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DEFENDING THE MAJESTY OF ISLAM:
INDONESIA'S FRONT PEMBELA ISLAM (FPI) 1998-2003

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Jajang Jahroni

Defending the Majesty of Islam: Indonesia's Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 1998-2003*

Abstraksi: *Front Pembela Islam (FPI) merupakan salah satu kelompok Islam radikal yang patut diperhitungkan keberadaannya pasca Reformasi Indonesia 1998. Seperti terlihat pada namanya, organisasi ini didirikan untuk 'membela' harkat dan martabat umat Islam dan menegakkan syariat Islam melalui cara-cara yang dianggap konstitusional. Menurut FPI, umat Islam selama ini terlalu sabar dan mengalah dalam menyikapi berbagai persoalan yang ada. Karena itu dari waktu ke waktu mereka senantiasa menjadi kelompok yang dirugikan. FPI melihat bahwa sikap seperti itu tidak bisa diteruskan. Umat Islam harus bangkit menuntut hak-haknya dan membela harkat dan martabatnya.*

Bagi sebagian orang, fenomena FPI bisa jadi menakutkan. Kehadirannya turut menyumbang dalam pencitraan Islam radikal di Tanah Air. Memang dalam setiap aksinya, tak segan-segan FPI melakukan tindakan destruktif dan anarkis. Mereka menghancurkan bar, diskotik, kasino, tempat pelacuran, dan kafe yang dianggap sebagai sarang maksiat. Semua ini mereka lakukan demi memenuhi kewajiban agama. Agama memerintahkan kepada setiap muslim untuk memerintahkan kebaikan dan melarang kemungkaran (amār ma'rūf nahyī munkar).

FPI lahir dalam situasi dan kondisi politik yang tidak menentu. Banyak peristiwa yang terjadi di Tanah Air sejak lengsernya Soeharto pada Mei 1998, mulai dari melambungannya harga-harga bahan pokok, kerusuhan sosial, sampai ketidakpastian hukum dan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia. Dalam keadaan seperti itu, sejumlah kelompok Islam mengambil inisiatif untuk mendirikan pam swakarsa yang berupaya melakukan pengamanan dan perlindungan. Di antara mereka adalah FPI. Dalam konteks ini, FPI pada awalnya adalah kelompok pam swakarsa yang didirikan untuk mengamankan dan melindungi umat Islam. Namun memandang FPI sebagai pam swakarsa semata juga tidak tepat. Karena sejak awal FPI memiliki tujuan politik yang jelas.

Tujuan politik FPI terlihat dalam upaya mereka untuk menerapkan syari'at. FPI mendirikan Komisi Nasional untuk Penerapan Syari'at Is-

lam. Komisi ini bertugas mensosialisasikan program penerapan syari'at Islam ke masyarakat. Di samping itu, mereka juga mendirikan komisi-komisi lokal di mana program syari'at Islam diperkenalkan kepada masyarakat bawah. Menurut FPI, pada dasarnya animo masyarakat untuk menerapkan syari'at Islam sangat besar, syari'at Islam tetap hidup dalam kesadaran mereka. Bahkan di beberapa tempat, menurut FPI, syari'at Islam sebenarnya sudah dilaksanakan. Sejalan dengan otonomi daerah, syari'at Islam akan menjadi isu politik yang sangat strategis.

Bagi kalangan tertentu—terutama masyarakat bawah—kehadiran FPI mendapat sambutan yang cukup besar. Hal ini disebabkan oleh kenyataan bahwa pada dasarnya FPI melakukan tindak pengamanan dan perlindungan. Ini jelas menguntungkan mereka. Dengan kehadiran FPI, tempat-tempat hiburan malam yang dianggap sarang maksiat menjadi sepi bahkan banyak yang tutup. Perjudian dan pelacuran yang seringkali bercampur baur dengan premanisme merupakan persoalan yang sangat mere-sahkan masyarakat bawah. Karena itu, ketika FPI tampil masyarakat memberikan dukungan.

Di samping itu, dukungan mereka juga didorong oleh keinginan untuk menegakkan "amār ma'rūf nahyī munkar". Seruan al-Qur'an ini jelas merupakan kewajiban atas setiap orang Islam. Karena itu mereka memberi dukungan—paling tidak moril—terhadap aksi-aksi yang dilakukan FPI. Sejak kemunculannya, dukungan masyarakat terhadap FPI, baik berasal dari aktivis pengajian, pemuda, majlis taklim, maupun kelompok-kelompok warga, terus mengalir. Bahkan mereka kemudian menjadi basis sosial bagi perkembangan FPI selanjutnya.

Cara yang dilakukan FPI sangat efektif dalam menggalang dukungan masyarakat miskin perkotaan yang secara sosial mengalami deprivasi. Jargon-jargon FPI membangkitkan solidaritas di kalangan mereka. Kewajiban untuk melaksanakan perintah agama selanjutnya berubah menjadi perasaan ingin melawan keadaan yang tidak berpihak pada mereka. Jargon tersebut digunakan untuk melawan musuh-musuh Tuhan dan melawan orang-orang kaya yang menghambur uang di tempat maksiat.

FPI telah mempengaruhi kelompok-kelompok Islam untuk melakukan gerakan dengan pola dan model yang sama. Hal ini misalnya terlihat bahwa di beberapa kawasan di Jakarta, Tangerang, Bogor dan Bekasi tumbuh kelompok-kelompok Islam yang memiliki pola dan model sama. Kyai, santri, remaja masjid, pemuda muslim, aktivis pengajian adalah kelompok-kelompok masyarakat Islam yang memiliki keprihatian yang sama terhadap masalah-masalah kemaksiatan dan kemunkaran. Mereka sudah nuak dan memendam kemarahan dan kebencian atas maraknya kemaksiatan yang ada di daerah mereka. Karena itu ketika FPI muncul, mereka mendukungnya bahkan mendirikan cabang dan ranting organisasi di daerah masing-masing.

Defending the Majesty of Islam: Indonesia's Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 1998-2003*

خلاصة: تعد جبهة الدفاع الإسلامية (Front Pembela Islam/FPI) جماعة متطرفة تستحق أن يحسب لها حساب في عهد ما بعد الحركة الإصلاحية الإندونيسية ١٩٩٨م، فهي كما ظهرت من اسمها أنشئت هذه الجماعة للدفاع عن حقوق الأمة الإسلامية وحرمتها والدعوة إلى تطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية بالوسائل الدستورية، ويرى هذه الجماعة أنه قد مضى على المسلمين في إندونيسيا فترة طويلة تبنا فيها موقفا أكثر تحملا وإيثارا إزاء القضايا التي يواجهونها، ولذلك كانوا دائما على الجانب الخاسر، ويرى الجماعة أنه لا بد من وضع حد لهذه الظاهرة، فالمسلمون يجب أن ينهضوا لضمان حقوقهم والدفاع عن عرضهم. وبالنسبة للبعض قد تكون هذه الظاهرة مخيفة، حيث كان ظهورها قد أسهم في إحداث طابع التطرف للإسلام في إندونيسيا، وفي كل نشاط تقوم به لم تتردد الجماعة عن القيام بأعمال العنف وإحداث الفوضى، فيقومون بهدم الملاهسي والكازينوهات والأماكن التي ترتكب فيها المعاصي، وذلك كله وفاء بالواجب الديني، إذ يأمر الدين على كل مسلم أن يقوم بالأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر.

لقد كان ميلاد جبهة الدفاع الإسلامية في ظروف سياسية سيئة حيث شهدت البلاد عددا من الأحداث منذ سقوط نظام سوهارتو (Soeharto) عام ١٩٩٨م تتمثل في ارتفاع الأسعار والاضطرابات السياسية وانتهاك حقوق الإنسان حتى عدم احترام سيادة القانون، وفي خضم هذه الظروف بادر عدد من الجماعات الإسلامية بإنشاء قوة دفاعية مدنية تقوم بالحماية والحفاظ على الأمن، ومن بينها جبهة الدفاع الإسلامية، فهي إذن كانت قوة خاصة تستهدف أول الأمر حماية المسلمين والحفاظ على أمنهم، بيد أنه ليس صوابا اعتبارها مجرد قوة مدنية فقد كان لها أهداف سياسية منذ نشأتها الأولى.

وتظهر هذه الأهداف السياسية في محاولتهم الدؤوب لتطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية، وقد أنشأوا لجنة قومية لتطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية وظيفتها الدعاية لتطبيق الشريعة وتفهم المجتمع عنه، كما أنهم ينشئون لجانا محلية تقوم بنفس الوظيفة حتى يتعرف أعضاء المجتمع على مشروع تطبيق الشريعة؛ ويرون أن المجتمع في حقيقة الأمر يوافقون ويحرصون على فكرة تطبيق الشريعة، بل في بعض المناطق تم تطبيق الشريعة فعلا، وأنه تمشيا مع مشروع الاستقلالية المحلية فيسحتل مشروع تطبيق الشريعة مكانة الاستراتيجية في القضايا السياسية.

وبالنسبة للبعض — خصوصا الطبقات الدنيا من المجتمع — فإن وجود الجماعة يتمتع بالترحيب لحقيقة هي أن الجماعة تقوم أصلا بالحماية والحفاظ على الأمن وهذا لصالح المجتمع طبعاً، وكان ظهورها إيذاناً بخلو الملاهي عن المترددين إليها بل تعرض كثير منها للإغلاق، لقد كان انتشار الميسر والدعارة إذ كثيراً ما تصحبهما عملية السطو والغصب مصدر ازعاج للمجتمع، وبالتالي كان منطقياً أن تلقى الجماعة ترحيباً واسعاً، بالإضافة إلى أن تأييدهم للجماعة يعد إسهاماً في أداء الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر، فإن هذا الأمر الذي يدعو إليه القرآن الكريم يجب أن يلتزم به كل مسلم على الأقل في صورة تشجيع لكل ما تقوم به الجماعة من نشاط، وهذا ما تتمتع به الجماعة منذ ظهور إذ لقيت ترحيباً من نشطاء الشباب وحلقات الدروس الدينية ومحاسن التعليم وكذلك الجماعات الأخرى في المجتمع، بل أصبحوا قاعدة لتطور الجبهة فيما بعد.

وكان الأسلوب الذي تلجأ إليه الجبهة في الحصول على تأييد الفقراء المقيمين في المدن الكبيرة الذين تعرضوا للإهمال جد فعال، حيث أحيوا فيهم روح الأخوة فصارت الواجبات الدينية التي يجب أن يلتزموا بها شعوراً يدفعهم إلى مقاومة الظروف التي ليست لصالحهم، إنما ظروف تسبب في حدوثها هؤلاء الأغنياء المترددين على الملاهي أعداء الله الذين ينفقون أموالهم في المعاصي.

وكانت للجبهة أثرها في قيام الجماعات الإسلامية الأخرى لنفس الحركة وعلى الأسلوب ذاته، ويظهر هذا في عدد من المناطق في أعمال جاكرتا وتاينجران (Tangerang) وبوجور (Bogor) وبيكاسي (Bekasi) حيث نشأت جماعات إسلامية تعمل عمل الجبهة مبدأ وأسلوباً، إن الشيوخ وتلاميذهم وشباب المساجد وشبان المسلمين يشكلون جماعات كان لهم قدر مشترك في ازعاجهم لانتشار المعاصي حولهم، ولذلك كان عليهم تشجيع الجبهة وإنشاء فروع لها في مناطقهم.

Indonesia's reformation in 1998 provided an opportunity for the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalist movements.¹ This can be seen from the proliferation of newly formed organisations which aim at either establishing an Islamic state or applying Islamic law. The emergence of these organisations is closely related to the spirit of reformation, where people seem to be free to express their feelings. Almost every day one can see people gathering at the House of Representatives in Senayan, Jakarta, in order to express their aspirations to the members of parliament.

This hardly ever occurred during the Soeharto era.² From the early days of his rise to power in the late 1960s, members of the Indonesian community, including Muslims, were denied the opportunity to express their feelings. He applied what is usually referred to as the "de-ideologisation" of all social and political power. Politics was cleansed of any religious embellishment. Furthermore, the Pancasila was imposed as the state's sole ideology, to be followed by all political and social organisations in the country.³

Islamic fundamentalism is a term used to indicate a movement that aims to revive the Golden Age of Islam.⁴ The return to the Holy Qur'an and the Hadith is seen as the only solution possible for Muslims if they want to achieve glory in this mortal life. The life of the Prophet and the Companions is regarded as the ideal model to be followed by Muslims. The confession of faith (*shahādah*) should accordingly be renewed by the Muslim community since it has long been contaminated by secular ideas which are incompatible with Islam. The unity of the Muslim community (*ummah*), which is based on the principle of *tawhīd* (the unity of God) should be re-enacted. Otherwise Muslims will loose their commitment to Islam. If Muslims are not committed to Islam and their hearts are impure, God's punishment will befall them. The backwardness and dependency of Muslim countries on Western aid are seen as God's punishment, under which Muslims suffer indignity. They believe that by accepting Islam without question Muslims can restore their dignity and live in this world gloriously.

On the one hand, the development of Islamic fundamentalism in some parts of Indonesia has been influenced by Soeharto's strategy of marginalising Muslims in social and political life. The mushrooming of Islamic fundamentalism in the last three years is thus a release after years of being abused by Soeharto. On the other hand, this development is inseparable from the global influence of the

Islamic resurgence that took place in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, modernisation and globalisation, which have gradually pervaded all corners of the world, including Muslim countries, are also important factors, bringing major changes into the lives of Muslims. These sociological factors are interwoven and overlapping causes of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia.

Muslims under the New Order

During the first two decades of Soeharto's term, Muslims were almost entirely absent from significant positions in the country. Instead of involving Muslims in his government, Soeharto invited minority groups, consisting of Christians, Catholics, and Chinese people, whose positions were highly dependent on him, to become his partners. This decision was related to his belief that Muslims would politically endanger his power. It is obvious that Soeharto wanted to establish his position before inviting any groups to come into power. Fully backed by the Armed Forces and the Golkar Party, his political machine, he had almost absolute control over the country for about 32 years.⁵

The Indonesian nation was in a deep crisis following the bloody coup d'état in 1965. One important step made at the beginning of Soeharto's presidency was his decision to invite economists, led by Widjojo Nitisastro, to become his economic advisory board. The duties of this board, later called the Berkeley Mafia,⁶ included facilitating a recovery from the economic crisis, stabilising the rupiah, slowing down the rate of inflation, and creating long-term strategic economic plans. The result was incredible. In a short space of time, Soeharto overcame economic problems and made significant improvements. In the following years, economic growth was relatively stable, on average about 7 percent per year.⁷

The short-term strategies made by the Berkeley Mafia for the New Order economy were extremely successful. But the implementation of the long-term strategy of the so-called trickle down effect was a disaster. The 1997 economic crisis in Indonesia was partly related to this error in strategic planning. This strategy was set up for the big business enterprises. The theory works on the assumption that following the development of industries, agriculture, trade, banking, finance, export-import, construction, information, transportation, telecommunication, mines, and tourism,

the benefits would trickle down to the broader community. But what happened next was totally different.

