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THE RUPTURE OF YOUNG MUSLIM INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE MODERNIZATION OF INDONESIA

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MEDIA AND ISLAMISM IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA: THE CASE OF *SABILI*

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Yudi Latif

The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligentsia in the Modernization of Indonesia

Abstraksi: *Modernisasi Indonesia yang dilansir pemerintah Orde Baru telah membawa banyak perubahan yang sangat berarti. Sejak tampil ke puncak kekuasaan pada 1965, pemerintahan Orde Baru di bawah Presiden Soeharto memberlakukan kebijakan yang berorientasi pada pembangunan (ekonomi), menggantikan Orde Lama yang terlalu menekankan pembangunan ideologi dan politik. Orde Baru mengetengahkan program-program yang berorientasi pada persoalan-persoalan praktis yang secara langsung berhubungan dengan kebutuhan hidup masyarakat. Perbaikan ekonomi dan peningkatan pendapatan masyarakat menjadi sasaran utama program ekonomi Orde Baru.*

Proyek modernisasi oleh pemerintah Orde Baru telah melahirkan pemikiran Islam yang sejalan dengan tuntutan perubahan sosial yang berlangsung sejalan dengan pembangunan. Lahirnya pemikiran Islam ini ditandai terutama oleh upaya sejumlah intelektual muda Muslim pada 1970-an untuk menafsirkan kembali ajaran Islam yang dinilai tidak lagi memadai untuk konteks perkembangan Indonesia belakangan. Dalam hal ini, peran Nurcholish Madjid (waru itu sebagai ketua Himpunan Islam Indonesia [HMI]) sangat penting. Pada 1970-an, dia menggarisbawahi perlunya pembaharuan pemikiran dalam Islam, khususnya pada gagasan sekularisasi dan penolakan untuk menjadikan Islam sebagai sebuah ideologi politik, lewat pernyataannya yang terkenal, "Islam Yes, Partai Islam No". Nurcholish dalam hal ini berusaha memperkenalkan satu pemikiran Islam baru yang menekankan substansi ajaran Islam, atau nilai-nilai Islam untuk diartikulasikan dalam konteks budaya Indonesia modern. Dengan demikian, perjuangan umat Islam harus diletakkan pada ranah kultural, ketimbang pada gerakan politik seperti dilakukan partai-partai Islam. Dan dengan perubahan pola

gerakan Islam ini, Nurcholish Madjid jelas-jelas mendukung proyek modernisasi Orde Baru.

*Namun tidak demimkian halnya dengan intelekltual Muslim lain yang berorientasi dakwah (*the dakwah-oriented Muslim intellectuals*). Mereka justru menawarkan satu usaha "Islamisasi Indonesia" yang sudah jauh masuk dalam orbit modern dan dengan demikian jauh dari ranah Islam. Perbedaan tersebut bahkan makin kuat saat kelompok ini kemudian berafiliasi dengan Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII). Di bawah wibawa pemikiran Islam tokoh kenamaan Mohammad Natsir, Prawoto Mangkusasmita, M Rasjidi, dan Osman Raliby, gerakan dakwah ini semakin berkembang kuat khususnya di kampus-kampus umum. Maka, sejumlah pusat kegiatan Islam di majid-masjid di kampus-kampus umum berdiri dan memberikan training keislaman skripturalis, yang kemudiah melahirkan gerakan tarbiyah di Indonesia.*

Masjid Salman di Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB), Masjid Arif Rahman Hakim di Universitas Indonesia (UI), Masjid Al-Ghifari di Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB) menjadi pusat-pusat kegiatan keislaman yang berorientasi pada penciptaan kader Muslim yang berhaluan berbeda dari yang ditawarkan Nurcholish Madjid. Disuarakan tokoh terkemuka antara lain Imaduddin Abdurrahim, Islamisasi menjadi satu gagasan pokok, yang meliputi tidak pada saja aspek lahiriah—seperti cara berpakaian [semisal berjilbab untuk kaum perempluan] yang khas—tapi juga menyentuh aspek mendasar sepertil ilmu pengetahuan. Intinya, mereka meyakini pentingnya kembali ke Islam yang murni sebagai landasan hidup di zaman modern, ketimbang mengadopsi pola hidup dan cara berpikir Barat.

Dua corak pemikiran yang berbeda ini—masing-masing menawarkan "Modernisasi Islam" dan "Islamisasi modernitas"—tampil demikian mapan menghiasi wacana sosio-intelektual Islam Indonensia. Program Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK), salah satu wujud gerakan dakwah di atas, terus esksis dan bahkan berkembang khususnya di kampus-kampus umum di Indonesia. Di era reformasi ini, keberadaan mereka bahkan semakin kuat dengan terbentuknya jaringan aktifis mereka melakui Kesatuan Aksis Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (KMMI), dan secara politik terlembaga dalam Partai Kesejahteraan Sosial (PKS).

Sementara itu, pada saat yang sama, gerakan pembaharun Islam yang dilansir oleh Nurcholis Madjid juga terus menujukkan eksistensinya. Berbasis terutama di kampus Islam Institute Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) dan Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN), aspirasi keislaman mereka tercfiekikan antara lain dalam Jaringan Islam Liberal yang menawarkan antara gagasan Islam moderat di Indonesia.

Yudi Latif

The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligentsia in the Modernization of Indonesia

خلاصة :إن التحديث بإندونيسيا الذي عرضته حكومة النظام الجديد قد أدى إلى تغيرات ملموسة. وأصدرت هذه الحكومة تحت رئاسة سوهارتو منذ تولّى قمّة السلطة التنفيذية في عام ١٩٦٥ سياسات متجهة إلى التنمية، بدلا من سياسة النظام القديم التي ركزت على بناء الإيديولوجية والسياسة. وعرض النظام الجديد برامج ذات الاتجاه في المسائل العملية التي تتصل بشكل مباشر باحتياجات المجتمع .ولقد أصبح تحسين المستوى الاقتصادي وترقية دخل المجتمع هدفا رئيسيا من البرامج الاقتصادية للنظام الجديد.

وإن مشروع التحديث الذي جاء به النظام الجديد قد أنشأ الفكر الإسلامي المتلائم مع متطلبات التغير الاجتماعي الجاري متمشيا مع التنمية. ويتسم ظهور الفكر الإسلامي في السبعينات بمحاولة بعض المثقفين المسلمين الصغار لإعادة تفسير التعاليم الإسلامية التي لا تناسب سياق تطوّر إندونسيا الراهن. وفي هذا الصدد كان دور نور خالص مجيد (وهو رئيس هيئة الطلاب المسلمين) آنذاك في غاية الأهمية، ونادى في السبعينات بضرورة التجديد في الفكر الإسلامي، وخاصة بفكرة العلمنة ورفض جعل الإسلام إيديولوجيا سياسيا، وذلك عن طريق إعراب شعاره المعروف: "الإسلام نعم، والحزب الإسلامي لا." وقد حاول نور خالص لتعريف نوعا جديدا من الفكر الإسلامي الذي يركز على جوهر التعاليم الإسلامية أو القيم الإسلامية المصطبغة بسياق الثقافة الإندونيسية الحديثة. بعبارة أخرى أن كفاح الأمة الإسلامية لا بد أن يوضع في المجال الثقافي بدلا من الحركة السياسية العملية، الأمر الذي عملت الأحزاب السياسية الإسلامية على تحقيقه. ومن الواضح أن نور خالص مجيد بما حاوله من تغير في نمط الحركة الإسلامية أيّد مشروع التحديث للنظام الجديد.

بيد أن بعض المثقفين المسلمين الآخرين الذين ساروا على اتجاه الدعوة الإسلامية لا يوافقون على ما اقترحه نور خالص، فهم عرضوا فكرة أخرى في ضرورة "أسلمة

إندونيسيا" التي قد انغمست في محور التحديث الغربي الصبغة، وبذلك فقد بعدت عن تعاليم الإسلام. وأصبح الاختلاف بين الفئتين من المثقفين شديدا حينما انتمت الفئة الثانية إلى مجلس الدعوة الإسلامية الإندونيسي (DDII). ونالت هذه الحركة الدعوية بفضل هيبة أشهر رجال الفكر الإسلامي من أمثال محمد ناصر، وبراووتو مانجكوساسميتو (Prawoto Mangkusasmita)، ومحمد رشيدي، وعثمان رالبي، حظا كبيرا من تقدير المسلمين، وتطورت هذه الحركة تطورا هائلا في المجتمع بصفة عامة وفي الجامعات العامة بصفة خاصة، فأنشئت مراكز للأنشطة الإسلامية في مساجد الجامعات العامة، ونظمت دورات تدريبية عن مفهوم الإسلام الحرفي، وبالتالي أدت إلى ظهور حركة التربية بإندونيسيا.

ولقد أصبح مسجد "سلمان" بالمعهد العالي لتكنولوجيا باندونج، ومسجد "عارف رحمن حكيم" بجامعة إندونيسيا، ومسجد "الغفاري" بالمعهد العالي للعلوم الزراعية بوغور مراكز للأنشطة الإسلامية التي تسير على اتجاه في إعداد الكوادر المسلمة، والتي تنتهج منهجا مخالفا لما عرضه نور خالص مجيد. وأصبحت الأسلمة التي نادى بـــها المفكر الرائد عماد الدين عبد الرحيم فكرة رئيسية لا تعتني بالجانب الظاهري – من أمثال أسلوب اللباس الإسلامي مثل الحجاب للمرأة – فحسب، وإنما تشمل أيضا الجانب الأساسي الذي يتمثل في العلوم. وخلاصة القول إنـــهم يعتقدون بضرورة الرجوع إلى الإسلام الأصيل باعتباره منطلقا للحياة في العصر الحديث، بدلا من تبني أسلوب الحياة والتفكير الغربي الصبغة.

وأصبحت الصبغتان المختلفتان السابقتان اللتان عرضت كل منهما "تحديث الإسلام" و"أسلمة الحداثة" سائدتين في تكوين الخطاب العقلي الاجتماعي الإسلامي بإندونيسيا. وما زالت برامج الدعوة الإسلامية بالجامعات(LDK)، باعتبارها أحدا من أنواع تجسيد لحركة الدعوة، متبقية، بل متطورة في كثير من الجامعات العامة بإندونيسيا. وازداد كيانـــهم قويا في عصر الإصلاح بفضل تكوين شبكات الناشطين التي تتشكل في وحدة أعمال الطلاب المسلمين بإندونيسيا (KMMI)، كما تتشكل سياسيا في حزب العدالة والرفاهية (PKS).

وفي نفس الوقت، ظلت حركة التجديد في الفكر الإسلامي التي نادى بـــها نور خالص مجيد متبقية. وتنعكس الطموحات الإسلامية لهذه الحركة على شبكة الإسلام اللبرالي التي تعرض الفكرة الإسلامية الوسطية بإندونيسيا، وذلك متمركز في حرم المعاهد العالية الإسلامية الحكومية (IAIN) والجامعات الإسلامية الحكومية (UIN).

In March 1966, Army Chief of Staff Soeharto rose to power, taking control of the Indonesian Government. Soeharto's 'New Order' regime inherited a plethora of economic, political and social problems. The New Order came to the conclusion that these crises had evolved as a result of the previous regime's neglect of the economy and lack of concern for social welfare. Economic recovery was viewed as a priority by the new regime for it would turn the attention of the people from politics to the economy thus changing the national outlook from *'politik-sebagai-panglima'* (politics as commander) — as practiced during the Old Order — to *'ekonomi-sebagai-panglima'* (economy as commander).

In emphasizing the importance of economic growth and modernization, the new regime made every effort to restore links with the capitalist world and multinational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, from which Indonesia had withdrawn in August 1965 as part of Sukarno's anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism campaign. Economic development required capital, but as the country was bankrupt, the New Order had no choice but to open itself to the idea of foreign investment and loans from outside sources. To guarantee the inflow of foreign capital and the success of economic development, political stability was considered essential.

