonesia felt about the Jakarta Charter. Secondly, his recollection of the event suggests his firm position on the issue of the relation between religion and state. As he had raised this position before, it should be clear to us that he didn’t make up the case in his recollection. Corroborating this point was the fact that, although he believed that religious affairs should be separated from state affairs, he did leave room for Muslims to have their own *Shari`a* through democratic process in the future.

## “Islamic State” Group and Soekarno’s Guided Democracy

On August 18, 1945, Hatta became Indonesia’s first Vice-President. After the fall of Amir Syarifuddin Cabinet, Soekarno appointed him Prime Minister on January 30, 1948. He was captured by the Dutch in the Second “Police Action” (December 19, 1948), but headed the Republican delegation at the Round Table Conference (from August 23 to November 2, 1949), and signed the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949 on behalf of the Republic. In September 1950, Hatta resigned as Prime Minister to begin his second term as Vice-President. However, on July 26, 1956 he also resigned as Vice-President.

In spite of his involvement in various political positions during the post-independence period, however, it can be said that Hatta’s influence on Indonesian national politics shrank sharply. It turned out that he differed with Soekarno, the President, over many issues. It also appeared that he dissatisfied with the performance of political parties, which he accused of serving mostly their own group’s interests, particularly after the general election in 1955. What disturbed him most was inter-party rivalry at the expense of stable government: “Political parties are intended to be an orderly means of representing public opinion,” he said in 1951, “but in the development of our parties, the party is the goal and the state becomes its tools.”<sup>44</sup> These difficult years culminated in 1957, when Soekarno called for a system of Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*) to replace what he saw as the tyranny of the majority in a conventional parliamentary system. Soekarno played an active role in forming government after the fall of the second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet in 1957 and in 1959, with army backing, took over the prime ministership and instituted his system of Guided Democracy.

The dissolution of the elected Constituent Assembly and the reversion to the 1945 Constitution demanded for Hatta’s recall to the Vice-Presidency, which it pointed out as an intrinsic part of that Constitution. However, Sukarno ignored these and Hatta didn’t have any intention to again working directly with Sukarno. Hatta was overseas at the time, but his response to the dissolution

of the elected Constituent Assembly was, surprisingly, mild enough. I would argue that this mild response reflected the dilemma he was facing: in addition to the poor quality of political parties at the period, the dissolution of parliamentary democracy was at least compensated by the reenactment of the 1945 Constitution. He knew that he had included the principle of *kedaulatan rakyat* in this Constitution. He was also no doubt relieved that the state philosophy remained the Pancasila, which for him was the basis of religious socialism and, in contrast with communism, was avowedly “theistic.”

Hatta thought on Islam and nationalism should be understood within this general context. He was frustrated by the fact that the Constituent Assembly, on which he had suggested his last hopes for achieving constitutional reform, remained deadlock over the old issue of whether to give more recognition to Islam or to retain the Pancasila. When he recalled this period in a speech he made in 1975, he was critical of the groups he called “Islamic state group” for slowing up the deliberation, giving a more valid reason for the Assembly’s dissolution. He commented: “How much better it would have been if it had been more tolerant. Having earnestly struggled and been outvoted, it should not have continued but democratically accepted its defeat and reached a consensus on the Pancasila, which was the original basis of the state.”<sup>45</sup>

In 1957, Hatta spent much of his time touring Sumatera, where he received an enthusiastic welcome. He described regional revolts that were taking place at the time as “explosion of dissatisfaction” and “a psychological conflict between the center and the regions.” However, he emphasized that he was not there as the leader of a breakaway movement. In South Sumatera he declared heatedly: “If it is the case that the movements in South Sumatra intend to separate themselves from the unitary state, then I will never again return to South Sumatra.”<sup>46</sup> This strong *fait accompli* reflected his belief in the necessity to resolve conflicts in a peaceful way as well as his belief in the superiority of the Indonesian national unity over anything else. It is undoubtedly these same reasons that forced him to deliver a strong comment on the rebellion under the banner of Islam in early 1950s: “It is no longer the time to play at

being romantic heroes, we must get down to work.” He made clear to the Muslim guerrilla groups still harboring the countryside that they should cease fighting: “Rebellion is no longer a revolution, but counter-revolution, which must be wiped out. There must be no ‘state within the state.’” The state within the state referred to those Islamic groups.<sup>47</sup>

