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Mapping Radical Islam in Indonesia

Abstraksi: *Munculnya gerakan keagamaan yang bersifat radikal merupakan fenomena penting yang turut mewarnai citra Islam kontemporer Indonesia. Munculnya Front Pembela Islam (FPI) dan gerakan kelompok lasykar Jihad Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah misalnya, patut dilihat secara proporsional, karena fenomena ini memiliki tempat tersendiri dalam diskursus kehidupan sosial politik dan keagamaan kontemporer.*

Artikel ini berusaha mendiskusikan fenomena munculnya gerakan keagamaan yang bersifat radikal tersebut, mulai dari akar kemunculannya, hingga karakteristik, sifat organisasi, nilai-nilai, potensi, serta jaringan yang dimiliki masing-masing kelompok tersebut.

Dijelaskan bahwa yang dimaksud dengan kelompok 'Islam radikal' di sini adalah kelompok yang mempunyai keyakinan ideologis tinggi untuk menggantikan tatanan nilai dan sistem yang sedang berlangsung yang dianggap tidak sesuai dengan apa yang mereka yakini. Dalam perjuangan itu, tak jarang mereka menggunakan aksi-aksi yang keras, bahkan tidak menutup kemungkinan kasar terhadap kegiatan kelompok lain yang dinilai bertentangan dengan keyakinan mereka. Secara sosio-kultural dan sosio-religious, kelompok ini memiliki ikatan kelompok kuat yang tertutup dan menampilkan identitas yang khas.

Pertanyaan yang mengemuka kemudian adalah apa warna ideologi yang khas dari sebuah gerakan 'Islam radikal'? Harus dicermati bahwa dalam beberapa literatur, istilah-istilah yang digunakan untuk menggambarkan sebuah fenomena kontemporer 'fundamentalime' dalam Islam tidaklah seragam. Karena itu istilah 'Islam radikal' seringkali dipakai secara overlapping *dengan istilah 'Islam fundamentalis' atau 'Islam revivalis'.*

John L. Esposito, sebagai misalnya dalam bukunya Islam: The Straight Path *(1988), lebih suka menggunakan istilah 'Islam revivalis' untuk menunjuk gerakan Islam kontemporer itu.*

Secara sederhana kemunculan gerakan 'Islam radikal' di Indonesia disebabkan oleh beberapa hal:

Pertama, *betapa pun bibit gerakan 'Islam radikal' mulai bersemi setelah masa kemerdekaan yang ditandai dengan munculnya gerakan Darul Islam/ Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII), gerakan 'Islam radikal' kontemporer secara organisatoris dapat dinyatakan mulai muncul kembali pada akhir 1970-an dan mendapatkan momentum semenjak pecahnya Revolusi Islam Iran. Pada periode ini, keberhasilan kelompok Mullah menggulingkan kekuasaan Shah Iran pada 1979 yang dianggap sebagai lambang budaya Barat, memberikan inspirasi kepada gerakan serupa di wilayah Muslim lainnya. Di Indonesia, walaupun pengaruh Iran pada waktu itu belum begitu mengarah pada munculnya gerakan Syi'ah karena ditentang oleh mayoritas Muslim Indonesia yang berpaham Sunni, Revolusi Iran telah mengilhami lahirnya kelompok-kelompok radikal semacam kelompok Usroh, kelompok pengajian di kalangan mahasiswa yang meniru gaya imamah Syi'ah.*

Kedua, *gerakan 'Islam radikal', sebagaimana kelompok-kelompok sosial politik lain, muncul ke permukaan pada masa reformasi ketika pintu gerbang kebebasan menyampaikan pendapat dan berasosiasi dibuka. Pada masa ini, beberapa kelompok keagamaan, khususnya Islam, yang selama rezim Orde Baru terpinggirkan mulai mengekspresikan kekecewaan psikologis yang tersimpan cukup lama terhadap Pemerintah yang dianggap tidak adil. Inilah yang disebut oleh Lawrence yang dikutip oleh Martin E. Marty dan R. Scott Appleby dalam* Fundamentalisms Observed *(1994) sebagai* delayed reaction to psychological hegemony, *yakni suatu reaksi yang tertunda atas hegemoni psikologis yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah sekuler yang dianggap bertentangan atau jauh dari norma-norma Islam.*

Beberapa kelompok yang menjadi fokus pembahasan artikel ini adalah: Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Lasykar Jihad Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah, dan Majlis Mujahiddin Indonesia (MMI). Pembatasan beberapa organisasi tersebut terutama didasarkan pada perkembangan selama lima tahun terakhir, di mana organisasi-organisasi tersebut menunjukkan "gregetnya" sebagai sebuah gerakan, kendati belakangan agak surut, dan bahkan organisasinya "dibekukan".

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خلاصة: يعد نشوء الحركات الدينية ذات الطابع المحلي ظاهرة هامة قد أسهمت فى إعطاء الصبغة الإسلامية لإندونيسيا، وظهور جبهة الدفاع عن الإسلام (Front Pembela Islam/FPI) وحركة جماعة الجهاد(Lasykar Jihad) لأهل السنة والجماعة على سبيل المثال ينبغى النظر إليه بشكل موضوعي ومنصف لأن لهذه الظاهرة مكانتها الخاصة فيما هو متداول من الأحاديث المتعلقة بالحياة الاجتماعية والسياسية والدينية المعاصرة.

وهذه المقالة تحاول أن تناقش ظاهرة نشوء الحركات الدينية ذات الطابع الراديكالي أو المتطرف ابتداء من أصول النشأة وطبيعة الحركة وأساليب التنظيم والقيم التي تلتزم بها والإمكانات التي تمتلكها وكذلك الشبكة التنظيمية التى تتصل من خلالها كل جماعة بعضها ببعض.

ومن الواضح أن المراد بالجماعة الإسلامية المتطرفة هنا هي الجماعة التي تجاهد بعقيدتها الراسخة من أجل تغيير الأنظمة والقيم السائدة اعتقادا من أفرادها بأن تلك الأنظمة والقيم مخالفة لما تؤمن بها هي، وفى سبيل تحقيق ذلك لم يندر أن يستخدموا فى نشاطهم وسائل القوة بل لا يبعد أن يلجأوا إلى العنف ضد نشاط الجماعات الأخرى التى يعتبرونها مخالفة لعقائدهم، والحق أنه من الناحية الاجتماعية والثقافية والدينية كذلك تتمتع هذه الجماعات برابطة قوية وهي منغلقة على نفسها مع الحرص على إبراز هويتها الخاصة.