This provided the new regime with the justification to dismantle what it perceived as political barriers to modernization. Under the slogan *'pembangunan'* (development), 'developmentalism' was inaugurated as the new official orthodoxy. This was officially signaled by the unveiling of Soeharto's first cabinet as president (June 1968-March 1973),[1] which was named *'Kabinet Pembangunan I'* (the First Development Cabinet). Alongside this state technocratic ideology, political stability was made the primary political objective reinforced by a doctrine entitled the 'Military's Dual Function', which legitimized the military's role in non-military affairs. With this pair of 'magic' formulae, that is *'pembangunan'* and 'political stability', the New Order soon transformed itself into what Feith called a 'repressive-developmentalist' regime.[2]

With a combination of effective economic management, a supportive environment, and political stability, Indonesian economic development soon became a fairytale story of success. By the late 1960s price stability had been achieved, and the Indonesian economy began to experience unprecedented rapid growth, which was sustained for the next three decades. Throughout the period 1965-1996 the Indonesian Gross National Product (GNP) grew steadily at an average annual rate of 6.7%.[3] The economic growth that Indonesia experienced during this period transformed the country from being a so-called economic 'basket-case', which was poorer

than most other Southeast Asian countries, into one of the 'Newly Industrialized Economies' (NIE) of Asia. In 1993 the World Bank, in its famous but controversial report on the 'East Asian Miracle', classified Indonesia as one of the 'highest performing Asian economies'.[4]

Alongside economic development, Indonesia's social structure underwent a dramatic change. A successful family planning program reduced population growth from an average of 2.4% in the period 1965-1980 to an average of 1.8% in 1980-1996.[5] The poverty rate decreased considerably from 70% at the end of the 1960s to 27% in the middle of the 1990s. The proportion of Indonesia's population living in urban areas rose from 17% in 1971 to 31% in 1990. The share of professional, managerial and clerical occupations rose from 5.7% in 1971 to 8.8% in 1990.[6] Beginning in the 1980s, sustained economic growth had given rise to the unprecedented accumulation of private capital. Vast private commercial conglomerates emerged, many owned by Sino-Indonesians and a few by client indigenous bourgeoisie, all possessing high-level political connections.[7]

All these tremendous socio-economic achievements had their costs. The greatest cost was the sacrifice of political freedom. With the economy being in command, the role of politics was reduced to simply maintaining national stability. Consequently, the Indonesian honeymoon with freedom in the New Order's public sphere did not last long. The regime used various repressive measures to curb freedom of speech and association as well as political opposition and intellectual criticism, as all of these were perceived as serious threats to political stability.

Besides the demolition of the New Order's greatest enemy, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), one of the first victims of this repressive regime was political Islam as it was marginalized from the formal political arena. The 'extreme right', so to speak, became the scapegoat for past political disorder.

Although Islamic groups provided critical support to the army in dismantling the Old Order, the New Order's actions and policies over the ensuing two decades prevented Islamic involvement in any state affairs. Once it had consolidated its power, the new regime set about systematically neutralizing Islam as a basis for political and legal mobilization whilst further increasing bureaucratic leverage over Islam.[8]

Amidst the state's push for modernization, young Muslim intelligentsia were divided into two camps, that is, the proponents of the 'modernization of Islam' and those who supported the 'Islamization of modernity'.

At the Intellectual Crossroads

The first serious Islamic intellectual response to the challenges presented by the New Order's modernization push came from fourth generation Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia. This generation of Muslim intellectuals was composed mainly of those who were born in the 1930s and 1940s and who were the first product of the postcolonial education system, in which Muslims began to gain equal access to modern schools.

During its formative phase, this generation experienced an intense exposure to ideological (Islamic) radicalization, characterized by political disputes on the national scene that ignited conflicts and tensions within student politics during the guided democracy period of the Fifties and Sixties. This generation also experienced an intense exposure to the drive for a national language and greater national solidarity, which was spurred by the urgency to build a common bloc to counter pro-establishment political and intellectual forces and to dismantle the Sukarno regime. Unlike previous generations, however, this generation was much more confident, both psychologically and intellectually, which was greatly influenced by the dominant position that Islamic student organizations had taken in student politics during the 1960s.

Intellectuals of this generation largely came from Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (the Islamic University Students' Association, est. 1947), or HMI. As a synthesis of the internal tensions between Islamic-mindedness on the one hand and nationalistic solidarity on the other hand, HMI as an entity underwent a degree of political moderation. HMI as an organization continued to maintain this balance between its Islamic and nationalistic orientations, although individual intellectuals of HMI began to divide by and large into two streams: those who were more inclined towards political Islam versus those who more inclined to a more inclusive political ideology.

The chairman of HMI during this crucial period of the early years of the New Order was a gifted young intellectual, Nurcholish Madjid.[9] With his intellectual capacity and multiple religio-educational affiliations, he was the right man at the right time. His all-encompassing and non-sectarian outlook enabled him to be a bridge-builder in the internal fragmentation within HMI. He was a leader and solidarity maker. His invigorating Islamic ideas provided a common ground for his fellow HMI intellectuals of different ideological inclinations. The combination of his intellectual qualities and leadership style saw him elected as the chairman of HMI for two consecutive terms (1966-68, 1968-71), which had no precedent in the HMI tradition.

During the period of Madjid's leadership, HMI activists experienced a kind of identity crisis. HMI had sided with Masjumi[10] during the Old Order period, and thus the sidelining of political Islam at the beginning of the

New Order was of a great disappointment. On the other hand, the dominance of HMI in student politics from the early 1960s had given rise to expectations of a significant public role in the future of the nation. HMI was in limbo, forced to choose between a return to the unfinished project of 'Islamizing' Indonesian politics or embracing the project of liberalizing Islamic thinking and politics.

Faced with these choices, discourse emerged on some crucial issues concerning the future shape of Islam and HMI's historicity. Externally, there was a demand to produce strategic and rigorous responses to the challenges presented by modernization and the peripheralization of political Islam. At the same time, a response was required to the dilemma of whether to support the so-called *'integrasi ummat'* (integration of the *ummat*) or to side with the agenda of liberalizing Islamic thinking that came to be known as the 'renewal movement' *(gerakan pembaharuan).* Internally, HMI had to choose whether it should be politically independent or side with Islamic socio-political organizations and also whether it had to be a cadre or mass-based organization.

Early general reaction of the HMI intellectuals to modernization was defensive for it was perceived as a pre-text to westernization that was too many within the HMI circles synonymous with secularism. In essence, there emerged three kinds of responses: liberal, reactionary (Islamist), and moderate (moderate-reactionary).

The initial liberal response came from a circle of HMI activists from the Yogyakarta branch, sometimes referred to as the Yogya Group; the branch that had supported Sukarno's orthodoxy, Manipol-USDEK, during the guided democracy period. There were a number of prominent intellectuals from this group, including Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib and Dawam Rahardjo with Djohan and Wahib being far-liberals and Dawam being a moderate (centre)-liberal.

Outside HMI, another group that influenced the intellectual development of these young intellectuals was the 'Limited Group'. This study group operated from 1967 up to 1971 under the mentorship of Mukti Ali, a Western trained Islamic educator (a lecturer at IAIN Yogyakarta)[11] who introduced them to his ideas on comparative religion and to modern Islamic thinking. In Ahmad Wahib's case, he had a strong emotional and intellectual connection to some Catholic priests for he had spent some years at a Catholic student's dormitory. For this group, modernization was both welcomed and perceived as being critical to Indonesian Muslims' future development, even if it might lead to westernization.[12]

The reactionary-Islamist response came notably from activists of the HMI Dakwah Body, Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam (LDMI). Estab-

lished in 1966, the first chairman of this body was Imaduddin Abdulrahim assisted by Endang Saifuddin Anshari (both of the HMI's Bandung Branch), and Miftah Faridl (of the Solo branch). As its central leadership was located in Bandung, a group of intellectuals associated with this body was often referred to as the Bandung Group. During the guided democracy period, HMI's Bandung branch was a strong opponent of Manipol-USDEK. The general attitude of this group to the modernization project tended to be reactionary and suspicious, for reasons of logic and politics. This group did not object to modern rationalism, science and technology, because the Islamic doctrine and scientific discovery, according to the standard apologetic argument of the Islamist, are not really conflicting but complementary forms of belief. Nevertheless, this group objected to the term 'modernization' since it was perceived as closely associated with the process of westernization and secularization, and its adoption by the New Order regime was suspected to be a pretext for marginalizing Islamic political influence.

That the views of this group echoed those of Masjumi leaders was not very surprising. Leaders of LDMI, especially Imaduddin and Endang, maintained an emotional and intellectual connection with Masjumi leaders and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Council of Islamic Outreach).[13] Fathers of these two men (Abdulrahim and Muhammad Isa Anshari) originated from Langkat (East Sumatra) and West Sumatra respectively. An Al-Azhar graduate, Abdulrahim was a well-known local Masjumi leader in Sumatra, while Isa Anshari, after moving to Bandung, was prominent as a militant Masjumi and Persis (Islamic puritan-reformist association) leader. Moreover, both Imaduddin and Endang had been exposed to the same religious teacher, Rusjad Nurdin (a Persis and Masjumi leader). As the son of a Persis leader, Endang had a long association with Nurdin, while Imaduddin was in close contact with him after Nurdin became a lecturer in Islamic studies at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) in 1962.[14] Thus, ethnically, ideologically, and intellectually, both Imaduddin and Endang had a predisposition to identify themselves with Mohammad Natsir.[15] Moreover, both also belonged to a group of young intellectuals who had been trained by the DDII from the late 1960s to become Islamic propagandists for the Muslim community in secular universities.

The moderate group, which tended to reinforce the reactionary views and as such is appropriately referred to as moderate-reactionary (moderate-Islamist), accepted modernization with qualification. This view represented the general attitude of HMI's central leadership (Pengurus Besar, PB) in Jakarta. As a group with a wide range of ideological inclinations, the central leadership was caught in the middle of a tug-of-war between

the Jakarta-Bandung axis versus the Jakarta-Yogyakarta axis, with the former being what Madjid called the 'political lane' *(jalur politik)* and the latter being the 'lane of ideas' *(jalur ide)*. Madjid himself originally took the moderate-reactionary position.

In 1968, Madjid wrote a series of articles entitled 'Modernisasi ialah Rasionalisasi Bukan Westernisasi' (Modernization is Rationalization, not Westernization), published by *Pandji Masyarakat*[16] and *Liga Demokrasi*. According to him, a simplified definition of modernization is 'that which is identical, or almost identical, with rationalization' and if the term is defined in this way, modernization for a Muslim is imperative. Nevertheless, he then warned that there was a possibility of secularism (including humanism, liberalism and communism) and Westernization being disguised under the cloak of 'modernization'. In his view, secularism should be resisted for it could destroy the religious basis of the Indonesian state. At the same time, he emphasized the necessity of ideology and the indispensability of religion as conditions for a purposeful national existence. Modernization in the Indonesian context, he added, should not entail the end of ideology, because life is not possible without a set of beliefs, ideas, attitudes and convictions. He finally warned that there was a hidden agenda developed by some of the Indonesian Westernized elite who developed a strong dislike for anything Islamic. They therefore directed modernization toward Westernization in accord with the spirit of what he called 'Snouckism'[17] to marginalize Islamic political aspirations. He then came up with a proposition:

> Whoever is courageous enough to be honest with himself will admit that the present difficulties are due to the fact that minority groups which do not enjoy the popular support of the people are playing too big a role, while the majority group is being obstructed from playing its decisive role. The role it is playing does not correspond to its majority position.[18]

Given that the article exhibited Madjid's advocacy for Islamic political aspirations, soon afterwards he was celebrated as 'Natsir Muda' (the Young Natsir).[19]

When the New Order refused to allow the revival of Masjumi, the HMI intellectuals were at the outset overwhelmed by a general sense of frustration. The liberal group then came to the conclusion that HMI and Muslims in general were not committed to Islamic organizations or leaders but rather to Islamic values. In their view, Islam itself was not supposed to be treated as an ideology but rather as a source of universal moral and ethical precepts. For this group, the formal demand for an Islamic party or Islamic state was not only unnecessary but also misleading. With this kind of thinking, the group moved further towards explicitly supporting *Pancasila* as the principle of the state.

On the other hand, the reactionary group continued to be preoccupied with a standard apologetic argument that Islam is not only a religion but also a complete way of life and that in Islam there is no separation between religious and political life. Despite the New Order's repression of political Islam, intellectuals of this kind managed to find other ways to socialize their Islamic political aspirations.

The moderate group attempted to avoid apologetic arguments through its willingness to criticize standard Islamic arguments as well as the shortcoming of the Muslim community, but it continued to perceive Islam as an ideo-political system. Madjid, for instance, in the first term of his chairmanship had criticized HMI's use of Tjokroaminoto's book, *Islam and Socialism* in cadre trainings, for its apologetic tendency. At the same time, he wrote a famous handbook for HMI training purposes entitled *Islamisme* (Islamism), which presented Islam as an alternative ideology to communism, capitalism and other secular ideologies.[20]

Concerning the integration of the *ummat*, HMI intellectuals initially viewed this as a critical issue. The eighth National HMI Congress in Solo (10-17 September 1966) supported the idea of an All Islam Congress. The liberal group then came to favor the agenda of the Islamic renewal movement, even though prioritizing this agenda could cause a strained relationship with the *ummat*. For this group, the main problem for Indonesian Muslims was not the fracturing of the Islamic community, but rather the obstinacy of Islamic thinking. For the Islamist group, however, Islamic disputes were regarded as at the root of Muslims' weakness, and the preservation of Islamic solidarity was considered as far more important than the self-indulgence of intellectual adventure. For the moderates, the reconstruction of Islamic thinking was important, but not at the risk of severing the relationship with the *ummat* and other Islamic organizations.