In 1959, Hatta wrote an article where he publicly aired his personal criticism of Soekarno, pointing to his open disregard for the Constitution and condemning his dissolution of the elected Constituent Assembly and parliament. He made it clear as his opinion that, by so doing, Soekarno had replaced democracy with dictatorship. In this classical text of the Indonesian democracy, which later on was banned by Soekarno, Hatta suggested Islam as one of three sources of social democracy ideals of Indonesian leaders, in addition to Western socialist thought and Indonesian village democracy based on collectivism.<sup>48</sup>

### The Case of Aborted PDII

In 1960, during the period of Guided Democracy, Sukarno outlawed Masjumi and Indonesian Socialist Party (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia* or PSI), the two parties most opposed to his regime and closest to Hatta, and also the two parties most under attack in the PKI press during the 1950s. Hatta quietly set about organizing a movement which would continue to promote his ideas about *kedaulatan rakyat*.

As Rosihan Anwar wrote in his notes on the Indonesian political scene during that the period,<sup>49</sup> Hatta began to invite selected “non-cooperators” to his secluded villa at Megamendung in the West Java hills. He suggested that a People’s Sovereign Party (*Partai Daulat Rakyat* or PDR) or the PNI be once again established. However, he suggested that this time the party should include Islamic groups but have as its ideological basis the Pancasila, with particular emphasis on democracy and socialism.<sup>50</sup> What Hatta seemed to be proposing was an amalgamation of Masjumi and the PSI, the two parties most supportive of parliamentary democracy, with the Masjumi participants encouraged to be more socially aware than in the past. At this time many Masjumi and PSI leaders, in-

cluding Sjahrir, were put in jail. Hatta probably realised the potential of Islam to reach down to the masses which the elitist PSI had found it difficult to do.

Although admittedly he needed to make use of the ardour of Muslim youth, in 1962, Hatta did not suggest the inclusion of the word “Islamic” in the title of the proposed party. PNI, his long time model of a political party, had always tried to make religion a personal matter from its inception. The over-riding consideration for Hatta was to institute a party that was prepared to continue to struggle for the unachieved goals of the PNI, that was the struggle for *kedaulatan rakyat*.

However, the radical disruption of the Indonesian political scene had changed the entire idea. Aborted Left-wing coups such as that which took place on 30 September 1965 tend to trigger hard swings to the right.<sup>51</sup> In the Indonesian case, it was to a military regime under the leadership of General Suharto. The two main exponents of parliamentary democracy, the PSI and Masjumi, were not permitted to be rehabilitated. For the modernist Muslim groups, who had been supportive of the military action against Sukarno and the PKI, this rejection of Masjumi came as a blow. The Suharto government, which was named the New Order (*Orde Baru*), conceded that a completely new Islamic party could be established. As for the PSI, there was no reprieve for it.

As Mavis Rose wrote, Hatta must have realized that:

[I]f the PSI were debarred from politics, a party with similar roots and overtly advocating parliamentary democracy and social reform such as the proposed *Partai Daulat Rakyat* would never gain acceptance. The New Order, following Sukarno’s example, preferred to appoint the majority of representatives to the MPR and would also screen future election candidates for the DPR. A party drawing attention to *kedaulatan rakyat* would have appeared hopelessly utopian, almost verging on the anarchical, in the prevailing political climate.<sup>52</sup>

It can be suggested here that the alternative left for Hatta was to continue approaching the goal to achieve the *kedaulatan rakyat* through a party that would have as its name “Islam,” since Suharto had agreed to the establishment of a Muslim party to replace Masjumi. Hence, instead of reestablishing the PDR or PNI, Hatta

was ready to establish the Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia* or PDII).

