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

PONDOKS, MADRASAHS AND THE PRODUCTION OF *'ULAMĀ'* IN MALAYSIA

William R. Roff

THE FRAGMENTATION OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY: ISLAMIC PRINT MEDIA IN EARLY 20TH CENTURY INDONESIA

Jajat Burhanudin

ON THE GENESIS OF INTELLECTUAL CROSSROADS: EARLY FRAGMENTATION IN THE FORMATION OF MODERN INDONESIAN INTELLIGENTSIA

Yudi Latif

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Yudi Latif

On the Genesis of Intellectual Crossroads: Early Fragmentation in the Formation of Modern Indonesian Intelligentsia

Abstrak: *Artikel ini menghadirkan kajian tentang proses pembentukan wacana sosial-intelektual di Indonesia awal abad ke-20, di mana perbedaan dan pertentangan—atau fragmentasi—mulai mengemuka. Kaum intelektual (*clerisy*) mulai mengedepankan berbagai orientasi pemikiran, seiring dengan hadirnya kekuatan baru, baik dalam relasi kekuasaan Indonesia maupun jaringan internasional. Hasilnya, tiga orientasi pemikiran muncul dalam peta intelektual Indonesia: mereka yang berorientasi ke Barat (saat itu disebut kaum terpelajar), mereka yang masih berpegang pada khazanah agung (kaum tradisionalis), dan mereka yang berhaluan pembaharuan (kaum modernis).*

*Proyek modernisasi oleh pemerintah kolonial, Politik Etis, merupakan salah satu faktor sangat penting yang mendorong munculnya perubahan. Salah satunya yang terkemuka adalah pembukaan sekolah-sekolah dengan sietem pendidikan Barat modern. Dirancang sebagai salah satu strategi baru dalam kolonisasi Indonesia, sekolah-sekolah tersebut menghasilkan lulusan yang sangat akrab, baik dengan gaya hidup perkotaan, maupun pemikiran modern tentang kemajuan (*progress*). Berhadapan terutama dengan dominasi kaum priyayi lama, kaum terpelajar ini—yang mengisi sejumlah posisi dalam birokrasi kolonial—tampil sebagai elit baru dengan sejumlah agenda untuk menciptakan ruang baru bagi eksistensi mereka di tengah relasi kuasa saat itu. Di sini, mereka mengedepankan gagasan kemajuan sebagai salah satu isu penting, yang diasosiasikan dengan pengalaman dunia Barat sebagaimana mereka pahami di bangku sekolah. Di samping menerbitkan media cetak, mereka juga giat mendirikan asosiasi (*club*), seperti Mangkoesoemitro (1882), Langen Sanitro (1888) di Semarang, Medan Perdamaian di Padang, dan Abri Projo di Surakarta. Asosiasi ini berfungsi sebagai satu sarana untuk membahas keprihatinan*

mereka tentang perlunya kemajuan bagi kaum pribumi, selain tentu saja sosialisasi keberadaan mereka dalam konstelasi sosial-politik Indonesia.

Sementara proyek kolonial mulai melahirkan kaum terpelajar, kelompok clerisy *lain yang berbasis di lembaga keagamaan, khususnya ulama pesantren, tengah mengalami proses konsolidasi. Hal ini didorong terutama oleh terbentuknya jaringan yang semakin intensif dengan pusat Islam di Timur Tengah, khususnya Mekkah. Pembukaan Terus Suez pada 1869, disertai perbaikan sistem transportasi laut, telah memfasilitasi lalu lintas kaum Muslim untuk datang ke Mekkah melaksanakan ibadah haji. Maka, pada paruh kedua abad ke-19, jaringan Indonesia-Mekkah menyaksikan jumlah jemaah haji yang kian meningkat, yang pada gilirannya mendorong makin tersebarnya pesantren. Hal ini karena mereka yang berhaji sebagian besar berasal dari institusi keagamaan tersebut.*

Di samping itu, hal terpenting lain dari jaringan tersebut adalah terbentuknya komunitas Jawi, mukimin asal Indonesia dan Asia Tenggara yang belajar Islam di Mekkah. Mereka berjasa dalam proses transmisi Islam, yang menjadikan Mekkah sebagai jantung dari dinamika Islam di Indonesia. Melalui jaringan ulama yang terbentuk, diperkuat dengan tersebarnya kitab kuning, kaum clerisy *ini mengalami perkembangan yang mapan. Mereka selanjutnya membentuk satu komunitas tersendiri yang kemudian dikenal dengan kaum santri. Proses terakhir ini selanjutnya diperkuat dengan kebijakan politik kolonial yang tidak berpihak pada Islam, yang melihat ulama sebagai kekuatan pembangkang terhadap kekuasaan politik kolonial.*

Meski demikian, orientasi baru pada kaum clerisy *keagamaan juga mulai tumbuh. Hal ini berlangsung terutama pada awal abad ke-20, ketika proyek modern oleh pemerintah kolonial telah menciptakan generasi Muslim baru yang akrab dengan gagasan kemajuan. Hal ini juga sejalan dengan proses perubahan di lingkungan komunitas Jawi, di mana mereka mulai berkiblat ke al-Azhar di Kairo, Mesir, pusat gerakan pembaharuan Islam oleh Muḥammad 'Abduh dan Rashīd Riḍā. Jaringan Indonesia-Kairo, yang berkembang pada 1920-an, telah melahirkan kelompok Muslim baru, kaum modernis. Mereka, berbeda dari kaum ulama pesantren, mengedepankan agenda baru untuk merumuskan kembali ajaran Islam yang sesuai dengan semangat baru. Maka, di samping mendirikan lembaga pendidikan modern dan menerbitkan media cetak, mereka juga mengusung isu kemajuan, seperti halnya kaum terpelajar.*

Demikianlah, ketiga kelompok clerisy *ini terus tumbuh dan berkembang, Mereka secara berarti mewarnai perkembangan wacana sosial-intelektual Indonesia. Perbedaan serta pertentangan kerap menjadi ciri penting mereka.*

Yudi Latif

On the Genesis of Intellectual Crossroads: Early Fragmentation in the Formation of Modern Indonesian Intelligentsia

خلاصة

تعرض هذه المقالة لدراسة حول تكوين الموضوعات الفكرية الاجتماعية والسياسية بإندونيسيا في أوائل القرن العشرين الميلادي حيث بداية ظهور الاختلاف والتعارض؛ فقد بدأ المثقفون يبرزون مختلف الاتجاهات الفكرية في الوقت الذي ظهرت فيه قوة جديدة سواء فيما يتعلق بالسلطة في إندونيسيا أم الشبكة الدولية؛ والنتيجة نشوء ثلاثة اتجاهات فكرية في خريطة الفكر الإندونيسي: فهناك الاتجاه الغربي ويسير عليه المثقفون؛ وهناك الاتجاه التراثي التقليدي ويسير عليه الشيوخ المحافظون؛ والاتجاه التجديدي ويسير عليه الإصلاحيون.

ولقد كان مشروع التحديث الذي قامت به الحكومة الاستعمارية مع اتخاذ سياسة الأخلاق عاملا مهما جدا في سبيل التغيير؛ وكان من أهم ما في ذلك المشروع فتح مدارس على نظام التعليم الغربي الحديث، وحيث أنها أي المدارس صيغت لتكون إحدى الوسائل الاستراتيجية في استعمار إندونيسيا، فقد أنتجت تلك المدارس متخرجين قريبي العهد بأساليب الحياة بالمدن والتفكير الحديث حول التقدم؛ وفيما يجدون أنفسهم وجها لوجه مع هيمنة القوى القديمة من النبلاء —الذين يشغلون عددا من المناصب في مصالح الحكومة الاستعمارية– فقد برز هؤلاء المثقفون كنخبة جديدة يحملون معهم خططا جديدة لخلق مساحة جديدة لإثبات وجودهم وسط السلطات في ذلك الوقت؛ وهنا يعطون الأولوية للأفكار التقدمية على أنها قضيتهم التي يربطونها بتجربة العالم الغربي وفقا لما يفهمونه أثناء الدراسة في الغرب؛ وهكذا فإنهم بجانب استخدامهم الوسائل الطباعية كانوا حريصين أيضا على إنشاء روابط مثل رابطة مانجكوساسميتو(Mangkoesoemitro) فيي ١٨٨٢، ولانجين ساميترو (Langen Samitro) بسيمارانج(Semarang) في ١٨٨٨، وميدان فيرداماياان (Medan Perdamaian) ببادانج (Padang) وآبري بروجو (Abri Projo) بسوراكارتا (Surakarta).

وكانت هذه الروابط تقوم بدور وسيلة لإبراز اهتمامهم بضرورة تحقيق التقدم للمواطنين في المستعمرات بجانب كونها وسيلة لهم أيضا في ترويج أفكارهم من أجل إثبات وجودهم وسط الصراعات الاجتماعية والسياسية في إندونيسيا.

وفي الوقت الذي بدأ فيه النجاح يتحقق في مشروع الحكومة الاستعمارية لإخراج مثقفين كانت طائفة أخرى من المفكرين المنتمين إلى المؤسسات الدينية وخاصة شيوخ المعاهد التراثية في سبيل توحيد صفوفهم، وكان هذا نتيجة نشوء شبكة تربطهم بالشرق الأوسط وخاصة بمكة المكرمة؛ ثم إن فتح قناة السويس سنة ١٨٦٩م مع تحسن وسائل النقل البحري قد سهل مرور المسلمين إلى مكة لأداء فريضة الحج؛ وما أن أهل النصف الثاني من القرن التاسع عشر الميلادي حتى شهدت الشبكة الإندونيسية المكية تزايد عدد الحجاج الأمر الذي أدى بدوره إلى زيادة انتشار المعاهد التراثية والطرق الصوفية لأن القادمين لأداء فريضة الحج يأتون من هذه المؤسسات الدينية.

علاوة على أن الجانب الأهم لتلك الشبكة هو تكوين الجماعة الجاوية أعني المقيمين بمكة المكرمة من أصل إندونيسي ودول جنوب شرقي آسيا؛ وقد كان لهم دور بارز في الدعوة الإسلامية التي كانت تجعل مكة المكرمة قلب الحركة الإسلامية النابض لإندونيسيا، فمن خلال الشبكة التي تكونت والتي تأيدت بانتشار الكتب الصفراء حقق أولئك الشيوخ لأنفسهم التطور باستحكام، فكان لهم أن ينشئوا جماعة مستقلة عرفت فيما بعد باسم جماعة التراثيين، ولم يلبث أن ازدادت مكانتهم ثباتا بما كان عليه السياسة الاستعمارية من عدم مساندة الإسلام بل تنظر إلى الشيوخ على أنهم قوة ضد السلطات الاستعمارية.

ومع ذلك فإن اتجاها جديدا بدأ يطفو على السطح عندما حقق مشروح التحديث الذي قامت به الحكومة الاستعمارية نجاحا في إخراج جيل جديد من المسلمين قريب العهد بالأفكار التقدمية، وقد حدث هذا في أوائل القرن العشرين في الوقت الذي بدأ فيه اتجاه الجماعة الجاوية إلى التغيير حيث توجهت أنظارهم إلى القاهرة — مصر التي صارت مركزا للحركة التجديدية الإسلامية بريادة الشيخين محمد عبده ورشيد رضا.

إن الشبكة الإندونيسية المكية قد أنتجت طائفة إسلامية جديدة هم أصحاب الحركة التجديدية؛ وهم خلافا لما عليه الشيوخ من المعاهد التراثية يعطون الأولوية لمشروعاهم وخططهم الجديدة إعادة بناء الفكر الإسلامي وفقا للروح الجديدة؛ وإذن بالإضافة إلى قيامهم بإنشاء مدارس حديثة واستخدامهم الوسائل الطباعية فقد قاموا أيضا بترويج الأفكار التقدمية، تماما كما يفعله المثقفون.

وهكذا استمرت هذه الاتجاهات الثلاث في النمو والتطو، ولقد شاركوا بشكل قيم في تطور الأفكار الاجتماعية والعلمية الإندونيسية، وكان الاختلاف والتعارض فيما بينهم من مميزاهم أحيانا.

The old order is destroyed, a new world is created and all around us is change.

Munshi Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir (1843)

As they entered the century, the *clerisy*[1] of the "land below the winds" stood at a crossroads. The path of knowledge to "Mecca" inherited from previous centuries through the international *'ulamā'* networks remained. At the same time, the deepening penetration of Dutch colonialism and capitalism inescapably brought its own regime of knowledge that paved the new intellectual road to the "West".

The picture of Islamic development and Islamic studies in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI, now Indonesia) at the turn of the century was not as gloomy as Islamic reformists commonly imagined. Western colonial encroachment upon the Islamic life-world by no means exhausted all avenues of Islamic sustainability. Although throughout the 19th century Islam was frequently used as a rallying cry for native resistance, which entailed various colonial restrictions on certain aspects of Islamic development, Islam in fact exhibited its own internal dynamics. Quantitatively, it obtained new adherents with the conversion of people of non-Muslim territories such as Tengger and South Tapanuli as well as Chinese in some regions. Furthermore, as discussed later, the traditional Islamic schools, *pesantren*, inherited from the previous hundreds of years, tended to grow significantly. The Islamic (inspired) literature produced monumental achievements, both inside and outside the milieu of the court. The number of those making the pilgrimage to Mecca *(ḥajj)*, despite the apparent Dutch obstruction, continued to increase and became even more extensive after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The contribution of the Indo-Malayan 'epistemic community' *(Aṣḥāb al-Jāwiyyīn)* in the Ḥaramayn (Mecca and Medina) to the reproduction and redistribution of religious knowledge remained. The endurance of this so-called *Jāwah* colony enabled the continuous transmission of reformed ideas from the Middle East to the archipelago, which inspired the emergence of reform movements in *ṭarīqah* (*Ṣūfī* brotherhood), Islamic doctrine, politics, and schools. And last but not least, the Muslim adoption of lithographic printing helped with the multiplication of the old manuscripts, which caused an explosion in the amount of religious reading materials.