Despite severe external (political) pressures imposed by the new regime, there was a positive internal development that helped boost HMI's intellectual confidence and expectations. The preponderance of young Islamic intelligentsia during the Old Order became even stronger after the changeover to the New Order polity. In the wake of the dismantling of leftist movements, there was an upsurge in student interest to learn about Islam and to join Islamic student organizations. At the same time, religious instruction in secular schools and universities was made compulsory. Consequently, in the secular strongholds such as ITB, for instance, where students who practiced the weekly Friday communal prayer *(shalat jum'at)* were previously referred to as 'Arabic Camels', were now dens for students who had began to turn to Islam.[21]

The growing interest in Islamic studies, practices and organizations (hereafter, referred to as the 'Islamic turn') received a different reaction from HMI intellectuals. For the liberal group, the phenomena of the 'Islamic turn' provided a means to end obsessions with formal and quantitative Islamic achievements. HMI, according to this view, should become an independent organization and detach itself from Islamic organizations. Moreover, as this group believed that the urgent need was for the renewal of Islamic thinking, it was argued that HMI should position itself as the nurturer of a creative minority rather then as a mass organization. In contrary, the *dakwah*-oriented Islamist intellectuals viewed the growing interest in Islam as a fine opportunity to bring educated people to the 'house' of Islam. For this group, HMI should increase its *dakwah* efforts to reach a wider audience. In its eyes, to bring new converts into Islamic action groups was of paramount importance in order to strengthen their Islamic socio-political consciousness. To better respond to this challenge, HMI should maintain its network with other Islamic organizations.[22] The moderate members agreed with the idea that HMI should position itself as an independent organization, but by no means detach itself from other Islamic organizations and terminate its *dakwah* efforts.[23]

The internal disputes among HMI intellectuals reached a climax in the wake of the deepening affinity of the *dakwah*-oriented intellectuals with DDII and the changing face of Madjid's intellectual orientation. This development began on the eve of the second term of Madjid's chairmanship. This affinity was especially strengthened by a common concern with the challenges of the *dakwah* movement. In the face of the 'Islamic turn', there had already emerged in the late 1960s embryos of the mosque movement in the setting of secular universities. At the same time, when religious instruction became compulsory, there was a surge in demand from secular universities for lecturers in religious instruction. In 1968 Imaduddin, for instance, was asked by ITB to be a lecturer in Islamic studies, though his academic background was electrical engineering. In response to such circumstances, in late 1967 the DDII began to promote the establishment of campus mosques in Bandung, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Medan and Makassar. It provided not only motivation but also financial assistance. About the same time, it also began to recruit *dakwah*-oriented intellectuals from diverse secular university backgrounds (mostly former activists of HMI and Pelajar Islam Indonesia, or PII) to be trained as lecturers for religious instruction and as mentors for the mosque movement.[24]

The cadre training of the *dakwah* movement was largely conducted in Jakarta with headquarters being in the ashram of Panitia Haji Indonesia (PHI, Indonesian Haji Committee) in Kwitang (Central Jakarta). The prin-

cipal trainers were DDII intellectuals, such as Mohammad Natsir, Prawoto Mangkusasmita, M Rasjidi, and Osman Raliby. Besides an in-depth study of various aspects of Islam and Islamic teaching, this *dakwah* group - sometimes referred to as the PHI group — made an attempt to standardize the content of religious instruction in universities under the banner 'Islam as a Scientific Discipline' (*Islam Disiplin Ilmu*, IDI). This effort gained official support from the Ministry of Religious Affairs during Alamsjah Prawiranegara's period (1978-1983), but was then ignored by his successor, Munawir Sjadzali, who disliked the formalization of Islam.[25] The IDI was in fact a prelude to the ambitious project of the Islamization of the sciences that would became an important Islamic theme in the following years. The network of *dakwah*-oriented young intellectuals with the DDII group provided the channel for the transmission of Islamic historical ideas and the impetus for the mosque movement that became more apparent from the early 1970s onwards.

Until the late 1960s, the *dakwah*-oriented intellectuals also benefited from Madjid's tendency as the chairman of HMI to be sympathetic to the Islamists' ideas. Madjid had previously shared similar views with the Bandung group, in their opposition to the pro-Manipol and pro-liberal ideas of the Yogyakarta group. He had been admired by the *dakwah* group so much that Imaduddin named his son Nurcholish. Later, however, Madjid disassociated himself from the Islamist *(dakwah)* group.

Madjid's shift towards liberal Islamic thinking was partly a result of his intellectual dynamism and surroundings. As Wahib stated, 'Nurcholish Madjid is a man of learning and reading. The book is his most beloved friend. Even if he feels that he is right, his willingness to continuously learn will in turn force him to re-question that which he has previously believed.'[26] Because of his reading hobby, Wahib, added, 'Madjid has enough scientific tools so that with a mental switch he can leapfrog to catch up with what other people have initiated' (p.163). Madjid was also an independent individual with no special older mentor.[27] For an IAIN student, becoming the chairman of HMI was very unusual and is also a reflection of his personal strength. Madjid also exhibited a strong tendency to be relatively less radical than other students of the IAINs (State Islamic Institutions) and traditionalist *pesantrens* (traditional Islamic boarding schools) and to strongly desired Western scientific knowledge and the language of modern 'intellectual discourse'.

The impetus for his shift to the liberal cause, however, was his direct encounter with the Western world. In October 1968, he was invited to visit the USA by the State Department of the Federal Government of the United States of America under the sponsorship of the Council for Lead-

ers and Specialists (CLS). The reason behind this invitation, according to an official of the American Embassy in Jakarta, was 'just to show him what he dislikes so far.'[28] During his two-month stay in America, he visited universities and learned about the academic life of university students, attended seminars and discussions with several academic and political figures, and witnessed some of the achievements of Western civilization. He also had the opportunity to meet the influential Indonesian socialist intellectual Sudjatmoko, then the Indonesian ambassador to the USA, who welcomed his visit with great hospitality. Shortly afterwards, he continued his journey to France, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Egypt, and Pakistan. Next in March 1969, at the invitation of King Faisal of the Saudi Arabia, he made a pilgrimage to Mecca along with some 10 other HMI functionaries. Reflecting on his visit both to the Western and Islamic worlds, he came to realize the disjuncture between Islamic ideals and the reality of life in the Muslim world. On the other hand, the West that he had been so critical of, exhibited many positive dimensions and achievements. Henceforth; 'he began to appreciate the good aspects of Western humanism'[29].

Madjid's mental switch had begun, though this did not lead to a sudden radical shift in ideology. For sometime, his new insight was submerged under a thick sediment of his established intellectual thinking as recorded in his work *Islamisme*. His thinking as described in *Islamisme*, combined with his new insights and other HMI intellectuals' ideas, were synthesized during and in the aftermath of the ninth HMI National Congress in Malang (3-10 May 1969). It was here that a new HMI ideology, known as *Nilai-Nilai Dasar Perjuangan* (NDP, the Basic Principles of the Struggle) became known.[30] Among other things, this ideology emphasized Islamic monotheism (*tauhṣd*) as the guiding theme of the Islamic struggle. For HMI in particular, it emphasized the need to maintain integration and coherence between *iman* (belief), *ilmu* (knowledge) and *amal* (action) as well as between an Islamic and nationalistic orientation.[31]

The remaining months of 1969 were critical ones for Madjid's thinking about Islamic liberalism. He continued to be overwhelmed by a process of self reflection, whether to side with the integration effort or the renewal movement. An influential factor in his move towards the renewal movement came from informal small group discussions which involved his closest friends, especially Utomo Dananjaya. He was a moderate leader of PII (chairman of PII, 1967-1969) and an intimate friend of Madjid who in 1969 reactivated the tradition of inviting the HMI chairman (at that time Madjid) to give a speech to the PII National Congress (held that year in Bandung). In the same year, at a post-*Idul Fitri* social event (known as

halal bihalal), Utomo conducted a discussion under the theme 'Integration of the Islamic Community', which involved Subchan Z.E (of Nahdlatul Ulama), H.M. Rasjidi (of Muhammadiyah), Anwar Tjokroaminoto (of PSII), and Rusli Khalil (of Perti). However it became evident following the event that the agenda of integration had not been well received. So Dananjaya began to conduct small group discussions, which involved his close fellows: Nurcholish Madjid (of HMI), Usep Fathuddin (of PII), and Anwar Shaleh (of GPII), to solve the dilemma of whether to support the impractical aims of integration or to side with the disintegrating renewal movement.

In addition to the small group discussions, Madjid also conducted discussions with *Masjumi* leaders such as Prawoto Mangkusasmita, Mohamad Roem, and Osman Raliby from which he got the impression that these men did not really consider the idea of an Islamic state as an urgent priority. In his view, 'They had an idea about something like an Islamic state, but it had yet to be achieved through democratic mechanisms. Even a man like Roem had no aspirations about it, though he retained his empathy for its supporters.'[32]

Although these small group discussions did not produce any conclusive results, they provided new inspiration for the participants. Already in late November 1969, Madjid wrote personal letters to Ahmad Wahib and Djohan Effendi, two liberal protagonists who had resigned from HMI on 30 September and 10 October 1969 respectively because of their disagreement with the Islamist group in HMI. In his letter he stated his agreement with the principal ideas of these two men, while asking their understanding about the difficulty of implementing such ideas in HMI.[33] Then, in preparing a post-*Idul Fitri* social event in 1970, which was organized jointly by four Muslim student-youth and *sardjana* (academic) organizations — HMI, GPI, PII, and Persami — the committee, which involved those participants in the small discussions, agreed to choose 'rethinking and integration' as the theme of the *halal bihalal* discussion. The original intention of choosing this theme was simply to stimulate discussion and to underscore the determination of the leadership of the Muslim youth groups to find solutions to the deeply agonizing problems of the *ummat*. Initially, the intellectual invited to give the speech on this occasion was Alfian (a Muslim intellectual from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, LIPI). But he was unable to come, so Harun Nasution (a rationalist Islamic scholar) was chosen to be his replacement. However Nasution was also unavailable. Finally, Madjid was appointed to be the speaker and 'the rest is history'.[34]

In this *halal bihalal* event, held on 3 January 1970, Madjid presented a paper entitled 'Keharusan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah In-

tegrasi Ummat' (The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of Integrating the *Ummat*). In the speech he explained that in his view the agenda of integration was an impractical approach. The political opportunity structure of the New Order necessitated changes in the behavioral and emotional condition of the Muslim community, whereas the idealistic approach of integration would only help to perpetuate intellectual impotence and stagnation within the *ummat*. He believed that the Muslims' loss of what he referred to as 'psychological striking force' had caused a '25-year set-back' for the *ummat* and was too complex to be solved through an integration-oriented approach. Thus, he considered the agenda for renewing Islamic thought to be a cure for the frailty of the *ummat*. Controversial issues of this agenda might undermine integrative efforts, but in his judgment the risk was worth taking; even if this project failed to produce the desired results it would still be useful at least as an attempt to cast aside the burden of intellectual stagnation. This project, he added, became more urgent in view of the fact that established reformist Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Al-Irsyad, Persis and others had lost their reformist verve and *elan vital* that caused them to be indistinguishable from, and even less progressive than, the traditionalist Muslim organizations.

As he went on to outline his thinking on 'the renewal movement', Madjid came to a very crucial point. He believed that the renewal process should begin by liberating the *ummat* from 'traditional values' in favor of 'future-oriented' values. This liberation process, he continued, necessitated the adoption of 'secularization', the promotion of intellectual freedom, the pursuit of the 'idea of progress' and the cultivation of open attitudes. What he meant by the term 'secularization' here is not identical with secularism, as the latter, in his view, is admittedly alien to the Islamic worldview. Madjid borrowed the interpretation of a Christian theologian, Harvey Cox, and of an American sociologist, Robert N. Bellah, so that by secularization he meant a process of 'temporalizing' values which are indeed temporal, but which the *ummat* had a tendency to regard as otherworldly *(ukhrawi)*. The term also meant to him the 'desacralization' of everything other than that which is truly transcendental. Last but not least, in response to an encouraging growth of people's interest in Islam on the one hand and the impotence of political Islam on the other hand, he came to the conclusion that a good proportion of the Muslim community at that time was in favor of: 'Islam: yes; Islamic party: no!'