والسؤال الذى يفرض نفسه هنا هو ما الطابع الخاص المتميز لما سمي بالحركة الإسلامية المتطرفة؟ وهذا مع ضرورة التحقق بأنه فى بعض المراجع يأتى استخدام المطلحات التى تشير إلى ظاهرة الأصولية فى العالم الإسلامى اليوم غير متماثلة ولذلك فإن مصطلح التطرف الإسلامي كثيرا ما يستخدم بشكل متداخل مع مصطلح الأصولية الإسلامية أو الانبعاث الإسلامى، والاستاذ جون ل أسبوسيتو (John L. Esposito) يفضل استخدام مصطلح الانبعاث الإسلامى للإشارة إلى تلك الحركات الإسلامية المعاصرة.

والواقع أن أسباب نشوء الحركات الإسلامية المتطرفة بإندونيسيا ترجع إلى أمور أولها جذور التطرف الإسلامى الذي ظهر بعد استقلال البلاد من الاستعمار المتمثل فى قيام حركة دار الإسلام والجيش الإسلامي (DI/TII) الانفصالية.

أما من الناحية التنظيمية فإن ظهور التطرف الإسلامي بإندونيسيا يمكن إرجاعه إلى أواخر السبعينات ووجد له قوة الدفع منذ انفجار الثورة الإسلامية الإيرانية، ففى هذه الفترة كان النجاح الذي حققه رجال الدين في عزل شاه إيران من عرشه عام ١٩٧٩ الذى يعد رمزا للثقافة الغربية قد أعطى قوة دفع للحركات المماثلة فى المناطق الأخرى من العالم الإسلامي، وأما فى إندونيسيا فلم يكن التأثر بإيران من القوة بحيث يتجه بالبلاد إلى نشوء حركة الشيعة لأنها مرفوضة لدى غالبية المسلمين بإندونيسيا الذين يعتنقون مذهب أهل السنة، ومع ذلك فإن الثورة الإيرانية كانت موضع استلهام الجماعات المتطرفة من أمثال جماعة الأسرة وجماعة الحلقات التى ينظمها الطلبة الذين يسيرون على غرار الإمامة الشيعية.

وثانيها أن الحركات الإسلامية المتطرفة برزت إلى الأفق كما يحدث للجماعات السياسية الأخرى في عهد الحركة الإصلاحية عندما انفتحت الأبواب على مصراعيها أمام حرية التجمع العام وحرية التعبير عن الرأي، ففي هذه الفترة بدأت الجماعات الدينية وبالأخص الإسلامية منها التي كانت في عهد نظام الحكم الجديد السابق محرومة من المشاركة الوطنية تعبر عن استيائها لتلك الحكومة التي اعتبرتها ظالمة وطاغية، وهذا هو الذي أسماه لورينس (Lawrence) رد الفعل (النفساني) المؤجل ضد التسلط المفروض من الخارج والذي نقله مارتن أي ملوتي (Martin E. Marty) و ر. سكوت آبليبي (R. Scott Appleby) في كتاب *Fundamentalism Observed* (١٩٩٤)، وهو رد فعل الجماعات السياسية التي تعاني من القمع إبان فترة الحكومة العلمانية التي اعتبرتها تلك الجماعات حكومة خارجة عن القيم الإسلامية.

وأما الجماعات التي تدخل في الموضوعات التي يتناولها هذه المقالة فهي جبهة الدفاع عن الإسلام وحركة جماعة الجهاد لأهل السنة والجماعة ومجلس المجاهدين الإندونيسيين (MMI)، ووجه انحصار البحث في هذه الجماعات بناء على التطورات خلال الخمس سنوات الأخيرة حيث تبرز فيها معبرة عن نفسها بكل قوة وتفرض وجودها كحركة على الرغم من انحسار نشاطها في الآونة الأخيرة بل تعرض البعض منها للتجميد.

THERE have, in recent times, been many discussions about religious revival. This revival is reflected in increasing religious dedication, such as Christians and Catholics visiting church, and Muslims performing prayer five times a day, fasting and fulfilling other religious duties.[1] All religions are experiencing this religious revival. In Indonesia, for example, it can be seen from the rise in numbers of middle class and urban middle class performing religious duties. During Ramadhan, the increasing religious dedication can be seen everywhere: in television programs, hotels and offices.

This religious revival is an interesting phenomenon because it occurs exactly at a time when people think that the rational forces of science and technology have been able to sideline spiritual mystery. This movement is gaining momentum at a time when many believe that material wealth leads to happiness.

What is an appropriate term for the emergence of religions on the world's center stage? Some call it a revival, but others consider it to be a rediscovery.[2] Revivalism implies a kind of collective turning point, a return to religion. Thus, the question is whether the increasing number of people performing their religious duties is a sign of religious revival or of religious rediscovery. In fact, the religious feelings of modern people never disappeared, so when they returned to their religion, it was actually only a rediscovery of their 'lost' faith.[3]

One salient trend in the religious revival is the strengthening of the so-called fundamentalist movements in almost all religions throughout the world. This can be seen from the emergence of 'militant' Muslims in Iran and Lebanon, the increasing influence of Zionist factions in Israel, the deepening conflict between Protestants and Catholics in North Ireland, and the popularity of 'televangelists' in America. This trend shows that there has been a reorientation within society towards appreciating religion, albeit in a number of different formats.

In Indonesia, the increasing commitment among Muslims towards their religious practices is part of a religious revival in a global sense. The religious revival in Indonesia can be explained partly as a crisis of modernity. The emphasis placed on material life, the marginalization of spirituality and the dominance of rational thinking due to developments in science and technology, are all contributing factors to the religious revival. This revival can be seen from the increasing numbers of middle class Muslims

who attend religious sermons and the large number of students who attend sermon groups at campus mosques.

The demise of the New Order authority has opened up a space for new social, political and religious movements. Political openness has given rise to many organizations expressing their members' aspirations. The emergence of organizations and movements is made possible by the delayed responses to the authoritarian New Order political system.[4] The emergence of various social and political movements, which are in sharp contrast to the mono-ideological movements in the New Order era, is hardly surprising. Organizations of laborers, teachers, students and other social movements are growing in many Indonesian cities. On the political stage, many political parties using religious and social symbols join Indonesian democracy festivals. The Indonesian reformation era is also has also seen a rise in the number of religious groups that utilize religious-militant symbols. Because the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, Islamic groups dominate the growing religious movement.