By the 1980s, as a result of this strategy a number of tycoons, most of whom were Chinese, the rest Christians or Catholics and only a few Muslims, controlled large parts of the national economy. Instead of trickling down to the broader Indonesian community, the money stayed with the families of the tycoons. Companies that expanded to other sectors were in fact controlled by the cronies of these companies' owners. The trickle down effect theory did not work at all. Rather than providing credit, loans, or grants, it provided fertile ground for corruption, collusion, and nepotism.⁸

The majority of Muslims did not play a significant role in these national business activities. They were the excluded group. They were allowed access mainly to medium and small businesses, and mostly in informal sectors. Most Muslims felt this was unfair, which caused resistance towards the Chinese at the grass roots level, as well as amongst the middle classes. As the gap between the rich Chinese and the poor indigenous Indonesians became wider, the resistance grew stronger. At the same time, resistance towards Christians, Golkar, ABRI (the Indonesia Armed Forces), and Soeharto's family also increased.⁹

By the late of 1980s, there were some important changes in Soeharto's approach towards Islam. These changes were related to his close relationship with the minority groups, which occasionally bothered him. It was reported that he was angry after being questioned L. B. Murdani, a Catholic and the commander of the Indonesian Armed Force, about his family's pervasive businesses.¹⁰ Soon afterwards, Murdani was dismissed and replaced by Feisal Tanjung, a conservative Muslim and Murdani's foe. After this event, Soeharto's relationship with the minority groups deteriorated further. In contrast, his relationship with Muslims had entered a new phase.

It is highly likely that Soeharto realised that genuine legitimacy actually comes from the majority. In the last decade of his term, he approached Muslims and applied 'conservative Islamism'.¹¹ Another reason for these changes was the Islamic resurgence taking place in the country. This was partly the result of the national education project initiated during the first years of his term. Islam was seen to be too powerful and too important to be abandoned. During these years, policies such as an Islamic banking system, a

Muslim intellectual organisation foundation, the application of Islamic law in a limited forms, permission for Muslim women to dress according to their creed public schools, the publication of Islamic magazines, and the broadcasting of Islamic teaching programs on television, were arranged for Muslims.

These policies were followed by Soeharto's sudden practicing of Islam. He had long been known for his strong adherence to Javanese mysticism. In 1991, together with his family, he performed the pilgrimage to Mecca and added 'Muhammad' to his name. Some Muslim leaders welcomed these changes, believing that a real shift in Soeharto's approach towards Islam was taking place. It is highly likely that he wanted to assure his fellow Muslims that he had really changed. But some Muslim leaders reacted cynically, saying that it was too little, too late. They urged Muslims not to be manipulated by Soeharto. All the steps he took were designed to support his power.

Islamic Movements in the 1980s

The project of conservative Islamism was enormous, but only attracted urban elite Muslims, consisting of bureaucrats, technocrats and intellectuals. It is evident that this project only involved, as Hefner calls them, the regimist Muslims.¹² At the grass roots level, the majority of Muslims did not benefit from this project at all. The foundation of the ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association), the biggest project of conservative Islamism, did not significantly impact upon the lives of the majority of the Muslim community. A great number of Muslims were still affiliated to established religious organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.¹³

A number of campus-based organisations were founded in the late 1970s and early 1980s. At least two main groups need to be mentioned here. The first group was influenced by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, while the second showed strong Shī'ite tendencies. However, it is not easy to obtain a clear picture of their nature. They had no formal organisations as they kept a low profile in public. Sometimes they referred to themselves as *usraḥ* (family), *harakah* (movement), and *ikhwān* and *akhwāt* (brothers and sisters).¹⁴ Names seemed not to be very important. There appeared to be no distinction between them as the two groups blurred together and combined the ideas of the Muslim Brother-

hood and Shi'ite thought. They were not concerned with the ideological boundaries that existed between their Islamic schools of thought, as they claimed it was not in the spirit of Islam. These organisations were supported by a large number of students and were credited with the Islamisation of the campus community.

It is possible that such support was due to the growing aspirations of young Muslim students who were in favour of their ideas. There was a new movement to understand Islam in a modern and holistic manner (*kāffah*). Established Muslim organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah were regarded as being unable to realise these aspirations. These organisations were seen as 'unserious' or 'half-hearted' in their efforts to realise the ideals of Islam through producing various innovations (*bid'ah*), which in fact reduce the spirit of Islam.

Meanwhile, students organisations such as HMI (Muslim Students' Association), IMM (Muhammadiyah Students' Association), and PMII (Indonesian Muslim Students' Movement, an NU-linked student organisation) were too busy with the development of intellectual discourse. Feeling disappointed with their circumstances, the newly formed student organisations focused their activities much more on activism. At the beginning of the 1980s, this new activism began to pervade a number of campuses. This was evident from the increased popularity of the *jilbab* (veil worn by women) and *burqa* (long clothing worn by women), which replaced mini skirts, jeans and t-shirts. Meanwhile, a number of male students grew their beards long and wore *koko* (traditional Javanese dress). Keeping a low profile in public, they created small discussion circles (*halaqah*), where various Islamic subjects were addressed. These discussions were often held door-to-door in a very informal manner.¹⁵

The Islamic movement of the 1970s and 80s was marked by several attempts to seek 'an alternative Islam' that was capable of realising the movement's ideals.¹⁶ An alternative Islam was sought to 'substitute' the existing Islam, which was considered 'impotent.' This new Islam was expected to be able to actualise an ideal form of *ummah* (Muslim community). To create such a community, they began with an explanation of the meaning of the Islamic confession of faith (*shahādah*). It is usually understood as the formal utterance of several words indicating that one embraces Islam, however these groups interpreted the confession of faith in a very

sophisticated way.¹⁷ As a result, they understood Islam as a holistic system, a way of life and the ideology by which Muslims can achieve their ultimate goals. Islam is not only concerned with personal affairs, but also with social, economic, cultural and political affairs.

They believed that if the confession of faith were understood correctly by Muslims, they could understand other aspects of religion, such as Islamic moral conduct (*akhlāq*) and the purpose of religious devotion (*‘ibādah*), without too much difficulty. They would also perform all religious obligations without hesitation. They were concerned with creating a new system to replace the existing system of ignorance (*jāhiliyyah*) and infidelity (*kekufuran*). They criticised the established Islamic organisations for misunderstanding the fundamental religious principles, which meant that, despite constituting the majority of the Indonesian population, Muslims did not wholeheartedly practice their religion.

The Islamic movement of the 1970s and 80s was fully backed by young Muslim intellectuals who supported the university students, and also by middle class Muslim families. These intellectuals were mostly graduates of Western universities, with only a few graduates of Middle Eastern universities. They disseminated new ideas about Islam and modernity. During this period, public perception towards Islam and Muslim seemed to gradually head in a positive direction. Islam was suddenly seen to be an elegant and modern religion, which led to a growth in the number of people involved in the Islamic movement. This could be seen, for instance, from the growing number of women wearing *jilbāb* and *burqa*. Many discussions on Islam were held, and more and more people made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Global Influences

The rise of the Islamic movement in Indonesia was encouraged by several events that took place in the Muslim world. In 1979, Muslim groups were injected with new enthusiasm by the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution. Indonesian Muslims do not subscribe to Shī‘ite Islam, but rather to Sunnite Islam, nevertheless this remarkable event inspired the Indonesian Islamic movement and once again reassured them of Islam’s ability to serve as the ideology of resistance. Shī‘ism became an important issue in the country, raising pro and contra opinions amongst the Muslim community. But later on,

thanks to a number of intellectual figures, perceptions towards Shi'ism gradually changed. Shi'ism greatly contributed to the development of Islamic discourse in Indonesia.¹⁸

A number of works by modern Iranian thinkers such as Ayātullāh Rūhullāh Khomeini, 'Alī Shari'ati, and Murtaḍā Mutahharī enjoyed a large readership and influenced the ideological formulation of Islamic movements in Indonesia. Several publishing houses in the country even specialised in the circulation of Shi'ite books, whilst others specialised in Islamic movements. Amazingly, these books were always sold out. The publication of Islamic books reached its peak in the 1990s, when at every book fair held in the country, Islamic publishing houses dominated the exhibition hall. Certain books have even been republished a number of times. This can only be explained by the fact that the Indonesian Muslim community embraced the new spirit of Islam.

Shi'ite thought was combined with Sunnite thought, such as that of Sayyid Quṭb, Hasan al-Bannā, Saïd Hawā, and Yūsuf Qarḍāwī. The relationship between the Indonesian Muslim community and the Middle Eastern thinkers existed long before their contact with Iranian Shi'ite thought.¹⁹ Indonesian Muslims regularly sent students to study at Al-Azhar University in Egypt, where they made contact with the Muslim Brotherhood and brought home their ideas. *Fi Zilāl al-Qur'ān* (Under the Shadow of the Qur'ān), a work by Quṭb, has been very popular in Indonesia. To a lesser extent, the same intellectual and religious relationships also occurred with Pakistan and India, and the ideas of Maudūdī and Nadwī have been imported to Indonesia.

The Threat of Modernisation

Modernisation began to pervade all of parts of the Muslim world in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Most Muslim countries, which had just achieved independence from Western colonialism, failed to anticipate this rapid tide of modernisation. The main reason for this failure was that most of them were still living in traditional or transitional modes, which were totally different from modern ones. Castells points out that the social root of Islamic fundamentalism was a reaction to "the failure of economic modernization in most Muslim countries in the 1970s and 1980s."²⁰ As a result, many aspects of life changed drastically, which brought serious problems into the lives of Muslims throughout the world.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that modernisation brings with it not only rationalisation but also secularisation. Islam does not provide a space for the idea of secularism. The fact that modernism brings the evil of secularism with it means that Muslims feel pressured and confused in their decision of whether or not to accept modernisation with all its consequences, or reject it outright. In addition to this, new ideas imported from the West like democracy, gender equality, and human rights are also regarded with suspicion. Muslims do not have a single response to this challenge, rather they provide various reactions, ranging from total rejection to total acceptance.

In the Indonesian context, the situation worsened because, compared to the minority groups, Muslims were the least prepared in facing the challenges of the modern world. From the 1970s onwards, whilst minority groups, constituting twelve percent of the Indonesian population, started to enjoy high tech lifestyles and developed modern business enterprises, the other 88 percent, the Muslim majority, waged a war against poverty and illiteracy. Only a few Muslims from middle class families enjoyed relatively better conditions.

In the late 1970s and 80s, a wave of urbanisation occurred in Indonesia. Thousands of people, both men and women, most of them traditional peasants, were expelled from their villages after their land was sold for a low price to wealthy people from the big cities. They moved to urban areas looking for a better life but suffered from terrible and unexpected consequences. These unskilled workers were unable to compete with their fellow Indonesians from minority groups. Feelings of frustration, fear, and anger grew rapidly and collided with religious sentiments. A number of *halaqah* were made up of these uneducated and unskilled urbanites. Later on they developed an ideology of resistance to fight against all injustice and corruption.

“Thus, a young, urban population, with a high level of education as a result of the first wave of modernization, was frustrated in its expectations, as the economy faltered and new forms of cultural dependency settled in. It was joined in its discontent by impoverished masses expelled from rural areas to cities by the unbalanced modernization of agriculture. This social mixture was made explosive by the crisis of the nation-state, whose employees, including military personnel, suffered declining living standards, and lost faith in the nationalist project.”¹²¹

The Biography of Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab

Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab was born in Jakarta on August 24, 1965 to an *ahl al-bait* family (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), as indicated by the title *habīb* (pl. *hāba'ib*). His father, Husein, was an activist who in 1937, together with a number of colleagues and friends, established PAI (Indonesian Arab Boy-scouts), which later became PII (Indonesian Islam Boy Scouts), of which he was the chief. From 1930-1945, he was a spy who supplied information to the Indonesian forces.

In 1945, he was caught by the Dutch and sentenced to death, but escaped thanks to a native Indonesian working for the Dutch. After Indonesia's independence in 1945, Husein worked as a religious teacher, as did most of the *hāba'ib*. He enjoyed a close relationship with Habib Ali ibn Abdurrahman a-Habsyi, one of the most respected *habīb* during that period. Habib Ali ibn Abdurrahman a-Habsyi was the founder of an Islamic learning centre in Kwitang Jakarta and had a great number of followers among the Ḥādrāmī²³ and Betawi (native Jakartan) communities. Rizieq never met his father, because Husein died in 1966, one year after Rizieq's birth. His mother, Syarifah Sidah Al-Attas, who was also an *ahl al-bait*, took over his education.

From early on Rizieq obtained a relatively secular education, as can be seen from the fact that he studied at an elementary school in Petamburan. Later he attended a secondary school in Pejompongan. For security reasons he was, surprisingly, moved to a Christian school located not far from his home. He initially rejected this plan as he was worried about being influenced by ideas contradictory to his faith. After being reassured by his mother, however, he accepted this decision and spent several years at the Bethel secondary school. He was purportedly very critical of his teachers in this Christian environment, especially when they were discussing religious matters. On one occasion he introduced the Islamic perspective of Jesus Christ, according to which he is a prophet of Allah.

After completing high school, Rizieq planned to study in the Middle East, but his lack of Arabic meant that he studied at LIPIA (The Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic) in Jakarta. This institute was financially backed by the Saudi Arabian government. Rizieq was later accepted at the Faculty of Law at King Saud University. It is important to note that the Saudi government provided a million dollars annually, channelled through LIPIA or OIC

(Organisation of Islamic Countries), to send young Muslim students to study in Saudi Arabia.

Before heading to Saudi Arabia, Rizieq married Syarifah Fadlun, the granddaughter of a well-known Betawi mufti, Sayyid Uthman ibn Abdullah ibn Yahya.²³ During his studies, like the most Indonesian students, he became a guide during the pilgrimage season. He also worked for the Indonesian Embassy in Riyadh. After his graduation in 1990, he became a teaching assistant at a high school in Riyadh, but only for one year. In 1992, he returned to Indonesia, and soon afterwards he became active as a preacher, making religious speeches to the community. This activity lasted for one year before he was tempted to undertake further study at the University of Antar Bangsa in Malaysia. After one semester, however, he dropped out, as he felt that his community needed him. He then returned to Indonesia and resumed his role as a preacher.²⁴

Like most Hadramī communities, the Hadramī community in Batavia (later called Jakarta) developed a particular tradition with Islamic and Arabic symbols at its centre. They maintained the traditional clothing style of their ancestors from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, used their family names, and communicated only in Arabic. This behaviour continued up until the beginning of the twentieth century. The Jami'at al-Khair (The Community of Righteousness), an organisation largely working on education, was a medium through which they maintained their identities. Arabic and Middle Eastern geography were included in their schools' curriculum.²⁵

When the wave of modernisation reached Indonesia, the Hadramī began to accommodate new cultures. Although previously the *sayyidah* were only allowed to marry the *sayyid*, a number of them married common people. This is what actually instigated the conflict between the Hadramī and the Irshadi, because the Irshadi did not accept the Hadramī's views on marriage. According to Syeikh Ahmad Soorkati, the great master of the Irshadi, marriage with a non-*sayyid* was valid since all Muslims, Hadramī or Irshadi, were equal.²⁶

Three groups of Hadramī exist in Indonesia, based on their religious attachments. The first group is the puritans, which consists of Hadramīs who have a strong commitment to the pristine source of Islam. Their roots are found in the teachings of Sayyid Uthman who considers *tariqah* (Sūfī orders) as being against the teachings

of Islam.²⁷ The second is the moderates, consisting of Ḥaḍramī who accommodate religious practices such as those of Nahdhatul Ulama, the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. This group is represented by Sayyid Aqil Husein al-Munawwar, the former Minister of Religious Affairs, who is also a member of Nahdhatul Ulama. The third group is the seculars. This group consists of the Ḥaḍramī who enjoyed privileges under Dutch colonialism and who were educated in the Dutch education system. Ahmad Albar, Indonesian rock star and celebrity, represents this group. The secular Ḥaḍramīs are not really concerned with religion. They usually school their children in the secular education system.