Madjid's courage in taking the unpopular step of favoring the renewal movement despite running the risk of attracting popular criticism was a decisive moment for his initiation as an avant-garde intellectual. As Max Weber noted, 'Intellectuals often face the dilemma of having to choose

between intellectual integrity and extra-intellectual contingencies, between rationalizing the flow of ideas and dogmatic stagnation. Any decision in favor of the latter involves a 'sacrifice of intellect'.'[35] A typical ambivalence arises from this position, described by Bernhard Giesen as follows:

> Intellectuals bewail the lack of understanding from a public that is unaware, insufficiently aware, or even hostile to their interpretations. On the other hand, precisely this rejection by the public typically creates the tension that can be understood as the interpretative head start of the intellectual avant-garde. In his or her complaint about the public, the intellectual initially constructs the basic structure within which he or she can gain exceptionally as an intellectual. Conversely, the adoption of intellectual interpretations by a wider public always poses a danger to the distinction of an intellectual. [36]

By prioritizing ideas over public opinion, Madjid tended to be indifferent towards the social implications of his contemplative questionings and statements. This is especially true in his crucial statement about the necessity of 'Secularization'. No matter what his definition of Secularization was, language or terminology does not operate in isolation and cannot escape from history. Meaning is always constructed in social and historical contexts where social institutions and struggles engage in the process. As Jay L. Lemke argued, 'All meanings are made within the communities and the analysis of meaning should not be separated from the social, historical, cultural and political dimensions of these communities.'[37] In the cognitive structure of the Indonesian Muslim community, the term 'secular' and its derivations had an established negative connotation as signifiers of otherness. The term was commonly associated with the removal of religious influence from the public and political sphere — which is considered as alien to an Islamic worldview — with a specific reference to a repressive Dutch colonial policy under Snouck Hurgronje's influence to marginalize political Islam. Muslims' objections to the term were exacerbated by Madjid's excessive reference to Western academic sources, which reinforced the sense of otherness of the term.

For similar reasons, Madjid's statement about 'Islam: yes; Islamic party: no!' had also been misunderstood. Like Tjokroaminoto's statement before the Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Union)[38] congress in Surakarta in 1913 that 'SI is not a political party, and not an organization that desires a revolution, and it is loyal to the government,' Madjid's statement is actually not void of political intention. It can be considered as a political strategy in the guise of a non-formal political approach; that in the powerlessness of political Islam, Muslims should seek other ways to survive. But again because it was perceived as part and parcel of his statement on Secularization, his critics could not read the nuances of his statement.

The clash between 'vision' and 'tradition' occurred around these two crucial points in Madjid's position and exhausted intellectual debates thereafter. The debate was trapped in a semantic contention, which failed to deal with substantial issues. The scale of controversy and the seriousness of Madjid's vision became even more widespread and forceful because of the intensity and density of media coverage, especially by the magazines *Tempo* and *Pandji Masjarakat* which became the main instigators of the polemic. Spurred by the media coverage, the reactionary elements of the Muslim community both from the older and younger generations of Muslim intellectuals, such as H. M. Rasjidi (a Masjumi/DDII leader), Abdul Qadir Jaelani (a militant PII leader), and Endang Saifuddin Anshari (a *dakwah*-oriented intellectual of the HMI) began to launch severe attacks. Among others, Rasjidi criticized Madjid's view of secularization as being an arbitrary interpretation, for it already had a standard signification. Rasjidi further argued that Madjid ignored the fact that the secularization process would in turn lead to secularism. In supporting Rasjidi's critique, other polemicists objected to what they perceived as Madjid's rejection of Islamic politics. They believed in 'Islam, yes; Islamic party, yes!' [39]

The arguments and categorization made by the media and analysts often force academics to hold to a particular intellectual position more firmly even when they previously had some doubts. Although the original intention of Madjid's speech was only to stimulate discussion, the effect of hostile criticism and media exposure pressed him to move further along the path of the liberal cause. His move in this direction was welcomed by the liberal camp. Ahmad Wahid expressed this as follows:

> As we [Wahib and Effendi] got Nurcholish Madjid's paper from Dawam, via the post, we expressed our happiness by going around Yogyakarta to meet with leaders of HMI and the *ummat* [to tell them about his speech]. To be frank, we exploited Madjid's authority as the chairman of the biggest and the most respected student organization, who was often called 'the second Natsir', to popularize the liberal thinking.[40]

On the other hand, Madjid's departure from his original position greatly disappointed the *dakwah*-oriented group. This disappointment provided the group with the impetus to engage more seriously in the mosque movement.

The Development of the *Dakwah* Movement

To analyze the development of the *dakwah* movement — as well as the renewal movement — theories on social movements provide useful insights. There are two major paradigms in contemporary debates about

social movements. The first is the so-called 'resource mobilization' approach, and the second is the 'personal motivation' approach. The first approach takes as its starting point the analysis of organizations rather than the individual. The prime research question of this approach is not who the actors are or what motivates them but rather why some movements are more successful than others. The resource mobilization approach studies the mechanisms through which movements recruit their members and the organizational forms through which mobilization of both human and social resources takes place. The second approach focuses on the personal motivations that lead one to participate in social movements. This approach investigates individuals' socio-psychological backgrounds that ultimately lead them to become involved in a particular movement.[41] Based on these approaches, this analysis of the *dakwah* movement will use a productive exchange between the two perspectives, rather than an either/or choice.

The driving force for the early development of the *dakwah* movement was the socio-political dislocation of Islamist intellectuals. They had to face threats from two directions: state political repression and the challenge of the liberal-minded Muslims. Driven by Islamic political aspirations on the one hand, but confronted by the government's obstruction of political Islam on the other, this Islamist group experienced acute political dislocation. In the meantime, the general mass media, as another manifestation of the public sphere, tended to serve as the state ideological apparatus in championing modernization. The media was thus preconditioned to be sympathetic to the renewal movement. Realizing that the public sphere was hostile to their ideo-political aspirations, the Islamist intellectuals created a subtle and fluid social movement, which was relatively impervious to state control, as a new foundation for constructing collective solidarity and identity.

The alternative resource for the mobilization of the new Islamists' collective action was found in the relatively 'free' space of 'independent' mosques located on university campuses.[42] Although the function of the mosque as the central ground of religio-political movements was not something new to the Muslim World, its use as the base camp of a religio-political movement in a secular university was certainly a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Most of the secular university mosques began to emerge during the New Order period.[43] Perhaps some of the more prominent examples of such a phenomenon included the establishment of campus mosques within the prestigious universities ITB and the University of Indonesia (UI).

The establishment of the ITB mosque, known as Salman Mosque, had been planned by a nucleus of Islamic activists of this institution since 1958. However a number of obstacles — including the unfavorable response of the rectorate to the idea of establishing a mosque inside 'the bastion of the secular intellectuals' — delayed its building and so it was only completed in 1972.[44] The UI mosque began to be built in 1966 and was finished in 1968. It was named Arief Rahman Hakim Mosque in memory of an Islamic activist of that university who became a martyr of the student movement of 1966. Most other campus mosques began to emerge from the latter part of the 1970s onwards.

In the absence of mosques, Islamic activists began their religious activities in public spaces such as classrooms or auditoriums. With the frequent difficulty of getting official permission to establish a mosque inside the campus, many 'clever' strategies had to be developed. The establishment of the mosque at the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), Al-Ghifari, in the early 1980s, for instance, is an interesting case. It was originally proposed to the authorities as a laboratory building. Once it had been built, however, Islamic activists shifted the function of the building from scientific laboratory to 'spiritual' laboratory.[45] On most other campuses, the strategy of involving the rectorate on the committee for the mosque establishment was very effective. This approach was effective because it gave the impression that it had no political agenda.

It is worth noting that intellectuals who had been trained by DDII in the PHI played a decisive role in the establishment and development of many early campus mosques, as most of them became lecturers in the secular universities where they originated. In short, the presence of mosques inside secular universities was a monument to the ascendancy of the *dakwah*-oriented intellectuals.

Early leaders of these mosque movements were largely drawn from the *dakwah*-oriented HMI/PII[46] circles of the fourth generation. Their initial audiences were Islamic activists of the fifth generation of intelligentsia, especially those who entered university in the 1970s. In the gestation period, the principal proponents of this movement were composed largely of the HMI/PII members as well. Although the leftist student groups had been dismantled, activists of Islamic student organizations of the 1970s were still motivated by a fierce competitive political struggle with those of secular student fronts, especially to control intra-university student governments. In the face of this challenge, these Islamic activists shared the vision of the older generation of the *dakwah* activists to make the campus mosque the base of student activities, both to prepare and enlarge Islamic cadres and constituencies and to find ways of bridging the differences

between student activists of different organizational backgrounds. For the older generation, however, there was another additional interest: to protect students of secular universities from the influence of the renewal movement.[47]

The prototype of this mosque movement emerged in ITB's Salman Mosque in early 1970s, which adopted the ideology and 'movement intellectual'[48] of the so-called *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah* (LMD, Dakwah Fighter Training). LMD was first introduced by Imaduddin Abdulrahim and his fellows[49] to the community of Salman Mosque in 1973. Interestingly, the basic material of LMD's ideology was in fact a modified version of the Madjid-composed NDP (of the HMI) with a stronger emphasis on the *tauhid* doctrine and a special caution about the threat of the so-called intellectual warfare *(ghazwul fikr)* with Western-influenced secular ideas.[50] Inspiration for the emphasis on the *tauhid* and *ghazwul fikr* was taken from the doctrine of the well-known Egyptian Islamic movement, *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (the Muslim Brotherhood, est. 1928).

The exposure of the Islamist group to aspects of the Brotherhood ideology and *dakwah* methods was made possible especially by the involvement of Abdulrahim in international networks of Islamic students. One of the most important was the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO, est. 1969). With Natsir's encouragement, Abdulrahim began to be actively involved in this organization in 1971 and soon assumed the position of Vice-Secretary General.[51] Many leaders of this organization had been influenced by the Brotherhood ideology. Abdulrahim's encounter with them seemed to provide a catalyst for his rudimentary understanding of the Brotherhood ideology and methods, which had a certain influence on the curriculum and method of LMD.[52]

What made LMD special and influential was its training approach. Participants had to stay in the Salman Mosque complex for about a week with no contact with the outside world. The training began an hour before early morning prayer (about 4.00 a.m.), and during the day participants were involved in intense and stimulating small-group religious discussions. At night they had to perform the midnight (optional) prayer, and on the final night they had to swear an oath before the trainers containing the profession of the Faith *(kalimat syahadat)*, 'There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God.'[53]

This type of Islamic training in fact stimulated a new religious awareness that could be described as somewhat radical. The birth of this new religious-mindedness was signaled by the wearing of *jilbab* (headscarf) by female activists, which speedily became the very symbol of the mosque *(dakwah)* movement. In later developments, LMD became the recruiting

ground for junior mentors who led Islamic tutorials known as 'mentoring' (using the English term) for other ITB students. As the mentoring activity attracted students from other universities and even high school students in Bandung, the Salman Mosque accommodated this enthusiasm through the establishment of the Salman Islamic Youth Community (KARISMA).

The mentoring activities, in which participants were organized into small discussion groups, became the basis for the creation of circles of cohesive groups, termed *usrah* (Ar. family). Each *usrah* cell had its own mentor who served as a motivator and role model, as well as a bridge to connect the small groups into the whole entity of the mosque movement. Members of *usrah,* in turn, became new propagandists who actively recruited new followers.

LMD soon attracted Islamic activists from other secular universities. Thus, its participants were extended to include students of diverse universities throughout Indonesia.[54] After attending LMD, representatives from each campus began to introduce the *dakwah* training and mentoring program on their own campuses by adapting the material and approach of the Salman Mosque. In this way they laid the foundation for the establishment of the campus mosque *dakwah* body that came to be known as Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK). Furthermore, former participants of the LMD also provided connection chains for informal networks of *dakwah* activists across universities and for the dissemination of the Islamist ideology. This informal network facilitated resource mobilization such as the coordination of a common action plan, the exchange of information and the provision of religious preachers or instructors for particular religious events. The simultaneous action of the campus *dakwah* bodies rapidly extended the sphere of influence of the Islamist ideas.

The success of the LMD programs propelled the mosque movement outside the campus. The rise of the mosque movement outside the campus itself actually coincided with the 'Islamic turn' in the secular universities. The 1970s was the formative period the emergence of the so-called *remaja masjid* (the mosque youth) movement throughout Indonesia with many activists of the HMI/PII background being involved in its gestation period. In a sign of growing frustration with politics, the mosque youth began to popularize the slogan 'Back to the Mosque' (using the English phrase). Among the major mosques in large cities which were well-known for their *remaja masjid* movement activities were Al-Azhar, Sunda Kelapa, and Cut Meutiah mosques in Jakarta, the Istiqomah and Mujahidin mosques in Bandung, Syuhada mosque in Yogyakarta, and Al-Falah mosque in Surabaya.[55] In recruiting members and enlarging their constituency, these groups

benefited from the material, method of training and mentoring programs of the campus mosque movement.

As the mosque youth movement grew in numbers, the Communication Forum of the Indonesian Mosque Youth (Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid Indonesia, BKPMI) was established in 1977 to improve networking among them. Structurally, the BKPMI operated as an autonomous institution in the Indonesian Council of Mosques, while the latter was part of the World Council of Mosques (an affiliate of the Muslim World League) with Mohammad Natsir being one of its members. The BKPMI, which transformed itself into BKPRMI[56] after 1993, became the catalyst for the dissemination of Islamist ideas beyond the campus.[57]

By the end of the 1970s the scope and force of this mosque movement began to enter a new stage in the wake of the New Order's increasing political repression. By the end of the 1970s student politics had reached a low point. Following the dissolution of dewan mahasiswa (the student council) and the imposition of 'Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus' (NKK, the 'normalization of campus life) in 1978, student politics gradually lost its political significance. By the early 1980s, the ability of both extra-campus student organizations and the remaining intra-campus student governing bodies (faculty-based student senates) as mediums for the actualization of students' political aspirations had been severely impaired. HMI, for instance, began to lose its attraction for Islamic students.