Alongside the continuous efficacy of historical Islam across generations, however, the decline of international Islamic politics in conjunction with the deepening penetration of colonialism and capitalism especially since the mid-19th century brought about some ruptures in Islamic development. The decline of the Islamic empires' control over the sea trading routes entailed a gradual demotion of the Arabic language, leading to gradual fracturing and territorialisation within the global Islamic community *(ummah)*, followed by internal conflicts within the *'ulamā'* community. Furthermore, the augmentation of colonial incursion and capitalist intrusion into the life-world of the East Indies brought about new developments that debilitated certain aspects of traditional Islamic institutions whilst also opening new spaces for creating a new face of Islam. These new developments included the imported bodies of Western education and ideas, changes in the symbolic universe and media-sphere, the detachment of the traditional Islamic *clerisy* from the historic ruling class, and the secularisation of law.

In short, this was the beginning of the acute fractured world of the East Indies Muslim *clerisy*. The old fantasy of Mecca as the ideal city of God as reflected by the epithet of Islamic sultanates, such as Aceh and Riau, as the 'Serambi Mekah' (the Verandah of Mecca), persisted. Alongside this fantasy, however, the Dutch created a new secular paradise in designating the East Indies as the 'exotic garden of the east' *(Mooi Indië)* that implied the glorification of Western civilised world as a new exemplary centre. The existence of the traditional *'ulamā'* and *literati* as the articulators of the collective conscience and social traditions was contested by the gestation of a western educated 'intelligentsia' as well as the emergence of a new breed of reformist-modernist *'ulamā'*.

This article is an inter-textual analysis of the early colonial and capitalist driven implantation of a western education system and its subsequent influence on the way of thought of the East Indies new elite. Such a feature will be juxtaposed with the impacts of the deepening penetration of colonialism and capitalism on the continuity and discontinuity of historical Islam.

On the Roots of Westernisation

Until the early nineteenth century, the knowledge and educational institutions of the East Indies had resembled those in most traditional religio-political systems all over the world. Knowledge

and education in the pre-modern world tended to be subordinate to the sacred. Religion provided the rationale, objectives, and content of traditional education, as well as the teachers and the spatial setting for learning. The ruler patronised learning as part of his overall patronage of the faith (Smith, 1970). This was also the situation of education in the East Indies before the introduction of a Dutch-sponsored secular education system to the islands. In areas where Islam was heavily entrenched, sons of the gentry, Muslim traders, and other religious families were sent to traditional Islamic schools (*pesantren, pondok, surau, dayah*), or perhaps to centres of Islamic learning in the Middle East.

The *Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie*, VOC (United [Dutch] East India Company) authorities that assumed control over parts of the NEI for almost 200 years (1602-1800) had no interest in interfering with native religious matters and education, except for some haphazard support for missionary schools. With the collapse of the VOC,[2] hegemony over the region was handed over from the colonial-private enterprise to the colonial-state empire. Under the new regime most parts of the islands were gradually and distinctively integrated into the colonial empire, transforming the dispersed power centres into a unitary colonial state.[3] Yet until the mid-19th century the Dutch colonial state continued to neglect native education and avoided excessive interference in native religious affairs.

There were several reasons for the colonial powers ignoring native education for such a long period. In the initial stages the colonial powers concentrated on capital accumulation. Next, there had been such a feeling of western superiority amongst the Dutch that there was no call to impose a Western civilised life-world upon the native traditions in order to maintain the "authentic" *Mooi Indië*. This feeling coexisted with a prevalent European assumption of social evolution: that as modern societies rise, religious faith and observances declines. In line with this assumption it was envisioned that excessive interference in native (religious) matters would be counter-productive, for it might not only evoke native insurrections but also obstruct the process of evolution. On the other hand, there was much optimism that the successful Christianisation of the East Indies would solve the Native cum Islamic troubles (Lombard, 1996a: 96; Suminto, 1996: 9-14).

Alongside this view, the Dutch created a boundary between the civilised and uncivilised world by initially limiting the intro-

duction of Western "high" culture only to the European community. The early development of public primary schools for European children commenced in the period following the British return of the Indies to the Dutch in 1816.[4] The Commissioners of education in 1815, while pioneering the provision of education for European children (or those whose status was treated as equal to Europeans), left native education to the care of the regents—and it did not materialise until the second half the 19th century (Furnivall, 1944: 218). Inspired by the spirit of enlightenment, which emphasised the separation of education and religion, one European elementary school was established in Weltevreden (now Menteng), Jakarta, in February 1817, followed by others, both within and outside of Java. The introduction of this school was concomitant to the early installation of European scientific infrastructure and the emergence of exclusive European-style social clubs *(Sociëteit)*. Thus, the Botanical Garden at Buitenzorg (Bogor) and its associated institutes were established in 1817, followed somewhat later by the establishment of The Association of the Natural Sciences in the Netherlands Indies (*Natuurkundige Vereeniging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, est. 1850). Meanwhile, the most exclusive *Sociëteit*, Harmonie, had appeared in Weltevreden in 1815[5] followed by the Concordia in the same city (est. 1830), *De Vereeniging* in Yogyakarta (est. 1822) and some others in Surabaya and Bandung. The genesis of such institutions, together with the emergence of the Dutch press and scientific journals (whether produced in the NEI or imported from Europe), as well as the development of social clubs' libraries, meant that the European community was well-informed and able to disseminate the intellectual and scientific achievements of the Western world (Lombard, 1996a: 83-5).

In the face of a general colonial lack of interest in native education, the pioneering effort to introduce a modern (Western) education system to the heart of the native East Indies was conducted by the Christian missions. Missionary presence in the archipelago originated with VOC's Board of Directors' ambition to meet the spiritual needs of the Company's servants as well as to counter the influence of Catholicism and Islam. It was not until their encounter with a larger congregation that the missionaries started realising a sort of *mission sacrée* to run educational institutions in the Dutch East Indies. This happened especially in dealing with the problem of teaching Bible and religious catechisms to new native East Indies and Chinese *peranakan* (East Indies born Chinese) con-

verts or even to children of the European *peranakan* with a poor mastery of Dutch (Maier, 1993: 57-9; Adam, 1995: 5-7).

The missionary zeal in education for evangelical purposes became more accentuated following the end of the Napoleonic war in 1816 that coincided with the emergence of the so-called "Age of Mission" (Steenbrink, 1993: 98). At this juncture, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, the independent efforts of foreign missionary societies flourished in Western countries. In the Netherlands, the hallmark of this development was the formation of the Nederlandsch Zendelingen Genootschaap (The Netherlands Missionary Society) in 1797, whose efforts in the NEI began in the 1820s (Jones, 1976: 23). Subsequently, some other missionary unions operated in the archipelago with the Dutch Reformed Missionary Union as the most important one (Steenbrink, 1993: 98; Coppel, 1986: 16).

After following in the footprints of the Catholic missions,[6] from the 1820s onward the Christian missions and schools ranged broadly throughout the islands—except in areas where Islam was heavily entrenched. Initially operating amongst the minority peoples in the eastern parts of the East Indies (Maluku, Minahasa, and Timor), the mission schools then spread out to Tapanuli and Nias-Mentawai (North Sumatra), parts of Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, Central and South Sulawesi, and parts of Java (Jones, 1976: 23-4; Coppel: 1986; Furnivall, 1944: 219). The number of these schools increased slowly to reach about 8,400 in 1871, rising to 15,750 in 1892. Apart from stressing education as a means of divulging the Gospel and drawing unbelievers into the church's gravitation, these schools also proposed other benefits for the new converts. "Becoming a Christian," according to Gavin W. Jones, "also meant becoming westernized, and education was an integral part of westernization" (Jones, 1976: 38). Later on, when the colonial administration commenced paying more attention to native education, it was the mission schools that were used as the springboard for further development (Steenbrink, 1986: 1-7).

The turning point in the colonial government's attitude towards native education in the Dutch East Indies came in the second half of the 19th century as a resonance of liberal movements in Europe. In February 1848, electrified by so called "social Romanticism" (liberal movements) and triggered by the downfall of the King of France, Louis Philippe, pulsing waves of the democratic revolution that pounded Europe brought about the installation of a new

democratic constitution in the region (Stromberg, 1968: 72-8). The Liberal wing in the Netherlands led by Jan Rudolf Thorbecke quickly responded to the momentum by successfully shifting the course of fundamental law *(grondwetsherziening)* from conservatism towards liberalism. With this fundamental law of 1848, the Netherlands became a constitutional monarchy, and the Queen became responsible to the parliament. Consequently, the Dutch entered a legal era moving away from the rule of absolute authority to the rule of law, and as such, they gained rights to interfere in colonial matters through parliament. In the educational realm, the guarantee of the Fundamental Law of 1848, of free education to everyone in the Netherlands had a trickle down effect, which gradually led to a new attitude towards public education in the Netherlands Indies (Furnivall, 1944: 148-224; Simbolon, 1995: 126-27).

Supported by private entrepreneurs and a politically conscious Liberal middle class, this Liberal force became increasingly dissatisfied with financial administration, first in the homeland and then in the colony. This class originally aimed to wield power at home and, later, to have access to or control over colonial profits (Furnivall, 1944: 148). In the context of Liberal illusions of 'free cultivation', 'free labour', and 'individual possession', to assume control over colonial profits meant urging the colonial government to secure private capital in obtaining land, labour and opportunities to run new businesses or plantations. This push was issued in the passing of Agrarian Law and Sugar Law of 1870, which guaranteed property rights and the operation of private enterprise. This achievement was accelerated by the improvements in communications: telegraphy, opened to the public in 1856; a modern postal service, inaugurated in 1862; railway installation and high seas steamers in 1867; and the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 (Furnivall, 1944: 174-75).

The shift towards a liberal economy in fact necessitated not only institutional reforms but also infrastructural support. Private enterprises/planters demanded irrigation for their fields, railways for their produce and mobilisation, medical facilities for their families and their coolies, schools and vocational training for their children, subordinates and staff, and so forth. This, in turn, called for state responsibility in providing such needs. In this respect, the enhancement of the government bureaucracy was necessary. With regard to this point, it is worth noting that unlike in British India with its tradition of direct administration and disregard, at

least in theory, of racial differences, in the Netherlands Indies the practice of administration was characterised by the presence of a dual system that combined direct and indirect rules and deliberately maintained racial segregation. Thus, alongside the European Civil Service there was a Native Civil Service (Furnivall, 1944: 175, 251). With the pressure from the Liberal interests, both administrative corps had to improve their capacity and recruit a large number of skilled labourers. This in turn urged the colonial government to pay more attention to education (Simbolon (1995: 143-215).

Due to the very nature of the colonial's worldview, education posed a dilemma. On one hand, it was important to underpin the political economy of industrialisation and bureaucratisation. On the other hand it was a potential menace to the "mystique" of colonial superiority. From the very beginning, the Dutch were quite aware of the inadequacy of the repressive state apparatus in maintaining total control of the vast archipelago, given the limited numbers in the colonial army. To compensate for this deficiency, "hegemonic" (symbolic) weapons in Gramsci's sense were needed to construct the moral authority that positioned the civilised European above the native. This included the preservation of segregation and differences in terms of ethnicity, culture and language. The colonised subjects were made aware of this mythical distinction between, what Sutan Sjahrir (one of the native leaders) once called, "those who suffer from megalomania and those who suffer from inferiority complexes" in order to make Dutch-dominated rule somewhat easier. According to H.M.J. Maier (1993: 41), the myth of the "white race" that the colonial administration had been successfully preaching since the last part of the 19th century was the myth of Dutch *zakelijkheid*. In Benedict Anderson's words (1966: 17), this term can be described as: "a mystique of innate racial superiority, near-magical efficiency and the arcana of science. This myth was perhaps the most important single feature of Dutch colonial rule and allowed the Dutch to maintain total control of the vast archipelago with a colonial army of less than 40,000 men."

To come to terms with this dilemma, the colonial administration could do nothing but base education on ethnic lines of segregation. No matter that the Liberal revolution in the homeland called for the "rule of law" and "equality before the law", this was not the case with Liberal policy towards the Dutch East Indies. Based on article 6 of *the Algemeene Bepalingen van Wetgeving*

voor Nederlandsch Indië (General Rules of Law Enactment for the Netherlands Indies) of 1848, the people of Dutch East Indies were classified into different categories. Firstly, the Europeans and those who were officially treated as equal to the Europeans—that is all Christian Indigenous people *(Boemipoetera)*. Secondly, the *Boemipoetera* and those who were officially treated as equal to the Boemipoetera—that is Arab, Moor, Chinese, and all Muslim believers and other worshippers (Simbolon, 1995:128:29).[7] In practice, this classification was even more complicated. There were several substratums in each social category. Within the group theoretically assumed as being equal to the European, there were likely several levels of hierarchy: the full-blooded Europeans were at the top, the Eurasians *(Indos)* in the middle and the indigenous Christians at the bottom. A similar situation prevailed in the Boemipoetera group in respect to the individual's closeness to symbols of political power and authority. The hierarchy ranged from the gentry (higher *priyayi*, aristocrat); servants of leading European and Boemipoetera families; lesser *priyayis* or lower level civil servants, and well-to-do families; and finally, peasants, petty traders and other commoners (Van Niel, 1970: 22). In following these lines of segregation, the nature of early policies on education in the Dutch East Indies was anti-assimilation, elitist and dualistic in character (Kartodirdjo, 1991: 338).

The Liberal force in the Netherlands began to influence colonial attitudes towards native education in around the second half of the nineteenth century. The Organic Law of 1854 was put into effect, imposing responsibility for native education on the colonial government, and in accordance with the Law, a Department of Education was set up in 1867. Under the influence of the Liberal forces the school system was designed along lines of hierarchical status. At the beginning and the top, the aforementioned prototype of the European primary school was reorganised into a seven-year primary school—offering instruction in Dutch and teaching other European languages—and was popularly known as the *Europeesche Lagere School* (ELS). Originally, this school was destined exclusively for European children (or those with equal status to Europeans). After 1864, however, in line with colonial efforts to incorporate the historic ruling class (*priyayi*) into the colonial sphere of influence,[8] this school was made accessible to a select few from the very elite of the indigenous community. Furthermore, after 1891 access to ELS was also given to "qualified"

descendants of the wealthy. The non-Christian native attendance in these European elementary schools steadily increased from nearly 400 students in 1883, to 762 in 1898, and it rose to 1,870 in 1900 (Sutherland, 1979: 46; Van der Veur, 1969: 1).

