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The Multiplicity of Muhammadiyah's Political Engagement in Indonesia's DPD Election

Amika Wardana & Syahrul Hidayat

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Amika Wardana & Syahrul Hidayat

The Multiplicity of Muhammadiyah's Political Engagement in Indonesia's DPD Election

Abstract: *The establishment of the DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or Regional Representative Council) in Indonesia in 2004 has provided individuals and civil society organizations such as Muhammadiyah with the opportunity to participate in the legislative process without formally entering politics. As exemplified by three cases in Yogyakarta, South Sulawesi and West Sumatra, three local Muhammadiyah branches have participated in the last three DPD elections (2004, 2009, and 2014), with each winning a seat each in the 2014 election. This reveals the inherently political nature of civil-cum-Islamic social-religious organizations such as Muhammadiyah, which will manifest itself whenever opportunities become available. Yet, due to different organizational strengths and the social-cultural capital of each local branch office, diverse approaches and political strategies were used to mobilize members and sympathizers, thereby encouraging them to vote.*

Keywords: Muhammadiyah, Political Islam, Regional Representative Council, Indonesia Elections.

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Abstrak: *Pembentukan Dewan Perwakilan Daerah dalam sistem politik Indonesian sejak tahun 2004 telah membuka peluang baru bagi individu atau organisasi masyarakat sipil – yang direspon oleh Muhammadiyah – untuk terlibat dalam lembaga legislatif tanpa secara formal masuk dalam sistem politik. Sebagaimana ditunjukkan oleh 3 kasus di Yogyakarta, Sulawesi Selatan dan Sumatera Barat, ketiga wilayah Muhammadiyah tersebut telah berpartisipasi dalam ketiga Pemilu DPD, 2004, 2009 dan 2014; dan masing-masing memenangkan satu kursi pada Pemilu 2014. Perilaku politik ini membuktikan bahwa adanya kesadaran politik yang terus ada dalam organisasi sipil-sosial-relijius seperti Muhammadiyah; yang berpotensi diartikulasikan apabila terbuka kesempatan. Namun karena perbedaan kekuatan organisasi dan modal sosial-budaya masing-masing wilayah Muhammadiyah, terdapat berbagai variasi pendekatan dan strategi politik yang digunakan untuk memobilisasi suara anggota dan simpatisan Muhammadiyah dalam Pemilu.*

Kata kunci: Muhammadiyah, Politik Islam, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Pemilu Indonesia.

ملخص: أتاح إنشاء المجلس التمثيلي الإقليمي في النظام السياسي الإندونيسي منذ عام ٢٠٠٤ فرصة جديدة للأفراد، ومنظمات المجتمع المدني، مثل الجمعية المحمدية للمشاركة في المجلس التشريعي دون الدخول رسميا في السياسة. وذلك كما حصل في ثلاث حالات، وهي في يوغياكرتا، وسولاويزي الجنوبية، وسومطرة الغربية. فقد شاركت هذه الفروع المحمدية المحلية في ثلاثة انتخابات المجلس التمثيلي الإقليمي المنعقدة في ٢٠٠٤ و ٢٠٠٩ و ٢٠١٤، حيث حصل كل منها على مقعد واحد في انتخابات عام ٢٠١٤. وقد أثبت هذا السلوك السياسي أن هناك وعيًا سياسيًا لا يزال قائماً في المنظمات الدينية مثل المحمدية؛ وهذا الوعي سوف يظهر نفسه عندما تكون الفرصة مفتوحة. ومع ذلك، وبسبب نقاط القوة التنظيمية المختلفة ورأس المال الاجتماعي والثقافي لكل مكتب فرعي محلي، تم استخدام أساليب واستراتيجيات سياسية متنوعة لتعبئة أصوات الأعضاء والمتعاطفين معهم في الانتخابات.

الكلمات المفتاحية: المحمدية، الإسلام السياسي، المجلس التمثيلي الإقليمي، الانتخابات الإندونيسية.

Indonesia and Turkey were once celebrated as Muslim-majority country democratization success stories. Both, however, then largely failed or proved themselves to be politically unstable (Künkler and Stepan 2013). Whilst the project of political Islam has transformed and proliferated emphasizing the shift to the commitment to democracy, it is expressed by not merely Islamic political parties but also in wide range of forms, from the jihadi movements glorifying violence and terrorism to socio-religious organizations who traditionally concerned with missionary programs (*da'wah*) and provision of social welfare, education, and healthcare services (Bayat 2007, 2013; March 2015). Typically, social-religious activities conducted by Islamic organizations are both constrained and enabled by the politics of a given state. They therefore reflect a desire to participate in politics, they articulate an Islamic political agenda, and they support political democratization in that country. Furthermore, the motives, forms, and strategies of Islamic activism and political engagement, as conducted by Islamic organizations, have varied, including their commitment to democracy and to conduct violent or militant actions (Wiktorowicz 2004).

This article addresses the political engagement of Muhammadiyah as a prominent Islamic social organization, alongside Nahdlatul Ulama, in terms of its motives, forms and strategies during Indonesia's democratic transition. There exist different trajectories of Islam in the social-individual life of Indonesian society and in the realm of politics. On the one hand, significant Islamization has occurred across Indonesian society in the last few decades, largely as a result of democratization, which established the socio-religious and political roles of Islamic organizations (especially Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama and other smaller organizations) (for details see Bruinessen 2013; Fealy and White 2008; Pringle 2010; Ricklefs 2012). On the other hand, Islamic political parties have experienced stagnation or continual decline by failing to attract a significant number of voters at the last three democratic general elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014 (see Hamayotsu 2012; Hicks 2012; Mietzner 2013; Mujani and Liddle 2009; Tanuwidjaja 2010). In contrast to the election in 1955, when Islamic political parties received 45 per cent of the collective vote (Feith 1957, 58–59), on this occasion Islamic political parties were not able to dominate the representative body as Islamic parties in this first general election did. These two different tendencies seem contradictory and

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place Indonesian Muslims that have more concern on their political and social recognition found their aspiration in danger of limited access to politics. Based on these backgrounds, this article aims to elaborate on the ways in which Islamic organizations, particularly Muhammadiyah, have responded to the decline of electoral political Islam and taken advantage of the more open and egalitarian political sphere created by ongoing political democratization. Their response reveals Muhammadiyah's commitment to the perpetual Islamization of Indonesian society.

However, the recent decline of electoral political Islam has challenged the organization's expectations and position in politics and some of the organization's elites have endeavored to have a role in the electoral process in different ways, especially at the local level. The enticement to have a role in politics, albeit on a marginal scale, has complicated any effort to define its position categorically between social or, for some known as, civil and political institutions. The examination of its response to the current situation may contribute to the debate on the concept of voluntary social organizations in the broader context of civil society, particularly with regard to the question of when 'the civil turn political' (Edwards and Foley 1998, 39). It is obvious that the concept of voluntary civil organization does not involve direct activities related to elections. Therefore, the case of Muhammadiyah is interesting as the civil has become the political as it is situated and influenced by several internal and external factors. In fact, demarcated lines between the social and the political as seen by the 'Western' conceptual framework is atypical in political Islam, as social and political sciences are secularized disciplines making them less sensitive to define the social and political aspects of Islamic movements distinctly (Volpi 2013, 2). The surge of Islamist movements, since the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924 and the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood and *Jami'at Islami* in Egypt and Pakistan, has provided the setting for finding a pathway for the voice of Muslim society at the state level. However, it has to be understood that Islamist movements across the Muslim world vary and not all intend to recapture the state from secularists or nationalists. In short, defining an Islamic movement as simply social or political in nature can be misleading. Thus, defining an Islamic movement or organization as either a social or political institution can be difficult too.