In the face of the NKK-policy to isolate campuses from the influence of external socio-political organizations, HMI lost its firm foothold inside universities. It also increasingly lost its credibility in the eyes of the campus-based Islamic activists because of its increasing cooperation with the state and political structures. HMI officially changed its organizational principle from Islam to Pancasila at the sixteenth HMI National Congress in Padang (24-31 March 1986). This change caused the organization to split into two camps, as those who refused to accept Pancasila as the sole principle of the organization seceded from the HMI and established a new rival organization that came to be known as the HMI-MPO (Majelis Pertimbangan Organisasi, Organizational Consideration Council). After this, the leadership of HMI tended to follow an accommodationist line.

With the de-politicization of the student world, student activity inside campuses was channeled into intra-student organizations which catered for students' demands for recreation and professional development. Some student groups, however, did manage to vent their criticism through the mosque movement and through the creation of general discussion groups that began to mushroom in the early 1980s.

The campus mosque movement and the general discussion groups displayed antithetical tendencies. While the former operated inside the university, the latter operated beyond the walls of the university. The former aimed to recruit a larger constituency and this was made easier by its operation inside the campus. The discussion groups never attempted to recruit a large membership and tended to be alienated from day to day student life due to their operation outside the campus. While the resistance ideology of the mosque movement derived from Islamist ideologies, that of the discussion groups in general was highly influenced by leftist and new-leftist ideologies. Whereas the mosque movement connected itself with local and global networks of Islamic *harakah* (movements), the discussion groups were mostly connected with local and global networks of socialist-minded non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

In a further development, the mosque movement became more successful than the general discussion groups and NGO movement, in being able to maintain its 'communicative sphere' as a necessary condition for continuing and enlarging the intellectual community. Operating within the mosque, the former had a sort of cover to protect itself from direct control by the security apparatus, while the latter had no such cover and hence were more easily controlled or eliminated by the government. In this regards, Taufik Abdullah comments, 'It is clear that religious discourse, with reference to the sacred texts, is one of the few channels relatively free from the imposition of the mastery of meaning by the powers that be.'[58]

Besides being an unintended consequence of the New Order's policy of political repression, the mosque movement benefited indirectly from the modernization project. In deviating from the general theory of modernization, which tends to assume that as modernization increases, religious faith and observance declines, the New Order's modernization project brought about a new religious awareness amongst many modernized secular university students.

One of the possible reasons for the growing religious awareness had something to do with the socio-psychological deprivation of newly urbanized students. Moving from the countryside or small towns into metropolitan cities for the sake of learning, these new student migrants were plunged into a sort of silent atomized individualism and experienced serious problems of dislocation. As R. W. Bulliet argued:

> Village life changes over time, but usually change is slow enough to leave undisturbed, at least in later memory, the illusion of stability and continuity. Migration to the city, however, is a profoundly disrupting experience. Even when

there are previous migrants from the same village to cushion one's entry into urban life, the loss of routines of the agricultural cycle, and of the village's closed society, is not easily compensated for.[59]

For students from the middle and upper classes, who had long stayed in metropolitan cities, a feeling of spiritual deprivation seemed to be a major drive for their turn to the mosque movement. One of the results of the New Order's modernization project, for those with money, was a hedonistic life-style and exhibitionism among the new rich, as well as corruption among state officials and government servants. Some idealist students of these classes experienced a sort of 'cognitive dissonance', as a result of disjuncture between their conception of the good life and the real life of their family. Some of them attempted to find a spiritual sanctuary, as an escape from the 'dirty' world.

These problems of social and spiritual deprivation became more acute because of the presence of heterogeneous post-modern (global) cultures brought in by the New Order's technological successes. This was signaled by the emergence of a range of means of mass communication and a bewildering experience of the proliferation of life-worlds, consumer lifestyles and the secularization of culture. Trapped in this situation, urban settlers 'needed new sets of moral precepts to provide them with a sense of meaning and purpose.'[60] To meet this need for moral precepts, the urban educated-Muslims faced a dilemma. Should they embrace materialistic and secularist modern values in order to feel fully part of the new world (thereby spurning their traditions), or should they, on the contrary, revive their local traditions, even at the price of material disadvantage. It was painful to spurn indigenous traditions, but it was also painful to remain under-developed. Many Muslims attempted to solve this dilemma by embracing neither modern Western values nor local indigenous tradition, but rather returning to what they perceived as their true origin; that is the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. In extreme cases, this obsession with returning to Islamic authenticity led to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism.[61]

Having been poorly educated in religious matters, new migrant and urban students who crowded into secular universities in metropolitan cities from the latter part of the 1970s constituted what Bulliet called the 'new edge' of the Muslim community. In the relative absence of corporate life (civil society) — in the European sense — in Indonesia, the need of these 'new edge' Muslims for a new community and moral precepts was met particularly by the presence of the network of mosque movements, *Sufi* orders and other Muslim institutions. In their encounter with

the Islamic epistemic community, these 'new edge' Muslims began to question their existence as Muslims. At the same time, secular policies that had created the public education system diminished the status of traditionally trained *ulama*. Thus, when the new edge began to ask questions about Islam, they did not turn automatically to the traditional *kyai* from whom their parents would have sought advice. They turned rather to 'non-scholastic' assertive Muslim thinkers who, in many cases, had not received an established traditional religious education. As Bulliet noted: 'The fact that the answers these thinkers gave to the questions asked of them were often at odds with traditional teachings, or manifestly predicated upon ideas deriving from Western academic study, did not deter the young men and women of the new edge from following them.'[62]

The religious curiosity of this 'new edge' was also fed by the flourishing of new Islamic publications. Beginning in early 1980s, the fifth generation of Muslim activists established new Islamic publishing houses, such as *Pustaka-Salman* and *Mizan* in Bandung, *Gema Insani Press* in Jakarta, and *Shalahuddin Press* in Yogyakarta, which provided alternative Islamic reading for the new edge. This reading material was initially derived from the translated works of foreign Islamic thinkers and then from anthologies of articles by Indonesian intellectuals. Throughout the 1980s there also emerged new Islamic journals and magazines such as *Risalah, Amanah, Pesantren, Salman Kau* and *Ulumul Qur'an*. The emergence of this number of Islamic publications reflected and affected the Islamic enthusiasm of the new edge. This contributed to making Islamic publications the trend setters in book production in the 1980s. Based on a survey of the 'Library and Documentation Section' of *Tempo* magazine, of the 7,241 total books collected by this section between 1980-1987, the number of books on religious themes was 1,949 — most of which were on Islamic themes.[63]

The Islamic zeal of this new edge found its actualizing space in the campus mosque. In this context, the mosque served as the melting pot for the new edge of different Islamic streams. Having no direct connection to any major organized Islam, the campus mosque was able to distance itself from historical Islamic disputes on matters of different interpretation. Slowly but surely, activists of the mosque movement began to form a new Islamic hybrid which disengaged itself from the long-established divide between traditionalist versus reformist Islamic groups. At the same time the Islamic teaching of the campus mosque seemed to suit the religious disposition of new urbanized students. There was a strong indication that urbanization had been followed by the shift in the religious disposition and affiliation of many students, from the characteristics of rural Islam that tends to stress 'anthropolatry' towards the characteristics of the urban middle-class Islam that tends to stress 'bibliolatry'.[64]

Another aspect of modernization that helped boost the reputation of the mosque movement was the growing number of Muslim intellectuals with Masters and PhD degrees. Benefiting from the government's drive for human resource development through overseas training, many *dakwah*-oriented scholars were able to improve their educational qualifications in Western countries, the very countries that were often viewed by Islamists with a double-consciousness. On the one hand, these Western countries were often portrayed as a source of moral degeneration and as a menacing threat to Islamic civilization. On the other hand, they were commonly viewed as a source of admiration since those who were able to study in the Western world were highly respected by their fellow compatriots. A significant number of Islamic scholars from secular university backgrounds began to pursue PhD or Masters degrees in Western universities in the 1970s. Among them were such prominent *dakwah* activists as Amien Rais, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Syafi'i Ma'arif, Kuntowidjojo, Fuad Amsjari, and Djalaluddin Rahmat (all who went to the USA), Endang Saifuddin Anshari (who went to Canada), and A. M. Saefuddin (who went to Germany). When they returned home, mostly in early 1980s, they contributed to the strengthening of the intellectual credibility of the mosque movement.

In addition to the unintended consequences of political repression and modernization, another driving force for the development of the mosque movement was the reconnection of the Indonesian Islamic movement to that of global Islam. Since the late 1920s, much of the attention and energy of the Indonesian Muslim community had been focused on domestic political struggles and intra-religious tensions that caused the Indonesian Islamic movement to be inward looking. The New Order obstruction of political Islam, which coalesced with the drive of modernization, provided the impetus for the younger generation of Muslim intelligentsia to reconnect itself with the global *ummat*. In this way the new Islamic movement tended to be more outward looking.

This reconnection with the global *ummat* took place at the very time when the entire Muslim World was swept by the growing tide of Islamism as the new ideological passion. Beginning in the 1970s, the failure of the secular elite and their secular ideologies to offer an effective redemption for the socio-economic plight of Muslim societies in previous decades gave rise to a general social dissatisfaction. This disappointment, in the context of the Arab world, culminated in the defeat of Arab countries in the 1967 Arab-Israel war. Henceforth, the efficacy of secular ideologies such as socialism, liberalism, and Arabism were seriously questioned, and many Islamic activists began to call upon the Muslim community to return to the authentic source *(ashala)* of Islamic values. In countries character-

ized by moderate-secularism like Egypt, for instance, the literature of Marxism, existentialism, and other Western theories that were widely circulated among student activists in the 1950s and 1960s now began to be replaced by the Islamists' works, especially those of Muslim Brotherhood figures, such as Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al-Banna. Groups of Islamic fundamentalist intelligentsia such as the Jama'at Islamiyya in Egypt began to attract large numbers of recruits from amongst university students in the Arab World and beyond. Even in a secular Muslim country such as Turkey, the term *'aydin'* (Islamist intellectual) became popular in the 1980s. This tide of Islamism gained its material foundation from the boom in oil prices in the 1970s giving rise to 'Petro-Islam'. The trickle-down effect of this oil boom brought benefits for the dissemination of Islamism, as giants of Petro-Islam like Saudi Arabia provided financial assistance to the *dakwah* organizations, especially through the Muslim World League.[65]

Being receptive to external influences, the mosque movement in Indonesia became interested in Islamic ideas and methods of contemporary Islamic movements *(harakah)* in the Muslim World. In 1969, one of Sayyid Qutb's works, *This Religion of Islam* (published in 1967), was translated into Indonesian under the title *Inilah Islam* by A.R. Baswedan and A. Hanafi and published by Hudaya (Jakarta). In 1978 another translated work of Qutb, *Masyarakat Islam* (Islamic Society), was published in Bandung.[66] Thus, in the 1970s, Islamic ideas of this venerable intellectual of the Egypt-born Islamic *harakah* the Muslim Brotherhood became accessible to a particular segment of the Indonesian Islamic scholarly community. This would be followed in subsequent decades by the arrival of the Malaysian movement Darul Arqam, the Indo-Pakistan-originated Jama'ah Tabligh, the Jordan-originated Hizbut Tahrir, amongst others.[67]

DDII was the agent most responsible for the dissemination of the Brotherhood's ideology and *dakwah* method. Natsir had a close relationship with leaders of the Brotherhood. The banning of Masjumi made him sympathetic to the Brotherhood that had faced similar persecution in Egypt.[68] Moreover, the Brotherhood's emphasis on the so-called *tarbiyah* movement (social-education based on a tight network of *usrah*), was regarded by DDII as a useful method for the *dakwah* movement in Indonesia. In 1980, DDII's magazine and publishing house, *Media Dakwah*, published a translation of Sayyid Qutb's work, *Ma'ālim fi al-Tharşq*, under the title *Petunjuk Jalan* (Signposts along the Road).[69] Moreover, in 1980 Natsir and DDII began to support the establishment of Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA, Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies). This institution was founded by King Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah of Saudi Arabia under the guidance of Mohammad Qutb (brother of Sayyid Qutb) and well-known Islamic scholar Shaikh Abdul 'Aziz bin Baz.