Based on this typology, Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab comes from the puritan school, though he spent several years in secular schools. Most of the puritans send their children to religious schools or *madrasah* (Islamic schools) built by their fellow Ḥaḍramī. Many of them studied in *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) in East Java, especially Malang, which is the stronghold of Ḥaḍramī settlements. During the colonial era, they travelled to Hadramaut to receive religious higher education from various *shaiikh* and *'ulamā'*. Post-independence, this tradition was abandoned, since the younger generation of Ḥaḍramī, unlike their forefathers, preferred to be fully Indonesian rather than Ḥaḍramīan. This held particularly true for Abdurrahman Baswedan, who in the late 1930s established PAI (the Arab-Indonesian Party).²⁸

It is highly likely that Rizieq travelled to Saudi Arabia not only to study, but also to find his cultural roots. He was concerned about the condition of the Ḥaḍramī in particular and the Muslim community in general. Soon after his return he began to wear a *ghamis* (Arab-style shirt) and turban. Like most of the Saudi graduates, he spoke Arabic as well Indonesian. However he was not strongly influenced by Wahabism, the formal school of thought of the Saudi Arabian kingdom. He has explained on many occasions that he is not a follower of the Wahabite school, and instead follows *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*.²⁹

As a promising young leader, Rizieq was offered a teaching position at Madrasah Aliyah (Senior Islamic High School) Jami'at al-Khair in Tanah Abang, an area predominantly occupied by the Ḥaḍramīs. After a number of years he was promoted to headmaster of the school. In 1996 he resigned from this position, though he maintained his relationship with Jami'at al-Khair as he remained as a member of its teaching staff. He produced a book on *tajwid*

(the rules of Qur'anic reading), *al-Jadwal al-Mufid fi al-'Ilm al-Tajwid* (The Useful List of *Tajwid*), which has been widely distributed throughout *madrasah* in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei.

Rizieq witnessed the rapid changes that have taken place in Jakarta. Tanah Abang, where he grew up, is a slum area³⁰ where prostitution and robbery exist alongside the mosques and *madrasah*. Gambling and drugs have become part of the community's daily life, which is mixed with injustice, poverty, and corruption. These realities led to Rizieq's uncompromising approach towards unlawful behaviour. He believes that this situation occurred because the state is no longer able to undertake its duties of enforcing law and order.

In many of his speeches, he has criticised the government for their failure to stop corruption (*kemungkaran*)³¹ in the country. "To Command Righteousness and to Prevent Corruption" has been his major theme for years. In effect, this theme has led him to address subjects such as moral crisis, faith, decadence, righteousness and corruption in his speeches. The term *jihād* (holy war) has appeared in most of his speeches. Before the economic crisis hit Indonesia in 1998, he had already warned the country about the dangers of a moral crisis.

Instead of anticipating the crisis, he argues, the government had controlled public preachers.³² A number of them were even jailed without clear evidence or legal procedures. The government tightly censored all Muslim preachers and they were not allowed to speak in front of the public unless they were licensed by the police. It is hardly surprising that Rizieq compared Soeharto to the Pharaoh, the symbol of infidelity in the Qur'an. He was reportedly very cautious with government officials, and played a game of "cat and mouse" with them.

During the 1980s and 1990s there were a great number of preachers who opposed the government and witnessed growing dissatisfaction among the *ummah*. Rizieq argued that it was time to rise up and make no compromises. Muslim people have been patient and tolerant for so long, for which they have received nothing but suffering. In several places Muslims were killed by the military and were stigmatised as a result of their desire to separate themselves from the country and create an Islamic state. These actions were instigated by the elites, some of them Christians, who saw Islam as a potential threat to their interests.

The Emergence of Front Pembela Islam (FPI)

On August 17th 1998, the 53rd anniversary of Indonesian independence, a number of preachers, *habā'ib*, *ustādih*, and '*ulamā'*,³³ mostly from Jakarta, gathered in the Pesantren al-Umm, Kampung Utan Ciputat. This meeting was held to celebrate Independence Day as well as to respond to a number of issues, ranging from injustice to human rights violations, where a large number of the victims were Muslims. Among those in attendance were K.H. Cecep Bustomi, Habib Idrus Jamalullail, K.H. Damanhuri, Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, and K.H. Misbahul Anam, who hosted the meeting. During this meeting they agreed to create an organisation to find the best possible solutions to all the problems affecting the *ummah*. This meeting has been identified as the emergence of Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders' Front — henceforth referred to as FPI).

The meeting attracted a great deal of interest. Hundreds of Muslims attended, and a number of high-rank officials from the Indonesian military are said to have been involved in the establishment of FPI. It is reported that the military provided a lot of support in the form of money and military training to FPI paramilitary members. This training was in anticipation of emergency situations. The close nature of the relationship between the military and FPI became even more apparent when a number of high ranking military officials attended the first anniversary of FPI.

Muslim leaders reacted to this closeness in a different way. Some of them said that this closeness was normal since Muslims form the majority in this country. The Muslim-military relationship had been interrupted when the military became too close to the authorities, and were even used to maintain government power. During the 1980s, the relationship reached its lowest point when the military was involved in a number of operations that led to the loss of Muslim civilian lives. Although the relationship was troubled, it did not mean that it could not be improved. According to Adi Sasono, a respected Muslim leader, the relationship between Muslims and the military is actually a dynamic phenomenon, which depends on the political situation. Since the reformation era, Muslims and the military have reached a new phase in which both parties have the chance to improve their relationship.³⁴

Since General Faisal Tanjung became the chief commander of the Indonesian armed forces, important positions in the military have been controlled by Muslim generals, who, according to Oliv-

ier Roy,³⁵ supported the 'conservative Islamism' applied by Soeharto at the beginning of the 1990s until his resignation in 1998. Meanwhile reminders of Murdani's men, a Christian and former military commander, have gradually been removed. The terms 'green military' (Muslim generals) and 'red-white military' (nationalist generals) are used to indicate friction within the military. With the arrival of the reformation era control over the military was handed to General Wiranto.³⁶ However, Wiranto was appointed as the chief commander at a time when the military was facing many problems. On one hand, Wiranto was actually a reformist general, who tried to restructure and reform the military. On the other hand, he could not overcome all the problems facing the military by himself, including charges of human rights violations against a number of generals.³⁷

Another theory asserts that the military approached a number of Muslim groups to counter criticisms made by left wing groups consisting of various NGOs, intellectuals, and student associations.³⁸ By manipulating religious issues such as the fact that the generals were Muslims, FPI tried to change this from a political problem into a religious one. On many occasions, FPI leaders convinced the public that this was the best time to develop a mutual relationship with the military. They deplored those who criticised the military. They argued that Muslims should support the military since the military was at that time controlled by Muslim generals. However this argument did not erase the stigma of its many violations in the past. People still remembered how bad the military was during the 1980s, when a number of incidents occurred in the country and hundreds of Muslims were killed. The doctrine of the military's dual function meant that the armed forces were very powerful and made it possible for them to control the country. In several cases, the military had been accused of human rights violations. Students, NGOs activists, intellectuals, and human right activists asked the government to take legal action against the generals behind these incidents.

It is important to note that several Muslim paramilitary groups, including FPI, emerged during the interval between Soeharto stepping down on May 1998 and the 1999 general election. Various Muslim groups proposed that Habibie, the incumbent Vice-President, be given a chance to come to power. They regarded him as a good Muslim who was concerned with Islam, as seen from his

track record and his Muslim political affiliation from the early 1990s. Muslim paramilitary groups were created to mobilise and maximise support. Habibie purportedly gave a huge amount of money to several Muslim groups, including FPI, to pave the way for his presidency. However, his address to the members of the People's Consultative Assembly was rejected and he was unable to stand for another presidency.³⁹

K.H. Misbahul Anam, the Secretary General of FPI, however, casts doubt on the relationship between FPI and the military. FPI, he said, rejected the idea of the paramilitary group's participation in the security forces during the 1999 Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR-RI).⁴⁰ Anam believed that this kind of participation would only lead to conflict. However, Anam cannot deny the close relationship between FPI and the military. Anam argues that FPI have the same task of protecting all members of the community. According to FPI, this task does not exclusively belong to the military forces. Muslims are obliged to protect all members of their community.

"There are three factors underlying the emergence of FPI. The first is the growth of *maksiat* (immorality) in this country which has reached an intolerable level. Something that we cannot contain. We think it is necessary to create a social movement that is able to stop this *maksiat*. We can no longer rely upon the government, the police officials. They can't. Otherwise we will see more and more people becoming victims. So we have to rise up and fight against all of these things. The second factor is the increase in human rights violations against Muslim people and the impotence of the government and social and political organisations in handling these problems. We are the majority here, but alas, from time to time we are victimised. Look at what happen in Tanjung Priok, Aceh, Haur Koneng, and Majalengka. All these incidents victimised Muslims. Thirdly, it is our obligation to perform *amr ma'rūf* (command righteousness) and *nahy munkar* (prevent corruption) through the constitutional channels that exist in this country, as a step towards the realisation of the struggles of our predecessors from NU and Muhammadiyah."⁴¹

Even though the FPI leaders argued that they supported the military and Habibie on religious grounds, no one can deny that their relationship was tinged with political opportunism. After the Special Session 1999, in which Habibie's address was rejected by the members of parliament, his attempts to build relationships with radical Islamic groups seemed to have come to an end. Meanwhile, a number of high ranking military officials maintained their relationships with these groups for a number of years, because the

military still needed organisations such as FPI as they continued to face various problems in the country. Demonstrations and protests against the military had become part of the daily life of the Indonesian community. However, the relationship between the military and FPI depended upon the support of a number of top military leaders, and the replacement of these leaders influenced this relationship. Based on this, some people have argued that the presence of radical Islamic groups was actually an experiment by a number of military officials. This argument is an over-simplification of the facts.

From its inception, FPI flourished as an independent paramilitary group which aimed to protect all members of the Muslim community. However, it never refused to cooperate with other groups, as long as the cooperation was mutually beneficial. In this context, it is easy to understand why it developed its relationship with the military. If we look back to the 1980s, close relationships between military figures and Muslim leaders were very common. Having access to the grass roots level of the community, Muslim leaders are always in a good bargaining position, which attracts various parties including the military.

When FPI's relationship with the military came to an end, Hamzah Haz, the leader of Indonesia's biggest Islamic political party, PPP (United Development Party) filled the military's position. This relationship was partly related to the fact that FPI is dominated by the *habā'ib*, who are also his party's main supporters. Hamzah Haz needed to maintain his contact with FPI in order to gain political access to certain Islamic groups in a broader context, though he relied upon his traditional supporters during the following general election.⁴² It is necessary to note that the *hubā'ib* play an important role in the Betawi Muslim community, the social base of FPI. When Hamzah was elected Vice-President in 2001, he frequently attended meetings held by FPI as well as by other Islamic radical groups. According to one source, Hamzah provided a great deal of support to Rizieq when the latter was facing several problems.

During the term of General Sofyan Jacob, FPI experienced its worst treatment from the police. Unlike his predecessors, Jacob was unwilling to tolerate any destructive behaviour by FPI. From the beginning, he indicated his hostility towards FPI which, according to him, has never respected the supremacy of the law. It is hardly surprising that the police and FPI paramilitary troops

were involved in a number of conflicts. The most important conflict occurred when FPI refused to accept that Rizieq had been charged with destructive behaviour. The FPI headquarters in Petamburan Tanah Abang was attacked by police officers following FPI's attacks on a number of billiard centres in West Jakarta. This attack indicated that the support of a number of high-ranking police officers had come to an end.

Most Indonesian Muslim radical groups are linked in some way to Middle Eastern figures and organisations. But the extent of their links very much depends on their ideological and political background. FPI seems to be the radical Islamic group with the weakest connections with Middle Eastern hard line figures, even though its top leaders are mainly graduates of Middle Eastern universities. FPI was created to respond to the social and political situation in Indonesia. It is therefore not surprising that it has no links to radical Islamic groups in the Middle East. However, it is reported that it has attracted a number of Middle Eastern hard-line figures. Osama bin Laden, the number one enemy of the U.S. and the foremost suspect in the September 11 attacks, is said to have offered FPI support in the form of money and weapons. So far, as Misbahul Anam argues, FPI does not need such support, as it is able to support itself.

It is a different case with Laskar Jihad (LJ). LJ was founded after the release of a *fatwā* (religious decision) by a number of Middle East *'ulamā'*. It is reported that several figures, who later became LJ leaders, asked the opinion of a number of *'ulamā'* in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, concerning the Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon.⁴³ In response they said that Muslims are obliged to help and protect Ambonese Muslims from persecution by radical Christians. Based on this opinion, LJ was established. LJ therefore has a strong connection with its allies in the Middle East. It goes without saying that this connection was its *raison d'être*, both in its establishment and its dissolution. Following the Bali bombing in October 2002, Ja'far Umar Thalib, the leader of LJ, who was at the time in police custody on charges of making a contemptuous speech, suddenly called an end to LJ. This decision was made after the Middle Eastern *'ulamā'* said that the situation in Ambon had improved significantly, so LJ's presence was no longer necessary.

At the end of 2002, there were several changes in government policy in response to the existence of radical Islamic groups. Following the Bali bombing in October 2002, in which hundreds of

civilians were killed, they appeared to take severe action against these groups. One by one the leaders of radical Muslim groups have been arrested by the police and charged with various offences, ranging from planning the assassination of President Megawati Soekarnoputri as in the case of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir,⁴⁴ a cleric and leader of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), to making a contemptuous speech, as in the case of Ja'far Umar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad. Rizieq himself was arrested by the police, charged with the destruction of several entertainment centres. Soon after his arrest, Rizieq disbanded the FPI paramilitary troops since so many people were using them for their own political interests.