The emergence of new Islamic movements, such as radical Islamic groups, liberal Islamic groups and Islamic political parties will no doubt influence the social and political future of Indonesia. Some of the Islamic parties participating in the 1999 general election used Islam as their ideological and political base. They campaigned to implement Islamic *Sharī'ah* in society, and attempted to introduce *Piagam Jakarta* (the Jakarta Charter) into the Constitution, in particular so as to include the clause: "Muslims are obliged to abide by Islamic syari'at." It is undeniable that the emergence of ideological issues introduced by Islamic parties has influenced Indonesia's current political system.

This paper focuses on the emergence of groups that, according to their followers, want to apply Islamic teachings comprehensively (*kāffah*) and wholeheartedly. These groups have been variously described as fundamentalist, extremist, radical, and militant. Of course, they do not apply these labels to themselves. The labeling of certain groups has resulted in them gaining negative or pejorative images. It is important to note that the label "fundamentalism," initially applied to Christian-Protestant groups, actually has a neutral meaning. It refers to groups that attempt to return to their basic religious foundations. Implicit in their goals is the rejection of rationality, as it is assumed to bypass revelation or religion as the justification of truth. As a result, these groups re-

ject progress in science and technology as it developed along with rationalism. However, when this "fundamentalist" label was given to Islamic groups, these characteristics were not considered to be appropriate and were never applied.

Islamic Militant Groups in Indonesia: Tracing the Socio-Historical Roots

Militant Islam is an interesting case for many reasons. It is particularly fascinating, not only because of the Bali Bombing itself, but because of the accusations from some states that the perpetrators of the bombing came from moderate or middle-line Muslim groups. The attention directed towards these moderate Muslim groups is neither the result of the 11 September 2001 WTC tragedy, nor of Samuel P. Huntington's thesis of "*Clash of Civilization*" after the demise of Soviet Union. Rather, these moderate Muslims have long attracted attention. If interest in moderate Muslim groups were precipitated by the above events, the intellectual writings and research on the groups would only have appeared recently.

The long-term attention paid to both moderate and militant Muslims can be seen in books such as *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* written by John L. Esposito. This book not only responds to Huntington's thesis,[5] but it also contains studies on militant Muslims in Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, and Algiers. It shows that the rise of militant Islam occurred long before the cases mentioned above. This shows that not all militant Islamic movements have emerged as a result of conflict and hatred toward the West.

The militant movements in Iran, for example—although it has a strong anti-Western element—can be traced historically from the marginalization of the Shī'ah group, particularly the descendents of 'Alī, from the Islamic political mainstream at that time. During the Mu'āwiyah Caliphate, 'Alī's family were hunted and arrested as enemies of the state. Shī'ah evolved into a clandestine group and in this marginalized condition, separated from the rest of society, the Shī'ah community became strong and stable. The logical implication of this was that the Shī'ah members' dedication to their leaders was very strong. It is not surprising that Shī'ah movement was strongly influenced by the belief that the savior or messiah would return with the arrival of the new millennium. It is clear that the emergence of militant groups in Iran was initially not the result of anti-American sentiment. Anti-American sentiment only appeared recently, in particular when Imam Khumaeni led an Is-

lamic revolution to topple Reza Pahlevi, who was supported by the Americans.

In Indonesia, the history of hard-line or radical Muslims can be traced back from the Bali Bomb and other recent tragedies. One of the radical Islamic movements that emerged in modern Indonesia was DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia or Islamic State/Indonesia Islamic Force).[6] The DI/TII movement grew in three areas: West Java, Aceh and Macassar. The movement began in West Java, and was then joined by supporters in Aceh and Macassar for different reasons. Their movements were united by a shared goal to implement *sharī'ah* as the main foundation of the Indonesian state.

The DI/TII movement became active when, during the Indonesian revolution, a guerilla movement under the leadership of Kartosuwiryo rejected the Renville agreement between Indonesia and the Dutch government.[7] Kartosuwiryo and his supporters then moved from Central Java to West Java to continue their struggle against Dutch colonial rule. They took control of three regions in West Java: Ciamis, Garut and Tasikmalaya, which then became their headquarters. Kartosuwiryo and his supporters rejected the position of the Indonesian government, which accepted the Renville agreement, declared Islamic *sharī'ah* as the basic law for his group and started the struggle for an Indonesia Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia—NII). The Darul Islam movement ceased operation when all of its leaders were arrested or killed in early 1960s.

Islamic hard-line movements appeared once again in the early 1970s and 1980s. Groups such as Komando Jihad, Ali Imron, Terror Warman and the like were active during this period. They declared war against communism in Indonesia. As a result of this declaration, there were rumors that these groups were 'exploited' —if not formed— by Indonesian intelligence in order to fight Communism. Moreover, these groups were also used to legitimize the New Order government's ban on and repression of militant Indonesian Islamic movements. This program of prohibition and repression was a government strategy to sever the possible links between these groups and the political parties that used religious issues in their campaigns. The government strategy was deemed to be a success and for a long time these hard-line Islamic groups were stigmatized and given a bad name.

During the reformation era the Islamic hard-line movements reappeared in significant numbers, including the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam), Lasykar Jihad and Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia. Apart from being a delayed psychological response to an authoritarian regime, the reappearance of these movements is a normal reaction to newly found political openness. Islamic middle-line groups are just one kind of movement that appeared during the reformation era.

From the short explanation above, it can be seen that the emerging hard-line Islamic movements have different backgrounds. They grew out of local political issues, such as political failures in the regime, political marginalization, and other similar reasons. Initially, religion was not the main cause of their formation. However, after the movements were formed, religion played an important role in legitimizing and binding the groups.

Solidarity with Muslims in other parts of the world is another important contributing factor in the growth of radical movements. A popular example of this is the Palestinian issue. Indonesian Islamic movements see the weak responses from the West towards the Israeli occupation of Palestine as an imbalance and injustice, particularly in comparison to the harsh measures taken by the West towards Iraq. The Palestine problem is an important one in terms of Muslim solidarity, and one that can instigate radical attitudes among the movements.