They advised Abdullah to contact Natsir to ask for his support. It was due to this strong connection with Brotherhood figures that led to LIPIA's library being loaded with Brotherhood literature.[70]

Meanwhile, by the early 1980s some students who had been sent by Natsir to undertake overseas studies in the Middle East had retuned home. Among them were people like Abu Ridho[71] who had studied in Saudi Arabia and had been influenced by the teachings and methods of the Brotherhood *harakah*. When he returned home in 1981 he began to promote Brotherhood ideologies and methods of *dakwah* among the DDII activists. Thus, there emerged an early circle of Brotherhood followers within DDII, composed of Abu Ridho and some younger activists such as Mashadi (personal secretary of Mohamad Roem) and Mukhlish Abdi.[72]

Brotherhood ideas then spread to activists of PII. Besides the long history of a close relationship between PII with Masjumi/DDII activists, the PII central office was located in the same complex as the DDII office. During the period of Mutammimul Ula's leadership (1983-86), Qutb's translated works, particularly *Petunjuk Jalan*, were used in PII training.[73] The same book became compulsory reading material for alumni of Salman's LMD.[74] Following the PII's rejection of Pancasila as the sole basis of the socio-political organization, the PII was banned from the public sphere which hindered the marketing of Brotherhood ideology in this organization. Nevertheless, Islamic ideas and *dakwah* methods of the Brotherhood continued to influence the Indonesian *dakwah* movement. Other works of Brotherhood leaders were translated by graduates of Middle East universities. Abu Ridho played a conspicuous role in this project by translating works of Hasan Al Banna, Mushtafa Masyhur and Sa'id Hawwa, and establishing his own publishing house, *Al-Ishlahy* Press to print them.[75] New Islamic publishers such as *Gema Insani Press*, *Al-Kautsar*, *Robbani Press* and *Era Intermedia* enhanced the success of Brotherhood popularization by translating and publishing other works of Qutb as well as works of Brotherhood figures such as Muhammad Qutb, Muhammad Al Ghazali and Yusuf Qardhawi. As a result, Brotherhood ideologies and *dakwah* methods greatly influenced Islamic activists of the campus mosques and were soon adopted by the training and mentoring program of LDK.

The reconnection of the Indonesian Muslim community to global Islam was also signified by the increase in numbers of Indonesian students in the Middle East. According to Mona Abaza's records[76], in 1966 the total membership of the Indonesian student association in Egypt was 36; in 1982/1983 the number of Indonesian students in this country jumped to 415, increasing to 722-730 in 1987, and reaching around 1000 in 1993. In 1987, the total number of Indonesian students studying in Arab and Per-

sian countries was 1742 with most of them being in Saudi Arabia (904 students) and Egypt (722 students). The rest of the students were in Iran (32), Libya (27), Syria (21), Sudan (10), Jordan (9), Iraq (8), Turkey (7), and Algeria (2) respectively. Unlike Indonesian students in Western countries, however, most Indonesian students who studied in Muslim countries were studying at the undergraduate level. Influenced by the growing popularity of Islamic *harakah* in the Middle East, many of these students after their return home became strategic partners of the mosque activists in championing *harakah* ideologies.

Another major event in the Muslim World that influenced the development of the mosque movement in Indonesia was the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Although the majority of Iranians follow Shiite Islam, while Indonesians follow Sunni Islam, this did not discourage Indonesian Islamic activists from admiring the success of the Islamic revolution and even led a few circles of Indonesian Muslims, especially those of Arabic origin, to be attracted to *Shi'ah* teachings.[77] For most Indonesian Islamic activists, however, this did not lead to (internal) religious conversion. For them, the significance of the Iranian Islamic revolution simply lay in its ability to provide an Islamic concept of revolution.

Soon after the Iranian Islamic revolution, new Islamic publishing houses, especially the Bandung-based Mizan publisher, published translations of the works of Iranian intellectual-revolutionaries such as Ali Shariati, Murtadla Muthahhari and Imam Khomeini. These works provided Indonesian Islamic activists with additional inspiration and motivation for Indonesian Islamic Movements. Thus, Ali Shariati's term *'raushan fikr'* (enlightened thought),[78] which advocated intellectual engagement with the plight of human beings, appealed to activists of the mosque movement.

The tide of Islamism which coincided with the windfall of the oil boom had given rise to a climate of optimism in the entire Muslim World that envisaged the arrival of an Islamic renaissance. The 'World of Islam Festival' in London in August 1976, which exhibited the glorious past of Islam, expressed the spirit of Islamic revivalism. In the lead-up to the 1980s, the Muslim World League began to proclaim the 15th century of the Muslim calendar *(hijriyah*—which started in 1981) as the era of Islamic resurgence. To mark this imagined historic moment, the Muslim World League conducted the very first Islamic Mass Media Conference which took place in Jakarta, the capital of the most populous Muslim country, 1-3 September 1980. The reverberations from this event further galvanized the Islamic zeal of the mosque movement in Indonesia.

The campus mosques continued to serve as the exemplary centers of the mosque movement. Slowly but surely, almost every secular university

developed its own LDK, and every LDK formed collaborations with lecturers of Islamic subjects to make sure that the 'mentoring' program became part of the curriculum. Slowly but surely, the original content and method of *dakwah* as offered by LMD was overshadowed by that which was imported from the international *harakah*. The *dakwah* movements increasingly drew on Arabic terminologies and replaced the English that had been widely adopted by Islamic student movements in the previous decades. By the late 1980s, the mosque movement under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood began to be known as the *tarbiyah* (educational) movement, using the same code as the Brotherhood.

The *dakwah* activists of the late 1980s and the 1990s were more dedicated than the HMI/PII-dominated *dakwah* activists of the 1960s/1970s in their appreciation of mosque life. According to a well-known campus mosque activist of the 1990s, Fahri Hamzah, the mosque was not the main ground for the HMI/PII training and activities, and it was not until the late 1960s that the *dakwah*-oriented HMI/PII intellectuals began to turn to the mosque as their base. For the later *dakwah* activists, on the other hand, the mosque was not only the main ground for their training and activities from the very beginning but also, for many of them, the home at which they stayed. This intimacy with mosque life caused the internalization of an Islamic identity and Islamic mindedness of the later *dakwah* activists to be much deeper than that of the *dakwah*-oriented HMI intellectuals.[79] As such, the later *dakwah* activists were more susceptible to the influence of more puritan/militant Islamic ideas offered by the international Islamic *harakah*.

Moreover, there were at least two other reasons for the deepening identification of the Indonesian *dakwah* activists with the international *harakah*. Muslims in the 'edge' (new learners of Islam on the periphery of the Muslim World) tended to glorify the 'center' either as a reflection of their obsession with authenticity or as an over-compensation for their lack of authority in Islamic studies. For people with this kind of psychological predisposition, the Islamic ideas of the international *harakah* offered a sense of credibility and authenticity, since organic intellectuals of this *harakah* mostly came from the centre of the Muslim World — that is the Middle East — or at least from those who had studied in the Middle East. At the same time, there was a serious shortage of in-depth Islamic literature written by Indonesian intellectuals.

In the deepening identification with the international *harakah*, the later *dakwah* activists formed a distinct response to the challenges of the modern world. As the majority of Indonesian Muslims had been intensely exposed to the process of modernization, and most of the campus *dakwah*

activists had also been very familiar with modern science and technology, the later *dakwah* activists began to depart from the historical project of previous generations of Muslim intelligentsia. While the concern of previous generations was how to modernize Islam, the concern of the later *dakwah* period was how to Islamize modernity. Consequently, people like Imaduddin Abdulrahim and other *dakwah* activists of the 1960s and 1970s, who used to be viewed as too Islamist by the standards of that time, came to be regarded as too moderate by the standards of *dakwah* activists of the late 1980s and the 1990s. For instance, Abdulrahim did not insist that his wife wear the *jilbab* (veil), which came to be considered obligatory for a true Islamic believer, as well as an icon for the Islamization of modernity. Slogans such as 'Islam is the solution' and 'Islam is the alternative' now reverberated throughout university campuses.

To consolidate groups of LDK and to strengthen the cooperation among them, LDK activists from diverse campus backgrounds organized the first inter-LDK meeting known as *Forum Silaturahmi* (FS)-LDK in ITB's Salman Mosque in 1986. At the second inter-LDK meeting, held in the IPB's Al-Ghifari mosque in 1987, the guiding principle *(khitah)* of the LDK was formulated: 'the LDK struggle rests on Islam as the religion of Allah *(dinullah)* and as a way of life, and will be united through the tie of the profession of the faith ('There is no god but God; Muhammad is the Prophet of God').[80] This informal forum formed a network that connected these *dakwah* activists to one another, thus empowering their collective identity and solidarity. The forum also provided avenues for exchanging ideas, allocating resources, and strengthening networks.

The FS-LDK, with its ideology and networks, served as the basis for further socio-political action. When the political opportunity structure in the New Order's public sphere changed in the late 1990s, *dakwah* activists of the sixth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, composed largely of those who were born in the 1970s, began to translate the LDK network into a political action group. In the midst of the *'reformasi'* (reform) movement of 1998, the tenth inter-LDK meeting, which was attended by 64 out of the 69 existing LDKs throughout Indonesia and held in the mosque of the Muhammadiyah University in Malang on 25-29 March 1998, agreed to transform the LDK network into Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI, the United Front of Indonesian Islamic University Students) with Fahri Hamzah of UI as its first chairman. The acronym 'KAMMI' was inspired by 'KAMI', the HMI-dominated student movement of 1966. In the newly established KAMMI, however, HMI was not included and its role in the reform movement was also marginal. KAMMI was to become the most powerful student front in the 1998 student movement and beyond.[81]

The Development of the Renewal Movement

As the secular universities became the stronghold of the *dakwah* movement, religious institutions (especially IAINs) became the strongholds of the renewal movement. There are several explanations for this phenomenon. In Islamic institutions, almost all students are members of the *santri* (devout Muslim) community. As such, the level of competitive ideo-political struggle among students in Islamic institutions was less intense than that in the secular universities. The perennial conflict within the IAIN is an endogenous one, between the traditionalist and reformist-oriented Islamic students. Because of the lack of competition with supporters of secular ideologies inside the campus, students at Islamic institutions by and large tend to be less motivated than Islamic activists in secular universities in their propagation of Islamic claims.

In addition, Nurcholish Madjid had a hypothesis that the lack of religious instruction in secular universities prompted Islamic activists there to be more appreciative of Islamic knowledge and symbols. Needless to say, this lack of religious teaching could also lead students in secular universities to secular-mindedness.[82] Following the same logic it could be argued that the relative lack of secular scientific instruction in IAINs and *pesantrens* could lead students of this community to highly value secular knowledge and symbols. Again, it could also be argued that overwhelming amounts of religious instruction could also lead students in Islamic institutions to Islamic conservatism.

Imaduddin Abdulrahim believed that the persisting residue of colonial hierarchies of knowledge made students in Islamic institutions feel inferior to students in secular universities. To overcome this sense of inferiority, he believed, students in Islamic institutions tended to over-compensate by showing off their erudition in and openness to Western intellectual ideas.[83] Pursuing this reasoning, we may assume that Islamic activists in secular universities tend to be obsessed with Arabic terminologies and Islamist ideas as an over-compensation for their poor mastery of Arabic and Islamic literature.

Moreover, for many IAIN students, Madjid was regarded as a hero. His double term as chairman of HMI and his reputation as the most celebrated Muslim intellectual of his generation helped raise the self-confidence and intellectual leverage of the IAIN community. In this way, he served as a role model for many of the IAIN students and intellectuals and his renewal ideas provided a benchmark for a new generation of IAIN intellectuals. His period of study at the University of Chicago,[84] for his doctorate (1978-1984), provided the inspiration for many IAIN scholars to study at Western centers of Islamic studies.

The receptiveness of a great bulk of the IAIN community to the renewal movement was reinforced by the pro-modernization and accommodation policy of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Since the Mukti Ali period (1973-1978), this Ministry began to strengthen the teaching of general subjects in the IAIN and to encourage Muslim scholars to obtain higher education at Western centers of study. Apart from the government's general admiration for Western scientific and technological achievements, this encouragement was intended to stimulate Muslim intellectuals to take a more 'objective' view of religion's role and to appreciate the need to accommodate it to a secularized modern world. In doing this, as Ruth McVey noted, the Ministry of Religious Affairs had 'tried to bridge the gap between the *santri* community and the state by providing Islam with spokesmen who can communicate easily with the regime and share its general perceptions.'[85]

The immediate impact of this government support was a shift in the main destination for overseas postgraduate study of IAIN scholars — from centers of Islamic studies in the Middle East to those in the Western World. Until the late 1960s, only a few Indonesian scholars with Islamic educational backgrounds pursued Islamic studies at Western universities. Among the very few were H. M. Rasjidi, Mukti Ali, Anton Timur Jaelani, Harun Nasution, and Kafrawi.[86] From the 1970s onwards, however, the flow of IAIN scholars to Western universities multiplied and continued to increase exponentially. It was returnees from Western universities who became the potential agents for the diffusion of renewal ideas among the IAIN community (and beyond) throughout Indonesia.