Considering these facts, it was not really surprising that PDII's constitution had much in common with that of the PNI. Its first aim was to implement "Indonesian socialism." The role of Islam in character training was acknowledged but coupled with Hatta's former emphasis on political education. The cadre system adopted by the PNI was also to be used, urging party branches to establish political education clubs "to teach prospective members the aims of the party and to educate party cadres."<sup>53</sup>

On January 11, 1967, Hatta sent a letter to Soeharto informing him of this intention.<sup>54</sup> In view of the party's social democratic flavor and its methodology, it was not really surprising that Suharto refused to sanction it. He fulfilled his promise that a new Islamic party would be established, but he did not permit Hatta to lead it.<sup>55</sup> For Hatta, it was a bitter setback and one which he was powerless to fight openly. He admitted: "For me, there was nothing else but to accept the decision and so the *Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia* never materialized."<sup>56</sup> In his reminiscence on Hatta, George McT. Kahin, who held discussions with him in 1968, noted that he was still very hurt and disappointed that he had not been given an opportunity to form and lead the PDII. Kahin personally deplored the situation, noticing: "The reality that one of the two people who had established a nation was not allowed an opportunity like that certainly constituted a tragedy in the history of that nation."<sup>57</sup>

Hatta had to admit that there were also many Muslim leaders who expressed that the newly established PDII is "not an Islamic party but a Pancasila party." Hatta defended the party, impatiently asking: "Can the basis of 'Belief in God,' which permeates the whole Pancasila, not be put into practice according to Islamic concepts?" He stressed that the party would be different from other Islamic party because it would be based on "socialism which is sanctioned by God," a party for "Islamic youth of the 1966 Generation."<sup>58</sup> No matter how furious Hatta was in reflecting on the above comment, he should agree with it. As the matter of fact, they were telling only the truth: what Hatta attempted to establish was



not an Islamic party, but a party that would be based on the Pancasila.

Hatta's disappointment with the lack of support which he received from his Muslim colleagues may have prompted his statement quoted in the opening of this paper, which he made about the aborted PDII in 1978: "One of the things to be taught to the Islamic communities is that they should apply the science of salt, which is felt but not seen, rather than the science of lipstick, which is seen but not felt."

### Conclusion: Historiographical Significance

By the way of conclusion let me return to the accusation in *Suara Hidayatullah* article mentioned in the beginning of this paper. The article accused Hatta, as a secular nationalist, of betraying the Jakarta Charter. As the above discussion has demonstrated that Hatta was anything but a secularist, I would suggest that this accusation is baseless.

Beyond this point of discussion, however, there is a more interesting point to question and analyze further, a point that has a historiographical significance. As Hatta's Muslim-ness was strong and publicly well known, we may wonder why certain groups among the Indonesian Muslims called him a "secularist." This reflects to an important degree, as I have mentioned, the uneasiness that the proponents of the idea of Islamic state have been facing in their dealing with Hatta's thought on Islam and nationalism. I would argue that this is more because of their unwillingness to accept other forms of Islamic interpretation such as the one presented by Hatta than by Hatta's being as a secularist. In other world, the latter was made up to support the former. Another article published in the same journal, i.e. *Suara Hidayatullah*, confirmed this suspicion. The article said that "the majority of the members of BPUPKI were secular nationalists who openly opposed [the idea of] Islam as the basis of state. Among them were Radjiman Widiodiningrat, Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, Muhammad Yamin, and Prof. Supomo."<sup>59</sup>

It is instructive to note here that, at this point, *Suara Hidayatullah* basically only follows the long tradition of Indone-

sian studies that dichotomized Indonesian nationalist leaders into the *kebangsaan* group and Islamic group based on their respective positions in the issue of Islam as the basis of state; the only invention *Suara Hidayatullah* creates is to identify the *kebangsaan* group as “secularists,” which makes the matter even worse. My discussion and analysis about Hatta’s thought on nationalism and Islam above strongly suggested that this dichotomy is unhelpful at best, if not misleading. A new way to more accurately identify those nuances in the thoughts of Indonesian nationalist leaders is in need here, although I bring no suggestion to resolve this complex problem. Nevertheless, it should be said that Hatta’s term “Islamic state” group is a more accurate identification of Muslim nationalists who strived for an Islamic state than the more general identification such as “Islamic group” that was employed in the above dichotomy.

However, looking at the issue from a historiographical perspective, I would suggest that the *Suara Hidayatullah*’s accusation has more to do with politics than with history. In this political venture, Hatta’s firm and powerful thought about the compatibility of Islam and nationalism became a handicap for the “Islamic state” groups to express their version of Indonesian history. It is interesting here to find out that the same issue of *Suara Hidayatullah* publishes an interview with Sjfii Maarif, a source they identified as an “expert in Islamic history.”<sup>60</sup> Below is the passage from this interview:

*Suara Hidayatullah* (SH): There was time when the relation between state and Islam in Indonesian political history was colored by the willingness of Muslims to enforce the Islamic *shari’a*, as it was written in the Jakarta Charter. Then, it was stopped (*kandas*) on August, 18, 1945 and during the Constitutional Assembly. How do you see these [histories]?