Next, to meet the needs of the indigenous Christians (many of whom were soldiers in the colonial army), particularly in Ambon, and elsewhere of missionary enclaves, the government set up the so-called *Speciale School* (Special School). Embarking on the reorganisation of mission schools, this school emulated the curricula of the ELS (Van der Veur, 1969: 2).

In the final stage the government established schools for the *Boemipoetera*. In 1849 there was an experiment of running two elementary vernacular schools and in 1852 the number of these schools rose to 15. Using the vernacular language, these new schools were designed originally to prepare the natives of *priyayi* origin for the colonial administrative service, in line with an attempt to restrict native people from entering the ELS (Furnivall, 1944: 219; Van der Veur, 1969: 1). The school arrangement reflected Governor General Jan Jacob Rochussen's (1845-51) attitude of remaining consistent with the old colonial policy, to ensure the *Boemipoetera* continued with their own customs and to make the languages of the colonial and the colonised people constantly separate and independently categorised (Maier, 1993: 49). In fact, children of the *priyayi* favoured the schools offering instruction in the Dutch language due to better career and status prospects. To respond to such a demand two types of elementary schools for native East Indians were introduced in 1893: the *Eerste Klasse* (First Class Native school) and the *Tweede Klasse* (Second Class Native school). The first one was designed for the children from *priyayi* and well-to-do families, where Dutch language was taught in early years and used as the medium of instruction in the final year. The second one was for the children of the general population and did not offer Dutch language lessons (Ricklefs, 1993: 158; Van der Veur, 1969: 1-2).

Whereas the development of the primary school system improved under liberalism, this was not yet the case with the secondary schools. There was no single public middle school until 1850 (Furnivall, 1944: 212). At the end of the 19th century there were only three general secondary schools in Java, which were well known as Hoogere Burger Schools (HBS, Higher middle-class schools). One was the Gymnasium Willem III in Batavia (opened

1860), and others were established in Surabaya (1875) and Semarang (1877). These schools were identical to high schools in the Netherlands. Not only did they offer instruction in Dutch, they also used a strict and high standard curriculum equal to that of schools in Europe, so that the failure rate (even among Dutch students) was high. Thus, they were intended almost exclusively for the European (or equal) children. Only a handful of Boemipoetera were allowed to attend these schools, their total number in 1890 being no more than 5 pupils (Sutherland, 1979: 46; Van der Veur, 1969: 4-5; Ricklefs, 1993: 158).

While the European school system remained highly biased towards the Europeans and the higher *priyayi*, the access of the lower classes to better education was made possible by loopholes in the discriminatory colonial policy itself. As the expansion of the liberal bureaucracy necessitated the support of technical staff, the government decided to establish *vakscholen* (vocational schools). The shortage of qualified teachers created a demand for a native teacher-training school *(kweekschool)*, which was initially established in Surakarta in 1851/52 with several others following in Java and other areas, especially after 1870. The enhancement of government health and hygiene services necessitated semi-skilled medical workers. Thus, the medical training that had begun in 1822 with courses for government vaccinators was developed in 1851 into the so-called *'Dokter-Djawa'* (native paramedical) school in Menteng (Jakarta).[9] Meanwhile, the need for a skilled native civil service encouraged the government to establish the *Hoofdenscholen* (Chiefs' Schools) popularly called 'Sekolah Radja' (school for the native nobility), which came into existence in 1879 in Bandung, Magelang and Probolinggo. This type of school was initially planned for the sons of chiefs and other prosperous natives, to prepare them for the new bureaucratic style of the native administration.[10] In fact, in general the children of the higher *priyayi* did not regard teaching and vaccinating as prestigious or promising careers. Therefore, they favoured the Chiefs' School and were hardly interested in the teacher-training and *Dokter-Djawa* schools. To attract enrolments to the latter schools, the government began to offer incentives such as scholarships and promises of governmental status. At the *Dokter-Djawa* school, a special arrangement (especially after 1891) was made to allow youngsters expressing an interest in this school to obtain entry into the ELS free of charge. Many of those students came from lesser *priyayi* origin, and even frequently came from merchant and village families (Van Niel, 1970: 28, 51).

On the Genesis of the '*Kemadjoean*' (Progress)-Oriented Native Elite

Towards the end of the 19th century, the impact of Liberal education on the genesis of a new East Indies elite was evident. Graduates from the missionary, European and Native public schools, and especially vocational schools produced the prototype of the *homines novi* of civil servants and intelligentsia of the 20th century. Although graduates of the vocational schools were often not descended from the higher *priyayi* families, their elevation to the status of public servants in the colonial administration granted them the aura of *priyayi* (new *priyayi*) of some standing in the eyes of the East Indies people. Meanwhile, for those who were already of *priyayi* status, the acquisition of this new qualification strengthened their position within the *priyayi* group. For a few of them, however, the old-fashioned *priyayi* might have lost their "magic", for as new professionals they became obsessed with the personal and social prestige attached to new roles in the service of the modern colonial bureaucracy (Van Niel, 1970: 29).

For this rudimentary intelligentsia, obtaining these new roles and moving from the edge of the colonial as well as the feudal world into the whirl of modern bureaucratic machinery meant changing the "life-world". Educational cultivation seemed to have drawn them into the process of 'vicarious learning' resulting in a sort of self-reflexive power to measure how far they had stepped forward compared to the achievements of the "others". What seemed to be state of the art human achievements of the time were modern techniques and new industrial enterprises brought into the East Indies as a by-product of the liberal economy. These were exemplified with the introduction of more elaborate and innovative communication systems such as new shipping technology, railways, telephones, telegraphs, post offices, a printing industry and newspapers. The introduction of such a modern communication system was concomitant with the growth of urban centres and a metropolitan super-culture signalled by the expansion of industries, banks, extension services, and warehouses containing imported items from centres of the European capitalist world (Adam, 1995: 79; Shiraishi, 1990: 27; Geertz, 1963).

In the face of such astonishing modern phenomena the *homines novi* were fascinated and accepted them as the barometer of the *kemadjoean* (progress) that they had to achieve. In this trajectory of progress, the achievements of the "others" were simply incom-

mensurable. The Europeans as wealthy planters and newly emerging bourgeoisie of the urban centres had of course been well exposed to modern education, new media, luxurious properties, carriages, and 'civilised' social clubs. Even the Chinese, because of their better economic conditions due to their position as the middlemen in commercial transactions and the dominant power in the retail trade as well as their exposure to missionary schools, moved forward along this trajectory. This was signified by their remarkable achievements in the realms of press, education and associations.

Under such historical conditions the issue of how to catch up with the *kemadjoean* (progress) became the dominant discourse of this emerging intelligentsia. For them, *kemadjoean* meant the ideal loftiness of one's social status, whether as an individual or as an imagined community, encompassing many other things: educational improvement, modernisation (widely associated with Westernisation), respectability, and success in life. As a measure of the obsession with *kemadjoean*, Dutch words, as the icon of the progress itself, were increasingly used in the daily conversation of the enlightened minorities. Thus, to use Shiraishi's depiction (1990: 27), "the words signifying progress—such as *vooruitgang* (advance), *opheffing* (uplifting), *ontwikkeling* (development), and *opvoeding* (upbringing)—embellished the language of the day together with *bevordering van welvaart* (promotion of welfare)." It is worth noting that the proliferation of this discourse was made possible by the embryonic public sphere of the intelligentsia in the form of the foreign-owned vernacular press and the Western-inspired and localised social clubs.

Following the printing activities of missionaries and the VOC since the early 17th century, as well as the emergence of "white papers"—from the appearance of the first printed newspaper, *Bataviasche Nouvelles*, in 1744 through to the inception of liberalism (around 1854)[11] - the liberal force brought about a new stage in these activities by encouraging the development of vernacular newspapers and periodicals. From 1854 until 1860 several vernacular presses owned and edited by the Dutch were established. These were the high Javanese-language weekly *Bromartani* in Surakarta (1855-1857) and *Poespitamantjawarna* in Surabaya (1855), the first (low) Malay-language Newspaper *Soerat Kabar Bahasa Melaijoe* in Surabaya (1856), the first (high) Malay-periodical *Bintang Oetara* printed in Rotterdam but circulated in the East Indies (1856-

1857), and the (low) Malay-language Newspaper *Soerat Chabar Betawie* in Jakarta (1858). Between 1860 and 1880, parallel to the expansion of the liberal economy and the growth of literate people, the number of vernacular newspapers and periodicals increased, with most of them using low Malay.[12] During this period, although the owners of the presses continued to be Dutch and Eurasian, there were already a few Chinese editors (journalists).[13] From 1880 until the end of the century, the Chinese and then native editors (journalists) [14] became more dominant and the fully-fledged representation of the Chinese press[15] appeared (Surjomihardjo, 1980: 43-4; Adam, 1995: 16-78).

The genesis of the vernacular press in the East Indies represented a centrifugal force that deviated from the mainstream centripetal force of colonial policy. The wave of liberal economy accompanied by the expansion of the colonial administration, educational institutions, literacy and printing activities was conducive to discursive uniformity and standardisation. Due to the very nature of the dualistic approach of Dutch colonial rule, the standardisation of language had to be translated into a number of different lines of action. For the European Civil Service and European school system the government had to introduce the "real" and "correct" Dutch language. Meanwhile, for the Native Civil Service, the Dutch officials dealing with this corps and for the vernacular school system, the government had to standardise the most widely used vernacular languages, Malay and Javanese; but from 1860 onwards the main focus was on Malay. During the second half of the 19th century the Dutch invented and scientificised the 'real' and 'original' Malay by selecting and standardising 'high Malay' (the language of the Malay heartland of the east coast of Sumatra [Riau], the Peninsula [Malaka, Johore], and the west-coast of Kalimantan) to be promoted for formal communications. In contrast to this policy, the kind of Malay language that was widely used in cities of the coastal areas — where most modern commercial and governmental activities were run and most of the Europeans were living — was *pasar*/bazaar Malay (low Malay). This spoken form of Malay, in Maier's view, could be called "pidgin", or a "simple linguistic structure, almost no redundancy, without a clear standard, but sufficient for communication between people who had a better knowledge of another language" (Maier, 1993: 46-7). In fact, it was this kind of language that was the springboard of the vernacular press.

When the liberal economy reached the press sector, considerations about the potential market and the perceived simplicity and flexibility of the low Malay meant that this language gradually became the major medium of journalism.[16] The potential readers of the low Malay vernacular newspapers and periodicals ranged from European merchants, soldiers and missionaries who had used this kind of language in their contacts with the indigenous population, the growing number of literate Chinese familiar with Sino-Malay, through to the emerging new group of literate Boemipoetera who had long been exposed to the Malay language[17]. Surprisingly enough, it was through this subaltern 'low' code that interest in '*kemadjoean*' and the native political consciousness finally found its medium of articulation.

Words used to name the vernacular press from 1854-1900 seemed to reflect the emergence of a liminal space in which the old and the new worlds, as well as multi-layers of consciousness and interests interchanged without a common political orientation. First of all, it was commonplace to use such the words *kabar, chabar, pewarta, berita* (news), *bentara* (herald), *penghentar* (medium), *selompret* (trumpet), *courant* (newspapers). This likely indicated the liberal economic worldview in which the press was simply regarded as a medium for information, generally produced by private enterprises for the sake of economic interests, without reference to any particular collective identity. Secondly, the local-territorial signifiers such as Betawie, Semarang, Melajoe, Soerabaja, Menangkabau, Sumatra, Prajangan, and Djawi frequently emerged, possibly to reflect the dominance of the provincial outlook and orientation of the press. Thirdly, the myths of the past such as *Batara-Indra* (Indian legends), *primbon* (divining manuals) and various other Javanese archaic literary symbols were still used, seemingly to indicate the continuing presence of the previous cosmology. Finally, symbols of enlightenment, such *bintang* (star), *matahari* (sun), *tjahaja, palita, sinar* (lights) and *soeloeh* (torch) together with professional codes such as *pengadjar* (teacher), *soldadoe* (army) and *pengadilan* (court) were widely used, possibly to represent the obsession with the new orientation: *kemadjoean*.

The shift towards *kemadjoean*-oriented press was initially driven by the logic of capitalism itself. With the proliferation of the vernacular press, the competition to win subscribers became fierce. This was especially the case when the *peranakan* Chinese began to possess their own press, inducing the Chinese readers to pull away

from their former Dutch/Eurasian counterparts. In the face of this new challenge more serious efforts were made by the Dutch/Eurasian-owned press to attract native subscribers. In this respect, the press could not only take care of commercial interests but could also cater for the aspirations of the emerging intelligentsia.

For those who were preoccupied with the idea of *kemadjoean*, their core aspirations reflected the gap between the rising expectations in terms of the elevation of their self-esteem and the actual constraints they had to face. The major constraint they felt, as reflected in the vernacular press, was the imbalance between the desire for schooling and the real shortage of schools. The fact that until 1882, there were only about 300 schools in Java, and no more than 400 in the outer provinces with the total number of students being no more than 40,000 (Furnivall, 1944: 220) seemed to be the backdrop that instigated a call for government attention. Numerous letters from native readers were sent to the press complaining that the government was not providing enough chances for native children. In edition, the press also frequently raised issues concerning the poor condition of pupils' food, hygiene and conscientiousness in their schoolwork. Graduates of the native teacher-training schools spearheaded this criticism. Their disparagement was reflected especially in educational journals published as a result of the growing interest in native education, such as *Soeloeh Pengadjar* (The Teachers' Torch) in Probolinggo (which first appeared in 1887) and *Taman Pengadjar* (Teachers' Garden) in Semarang (1899-1914). These journals played a significant role in articulating the native teachers' aspirations for the alleviation of discrimination in the provision of education, the restoration of teaching the Dutch language in the native teacher-training schools and making the language available to all native children.