Renewal ideas also found fertile ground in HMI. With the HMI being dominated by pragmatic and moderate intellectuals, renewal ideas provided the mainstream HMI members with an ideological legitimacy for their integration into the New Order polity and bureaucracy. During the period of Ridwan Saidi's chairmanship (1974-76), it was thought that the HMI would provide an institutional basis for renewal ideas. Madjid and his colleagues, however, did not support the implementation of this idea, on the grounds that formalization might lead to the stagnation of renewal concepts.[87] Even so, HMI members continued to become a potential audience for renewal ideas.

Beyond the IAIN and HMI community, the renewal ideas appealed to the accommodationist Muslim politicians and bureaucrats. The latter were mainly those who typically had no strong interest in theoretical Islamic thinking but provided the practical mechanism for the grounding of renewal ideas within the New Order political structure. Representatives of these politicians and bureaucrats were Akbar Tandjung (Chairman of HMI,

1971-73) and Mar'ie Muhammad (a prominent HMI activist). Behind these two, there was a block of pragmatic Muslim intelligentsia who aspired to political and bureaucratic positions but could not achieve them through the vehicle of political Islam. Their incorporation into the New Order bureaucracy strengthened the Muslim 'bloc within' that had been pioneered by the previous generation of Muslim intelligentsia.

For the Muslim intelligentsia of the bloc within, Madjid's slogan, 'Islam, yes; Islamic party, no!' and the acceptance of the Pancasila by major Islamic organizations after 1983 were particularly pertinent. These were viewed as an indication of acceptance of the state orthodoxy and paved the road for a mutual rapprochement between the Muslim intelligentsia and the state as well as making the state more responsive towards Muslims' cultural and positional interests.

The effect of the renewal ideas of former HMI leaders reverberated throughout society following in the path of the development of the renewal movement within the biggest traditionalist Islamic association, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The main protagonist of the renewal movement within this traditionalist community was Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940), NU's foremost intellectual and member of the most honored family-line in that community. He was a grandson of the venerable founding father of the NU, Hasjim Asj'ari, and also a son of a prominent NU scholar, Wachid Hasjim.

After eight years' study in the Middle East (first at Al-Azhar University, Egypt and then at Baghdad University, Iraq), Abdurrahman Wahid returned to Jombang (East Java), the stronghold of the Indonesian traditionalist community, in 1971. When he returned home having studied both Islamic and Western literature, he was soon confronted with two serious challenges within the NU community: the challenge of the government-promoted modernization and the beginning of NU's strained relationship with the government that resulted from NU's considerable success in the 1971 election. How to enable the traditionalist community to come to terms with modernization and the (state-defined) national interest soon became his main concern.

As an intellectual, Wahid was challenged to develop a reinterpretation of the NU traditionalist legal and theological thinking in order to better deal with the challenge of modernization and national interests, while at the same time remaining respectful of indigenous local traditions. This was reflected in his early works such as *Bunga Rampai Pesantren* (Capita Selecta of the *Pesantren*, 1979) and *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan* (Muslims in the Midst of Struggle, 1981).

His renewal ideas following neo-traditionalist lines were enriched by his socialization with intellectuals of diverse backgrounds, especially the

Jakarta-based renewal intellectuals. From the 1970s he was invited by Tawang Alun, Dawam Rahardjo and Adi Sasono (pro-renewal HMI intellectuals in the NGO sector) to take part in a project concerning *pesantren* community development, designed by two prominent Jakarta based-NGOs, the Social and Economic Research, Education, and Information Institute (LP3ES, est. 1971) and the Association for *Pesantren* and Community Development (P3M, est. 1983). Through his encounter with NGO activists, Wahid's intellectual ideas began to be imbued with the dominant themes among NGO activists: alternative development, democracy and human rights.[88]

Wahid was also invited to join a circle of renewal intellectuals of neo-modernism gathered around an NGO organization, LKIS, and around a pluralistic discussion forum known as Majelis Reboan (The Wednesday Circle, est. 1984).[89] Both of these institutions contributed to the reinforcement of Wahid's ideas on secularization, pluralism, non-sectarianism, inclusivism, and the contextualization of Islam.[90] This would lead to the formulation of his Islamic paradigm called *'pribumisasi Islam'* (indigenization of Islam). Through this paradigm, the traditionalist community found not only a new intellectual weapon to defend its historical religious practices from reformist-modernist criticism, but also a new rationale for the subordination of Islam to the national interest.

Wahid's intellectual ideas partly reflected his genuine commitment to pluralism, the national interest, and democracy, but they were not entirely devoid of political interest. As a man committed to defend the interests of the traditionalist community, he attempted to ease the strained relationship between NU and the authorities and to bring NU along the accommodationist line. He came to see the necessity of accommodationism because of the continuing marginalization of NU politicians from the Islamic party, PPP. The government's imposition of Pancasila as the sole political principle *(azas tunggal)* provided him with a means to draw the NU away from the PPP and to bring it closer to the government. Already in December 1983 he had successfully influenced the NU national meeting in Situbondo (East Java) to accept Pancasila as *azas tunggal* and to return the NU to its original spirit *(khitah)* as a social and religious organization. Like Madjid's slogan 'Islam, yes; Islamic party, no!', this return to the *khitah* is worth considering as a political strategy which used a non-formal political approach to strengthen the NU's bargaining power with the New Order regime. Shortly after the Tandjung Priok massacre on 12 September 1984, Wahid made the controversial decision to invite General L. B. Murdani to visit some NU *pesantrens*. Partly as a result of this friendly move towards the government he was able to be elected as the Chairman of the NU's

executive body *(tanfidziyah)* in December 1984. In 1988, he was also appointed as a Golkar representative in the Working Committee of the MPR.

While maintaining his accommodationist strategy, Wahid was also able to maintain the NU's reputation and his own in the eyes of the community based on his participation in NGO activities and his outspoken championing of pluralism, democracy and human rights. In many cases, however, not all good things went together. His position as the defender of the interests of the traditionalist community drew him towards accommodation with the government, while his position as a free intellectual urged him to speak truth to power. Because of this he became known as the most controversial Muslim intellectual. As the chairman of the largest Muslim organization in the country his renewal ideas made a significant contribution to the impact of the renewal movement.

The hegemony of the renewal discourse in the public sphere, which was made possible by the positive reception of the 'regimes of truth' (the state ideological apparatus and media exposure) in a Foucauldian sense,[91] would finally force Muhammadiyah to support the renewal ideas, although in a more limited way. The acceptance of the renewal ideas within Muhammadiyah came rather late for at least two reasons. As a reformist organization, Muhammadiyah could not easily bury its desire to maintain Islamic purity and authenticity. Moreover, prominent young figures of Muhammadiyah such as Amien Rais and Syafi'i Ma'arif had a close relationship with DDII. Even so, the exposure of these young intellectuals to another epistemic community and the intellectual network had a significant impact on their later intellectual development. This was especially true after Rais and Maarif undertook postgraduate studies in the USA. Both Rais and Maarif finished their PhD programs at the University of Chicago in 1981 and 1982 respectively. During their study at that university, Rais was supervised by three Jewish scholars, one of them being Leonard Binder,[92] while Maarif was supervised by, among others, a prominent liberal (neo-modernist) Pakistani Islamic thinker who also taught Madjid and Fazlur Rahman. Through their encounter with these intellectuals who were promoting liberalism, they began to be more sympathetic to the renewal ideas.

In November 1982 Amien Rais surprised the Indonesian public by his move towards the renewal line. In an interview with *Panji Masyarakat* (No. 376/1982) he rejected the concept of the Islamic state because, according to him, it was not mentioned in the *Qur'an* or the *Sunnah* (Way of the Prophet). Next, he stated he could accept the Pancasila as the state ideology, on the basis that Islam is the supreme ideology and the Pancasila

itself does not contradict Islamic principles. Under the influence of young intellectual figures such as Rais, the Muhammadiyah National Congress in December 1985 accepted Pancasila as its *azas tunggal*. Many Muhammadiyah intellectuals, however, tended to reject the idea of Secularization on the basis that the concept is alien to Islam. The rejection of an Islamic state, in Rais' view, was by no means meant to push for the removal of religious values and guidance from public life. The first principle of *Pancasila*, he argued, implicitly recognizes the indivisibility of religion and public life. This latter view made it possible for him and other Muhammadiyah intellectuals to remain on good terms with activists of the *dakwah* movement. At the same time, this inhibited the further development of his liberal ideas. His renewal ideas were then focused on the rethinking of Islamic legal theories *(fiqh)*, to enable Islam to respond better to the challenges of modern life, and then on the practical reform of the Indonesian political system.

The gestures of Muslim intellectuals and organizations towards the state orthodoxy freed the Muslim intelligentsia in the bureaucracy from the stigma of being against the New Order and helped break the psychological barrier to expressing cultural Islam within bureaucratic settings. Muslim bureaucrats now openly organized communal prayers, religious services and the celebration of Islamic Days. They also established at first small prayer houses *(mushalla)* but then gradually built mosques *(masjid)* near most government offices. Slowly but surely, Muslim bureaucrats dared to express their Islamic identity, expressed through new fashions like using Islamic greetings *(assalamu'alaikum)* and making the pilgrimage to Mecca. A rapprochement between nominal and devout Muslims within the bureaucracy began to take place, as the former were gradually incorporated into the 'house' of cultural Islam. Many nominal Muslim bureaucrats began to learn more about Islam by inviting private Islamic teachers to their own houses with the Soeharto family being a notable example of this phenomenon.[93]

There were some surprising results from these developments as exemplified by the following B. J. Habibie story. Once in the late 1980s, he said, Soeharto led and opened the Cabinet meeting wearing a *peci* (black cap, as an icon of Muslim identity) and reciting *'bismillah'* (a phrase used by Muslims for various occasions and considered an act of piety). Habibie then asked him he had done this, to which Soeharto replied, 'Formerly, we were weak economically. That is why we needed the Catholic lobby for the international capitalist community and why it was difficult for me to express my own Islamic identity. But now we are sufficiently strong to assert our own identity.'[94]

Islamic Youth in the Aftermath of the Reform Movement

The resignation of Soeharto (on 21 May 1998) and Habibi's interregnum brought about a new political opportunity for the Muslim community. Under the free public sphere and political fairness of the so-called 'reform era', the Muslim intelligentsia showed their original diverse nature. Fuelled by a mixture of ideological differences, modernization-driven political pragmatism, elite rivalries, and the sudden explosion of freedom, Muslim groups competed with each other to establish their own political parties. As a result, Muslim politics became more fragmented than it had ever been.

Along the path of this fragmentation, a new generation of the Muslim intelligentsia emerged showing the almost characteristic tendency to diversity. A new generation of *dakwah* activists, led by the fifth generation of Muslim intellectuals but comprised largely of those of the sixth generation (who were mostly born in the 1970s and 1980s), after exposure to the post-modern global conditions became more deeply incorporated into the global Islamic *harakah*. Nevertheless, they were by no means homogenous. Contestation and rivalries occurred between followers of different *harakah* over the difference in *manhaj* (method of reasoning), intellectual networks, and leadership competition. The most influential Indonesian *harakah* was that under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, namely KAMMI and its political party, the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS).

On the other hand, a new generation of PMII (traditionalist student organization) activists, influenced by Abdurrahman Wahid's liberal thinking, experienced an unprecedented degree of liberalization. In parallel with this development, the renewal movement continued under the leadership of young intellectuals from IAIN and NU backgrounds in collaboration with young Islamic-friendly secular intellectuals from secular university backgrounds. At the beginning of the 21st century, these young protagonists of Islamic renewal ideas began to promote the so-called network of liberal Islam (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL). New intellectuals of this movement such as Ulil Abshar-Abdallah, Luthfi Assyaukani and Saiful Muzani in their exposure to the post-modern global condition went deeper than their predecessors in their appreciation of Western liberal-secular values.

Thus, the exposure of young Muslim intelligentsia to post-modern conditions and the deepening globalization at the turn of the new millennium resulted in an antithetical tendency. One extreme gravitated towards Islamic fundamentalism, while the other extreme gravitated towards Western liberalism and secularism. Yet, the majority of Muslim activists continue to accept and to extend the hybridity between different cultural traditions.

The energy of Islamic fundamentalism continued to be checked by the energy of Islamic liberalism. The internal varieties of Indonesian Islam provided a built-in mechanism for Islamic moderation. Under these conditions, the possibility of transcending ineluctable religio-cultural differences, to soften and render them tolerable to civil order, continued to be imaginable.

Conclusion

The process of modernization in the Muslim world, especially in Indonesia, does not necessarily result in secularization, as claimed by the proponents of social Darwinism. It may, in fact, actually enlarge religious pervasiveness. At the same time, this latter tendency does not necessarily lead to Islamic fundamentalism.