Muhammadiyah has positioned itself as a social-religious-cum-civil society organization rather than a political organization. The policy of the New Order regime that precluded it from entering politics for decades and thus encouraged it to develop into a social organization seems to have been maintained notwithstanding the democratization that followed Suharto's demise in 1998. However, the history of Muhammadiyah suggests that it is not alien to political involvement, especially given its support of *Masjumi* in the 1950s.

Muhammadiyah's history of political engagement pre-dates the establishment of the Indonesian state itself. It is therefore not surprising to find that Muhammadiyah responds to the unfriendly to Islamic political aspiration present-day political situation. The current democratization with impacts on the declining electoral vote of Islamic political parties – as showed by the unlikely fate of its un-official affiliates, i.e. PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional* or National Mandate Party) and PMB (*Partai Matahari Bangsa* or National Sun Party) – has been understood to affect the socio-political role of Muhammadiyah within the Indonesian society at large (see Bush and Fealy 2014; Hamayotsu 2012; Hicks 2012). In response to this development, there is increasing political awareness of the modernist Islamic movement and an eagerness to participate as a civil society force in the democratization process (Jurdi 2010; Nashir 2006). The involvement of local Muhammadiyah offices in the DPD (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah* or Regional Representatives Council) elections of 2004, 2009 and 2014 has provided a prominent example of the ways in which one of Indonesia's largest Islamic organizations engages politically in contemporary Indonesia.

Taking the cases of three local Muhammadiyah provincial offices in Yogyakarta, South Sulawesi and West Sumatra, these three local offices have shown a strong interest in exercising and converting their social-religious clout and resources for the purposes of electoral politics by winning a seat in the DPD. Since its establishment prior to the 2004 election, the DPD, which is a senate-like representative body that, together with the DPR (People's Representative Council), makes up the MPR (the People's Consultative Assembly), has made available to individuals and/or representatives of civil society organizations outside existing political parties the opportunity to participate at the legislative level (Indrayana 2008). According to Rich (2014), the DPD is a comparative innovation in the new democratic political system

across Asia, the primary purpose of which is to provide non-partisan organizations the opportunity to participate in the political process.

This article finds that a social religious-cum-civil society organization may become involved in electoral politics when there is an opportunity to do so and when the appropriate circumstances exist. DPD elections provide the perfect opportunity for non-partisan members of the public to formally engage in the political process as candidates. Furthermore, in the case of Muhammadiyah, it is also the opportunity to engage with other organizations and to gain access to political elites or political decision makers from a particular area that may encourage a branch office to directly participate in an election. However, political opportunity and competition for political access are not the only factors that move an organization such as Muhammadiyah to become involved in the political process. Indeed, the ability to mobilize resources is another decisive factor. This study offers insight into the process of a social religious and non-political organization becoming politically involved through the exploration of three Muhammadiyah provincial offices that formally supported, individually claimed, and informally supported candidates at the DPD election in 2014. These three different patterns are related to the ability of each provincial office to provide resources (e.g. manpower, funds, and access). When a provincial office is confident with the resources it has, it formally supports a candidate to represent the organization at the election. In contrast, when an office is not confident with the resources it tends not to support an official candidate.

First, in order to understand the political character of Muhammadiyah, its historical trajectory needs to be investigated. Thus, the political engagement of Muhammadiyah will be further examined and contextualized pursuant to the current academic debates of the compatibility (or incompatibility) of Islam and democracy and of the rise and proliferation of political Islam and Islamic activism in the Muslim world (Bayat 2007, 2013; March 2015; Volpi 2013). The discussion of engagement will be based on the cases of three local Muhammadiyah branches to describe the differences between the motives, forms, and strategies of each following a discussion of related concepts. This research applies a qualitative approach and data was primarily gathered through interviews with key informants from each case, combined with data from official reports issued by Muhammadiyah itself.

When Civil Turns Political

It may seem peculiar that Muhammadiyah, as a social organization, has its own candidates who compete for a seat in parliament. In theory, there is a clear difference between social and political organizations, in particular political parties. The primary objective of the latter organization is to compete for political influence through electoral competition and ultimately occupying political office (Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008, 1108). In short, participation in elections at any level typically becomes the focus of party members, whether they be elites, activists, or ordinary members. Regardless of the different views of electoral positions before citizen, such as mandate and accountability, elections will always be the place for politicians, not others, to offer their policies to be scrutinized (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999, 29), and the only organization as a vehicle for politicians to organize themselves is political party, if not compete as independent. Although it can be defined critically as a complex set of behaviors (e.g. Key 1955, 3), including the way citizens vote, elections are always regarded as the main arena for political parties and their leaders to compete and capture positions to influence their preferred policies (Müller et al. 1999, 1).

At some point, the objective of non-political party groups or social groups or organizations is similar, namely to influence the policies produced by state institutions. However, if a political party has access to the decision-making process by being elected, social groups or organizations can only do so by contacting and/or lobbying those in legislative and government positions. This construction of political and non-political organizations is challenged by the fact that the importance of political parties and elections is declining along with the transformation of state's role in Europe (Webb, Farrel, and Holliday 2002). The impact of these changes is the transfer of resources allocation from the discourse and competition of ideas in elections and political parties to 'policy networks and negotiation' (Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008, 1104). This proposition is, in fact, parallel with the argument that the non-political organization has a strong tendency to be political as well (Chandhoke 2001, 3). Hence, non-political social organizations have gained more ground to be identified as political entities and more studies are starting to give their attention to the political behavior of these organizations. Nevertheless, this new phenomenon raises more questions on the identification of the borderline between the two entities.

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Several studies on this issue have identified the political activities of social organizations. A study by Teorell (2003), for example, has identified the ways membership of a voluntary organization drives members to become politically engaged. Membership has given members the opportunity to engage with the activities of an organization, which, in turn, develops those members' social networks, which may provide them with the necessary social capital to participate in political activities. Previous studies also confirm the role of organizational membership in political participation by providing mechanism to develop group consciousness (Müller et al. 1999), which can be mobilized by the organization whenever it decides to get involved in political activities (Leighley 1996). Although Teorell defines it as a weak benefit, the social capital a member can gain is, in fact, part of a wider social network that makes democracy works as suggested by Putnam (2002). However, studies of the political aspects of social groups or organizations seem to follow the groups or organizations's distinctive differences with political party. Here, participation in politics is defined as an individual activity rather than as an institution. Their involvement in politics is identified when social groups or organizations challenge the state's policies or maneuvers that influence the collective concern. For some, it is the situation where social groups become political (Chandhoke 2001, 3). Therefore, to find a social group or organization to get involved in electoral activities directly at this stage seems beyond the existing conceptual definition.

In the studies of social groups or organizations, known as third sector organizations, the identification of a group or organization's activities confirms its disengagement with direct electoral involvement. The third sector organization is categorized into three different forms: civil society, social movements, and non-profit sectors. These categories are based on research conducted by scholars of the organizational forms and characteristics of the class of organizations (Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005) and none of them are typically used for research on electoral activities. Social movements are typically more engaged in politics by bringing specific issues into the public and challenging the government's policies. Nevertheless, the intention of these movements is not to enter politics as political parties per se. Interestingly, it is suggested that notwithstanding the fact that categories have been developed to capture all organizations, there will always be new things

to define as these organizations evolve. There are organizations that qualify as more than one category and are defined as multi-purpose hybrid organizations (98). For Hasenfeld and Gidron, who studied and proposed the term, there are always organizations that are social movements, voluntary associations, and non-profit organizations. They argue that a multi-purpose hybrid organization should meet the following criteria: '(a) they seek to bring about social change, though not necessarily through protest and other non-institutional means; (b) the services they provide, such as social and educational, are a strategy for social change; (c) their internal structure is a mix of collectivist and bureaucratic elements' (ibid). This article argues that Muhammadiyah meets all these criteria and is, interestingly, a religious charitable organization. Muhammadiyah also has the attributes of a hybrid organization, namely 1) it upholds cultural values; 2) it offers services to its members; 3) it promotes a collective identity; and 4) it has evolved into a hybrid organization by having multiple purposes. That said, this term has no fixture of being active in electoral politics. They may enjoy a relationship with the state, either one of neutrality, opposition, or cooperation, but these positions are fluid. At some point, these organizations may depend on the government for fiscal support for the services they provide the people or for legitimacy, which results from being recognized by the state (Salomon 1995). In other cases, they can challenge the government. The best example of this is a religious-based organization, which shares the features of Muhammadiyah, insofar as it receives state funding to assist it with providing social services for the poor, but it can also oppose state policies on particular issues, such as marriage and abortion (Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005).