In addition criticising government policy, the vernacular press also reflected covert tensions and crises in the gestation phase of the new intelligentsia's constitution. The emerging intelligentsia, nurtured in the western education system, living in big new cities, using sprinklings of Dutch in daily conversation and adopting a kind of western lifestyle, were likely to be out of place in the *habitus* of their elder aristocrats. Meanwhile, in the eyes of the older generation of the *priyayi* the professionals were nothing but newcomers who needed recognition and acceptance by the traditional establishment. In this regard, they were expected to adopt the lifestyle and hierarchical order of the 'feudal' *priyayi*, which

meant preserving *hormat* (respect) towards the old (higher) aristocrats (Kartodirdjo, 1991: 341-42). Moreover, the educational qualifications of the new intelligentsia that were superior to those of the traditional aristocrats often meant that the European administration dealt directly with them, bypassing the traditional hierarchy and procedures (Van Neil, 1970: 29).

This all led to an envious relationship between the old aristocrats and the new professionals. *Selompret Melajoe*, No. 143-155 (November 30-December 28, 1899), for instance, carried a complaint from the Regent of Demak, Raden Mas Adipati Ario Hadi Ningrat, who begged the government to prioritise the improvement of education for the children of Bupati (Regents) and reminded them that the time was not yet right for appointing non-(higher) aristocrats to high bureaucratic posts. On the other hand, *Taman Pengadjar* No. 4 (October 15, 1899) ran an article criticising the newly emerging intelligentsia for what they considered to be the humiliating practices of traditional *hormat* (respect) towards the upper *priyayi*.[18]

This emerging intelligentsia was by no means monophonic. Although most of them came from the *priyayi* circle, there was a covert tension between those derived from the lesser *priyayi* and those from the higher one. Descendants of the lesser *priyayi* who could not achieve high positions in the traditional status hierarchy were in fact still unable to wield the same power in the modern sector of the rationalised bureaucratic structure. While most of the children of the higher *priyayi* were favoured for admission to the Chiefs' schools and ensured of a secure career and of having better status and salary, children of the lesser *priyayi* could only choose other vocational schools, which were usually disfavoured by the former and less promising in terms of prestige and salary. The lesser *priyayi* were unhappy with such a dual-system, regarding it as a system of favouritism, and publicly criticised it in the press of the time.[19] This meant that the ongoing discordant relationship between the emerging intelligentsia and the old aristocracy coalesced with the internal friction amongst the intelligentsia, in which descendants of the higher *priyayi* tended to side with the old aristocrats.

Afterwards, in echoing the discourse of *kemadjoean* that was reflected in and ignited by the vernacular press, localised native interest clubs emerged as alternative spaces for action. Inspired by the existing Dutch and Chinese clubs, these clubs revolved

around the issue of *kemadjoean,* either as spaces for displaying the new modern lifestyle or for improving the knowledge and education of their members. These clubs emerged within the communities of higher *priyayi* and teachers. The first club that seems to have been recorded by the vernacular press was called 'Mangkoesoemitro', formed by teachers in Semarang in 1882. Next, similar clubs appeared within the *priyayi* milieu in Semarang, such as *Langen Samitro* (est. 1888) and Langen Darmodjojo (est. 1891). From Semarang, these associations spread out to other cities such *Medan Perdamian* in Padang, *Perkumpulan Sukamanah* in Batavia, *Abi Projo* in Surakarta, and *Langen Hardjo* in Surabaya. The most important club at the end of the century emerged among the teacher communities and was called the 'Mufakat Guru' (Teachers' Discussion Group). This kind of club appeared in various districts and residencies in Java. The 'Mufakat Guru' basically aimed "to pave the way for teacher unity and encourage discussion of problems of common professional interest such as teaching, matters relating to pupils, and school administration. Issues such as education for girls and ways to encourage parents to send their children to school were also discussed at meetings held by the Mufakat Guru" (Adam (1995: 89).

Until the end of the century the role of teachers in promoting the discourse of *kemadjoean* was very conspicuous, for at least two reasons. The teaching profession at this juncture mainly consisted of educated natives, and as educators they were most highly imbued with a kind of obligation to enlighten their fellow countrymen. Additionally, the fact that this profession was less respected compared to administrative positions might have stimulated them to be vocal about '*kemadjoean*' in order to construct a new measurement of social privilege. Such a conspicuous role for teachers suggests that the "organic intellectuals"[20]of the germinal intelligentsia in the 19th century mainly consisted of teachers.

It is worth noting, however, that until the end of the century this embryonic stratum of intelligentsia did not form a distinct collective entity in its own right. Its presence remained hidden under the shadow of the old aristocracy. This was not only because their number was still limited, but also because they had not yet discovered a special "code" to represent a collective identity that could incorporate the emerging intelligentsia from diverse sectors into a particular community. This factor, along with the restricted social mobility as well as the limited number and circu-

lation of the trans-border media, confined the voices and movements of the *kemadjoean* to a narrow and localised sphere of influence. This, however, was only an accidental circumstance liable to be changed in the near future. By the early 20th century, these *homines novi* together with all other western educated people born in the 19th century constituted the first generation of the new stratum of East Indies intelligentsia.

On the Continuity of Historical Islam

The deepening penetration of colonialism and capitalism by no means led to the extinction of the Islamic schools. Although the Dutch seizure of power of the coastal trading activities had devastated the socio-economic underpinnings of Islamic development in its early habitat (coastal cities), centres of Islamic studies continued to survive by moving towards the hinterlands and inland areas where the agrarian networks of the *pesantren*-based *'ulamā'* and *Ṣūfī* brotherhoods, especially in Java, took over the role of Islamic teaching (Lombard, 1996b: 124-48).

With the colonial-state's lack of interest in native education until the first half of the century, traditional Islamic schools remained as the major educational institutions of the Netherlands East Indies. When the liberal economic forces necessitated more attention towards native education, the contradictory and discriminatory colonial policies towards Islam as well as the distrust of the *santri* (the devout Muslim) community towards western institutions provided new rationales for the Islamic institutions to keep growing.

Colonial-state policy towards Islamic education was ambiguous. This reflected the tension between the Dutch desire to avoid excessive involvement with native religious matters and the residue of unpleasant encounters of Christian and Muslim in the past; as well as the tension between a secular outlook and the will to curtail potential Islamic threats by supporting Christian missions. Such tensions pushed the politics of 'neutrality' towards Islam onto shaky ground. In the very beginning Islam was misunderstood by the Dutch as having an ecclesiastical structure like that of Christianity, so that Muslim travel to the centre of the Islamic world (Middle East) or even the spatial mobility of the religious teachers within the country should be restricted to prevent vertical and horizontal integration of what they called the Islamic priests. Thus, in 1664 the VOC had already restricted the practice of *ḥajj* and in

1810 Governor-General Herman Willem Daendels (1808-11) issued a decree ordering the kyai (religious teachers) to have a passport for travelling within the NEI (Suminto, 1996: 8: Dhofier, 1982: 10). With the emergence of the serial native insurrections led by returned *haji* and local religious scholars, the restriction on the practice of *hajj* and religious educational activities found a new rationale.

Initially, the colonial government attempted to be consistent with their policy to ensure the Boemipoetera continued their own traditional institutions. This, for instance, was reflected in Governor General G. A. G. Ph. van der Capellen's (1816-26) instruction to the Residents in 1819 to investigate the possibility of improving traditional native education. Unfortunately, this effort resulted in no more than official reports on the state of the *pesantren* (Steenbrink, 1984: 159; 1986: 159).

When the liberal forces touched the educational sector, J.A. van der Chijs, who was appointed the first colonial officer to develop native education, conducted research in 1867 particularly in Minahasa and Maluku. This research resulted in a policy that in Christian territories the government would gradually improve and promote Christian missionary schools by expanding the teaching of "secular" subjects. In the Islamic territories, however, his fear (mixed with disdain) towards Islam led to the decision that the government would only promote the Dutch-type public schools for the elite indigenous people in order to protect the Dutch from what he called the 'Islamic volcano' (Steenbrink, 1984: 160-1; Soekadri, 1979: 80).

Whilst the Christian schools became the springboard for the development of public schools this was not the case for the traditional Islamic schools. In contrast to the policy of the British-Malaya where the government decided to develop afternoon schools for Qur'ānic teaching (Roff, 1967: 26), the idea of developing Islamic schools was rejected in the NEI. In 1888 the Dutch colonial minister refused to subsidise Islamic schools because the Governor General did not want to spend state finances on developing an education system that might ultimately challenge Dutch authority (Steenbrink, 1986: 6-7). This policy of excluding the Islamic school system was in fact a supplement to earlier favouritism with the government schools' access allocation that gave priority to the children of *priyayi* and non-Muslims rather than to devout Muslim families.

In the face of this policy, from the late 19th century onward there was a dual system of education in the NEI in which the Islamic education system was separated from the Dutch education system. And this was continued in post-colonial Indonesia, with a "secular" education system under the Ministry of Education and Culture and an Islamic education system under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Thus, the general education system in Indonesia did not emerge as a result of its adaptation to traditional Islamic education. On the contrary, the Islamic education system as it appears now is the result of a gradual transformation from a traditional system, in order to respond to challenges from the general education system (Steenbrink, 1986: 7).

The exclusion of traditional Islamic schools by the colonial education system was reciprocated by the general negative attitude of the devout Muslim community towards Western institutions. After a series of bloody native insurrections[21] that involved *'ulamā'* and their disciples, the *santri* community was forced to develop a kind of "outsider" mentality, creating a symbolic boundary with the life-world of what they called the 'white infidels'. A vivid example of such a mindset was expressed by the dictum circulated within the milieu of the Acehnese religious community: "Those who write in the Latin alphabet will find their hand cut off the day after, those who follow the Dutch way belong to the infidels" (Alfian, 1987: 204).

Being obstructed from or reluctant to attend government schools, the most feasible choice for devout Muslim families until the late 19th century was to attend historic traditional Islamic schools. The number of such schools, based on the 1831 government report on native educational institutions in Java, was around 1, 853 with about 16,556 students. According to Van der Chijs, most of these schools, however, taught the students no more than Qur'ānic reading with only a small number of them learning Arabic writing (Dhofier, 1982: 35). From 1873, the Office of Native Educational Inspection (established by J. A. Van der Chijs) produced annual reports on the number of Islamic schools and students. Based on these reports the number of *pesantren* was reported as averaging around 20-25,000, while the number of students was about 300,000. This figure, however, may be unreliable since some regions did not report the number of teachers and students for several years, while other regions repeatedly reported the same figure for a number of years. Furthermore, the Dutch reports some-

times described the activities of the Islamic schools as declining and sometimes as increasing. These different conclusions were the result of different objectives. The former conclusion was intended to prove that the source of potential Islamic disobedience was successfully under government control, while the latter one was intended to convince the central government of the continuing reality of the Islamic threat (Steenbrink, 1984: 161).

Although the official statistics on the development of traditional Islamic schools are questionable it is safe to say that the schools grew significantly throughout the century. This is especially true considering that most of the outstanding *pesantrens* that remain today in East and Central Java were established in the 19th century. For example, *pesantren* Termas in Pacitan (est. 1823); *pesantren* Jampes and Bendo in Kediri and Pelangitan in Babat (est. 1855); *pesantren* Tegalsari in Semarang (est. 1870); *pesantren* Tebuireng in Jombang (est. 1899); as well as *pesantren* Probolinggo, Bangkalan (Madura), Siwalan Panji (Sidoarjo) and several other *pesantrens* in Jombang such as Ngedang, Keras, Tambak Beras, Den Anyar, Rejoso, Peterongan, Sambong, Sukopuro, Watu Galuh were founded in the 19th century (Soekadri, 1979: 19; Dhofier, 1982: 2).

The growing number of traditional Islamic schools combined with the maintenance of intellectual and emotional links between teachers *(kyai)* and pupils *(santri)* as well as informal contacts among teachers, *santri* and *pesantren* across regions, traditional Islamic networks for the cultural containment of historical Islam emerged. Thus, despite apparent colonial discrimination and restrictions on Islamic teachings, in 1890 Snouck Hurgronje revealed information on the continuing increase of the *pesantren* (Benda, 1958: 27). If twenty years later he celebrated early signs of Western schools winning against their Islamic counterparts, he possibly underestimated the ongoing transformation of the Islamic schools and Islamic intellectuals in order to cope with the changing environment.

In addition to the development of the traditional schools, court-affiliated Islamic learning and literature continued to survive. Although the abolition of a number of sultanates such as Palembang (1820), Banjarmasin (1860) and Aceh (after 1873) had constricted the space for the development of Islamic learning and literature within the milieu of the court, the remaining sultanates continued to produce monumental achievements. To provide examples of this achievement we may refer to what happened in the royal capitals of Riau (Sumatra) and Surakarta (Java). With the death of

Raja Haji when fighting against the Dutch at Melaka in 1784, the Bugis sultanate in Riau was revived by his descendants[22] in the tiny island of Penyengat and reached its golden age at the end of the century, until its abolition in 1913. Towards the latter part of the century the sultanate became a centre of Islamic scholarship in the region, ruled by religious and learned sultans. During this period an experiment was conducted, with the implementation of al-Gazālī's description of the ideal ruler in *Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk*—which idealised the interdependence of the sultan, the *imām* and the *'ulamā'*. The influence of 'Islamic reformism' began to appear during the reign of Raja Ali (1844-1857), as indicated by the strict attitude of the sultanate towards the practice of Islam. The Naqsybandiyyah *ṭarīqah* became popular with all princes interested in studying mysticism. Furthermore, in the early 1880s an Islamic study club, the *Rusydiyah Club*, was established, equipped with library and printing press to print members' works and religious texts (Matheson, 1989). Last but not least, the manuscript-based Islamic (inspired) literature patronised by the royal court continued to flourish. The most influential man of letters in this sultanate was Raja Ali Haji (1809-1870). Besides being a prolific writer who wrote several books and treatises such as the well-known *Tuhfat al-Nafīs* (1866) on the history of Riau and *Thamarat al-Muhimmah* (1857) on the correct conduct of the ruler, he was also highly regarded as a religious scholar, who actively recruited Islamic teachers for Riau, as well as being an adviser for the royal family on points of Islamic doctrine (Andaya & Matheson, 1979: 112-3).