FPI as a Muslim Paramilitary Group

From 1998 until 2000, there were a number of incidents that led to the loss of hundreds of civilian lives. These cases—as far as FPI is concerned—have never been solved by the police. In response, FPI created an independent fact finding team (*Badan Pencari Fakta*), whose duty it was to investigate the slaughter of so-called 'black magic practitioners' in a number of places in Java. The team went to Demak, Pasuruan, Jember, Probolinggo, and Banyuwangi. They found that the term 'black magic practitioner' was misleading and that the victims were actually members of the Muslim community who had nothing to do with black magic. They also found that the motives behind all these tragedies were political and ideological,⁴⁵ though because of the frightening nature of the incidents the government did not respond quickly. The killers apparently masked their faces and their bodies with ninja uniforms and were well trained in performing their jobs. Some people said that these killings were carried out in order to split apart the unity of the Muslim community and to cause infighting. Others argued that this was retaliation by Muslim enemies.

There was speculation amongst Muslims that certain groups of people, who had previously been abused by Muslims, were planning revenge. This speculation obviously refers to the communists who were killed by Muslims following the failed coup d'état in 1965. Based on historical records, thousands of members and supporters of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) were killed by Muslims, without due legal procedure.⁴⁶ For some people, like Abdurrahman Wahid, former president and leader of Nahdhatul Ulama, whose members may have been involved in the tragedy, the 1965-66 massacres remained an uncomfortable issue that re-

quired resolution. On many occasions, he spoke of the need for reconciliation between the Muslim community and members and supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party. When he became President, the first issue he raised was the removal of Act no. 25 1965 on communism.⁴⁷ However, this proposal only attracted public criticism and appeared to be too sophisticated. In reality, hatred and stigma towards communism and all its sub-organisations is still dominated by public perception.⁴⁸

FPI did not accuse the communists of perpetrating these killings. They just demanded that the government capture those groups responsible for the 'black magic practitioner killings'. Once again, FPI requested the government's commitment to overcoming these problems. They called on the Muslim community to trust the police to take all necessary action and measures and not to take the law into their own hands. However, people were unable to overcome their impression that the police did not take their jobs seriously and distrust rapidly grew. In certain places, especially in small cities and remote areas, they created paramilitary groups or voluntary security groups to defend and protect themselves. It is not an exaggeration to say that FPI pioneered the emergence of Muslim paramilitary groups. This was due to the fact that the government did not demonstrate a strong commitment to overcoming problems within the community. From 1998-2000, social and religious conflicts escalated in the country. Meanwhile the country seemed to be lacking government leadership. FPI became the most important movement in challenging this governmentless situation.

One of FPI's most noteworthy actions was its attack on the KOMNASHAM (the National Commission for Human Rights) office in Menteng, Jakarta. This action followed the commission's investigation report concerning the Tanjung Priok Massacre in 1983,⁴⁹ in which hundreds of Muslims, many believe, were killed and in which the notorious L.B. Murdani was allegedly involved. FPI accused the commission of being unfair in their investigation, according to which the massacre was the result of a *force majeure* and only a few people were killed. FPI demanded that the government abolish the report, for the body was not independent in undertaking its duties. From the beginning FPI did not expect too much from the report, since the commission was dominated by lawyers and human right activist, many of them Christians, who did not support Muslim interests.

FPI has made numerous attacks on entertainment centres. The most prominent ones are those in the cafés in Kemang, South Jakarta. Former President Abdurrahman Wahid commented on this and accused FPI of being unfair in carrying out its actions: the entertainment centres that did not give money to FPI were attacked, while others that give them money were not. He further accused its member of taking the expensive liquor and leaving behind the cheaper products. In response to this, Rizieq responded, "How does he know? He is blind, isn't he? His accusation has been imbued by his whisperers, who sometimes simply supply him with incorrect information."⁵⁰ After this event FPI became critical. It expressed its political opposition to Wahid a number of times, and accused Wahid of being unable to solve the country's problems.⁵¹

An incident in Ketapang, West Jakarta, November 1998, was when FPI first came to the public's attention. According to an investigation by FPI, the incident started when a group of young Ambonese tortured a man called Irfan. Irfan's father, Udin, arrived and asked what had happened to his son, but instead of receiving an explanation, Udin was also tortured and brought to the hospital. The situation was suddenly uncontrollable. Hundreds of Christians flocked to the site and burnt down a mosque. The Ketapang community, mostly Betawi Muslims, called the FPI headquarters in Petamburan. By the time the FPI paramilitary troops had arrived the two opposing groups were ready for war. FPI controlled the situation and prevented further damage.

In the following week, Kupang, the capital of the predominantly Christian province of East Nusa Tenggara, erupted into violence. It was obvious that the violence was instigated by the Ketapang incident. A large number of Christian groups took to the streets and burnt down every mosque they found. Dozens of Muslims were reportedly killed. One source said that the incident was provoked by General Theo Syafei, the Bali Military Commander. His voice was recorded as evidence of his involvement in the incident. A number of Muslim groups demanded that the government arrest Syafei and put him in jail.⁵²

On December 1st, FPI released a strong statement on the Kupang incident. *First*, FPI condemned the actions of a number of Christian groups who killed and tortured Muslims during the Kupang incident. FPI condemned a number of Christians who demolished and burnt down the mosques. *Second*, FPI called upon Christian communities throughout the country not to act in ways

which might incite anger amongst Muslims. *Third*, FPI demanded that the government investigate the Kupang incident. The government should punish the perpetrators, organisers, masterminds, and fundraisers of the Kupang incident. *Fourth*, FPI called on all Muslim people to carry out *jihād* (holy war) to defend the majesty of Islam.⁵³

Like many other fundamentalist Islamic groups, FPI has sent soldiers to Ambon to help Moluccan Muslims fight against Christians. The Moluccan battlefield, as an eyewitness soldier called it, is the battle of *jihād*, where the soldier longs for martyrdom (*shahīd*). FPI believes that the Ambon tragedy is in fact an international conspiracy to split united Indonesia into small countries, some of which are to be controlled by the Western-affiliated Christians. It is therefore incumbent upon all Muslims to protect and defend their country. According to various information sources, the FKM (Forum for Mollucan Sovereignty) is controlled by radical Christians, whose plan is to build an independent state for Ambonese Christians. The forum is reminiscent of the previously known separatist movement, RMS (South Moluccan Republic). At the beginning of Indonesian independence, a rebellion led by Dr. Soumokil was formed in this region, which aimed to separate the South Moluccas from the rest of Indonesia. Although this movement was destroyed, elements of the rebellion can still be found. Ambon is one of the most critical regions in Indonesia, where Muslims and Christian have frequently been in conflict.

Even though FPI sends its soldiers to Ambon, as far as I am concerned, the number of troops is limited, as the Ambon conflict has never been its main concern. Its flag reportedly flies side by side with that of LJ,⁵⁴ which sends a large number of its troops to Ambon. LJ has not only been involved in military action, but it has also performed humanitarian aid and community development.⁵⁵ It brought doctors, paramedics, teachers, and social workers to work side by side with the members of the local Ambonese community. It seems to me that FPI and LJ share the responsibilities of the Muslim factions. From the beginning, as we shall see in the following chapter, FPI has focused its activities on social issues, especially those related to *amr ma'rūf nahy munkar* ("to command righteousness and to prevent corruption").

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and U.S. foreign policy towards Muslim countries are amongst the global political issues that have attracted a great deal of FPI's attention. This, for instance, was

seen from its rejection of the presence of Israeli delegations at the IPU (International Parliamentary Union) conference held in Jakarta in 2000. According to FPI, Israel violates human rights in Palestine and other Arab countries. FPI threatened that if the conference committee insisted on inviting them, FPI would summon people to the streets of Jakarta, and Soekarno-Hatta airport would be sieged. They threatened that Israelis would not be allowed to enter Indonesia if they failed to show their commitment to solving their conflict with Palestine.

Meanwhile FPI has been involved in a number of anti-U.S. campaigns following the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. These attacks, most Muslims believe, are not justifiable since both are independent and sovereign countries. These attacks have also proven that the U.S. is actually a terrorist country which does not respect human rights and democracy. Together with students, intellectuals, NGOs, women's rights activists, and human rights activists, FPI marched to the U.S. Embassy in Jalan Merdeka Selatan Jakarta, shouting anti-American slogans. Its leaders also vowed to sweep Jakarta and to expel all American expatriates found in the city.⁵⁶ Concerns towards Afghanistan and Iraq has seen a number of Islamic organisations, including FPI, open a commission to send volunteers to Afghanistan and Iraq. Rizieq himself flew to Amman for humanitarian aid programs in the minutes before the first U.S. bomb was dropped in Baghdad, even though he was under house arrest at the time.

Although FPI provokes anti-American sentiment in the Indonesia, this does not mean that it is anti-Western.⁵⁷ The group simply refuses secular ideas and Western domination. As long as the world is unbalanced and the Muslim world continues to be dominated, Muslims will wage *jihād*. This is the martyrdom or *shahīd* that every Muslim longs for. This domination has been made possible as the West, especially the U.S., controls the global political situation through a number of international bodies, including the UN and IMF, which are believed to be subordinate to U.S. foreign policy.

The *Amr Ma'rūf Nahy Munkar* Movement

FPI has created an image of radical Islam in Indonesia, an image that is acknowledged by the movement's leaders. According to Ahmad Shabri Lubis, they share tasks and responsibilities with other Muslim groups. Based on their understandings, most Mus-

lim organisations focus on education, *dakwah* (proselytisation) and social welfare. However none of them focus on *amr ma'rūf* and *nahy munkar* issues. FPI takes on these issues, even though they may pose a threat to its members' lives.

"FPI's duty is to carry out *amr ma'rūf nahy munkar*. This is actually the duty of every Muslim. If Muhammadiyah, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) carry this out, forget FPI. FPI is created on the basis that nobody is taking care of this issue. There seems to be a division of labour amongst Muslim groups. Muhammadiyah is active in educational and social activities. NU is active in traditional Islamic education. They have thousands of Islamic boarding schools all over the country. The same thing also holds true for DDII (Indonesian Commission for Islamic Mission), which is concerned with proselytisation. They proselytise not only in cities and villages, but also in very remote areas, in the mountains and jungles. They intercept and anticipate Christian missionaries. Nobody can do this except the DDII. FPI sees that there remains an empty position, namely *amr ma'rūf nahy munkar*. The task of FPI is to destroy *kemaksiatan* (immoral behaviour). Nobody takes care of this because it is very difficult. We fight criminals and gangsters. Sometimes we confront the officials. We don't care what people say about us. Radical or militant does not really matter."⁵⁸

The model of Islam as exemplified by FPI has caused the escalation of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia. This can be seen in Jakarta and its surrounding areas. A number of Muslim groups in Tangerang, Depok, Bogor, and Bekasi, have been influenced by FPI to different degrees. Many of them have even joined the organisation and established new branches. This has led to a snowballing growth in the number of FPI members and supporters. Misbahul Anam claims that in its first years FPI had around fifteen million members and supporters throughout the country, with branches in seventeen provinces.⁵⁹

Anam may have exaggerated the number of FPI members and supporters, though it is obvious that it has its own way of garnering the support of Muslim groups. This is related to the fact that it introduces a simple idea that every Muslim is obliged "to command righteousness and to prevent corruption" (*amr ma'rūf nahy munkar*). This doctrine has been applied by several Muslim groups. However, they have never practiced it in the same way as FPI. For FPI, it has been used to attract low class urban Muslims who have been socially and religiously deprived.⁶⁰ It develops solidarity, which is what has made the movement so massive and popular. The sense of obligation is turned into the spirit of resistance. Like a doubled-edged sword, it is used to fight the enemies of

God, and to fight the wealthy who waste their money in evil places.

There are many places in Jakarta, Tangerang, Bogor and Bekasi, where prostitution, drugs, and gambling seem to be legal businesses. FPI argues that besides being unlawful, the businesses have also caused several problems. According to the Perda (Regional Regulation) of Jakarta No. 19 1985, public entertainment centres are allowed to open until 02.00 a.m. However this regulation has so far never been taken seriously and many places remain open until 05.00 in the morning. To overcome this problem, FPI has suggested the government implement an *Anti-Kemaksiatan* Act. This is extremely important in the overseeing of the pubs, discotheques, bars and casinos that appear in almost every corner of the city. Given that the government is not serious about enforcing the law, FPI takes on this responsibility. However, FPI is fully aware that its destructive actions are also against the law. In most cases, therefore, FPI sends notices to the entertainment centre owners warning them to obey the rules. If the notices and warnings are ignored, FPI attacks these places.⁶¹

According to FPI, this kind of *dakwah* is justified by Islam.⁶² It practices this as a form of law enforcement. The group does not in fact like this type of action, and instead supports dialogue. However, the biggest problem facing law enforcement in Indonesia, it believes, is rampant corruption amongst officials, who generally accept bribes from the businessmen who own these entertainment centres. They do nothing and allow the businessmen to break the rules.⁶³ Based on this, FPI refers to this country as a Mafia Republic. A Mafia Republic means that the country is controlled by gangsters, criminals and corrupt officials.⁶⁴ In such a country, law enforcement is just an illusion.

This kind of *dakwah* has been criticised by other Muslim organisations as well as the general public. However FPI seems not to care about this, and argues that a number of Muslim organisations are impotent since they are funded by foreign funding agencies that have political motives for providing their donations. As a result, many Muslim organisations appear not to care about a number of social issues.

FPI has a standard procedure for its actions. Referring to the Qur'ān, the *dakwah* is carried out in "the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious."⁶⁵ FPI often provides input to the

local authorities in relation to growing *kemaksiatan* and drug abuse. Local authorities frequently invite the group to discuss certain social and religious matters, as well as issues concerning the fasting month of Ramaḍān. In particular regions, local authorities even invite FPI to discuss the formation of local regulations and together with other Islamic organisations it proposes a draft of the regulations. However, these kinds of FPI activities have never been covered by the media, which is more tempted to write about sensational issues, and thus the general public remains ignorant about this movement.

According to FPI, all places can be divided into two categories. The first is the *amr ma'rūf* (which encourage righteousness), and the second the *nahy munkar* (which discourage corruption). Those in the category of *amr ma'rūf* are places where a variety of *kemungkaran* activities such as gambling, prostitution, drugs, and crime can be found. People in these kinds of places are either supportive of these activities or turn a blind eye to the fact that they are taking place. These places cannot become targets of the *nahy munkar* program as this only leads to conflict. Instead the program targets *amr ma'rūf* places, where it encourages people to focus on community development and provides them with a number of Islamic teachings. If the people in these *amr ma'rūf* places are not supportive of, and even refuse the presence of such *kemungkaran*, they will target *nahy munkar* places, as they believe that *kemungkaran* can be eradicated without conflict.

Furthermore, FPI has a number of technical procedures that must be performed before carrying out its actions. Together with the local community, it creates a resolution to refuse the presence of *kemungkaran* in the area, which is signed by concerned parties. This resolution is given to the local authorities and the entertainment centre owners. If within two weeks there is no response either from the local authorities or the businessmen, FPI takes action.