It is the case that the civil can occasionally become the political, but it should also be noted that the sporadic moves of a civil organization do not a permanent political entity make. A social organization maintains its original state and does not change into political party, notwithstanding that it may act as a political party when it mobilizes its resources to win an electoral seat. In the discussion of social movement theory, it is part of resource mobilization theory, in particular the organizational-entrepreneurial model thereof (Canel 1997). According to this model, scholars argue that formal organization can operate as the carrier of a social movement (McCarthy and Zald 1987, 12). Most importantly, it underlines the two aspects of the organization, which are the interaction

of the organization with the environment and its structure that supports all activities. These two aspects apply to Muhammadiyah as it responds to the environment and maximizes its structure to mobilize political support. Therefore, at this stage, what Muhammadiyah has done still runs parallel to a social organization. It is important to look further, however, at social movement theory as it argues that social activism depends on available political opportunities. It may refer to the condition of a political system as in the case of Muhammadiyah. The theorists of the concept, however, including Oberschall, Gamson, and Tilly, argue that the concept of 'political opportunities' is only related to the structure of a political system, which may influence the ability of any social movements or groups to act freely, or under restriction, or to be coopted by state. There is no indication that political opportunities are related to possible electoral involvement, unless they transform into a political party, as in the case of the Green Party in Europe (i.e. Jahn and Korolczuk 2012; or Poguntke 1993).

The problem with this framework is the fact that political theories tend to be insensitive to religious social organizations. As mentioned, scholars who study such organizations, especially in response to the rise of Islamic activism, have found having a clear distinction between the social and the political to be problematic in understanding the political behavior of Islamic movements across the Muslim world. As one of the organizations that represents Islamic movements, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt interacts in both the social and political arena. Although its primary objective is to rekindle religious awareness among Muslims, especially the youth, many of its members contest for parliamentary seats as independent candidates in many elections under Mubarak regime. The political openness that followed the Arab Spring has given way to the 'real' intentions of many Islamists, who have vied for the presidency and seats in parliament. Hence, transformation from the social to the political seems to be becoming part of the Islamic movement's identity.

Defining social character as apolitical can also be misleading as many Islamic organizations that work in the social arena can also be political without even competing in elections. In this context, Hirschkind (2013) underlines the problem by arguing that political Islam should be viewed differently than from what political theories have already identified. For Hirschkind, although an Islamic organization does not try to

capture authority at the state level, it can still be regarded as political as it may demand the accommodation of some Islamic jurisprudence, such as marriage and inheritance, within a state's positive law. Adopting Hirschkind's argument, many Islamic organizations are, in fact, political in nature, even though they are not political parties per se. It can be argued that political opportunity is one factor that can assist with the formal transformation of a social entity into a political entity.

Nevertheless, the case of Muhammadiyah offers a different angle, that being aspects other than political opportunity, namely the availability of resources. Although an October 2018 ruling of the Supreme Court (*Mahkamah Agung*) permits a member of a political party to nominate as a political candidate, Regional Representative Council (DPD) elections in Indonesia are not an arena in which political parties may compete; hence, it is seen as an opportunity for political involvement, even as a formal candidate, to represent a non-political organization, including Muhammadiyah. So, the election to fill the seats in DPD has some aspects of an arena for the independent candidates with or without affiliation to political parties to enter parliament. It is this competition that has challenged Muhammadiyah as to whether or not it should participate. Indeed, when the national committee forbids involvement in any form of election, a number of regional branches take this opportunity and ask its members to compete as the representation of Muhammadiyah, formally, or at least give their informal support.

Three different patterns of involvement (formally supported, individually claimed, and informally supported) are found in 2014 and the difference, this article argues, is due to the resources each of provincial offices are able, or confident, to mobilize. When resources are available there is a tendency that a branch will support its candidate formally and vice versa. Based on these, this study offers an insight process of the possible 'transformation' from social to political by looking at three different candidacies at DPD election. Other than political opportunity, it suggests that resource mobilization is crucial to the willingness or eagerness of an institution to submit a format support for a candidate in an election.

Muhammadiyah in Politics: A Brief Socio-Historical Review

The active political engagement of Muhammadiyah has not been a new phenomenon throughout its centennial age since the Dutch

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colonial era to the post-independence period and to the current transitional democracy of Indonesia. It has been widely argued that this modernist Muslim organization has played a significant political role in the country despite having never changed its non-political status as a social-religious Muslim organization (see Alfian 1989; Asyari 2009; Benda 1980; Boland 2013; Fuad 2002; Hefner 2000; Jurdi 2010; Nakamura 1983). The politics of Muhamamdiyah have revolved around four themes, namely (i) the awareness of the political dimensions that shape its socio-religious missions and activities; (ii) its association with Islamic-based political parties to express and articulate its political interests; (iii) the political engagement of its elites through the mobilization of Muhammadiyah's resources – in terms of the organization's structures, membership and financial support – for political purposes; and (iv) the role of Muhammadiyah as a civil society organization, which has become more relevant since the post-1998 era of *Reformasi*.

The early development of Muhammadiyah's political awareness was depicted in Alfian's now classic (1989) work, *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism*. Therein, Alfian elaborates on the political stances and activities pursued by this reformist Muslim organization in defending native Muslim interests in response to discriminatory Dutch colonial policies, especially in the field of education, wherein the Dutch privileged secular and Christian-based schools in the country (cf. Shihab 1998). For the purpose of achieving its socio-religious mission, however, Muhammadiyah had been unhesitant to engage in political cooperative works with the Dutch colonial government, including requesting its assistance and receiving financial help to run its Islamic-based education and social welfare services. A similar political attitude had been shown during the Japanese occupation with the involvement of its chairman at that time, Kyai Haji Mas Mansur, in *Putera* (*Pusat Tenaga Rakyat* or Center of People's Power), a government-supported organization designed to mobilize the Indonesian people for the purpose of the Japanese Asia-Pacific war project (see Benda 1980).

The political consciousness of Muhammadiyah had further developed and transformed in the post-independence period, both under Soekarno's guided democracy and Soeharto's New Order. Syarifuddin Jurdi (2010) comprehensively presents a critical stance,

as well as the cooperative initiative of Muhammadiyah under both regimes. Muhammadiyah played a key role in the consolidation of Muslim politics, with its official support of *Masyumi*, and preserved a rivalry against Soekarno's secular-nationalist projects by articulating Islamic-inspired political interests. Yet Muhammadiyah had maintained a closed relationship with Indonesia's first president, even bestowing him with the *Bintang Muhammadiyah* (Muhammadiyah Star), in recognition of his special membership and contribution to the reformist Muslim organization (Drakeley 2009).