In Java, particularly in the royal capital of Surakarta, the tendency to harmonise Islamic orthodoxy with traditional Javanese mysticism in court-based literature, which had been the most important and popular theme since the time of Yasadipura I in the 18th century, continued at least until the early decades of the 19th century. From the late 18th century, or the last years of the reign of Pakubuwana III (r. 1749-88), awareness amongst the Javanese court-poets of the decline of the Surakarta kingdom's power on the one hand, and the growing influence of Muslim orthodoxy outside the court on the other hand, brought about a particular literary genre expressing the will to conciliate and harmonise the two conflicting religious currents, as reflected in *Serat Cabolek* and *Serat Dewa Ruci* (Soebardi, 1971: 349). In the early decades of the 19th century this tendency continued to dominate literary works such as in *Serat Centini*

(the book of *Centini*) written in 1815.[23] According to Soebardi (1971: 341), a long description of this book on *pesantren* education should best be interpreted as "an indication of the intention of its authors to stress the importance of the *sharī'at* as prescribed by the holy-book and the traditions of the prophet, for Shaikh Among Raga was presented as a religious teacher who highly valued the *sharī'at*." In countering Th. Pigeaud and G. W. J. Drewes' thesis that the *Serat Cntini* reflected the literary attachment to traditional Javanese mysticism, Steenbrink argues that what they described as "inherited religious concepts; time-honoured speculations, or traditional Javanese mysticism are actually a resemblance of the *Sūfī* doctrines of ar-Rānīrī, Ibn 'Arabī, al-Jilī and Shaṭṭāriyyah *ṭarīqah*" (Steenbrink, 1984: 205). The last man of letters in this literary genre was Raden Ngabei Ronggawarsita (1802-1873), the last great *pujangga* (court poet) of the Surakarta royal capital. Among the works attributed to him was the poem *Wedhatama* ('Exalted Wisdom') and *Serat Wirid Hidayat Jati* (Book of the Rightly Guided Recitation of God's Names), which teaches moral values in line with an attempt to emphasise the compatibility of Islamic Sufism and Javanese mysticism.

Beyond the milieu of the court, Islamic (inspired) literature[24] also sprang up in traditional Islamic schools and other new Islamic centres of literary production. In Java, examples of this were *Suluk Wujil* and *Serat Yusuf*, which emerged in the countryside, whilst in Sumatra and its surroundings it was represented by the growing number of *hikayat* (folktales) and *syair* (verses). Thanks to the help of the printing press, in the latter part of the century *syair*, such as *Syair Mekkah* and *Syair Hakikat*, became the most popular form of literature in the region (Day, 1983: 154-7; Proudfoot, 1993: 28-9).

Apart from the development of Islamic teaching and literature in the archipelago, learning in the Middle East, particularly at the Ḥaramayn (Mecca and Medina), was still considered by many devout Muslim families to be the best way of achieving high qualifications in Islamic studies. Among the Muslim community of the NEI there was a perception that however capable one might be in religious knowledge, without having studied for some years in the Ḥaramayn one could only be regarded as teacher without an authorised license (Seokadri, 1979: 33).

This perception seemed to be in tune with the worldwide Muslim tradition of knowledge transmission across generations. Per-

son to person transmission was at the heart of the transmission of Islamic knowledge. Muslim scholars all over the world travelled from one centre of learning to another, with the Ḥaramayn was the most desired final destination, to receive in person the reliable transmission of knowledge (Azra, 1994; Proudfoot, 1997: 167-8).

The influx of East Indies students into the Ḥaramayn that had been taking place since at least the 1500s continued to increase in accordance with the growing numbers of those undertaking the pilgrimage. For the *Jāwah* (all people of the Malay race) of the time, the pilgrimage to Mecca was intended not merely in order to visit the Holy City and the holy tombs but more importantly to rectify religious practices and knowledge. As C. Snouck Hurgronje's observed (1931: 220), "Older *Jāwah*, who settle here either for life or for some years, wish to devote their last days to religious practices on the pure soil: younger ones devote themselves to religious studies."

With the conspicuous involvement of *ḥājīs* in a series of native insurrections throughout the century, the colonial government in 1925, 1931 and 1959 issued various resolutions *(ordonnantie)* intended both to restrict the pilgrimage and to monitor the activities of the returned *ḥājī* (Dhofier, 1982: 11-2; Suminto, 1996: 10). These restrictions, however, did not discourage the Muslim desire to perform the *ḥajj*. Although impeded in their homeland, they were able to avoid these regulations by travelling to Singapore where British requirements were less stringent (Roff, 1967: 38). There were at least two reasons for increasing the numbers of those undertaking pilgrimage to Mecca. Technologically speaking, the introduction of the steamships in the previous decades, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the operation of profit-oriented private shipping companies assisted the pilgrim traffic. Psychologically, the deterioration of East Indies social life and the tightening control over religious activities following a series of native insurrections provided the impetus for the religious revival. As Sartono Kartodirdjo observed (1966: 141):

> "For several decades a large part of Java was swept by a religious revival that demonstrated a tremendous increase in religious activities, such as the observance of daily prayers, undertaking pilgrimages, furnishing traditional Muslim education for the young, establishing branches of tareqats, the widespread distribution of sermons, etc."

The religious revival, along with the growing Muslim awareness about the potential shortage of *'ulamā'* as many of them had

been killed in wars, provided additional motivation for wealthy religious families to send their sons to the centre of Islamic learning in the Middle East (Abaza, 1999: xvii-xviii). These factors led to the considerable increase in the number of pilgrims in the last decades of the century. While in the 1850s and 1860s, an average of approximately 1600 East Indies pilgrims travelled annually to Mecca, the number increased to 2600 in 1870s, jumped to 4600 in the 1880s, and reached over 7000 at the end of the century (Ricklefs, 1993: 130).

With the influx of the islands' pilgrims to Mecca, the *Jāwah* colony (*Aṣḥāb al-Jāwiyyīn*) at the end of the century was the biggest and most active one in Mecca (Roff, 1970: 172). In the view of Hurgronje who stayed in Mecca in 1884/5:

> "There is scarcely any part of the Moslim world where the proportion between the number of the population and the yearly pilgrimages is as favourable to Mekka, as in the Malay Archipelago" (1931: 217).

In addition to the significant number of people, Hurgronje added (1931: 286), "the considerable number of Malay books printed from 1884 till now in Mekka bears witness to the importance of the *Jāwah* element in the Holy City."

The Islands of Java, Sumatra, Borneo and Moluccas were the most important sources of pilgrim traffic. Sumatra and the province of Banten (West Java), the regions that had been extensively pounded by the wave of wars and religious revival, delivered the largest percentage of pilgrims and students (Hurgronje, 1931: 229, 268-289).

The convergence of the diverse *Jāwah* people in the colony created a collective identity and consciousness of the unity of their Islamised race. This consciousness formed a sort of 'epistemic community' centred on outstanding *'ulamā'* whose reputation was recognized even by the local Arabs. Along with acting as religious counsellors for their fellow compatriots these *'ulamā'* produced religious works in both Arabic and Malay that became the main reference for Islamic thought in the archipelago (Roff, 1970: 172). Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 291) depicted this eloquently:

> "All other considerations as to consequences arising from the *Ḥajj* sink in comparison with the blooming *Jāwah* colony in Mecca; here lies the heart of religious life of the East-Indian Archipelago, and numerous arteries pump from thence fresh blood in ever accelerating tempo to the entire body of the Moslim populace of Indonesia".

Until the late 19th century the dominant ideology of the international *'ulamā'* networks in the Ḥaramayn was "Islamic Reformism". This ideology originated with the seventeenth and eighteenth century *'ulamā'* and *Ṣūfīs* who led the Muslim response to the social crisis in the Muslim world. Beginning in Arabia and Cairo and then spreading out to other parts of the Muslim territories, informal *'ulamā'* and *Ṣūfī* study groups espoused a reorganisation of Muslim communities and the reform of individual behaviour in terms of fundamental religious principles. This reform, as depicted by Ira M. Lapidus (1995: 563), called for "a purified version of Islamic belief and practice based on the study of the Qurān, ḥadīth, and law combined with *Ṣūfī* asceticism." In this regard, these reformers idealised the Prophet Muhammad as the perfect exemplary centre. As such they sought to "abolish saint worship and the more florid religious cults and ceremonies, and to dispel superstitious or magical beliefs and practice," while also opposing the tendency of native rulers of Muslim countries to collaborate with colonial infidels. The most radical version of this Islamic reformism was the Wahhābiyyah movement founded by Muḥammad b. Abd al-Wahhāb (1703-92), which assumed control over Mecca early in 1803. This movement inspired segments of the East Indies *'ulamā'* to apply a similar project in the region. It is said that elements of Wahhābiyyah teachings influenced a segment of the *'ulamā'* in West Sumatra, which resulted in religious conflicts between the reformist and conservative *'ulamā'*, eventuating in the Padri War (1821-1827). Beyond the Wahhābī influence, the wave of Islamic reformism that reached the archipelago provided the impetus for religious revival, as reflected in the shift of the *ṭarīqah* (mystical brotherhood) adherents from the ecstatic Shaṭṭāriyyah to the more *sharī'ah*-friendly Naqsybandiyyah and Qādiriyyah, and in the emergence of religio-political insurrections throughout the 19th century.

As part of the network of the Islamic epistemic community in the Ḥaramayn, the East Indies *'ulamā'* at the *Jāwah* colony could not escape from the dominant ideology of the time. In continuing the trajectory of the *'ulamā'* networks of the previous centuries, the East Indies *'ulamā'* who were important figures in the Ḥaramayn in this century were, among others, Shaikh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari (1710-1812), Shaikh Muhammad al-Nawawi al-Bantani (1815-98), and Shaikh Ahmad Khatib (1860-1916).[25] The influence of Islamic reformism is indicated by al-Banjari's correction of

the *qiblat* (direction of prayer) in several Jakarta mosques and his rejection of the teaching of *wihdat al-wujūd* (pantheism), practised by a particular *ṭarīqah* (*Ṣūfī* brotherhood) in Banjarmasin[26] (Steenbrink, 1984: 95-6). This was even clearer in the works and political attitude of al-Nawawi and Khatib.

Al-Nawawi's reputation as a doctor of divinity derived from his monumental work on the principal Shāfi'īte manual of Law. Born in Banten as the son of a district-*penghulu*, Omar ibn Arabi, he made the pilgrimage (with his other two brothers, Tamim and Ahmad) whilst quite young, after which he remained in Mecca for about three years. Shortly after he retuned home with rich "scientific" booty, he decided to return to the Holy City and to stay there permanently. His first teachers in Mecca were the leading *Jāwah 'ulamā'* from the previous generation, notably Khatib Sambas and Andulghani Bima, and then his real teachers were the Egyptian Yūsuf Sumbulawānī, Nahrāwī and Abd al-Ḥamīd Daghestānī (Hurgronje, 1931: 268-9).

During his life in Mecca he wrote no fewer than 20 learned Arabic works.[27] Some of his early works were published in the Cairo press, but he published most of his works in the newly established Meccan press that emerged in the last decade of the century (Hurgronje, 1931: 271). In the view of Hurgronje (1931: 270): "Under his inspiration, more and more Sundanese, Javanese, and Malays turn to the thorough study of Islam, and the politico-religious ideals of Islam gain, in their most highly developed form, increased circulation." Although he concentrated of literary works, he did not forget to express his anti-colonial sentiments. Hurgronje had something more to say on this subject: "The resurrection of the Banten sultanate, or of an independent Moslim state, in any other form, would be acclaimed by him joyously."

While Nawawi was celebrated for his erudition in religious knowledge, Shaikh Ahmad Khatib (1860-1916) deserves attention for his critical role as a "progenitor" of the upcoming generation of East Indies *'ulamā'*. Born in Kota Gedang, West Sumatra, his father (Abdul Latif Khatib) was a descendant of the aristocratic family whose occupation was *Djaksa Kepala* (chief of native legal official) of Padang, while his mother was the daughter of a well-known reformist *'ulamā'* of the Padri group, Tuanku nan Renceh (Steenbrink, 1984: 139). Born into an aristocratic family, the little Ahmad Khatib was able to attend the Dutch-sponsored primary school and then the native teacher-training school (most likely

unfinished) in Bukittinggi (Noer, 1980: 38). His stronger interest in Islamic studies, however, brought him to Mecca to study and then teach Islam there. Next, as a result of his marriage to the daughter of an influential and rich Arab merchant he was appointed as a religious leader and held the office of Shāfi'ī Imām at the Masjidil Haram (Abdullah, 1971: 7; Roff, 1967: 60).

During his life in Mecca he wrote some forty-nine books partly published in the Cairo press, particularly in his field of expertise, astronomy (Abdullah, *ibid*).[25] Under the influence of the ideology of 'Islamic reformism' he, along with al-Nawawi and other fellow *'ulamā'*, resited colonialism. He frequently depicted the Dutch as infidels who had poisoned Islam in the heart of its believers. In his view the relationship with the infidel colonials was the main reason for the waning Islamic spirit (Steenbrink, 1984: 146-7). His major contribution to the *Jāwah* epistemic community, however, lay in his position as the last great East Indies *'ulamā'* in the haramain from whom East Indian students from diverse socio-religious backgrounds and territories learned the dominant discourse and ideology of the previous generations of international *'ulamā'* networks in the haramain.

As the "last man standing" he functioned as a bridge between the old and new intellectual discourse, between so-called 'Islamic reformism' and 'Islamic modernism' (I will return to this point below). On the one hand, he was critical of the practice of cultic Sufism and what he perceived to be the distortion of Islam by local customs *(adat)*. On the other hand, he allowed his students to read the works of an outstanding Egyptian reformist-modernist *'ulamā'*, Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), in order not to follow, but to reject his idea of blending Islamic reformism and modernism—though this permission had the reverse impact and they were in fact influenced by 'Abduh. In such a liminal position he was able to perform as guru for both the upcoming generation of the reformist-modernist *'ulamā'* and the older conservative-traditionalist one. This is especially true when considering that several famous East Indies reformist-modernist *'ulamā'* of the twentieth century such as Mohd. Tahir b. Djalaluddin (the most notable editor of the celebrated reformist-modernist journal, *Al-Imam*), M. Djamil Djambek, Abdullah Ahmad, Abdul Karim Amrullah (Haji Rasul) and H. M. Thaib Umar (pioneers of the reformed schools in West Sumatra), Agus Salim (a central figure of Sarekat Islam and the forefather of Muslim intelligentsia movements), and Kyai Haji

Ahmad Dahlan (founder of the *Muhammadiyah* reformist-modernist association) of Yogyakarta; as well as the influential conservative-traditionalist *'ulamā'* such as Shaikh Sulaiman al-Rasuli of West Sumatra and even Kiyai Haji Hasyim Asy'ari (founder of the Nahdlatul Ulama conservative-traditionalist association) of East Java, were among his former students in the late 19th and early 20th century (Noer, 1980: 39).[29]

In addition to the endurance of the traditional Islamic schools and literature as well as the growing number of pilgrims and students in the Ḥaramayn, the Muslim adoption of the printing press both in the archipelago and in other parts of the Muslim World was also responsible for the development of Islam, particularly in terms of the increasing circulation of religious books throughout the archipelago. The aforementioned rudimentary printing activities of the missionaries and the VOC that emerged in the 17th century became more significant in the early 19th century as the Christian missions set up printing presses in Melaka, Penang, Singapore, Batavia, Bengkulu, Ambon and Kupang, along with the rise of privately owned printing presses and the emergence of privately printed newspapers. Triggered by this development and similar circumstances in other parts of the Muslim World, Muslim printing began to appear in the archipelago around the middle of the century.