Sjfii Maarif (SM): Yes, it stopped because the release of the Presidential Decree on July 5 [1956]. And why was that? [It was] because democratically Muslim’s votes didn’t reach the [required] two-third [of the whole members of the Assembly]. ... For me it meant that Muslims were losers.

SH: But it was so because of the sabotage of the [Indonesian] military?

SM: Even if there was no sabotage from the military, Muslim’s vote in the Constitutional Assembly didn’t reach the [required] two-third percentage. Therefore [it] needs an extra caution [in dealing with this issue]. Why? [It was so] because the *shari’a* that would be enforced at the time was the *shari’a* that had been interpreted. ... So which [version of] *shari’a* [that we want to en-

force]? It has to be made definitely clear. For if not, it would become a boomerang....<sup>61</sup>

Maarif correctly touched the basic problem surrounding any attempt to enforce Islamic *shari'a* in a certain historical context, which Hatta had suggested times and again in his firm thinking about nationalism and Islam. Now we may wonder if Maarif would also be attributed as a "secularist."\*\*\*

## Endnotes

1. Mohammad Hatta, *Bung Hatta Menjawab*, 2nd edition (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1979), p. 179.
2. See Mohammad Hatta, *Memoir* (Jakarta: Tintamas Indonesia, 1979), pp. 458-460.
3. "Naskah Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945: Pengkhianatan Pertama terhadap Piagam Jakarta?" *Suara Hidayatullah*, September, 2000 (the emphasis is mine).
4. Mavis Rose, *Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1987), p. 6.
5. Deliar Noer, *Mohammad Hatta: Biografi Politik* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990), p. 16. Here Syaikh Abdurrahman was *Syaikh nan tou* and Syaikh Arsyad was *Syaikh nan mudo*.
6. Noer, *Mohammad Hatta*, p. 19. ELS was the elementary school for the White, while MULU was a middle high school.
7. Rose, *Indonesia Free*, p. 7.
8. Hatta, *Memoir*, pp. 27-28.
9. Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 2.
10. Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 88. Socialist ideas began to infiltrate the nationalist movement in the late 1910s. The Indies Social Democratic Union (*Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging* or ISDV) under Baars and Sneevliet, the two Dutchmen, influenced Islamic Union (*Sarekat Islam* or SI) leaders such as Semaun, Darsono and Alimin to such an extent that the party split. For active and nationally conscious youth leaders such as Hatta, this development most probably did not go unnoticed.
11. See Mohammad Hatta, *Portrait of a Patriot* (The Hague & Paris: Mouton Publishers, 1972), p. 206. Here Hatta quoted the editorial statement of PI's journal *Indonesia Merdeka* (1924), which most probably was written by himself.
12. Hatta, "Indonesia Free," in Mohammad Hatta, *Portrait of a Patriot* (The Hague & Paris: Mouton Publishers, 1972), p. 275.
13. These impressions were recorded in *Bung Hatta Mengabdikan pada Cita-cita Perjuangan Bangsa* (Jakarta: Panitia Peringatan Ulang Tahun Bung Hatta ke-70, 1972), pp. 97, 130 and 390.
14. Sunario, "Bung Hatta dan Kepribadiannya," in Meutia Farida Swasono (ed.), *Bung Hatta: Pribadinya dalam Kenangan* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan dan Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, 1980), p. 248.
15. Ichsan, "Kenang-kenangan dengan Bung Hatta," in Swasono (ed.), *Bung Hatta*, p. 260.
16. Burhanuddin, "Bung Hatta sebagai Kawan dan Guru," in Swasono (ed.), *Bung Hatta*, p. 306.
17. Hatta, *Memoir*, pp. 204-208. It is important to note here that on his return to Minangkabau, in 1932, there was a mixed reception to him from his compatriots and traditional leaders. Because of this "convention," Hatta carried with him a stigma of Marxism, in spite of his acknowledged devotion of Islam. See Rose, *Indonesia Free*, p. 65, and Noer, *Mohammad Hatta*, pp. 45-48.
18. Quoted from Noer, *Mohammad Hatta*, p. 152. The article, "Catur Politik di Keliling Meja Bundar," was published in *Daulat Ra'jat*, December 30, 1931.
19. A rich presentation of the debates during this period is given in Deliar Noer,