Under Soeharto's New Order, with Soeharto's fierce and violent policies, which were designed to domesticate political Islamism and Muslim interests as a whole, Muhammadiyah pursued its cooperative style yet critical position via-a-vis the secularization of the state. Muhammadiyah cleverly initiated two strategic modes of political engagement by: (i) shifting its political activism to *da'wah* (socio-religious missions) to Islamize society from the bottom up (this was known as an allocative political strategy) (Syamsuddin 1990); and (ii) pursuing a strategy of 'high politics' through the promotion of ethics, morals, and social responsibility, and by avoiding active political engagement with the regime (Jurdi 2010). Under the latter strategy, there had been accommodation and compromise between Muhammadiyah and the regime in various issues, including the 1973 Marriage Law for Muslim couples, the 1985 *Asas Tunggal Pancasila* (Pancasila as the Sole Basis of the State), and the 1988 Education Law regarding religious teaching in schools (Jurdi 2010; see also Syaifullah 2015).

Next, the politics of Muhammadiyah have been examined through its associations, affiliations with, and support for, certain Islamic political parties. For about a decade and a half, during the late Dutch colonial era, since 1913, Muhammadiyah was affiliated with SI (*Sarekat Islam* – the Islamic Union), a sole Islamic political party at the time, under a mutual agreement to work together, both in politics and social-religious activities until their bitter split in 1927 (Noer 1973). As mentioned, during the early post-independence period, Muhammadiyah had been actively involved in the foundation of *Masyumi*, thus becoming a special and loyal member thereof until its dissolution in 1959 (Fogg 2012; Syaifullah 2015). Muhammadiyah had also sought to revive its level of political engagement during the early phase of Soeharto's New Order with the establishment of *Parmusi*, before *Parmsui* was hijacked by

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Soeharto and amalgamated with other parties to form the PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or Unity Development Party) in 1973 (Effendy 2003). Similar initiatives were instigated by Muhammadiyah in the post-1998 period of *Reformasi*, with the creation of PAN by one of its former chairpersons, Muhammad Amien Rais, in 1998, and the short-lived PMB in 2006 (Jung 2014). Syaifullah (2015), however, warns not to exaggerate the links as only about six per cent of Muhamamdiyah representatives went on to win a seat in the DPR/MPR.

For those Islamic-based parties, affiliation with, and the support, of Muhammadiyah has not always been mutual and cooperative; rather, it has, at times, ended in disagreement and disappointment. With SI, triggered by critics regarding the religiosity and accountability of its leaders, the party restricted and then excommunicated members affiliated with Muhammadiyah (Noer 1973). Muhamamdiyah had been forced to cut its official ties with *Masyumi* as the party threatened to be banned by the regime after being accused of supporting Islamic rebellious movements in outer islands (Fogg 2012; Syaifullah 1997). Muhammadiyah had also withdrawn its official and cultural support for *Parmusi* after Soeharto's men took control of the Islamic party (Boland 2013; Jurdi 2010). The current relationship between Muhammadiyah and PAN has not been easy either. Since the beginning, the efforts made by its founder, Amien Rais, to form a more open, as well as religiously and ethnically plural, party have cost Muhammadiyah its traditional sources of support (Asyari 2009). Though still enjoying massive support, PAN has appeared to disappoint Muhammadiyah by not promoting its Islamic-inspired political interests (Asyari 2009). The situation has further led this second largest Muslim mass organization to keep its distance from the party (Jung 2014) and resembles the relatively common pattern of loose party-social group relations in new democracies (Biezen 2005, 159–60).

The third theme of Muhammadiyah's politics rests on the political engagement of its elites either to articulate their Islamic-inspired interests or their own purposes. It has been argued that there have been discrepancies between the political aspirations of the masses and their articulation as pursued by the elites (Jurdi 2004; Nashir 2006). The case that many of Muhammadiyah's members were reluctant to support and vote for PAN, notwithstanding that PAN was founded and led by Muhammadiyah elites, has in some way confirmed these

discrepancies (Asyari 2009). For current Muhammadiyah elites, however, their political engagement has transformed and polarised in various ways and missions. Having examined the nature of Islamic-inspired political activism, Haedar Nashir (2006) insists that the politics of Muhammadiyah's elites have spawned in a continuum from the moderate-inclusive stance to a fundamentalist-exclusive one. This finding has been echoed by other research conducted by Al-Hamdi (2013) and Efendi (2014). To some extent, the support and popularity of Islamic-inspired political ideas, including the foundation of an Indonesian Islamic State and/or the implementation of Sharia Law in Indonesia, have continued to wane with current Muhammadiyah political elites in favor of a more religiously plural Indonesia; a significant transformation within the modernist Muslim political milieu in recent decades (see Assyaukanie 2011).

Further, the political configuration of Muhammadiyah's elites has been influenced by the internal debate between those in support of Muhammadiyah being a politically engaged organization and those in favour of Muhammadiyah maintaining a politically neutral stance, in accordance with its status as a social religious organization (Asyari 2009; Efendi 2014). To note, during the turbulent years of the early phase of Soeharto's New Order, Muhammadiyah had released two contradictory-like *Khittah* (literally, the principle of the movement): (i) the 1969 *Khittah* – known as *Khittah Ponorogo* as it was assigned in *Tanwir* (the 2nd level of the national meeting) held at Ponorogo– which demanded active political engagement as a way of achieving Muhammadiyah's Islamic religious missions; and (ii) the 1971 *Khittah* – known as *Khittah Makassar*, as it was agreed in the 38th *Muktamar* (the primary national meeting) – which prohibited any political participation in the name of the organization in order to protect Muhammadiyah from a policy of Soeharto's New Order that prohibited any form of political Islamism (Efendi 2014; Jurdi 2010; Nashir 2006; Syaifullah 1997). The organization has therefore seen political participation as an individual matter, as part of its citizenship rights, yet having no official links to Muhammadiyah. They have, however, been allowed to conduct campaigns in order to the gain votes of members of Muhamamdiyah, and to articulate the interests of the organization, which are sometimes imbued by a religious mission (Asyari 2008, 2009; Nashir, Nurmandi, and Efendi 2017).

The final discussion is related to the independent status of Muhammadiyah vis-à-vis the state namely as a civil society organization. It is not the case that Muhammadiyah (and Nahdlatul Ulama) have initiated various self-financed social welfare programs, particularly in the provision of health services and education for the masses, working in a complementary fashion yet equal and separated from the State (see Hefner 2000; Maarif 2000). The unique status of Muhammadiyah (and Nahdlatul Ulama) – entitled with the core tenets of civil society organization in Habermasian term (see Calhoun 1992) – has forged a prominent social capital known as civic cultures that made Indonesian Muslims eagerly adopt democracy (Mujani 2007; Pringle 2010). In other words, Muhammadiyah has been imbued with the power of a civil society organization, which could be used either for cooperative purposes with the state or to criticize state policies and programs. Yet, the power of Muhammadiyah is not without its limits. Fuad (2002) points out the loophole within the organization regarding its economic inability to finance all of its initiatives without the help of the state (cf. Njoto-Feillard 2014). Furthermore, as Hicks notes (2012), due to a lack of infrastructure and resources, many health and education provisions delivered by Muhammadiyah have been unsatisfactory and have thus failed to compete with state-owned ones (cf. Bush and Fealy 2014). This development has potentially undermined the role of Muhammadiyah as a civil society organization vis-à-vis the state.

Responses to Democratization: Muhammadiyah's Politics in the 2014 DPD Election

As mentioned, Muhammadiyah has always sought to participate in politics and contribute to the betterment of the nation. Muhammadiyah responded to the democratic reform that followed Soeharto's demise in 1998 firstly by issuing a *Tanwir* (the 2nd level of the national meeting) in Semarang, recommending that its former chairman, Muhammad Amien Rais, form a political party, namely PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, the National Mandate Party) (Asyari, 2008; 2009; Jurdi, 2010). Further responses to the democratization of the country have been agreed in the 44th *Muktamar* (the top level of the national meeting) in Jakarta, which pushed the organization to support the reformation agenda, especially to combat the corruption that had been rampant throughout Indonesia. Relevant to this case is Muhammadiyah's

2002 *Tanwir*, issued in Bali, 2003 in Makassar (South Sulawesi), and 2004 in Lombok (West Nusa Tenggara), which recommended that Muhammadiyah offices at all levels and members actively participate in politics following increased democratic reform (Jurdi 2010). On the one hand, the recommendation was influenced by the fact that PAN and Amien Rais required the votes of Muhammadiyah members and sympathizers in the 2004 legislative and presidential election. On the other hand, the recommendation was seen as legitimizing the involvement of regional Muhammadiyah offices in the DPD election, which was held concurrently with the 2004 legislative election. To note, the current political *Khittah* adopted by Muhammadiyah is the 1971 version, which encouraged the organization to remain vigilant of any political changes and developments, but limited its involvement to the extent necessary to prevent any potential harm being incurred by the organization as a whole (Syaifullah 1997; Nashir 2006).