In relation to Muslim solidarity, the Islamic revolution in Iran has also inspired hard-line Islamic movements. The leader of the revolution, Imam Khumaeni, was seen as a symbol of repressed Muslims in a struggle against oppression. The influence of this revolution on the movements in Indonesia can be seen in the behavior, clothes and the style in which members of these movements express their aims and goals.

In theological terms, the hard-line Islamic movements are known for their textual approach to understanding Islam. By focusing on the texts, they understand religion as is, or as it is written in the verses of the holy book. The textual approach has been criticized for its negation of the social, historical, political and rational contexts within which doctrines or religious decisions have been applied in the past. In other words, they disregard the *raison d'etre* of religious doctrine. This approach is also called a scripturalist approach. By taking this perspective, they capture the golden age history of Islam as a 'text', which should be realized as it was in the past, without any interpretation.

A Profile of Contemporary Islamic Militant Movements

Several organizations in Indonesia are considered to be militant Islamic groups. Many emerged after the fall of Soeharto, but others emerged as a reaction to regional conflicts between Muslims and Christians. Each organization has its own political background and *raison d'etre,* which leads to various similarities between them, as well as considerable differences.

Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam—FPI)

The FPI movement emerged after the fall of Soeharto, when Habibie was appointed by Parliament as the Indonesian President. It aimed at providing balance to the large student protests following the appointment. The students considered Habibie's government to be a continuation of Soeharto's New Order and grew bigger and bigger until the Parliament held its annual session and asked Habibie to step down.

Initially the group was called Pam Swakarsa (Paramilitary Group), its members recruited by the Indonesian military (TNI) to smooth the annual parliamentary session. They were recruited from various regions including, among others, Banten and Central Java. Pam Swakarsa then developed into FPI.

The FPI was emerged as a pressure group in Jakarta, which aimed to eradicate immoral behavior such as prostitution, attending nightclubs and so on. It was led by a young religious teacher, Habib Riziq Shihab. FPI attracted people's attention because it often used violence in its quest to eradicate immorality.

Although FPI rejected the leadership of Megawati on the basis of her gender, it was not set on the issue. The protest against Megawati, one day after she was chosen as the Fifth Indonesian President in an MPR Special Session in 2001 was not followed up with further protests. In fact, FPI was busy campaigning to close down cafes and brothels. To implement Islamic *sharī'ah* in Indonesia, FPI mobilized its supporters in an attempt to include the *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter) into the Constitution. The main issues chosen and the prioritized agenda of the group mean that FPI has its own "area of concern" that differs from that of other militant groups such as Lasykar Jihad Ahlussunnah Waljamaah and Majelis Mujahidin.

FPI was founded on the 53rd Indonesia Independence Day, 17 August 1998. It was lunched at Pesantren al-Umm Ciputat in South

Jakarta by K.H Misbahul Anam. The declaration was followed by a sermon to celebrate the anniversary of the Pesantren al-Umm. The idea to form FPI came from a discussion between Habieb Muhammad Rizieq Syihab (or Habib Rizieq) and Misbahul Anam, who became the founders of FPI. They were concerned about increasing immorality within society. Both of them appealed to other *'ulamā'* and *ḥabā'ib*, such as KH Cecep Busthomi (who was shot dead), KH Damanhuri and Habib Idrus Jamalullail to join.[8]

According to Habib, the goals of FPI, as an Islamic organization based on the *ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā'ah* faith (from *manhaj Salafī*), were to perform good deeds and to reject immorality. The words 'Islamic Defenders' in FPI, according to Habib Rizieq, mean that they not only defend Muslims but also Islamic values, which may also be followed by non-Muslims. FPI's motto is 'Live Respectably or Die as a Martyr' (*Hidup Mulia atau Mati Syahid*).

FPI's initial goal was to promote Islamic *sharī'ah*. Habib Rizieq, who wrote the book *Dialog Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter Dialogues), and other FPI activists support the inclusion of Piagam Jakarta into the Indonesian Constitution.[9] The aim of applying Islamic *sharī'ah* was communicated through a special body, named the Committee for the Implementation of Islamic *sharī'ah* (Komite Penegakan Syari'at Islam), that worked widely in regional areas. Within two years, according to KH Misbahul Anam, FPI recruited 15 million members from over 18 provinces.[10]

For FPI, the implementation of Islamic *sharī'ah* was not intended to replace the foundation or form of the Indonesian State. FPI acknowledged that the Republic of Indonesia Unity State was final. What FPI was fighting for was an adjustment to the positive laws in accordance with Islamic *sharī'ah*, as mentioned in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah.

The targets of the FPI movement were communities in the outskirts of the city, such as Ciputat and Bekasi, or in urban slums. FPI had a systematic chain of command, right down to the village level. That was how FPI was able to quickly mobilize its supporters whenever they were required to protest or take action against 'immorality'. This was also made possible because of the influence of Habib networks among Arab descendents who were highly respected by the Betawi community.

After the Indonesian security forces took a series of harsh actions against the PFI activities of destroying bars and nightclubs, the FPI leaders temporarily froze their organization. Several FPI

leaders, including its main leader Habib Riziq, were arrested for destroying property.

Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah)

Discussions concerning Lasykar Jihad Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah cannot be separated from discussions about the Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah -FKAWJ). Similarly, FKAWJ needs to be addressed in relation to an important leader of the organization, Ja'far Umar Thalib. FKAWJ was founded as a result of the hard work of Ja'far and his followers. FKAWJ was launched during a large address in Yogyakarta on 14 February 1999. M. Umar As Sewed, Ayib Syafruddin and Ma'ruf Bahrun developed FKAWJ along with Ja'far.

The lineage of FKAWJ is closely related to that of Jamaah al-Turats al-Islami in Yogyakarta, a movement founded by Ja'far and Abu Nida (Chamsaha Sofwan). This group was a "semi clandestine" movement that held its meetings secretly. Thus, it is not surprising this group was commonly associated with movements such as Ikhwanul Muslimin and DI/TII.[11] The Pesantren Ihya'u as-Sunnah, led by Ja'far Umar Thalib in Yogyakarta, became FKAWJ's base. The main goal of FKAWJ was to facilitate the restoration of Muslim 'honor', which was neglected during the authoritarian New Order regime.[12]

The birth of FKAWJ was motivated by the economic, political and social-historical crisis taking place in Indonesia during the reformation era. Initially, FKAWJ joined other Islamic groups to support Habibie. FKAWJ, with its military wing, Lasykar Jihad, joined the Muslim Forum (Forum Umat Islam), which at that time supported the Habibie government. They argued that the mass protests by students and others against Habibie's government were a reaction to having a Muslim leadership.