“Illegal practices are intolerable. When the authorities respond well to our notices and warnings, the problem is solved. Why should we waste our time and energy chartering buses and mobilising people? We are not paid. We pay them. That is their job. We support them to be more active. We want them do their jobs. That's all. When they do their jobs, the problem is solved. But when our warnings are ignored, we report to the higher authorities. We ask them to handle these problems. Everything is procedural. We are good citizens. We have to stress that. If the higher authorities

respond to our reports and handle the problem, then the problem is solved. You can see our procedures - how patient we are. We don't suddenly destroy these places. We obey the law. But if the law doesn't work, what happens then? When water is unchannelled, what happens then? Floods everywhere. We can flood the city."⁶⁶

It is interesting that FPI does not use the term 'law enforcement' but rather *gusur kemaksiatan* (demolish immorality). For many members of the Muslim community, the first term is too difficult to understand, while the second is easier to grasp, though it indicates dark justice. Moreover, it has a specific meaning that could give rise to religious sentiment. *Maksiat* has long been a sensitive issue amongst Muslims. It concerns dirty things that are against religion. By using terms such as *gusur maksiat* and *ganyang munkarat*⁶⁷ (destroy corruption), FPI mobilises the masses and calls them to *jihād*. For the majority of its members, *jihād* is understood as an attempt to perform all religious duties and to defend the dignity of Islam, even if this involves destructive action. God will forgive Muslims who perform these duties; they are the true believers.

Kemaksiatan is an extremely important issue during Ramaḍān. FPI intensifies its actions during this month. For a number of radical Muslim groups, the issue of *kemaksiatan* has been manipulated to achieve political aims. Together with other Muslim groups, FPI summons people to Jakarta and asks them to gather at Monas Square. It urges the public to fight against *kemaksiatan* and asks the government and non-Muslims to respect Muslims.⁶⁸ Working with its various branches and allies, the whole month is perceived as *jihād*. After performing *tarāwih* prayer (supplementary evening prayer during Ramaḍān), they begin their actions. Pubs, casinos, bars, and discotheques are their main targets. They stop their actions as soon as it is time for *sahur* (meal before fasting, around 3.00-4.00 a.m.).

The movement against *maksiat* does not only occur in Jakarta, but has also emerged in Bogor, about 50 miles from Jakarta. A number of Muslim leaders expressed their concerns and suggested that local authorities limit public entertainment activities during Ramaḍān. In Puncak, the mountainous tourist resort area south of Jakarta, hundreds of public entertainment centres are allegedly used for prostitution. A number of members of the Muslim community living around this area have been bothered by this kind of activity and have expressed their concern about its existence. However local authorities cannot do anything since Puncak has been

developed as a tourist industry, which supplies a lot of money to the region.

Parung, located about 15 miles from Jakarta, has also been developed as an entertainment centre. FPI has attacked a number of bars, karaoke clubs, and pubs in Parung in the past. Prostitution is common in a number of places in this area. Meanwhile, in Sawangan and Depok, a number of Islamic boarding schools and mosques have emerged as part of the Islamisation movement that has occurred since the 1980s.⁶⁹ When FPI emerged in 1998, a number of Muslim leaders from these areas stated their allegiance to the group, as they found what they had been waiting for. Depok and Sawangan are known as some of FPI's strongest branches. Several times they warned that bars, karaoke clubs, and pubs should be closed during Ramaḍān. But this warning was not heeded, and as a result FPI attacked these places.

From 1998-2000, while people were gripped by the euphoria of democracy, a number of previously unimaginable events occurred in the Indonesia. Widespread pornography was exposed, which caused protest and concern among the community. FPI was involved in a number of actions to fight against this pornography. In principle, it supports every community action that fights *kemaksitan*. FPI purportedly supported the Kebon Melati community in closing several places that were allegedly used for prostitution and gambling. It is also reported that FPI supported the Rawa Buaya community in East Jakarta to close the similar venues in their area.

Ideology

The aim of FPI is to stipulate Islamic law for Muslim people in Indonesia. Islam and the state are the two entities which cannot be separated from one another. The state is created to protect the people and to give them their rights. According to FPI, the implementation of Islamic teachings is one of the civil rights that should be provided by the state.⁷⁰ If Islamic teachings were implemented, FPI believes, the Indonesian people would live in peace and prosperity. Islamic fundamentalist movements always relate punishment to the absence of the implementation of God's laws in the daily lives of Muslim people. In the case of FPI, the multi-dimensional crisis facing Indonesia is believed to be punishment from God. The crisis has occurred due to the Indonesia's Western-affil-

iated politics and economics and the adoption of secular laws, which are in fact inappropriate for Indonesians.

To realise this aim of implementing Islamic teachings, FPI has created the National Commission for the Application of Islamic Law. The task of the commission is to introduce and disseminate the issue of the application of Islamic law to its members as well as other Muslim people. Local commissions have been created in several provinces throughout the country, in which the programs are further introduced at the grass roots level. According to FPI, Muslims respond positively to this issue.⁷¹ At the grass roots level, there is a strong level of appreciation for Islamic law or *sharī'ah*. FPI believes that Muslims remain appreciative towards Islamic teachings because secular law is not suited to their aspirations. Several years ago, a number of Muslim leaders proposed the need for the implementation of Islamic law.

Muslim perceptions of Islamic law are indicated by the national surveys carried out by PPIM (Centre for the Study of Islam and Society) in 2001, 2002 and 2004, which showed that Muslims' appreciation for Islamic law is relatively high in Indonesia.⁷² But these statistics do not necessarily please proponents of Islamic law, since the answers are ambiguous. When people were asked specific questions concerning the application of Islamic law (e.g. cutting off the hands of thieves and stoning adulterers to death, as found in the classical Islamic legal texts), the percentage dropped significantly, and was not as high as their appreciation for Islamic law. This indicates that there are various interpretations of Islamic law. People have different understandings of *sharī'ah* because, historically speaking, *sharī'ah* has never had a clear meaning. Basically Muslims have no questions about *sharī'ah* as long as it concerns the universal ideas of Islam. However, there is very little agreement when it is understood as *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) or the compendium of Islamic legal opinion.

Even though it is difficult to implement *sharī'ah*, FPI claims to have succeeded in disseminating this idea. In a number of regions in Java as well as in Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan, FPI argues, Islamic law has actually been applied. Muslims' commitment to the application of Islamic law can be seen in several cases. In Cianjur West Java, for instance, the *Gerbang Marhamah* (the Gate of Blessing) movement has emerged, which proactively campaigns for Islamic law.⁷³ This movement is said to be supported by the public as well as by local authorities. Muslim leaders in the region

have reportedly prepared a draft for the implementation of Islamic law on a national scale. Islamic *sharī'ah* movements are also found in Makassar, Padang, and Serang Banten, which are known as the most committed Muslim communities in Indonesia. *sharī'ah* movements have, however, so far been elitist, appealing only to particular segments of the community.

In many cases, the application of *sharī'ah* in Indonesia seems to be symbolic rather than substantial, which often causes scepticism amongst its opponents. For the Acehnese, *sharī'ah*, besides being symbolic, is also political and cultural, since the province of the "Verandah of Mecca" has long been in conflict with the government, demanding that Islam constitute their cultural and political identity. In this instance, *sharī'ah* is usually related to women wearing the *jilbāb* (veil), women being escorted by their *muhrim* (male guardian) when travelling, etc., a number of issues that are criticised by gender activists. In some cases, *sharī'ah* is even understood as men growing a long beard and wearing *koko* (traditional Javanese clothing). This, once again, indicates that even amongst proponents of *sharī'ah*, the meaning of *sharī'ah* seems to be unclear.

Unlike other proponents of Islamic law, FPI interprets *sharī'ah* in a more substantial matter, meaning that it proposes a number of ideas derived from Islamic teachings be integrated into national law. This can be seen in a number of drafts and proposals made by FPI regarding various issues. For instance, FPI suggested that the Anti-Maksiat Act be organised and implemented since *maksiat* has become a social disease, not only within Muslim community, but also for non-Muslim people. FPI also created the Anti-Drug Act, the *Zakat* (Almsgiving) Act, the *Hajj* (Pilgrimage) Act and the Islamic Criminal Law Act.⁷⁴ As far as FPI is concerned, it has never been involved in the *jilbāb* or *koko* movements which interpret *sharī'ah* in a symbolic manner even though its members are often dressed in traditional Arabic clothing.

Regardless of its destructive actions, FPI has become a real challenge to the national law enforcement agencies. It seems to me that FPI is actually an expression of frustration and anger towards national law enforcement. Since the end of the reformation era, debates over law enforcement and the national legal system have become one of the country's most pressing issues. On one hand, there are many weaknesses in the national legal system, which leads to low quality law enforcement. On the other hand, political will and concrete actions from the government to reform this sys-

tem remain far from adequate. There is suspicion amongst the public that the government is unable or unwilling to reform the legal system.

It is argued that reformation of the national legal system can be achieved through improving the existing legal system and its apparatuses. It is important to note that Indonesian legal system was adopted from the Dutch colonial legal system and is regarded as being no longer appropriate to modern Indonesia. Many Muslim leaders argue that it is time to reform the national legal system, including adopting Islamic law into the national law. Islamic law could make a significant contribution to the national legal system. Since the downfall of Soeharto in 1998, the chances of this happening have improved. FPI is willing to participate in this process, by proactively campaigning for the application of Islamic law, both amongst its members and in the Muslim community in general. Islamic law, FPI argues, should be integrated into national law and only be enforceable for Muslims.

FPI leaders realise that law reform would take a lot of time and energy. At the moment, according to FPI, the target is providing a national legal framework into which Islamic law can be integrated. Whether Islamic law is applied in the coming “five years, ten years, fifty years, one hundred years, or even five thousand years, FPI does not really care. The important thing is that we follow all the processes, and we provide all the supporting factors for the application of Islamic law.”⁷⁵ FPI believes in the principle of *tadarruj* (graduality) in the process of *jihād*.

Muslims view the application of Islamic law as being in favour of universal human rights. At the same time, non-Muslims should not interpret this aspiration as threatening or offensive. If non-Muslims require a legal system derived from their own traditions or religion, the government should provide them with the same opportunities that they provide Muslims. However Islamic law has been stigmatised and delegitimised by secular Muslim intellectuals—usually graduates of Western universities—or non-Muslim people who seem to be afflicted by Islamophobia, so that the idea of applying Islamic law often loses momentum. In general—as a result of this delegitimation and stigmatisation—people are not supportive of the application of Islamic law. This has made it increasingly difficult for the proponents of Islamic law to realise their aspirations.

However, according to FPI, opportunities still exist, and the application of Islamic law will run smoothly alongside the government's autonomy program. One by one the provinces in which Muslims are the majority, FPI predicts, will choose Islamic law instead of secular law. For the final phase, FPI proposes a National Referendum to decide if Islamic law is to be applied on a national scale. If the majority of Indonesian people voted for Islamic law, Islamic law would be applied nationally, and if they voted for secular law, Islamic law could only be applied in certain provinces in which the majority voted for it. But Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, the chief leader of FPI, believes that the majority would vote for Islamic law.⁷⁶

According to FPI, the application of Islamic law does not necessarily mean the establishment of an Islamic state. There is no single verse in the Holy Koran imploring Muslims to establish an Islamic state, whereas one can easily find verses that say that Muslims should follow the law of God. Thus, FPI's concept of the application of Islamic law does not oppose the Republic of Indonesia (RI). Its allegiance to RI seems to be beyond question. It is no coincidence that it was founded on August 17th 1998, which indicates that they are "true believers" in RI. Early on there was a statement on FPI's website (no longer available), which, FPI believes, derives from the Prophet's sayings. "The Prophet has ever foretold that at the end of the ages, his country would emerge in this world with a red-white flag." Allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia is integrated into the teachings of FPI itself and well recorded in many of its documents. One such document is the Decree on Women's Appointment as President.⁷⁷ On many occasions this oath of allegiance has been a ritual in FPI's activities.

Based on this belief, it is impossible for FPI to oppose the Republic of Indonesia. The RI is thus the *raison d'être* for the establishment of FPI. On every Indonesian independence day commemoration, thousands of FPI members, along with other members of the community, flock to the city, carrying the red white flag. Other radical Islamic groups, such as Laskar Jihad and KAMMI (The Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union) are never involved in such patriotic celebrations. FPI has never questioned the presence of RI. This is one of its main characteristics which differentiates it from, for instance, the Hizbuttahrir (The Party of Liberty), whose ultimate goal is to create an Islamic caliphate.

FPI does not really care whether RI is an Islamic state or a *Pancasila* state. The important thing is that the state gives Muslim people the opportunity to live in accordance with Islamic teachings. They argue that every Muslim has the right to live with and to practice Islamic teachings. The state should protect this right since it guarantees the rights of its citizens. If the state is unable to guarantee, or limits or constrains the rights of its citizens, it has violated its ultimate responsibility. According to FPI, this is what occurred in Indonesian history and the state does not guarantee the rights of Muslims to live according to Islamic teachings. As a result, Muslims, from time to time, demand that the government provide them with the opportunity to implement Islamic teachings. It is hardly surprising that the relationship between Muslims and the state has been filled with tension and conflict. This can be seen from early Indonesian history, when in the 1950s Darul Islam (The Abode of Islam), an archetypal Indonesia Islamic movement, opposed the government due to their dissatisfaction with various issues, including the state's refusal to implement Islamic law.

"We don't really care about the form of the state. Be it an Islamic state or a *Pancasila* state, we don't care. The important thing is that Muslims live in peace, Muslims should be respected because we deserve respect. That's all. I want to tell you something. If we live in Singapore, we are the minority. If we live in the United State, we are the minority. Would it be possible to request *shari'ah* as the state legal system in such countries? That is impossible because Muslims are the minority. Don't do something stupid if you are the minority. But here, we constitute 90 percent of the population. We ask for something that we deserve to have, we ask something that it is possible. That's all. So don't try to make any ridiculous interpretations."⁷⁸

According to Martin van Bruinessen, Muslim dissatisfaction was not only represented by the emergence of Darul Islam but also by the Masyumi. Masyumi was another archetypal radical Islamic movement in Indonesia. Before its ban in the late 1950s, Masyumi, the largest Islamic party during the Soekarno era, attempted to make Islam the state ideology. However, this attempt finally came to end when Soekarno dismissed the parliament and returned to the 1945 Constitution. At that time Indonesia had a liberal political system, which led to political fragmentation and social regimentation. In some parts of the country, separatist movements became a serious threat to national integration. Masyumi was finally banned because a number of its top leaders, Soekarno be-

lieved, were involved in the PRRI (The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) movement in Sumatra. In the late 1950s, Soekarno banned all ideological and political movements. Instead he proposed the "Guided Democracy" policy, in which the meaning of democracy was reduced to an authoritarian state.

In spite of the official ban on Masyumi, its memory was kept alive and transformed into new organisations. It is not an exaggeration to say that Masyumi, as van Bruinessen demonstrates, was an archetype for Islamic radical movements in Indonesia. A number of newly formed Islamic organisations during the Soeharto era, including Parmusi (Indonesian Muslim Party) and the DDII (The Indonesian Commission for Islamic Mission), were reminiscent of Masyumi. The former was a political party which, in the early 1970s, together with other Islamic parties, was fused into PPP (United Development Party), an Islamic party to rival Golkar, the political machine of the New Order. The latter was an organisation focused on Islamic missionary activities, including intercepting Christian missionary activities in remote areas.