Next, we examine the ways in which the local Muhammadiyah offices in Yogyakarta, South Sulawesi and West Sumatra responded to the political recommendation of Tanwir and Muktamar to take part in the current democratization agenda thus inspired them – as a civil society organization – to participate in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 DPD elections. To note, these three provincial offices are considered traditional Muhammadiyah footholds, covering western, central and eastern Indonesia, each with similar organizational and structural strength, similar membership numbers, and similar financial support (for detail see MPI PPM, 2015; LPCR PPM, 2015). Yet, as already suggested, there has been a variation of motives, forms and strategies of those three local offices that have informed the manner in which they have engaged at the political level for the purposes of the DPD elections, as reflected by the degree to which the branch offices have been prepared to take part. In Yogyakarta, which is also known as the capital of Muhammadiyah, the provincial office was confident enough to make the DPD elections its political target, thus formally and systematically mobilizing and converting its strong structural organizations, large memberships and social-cultural capital into votes. While in South Sulawesi, the provincial office seemed largely affected by the failure in the 2004 and 2009 elections, which was, in large part, due to internal fragmentation and competition. The office thus agreed to informally support a candidate, granted him with access to

its organizational structures, and mobilized the support of its members with the cost that his victory in the election belonged to Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi. The case of the West Sumatra provincial office was different as it lacked the confidence and ambition necessary to take advantage of this political opportunity, instead opting to support all DPD candidates coming from culturally from Muhammadyah family. With its supports, the office, however, had been able to claim their victory thus hoped to gain benefits from them.

Yogyakarta Case: Establishing Muhammadiyah's Dignity

The Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah local branch's involvement in the DPD election exemplifies a successful story of political engagement. Indeed, in all of 2004, 2009 and 2014, its support enabled the candidates to win a seat in each DPD election. Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta officially supported its chairman, Ali Warsito, for the 2004 election, and maintained similar support in 2009 and 2014, which helped a former local PAN politician, Muhammad Afnan Hadikusumo elected. The participation in this political experiment has resulted in a raft of implications, including the establishment of a fair and democratic process to select candidates, to socialize the candidate with the public in order to win votes, and to design an evaluation mechanism of sorts to assess the performance of elected DPD members supported by Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta. In some respects, this form of political engagement has transformed the organization into a political-party-like organization, thus potentially exploiting its organizational structures and resources for the purposes of conducting DPD campaigns, as well as mobilizing its members and sympathizers to vote for the candidate at the polls.

As mentioned, in the rationale of Muhammadiyah's current political stance, the involvement of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta in the DPD election has been set up as a response to the post-1998 democratization project. Compared to other elections, such as the local/national legislative, mayoral and presidential elections, all of which were formally controlled by political parties, the DPD election had given a full authority for Muhammadiyah provincial office a pivotal role in selecting and nominating the candidate and demanding him to articulate its aspiration in the legal-political arena without any intervention from any political parties. The argument is explicitly expressed by Azman Latief, one of the chairs of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta:

> From the beginning, we understood that the DPD is designed to replace *Utusan Daerah* and *Golongan* (regional and non-partisan organizational representatives) to sit in the MPR (the People's Consultative Assembly), in which Muhammadiyah had to take part. The issue had been intensively discussed and debated both at *Tanwir* 2002 in Bali and 2003 in Makassar (South Sulawesi), and finally, in 2004 in Mataram (West Nusa Tenggara). The result thereof was that it was agreed that Muhammadiyah should participate in the national democratization process. To follow up the agreement, some regional/provincial boards of Muhammadiyah, including Yogyakarta, decided to participate in the 2004 DPD election, though we did not know how to do that at that time. We luckily succeeded in 2004 with Ali Warsito; thus, we repeated this again in 2009 and 2014 with Afnan Hadikusumo (Interview, 18 May 2014).

Yet, the deeper motive to participate in the DPD election, especially in the 2014 election, was partially encouraged by the rivalry with other Islamic organizations in Yogyakarta. To note, instead of GKR Hemas (representing the existing Yogyakarta Court), which won a majority (about 1 million of about 2 million available votes) in the last three elections, another two seats in the DPD were won by Hafidz Asrom (supported by Nahdlatul Ulama) with 158,792 votes and Cholid Mahmud (supported by PKS) with 149,824 votes in the 2014 election. Muhammadiyah's candidate took the fourth seat with only 144,820 votes. David Effendi, a political scientist-cum-Muhammadiyah activist who was the mastermind of the DPD campaign, provided a vivid account of the rivalry between NU and PKS as a major determinant pushing the organization to perpetuate this political project.

> Idealistically, we might say that the participation (in the DPD election) is to broaden our *da'wah* in the political arena. Yet, it is clear to me that the DPD is about defending our prestige as one of the largest Islamic organizations in the country; and because Yogyakarta is the capital of Muhammadiyah, we should provide an example of how we deal with this political development. We understood that the political role of the DPD has been very limited compared to the DPR, even in terms of financial contributions (from the previously elected DPDs) to Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta, which were marginal too. We don't even think about money, but we think about the dignity, about the *Marwah* of *Muhammadiyah*. In other words, if NU is able to support Hafidz Asrom and PKS supported Cholid Mahmud to get a seat, Muhammadiyah has to be able to do the same or more than that (Interview with Effendi, 18 May 2014).

Effendi elaborated on several critiques from members and affiliates at the lower levels of the organization regarding the decision of

Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta to participate in the DPD election after its minimal involvement during the previous two election cycles. Effendi explained that it was not easy to convince those at the grass-roots level of the organization about the benefits of Muhammadiyah being politically active. Many believed that Muhammadiyah's participation would drain it of much needed resources, thereby precluding it from perpetuating its primary socio-religious role in society. After visiting and meeting with numerous Muhammadiyah leaders and activists at the district and sub-district levels across Yogyakarta, however, Effendi and his team espoused the idea of *Marwah Muhammadiyah* (the dignity of Muhammadiyah), which would be preserved by winning a seat in the 2014 DPD election. In other words, as one of the largest Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah should have official representatives to promote its socio-religious interests in the national political arena. The senate-like role of the DPD was understood as not only being suited for this purpose but also as the best way to preserve *Marwah Muhammadiyah* within broader Indonesian society.

Nominated as Muhammadiyah's primary political project, Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta issued a set of policies and programs designed to win a seat in the 2014 DPD election. Arif Jamali, the head of *Lembaga Hikmah dan Kebijakan Publik* (the Council of Wisdom and Public Policies) or LHKP, a think-tank-like council within Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, explained the three stages of the project, namely: (i) the mechanism to select an electoral candidate; (ii) the campaign program to introduce the candidate to the public and to win votes at the election; and (iii) the approach to set an interactive link between the elected candidate (if s/he won a seat) and the organization and to assess her/his performance.