Lasykar Jihad and its followers also appeared on the center stage in early 2000 when they called for jihad in Ambon to help Muslims fight Christians in the Mollucas. They argued that jihad was required because there was a separatist group, RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan – South Mollucas Republic), behind the ethno-religious conflicts in Ambon. The RMS group wanted to separate from Indonesia and Lasykar Jihad argued that it was their role to defend Indonesia's red and white flag.

However, the presence of Lasykar Jihad in Ambon exacerbated the religious conflict. Lasykar Jihad, representing clearly Islamic factions, had instigated the rise of similar groups of Christian and Catholic followers, such as Lasykar Kristus. It cannot be denied that after the arrival of Lasykar Jihad, the conflicts in the region became religious ones.

Another Lasykar Jihad goal was to implement Islamic *sharī'ah* in Indonesia. When it conducted the holy war in Ambon, *sharī'ah* already applied to its members. This was brought into play when a member of Lasykar Jihad had illegal sexual intercourse (without conducting a formal marriage), known as *zina*, and was punished by being stoned to death, as the law is written in Islamic *sharī'ah*. This punishment instantly drew strong protest. Although struggling for the implementation of *sharī'ah*, Lasykar Jihad claimed that it was not attempting to build an Islamic State in Indonesia, as was being claimed by middle-line Islamic groups. They claimed that their focus was only on improving the quality of individual Islam.

Together with conducting jihad, Lasykar Jihad developed *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) that initially, according to Lasykar Jihad leaders, aimed at caring orphans from Ambon. A *pesantren* at the Mungkid village in Magelang, for example, was predominantly made up of pupils from Ambon. The pesantren also functioned as a place for university students to deepen their religious knowledge, and to teach refugee children from Ambon how to read and write.

Eventually, Lasykar Jihad closed down its organization and ceased activities after receiving an order (*fatwā*) from its *Imām* in Medina. The dissolution of the group prompted many questions because it occurred just after the bombing in Bali, which caused speculation that the group's dissolution was related to the bombing. This speculation, however, was rejected by Ja'far Umar Thalib, who stated that Lasykar Jihad was closed down purely in accordance with the *fatwā* of their *Imām* in Medina. According to Ja'far, their *Imām* saw that Lasykar Jihad had been misused by its members, and to avoid further mistakes the organization must be dissolved and its actions ceased. The *Imām* also stated that the Lasykar activities in Ambon were complete. The *raison d'etre* for jihad was in Ambon, therefore, when the activities in Ambon wound up, Lasykar Jihad had to be dissolved.

Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)

The launch of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in Yogyakarta on August 2000 was attended by thousands of people from throughout Indonesia, along with representatives from overseas. The head (or *amīr*) of MMI is Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, one of the founders of Ngruki Pesantren in Surakarta. The appearance of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as the Head of MMI was interesting because of his links with Komando Jihad, along with his connection to Abdullah Sungkar, co-founder of the Ngruki pesantren. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir escaped to Malaysia when the New Order regime was looking for him and returned to Indonesia when the New Order regime was replaced with the new government.

The main agenda of MMI was to implement Islamic *sharī'ah*.[13] This agenda was closely related to the desires of a section of the Islamic community who wished set up an Islamic state (*daulah Islāmiyyah*). MMI claimed to be continuing the struggle to establish an Islamic State, as initiated by DI/TII a few decades earlier.[14] The majority of factions joining MMI came from Darul Islam (DI) movements, which attempted to reestablish and rebuild their scattered power.

In contrast to other militant Muslim groups such as FPI and Lasykar Jihad which used violence, MMI chose to take a political approach. For example, MMI members advocated the implementation of Islamic *sharī'ah* in Indonesia by encouraging discussion through public debates, the mass media, through writings on the Internet and by publishing books. They also formed political lobby groups in Islamic parties in the hope of bringing the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta) into parliamentary proceedings. To further share their goals of implementing *sharī'ah* in Indonesia, MMI conducted seminars in university campuses and mosques.

The political and academic struggle of MMI sometimes differed from the activities conducted by FPI and Lasykar Jihad. Although they agreed with each other ideologically, they followed different paths and used different methods in the implementation of these ideas.

MMI initially aimed to form a coalition with various similar organizations that were also trying to implement Islamic *sharī'ah* in Indonesia. This aim could be seen from the attendance of many representatives of Muslim militant groups at the first MMI Congress in Yogyakarta in 2000. It was hoped that MMI could become a meeting point, without geographical or state limits, in the strug-

gle for the implementation of Islamic *sharī'ah* for all Muslims. MMI formulated three basic principles: togetherness in the mission to implement Islamic *sharī'ah* (*tansīq al-farḍ*); togetherness in the program of Islamic *sharī'ah* implementation (*tansiq al-'amal*); and togetherness in one institution to implement Islamic *sharī'ah* (*tansiq al-niẓām*).[15]

The supporters of MMI were aware of the fact that the goal of the implementation of Islamic *sharī'ah* in Indonesia would have to be conducted by various different groups. Therefore MMI, as a coalition, aimed to unite the potential and strength of Muslims in order to support their struggle to implement Islamic *sharī'ah* (*taṭbīq al-sharī'ah*) comprehensively (*kāffah*) in various aspects of life, particularly in government matters, both national and international.[16]

MMI recently came to the forefront of public discussion because its leader, Amirul Mujahidin Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, was arrested as a suspect in a conspiracy to assassinate President Megawati, and for his alleged involvement in the bombing of several religious sites, malls, and government offices. MMI was often accused of having links with Jemaah Islamiyah, a group that aimed at destroying facilities belonging to the West and the US in Southeast Asia.

These groups are only three examples of militant Islamic movements, which also includes groups such as Darul Islam, Hizbut Tahrir, Tarbiyah Islamiyah and Ikhwanul Muslimin, among others. Although we can see similarities between them, such as their aim of implementing Islamic *sharī'ah* in Indonesia, each group had their own agenda. Some of their aims were similar in terms of political interest, so they often worked together to support these interests. However, the number of similarities between them was almost the same as the number of differences, making it difficult for them to form one coherent organization.