At the outset, Muslim printing in the archipelago used the new lithographic printing, which resembled the successful technique used first in India and then in the Middle East (Proudfoot, 1997). In the early stages, the Muslim preference for lithography was based on the consideration that this technique could preserve the graceful (Arabic) script and style of the Muslim manuscript tradition. The first Indo-Malay Muslim book printed using this technique was a beautiful edition of the Qur'ān published in Palembang in 1848, possibly followed by the publication of the kitab *Sharf al-Anām* (The Best of Men), the Malay version of a well-loved text in praise of the prophet Muhammad, in Surabaya in 1853. Thenceforth, Muslim publishers expanded their activities to mass-produce books of religious knowledge (*kitāb*) and other literature such as *hikayat* (folktales) and *syair* (verses) published by personal cottage industries. Several other Muslim religious texts were printed in Java during the late 1850s and early 1860s, but the most important developments in Muslim printing for the rest of the century took place in Singapore, which since the 1860s had emerged

as the centre of the region's Muslim publishing activities and the first centre of Malay-language Muslim printing anywhere in the world.[30] Outside the archipelago, beginning in the 1880s, Malay-language Islamic literature was also published in other Muslim lands such as in Bombay, Cairo and Mecca (Proudfoot, 1993: 27; 1998: 46).

Meanwhile, following the trajectory of Indian Muslim printing, which had adopted lithography since at least early in the century, by mid-century printing activities using the same technique in Cairo and Istanbul had emerged, followed by others in Mecca, notably after 1883 (Proudfoot, 1997: 163-82). This development contributed to the considerable reproduction of the old religious manuscripts and the multiplication of new religious works, which with the opening of the Suez Canal in the 1869 enabled a growing influx of religious books into the archipelago.

On the "Islamic" Ruptures

Not with standing the continuous efficacy of historical Islam, the pounding waves of colonialism cum capitalism that increasingly overwhelmed the archipelago and other parts of the Muslim World brought about a number of ruptures in Islamic development. These ruptures undermined the foundations of the global Islamic solidarity and the role of traditional Islamic institutions, but also provided alternatives for creating a new face of Islam.

First of all, with control of the Indian Ocean trade passing from the Muslim empires (Ottoman, Mughal and Safavid) and Arabic speakers to European powerhouses and speakers, the Arabic language underwent a gradual demotion from its former position as a lingua franca, at least among the *clerisy* along the Indian Ocean, to become a purely religious language. The fall of Arabic as the language of the international Islamic community led to the vernacularisation of the symbolic universe of the archipelago's *clerisy*. Their interaction with other Muslims, even in Mecca, was now largely restricted to those who spoke Malay. As the global language of the Islamic community withered away the image of the *ummah* as a binding universal solidarity of all those who accepted the will of God as expressed in *sharī'ah* (the holy law) was, to borrow Anderson's words, "gradually fragmented, pluralized, and territorialized" (Anderson, 1991: 19; Jones, 1984).

Next, the deepening penetration of capitalism under the Liberal economic forces that reached the archipelago around the mid-

dle of the century brought with it an influx of foreign newcomers to the islands. The arrival of these strangers, notably the Chinese and Europeans,[31] had a significant impact on the development of vernacular language. The most salient impact was the growing popularisation of 'pidgin' *(bazaar* or low*)* Malay, which slowly became the first-learnt tongue of the growing number of inhabitants in the coastal cities of the archipelago (Maier, 1993: 47). In 1858 a well-known Indo-Malayan *literatus*, Raja Ali Haji, commented critically in the draft of the *Kitab Pengetahuan Bahasa* (Book of Linguistic Knowledge) upon the ways in which Malay life was changing: values were endangered by outside forces, customs were decaying, and language was becoming debased with the increasing prevalence of bazaar usage (Andaya and Matheson 1979: 110; Roff, 1967: 47). In his view, this was a dangerous situation, for the neglect of language would lead to the neglect of established traditions, which would inevitably destroy "the arrangement of the world and the kingdom, *kerajaan*" (Matheson, 1986: 6).

Such a complaint was not surprising, as in Indo-Malaya, as elsewhere, the language as noted by Roff had a "peculiarly intimate relationship with cultural identity, both as the most expressive vehicle for a society's beliefs, values, and sentiments—for its innermost spirit—and as a means of self-recognition" (1967: 46-7). For the Muslims of "the land below wind", high Malay had been the vehicle particularly for religious and philosophical, as well as historical and romantic, literature. It was partly in this language that the great Sumatran mystics of the late 16th and 17th centuries, such as Hamzah Fansuri, Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani, and Abdurrauf al-Sinkili and the Gujerat-born Nuruddin al-Raniri, wrote manuscripts for the benefit, said Hamzah, "of those without knowledge of Arabic and Persian" (Roff, 1967: 43; Azra, 1994).

The proliferation of bazaar Malay was eventually reinforced by the introduction of print-capitalism. Printing, as noticed by Lucien Febre and Henri-Jean Martin (1997: 319-32), tended to favour the development of literature written in the vernacular. With the emergence of the capitalist-driven printing press along with vernacular newspapers and periodicals in the second half of the century, bazaar Malay became widely used as the language of journalism and literature. This in turn enhanced the status of the language as a lingua franca of the archipelago.

The print technology brought with it a further social implication. With the arrival of the printing press there was a shift from

manual to mechanical book reproduction that inescapably entailed a change in what Terry Eagleton called (1976: 45) "the literary mode of production", followed by a change in the social position of the *literati* and in the social consciousness of society.

In the manuscript mode of production, book copying was costly, labour intensive and scarce. In such a situation, it was difficult for the author to make a living in the market by selling his books to a larger audience. This meant that manuscript reproduction could only be afforded by a handful of *literati* from the (devout) wealthy families, mostly under the patronage of the royal family or feudal lords. Of course, there was a market for and or commercialisation of manuscripts. Such a market-based relation, however, remained marginal to the primary relationship between writer and patron. Thus, in the manuscript mode of production concern for the welfare of poets and writers never went beyond the institution of patronage (Milner, 1996: 96: Auerbach; 1965: 242). In the traditional Islamic polity this explained the symbolic mutualism between the sultan and the Islamic *clerisy*. The sultan benefited from the religious legitimacy of the *clerisy*, while the *clerisy* acquired royal patronage for their welfare and works. With the introduction of the printing press (firstly lithography and then typography), book reproductions became easier, cheaper and abundant. Outside the court there now emerged alternative power centres for supporting the reproduction of books. Apart from the presence of colonial masters as new possible patrons, the most powerful supporting agents were now printing press owners, as mediators between writer and reader, through whom the authors could obtain a guarantee of possible commodity exchange for their work. Under the new mode of production the patronage system was drawn into the commodity relations that brought about historically unprecedented forms of highly individualised literary production and consumption. This resulted in the gradual disjunction of the Islamic *literati* from the traditional ruling class.

Changes in the literary mode of production also changed the social position of the *literati*. The traditional *literati* derived much of their aesthetic power from the scarcity and uniqueness of the manuscript. This scarcity entailed a social perception of the authenticity and authority of the manuscript, which in its association with the divine message of the text gave this traditional literary work a sort of sacred 'aura' (Benjamin, 1973: 225). This aura in turn bestowed a special privilege on the few people who had ac-

cess to the manuscript, which enabled the old religious *clerisy* to command high social prestige. As Walter Benjamin observed (1973: 223), it is this aura that "withers in the age of mechanical reproduction." This aura was possibly still sustained in the lithographic book production since it was mostly based on the reproduction of the old religious manuscripts. Yet the multiplication of books in circulation with the help of lithography caused the decentralisation of knowledge possession. This in turn led to the gradual demotion of both the sacredness of the manuscript and the aura of the traditional *clerisy*, particularly in the eyes of the literate community.

This challenge of mechanical reproduction became even more serious with the Muslim adoption of typographic printing from the 1890s onward, following earlier uses of the technique by government agencies and private producers of newspapers and periodicals. With the capital costs for typographic equipment being higher than for lithographic equipment, the economic and managerial pattern of this technique was underpinned by formal business enterprises rather than personally conducted cottage industries. With new techniques and management, the scale and speed of book reproduction was simply incommensurable. This in turn changed the nature of literary production. Since the lithographed books were mostly reproductions of old manuscripts, lithographic materials mostly dealt with traditional subjects and histories. By contrast, to optimise the capacity and speed of the machine, typographic printing inescapably had to handle contemporary works, particularly works related to recent history and local events (Proudfoot, 1993: 46-54). Furthermore, the use of Arabic script in lithography was soon challenged by the dominant use of Roman script in typographical production, although for some fifty years Arabic and Latin characters continued to be used side by side.

All of these phenomena not only contributed to an explosion in the amount of reading material, but also seriously challenged the status of traditional subjects and knowledge, which had a subversive effect on the previous social prestige of the traditional *clerisy*. After all, the rapid increase in the amount of printed materials was conducive to both promoting the literacy rate and, more importantly, to increasing the number of equal "citizens" in the 'Republic of Letters' *(Respublica litteraria)*. This in turn significantly changed both the social status of the traditional religious *clerisy* and the religious consciousness of the society.

Furthermore, with the incorporation of the traditional ruling class (the *priyayi*) into the Dutch civil service administration, notably in the latter part of the century, the Dutch colonial system created a state as an administrative unity for the separate islands and kingdoms, so that political and Islamic authority gradually became separate. The detachment of Islam from the native ruling class undermined the traditional cultural links between the religious *clerisy* and the *priyayi*. This had a severe impact on the development of the "Islamic" (inspired) literature and the *clerisy*. Sidney Jones (1984: 5) puts this succinctly:

> The Dutch refusal to accord Islam even a symbolic place in the colonial government was reflected in the deterioration of relations between the religious elite and the indigenous Javanese political elite through whom the Dutch ruled. Fear of organized Islam made colonial authorities unwilling to give even the symbols of traditional power to aristocrats or *priyayi* with strongly Muslim sympathies...The *priyayi*...devoted more and more of their time to the refinement of arts and language, developing the artificial, flowery, and excessively Sanskritized high-status *krama-inggil* and turning to pre-Islamic themes for dance and drama. The gap between political and religious elites thus increased as neoclassical Javanese culture flourished. The gap was widened even further by the emergence of a competing school system to that of the traditional religious teachers, the *kyai*, in their rural *pesantren*. Until the appearance of Dutch schools designed to train some of the aristocracy for civil service careers, Javanese princes and sons of Muslim traders alike had been sent to *pesantren*, and if the education they received more resembled initiation into mystic secrets than instruction in Islamic legal principles, its authenticity as *Islamic* education was not questioned by either group. By drawing the *priyayi* sons out of the *pesantren*, the Dutch schools removed one important cultural link between *santri* and *priyayi*.

In the literary field, the detachment of Islam from the native ruling class destroyed former literary efforts to harmonise Islamic orthodoxy with Javanese mysticism. This was especially true with the post-Java war appearance of *Suluk Gatoloco* (Hymn of Gatoloco, written around 1830) and *Serat Darmagandhul* (possibly written after 1879).[32] In the former, the Prophet Mohammad and various Islamic terminologies are depicted in derogatory terms[33] and it includes a severe criticism of Islamic *sharī'ah* and an anti-Islamic interpretation of Javanese history. In the latter, the court's benign attitude towards Islamic orthodoxy, as reflected in *Serat Cabolek* and *Centini*, was converted into anti-Islamic orthodoxy, followed by the identification of "Javanism" with Westernisation. In so doing, the Javanese order joined the Dutch colonial order in op-

posing the influence of Islam. The story of the Islamic conquest of Majapahit, which is recounted in detail in the book *Darmagandhul*, is a parable of the new current of anti-*santri*-ism (Day, 1983: 147).

Alongside the breakdown of the cultural links between the religious *clerisy* and the *priyayi*, the colonial administration attempted to expand the secular polity at the expense of religious authority. This entailed not only transferring major areas of social life from religious regulation to the jurisdiction of the state, but also the subordination of the Islamic court to the secularised civil system. By the early seventeenth century, the major Islamic states in the archipelago had established regular institutions for the implementation of Islamic law (Reid, 1993: 182-84). The chief Islamic judge was appointed by the Sultan from at least the beginning of the century until the office was abolished with the consolidation of Dutch control over the area in the middle of the nineteenth century (Van Bruinessen, 1995: 168-72). In the areas still under Muslim rule *sharī'ah* remained basically unchallenged up until the middle of the nineteenth century (Smith, 1970: 102). The Dutch's encroachment on these areas in the following centuries, however, gradually eroded the jurisdiction of *sharī'ah*. From that time on, criminal and commercial law became almost wholly secularised, while family law remained relatively "Islamic." The reason may be correctly given by J. N. D. Anderson (1959: 90). "It is the family law that has always represented the very hearth of the *sharī'ah*, for it is this part of the law that is regarded by Muslims as entering into the very warp and woof of their religion." The government made special arrangements to interfere in religious courts in matters that remained under the jurisdiction of religious regulation. As early as the 1830s the Dutch issued a regulation that decisions in Islamic courts had to be ratified by a civil court in order to be enforceable. Furthermore, a Dutch Royal Decree was issued in 1882 to grant the government control over the Islamic Courts by setting up a system of Islamic tribunals called "Priests Councils" *(priesterraden)*[34] alongside the existing ordinary courts in Java and Madura (Cammack, 1997: 144-45).