> In March 2013, the regional meeting of the organization had instructed me as the head of LHKP to put in place a bottom-up mechanism to select the candidate for the 2014 DPD election. To do so, we sent requests both to the mother organization, the regional board of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, to submit three potential candidates, and the five district-level boards of the organization to nominate a potential candidate each. At the following meeting held in December 2013, we had four candidates, including the former mayor of Yogyakarta, Heri Yudianto, Budi Setiawan (a senior member of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta), Norma Sari (the chairwoman of Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, a youth female wing organization of Muhammadiyah), and the 2009 elected DPD, Afnan Hadikusumo. Thanks to the three candidates who declined to participate, for many different

> reasons, we proceeded smoothly on the way to selecting and officially supporting Afnan Hadikusumo to run for the 2014 DPD election, who was also the incumbent candidate (Interview with Jamali, 15 May 2014).

Based on two organization meetings, LHKP had set up a campaign team, namely the 1912 team, the primary duties of which were to introduce the candidate to the public, especially members and sympathizers of Muhammadiyah across *Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta* (the Special Region of Yogyakarta), and to campaign for their votes for the 2014 DPD election, which was scheduled for 9 April 2014. Effendi explained that the DPD campaign team was designed to duplicate the structural-hierarchical-organizational model of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, with the top level reflecting the regional/provincial level, and the lower ones at the district and sub-district to village-based comunities. The model had a tremendous implication in terms of the proliferation of the campaign teams as they were initiated, established, supported, and financed by many elements of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta, particularly as the grass-roots level. The campaign processes are thus more bottom-up style in which a village-based or sub-district branch of Muhammadiyah held an internal meeting with its members and sympathizers, thereby inviting Hadikusumo and his team to disseminate his political achievement (based on his previous entitlement) and goals, and gather electoral support. David Effendi and Arif Jamali stated that they spent about IDR 700 to 800 million on the campaign alone. The actual amount of money spent, however, was arguably double or triple that given the number of mass meetings, rallies, public advertisements, and transport fees for witnesses at the polling stations on election day, which were paid by anonymous members and/or other elements within Muhammadiyah who refused to be reimbursed.

It is understood that the key factors of success to win a seat at the DPD election rested on the existing ability of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta to mobilize its structural organization and social-cultural capital and convert them into votes. According to a 2015 LPCR (*Lembaga Pengembangan Cabang dan Ranting* or the Institute for the Village and District Development of PP Muhammadiyah) report, compared with two others, the Yogyakarta branch office had the most reach throughout the province, with five offices of five government regencies (100%), 83 branches of 78 government districts (106%) and 606 communities

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of 438 villages (139%) (LPCR PP Muhammadiyah, 2015). The office had been further supported culturally as well as financially by a large number of educational and health institutions – the core social business of Muhammadiyah – with 409 schools, three universities, four hospitals and several clinics (MPI PP Muhammadiyah, 2015). Those organizational representatives and educational-health institutions had provided significant support to the candidate nominated by the branch office. There were no reliable sources, however, concerning the actual number of members of this organization in the province.

Finally, the support for Hadikusumo from Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta in the 2014 DPD election came with its own challenges and consequences. Arif Jamali acknowledged that winning a seat in the election was not solely his team's achievement at the regional board level; it was, in fact, the highest accomplishment of many parts of the organization. So to say, Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta has a right to request a performance report done by Hadikusumo as an elected DPD; and importantly demand further contributions for the organization either in terms of materials or non-materials. Jamali added that there is demand to establish a mechanism to monitor and evaluate Hadikusumo's works and to encourage him to maintain connections with his supporters at the grass-roots level. The effectiveness of this mechanism will determine the organizational effectiveness of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta to conduct future political campaigns for DPD elections and/or even other mayoral or regental elections across the region.

South Sulawesi Case: Pursuing Islamization Agenda

A rather similar story took place in the case of Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi at the DPD elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014. Having failed in its first two attempts with Andi Najamuddin Razak in 2004 and Andi Iskandar Tompo in 2009 (both were senior members of the organization), Muhammadiyah finally enjoyed success at the 2014 election with Muhammad Iqbal Parewangi winning a seat in the DPD. The two previous unsuccessful attempts had been blamed on internal fragmentation and competition within Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi itself. The votes of Muhammadiyah's members and sympathizers had been divided between those candidates making for an unsatisfactory result. In addition, the female wing of Muhammadiyah South

Sulawesi, Aisyiyah, had promoted and supported its own candidate, who gained more votes in the 2009 DPD election. Considering this failure, Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi has barely left away its political engagement by not taking part in the 2014 DPD election; understood as useless attempt without guarantee any result.

As the organization had been politically idle, Muhammad Iqbal Parewangi, who also failed to win a seat at the 2009 DPD election, persuaded Muhammadiyah and Aisyiyah elites in South Sulawesi to support his candidacy for the 2014 DPD election. Though not guaranteeing him any financial backing, the elites acknowledged his request by allowing him to publicly represent Muhammadiyah, to have access to its organizational structures, and to mobilize the support of its members and sympathizers. As a result, Parewangi secured 233,785 votes, finishing fourth behind Ajiep Padiendang with 304,466 votes and Bahar Ngitung with 262,437 votes. Parewangi still, however, finished far behind the three time elected Andi Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, the grandson of a charismatic *ulama* of the province, Kahar Muzakkar, who once took military action against Soekarno's regime in the 1950s. Muzakkar secured more than 1 million votes.

The political involvement of Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi, particularly at the DPD election, could be understood as being inspired (or instructed) by three consecutive *Tanwir* mandates in 2002, 2003 and 2004, all of which urged Muhammadiyah branch offices at all levels to engage in politics at the national and local levels. These mandates were, to a significant extent, responded to by both the elites and members of the branch office in an enthusiastic manner. The former DPD candidate and senior leader of the organization, Andi Iskandar Tompo, illuminates his standpoints regarding the political role that Muhammadiyah should play.

> As you know, we in Muhammadiyah (through the 2004 *Tanwir*) have agreed that politics and *da'wah* (Islamic missionary) must not be separated. This means that politics have been considered a field in which the *da'wah* of Muhammadiyah should be perpetuated. We are against the common understanding that pious Muslims should rationally avoid politics due to its dirtiness. The fact that politics has a poor reputation due to corruption, manipulation, abuses of power and so forth, is because too few good people are eager to take part. This is Muhammadiyah's stance on politics. In South Sulawesi, we have tried hard to push this idea by actively participating in actual politics, especially at the DPD elections since 2004, in which we have the opportunity to compete. Thank God, after failed attempts in

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> 2004 and 2009, in which I participated, we have secured a seat in 2014 (Interview in 28 August 2014).

The active political engagement of Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi has been further elaborated by the political career of the elites, either as individual or as Muhammadiyah representatives, in various political parties. For example, the current chairman of the South Sulawesi regional office, Alwi Uddin, had participated in the early formation of Parmusi before it was amalgamated with other parties to form the government-controlled PPP in the 1970s. Similarly, Iskandar Tompo – one of the leaders of Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi - was elected as a provincial member of parliament for the 2004-2009 period with PAN. Based on our fieldwork, we met several Muhammadiyah youth activists, who were also members of various political parties, including PAN, *Partai Demokrat*, Nasdem, and Golkar, and running campaigns for local parliaments for the 2014 legislative election. That political involvement has been largely inspired by the standpoint that the *da'wah* of Muhammadiyah must be further extended throughout society, including into the political realm.

In the case of the DPD election, political involvement has been set up to further the *da'wah* of Muhammadiyah at another level. According to Assratilllah and Fakhrudin, both coordinators of the 2012 DPD campaign and youth members of Muhammadiyah, the DPD is considered one of the primary fields that should be Islamized by having Muslim representatives elected to it.