- The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973).
20. Noer, *Mohammad Hatta*, p. 151.
  21. See Rose, *Indonesia Free*, p. 208.
  22. Mohammad Hatta, "Perdamaian yang Sejati," *Panji Islam*, Syawwal 1, 1358 (1939). Quoted from Noer, *Mohammad Hatta*, p. 153: "Dunia ini dilahirkan Tuhan bagi kita untuk diperbaiki, tempat kita mempergunakan akal dan budi untuk kebaikan ummat Allah. Bukan untuk dielakkan atau ditiadakan semata-mata untuk mencapai kesenangan roh sendiri. Berusahalah kita untuk memperbaiki dunia ini sebagai tangga ke akhirat, supaya tercapai perdamaian yang sejati yang nyata suatu tuntutan Islam. Bukankah damai hukum yang setinggi-tingginya dalam Islam?"
  23. Mohammad Hatta, "Ajaran Marx atau Kepintaran Sang Murid Membeo," in *Karya Lengkap Bung Hatta. Buku 1: Kebangsaan dan Kerakyatan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1998), p. 490: "Dasar agama Islam, jika dipikirkan secara konsekuen, mutlak menuju kepada sosialisme. Karena dengan bertolak daripada pikiran, bahwa ia tunduk kepada Kehendak Allah SWT, Yang Maha Pengasih dan Maha Adil, maka seorang Muslim membaktikan hidup dan perjuangannya pada persaudaraan ummat manusia dan keadilan antara mereka. Karena itu hanya dapat dilaksanakan dalam susunan masyarakat yang sosialis, maka bagi kaum Muslim perjuangan untuk sosialisme adalah ibarat perintah Allah yang tak dapat dielaknya."
  24. Hatta, "Ajaran Marx," p. 490: "Siapa yang meneliti dengan cermat lingkungan dan kedudukan sosial dari alim-ulama itu, merasakan kebenaran kata-kata Marx, yakni bahwa tingkat masyarakat mereka yang menentukan kesadaran mereka - dalam hal ini kesadaran agama mereka."
  25. Anthony Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution: 1945-1950* (Melbourne: Longman, 1974), p. 20.
  26. This is the body responsible to provide answers to the Japanese administration's questions on issues related to Islamic affairs. Hatta was one of its members. See Daniel S. Lev, *Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal Institutions* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1972), p. 35.
  27. See Lev, *Islamic Courts in Indonesia*, pp. 34-41.
  28. Quoted from Lev, *Islamic Courts in Indonesia*, p. 40.
  29. Hatta, *Bung Hatta Menjawab*, p. 89.
  30. Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 2.
  31. Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 435.
  32. See Endang Saifuddin Anshari, *The Jakarta Charter 1945: The Struggle for an Islamic Constitution in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1979), p. 17, note number 1.
  33. Mohammad Hatta, *Menuju Negara Hukum* (Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu, 1975), pp. 9-10. See also Mohammad Hatta, *Pengertian Pancasila* (Jakarta: Idayu Press, 1977), p. 28: "Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa tidak lagi hanya dasar hotmat-menghormati agama masing-masing, seperti yang dikemukakan oleh Bung Karno, melainkan jadi dasar yang memimpin ke jalan kebenaran, keadilan, kebaikan, kejujuran, dan persaudaraan."
  34. B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 21-22.