Contemporary Militant-Islamic Movements: The Rise of Islam in Politics?

One evening, a group of people wearing white long-sleeved shirts, white knee-length pants and white turbans, like Middle-Eastern Arab clothes, appeared in Bogor. Their appearance was noticeable not because of their white clothes, but because they arrived in groups.

As commanded by their leader, the group began to destroy shops on Parung Street, Bogor. The 'blurry-light shops'—so named because of their location between the rice paddies and street, leading to gloomy lighting—were been assumed to be immoral places, a black market for prostitution and alcoholic drinks. Within a very short time, the shops, from which their owners had fled, were destroyed and burnt by FPI supporters. The decision by FPI members to destroy such places was meant to be a group commitment to implement Islamic teachings in Indonesia. Similar actions had been carried out by FPI every year, particularly during Ramadhan.

On another occasion, a number of youths wearing Arab-style robes turned up at places often frequented by young couples, such as parks and squares. They approached the couples, preached religious advice and then asked them to go home, particularly those who were not yet married.

Militant Islamic groups were also very vocal in the political arena. During the 2002 MPR annual session these groups, supported by their militant members, held street protests in front of the DPR and MPR buildings. They demanded the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter, which included the obligation of Muslims to obey Islamic syari'at, in the Constitution. They argued that as a Muslim-majority state, it was natural for the government to listen to Muslim aspirations for the implementation of Islamic *sharī'ah* in Indonesia. Although they had mobilized large groups to protest, in the hope of forcing DPR and MPR to include the Charter, their efforts were rejected by the majority of parliamentary members.

In Surakarta, a group named FPIS (Front Pembela Islam Surakarta—Surakarta Islamic Defender Front) conducted sweepings, aimed at foreigners, particularly those from the US, in reaction to the US attacks on Afghanistan. The US and its allies accused the Afghanistan government of protecting al-Qaeda, blamed for the attacks on the World Trade Center. FPIS protested that the US attacks on the Taliban government in Afghanistan were unnecessary and as a reaction to the attacks they conducted sweepings against foreigners in Surakarta.

The movements aimed to draw support from the Indonesian Muslim community in general. However, responses to their actions ranged from those who supported the steps they were taking to those who rejected their actions and labeled them as terrorist groups.

In terms of numbers, groups such as FPI or FPIS were relatively small. However, their strong militancy and constant activity meant that these groups continued to play an active role in public debates on religious discourse. It should be noted that these groups had access to advanced technology, and their use of the Internet and other information technology in spreading their ideas shows that their organizations had a solid base. This was supported by their members who came from modern backgrounds both in terms of education and employment.

Looking at the issues they supported, it could be concluded that these movements prioritized programs to crush immorality, which they thought would destroy religion. They claimed that casinos and nightclubs were anti-religious and would destroy the morals of Indonesian youth. Considering that their attitude towards immorality was so strong, it is not surprising that they tended to use force in order to ensure its demolition.

According to these groups, they used force because the police didn't take harsh enough steps to ban immorality. Moreover, they found out that some of the sites of immorality were backed and protected by certain security officers. They used violence in order to stop such immorality from developing further. However, sociologically the use of violence can be seen as a 'strategy' to make sure particular opinions are heard. A study on mass radical movements that use force to implement their ideas shows that those using violence are more successful in delivering their messages than those using peaceful methods. Violent movements attract attention instantly as the media reports on their activities. The activities then influence public opinion and result in an immediate response from the authorities.[17]

Contemporary Indonesian Islamic groups also show the emergence of more radical and militant movements, which have been labeled as "hard-line groups". The term militant was attached to them because of their strong and fundamentalist attitudes towards the implementation of religion in society, shown by their extreme attitudes to immoral practices such as prostitution, gambling and alcohol. It is not surprising that these groups destroyed the places where these activities took place.

The stigma attached to these groups comes from their need to implement basic religious teachings, reflected in their desire to put Islamic *sharī'ah* into practice. The punishment of death by stoning for a Muslim who had an extra-marital affair in Ambon was a

clear example of how serious they were about comprehensively implementing Islamic *sharī'ah*. Their wish to diligently practice Islamic teachings was also reflected in the special clothes they wore; their special rules in everyday life, such as the way to eat; the special relationships within the *jamā'ah* community; and their blind devotion to their leaders.

In religious literature, these groups have been labeled as extremist, militant, radical or fundamentalist. Indeed, it is not easy to write articles about Islamic movements such as these, and the difficulty lies in finding the right definition of 'radical Islam'. The word radical is often derogatory when used in relation to Islamic movements. In particular, since the September 2001 tragedy, the word radical has been identified with terrorism, and with groups that use violence to achieve their aims. Another difficulty is that radicalism is often contrasted with modernism. The definitions developed in the study of such movements often refer to the tradition of Christianity. Of course, each religious tradition has its own experiences and history, so that the use of certain terms can be misleading when applied to other religious traditions.

It is generally agreed that there are particular phenomena that occur in relation to these kinds of religious movements. However, it should be noted that these characteristics should be treated as a point of departure for more in depth information and not simply as a final conclusion. As such, these defining characteristics are always open for discussion. According to John O Voll, fundamentalist religious movements refer to "an affirmation of religious fundamental values and efforts to redevelop a society in line with these fundamental values."[18] As such, Islamic fundamentalist movements are a 'demand for Muslims to return to Islamic teachings,' 'a revival of Muslim attitudes', and 'an appeal to rely only on fundamental Islamic principles to fulfill the needs and challenges of contemporary life'.[19]

What people most likely have in their minds when they refer to radical movements are groups referred to in the West as anti-Western terrorist groups. These groups are specifically attached to Islamic movements that are against western policies. The Hisbullah group in Palestine, for example, is mentioned by Israel and the West as a group responsible for radicalism in that area. Al-Qaeda and its network is another example of this type of radical Islamic movement, as defined by the West.

According to research on terrorism, radicalism does not refer to the monopoly of any one particular religion in a particular place. Radical religious movements have taken place among Hindus in India and Catholics and Christians in Ireland. Radical religious movements even develop in secular states such the USA. This shows that religious radicalism is a universal occurrence that can potentially take place in all religious traditions.

In classic social theories such as sociology, psychology and politics, radical social movements, with religious flavor or not, can be seen as movements of defiance.[20] This is because their attitudes, views, and social behaviors are markedly different from those of mainstream society. According to the influential structural-functional approach, social systems should be seen as a united entity. Elements within the system support and strengthen each other to maintain the social system. Radical movements, according to this theory, defy the unity of a social system.