> Based on our earlier meeting, Iqbal Parewangi (and other senior figures of Muhammadiyah) set up a tagline 4-0 for Muslims for the 2014 DPD election due to the majority population, about 90% out of 8 million of which are Muslims. To let you know, in 2004, the provincial DPD comprised two Muslim representatives and two Christians. In 2009, we made a progress by electing three Muslim candidates and only one with a non-Muslim affiliation. In the 2014 election, we had planned since the beginning to elect four Muslim affiliates. The rationale is simple: we cannot expect DPD members to support our Islamic causes and interests, moreover our *da'wah*, if they are coming from our religious group. To make matters worse, in the previous two elections, all elected candidates from Muslim backgrounds had no ties t Muhammadiyah; the situation that made us feel unrepresented. Those combined causes led us to push forward together, one of us to become involved in the 2014 DPD election, in which we decided to support Iqbal Parewangi (Interview with Fakhrudin in 27 August 2014).

Nevertheless, as Fakhrudin added, it was clear that all votes from Muhammadiyah members and sympathizers would be far from enough to enable its candidate to win a seat in the 2014 DPD election. The understanding had influenced the strategies perpetuated by Parewangi and his DPD campaign team. Related to this, Ilham, the internal coordinator of the team and a close relative of Parewangi, stated that there existed several separate teams that were working to gather votes from different Muslim groups such as *Nahdlatul Ulama*, *Wahdah Islamiyah*, *Daarul Istiqomah* and so forth. There were also separate teams set up on the basis of the big family of Parewangi and networks on the basis of his Gama College, Kagama, and the association of Yogyakarta universities alumni in South Sulawesi. To note, however, aside from the significant contribution of various Islamic organizations and networking associations to secure a seat for Iqbal Parewangi, this does not mean that the role of Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi was limited.

> At that time, we began by setting up the DPD campaign team, namely the 1912 team resembling the same team as in Yogyakarta. The team mostly comprised Muhammadiyah youth activists, both those based in Makassar and other cities, towns, and villages across South Sulawesi. To let you know, most of us had experience in politics by being involved in political parties, running as candidates in local legislative elections, and taking part as members of campaign teams in various local/national elections too. Some of us had worked in political research and survey institutions and conducted public polling for various political activities. The 1912 team was thus responsible for designing the ways in which all the separate campaign teams worked, with different strategies and targets to secure votes from different segments and societal groups (Interview with Assratillah, 26 August 2014).

The effort of the DPD campaign team of Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi to build networks and work together with various external organizations and institutions had been related to the fact that its organizational representatives cover nearly the whole province. According to a 2015 LPCR report, the branch office had representatives at 23 offices of 24 government regencies (96%), 230 branches of 305 government districts (75%) and only 416 communities of 3024 villages (14%) (LPCR PP Muhammadiyah, 2015). In addition, it owned 189 schools, one university, four academies and eight medium hospitals (MPI PP Muhammadiyah, 2015). Compared to its Yogyakarta counterpart,

these organizational structures and resources were not quite enough, which in turn limited the confidence to nominate a DPD candidate independently who had a good chance to win a seat.

Due to collaboration with other organizations outside Muhammadiyah and informal ties with the elected DPD 2014-2019, Muhammad Iqbal Parewangi, challenges remain for Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi. The branch office will find it difficult to monitor and assess the performance of the DPD and to secure an exclusive commitment to articulate its political aspirations. In other words, Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi might not be in an easy position to call the elected DPD, and might turn to other candidates in the future. Similarly, Parewangi as the elected DPD candidate has no formal responsibility to report his work and achievements to Muhammadiyah, and might therefore seek the support of other social-political and religious organizations in the future.

West Sumatra Case: Pragmatic Politics

Compared to the other two provincial offices, Muhammadiyah West Sumatra is somewhat different. The local leadership of the provincial office has acknowledged Muhammadiyah's position as an independent yet politically inactive civil society organization. In short, Muhammadiyah West Sumatra will not make any declaration in support of any political organization or individual at any election, either locally or nationally.

One of the deputy heads of the provincial branch, Muslim Tawakkal, said, 'Muhammadiyah is always political without any relation to anyone, to any political party, so we are independent' (Interview with Muslim Tawakkal, 2 September 2014). For him, this position is supposed to be consistently held Muhammadiyah leaders which should become the unitary policy across the country. Hence, when he was confronted with the other Muhammadiyah provincial offices, especially the Yogyakarta office, which officially supported a candidate, and in South Sulawesi, where elites and activists supported a candidate, he considered their positions as mere declarations without any written consent. For him, this position, as adopted by the two branches, is still not regarded as an infringement on the national policy.

Adopting a neutral position, this provincial branch has expressed its willingness to make as many connections with political parties and electoral candidates as possible. One of the examples of this loose

position can be seen from believes that many political activists in the province enjoy relations with Muhammadiyah cadres, although the connection seems tenuous, such as being an alumnus of one of its nurseries. It is not uncommon for Muhammadiyah activists to claim that many political figures at the national and regional levels are from the organization as well. The current governor of the province, as well as the recently elected mayor of Padang, the capital, claim to be an important family of Muhammadiyah. Even the current vice president, Jusuf Kalla, according to one of the local Muhammadiyah leaders, is a member of Muhammadiyah. This claim seems to be one-dimensional as he is also known for his affiliation with NU, while the governor and mayor are clearly notable figures of PKS.

At the same time, Muhammadiyah is attractive to electoral candidates. They understand that Muhammadiyah enjoys great influence in the province. Hence, in order to win votes, an association with Muhammadiyah can be important. Four candidates for the DPD are members or at least are associated with the organization. At this point, Muhammadiyah has a clear policy that anyone can claim membership but the organization will give their preference to a selected candidate who is regarded as their representative. Furthermore, Muhammadiyah is also supportive of any of its members who become politically active, which is part of their commitment to the betterment of the country, as long as they do not declare themselves to be a Muhammadiyah representative.

Since the beginning of the DPD election, Muhammadiyah always gives its unofficial support to Irman Gusman, who was the leader of the DPD parliamentary chamber. Having been elected on three consecutive occasions, in 2004, 2009, and 2014, Gusman is positioned as the most electable candidate. For Muhammadiyah, it has not been a difficult decision to endorse his candidacy because he has been regarded as a member of the Muhammadiyah West Sumatra family. As a descendant of the founder of Muhammadiyah University in Padang, and following on in his father's activist footsteps, Gusman has served as the advisory member of this Muhammadiyah branch office. Hence, senior activists have not hesitated to support him and to openly urge other members and sympathizers of Muhammadiyah to show their support for him at the ballot box.

Such support is provided not through written consent, but through a verbal endorsement and a request that the candidate himself speak in

front of members of Muhammadiyah at official gatherings. Members are not punished for, or discouraged from, not voting for someone such as Irman Gusman. Muhammadiyah also does not provide any tangible support, so the candidate has to cover his own expenses. Although his major campaign manager, Zaitul Ikhlas, is a former head of Muhammadiyah in West Sumatera, his support is not part of the organization's effort to win his candidacy.

Gusman's close association with Muhammadiyah also means that such an endorsement can be quite emotional. With such loose relations, there is no demand for compensation for the support provided by Muhammadiyah. The local leaders of Muhammadiyah are relatively relaxed with regard to any reward for such support. Their only hope is that their cadre will contribute to the development of a better Indonesia.

> Our hope is as what he [i.e. Irman Gusman] has contributed [to the organization's expenses] as usual. We also want him to do whatever he can for the country, for the *ummah*, as long as he is there. That is all. We have no association in terms of an agreement if he wins that he should do this and that. No! …. We usually give this position to our cadres as the cadre of the organization as well as the country. So, if he [or she] is elected, he [or she] has understood automatically. Usually Muhammadiyah cadres are just like that, without any request he [or she] will give the best, either for the institution or for the members in general." (Interview with Muslim Tawakkal, 2 September 2014)

There is no pressure on candidates to provide Muhammadiyah with any reward if elected. In the case of Irman Gusman, Muhammadiyah West Sumatra had only asked that it be remembered and that Gusman attend its main activities as a sign of respect. So far, he has not disappointed the Muhammadiyah leaders and cadres, having endeavoured to provide Muhammadiyah with attention and a donation. Although the latter was not expected, a donation is typically appreciated. The recent gratification case in which Gusman became embroiled in early 2017, however, may call into question Gusman's donation to Muhammadiyah. It is certainly not something that an endorsed senator should do.