Martin van Bruinessen's theoretical framework, however, is unable to explain the existence of FPI. FPI is ideologically and politically associated neither with Darul Islam nor with Masyumi.⁷⁹ It is simply an expression of Muslims' dissatisfaction with law enforcement in Indonesia. Its roots can be found in various social movements in the 1980s and 90s, when modernisation, with all its implications, pervaded the country. A number of people, especially in the urban areas and not necessarily Muslims, began to be concerned about the worsening impacts of modernisation in their local areas. A number of anti-drug and alcoholism movements emerged in many cities in Indonesia since the 1980s, which sometimes led to radical actions. These movements were supported by members of the community working side by side with the police. In many streets, one can see their banners, "Say No To Drugs", "This Is a Drug-Free Area," "Drug Users Beware!" which reflect concern and even anger towards social problems. In a number of areas, concrete action was taken against drug dealers and users.⁸⁰

Meanwhile a number of Muslim groups are not only concerned with drug use and alcoholism, but also with issues such as pornography, prostitution, and gambling. Muslims are particularly concerned with such issues as they relate to their religious beliefs. I argue that these movements are primarily social movements.

Muslim people, especially those from mosque-based youth associations, later inserted religious sentiments into their movements. Time and again they have acted against places that they consider to be un-Islamic. These social movements are now represented by FPI. Alcoholism, narcotics, pornography, and prostitution are social problems, the solutions to which are the responsibility of all members of the community. FPI, however, combines this social unrest with religious sentiment in order to gain legitimacy.

Islamism is FPI's central point of view. Islamism is a set of notions asserting the need for Islam to be implemented as a set of political and legal principles. Unlike other radical Islamic groups, FPI does not have sophisticated ideologies such as the idea of a caliphate as promoted by the Hizbuttahrir, or the Muslim Brotherhood's concept of a Muslim community epitomised by the *ummah*. If we look at the prerequisites for FPI members, it is obvious that their Islamism is similar to that of Muslim people in general. According to FPI's general rules, all members of FPI should *salat* (pray) five times a day; should fast during the fasting month of Ramaḍān, should learn about Islam, and should behave in accordance with Islamic teachings, a set of values which are also practiced by other Muslims. During my visits to FPI headquarters between 1999-2000, I surprisingly saw nothing special about them. Unlike the members of Laskar Jihad, who are more organised and disciplined, FPI members appear to be easygoing as they talk, laugh and smoke. This indicates that FPI is simple in terms of ideology and discipline.

Even though FPI is unrelated to Masyumi and Darul Islam, FPI has used historical precedence to gain legitimacy. On many occasions, its leaders try to convince the public that the application of *shari'ah* is legitimate and is historically guaranteed. What they mean by historical precedence is the hijacking of democracy in Indonesia. Prior to Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945, the founding fathers, from both Muslim and nationalist factions, reached an agreement called the Jakarta Charter, under which Muslims would be given the opportunity to practice Islamic teachings in their daily lives. However, the agreement was nullified, allegedly following criticism from Christian leaders who did not agree with the stipulation. This nullification has often been a trigger for physical conflict between Muslims and the state. The Jakarta Charter remains problematic and is unsolved even today.

The Jakarta Charter and Islamic Law

In 1942 Japan occupied Indonesia, replacing the Dutch that had colonised the country for three hundred and fifty years. As soon as they arrived, the Japanese promised that they would release Indonesia from Dutch colonialism. Their arrival was supported and welcomed by the majority of Indonesian people. In April 1945, they established the *Dokuritsu Zyunbi Tyoosakai* (The Indonesian Independence Investigative Commission -BPUPKI) and *Dokuritsu Zyunbi Zyunkai* (The Indonesian Independence Preparatory Commission -PPKI), whose duty it was to carry out all the preparations and necessary steps for Indonesian independence. These bodies consisted of Indonesian leaders from both secular and Muslim factions.

From May 29 to June 1, 1945, the BPUPKI created a small commission called the Nine Commission, its membership consisting of nine people: Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, A.A. Maramis, Abikoeno Tjokrosjojoso, Abdul Kahar Muzakir, Haji Agus Salim, Ahmad Soebardjo, K.H. Abdul Wahid Hasyim, and Muhammad Yamin. In June 1945, it produced an agreement called the Jakarta Charter, which was an agreement between the Muslim and secular factions regarding state philosophy and the national constitution.⁸¹ Because there is a Muslim majority in this country, Muslims were given the opportunity to live according to and practice their religious beliefs.

The Jakarta Charter consists of two documents, the Preamble and the *Pancasila*.⁸² Its first principle, Belief in One God, included the additional words “*dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*” (“with the obligation for Muslims to abide by Islamic law”—later called the seven words), which clearly guarantees the application of Islamic law for Muslims. This phrase was also found in Act 29 of the Constitution and was agreed upon by both the secular and Muslim factions. However, these words were removed the very next day, when Soekarno and Hatta, on August 18, 1945, decreed that the *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution was the state philosophy and national constitution. The phrase that guaranteed the application of Islamic law was annulled. This deletion was purportedly made after Christian factions protested. If Muslims insisted on including these “seven words”, the Christians argued, they would separate from the nation and create their own country in the eastern part of Indonesia. Muhammad Hatta was reportedly the first man to support this deletion, believing that this phrase would only lead the country into disintegration.⁸³

This annulment obviously raised objections from Muslim factions. A number of Muslim leaders argue that the Jakarta Charter was an authentic document in the formulation of the national constitution, produced through constitutional means. Its annulment is believed to be the first betrayal of democracy. From 1945-1955, there were a number of movements which, by and large, were instigated by the issue of the position of Islam in the national context. The Darul Islam rebellion, which erupted in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, is evidence of the way in which Islam remained central to the political life of certain Muslim groups. The rebellion was an expression of their disillusionment in the national political situation which was not supportive of their aspirations.

In 1955, the first general election was held and Indonesia entered a period of parliamentarism. From 1955-1959, there were numerous opportunities for Muslim factions to discuss Islam as a political ideology.⁵⁴ However, since Muslim factions in the parliament, represented by Masyumi and Nahdhatul Ulama, were not the majority as they were slightly outnumbered by the nationalist secular factions, represented by the PNI (Indonesian National Party) and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), the parliamentary sessions always resulted in a deadlock. In response to this situation, on July 5, 1959, President Soekarno issued a decree to return to the Constitution of 1945. With this decree, the possibility of Islam becoming the state ideology was nearly destroyed.

Although the Jakarta Charter has been neglected in the last sixty years, its spirit remains in the consciousness of a number of Muslim groups. During the New Order era, this issue was almost never discussed. But since the reformation era, a number of Muslims have once again raised the issue of the Jakarta Charter. A number of Islamic parties - the PPP (United Development Party), PBB (the Crescent Star Party) and PKS (the Prosperous Justice Party)- have become its staunchest supporters, and it is at the top of their agenda at each annual session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Facing the fact that the majority of the parliament was unsupportive of their stance, during the process of the amendment of the National Constitution in 2001, they called for an amendment to Act 29 of the Constitution. They argued that the amendment of Act 29 should include the "seven words" which stipulate the application of Islamic law.

Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab wrote an important book about this issue, called *Dialog Piagam Jakarta*.⁵⁵ The book is said to have

been written after he received several requests from his colleagues and friends. Since FPI is strongly concerned with the Jakarta Charter, his colleagues and friends suggested that it would be a good idea for him to write a book about the Jakarta Charter so that the public could more easily understand his position. Rizieq argues that scepticism and cynicism among the opponents of Islamic law are groundless, since this law is only valid for Muslims. As freedom of religious life is guaranteed under the Constitution, Muslim people should be given the opportunity to live according to and practice their religious teachings. In most of his speeches, Rizieq states that FPI supports the political parties whose platforms include the application of Islamic law on a national scale. For Rizieq, the Jakarta Charter is only a starting point where the public can discuss and explore Islamic law and its integration into the national legal system. However, these attempts have been opposed by a number of Muslim intellectuals,⁸⁶ usually labelled secular or highly westernised, who call the Jakarta Charter a Pandora's Box.⁸⁷

According to Rizieq, the Jakarta Charter is important since it records one of the most important parts of the formulation of the national constitution. It is a legal-constitutional basis for the application of Islamic law, since it was produced by a commission in which both Muslims and nationalist factions were fairly represented. It is also a legal-historical basis since it is well recorded in the history of this country. According to Soekarno, Rizieq argues, the Jakarta Charter inspired the national constitution and the two are inseparable. However, so far this issue has not attracted support from the majority of Muslim people.

Organisational and Social Basis

FPI consists of two parts: the *Majlis Syuro* (the Consultative Assembly) and the Executive Board. The former consists of a number of respected people whose main task is to provide advice and act as consultants to the Executive. It is the highest body in the organisation. Of its five members, one is appointed as its chief leader (*ketua dewan majlis syuro*). In carrying out its duties, the *Majlis Syuro* is supported by five commissions (the Commission of *shari'ah*, the Commission of Honour, the Commission of Coordination, the Commission of Consultancy, and the Commission of Supervision).

The Executive Board is involved in the day to day affairs of the organisation. It runs the organisation based on the mandates provided by the *Majlis Syuro*. The Executive is led by a Chief Leader,

currently Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, and a Secretary General, currently Ahmad Shabri Lubis.⁸⁸ In order to carry out its activities, the Executive has twelve departments (Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Home Affairs, Department of Religious Affairs, Department of *Jihād* and State Defence, Department of Social, Political, and Legal Affairs, Department of Education and Culture, Department of Economy and Industry, Department of Research and Technology, Department of Logistics, Department of Social Welfare, Department of Information, and Department of Women's Affairs). Meanwhile, the Secretary General is supported by six special commissions (the Commission of Front Experts, the Commission of Front Recruitment, the Commission of Front Investigation, the Commission of Front Legal Assistance, the Anti-*Maksiat* Commission, and the Anti-Violence Commission).

FPI is founded on national, provincial, regional, district, and sub-district levels. Because the organisation is so large, it faces problems with internal coordination and consolidation, which leads to fragmentation within its networks. In many places, its branches seem to have little or no coordination with the central office. Initially affiliated to the central office, FPI Surakarta in Central Java now claims to be independent and has nothing to do with Jakarta.⁸⁹ This indicates the extent of the problems in its organisational networks. Meanwhile, its strongholds appear to have followed the patterns of the Ḥaḍramī settlements, which are scattered throughout the northern cities of Java. It is particularly strong in the northern cities of West Java such as Bekasi, Karawang, and Subang, and in some cities in the western parts of Central Java especially in Brebes, Tegal and Pemasang. There are also Ḥaḍramī settlements in several inland cities, such as Bogor, Depok, and Sukabumi in West Java. FPI are active in these cities, especially when approaching the fasting month of Ramaḍān.

FPI is an open organisation. Anybody can become a member or supporter. This indicates that it is not a clandestine movement like Darul Islam, which always kept its distance from the people. It is this aspect which has seen FPI grow so rapidly but ineffectively. In a number of places, certain members of FPI have been involved in blackmailing activities usually carried out by vigilantes. However, it is misleading to assume that FPI is simply a mob hired by political manipulators.⁹⁰ This assumption is clearly groundless since in a number of places, when abandoned by its political patron, the movement has remained active.

All members and followers of FPI are provided with Islamic teachings. The teachings are usually given by members of the consultative assembly, who are usually '*ulamā'* or religious leaders. Faith or '*aqidah*' is one of the most important aspects that must be practiced in the daily lives of all members. They are also taught *fiqh al-jihād*, consisting of the general principles of Islam concerning *jihād*. This includes the motives, methods, and practices of *jihād*. The reason for this undertaking is clear, namely to avoid making mistakes that could reduce the value of *jihād*. *Jihād* is understood as a holy duty which has particular requirements in accordance with Islamic teachings. When Misbahul Anam assumed the position of Secretary General from 1998-2000, he combined *fiqh al-jihād* with several litanies and chanting taken from different sources, including litanies from the Tijāniyyah *tarīqat* (*sūfī* order), of which he became a *murshid* (teacher). However, these teachings were no longer available after he resigned in 2000.

At the grass root level, FPI's main supporters are '*ulamā'*, *kyai*, and *ustādh*, who provide religious teachings to Muslim people with no material compensation. They have traditional networks with the *ḥabā'ib*. They became FPI's main supporters when it emerged in 1998. It is not an exaggeration to say that the *kyai kampung*, as Habib Rizieq calls them, have become the most important elements in the FPI movement, where programs are developed and disseminated at the grass roots level. Rizieq says that these *kyai kampung* "are the pious people".

"The *kyai kampung* are the '*ulamā'* and *kyai* who are unknown to most of the people. They provide religious teachings in one mosque and then go to another, from one village to another. Their insight is as sharp as knives and swords. Beware when they become angry. They are angry because of Allah, not because of their own desires. Their hearts are beating. The hearts of their students and followers are also beating, waiting for the command of *jihād*, which can happen at any time. If the drums of war are beaten by these '*ulamā'*, if the command of *jihād* has been announced by the *kyai* of the Hereafter, the Muslim people will come like a flock of birds, welcoming *jihād* and waiting for His reward. They are the soldiers of Allah, who are ready to meet death with smiles and happiness, '*Live your life with dignity or die as a martyr*'."⁹¹

The *Laskar Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defenders Paramilitary - LPI) is the most frightening element of FPI. It is an arm of the organisation that is attached to the Department of *Jihād* and State Defence. It is this group which usually carries out demonstrations and de-

structive actions against entertainment centres. The FPI paramilitary group has an organisational structure that is very similar to a military structure. It is led by the Chief Commander, Habib Rizieq himself, and has a hierarchical command structure. The members of this paramilitary group are selected through a system of recruitment which focuses on the importance of physical skill, as they are equipped with martial arts and mental discipline. They are provided with semi military training, held somewhere in Bogor, West Java, presumably led by members of the Indonesian military. It is said that they have a strong commitment to the organisation and are prepared to die for it.

The paramilitary organisation is structured in exactly the same way as the military. It is led by a Chief Leader called the *Imam Besar* (the Great Leader). *Imam Besar* is the highest position in the military structure. Under the Great Leader, there are several *Imam* who have command over a province. Under an *Imam*, there are several *Wali*, who have command over a region (*kabupaten* or *kotamadya*). The *Wali* is also called Chief Commander (not to be confused with Chief Leader). Under a *Wali*, there are several *Qoid* (*qā'id*; Arabic for commander), who have command over a *kecamatan* or district. Under a *Qoid*, there are several *Amir* (*amīr*), who have command over a subdistrict. Under an *Amir*, there are several *Rois* (*Ra'īs*), who have command over a village. *Rois* is the lowest hierarchical position in the paramilitary organisation. All members of FPI paramilitary group are under the authority of the Department of Paramilitary and State Defence.