In the above approach, radical movements appear as a reaction to structural strain that causes disruptive psychological states. As explained in classical theory for mass movements, structural weaknesses in society lead to disturbances in the human psychological condition, and when these psychological disturbances reach their peak, mass movements appear.

The classical theory of radical movements has certainly influenced society up until this point. However, there have been other theories that attempt to explain radicalism as a natural phenomenon. According to a modern political approach, radical movements are not seen as being rebellious, but are rather seen as a natural movement with individual political goals. Like other political groups that utilize social capital to gain support, these radical movements attempt to use their social capital (religious, social and economic) for political gain. In other words, radical movements are political movements, and are similar to other political groups.

There has been some interesting input from anthropology regarding radical movements. First, radical religious movements are often followed by "Ratu Adil," or millenarian movements. These movements are inspired by cultural and religious factors and are a response to external power—colonialism or the introduction of a foreign culture. Secondly, radical movements use cultural and religious symbols in opposition to the symbols used in mainstream society. The symbols can be seen, for example, in their special dress codes and religious rituals. From an anthropological point of view,

therefore, the radical movements are seen as a form of revivalism, an attempt to re-emerge from a cultural backwardness. These radical movements are also a form of struggle against and rejection of foreign culture and power.

How can radical Islamic movements be explained in light of the above perspective? Are the radical movements natural occurrences in a democratic era that demands participation and openness? Are they 'political movements' aiming at gaining political and economic benefits? Are radical movements in Indonesia cultural movements that oppose and reject modernity, or are they only puppet movements used to discredit certain groups?

Radicalism as a Political Movement

In a fast-changing political context where an old regime is replaced by a new one and when there is much political uncertainty, many people expect to acquire power. This can be seen from the number of people who set up political parties as a vehicle to enter the political arena. In the 1999 general election, there were more than 150 registered political parties, though only 48 were eligible to contest in the election. Ideologies and programs propagated by the parties varied from religion, to poverty, to rank and file issues.

The syndrome of political euphoria is not specific to Indonesia. Similar situations took place in Poland and Mali, which experienced political breakdowns similar to Indonesia's. In a pluralistic culture and society such as Indonesia, chaotic situations create opportunities for local political systems inspired either by culture or religion to emerge. This is why there were many alternative political systems proposed during the 1999 general election.

The fact that the majority of Indonesians are Muslim has made Islam an important factor in Indonesian social and political life. According to a survey conducted by PPIM (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat—The Center for the Study of Islam and Society UIN Jakarta), Indonesian Muslims stated that religion provided important guidance in their lives and 92% of Indonesian Muslims surveyed stated that religion had given their lives direction. More than that, 70% stated that they consider religion as a factor when making decisions regarding social and political issues. With the strong link between Indonesian Muslims and their religion, religion is naturally an attractive issue for political parties. In other words, religion is important social capital, introduced in order to gain political support.

The pattern of radical Muslim movements using religious issues, such as the implementation of Islamic *Sharì'ah* and the eradication of immorality, can be interpreted as a strategy to gain mass support. The decision to introduce religious issues is a rational choice in a religious society such as Indonesia. Therefore, unlike conventional theory of mass movements, which treats radical movements as a form of social deviance, political theory sees these groups as interest groups using religious issues in political bargaining processes.[21]

From the perspective of civil society, radical religious movements are social groups that occupy the public sphere and voice religious issues.[22] From this perspective, these voices that are perceived by other groups as being powerful are in fact part of a processes of social negotiation in formulating a new social order.

Aside from this, the political parties were not allowed a space in which to voice their opinions and aspirations during the New Order era. Although there was one party to represent Islamic political interests, real Islamic political aspirations were severely limited by the government. Government control of political parties was very strict during that time. It is easy to understand the emergence of many Islamic groups attempting to guide real Muslim aspirations when control was eventually relaxed.[23]

In this theoretical scheme, the life and death of radical movements depends on two things. First, it depends on the extent to which the religious issues that arise are in line with people's needs. Secondly, following on from the first issue, the radical movements strongly depend on people's support. If people do not subscribe to their religious agendas, the groups will eventually go out of business.

Radicalism as a Cultural Movement

A political activist from KPPSI (Komite Persiapan Penerapan Syari'at Islam—The Committee for the Preparation of the Implementation of Islamic *Sharī'ah*) in Macassar stated that "...we are now satisfied that Islamic *sharī'ah* has been discussed openly by its supporters and its opponents." There were several reasons why KPPSI members aimed to implement Islamic *sharī'ah* in Macassar.

First, they were disappointed in the government, which until this point had failed to deal with the national crisis. When the expectation of an end to the crisis disappeared, they remembered an historical hero, Kahar Muzakar, who had helped them prosper

in the past. The government may argue that Kahar Muzakar was a rebel, but for the Macassarese, he is a hero. For these people, it was because of Kahar's efforts that Islamic *sharī'ah* was implemented in Macassar, particularly in areas dominated by Kahar's armed forces. Although Kahar Muzakar was not a religious leader or *'ulamā'*, thanks to his leadership skills he was very well respected. With support from various *'ulamā'*, such as KH. Munawar Kholil and KH. Ambo Dale, Kahar and his community were able to implement *sharī'ah*. That was a prosperous time, when crime rates were low, and people felt safe and happy under Kahar's leadership. Why did the Macassarese choose Kahar Muzakar as a hero? The main reason is that Kahar was successful in implementing Islamic *sharī'ah*. In the Macassarese memory, when Kahar controlled Macassar, life was peaceful, prosperous and harmonious.

Secondly, the Macassarese struggle to implement Islamic *sharī'ah* was motivated by their disappointment in Habibie's stepping-down as President. Coming from Sulawesi, Habibie was a symbol of progress and self-confidence in this region. Therefore, when Habibie was betrayed in the middle of his presidency, many people in the Macassar region were very disappointed.

Thirdly, the success story of the implementation of Islamic *sharī'ah* in other areas using regional autonomy has influenced a similar struggle in Macassar. The success of the introduction of Islamic *sharī'ah* in Aceh as part of its process of autonomy has motivated other regions to follow. Macassar, for example, has strongly stated that if Aceh can acquire a special status in order to apply Islamic *sharī'ah*, then Macassar can also demand similar treatment. KPPSI, as coalition organization of several Muslim organizations in Macassar, imitated Aceh's struggle to implement Islamic *sharī'ah* by labeling it as a struggle for autonomy.