This kind of relationship is quite different from the problem that has been identified as Muhammadiyah's weakness, which is the need for material support from the state. The reason for not asking for a direct tangible relationship is the perception among the local leaders that Muhammadiyah is bigger than anything, including the state itself.

The leaders are proud of the fact that Muhammadiyah's establishment precedes Indonesian independence. Hence, the goverment's changes (namely Old Order, New Order, Reform Era) are part of the long historical enrichment that has made Muhammadiyah bigger than others. According to the local leaders, political dynamics are part of the change and what is perennial is the organization itself. So, there is no need for the organization to be reliant on politics to ensure its continued survival. It has thousands of members that can support all of its activities and services. This claim is rather optimistic as well as exaggerated, but judging by the existence of some of the local services provided by Muhammadiyah in the sub-urban areas of Padang, the quality of the buildings for local health services is adequate, if not luxurious.

The lack of confidence and ambition of Muhammadiyah West Sumatra to engage with the political realm during the 2014 DPD election could be understood based on its limited resources. Compared to South Sulawesi, however, the West Sumatra office was represented in 19 offices of 19 government regencies (100%), 157 branches of 179 government districts (88%), and 511 communities of 1145 villages (45%) (LPCR PP Muhammadiyah, 2015). The provincial office, however, owns fewer educational and health institutions compared to the other two offices, with only 126 schools, one university, four academies and one medium-sized hospital (MPI PP Muhammadiyah, 2015), which traditionally provide the office with cultural and financial support. Muhammadiyah's rather limited structural resources in West Sumatra meant it opted for candidates from its cultural basis and give them unofficial support in the 2014 DPD election.

Therefore, the political engagement of Muhammadiyah West Sumatra has been pragmatic and angled towards giving those candidates with loose links to the organization access to its membership. With relatively limited resources, there is a tendency to have a reciprocal relationship with political leaders although still in polite forms. For the leaders of Muhammadiyah's youth wing, all political support should be mirrored in the form of local policies that are supportive for the organization. For Murisal and Derry, the leaders of *Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah* (AMM or the Muhammadiyah Youth Cohort) in the province, the support for the organization's activities is inevitable for every local leader at the provincial or regental level. Although Muhammadiyah does not

support an elected governor, for example, the local government should still attend to those social services organized by Muhammadiyah. For example, Muhammadiyah currently operates 70 orphanages across the province. It is therefore awkward if local governments deny this reality and are unwilling to support. For them, giving support to Muhammadiyah is part of the mandatory service that is given to the society as a whole within which Muhammadiyah is an active part.

For the young activists, Gusman is regarded as the senior statesman who can provide them a political channel to the national level. So, the relation with the candidates is developed as a patron to client relationship, although in a loose manner. Many younger activists voluntarily support different DPD candidates, not only Gusman, due to kinship relations or seniority at an institution. Therefore, for the youths who, according to the AMM leader, have a greater appetite to be active in politics more than the elderly, this activism is part of their initiation to political dynamics more broadly.

Conclusion

Throughout this article, we have explained that local Muhammadiyah offices – Yogyakarta, South Sulawesi and West Sumatra – have shown an eagerness to take part not only in politics, but also the broader democratization process of the country. The decision is not without consequences, as Muhammadiyah has been urged to mobilize its resources for political campaigns, while its members and sympathizers have been encouraged to vote for Muhammadiyah-affiliated candidates at the ballot box. There are, however, different policies that have been adopted by those local Muhammadiyah offices. In Yogyakarta, the organization has provided its candidate both official and financial support at three elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014. Meanwhile, in South Sulawesi and West Sumatra, Muhammadiyah has only provided informal support, namely urging its members and sympathizers to vote for the relevant candidate. To some extent, both in Yogyakarta and South Sulawesi, the involvement of local Muhammadiyah offices in the DPD election has been stimulated by a rivalry with other social-religious organizations, either within broader Muslim communities and other religious groups in the area. For Muhammadiyah West Sumatra, there exists a policy to restrict the involvement of Muhammadiyah into the realm of politics with the main normative argument being that

the organization must stand above all political factions in the region, in which members and sympathizers of Muhammadiyah have been fragmentally affiliated.

The DPD election has revealed a duality by providing an opportunity for non-political party candidates to compete for seats as independent candidates. For some, including local Muhammadiyah elites, however, this is an opportunity to express the organization's political ambitions. This opportunity is taken by many candidates to represent their organization and the more competition between organizations occurs the more the organization feels compelled to enable formal candidates to take part. The case of Yogyakarta is an obvious one and the feeling of being superior to others as in the case of West Sumatera shows the reluctance to compete formally. The motivation to compete formally is to represent the organization in the political arena, as if the civil has political resources that should be acknowledged. There is also an indication that the more local elites have resources, the more eager they are to introduce their own official candidates. This nature of political opportunity is obviously different from what the theorists of social movements have defined as the involvement in elections crossing the boundary between the civil and the political (political party).

In short, the case of these three Muhammadiyah branch offices underlines the possibility of the civil becoming the political, as long as the opportunity to do so is available. It also underlines the embedded political character of a supposedly social Islamic organization. It should be noted, however, that involvement in electoral activity is due to competitive relations with other organizations, so a civil organization feels it is necessary to act and behave like a political party in terms of resource mobilization. Therefore, the organization's confidence vis-à-vis the resources it can mobilize is key to this process. The records of an organization's resources (i.e. network of local committees and affiliation, schools, universities, and hospitals) are consistent with the multiplicity of political engagement. Yogyakarta, which has reputable Muhammadiyah universities and hospitals, along with strong local activism, is more eager to nominate an official candidate for every DPD election. In contrast, West Sumatra has a completely different approach as it has no great resources. Nevertheless, questions, such as how those resources are mobilized and materialized into political support at the ballot box, require further research.

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It has also to be noted that such involvement is not permanent and will not be similar in different circumstances. The case of South Sulawesi shows that official support can also change to informal support after two unsuccessful attempts to have a Muhammadiyah-affiliated political candidate enter the DPD. Therefore, although it is possible to have direct participation in elections due to the competitive nature in a particular province, it will not transform Muhammadiyah into political party. It is the nature of an Islamic social organization to want to express itself politically, but it is also the nature of a social organization to restrain itself from becoming a political party.

Endnotes

1. He was known also as the grandson of Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, a former chairman of Muhammadiyah during the late colonial and early Indonesian independence and a national hero of the country.
2. The year of 1912 refers to the foundation of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta by Ahmad Dahlan.
3. Gama College is an education institution founded by Iqbal Parewangi himself that offers the preparation course for high school students to pass the National Exam and the state-owned university enrollment.
4. Kagama (acronym from Keluarga Alumni Universitas Gadjah Mada Yogyakarta) is a forum for alumni of Gadjah Mada University, which Iqbal Parewangi has acted as the coordinator for South Sulawesi.
5. He was later dismissed from the DPD for receiving bribes and corruption and now sentenced to jail for 5 years.

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ستوديا اسلاميا

ستوديا إسلاميكا

مجلة **إندونيسية** للدراسات الإسلامية

السنة السادسة والعشرون، العدد ١، ٢٠١٩

دور المرأة في أسرة السلفية الجهادية في فرض الانضباط على جسم الأبناء

أم ناحجة فكريتي ومحمد نجيب أزكى

اليهود في مؤلفات المسلمين بإندونيسيا: دراسة أولية

عصمة الرفيع