FPI Military Personnel

No	Unit/Position	Military Personnel
1	<i>Jundi</i>	1 person
2	<i>Rois</i>	Equivalent to 20 personnel
3	<i>Amir</i>	Equivalent to 210 personnel (200 <i>jundi</i> + 10 <i>rois</i>)
4	<i>Qoid</i>	Equivalent to 1,055 personnel (1000 <i>jundi</i> + 5 <i>amir</i> + 50 <i>rois</i>)
5	<i>Wali</i>	Equivalent to 5,280 personnel (5,000 <i>jundi</i> + 5 <i>qoid</i> + 25 <i>amir</i> + 250 <i>rois</i>)
6	<i>Imam</i>	Equivalent to 26,400 personnel (25,000 <i>jundi</i> + 5 <i>wali</i> + 25 <i>qoid</i> + 125 <i>amir</i> + 1,250 <i>rois</i>)
7	<i>Imam Besar</i>	All military personnel

Although the structure of FPI is very much alike that of the military, Ahmad Shabri Lubis refuses this comparison. A number of disciplines practiced by FPI are said to have been adopted from the Indonesian education system, which, in one way or another, adopts military discipline. During the Soeharto era, this discipline was an integrated part of the national education system. All over the country, students were introduced to the doctrine of patriotism and semi-military discipline, as seen from the compulsory Monday morning events and particular national commemorations, in which students were mobilised and trained to be loyal to the country. Shabri also refuses the assumption that FPI military personnel are equipped with weapons. If there is a weapon, it must be a stick (*toya*) made from bamboo or wood, initially used as a flagstaff, which in an emergency can be used as a weapon. He admits that it is difficult for FPI paramilitary members not to have weapons but says that *toya* would be sufficient for them. During my visits to FPI headquarters in 1999-2000, however, it was obvious that they were equipped with a number of traditional weapons such as knives and swords.

If we look at the structure of the organisation, either at the national or regional level, it is obvious that the top level, that of the *Majlis Syuro* and the Executive Board, is dominated by the *habā'ib*. I assume that the presence of FPI, in one way or another, is a means to accommodate and facilitate the interests of the *habā'ib*. Their domination can be seen in the overall structure of the organisation, where almost all important positions are under their control. Since the *Jami'at al-Khair* broke down in the first decades of the twentieth century due to its ongoing conflict with the *Irshadi*, an organisation dominated by the non-*habā'ib*, the *habā'ib* community have not had a strong organisation that is able to accommodate their interests. During the Soekarno and Soeharto eras, they were in a peripheral position in the nation-building processes, in terms of social, religious and political life. Since the end of the New Order period, the chances to access and control the public sphere have increased, not only for the *habā'ib* but also for Muslim people in general. The *habā'ib* have therefore taken up these chances to be more involved in public life.

The second level of the organisation is dominated by educated young Muslims from middle and lower class families. It is misleading to assume that FPI membership consists only of uneducat-

ed and poor Muslims. Based on my observations, it is clear that a number of its Executive Board members are young Muslims who have been educated in Middle Eastern universities. Some of them even graduated from secular universities.⁹² Most of them, however, are young Muslims who have studied Islam in *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), *majlis taklim* (learning centres), and mosque-based Muslim youth organisations (Ikatan Remaja Masjid). Similarly significant is the fact that they come from relatively different religious backgrounds. Many of them are attached to NU and Muhammadiyah, and the remainder claim not to have any religious affiliations.

The third and lowest level of FPI is dominated by uneducated Muslims who have become die-hard loyalists of the organisation. Most of them are ordinary Muslims who joined the organisation based on paranoia. Many of them are former vigilantes who are committed to return to the path of Allah (*taubat*). Criticised for the presence of a large number of former vigilantes in FPI, Shabri argues that the repenting vigilantes are as good as other Muslims who return to the path of God. They are even better than those Muslims who do not have a clear religious standpoint. It is obvious that those who believe that destroying entertainment centres is the meaning of *jihad*, and that in doing so their previous sinful deeds are forgiven by God and that they will be rewarded with paradise, are socially and religiously deprived. Time and again it seems that are manipulated by their senior comrades who provoke them to act against particular targets, which might have political implications for these senior comrades. These loyalists are easily mobilised and ready to fight against the enemies of Islam. One of my interviewees said that FPI can mobilise as many as 10,000 members in just a few hours. During its first anniversary in 1999, FPI deployed as many as 100,000 members and supporters from Jakarta, Tangerang, Bogor and Bekasi.

The domination of the *habā'ib* in FPI's Consultative Assembly and Executive Board appears to have caused many problems within the organisation. Such domination naturally leads to conflict between the *habā'ib* and non-*habā'ib*. Both have political interests which are frequently difficult to resolve. This assumption was confirmed when in 2000, Misbahul Anam and Cecep Bustomi declared that they were leaving the organisation. The former was the incumbent Secretary General and one of FPI's founding fathers. He

was a highly outspoken leader, who severely criticised government policy concerning Muslims affairs. Before he joined FPI, he studied at many *pesantren* in Java and grew up highly influenced by NU traditions. However, his life and career has not been strongly linked to his NU background. During his studies at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta in the late 1980s, unlike students with NU backgrounds who usually became activists in the NU-linked student organisation PMII (Indonesian Muslim Student Movement), he joined modernist Muhammadiyah, though informally, and later on, due to his hard-line standpoint, he joined PII (Indonesian Islamic Students), the radical Masyumi-linked student organisation.

Anam said during an interview that he resigned from FPI because it has moved away from the covenant that they had previously made. According to Anam, FPI was founded to respond to all the problems that face Muslim people. But it has increasingly become involved in issues which, in his opinion, "have nothing to do with Muslim concerns". It is not quite clear what Anam means by this, however, I assume that FPI is increasingly dominated by the *habā'ib* factions, many of whom are known as political brokers.⁹³ Anam's decision to leave the organisation effectively eroded the support his faction provided within the FPI branches scattered around Ciputat, Pamulang, Sawangan, and Depok. A number of informants said that they were no longer interested in FPI once Anam moved away. "If Anam moves away, I move away."⁹⁴ Anam has reportedly retreated from public life and is only concerned with his *pesantren*.

Cecep Bustami left FPI due to his extremely radical standpoint. FPI, in many ways, could not adopt his ideas. He left FPI and established Laskar Hizbullah (The Soldiers of the Party of God) in Serang Banten not long after the meeting at Kampung Utan in 1998. LH has been involved in several raids on entertainment centres in Serang. On one occasion his followers were involved in an argument with members of the Serang-based *Kopassus* (Special Forces of the Indonesian Military) troops and he was called by the authorities in Serang to take responsibility for the actions of his followers. On his journey from his home in Pandeglang a group of people, presumably members of *Kopassus*, stopped his car and shot him dead.

Conclusion

Does the issue of the implementation of Islamic *sharī'ah* signal a return to political Islam in Indonesia? Apparently not. In my opinion, the phenomena of fundamentalism in Indonesia, as indicated by FPI, is more a response to the social conditions that currently exist. The failure of the government to serve the people is a strong reason for the rise of fundamentalism and radicalism.

The most effective way to stop Islamic fundamentalism is reformation. Reformation must continue. The stagnation or failure of reformation will cause the community to reinterpret their religious understandings in a fundamentalist framework. Repressive steps by the government towards hardline Islamic leaders is highly effective in the short term. However, this method cannot be maintained in the long term. Fundamentalist groups always stress that root cause of the crisis that is affecting this country is Indonesia's failure to heed God's law. As a result, if this nation succeeds in overcoming the crisis, law will be implemented once again, the economy will return to normal, the community will experience justice, and fundamentalist ideas and hard-line Islam in the style of FPI will not longer be valid.

Endnotes

- * The original version of this article was written for the AMAN (Asian Muslim Action Network) Project in Bangkok, Thailand, 2003.
1. There are a number of studies on the emergence of Islamic radicalism in the post-reformation period in Indonesia. See Chaider S. Bamualim et al, "Radikalisme Agama dan Perubahan Sosial di DKI Jakarta" (Jakarta: Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 1999-2000); Noorhaidi Hasan, "Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia", *Indonesia*, 2002, p. 145-169; Jajang Jahroni, et al, "Agama dan Negara di Indonesia, Studi tentang Pandangan Politik Front Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad, Ikhwanul Muslimin, dan Laskar Mujahidin" (Proyek RUKK LIPI, 2002); and Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Soeharto Indonesia" (ISIM and Utrecht University, 2003).
 2. During the Soeharto era, especially in the 1970s and 80s, there were no significant Islamic movements due to tight government control. However, a number of clandestine movements were founded by Muslim activists. See for instance Muhammad Wildan, "Students and Politics: The Response of the Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII) to Politics in Indonesia", M.A. thesis, Leiden University, 1999; Abdul Syukur, "Gerakan Usroh di Indonesia, Kasus Peristiwa Lampung" (MA Thesis), (Jakarta, Fakultas Sastra Universitas Indonesia, 2001); Jamhari, "Mapping Radical Islam in Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* Vol. 10, No. 3, 2003.
 3. On the *Pancasila* as the sole basis of social and political ideology, see Faisal Ismail, "Pancasila as the Sole Basis for All Political Parties and for All Mass Organisation: an Account of Muslims Responses", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 3 no. 4, 1996, p. 1-92.
 4. For theories on Islamic fundamentalism, see Marty, Martin E., R. Scott Appleby, (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Comprehended* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).
 5. Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 58-83.
 6. The Berkeley Mafia is a term to indicate the economic architects of the New Order. Its history dates back to Widjojo Nitisastro, a young economist from the University of Indonesia (UI), whom Soeharto asked to handle the country's economic problems. Nitisastro created his working team, whose members mostly came from UI. During the first years of the Soeharto era, many scholarships were made available for them to study economics at the University of Berkeley in the U.S., from which they gained the nickname "the Berkeley Mafia". Not all members of the Berkeley Mafia graduated from Berkeley University, and not all of the UI economists were members of the Berkeley Mafia. It is simply a term to indicate the unseen but powerful organisation that controlled economic policy for at least thirty-five years. Its main approach was making Indonesia's economy dependent on foreign loans provided by the IMF, World Bank, Paris Club, London Club, IGCI, CGI, etc. Remnants of this policy remained in the economic cabinet of Megawati Soekarnoputri. Kwik Kian Gie, an outspoken Indonesian economist who criticises the IMF, who was the Coordinating Minister for Economy and Industry during the first months of Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency, believes that the Berkeley Mafia still controls Indone-

- sian economic policy. See Muh. Indrajit, *Berkeley Mafia dan Ekonomi Indonesia*, <http://mail2.factsoft.de/pipermail/national/2002-December/011759.html>
7. R. William Liddle "Indonesia's Unexpected Failure of Leadership" in Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris (eds.), *The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. 16-39.
 8. Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (*Korupsi, Kolusi and Nepotisme* abbreviated to KKN) are believed to be the root causes of the Indonesian crisis. The reformation movement aims to eradicate KKN as well as establish a good and clean government.
 9. Anti-Chinese movements erupted in several places in Indonesia during the New Order period, and Chinese-indigenous issues are still regarded as taboo. Issues of ethnicity, religion, and race (SARA) were almost never discussed during the New Order period in order to prevent horizontal conflict between Indonesian communities. Chinese people became the targets of widespread rioting in 1998. It is reported that during this period, thousands of Chinese left the country and headed to Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and the U.S. The Chinese, together with the Arabs, had enjoyed a number of privileges during the colonial era, as they were second (*vreemde oosterlingen*) in the social structure, after the Europeans, while native Indonesian were in third place.
 10. Robert W. Hefner, "Islam and Nation in the Post-Soeharto Era", in Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris (eds.), *The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. 49.
 11. Roy, Olivier, *The Failure of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994)
 12. Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000)
 13. Abdurrahman Wahid, the traditionalist NU leader, is amongst the Muslim leaders who refused to join the ICMI, arguing that it would only lead to sectarianism. Meanwhile the modernist Amien Rais, leader of Muhammadiyah, joined the ICMI, though later on, due to his criticism of the pervasive business of Soeharto's family, he was undermined within the organisation.
 14. *Ijarahah, usroh, ikhtwān, and akhwat* are term used by the Muslim Brotherhood-based organisation. However, as far as I understand, they are highly familiar with Shī'ite thought. One of my *usroh* friends who became a *murabbi* (educator) within the organisation is quite familiar with Shī'ite thought.
 15. Muhammad Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan* (Jakarta: Risalah Gusti, 2002)
 16. Jalaluddin Rakhmat, one of the young Muslim intellectuals involved in the Islamisation movements on campuses, wrote a book demonstrating their desire to seek a new model of understanding Islam, *Islam Alternatif* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986).
 17. The Muslim Brotherhood has a very sophisticated interpretation of *shahādah*. It begins with the meaning of *ilah*, which has ideological, emotional, and material understandings. *Ilah* means all the ideological, emotional, and material concepts that are beyond Allah. After having a good understanding of this concept, they are taught to question secular ideologies like the *Pancasila*, capitalism, socialism, etc., which are beyond Allah. Based on this

- indoctrination, the *ikhwān* and the *akhiwat* are strongly opposed to the *Pancasila* and its secular institutions.
18. Post-Iranian Revolution, Shī'ite propaganda was circulated by the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta. Pictures of Ayatullāh Rūhullah Khomeini, 'Allāmah Murtaḍā Mutahharī, and 'Allāmah Ṭabaṭṭabā'i were hung in mosques, schools, offices, and houses. Many Muslim activists idolised them as the modern heroes of Islam. Books, leaflets, and pamphlets on Iran and Shī'ism were handed out freely to students and Muslim organisations. This propaganda concerned Saudi Arabia and the rich gulf countries in terms of the impact of the Revolution. As a result they provided generous donations to *madrāsah*, mosques, and *pesantren*, and provided scholarships for study in Saudi Arabia.
 19. Based on my observations, the Muslim Brotherhood did not establish its networks until the early 1970s, when a young Muslim activist called Hilmi Aminuddin, an al-Azhar graduate, gained a great number of followers amongst Indonesian Muslim activists. He moved from one place to another to avoid the authorities. His identity was unknown even amongst the members of the Muslim Brotherhood and he only communicated with the inner circles.
 20. Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity* (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), p. 18.
 21. Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity*, p. 18-9.
 22. The Ḥaḍramī refers to people from Ḥaḍramaut, an ancient region in the southern part of the Republic of Yemen. The history of the Ḥaḍramī community in Indonesia dates back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when a large group of Ḥaḍramīs left their country looking for a better life. The Ḥaḍramī are divided into two groups, based on their genealogical relationship to the Prophet Muhammad: the *sayyids* (female: *sayyidah*) and the non-*sayyids*. The *sayyids* are those who claim to be descendants of the Prophet. There has been long-standing conflict between the *sayyids* and non-*sayyids*, as each group claims to be the real Ḥaḍramī. The *sayyids* established an organisation called *Jamī'at al-Khair*, while the non-*sayyids* established *al-Ishlah wa'l-Irshad*. See Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening, Community and Identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
 23. On Sayyid Uthman ibn Abdullah ibn Yahya, see Azyumardi Azra, "Hadhrami Scholars in the Malay-Indonesian Diaspora: A Preliminary Study of Sayyid Uthman", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1995, p. 1-33; Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*.
 24. Badru Salam, "Kepemimpinan Dakwah Al-Habib Muhammad Rizieq Bin Husein Syihab," Skripsi, (Fakultas Dakwah, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2002)
 25. Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 71-90.
 26. Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*
 27. Azyumardi Azra, "Hadhrami Scholars".
 28. Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*.
 29. *Ahl al-sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* is a theological school of thought which is rooted in the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. Abū Ḥasan al-Asy'arī was the pioneer of this theology, as he developed Ash'arism, an attempt to bridge extreme Mu'tazilism, which believes in