The secularisation of law is at the very heart of secularisation in the Muslim World. In Islam, as an "organic religious system",[35] in which ecclesiastical organisation is relatively underdeveloped, the primary collective expression of religion is found in societal structures *(sharī'ah)* that regulate the entire society. Thus, the secularisation of the East Indies legal system certainly had a pro-

found impact on the very foundation of Islamic society, as well as on the performance of the East Indies *clerisy* and polity.

Last but not least, a further challenge for historical Islam came from the internal conversion and transformation within the international *'ulamā'* networks that caused rifts within the *santri* community itself. This transformation reflected the determination of the younger generation of the Islamic *clerisy* to survive in the face of the "alien" and "harmful" colonised world.

As the Islamic *khilāfah* of the Ottoman Empire withered and the Muslim world became more territorialised, the superimposition of western civilisation through colonialism, missionaries, and diplomatic, commercial, and educational institutions infused new ideals and a new exemplary centre into the heart of particular segments of the Muslim *clerisy*. This led to a paradigm shift in the thinking of the new generation of educated Muslims. Being trained or highly exposed to the Western style of education or the imported body of the Western ideas, many of this new group of educated Muslims favoured the paradigm of "Islamic modernism" or even "secular nationalism" when imagining the future of the Islamic world.

Islamic modernism, which was first espoused by the Young Ottomans in the 1860s and 1870s and spread to other parts of the Muslim world, had a significant impact on centres of Islamic learning. While committed to the principles of Islam, this young Ottoman group called upon the endangered Ottoman regime to transform itself into a constitutional government imitating European forms of the state and civilisation. A similar response came from India. A modern Indian Muslim thinker, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, argued that for Indian Muslims to survive under British rule they required new approaches in the educational field in order to produce a new generation of Muslim leaders, who, while remaining loyal to the principles of Islam, could also adapt themselves to the political and scientific culture of the modern world. In short, "Islamic modernism" was the ideology of new elites in the Muslim world who were concerned with the restoration of the state and society through the adoption of modern methods, scientific and technological development, while still maintaining Islam as the cultural basis of power and society (Lapidus, 1995: 557-67).

Thus, Islamic modernism is different in some ways from Islamic reformism. Islamic reformism was the *'ulamā'* project that originated in the 17th century in an effort to reorganise Muslim com-

munities and reform individual behaviour. This project was based on the purification of Islamic belief and practice through the return to the perceived authentic source of Islamic orthodoxy (Qur'ān and ḥadīth) with a strong tendency to reject Western culture. On the other hand, 'Islamic modernism' was the project of the new western-influenced Islamic generation, to adapt themselves to modern civilisation while remaining loyal to Islamic culture. In other words, Islamic modernism was a liminal space in between 'Islamism' and 'secularism', which might return to the former or transform even further into the latter, such as was the case in Turkey under the Young Turks, or continue to take a moderate position. In the NEI during the colonial period, as will be discussed later, as the Dutch attempted to detach the ruling class from Islamic influence, the Dutch education system that favoured this class transformed the Indies' elite into a (moderately) secularised intelligentsia. Consequently, there were only few a Western-educated people who favoured 'Islamic modernism'.

In Egypt, Islamic modernism took a different turn in the hands of a new generation of al-Azhar-based *'ulamā'*. For a new generation of al-Azhar *'ulamā'* there were at least two reasons for an idiosyncratic approach in handling this issue. On the one hand, the ancient al-Azhar Academy in Cairo continued to be a prestigious learning centre for local and foreign students seeking to acquire Islamic religious scholarship. In this regard, the *'ulamā'*, as the vanguard of Islamic scholarship, had a sort of obligation to maintain Islamic stability. On the other hand, the strengthening imposition of Western civilisation, particularly after the country came under British occupation from 1882 onward, inspired several new *'ulamā'* to take a strategic approach in order to better deal with the challenges of the modern world (Landau, 1994: 122). To come to terms with this challenge they advocated the synthesis of the ideology of 'Islamic reformism' of the former generation of *'ulamā'* and the 'Islamic modernism' of the new modern educated people. The result of this combination was the hybrid 'Islamic reformist-modernist' concept of the Islamic movement.

This movement was inspired by the teachings of a distinguished nomadic Islamic thinker, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afgānī (1839-97), who resided in Egypt in the 1870s (just before he started his Pan-Islamic activity). Born in Asadabad (Iran) - though he later claimed to be an Afghan in order to ensure a favourable reception among Sunnī Muslims - his religio-political career urged him to travel

across Islamic countries and Europe, stretching from Iran, Afghanistan, India, Hijaz, Egypt, Turkey, France, England and Russia, until he died in Istanbul in 1897. His major concern was to rewind the ongoing Islamic paralysis and fragmentation and return to the true glory of Islam. In his view, in order to restore the glory of Islam it was important to awaken Muslims' consciousness of the threat of European domination. This was to be done through the infusion of Islamic anti-imperialist doctrine, oriented towards reviving national pride and mobilising Muslim people to resist both Western interference and Muslim rulers who supported this colonial encroachment. To achieve this goal the reform of corrupt Muslim societies and turning Muslims into scientific and technically competent modern people was essential. The reform Muslim societies necessitated the reform of Islamic belief and practice, as for him religion was the moral basis of technical and scientific achievement as well as of political solidarity and power. He believed that Islam was quintessentially suited to serve as the basis of a modern scientific society, as it had once been the basis of medieval Islamic glory, as long as Muslims could employ a rational interpretation of the scriptures. These efforts, in his view, should be grounded in the spirit of Islamic solidarity, as the only way to respond properly to European encroachment and the new Christian Crusades was to link the local resistance in Muslim countries into an international all-Muslim union (Lapidus, 1995: 578-620; Landau, 1994: 13-5).

Because of his erudition, writing ability, and charismatic oratory, he earned many admirers, some of whom considered themselves to be his disciples who continued to spread his message. Amongst his famous disciples was an Egyptian Islamic scholar, Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905). He was born into an educated family and was schooled at al-Azhar when he eventually encountered al-Afgānī, who often visited the university during the 1870s. Due to his involvement in the Urabi revolt of 1881, he was exiled to France in 1882. It was during his exile that he joined al-Afgānī in Paris to publish a monumental magazine, *al-ʿUrwah al-Wuthqā* (the Strong Tie), which would become the cornerstone of the propaganda for the so-called Pan-Islamic movement.

Although the term Pan-Islam was of non-Muslim origin,[36] the idea of (international) Islamic unity had been circulated among a secret society of Young Ottomans established in 1865, which employed the term *Ittiḥād-i Islām* (Union of Islam) in the late 1860s.

This term was then generally rendered as *Waḥdat al-Islām* (or *al-Waḥdah al-Islāmiyyah*) in Arabic, and later as *Jāmi at al-Islām*, which all mean Islamic unity or Islamic union. *Al-'Urwah al-Wuthqā* was responsible for the early use of this Arabic terms in one of the magazine articles published and edited by al-Afgānī and 'Abduh in 1884 at the very time when the term Pan-Islam was increasingly employed by Gabriel Charmes and others in France (Landau, 1994: 2-4).

Henceforth, the idea of a Pan-Islamic movement became an embodiment of al-Afgānī's former dream of Islamic solidarity. In the eyes of al-Afgānī, Pan-Islam and Nationalism could be mutually complementary in their 'liberationist' aspect. The grand plan of Pan-Islamic politics in the long run was the establishment of a Muslim bloc in the form of a confederation of semi-autonomous Muslim states, with the Ottoman Sultan as their suzerain. In the short term, however, priority was supposed to be placed on the immediate task of resistance to foreign aggression. Efforts would be made to institute study circles near mosques or religious schools as catalysts for mobilising public opinion and linking Pan-Islamic networks. In this respect, 'Abduh complained that the practice of the pilgrimage was increasingly intended solely for religious ends and had lost its power as the medium for igniting the spirit of Islamic solidarity (Landau, 13-26).

Both al-Afgānī and 'Abduh agreed that the primacy purpose of the Islamic movement was political revival. To attain this objective, however, the former emphasised the pragmatic need for political alliance, whilst the latter emphasised educational, legal, and spiritual reform. 'Abduh seemed to realise that a united Muslim state was politically unfeasible. Moreover, on his return to Egypt in 1888, he was appointed judge and later *muftī* (Islamic law chief) from 1889 to 1905. In such a formal position, it was perhaps important for him to remain on good terms with the British administration. He then withdrew from active involvement in politics, although he did call on Muslims to unite against their enemies. Henceforwards, his endeavours as *muftī* were directed toward modernising Islamic law, and revising the curriculum of al-Azhar to include modern history and geography. His later concern was maintaining the vitality of Islam while Muslims were adopting Western ways. He created the project of reformulating Islam in order to distinguish the essential from the non-essential, preserve the fundamentals and discard the accidental aspects of historical legacy.

He called for Muslims to return to the Qur'ān and the ḥadīth as God's guidance, but in regards to matters not expressly addressed in these sources he argued that *ijtihād* (individual reason and judgment) was essential in order to better respond to the challenge of modern society. Inherent in this project was the conviction that Muslims should not hesitate to draw on modern science and logic to deepen their knowledge and to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam with modern scientific thought and progress. In so doing he became the trailblazer of a hybrid Islamic reformism and modernism under the banner of the *Salāfiyyah* movement (Lapidus, 1995: 621: Landau, 1994: 25-6).

The great tremors from the Pan-Islam and *Salāfiyyah* movements speedily spread out to North Africa and the Middle East, providing a new light for various religio-political movements in the region. In the last decade of the century their impacts also reached the heart of the Islamic epistemic communities in the Ḥaramayn. For a new generation of Muslim students in the Holy City who had become politically aware of the detrimental effects of Western encroachments in their respective home countries, the idea of Pan-Islam in both political and educational fields was very stimulating. In the view of Snouck Hurgronje: "Those who at home have studied in the *pesantrèns, soeraus, mandarsah's [sic]* (institutions for the religious instructions of native Moslims) or in the mosques are most open to Pan-Islamic influences" (Hurgronje, 1931: 249).

It has already been mentioned that in the late 19th century Shaikh Ahmad Khatib asked his students to read 'Abduh's works in order to reject his arguments. His students were in fact not only reading his works but also admiring his thoughts (Noer, 1980: 146). Through reading materials, the encounter with pilgrims from Egypt, or perhaps through contact with Indo-Malayan students in Cairo that had developed since the middle years of the century,[37] the Pan-Islamic and reformist-modernist concepts soon became the new dominant discourse amongst the *Jāwah* students at Mecca. Mohd. Tahir b. Djalaluddin, one of Khatib's former students, had already left Mecca for Cairo in early 1893 to study astronomy at al-Azhar. In Cairo he spent four years being deeply exposed to the teachings of 'Abduh and formed a close relationship with his most enthusiastic disciple, Mohd. Rashid Ridha (Roff, 1967: 60). Several other *Jāwah* students subsequently followed in Djalaluddin's footsteps, leading to the gradual exodus of Indo-Malayan students from Mecca to Cairo. The change in preferred study des-

tination reflected a shift in religious paradigm, which would have a significant impact on the development of Islam in the archipelago.

In 1897 Shaikh H. M. Thaib Umar (a former student of Ahmad Khatib) had already established a reformed *surau* (Islamic school) in Batusangkar (West Sumatra). At this juncture, the classical system and general modern subjects had not yet been introduced, but all texts used in this school were printed books and the curriculum was adapted to that of the al-Azhar. Slowly but surely the influence of 'Abduh's school of thought spread throughout the islands (Junus, 1960: 45-53). In later developments, this reformed school led to the formation of what was popularly called *madrasah*, in which the classical system was applied, new technologies of education were introduced, and religious and general subjects were taught side by side.

The early development of *madrasah* clearly indicated a desire to blend the agenda of Islamic reformation centring on the purification of Islam, the adoption of modern scientific methods and a curriculum of 'Islamic modernism'. In the following century, with the help of typographic printing, new religious subjects for these *madrasah* were reproduced and widely disseminated. While the traditional *pesantren* for a long time to come continued to be highly dependent on the product of lithography, which were popularly called "kitab kuning" (yellow books), the *madrasah* soon adopted "kitab putih" (white books), which were the product of typography.

The installation of reformed schools in the NEI planted the seeds of internal rivalries within the Muslim epistemic community *(santri)*. The arrival of the new schools implied the birth of a new regime of truth, a new mode of production, a new religious consciousness and new relations of knowledge and power. This obviously signalled an attack on the status and habitus of the established traditional religious *clerisy* that would lead to the fracture of the East Indies Islamic community in the next century.

Conclusion

Finally, we arrive at the twilight of the nineteenth century. There was still only one ball of fire in the sky around which the earth revolved. But the sunset in the western part of the East Indies sky emanated particular gradations of light that reflected new currents in the cosmology and history of the East Indies. Alongside

the lingering colours of the past, new synchronic shades emerged, providing new contesting images to define the future historical direction of society.

The native ruling class gradually departed from the Islamic worldview and attempted to revitalise its existence through the union of what Ricklefs called 'budi' ('intellect', here meaning Western scientific thought) and 'buda' (pre-Islamic culture). This trajectory, however, was unlikely to end in the same terminus. Being exposed to western education and civilisation the new educated *priyayi* became more obsessed with the idea of *kemadjoean* (progress). Moreover, the elevation of this new *priyayi* into new professional career paths resulted in a sort of envious relationship between the old and the new *priyayi*. Meanwhile, the colonial policy of social segregation that favoured the higher *priyayi* resulted in a covert tension amongst the new western educated *priyayi*, between the descendants of higher and of lesser *priyayi*. This factor, together with the fact that the newly educated people had not yet discovered a special "code" to construct a collective identity, and also restricted social mobility and information exchange, meant that the voices and movements of western-inspired *kemadjoean* remained confined to a narrow and localised sphere of influence.