35. The first eight members were Muslims with different political outlook. The first four were from the *kebangsaan* group, while the latter four were from the Islamic group. Maramis was a Christian who shared the ideological inclination of the *kebangsaan* group.
36. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, p. 30.
37. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, p. 31.
38. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, p. 30.
39. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, p. 33.
40. Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, p. 20.
41. On his feeling that time, Hatta wrote, "I can imagine in my mind my struggle for more than 25 years, through imprisonment and exile, to achieve an independent of Indonesia, a country that should be united and not compartmentalized. Would the independent Indonesia, that just recently established, be dis-united and re-colonized because of something that actually could be resolved?" Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 459.
42. Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 460 (the emphasis is in the original): "*Apabila suatu masalah yang serius dan bisa membahayakan keutuhan Negara dapat diatasi dalam sidang kecil yang lamanya kurang dari 15 menit, itu adalah suatu tanda bahwa pemimpin-pemimpin tersebut di waktu itu benar-benar mementingkan nasib dan persatuan bangsa.*"  
"*Pada waktu itu kami dapat menginsafi, bahwa Semangat Piagam Jakarta tidak lenyap dengan menghilangkan perkataan "Ke Tuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya" dan menggantinya dengan "Ke Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa."* Dalam Negara yang kemudian memakai semboyan Bhineka Tunggal Ika, tiap-tiap peraturan dalam kerangka Syariah Islam, yang hanya mengenai orang Islam dapat dimajukan sebagai rencana Undang-Undang, yang setelah diterima oleh DPR mengikat umat Islam Indonesia."
43. See Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Graffiti, 1987), p. 43.
44. *Pikiran Rakjat*, February 7, 1951, quoted from Rose, *Indonesia Free*, p. 175.
45. Hatta, *Menuju Negara Hukum*, p. 15.
46. *Pikiran Rakjat*, June 27, 1957, quoted from Rose, *Indonesia Free*, p. 191.
47. *Merdeka*, September 20, 1951, quoted from Rose, *Indonesia Free*, p. 175.
48. Mohammad Hatta, "Demokrasi Kita," in *Karya Lengkap Bung Hatta: Buku 2: Kemerdekaan dan Demokrasi* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2000), p. 435.
49. See Rosihan Anwar, *Sebelum Prabhara: Pergolakan Politik Indonesia 1961-1965* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1981), 120 and 290.
50. Anwar, *Sebelum Prabhara*, p. 290.
51. Hatta's recollections on this happening and its aftermath are in order here. He was in Bali at the time of Gestapu, having been advised to take rest there for health reasons. He recalled that he heard the first news about the kidnapping and murder of the leadership of the Army from Simatupang on the morning of October 1st 1965. He added: "Further reports revealed that Nasution, after having left his hiding-place, went straight to Kostrad. He found that Suharto had already taken action." He presumed that the happening was at least carried out with the knowledge of Sukarno: "Without Bung Karno's consent, I do not think all this would have possibly happened." On Muslim anti-PKI, Hatta

- admitted, although cautiously, that “from the Moslems, the reaction was very strong, especially from those who at that time felt the worst pressure,” that Nahdlatul Ulama leaders were prepared to “take revenge by killing at least ten PKI people for every Moslem scholar they had killed.” Hatta, *Bung Hatta Menjawab*, pp. 48-49.
52. Rose, *Indonesia Free*, p. 213.
  53. See Mohammad Hatta, “Rencana Dasar, Program dan Struktur Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia (PDII): Pengantar Mohammad Hatta,” in Noer, *Mohammad Hatta*, “Lampiran,” pp. 727-730.
  54. Noer, *Mohammad Hatta*, p. 644.
  55. Suharto instead appointed conservative Muhammadiyah leaders, under the leadership of Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun, to set up the Indonesian Muslim Party (*Partai Muslimin Indonesia* or Parmusi). To ensure that the new Islamic party was relatively acquiescent, former Masjumi leaders were excluded from its executive. On this issue, see Kenneth E. Ward, *The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1970).
  56. Hatta, *Bung Hatta Menjawab*, p. 161.
  57. George McT. Kahin, “Mohammad Hatta sebagai Pemikir Bebas,” in Meuthia F. Swasono (ed.), *Bung Hatta: Pribadinya dalam Kenangan* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan and University of Indonesia, 1980), p. 459.
  58. Hatta, “Rencana Dasar,” pp. 730-731.59 “Pasang Surut Islam Indonesia,” *Suara Hidayatullah*, January, 2000.
  60. Sjfaii Maarif is a Chairman of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. He was trained in history at Ohio University, where he wrote a thesis titled “Islamic Politics under Guided Democracy in Indonesia 1959-1965” (1978) and in Islamic studies at the University of Chicago, where he wrote a dissertation titled “Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia” (1983). Both his thesis and dissertation were published as *Islam dan Politik di Indonesia pada Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965)* (Yogyakarta: IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Press, 1988) and *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan: Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985).
  61. See “Wawancara dengan Pakar Sejarah Islam: Kebenaran Tidak Selalu Berpihak Kepada Pemenang,” *Suara Hidayatullah*, January, 2000.



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