In contrast to movements conducted by FPI and other groups that voiced their desire to apply *sharī'ah* nationally, KPPSI in Macassar concentrated their struggle in the regional parliament. KPPSI's struggle received significant support from both the legislative body and the community.

The close links between regional autonomy and Islamic *sharī'ah* indicate that there was an element of cultural identity involved in the struggle. For the Macassarese, the implementation of Islamic *sharī'ah* could overcome the differences among existing ethnic groups such as the Bugis, Macassarese, Mandarese and others. Islam has proved an effective glue for unity amongst various ethnic groups.

Religious Movements

From their theological roots, Islamic middle-line movements have been influenced by *salafī* theology. *Salafī* theology has several movements and schools of thought. The hard-line Islamic movements in Indonesia claim to be followers of "*al-manhāj al-salafī*" (the Path of the First People). *Salāf* theology was first of all influenced by Ibn Taimiyyah thought, which rejected the infiltration of local cultures in the application of religion. Secondly, as a movement, *salāf* theology was influenced by reformist Wahabī movements in Saudi Arabia, which demanded the separation of Islamic teachings from cultural influences and non-Islamic practices, such as the rebuilding of graveyards, including the Prophet's graveyard. According to the Wahabī, the rebuilding was influenced by non-Muslim culture. Technological advancement was also initially rejected by the Wahabī movement.

In Indonesia, Wahabī movements have influenced reformist Islamic movements. Organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Persis (Persatuan Islam—Islamic Unity) have focused on purifying Islamic practices. In Muhammadiyah, there have been campaigns to eliminate TBC (*tahayul, bid'ah* dan *churafat*—superstition, heresy and supernatural occurrences) in Islamic practices in Indonesia.

Salāf theology has been continued by contemporary hard-line Islamic movements. FKAWJ for example, uses Ibn Taimiyyah texts as the main study resource in their *pesantren*. Even their specific style of dressing—wearing jubah (robes), scarves and growing a beard—can be seen as a form of following their virtuous leader (*salāf al-ṣālīh*).

Thirdly, the most fundamental characteristic of radical Islamic movements is that they are influenced by literal interpretation or *madhhab al-ẓāhirī*, which means they rely more on text than on context and textual interpretation. They aim to implement the punishment of cutting off the hands of thieves, because this is what is written in the Qur'ān. They believe that the implementation of rules such as this is obligatory for Muslims.

This literal understanding, which is also called the scripturalist approach, also impacts upon their understanding of history and civilization. The Islamic golden age during the Prophet's era is seen as the proto-model for state formation. During the struggle for creating an Islamic state, supporters of the scripturalist approach always refer to this golden age, and hope to apply it to their own situation, without interpretation.

Why is this scripturalist approach once again gaining support? Sociologically and anthropologically speaking, people tend to turn to religion during periods of crisis.[24] In the case of Indonesia, in a state of economic, political and social crisis since the regime changeover, many Muslims are returning to religion for a solution. But why scripturalist? Because this approach is the easiest to follow, particularly for new converts or born-again Muslims. This approach is also popular amongst young people who want certainty in their futures. The political, social and economic crisis has destroyed the hopes of the poor and unfortunate, and when desperation appears, religion is their only savior.

The Future Model of Islam in Indonesia?

A few years ago, many observers believed that Islam in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia, could become the new face of Islam. But so far Islam has often been identified with violence and terrorism. This image emerges because of the continued conflict and violence in the Middle East. It is in this context that Islam in Southeast Asia has the opportunity to present a different image. Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia emerged and grew as a tolerant Islam, which flourishes in these pluralistic societies. The image of Islam in Indonesia as being tolerant and open-minded is a reflection of the success of Indonesian Muslims in dealing with contemporary problems, such as issues of gender and democracy.

The role of women in Indonesia, both in religious and in political life is different from that in other Muslim states. In other contexts only small numbers of women visit mosques, whereas in Indonesia more women than men go to the mosques to pray and attending sermons. In social and political life, Indonesian women have more experience and opportunities than women in other Islamic states. Although there were ulama who protested against having a woman as President, in reality, without major unrest, Megawati became the President of Indonesia, a country in which the majority of the population is Muslim.

In terms of democracy, Indonesia presents a different picture. Since the fall of the militaristic and authoritarian New Order regime, there have been plenty of demands to implement democracy in Indonesia. And although it is slow, the democratic process in Indonesia is continuing. The thesis that Islam is not compatible with democracy is not applicable to Indonesia. In a 2001 survey by

PPIM, it was found that 70% of Muslims are committed to the implementation of democracy in Indonesia.

However, this friendly, plural and tolerant image of Islam in Southeast Asia is often overshadowed by militant Muslim movements. Because of these militant movements Indonesia has often been labeled as a "nest of terrorism", and the picture of moderate Islam in Indonesia has disappeared. The question is whether there is a general tendency towards radicalism in Indonesia or whether this just a small group of Indonesian Muslims. In fact, the number of radical Islamic followers is very small. Of course we must recognize that they are militant and are thus capable of acting in ways very different to how mainstream society behaves. The Bali bombing is an example of this.

Islamic radical movements have also influenced the Indonesian political map. The existence of Islamic political parties that are in line with the radical Islamic movements will certainly set a particular tone in the political system. The implementation of Islamic syari'at, for example, will remain an important issue, and will become part of public discourses among Indonesian Muslims. The typical behavior of radical Muslim movements in terms of fashion, organizational structure and conduct will remain.

However, as long as the two big Islamic organizations in Indonesia—NU and Muhammadiyah—are not disturbed, the radical movements can be contained. With their large number of followers and comprehensive cultural approach (NU with its *'ulamā'* networks and *pesantren*, and Muhammadiyah with its education system and social activities) these two organizations will continue to play an important role in influencing and determining the development of Islam in Indonesia.

Endnotes

1. According to a PPIM survey, there have been massive processes of santrinization (conduct in accordance with Islamic principles) in Indonesia. This is reflected in the activities of Muslims who perform prayer 5 times a day (82%) and fast during Ramadhan (90%). 'Makin Saleh Makin Curiga', *Tempo* 29 December 2001.
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