- the superiority of reason over revelation, and Jabbarism, which believes in the predestination of human beings.
30. Tanah Abang is one of the most important Hāḍramī settlements in Jakarta. Its history dates back to the beginning of the nineteenth century, when a large number of Hāḍramī migrated to the area and developed it as a religious and business centre. Tanah Abang has now become one of the most densely populated slum areas in Jakarta. Since its development as the centre of the garment business in the early 1970s a number of ethnic groups moved to the area looking for a better life. *Pasar Tanah Abang*, the most important business centre in the area, is allegedly controlled by vigilantes who are backed by military personnel. It is a perfect example of the contradiction that exists in Indonesia, where *madrasah* and mosques are located side by side with prostitution, crime, vigilantes, and poverty.
 31. *Kemungkaran* is a term to indicate all sinful deeds such as adultery, gambling, alcoholism, crime, corruption, etc., which are forbidden in Islam. *Kemaksiatan* or *maksiat* (Arabic: *ma'shiya*) has the same meaning.
 32. During the 1980s, the government tightly controlled Muslim preachers. All preachers were licensed by the government through the Kopkamtib (Command for Operation, Security and Order) led by General (Marine) Sudomo. Due to their criticism of the government, a number of preachers were sentenced to jail without due legal procedure.
 33. *Ustādh*, '*ulamā*', and *kyai* are titles given to those involved in teaching Islam. They generally deliver religious sermons, and are therefore called preachers (Ind. *penceramah*). Instead of using such titles, the Hāḍramī use *sayyid* as an honorific title. The use of *Ēabīb* as an honorific title did not begin until the late 1960s.
 34. Adi Sasono, "Kita Masuk Skenario Orang Lain," <http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1998/12/09/0012.html>
 35. Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994)
 36. General Wiranto was from the 'red white military faction'. The 'green military faction' included General Prabowo, the son-in-law of former president Soeharto, who, prior to reformation, approached a number of Muslim leaders, among others Din Syamsuddin. See Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
 37. Wiranto is one of the Indonesian military officers accused by the media and western countries of perpetrating human rights violations in post-referendum East Timor.
 38. One of my informants said that the military wing of I'PI can be used to counter attack Forkot (the City Forum), an extremely left wing student organisation, presumably supported by secular and Christian groups, which has criticised the military due to their close relationship with Muslim groups. Muslims student movements such as Hammas (Inter-Campus Muslim Students Association) and KAMMI (The Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union) were also founded to balance the manoeuvres made by Forkot and Christian student movements.
 39. Hābibīc was removed because he was considered to be one of Soeharto's cronies. He was known as Soeharto's golden boy, enjoying great privileges during Soeharto's presidency. One of his most controversial projects was the Indonesian aircraft manufacturing project, which required a huge

- amount of money. To this end, he used money initially allocated to a forestry greening project.
40. During the Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly, the military reportedly recruited as many as 100,000 paramilitary groups. See Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Soeharto Indonesia" (ISIM and Utrecht University, 2003).
 41. Interview with Ahmad Shabri Lubis, the Secretary General of FPI.
 42. Jakarta became PPP's political stronghold from the beginning of the New Order era. It is also strong in some parts of West Java, Central Java, parts of Sumatera and Kalimantan. Hamzah's approach to various Islamic radical groups has surprised many people. He attended Laskar Jihad's national congress held in Jakarta, 2002. This visit was highly controversial because its top leader, Ja'far Umar Thalib, was in police detention.
 43. On Laskar Jihad, see Chaider S. Bamualim, et al, "Radikalisme Agama dan Perubahan Sosial di DKI Jakarta"; Noorhaidi I Hasan, "Faith and Politics"; Jajang Jahroni, et al, "Agama dan Negara di Indonesia". On the roles of the Laskar Jihad in Ambon, see Mohammad Shoelhi, *Laskar Jihad, Kambing Hitam Konflik Maluku* (Jakarta: Pustaka Zaman, 2002).
 44. On Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, see Idi Subandy Ibrahim and Asep Syamsul M. Romli, *Kontroversi Ba'asyir, Jihad Melawan Opini "Fitnah" Global* (Bandung: Yayasan Nuansa Cendikia, 2003)
 45. Jajang Jahroni, et al, "Agama dan Negara di Indonesia". See also "Ada Pembunuhan Diam Saja, Itu Politik", Interview with Munir <http://aliansi.hypermart.net/1999/10/topik4.htm>
 46. See Hermawan Sulistyio, *Palu Arit di Ladang Tebu, Sejarah Pembantaian Mas-sal Yang Terlupakan* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2000).
 47. Based on this Act, communism in all its manifestations is a banned ideology in Indonesia.
 48. According to the survey by the PPIM, the communists are the group most hated by Muslims, followed by Jews, Chinese, Christians, and radical Islamic groups.
 49. Tanjung Priok is a district in the north of Jakarta. A number of ethnic groups such as the Buginese, Makassarese, Javanese, and Betawi live there. The incident started when a number of police officers warned Muslim people in the area to remove all pamphlets hung up in a local mosque encouraging people to refuse the *Pancasila* as the sole basis of social and political life. The following day, they returned to the mosque and found the pamphlets were still there. They immediately entered the mosque without taking their shoes off, removed the pamphlets and smeared the walls with excrement. This enraged the congregation, who then burnt the police officers' motorcycles. As a result, a number of people were arrested by the local police station. The following day, people gathered in the mosque in an attempt to release their friends. Amir Biki, the dissident leader who became a victim, led them to attack the police station. On their journey they were intercepted by military troops. Negotiations made in an attempt to persuade them to return to their houses, but they refused. The condition suddenly spiralled out of control and became a massacre. According to one version, hundreds of Muslims were killed during the incident, and many were arrested. With the downfall of Soeharto, this case re-emerged in public debate after fifteen years of being ignored. In its report, KOM-

- NASHAM (National Commission for Human Rights) concluded that only a dozen people were killed. Many Islamic organisations, including FPI, rejected this report and attacked the KOMNASHAM office in Menteng, Jakarta. It has not acknowledged the commission since then.
50. Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, "Kita Justru Akan Semakin Keras", *Tekad*, no. 7, Tahun III, 18-24 Desember 2000.
 51. FPI's opposition to Wahid is unclear. When a number of Muslim organisations asked Wahid to step down, FPI remained calm. Rizieq said that if the process adhered to the national constitution, he would support it. In an invitation extended by Wahid, Rizieq said that he despised those who criticised Wahid personally, saying that Wahid was also one of his teachers and that he himself was in fact a member of NU.
 52. A number of Islamic radical groups link Syafei's speech to the Kupang and Ambon incidents. They believe that the speech triggered the conflicts in both areas. However, the case remains covered up. Meanwhile, moderate Muslim leaders such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid have a different opinion. Wahid believes that such statements are slander, while Madjid calls it an 'incident'. Syafei needs to explain the truth to the Muslim people and apologise if necessary. Since his resignation from the military, Syafei has been active in the PIDIP (Indonesian Struggle Democratic Party) led by President Megawati Soekarnoputri, and is amongst the elites who control the party.
 53. Jajang Jahroni et al "Agama dan Negara di Indonesia".
 54. Interview with Zainuddin, FPI paramilitary coordinator.
 55. Interview with Ustadz Ja'far Shiddiq, the LJ coordinator.
 56. I don't know whether FPI has indeed "swept" the expatriates. Based on official information from the police, cases of sweeping are rarely found in Jakarta. I have heard that Islamic radical groups have carried out sweepings in some cities. The threats of sweeping by FPI have caused anxiety amongst expatriates. See "Religious Groups Threaten to Expel Americans from Indonesia", <http://198.65.147.194/English/News/2001-09/22/article9.shtml>; Lindsay Murdoch, "Islamic threat to hit Americans," <http://old.smh.com.au/news/0109/20/world/world15.html>
 57. Interview with Ahmad Shabri Lubis
 58. Interview with Ahmad Shabri Lubis
 59. Interview with Misbahul Anam
 60. As many as 98 % of FPI paramilitary troops are repenting vigilantes. Interview with Zainuddin, the coordinator of FPI.
 61. The media has played an important role in creating a frightening image of FPI. There are many social and *dakwah* activities which have never been covered by the media.
 62. "Ye are the best people, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God. If only the People of the Book had faith, it were best for them: among them are some who have faith, but most of them are perverted transgressors." (Q.S. 3:110). In one of the Prophet's sayings, it is said. "Whosoever see corruption among ye, he/she should change it with his/her hand. If he/she can't do that, he/she should change it with his/her words. If he/she can't do that, he/she should change it with his/her heart. And that is the weakest faith."

63. Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, "Kita Justru Akan Semakin Keras", *Tekad*, no. 7, Tahun III, 18-24 Desember 2000.
64. Jajang Jahroni et al "Agama dan Negara di Indonesia".
65. "Invite (all) to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious, for thy Lord knoweth best who have stayed from His Path, and who receive guidance" (Q.S. 16: 125).
66. Interview with Ahmad Shabri Lubis, the Secretary General of FPI.
67. The word '*ganyang*' was used by PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) members as a slogan to fight against their enemies. It is unlikely a coincidence that FPI uses this word to encourage the spirit of resistance among the oppressed.
68. "Operasi Jeda Maksiat ala FPI", <http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2000/12/01/2000121-040837.shtml>
69. Depok is a new settlement located in south Jakarta. It was developed during the late 1970s as an impact of the urbanisation project. Many Muslim people moved to this area and built mosques and *pesantren*. Sawangan is known as a stronghold of Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Meanwhile Parung is a relatively new area, developed after the Jakarta-Bogor highway was built in the 1980s. This leafy area attracts investors in entertainment businesses. Parung is known as the place where many *warung remang-remang* or places of hidden prostitution are found.
70. The ideology of FPI can be found in Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, Habib, *Dialog Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sidah, 2000).
71. Jajang Jahroni, "Islamic Fundamentalism in Contemporary Indonesia", *Refleksi*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 2002.
72. In 2001, the percentage of those who agreed with the application of Islamic law was 61.4 %. In 2002 and 2004, this percentage increased to 71 % and 75%. This survey has been misunderstood by a number of radical Islamic groups who see it as evidence of growing enthusiasm for the application of Islamic law. See "Barometer Indonesia untuk Konsolidasi Demokrasi" (Jakarta: PPIM, 2002). See *Tempo*, December 29, 2002; See also Jamhari and Jahroni, J. (eds.), 2004, p. 213.
73. See "Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlaqul Karimah" <http://www.cianjur.go.id/marhamah/htm>
74. Interview with Ahmad Shabri Lubis
75. Interview with Ahmad Shabri Lubis
76. Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, *Dialog Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sidah, 2000).
77. Allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia can be found in the decree concerning the appointment of a woman as president, following the election of Megawati Soekarnoputri after Abdurrahman Wahid's impeachment in 2000, as follows: "The Oath of FPI Paramilitary Members. We, the members of the FPI paramilitary, fully support the Decree of the Islamic Defenders Front on the appointment of a woman as president. We pledge to the state: (1). To protect the unity of the state of the Republic of Indonesia; (2). To protect the unity of the Indonesian nation; (3) To protect the security, order, and safety of the Republic of Indonesia; (4) To obey all of the government's policies as long as they are in accordance with the Constitution and not against Islamic teachings; (5) To be the guards of the Republic

- of Indonesia, with belief and fear in Allah the Almighty.” FPI’s Decree on the Appointment of a Woman as President (Jakarta: FPI Secretary, July 24, 2001).
78. Interview with Ahmad Shabri Lubis, the Secretary General of FPI.
 79. Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia.”
 80. There are hundreds of NGOs that focus on drug abuse in the country, which is an expression of people’s concern towards this issue. These movements have been supported by all members of the community including Muslim organisations, celebrities, women’s groups, and student organisations.
 81. A.A. Maramis (a Christian) was the only non-Muslim member of the Nine Commission.
 82. The *Pancasila* consists of five principles. (1) *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (Belief in One God); (2) *Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab* (Humanity Based on Justice and Civility); (3) *Persatuan Indonesia* (The Unity of Indonesia); (4) *Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Permusyawaratan/Perwakilan*. (The People are Led by Consultative and Representative Wisdom); (5) *Kendilian bagi Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia* (Social Justice for all Indonesians).
 83. For debate on the Jakarta Charter, see H. Endang Saifuddin Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 dan Sejarah Konsensus Nasional antara Nasionalis Islami dan Nasionalis ‘Sekuler’ tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia, 1945-1959* (Bandung: Pustaka, 1981)
 84. For debate on Islam as the state ideology during the period of parliamentarism see Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif, “Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia,” PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1983.
 85. Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, *Dialog Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta: Pustaka Ibnu Sidah, 2000)
 86. Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah reject the idea of a return to the Jakarta Charter. A number of Muslim intellectuals such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid, A. Syafi’i Ma’arif, Masdar F. Mas’udi, and Ulil Abshar Abdalla reject the Jakarta Charter as well as the amendment of Act 29 of the Constitution.
 87. See Nurcholish Madjid “Kotak ‘Pandora’ Bernama UUD ‘45” <http://www.kjihkg.org.hk/penerangan/nasional-16.htm>
 88. Ahmad Shabri Lubis is the third Secretary General of FPI. The first is K.H. Misbahul Anam and the second is Muhammad Reza Pahlevi, S.Ag.
 89. FPI Surakarta is one of the most active Muslim organisations in the country. It appears that it has been influenced much more by MMI, an Islamic organisation led by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, which in many ways has different interpretations of Islam to those of FPI.
 90. Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia”.
 91. Jahroni, Jajang, *et. al.*, “Agama dan Negara di Indonesia, Studi tentang Pandangan Politik Front Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad, Ikhwanul Muslimin, dan Laskar Mujahidin” (Proyek RUKK LIPI, 2002)

92. As many as 20 percent of FPI paramilitary members are university graduates. The total number of FPI paramilitary members in Jakarta in 2000 was 5200 personnel. Interview with Ustadz Zainuddin.
93. During Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency there was a *habib* called Ali Ba'aqil, a member of the *majlis syuro* of FPI, who was accused of helping Tommy Soeharto's renegade. On the political attitudes of the Hadrami see Azyumardi Azra, "Hadhrami Scholars in the Malay-Indonesian Diaspora: A Preliminary Study of Sayyid Uthman", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1995, p. 1-33; Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening, Community and Identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999)
94. Syu'iab Sumaryadi, an FPI supporter from Ciputat.

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