At around the same time, the superimposition of Western civilisation in the Muslim world inspired certain segments of the new generation of Islamic *clerisy* to reorganise Muslim society, based on a blend of 'Islamic reformism' and 'Islamic modernism'. Towards the end of the century a circle of the East Indies *'ulamā'* highly imbued with this ideology began to bring it down to the East Indies earth. The arrival of the new ideology carried an early warning of the threats in store for the conservative-traditionalist *'ulamā'*.

Alongside this polarisation and fragmentation, three streams emerged within the new generation of the East Indies elite, namely the secular, the *adat*-oriented and the Islamic *clerisy*. These three groups shared the same conclusion on the importance rejuvenating the East Indies society, based on *kemadjoean*. The difference being that while the first two groups preferred to ground *kemadjoean* in Western and pre-Islamic values, the latter preferred to ground it in purified Islamic belief and values. Thus, as the East Indians entered the twentieth century, there is evidence of the gestation of conflicting ideologies in the desire to rejuvenate East Indies society.

Endnotes

1. The term *clerisy* here is meant as a social group whose members variously thought of themselves as 'men of learning' *(docti, eruditi, savants, gelehrten, 'ulamā')* or 'men of letters' *(literati, hommes de letters, pujangga)*. For a further explanation of the term, see Gellner (1988: 70-1) and Burke (2000: 19-20).
2. On December 31, 1799, the VOC, because of mismanagement and "bankruptcy", was officially transferred, together with all its possessions, debts (140 million guilders), and property, to the Batavia Republic under the jurisdiction of the home government in the Netherlands (Adam, 1995: 4: Nieuwenhuys, 1999: 1-5).
3. Most of today's Indonesia was only conquered by the Dutch in the second half of the 19th century. Some kingdoms could not even be conquered until the first decade of the 20th century. Control of Aceh was bitterly contested for 30 years (1873-1904), while other Kingdoms such as in South Bali and Bone (South Sulawesi) were not conquered until 1906. It is also worth noting that some of the conquered islands were administered directly while other parts were indirectly ruled (Nieuwenhuys, 1999: 1-5; Dick, 2002: 2).
4. During the "Napolenic" War the Dutch colonial officials surrendered their territories to the British "in order to keep them out of the hands of the French" (Ricklefs, 1993: 112). The British interregnum in Indonesia was run under the leadership of Governor General Thomas Stamford Raffles (1811-16).
5. This club was planned by Governor General Herman Willem Daendels (1808-11) and officially opened by Thomas Stanford Raffles in 1815 (Lombard, 1996a: 83).
6. Before the coming of the Dutch and the Protestant missions the Portuguese had been responsible for converting the islanders of the eastern part of the archipelago and instructing them in the Catholic faith. In so doing they had pioneered missionary schools such as a Catholic seminary in Ternate in 1537. With the arrival of the Protestant missions in the territories the Catholic missions were curtailed until their operation was admitted for the first time by Governor General Herman William Daendels (1808-1811). Their activities were not confined to Europeans but also took place among the East Indies communities of all classes, with their strongholds in Flores, Timor, and Ambon—not to forget their significant appearance in Java (Furnivall, 1940: 218-9).
7. A similar situation prevailed when the Dutch East Indies moved into the so-called "ethical" era of the early twentieth century. In the Law of December 31, 1906, the people were classified into three groups: Europeans, Natives, and Chinese & other foreign Orientals (Maier, 1993: 39).
8. Following several native insurrections, most notably the Java War (1825-1830) and the Padri War (1821-38), the Dutch made an effort to curtail the influence of Islamic zealots within the provincial sphere of power by co-opting and transforming the traditional ruling class, the *priyayi* (such as *bupatis* in Java, *penghulus* in Minangkabau and *uleëbalangs* in Aceh), into subordinate functionaries of the Dutch native civil service administration *(Pangreh Praja)*. In this respect, the *priyayi* family was allowed to take part to a lesser degree in the civilization of the colonial master (Lombard, 1996a: 103).

9. The length of courses in this school was changed several times. From the beginning until 1863 it was only a two-year (vaccination) course for selected youngsters who were able to speak Malay using Malay as the medium of instruction, and was then extended to three years in 1864. In 1875 a reform was proposed to extend the course of instruction to five years after a two year preparatory course, and to introduce Dutch language as the medium of instruction at certain levels. Subsequently, from 1881 the preparatory section became three years, and then after 1890 the school was only open to ELS graduates (Junge, 1973: 3; Toer, 1985: 21; Hadisutjipto, 1977: 29-33).
10. At the beginning the course was two years long, with Dutch generally used as the medium of instruction. In 1893, the study was lengthened to five years and some new subjects such as law were added to meet new requirements in administrative posts. The pupils in these schools were mostly children of the *Bupati* (Regents), as it was assumed that they would succeed their fathers in the Native Civil Service posts (Sutherland, 1979: 17; Van Niel, 1970: 27; Ricklefs, 1993: 128).
11. The chief feature of this period was the advent of the advertisement-oriented and official (government) organ press, which used the Dutch language, was owned and edited by Dutch people and was oriented mainly towards the Dutch.
12. Examples include *Selompret Melajoe* in Semarang (1860-1911), *Bientang Timoor* in Surabaya (1862-1887), *Bintang Timor* in Sumatra (1865-1865), and *Bintang Barat* in Batavia (1869-1899).
13. It is said that the participation of the *peranakan* Chinese in the vernacular press began in 1869 when Lo Tun Tay assumed the post of editor for the bi-weekly newspaper, *Mataharie*, in Batavia. It is also worth noting that the major Chinese contribution to the development of the vernacular press was through their role as the subscribers and advertisers.
14. Examples of Indies natives who were involved in the press field before the 1900s were Dja Endar Muda as an editor of the Chinese-owned bi-weekly paper, *Pertja Barat* (1894-1898), Sutan Baharudin as an editor of daily *Sinar Menang-Kabau* (1894-1897), Tirto Adhi Surjo as a correspondent for the newspaper *Hindia Ollanda*, (1894-1896), Datuk Sutan Maharadja as an editor of the twice weekly *Warta Berita* (1895-1897) and Wahidin Sudiro Husodo as an editor of the Javanese and Malay twice-weekly *Retnodhoemilah* (1895-1906)
15. The peranakan Chinese started running their own vernacular presses in the period following the economic crisis of 1884, which forced some of the Dutch and Eurasian press owners to sell out their enterprises. Thus, from December 1886 ownership of the printing firm and the right to publish the well-known paper of the time, *Bintang Timor*, was in the hands of a peranakan Chinese, Baba Tjoa Tjoan Lok. This was followed by other Chinese-owned vernacular presses such as *Pembrita Betawi* (from 1886 up to 1887), *Bintang Soerabaia* (from 1887), and several others (Adam, 1995: 58-124).
16. This is not to forget the availability of a small number of presses that used Dutch, Javanese and High Malay languages.
17. Before the arrival of the Dutch the use of the Malay language was strongly rooted in the main cities in coastal areas throughout the archipelago, spread by Islamic trading and *clerisy* networks (Lombard, 1996b: 153).

18. For most quotations from the press published at the end of the 19th and early 20th century, I am indebted to the work of Ahmat B. Adam (1995).
19. To give an example, *Bintang Hindia*, No. 103, December 29, 1880, ran a complaint from a graduate of the Dokter-Djawa school about the fact that a graduate of this school could only become a vaccinator or at best a *dokter-djawa* whose maximum pay per month only be around fl. 90 (after about twenty years of service). On the other hand, a graduate of the Chiefs' school had a better prospect of being appointed as a *mantri polisi*, assistant *wedana*, *wedana*, *patih* or *jaksa*, with the possibility of ultimately becoming a regent.
20. The term 'organic intellectual' was coined by Antonio Gramsci (1971: 3), referring to one who works consciously towards developing the cultural and political capacities of his/her own class. Somewhat different from Gramsci's conception, the organic intellectual in this work is not only attached to a particular fundamental social class but also to any other subject positions (collective forces) outside class relations.
21. Examples of the native insurrections under the banner of Islam throughout the 19th century were the so-called Cirebon War (1802-06), the 'Java (Diponegoro) War' (1825-1830), the 'Padri War' in West Sumatra (1821-1838), the 'Banjarmasin (Antasari) War' (1859-1862), the 'Jihad in Cilegon' (9-30 July 1888) and the Aceh War (1873-1903).
22. The sultanate was respectively ruled by *Yang Dipertuan Muda* (YPM) Raja Jaafar (r. 1806/7-1831), Raja Abdul Rahman (r. 1831-1844), Raja Ali (r. 1844-1857), Raja Abdullah (r. 1857-1858), Raja Muhammad Yusuf (r. 1858-1899), and finally Raja Abdul Rahman (d. 1930) who merged it with the Malay-Lingga sultanate to became the new Riau-Lingga sultanate until its abolition in 1913 (Matheson, 1989).
23. This book was actually written outside the court, probably in East Java, but was closely related to the spiritual problems of the court and was preserved in the form of a court text commissioned by the Surakarta Crown Prince, later Pakubuwana V (1820-23). For a different perspective on this book, see A. Day (1983).
24. In the matter of Islamic (inspired) literature, M. B. Hooker takes the view that throughout the archipelago there was a continuum of literary expression across generations of different religious traditions. "Artistic themes or structures existing prior to or next to (the religion of) Islam expressed or came to express Islamic belief." Thus, "Islam is an element in this continuum, and very often the most obvious one" (Hooker, 1983: 18-9).
25. According to Azra (1994) the network between Muslims in the Middle East and in the archipelago was initiated as early as the emergence of Islam, in the form of religio-economic relations. With the extensive Islamic propagation throughout the archipelago, especially from the late 12th century, and with the dominant power of the Ottoman Empire and other Islamic kingdoms (such as the Mughal and Safavid) over the Middle East, Red Sea and Indian Ocean from the second half of the 15th and throughout the 16th century, this network was extended to religio-political relations. Furthermore, from at least the 17th century this network began to transform itself into intensive religio-intellectual relations. The important Indo-Malayan figures of the 17th century international *'ulamā'* networks were, among

others, Nuruddin al-Raniri (b. 1658), Abdurrauf al-Sinkili (b.1615), and Muhammad Yusuf al-Maqassari (b. 1627). Those of the 18th century were Syihabuddin b. Abdullah Muhammad, Kemas Fakhruddin, Abdussamad al-Palimbani, Kemas Muhammad b. Ahmad and Muhammad Muhyiddin b. Syihabuddin (from Palembang/Sumatra); Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari and Muhammad Nafis al-Banjari (South Kalimantan); Abdul Wahhab al-Bugisi (From Sulawesi); and Abdurrahman al-Mashri al-Batawi (Jakarta).

26. Examples of his works were *Sabīl al-Muhtadīn* and *Perukunan Melayu* written around the turn of the 18th/19th century.
27. Examples of these were a Qur'ānic commentary, *Tafsir Marah Labid* (published early 1880s), *Syarh Kitab AJurūmiyyah* on Arabic grammar (1881), *Lubab al-Bayān* on linguistic style (1884), *Dharī at al-Yaqīn* on doctrine (1886), *Sulūk al-Jādah and Sullam al-Munājāh* on Islamic Law (1883 and 1884), and *Sharh Bidāyat al-Hidāyah* on Sufism (1881) (Hurgronje, 1931: 271-2).
28. Examples of his works are *Rauda al-Ḥussāb fī 'Ilm al-Ḥisāb* (Cairo, 1892) and *al-Jawāhir al-Naqiyyah fī al-A'māl al-Jaibiyyah* (Cairo, 1891) (Steenbrink, 1984: 145).
29. These students arrived for the first time in Mecca as follows: Djalaluddin in 1881, Umar in the early 1890s, Asy'ari in 1892, Haji Rasul 1894, Ahmad in 1895, Djambek in 1896, Dahlan in 1889, and Salim in 1906. Interestingly enough, before going to Mecca three of them had been exposed to a Western education system. Djambek and Ahmad had attended modern primary schools, while Salim was a graduate of the HBS, the only (general) secondary school available in the NEI at the time (Noer, 1980: 40-54; Roff, 1967: 60; Syaifullah, 1997: 28; Junus, 1960: 45).
30. Examples of books published in Singapore from 1860-1870 were *Sabīl al-Muhtadīn, Bidāyat al-Mubtadī, Uṣūl al-Dīn, Tanbīh al-Ikhwān, Sirāṭ al-Mustaqīm, Qawā'id al-Islām, Tāj al-Mulūk, Syair Mekkah,* and *Syair Hakikat* (Proudfoot,1993: 28).
31. In early 19th century the number of Chinese in Java was estimated at 100 thousand. In 1850 there were already some 150 thousand in Java, and by 1900 there were 277 thousand in Java and 250 thousand in the Outer Provinces (Furnivall, 1944: 47 & 213). Meanwhile, there were only a few thousand Europeans in the early 19th century. The figure became 22,000 in 1850 and jumped to 75,700 in 1900 (Furnivall, 1944: 347; Lombard, 1996a: 78).
32. This is not to ignore the presence of a similar Javanese critique of Islam in earlier times. For further discussion of this issue, see G. W. J. Drewes (1978).
33. For example the Prophet Mohammad is represented as only a minor prophet who was possessed by the Satan (devil), and the term 'Syetan' (Satan) itself is said to etymologically come from the Javanese word 'seta', meaning 'white', which is the colour of sperm.
34. These councils were composed of *penghulus*, who were misleadingly perceived by the Dutch as Islamic priests, to act as government agents in dealing with Islamic legal matters.
35. The organic religious system is characterised by a concept of the fusion of religious and political functions performed by a unitary structure. The ruler exercises both temporal and spiritual authority, and his chief function is to maintain the divine social order according to sacral law and tradition. Besides this model there exists the church religious system, characterised by the

close alliance of two distinct institutions, government and the ecclesiastical body, where the ecclesiastical structure is separate from both society and government (Smith, 1970: 9-10).

36. The first extensive use of the term was by Gabriel Charmes, a prolific French journalist interested in the Ottoman Empire, who employed the term as a variant of existing terms such as 'Pan-Slavism', 'Pan-Germanism' or 'Pan-Hellenism' (Landau, 1994: 2).
37. According to Mona Abaza, based on the historical account written by an Egyptian historian, Mubarak, there were 11 Indo-Malayan students in Al-Azhar in the mid-19 century (1999: 31).

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