For mainstream Indonesian Muslim scholars, Islam is compatible with science and modern rationalism. One can be Muslim and modern at the same time. The reality, however, is not always as such: not all good things go together. Modernization and Islamization seem to have their own logic. As a result, the relationship of both projects has not always been harmonious but rather conflicting. If this is the case, which one should Muslim Youth choose: MODERNIZED Islam or ISLAMIZED modernity? If the choice is the first, the result has been more liberal Muslims. On the other hand, if the choice is the later, the result has been more fundamentalist Muslims. For the greatest bulk of young Muslims, however, the choice has not been 'either or', but rather a cocktail of various cultural traditions.

'The Indonesian (and especially the Javanese) mode of attack,' said Clifford Geertz was 'adaptive, absorbent, pragmatic, and gradualistic, a matter of partial compromises, half-way covenants, and outright evasions. The Islamism which resulted did not even pretend to purity, it pretended to comprehensiveness.'[95]

Notes

1. In March 1968 Soeharto was appointed full president by the (provisional) MPRS, instead of by the newly elected permanent MPR, as the general elections were delayed until mid-1971.
2. H. Feith, 'Repressive-developmentalist regimes in Asia: old strengths, new vulnerabilities', *Prisma*, no. 19 (1980): 39-55.
3. By the early 1990s, the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had expanded by over 450 per cent, and per capita GNP had reached almost $ 1000. Rice yields had almost doubled, and production of most food crops had increased substantially. Rapid industrial growth transformed Indonesia from an economy highly dependent on agriculture in the mid-1960s to one in which the manufacturing sector contributed more to GDP than agriculture in the mid-1990s.
4. H. Hill & J. Mackie, 'Introduction' in *Indonesia's New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation*, ed H. Hill, xix (NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1994). See also Kian Wie Thee, 'The Soeharto Era and After: Stability, Development and Crisis, 1966-2000' in *The Emergence of A National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000*, eds. H. Dick et.al., 196-198 (NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2002).
5. World Bank Report, Indonesia, 1998: 43
6. T.H Hull and G.W. Jones, Demographic Perspectives, in H. Hill (ed.), *Indonesia's New Order* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994), 123 - 178.
7. Hill & Mackie, xxv.
8. For further discussion, see M. Cammarck, 'Indonesia's 1989 religious judicature act: Islamization of Indonesia or Indonesianization of Islam?', *Indonesia*, no. 63 (1997): 143-168.
9. Nurcholish Madjid was a unique person by origin. He was born in the stronghold of the traditionalist Islamic community, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), Jombang (East Java), with his father, Abdul Madjid, belonging to the NU community by religio-cultural affiliation, but remaining a member of *Masjumi* (the biggest modernist Islamic political party) after the NU split. His father's political background made it difficult for him to study in a traditionalist school. Thus, after finishing his primary school plus two years of study in the traditionalist *pesantren*, *Darul 'Ulum*, in 1955 he continued his study at the most prominent modern Islamic boarding school in the country, *Darussalam* (est. 1926), in Ponorogo (East Java), which is commonly known as *'Pesantren Modern Gontor'*.10 In 1961 he left for Jakarta to enter the Jakarta State Islamic Institute (IAIN Syarif Hidajatullah). It was there that he began to encounter influential *Masjumi* and reformist leaders. More importantly, he gained greater access to scientific literature and general knowledge. His encounter with students of diverse academic backgrounds in HMI provided him with a testing ground for strengthening his intellectual capacity.
10. Masjumi is an acronym of *Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* (Consultative Council of Indonesia). Established in 1945, it was the biggest Islamic party along the modernist line banned by the Sukarno regime in 1960.
11. IAIN is an abbreviation for 'Institute Agama Islam Negeri'. There are several of these Islamic institutes cities throughout Indonesia.
12. Ahmad Wahib, *Pergolakan Pemikiran Islam: Catatan Harian Ahmad Wahib* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1981), 40; 149.
13. DDII was established by leaders of Masjumi in 1967, after the refusal of the re-establishment of *Masjumi* by Soeharto regime.

14. Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim, 26 November 1998.
15. Natsir, the grand leader of Masjumi who hailed from Sumatra was a well-known *Persis* intellectual in the 1920s/1930s.
16. *Pandji Masjarakat*, nos. 28, 29, 30; the articles are dated 1 Muharram 1388 H./29 March 1968.
17. The term 'Snouckism' here referred to the architect of the Dutch 'association' policy, C. Snouck Hurgronje.
18. *Liga Indonesia* (p. 39), Quoted in M.K. Hassan, *Contemporary Muslim Religio-Political Thought in Indonesia: The Response to 'New Order Modernization'*, thesis (PhD), Columbia University, USA (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1979), 43.
19. A similar view had actually been expressed by Amien Rais, a former HMI activist. In his article in *Suara Muhammadijah* (No. 16, August 1967) entitled *'Agama, Modernisasi, dan Mahasiswa'* (Religion, Modernization and University Students), among other things, he stated that in an effort to overcome the misery and backwardness of Indonesians, students belonging to the '1966 Generation' had a vital role to play as 'agents of modernization'. Admitting that modernization had 'become a national consensus', he regretted the existence of what he called some selfish elements in Indonesian society who wanted to use the idea of modernization as a bandwagon for particularistic political goals. He then gave the following example (p. 10): 'The PMKRI (the Catholic Students Organization of Indonesia), for instance, in its Members' Deliberating Council held in Bandung last month adopted 'modernization' as its national program. But, in addition to that, it categorically stated that in order to accomplish renewal in Indonesia, the state should not manage matters pertaining to religion. This statement implied insistence on the abolition of the Department of Religion and its divisions...The motive behind PMKRI's attitude is simple; that is, to hit the Muslim community (whose toleration has been excessive) which forms the majority of the population.' For a further discussion of Indonesian Muslims' response to modernization, see Hassan.
20. D.D. Malik & I.S. Ibrahim, *Zaman Baru Islam Indonesia: Pemikiran & Aksi Politik Abdurrahman Wahid*, M. Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, and Jalaluddin Rakhmat, (Bandung: Zaman Wacana Muda, 1998), 125. See also Wahib, 156.
21. Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim, 26 November 1998.
22. *Ibid.*
23. For further discussion of this issue, see Wahib, 144 - 193.
24. A. M. Luthfi, interview, 3 September 1998. Among the early recruits were Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Ahmad Sadaly and A.M. Luthfi (of ITB), Endang Saefuddin Anshari and Rudy Sjarif (of Padjadjaran University), Jusuf Amir Feisal (of IKIP Bandung), Daud Ali, Djurnalis Alí and Ichtijanto (of UI), A. M. Saefuddin and Soleh Widodo (of IPB), Sahirul Alim and Amien Rais (of UGM), Rofiq Anwar (of Diponegoro University), Daldiri Mangundiwirdjo, and Fuad Amsjari (of Airlangga University), Gadin Hakim, Bachtiar Fanani Lubis and Faiz Albar (of North Sumatra University).
25. Interview with Utomo Dananjaya (one of Madjid's closest friends), 29 November 2000.
26. Wahib, 160-1.
27. Interview with Utomo Dananjaya, 29 November 2000.
28. Wahib, 161.
39. *Ibid.*

30. The congress commissioned Nurcholish Madjid, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Endang Saifuddin Anshari and Sakib Mahmud to perfect the NDP draft that had been prepared by PB HMI. In fact, it was Madjid who contributed a larger share of ideas to the final version of the NDP. See (Sitompul 2002: 246).
31. For the content of the NDP, see A. Sitompul, *Menyatu Dengan Umat, Menyatu dengan Bangsa: Pemikiran Keislaman-Keindonesiaan HMI (1947-1997)* (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2002), 323-508.
32. Interview with Nurcholish Madjid, 18 September 1998. Later in 1983, Madjid and Roem continued their discussions about the idea of an Islamic state through letters between Jakarta and Chicago, as Madjid at this time was a graduate student at the University of Chicago. In the end, they both agreed that the idea of an Islamic state was alien to Islamic scriptures. See A. E. Santoso, ed., *Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem* (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1997).
33. Wahib, 165-6.
34. Interview with Utomo Dananjaya, 7 December 2000.
35. See Ahmad Sadri's *Max Weber's Sociology of Intellectuals* (1992: 72).
36. Bernhard Giesen, 1998, *Intellectuals and the Nation: Collective Identity in a German Axial Age*, trans. N. Levis & A. Weisz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 43.
37. J.L. Lemke, *Textual Politics: Discourse and Social Dynamics*, (London: Taylor & Francis, 1995), 9.
38. Sarekat Islam (SI) is a proto-nationalist Muslim association, established in 1912.
39. For a further discussion of the polemics on Madjid's renewal ideas, see Hassan, 133-217. See also E.S Anshari, *Kritik atas Faham dan Gerakan "Pembaharuan" Dr. Nurcholish Madjid* (Bandung: Bulan Sabit, 1973); and H.M Rasjidi, *Sekularisasi dalam Persoalan Lagi* (Jakarta, Jajasan Bangkit, 1972).
40. Wahib, 166.
41. R. Eyerman & A. Jamison, *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), 23-29.
42. The term 'independent mosques' here refers to the mosques that were not funded and controlled by government authorities and also not directly attached to any major Islamic organization.
43. The mosque of the North Sumatra University, known later as *Masjid Dakwah*, was the only campus mosque to be built in the 1950s. At the very beginning of its establishment in 1952/53, however, only ritual and community activities were carried out from the mosque. Interview with Bachtiar Fanani Lubis, 11 November 2000.
44. Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim, 26 November 1998 and the public relations officer of the Salman mosque, Budi Prayitno, 13 December 2000.
45. Interview with Adian Husaini, former Al-Ghifari activist, 23 May 2001.
46. PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, est. 1947) is a union of Indonesian High School Students along the modernist-reformist line which has been a junior partner of HMI.
47. Interview with Chairil Anwar, an early activist of the UGM *(Shalahuddin)* mosque 11 November 2000); Muhammad Nuh, an early activist of the ITS *(Manarul Ilmi)* mosque, 11 November 2000; and Muchtar Abbas, an early activist of the ITB *(Salman)* mosque, 29 November 2000.
48. The term 'movement intellectual' here is borrowed from Ron Eyerman, and refers to an intellectual of a particular social movement. See Eyerman & Jamison, 94-119.

49. The principal instructors of LMD were Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Endang Saifuddin Anshari, Miftah Faridl, and Sakib Mahmud. All of them were former leaders of the HMI's dakwah institute, LDMI.
50. Interview with Muchtar Abbas, 29 November 2000.
51. Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim, 26 November 1998.
52. A.S. Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 71.
53. For a more detailed description of the LMD, see R. Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movement among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia*, thesis (Masters)—the Australian National University, Canberra, 1995; H.K. Dipojono, 'Bang Imad yang saya kenal' in *Bang 'Imad: Pemikiran dan Gerakan Dakwahnya*, eds J. Asshiddiqie et.al., 215-221 (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002); and H. Radjasa, 'Bang Imad, guru spiritual dan intelektual' in *Bang 'Imad: Pemikiran dan Gerakan Dakwahnya*, eds J. Asshiddiqie et.al., 212-214 (Jakarta, Gema Insani Press, 2002).
54. Among prominent figures of the following decades who had joined this training were Hatta Radjasa (Secretary General of PAN and Minister of Research and Technology in the Megawati Cabinet), Al-Hilal Al-Hamdi (Minister of Manpower in the Abdurrahman Wahid Cabinet), M. S. Ka'ban (Secretary General of the PBB), Didin Hafiduddin (venerable leader of the *tarbiyah* [dakwah] movement), Mutammimul Ula (leader of the Justice Party, PK/S), Hermawan K. Dipojono (Executive Director of the Salman Foundation in the early 2000s), Muchtar Abbas (a well-known NGO activist) and Faisal Basri (a leading economic analyst). For a complete account, see the Salman Database (2001).
55. Some of the well-known figures of the *remaja masjid* movement were Toto Tasmara (Cut Meutiah), Jimly Asshiddiqie (Al-Azhar), Faisal Motik (Sunda Kelapa) and Bambang Pranowo (Istiqomah).
56. BKPRMI stands for *Badan Koordinasi Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid Indonesia.*
57. For the history and development of the BKPRMI, see DPP-BKPRMI (2000).
58. T. Abdullah, 'The formation of a new paradigm: a sketch on contemporary Islamic discourse' in *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought*, ed M. R. Woodward, 59 (Arizona: Arizona State University [Program for Southeast Asian Studies], 1996).
59. R.W. Bulliet, *Islam: The View from the Edge* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 202.
60. S.P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 97.
61. E. Gellner, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion* (London: Routledge, 1992), 19.
62. Bulliet, 204
63. N.J Tampi, 'Trend bacaan 1980-an: cermin meningkatnya telaah keagamaan', a working paper, Bagian Dokumentasi dan Informasi Majalah *Tempo*, Jakarta (1987).
64. See Gellner.
65. M. Abaza, *Pendidikan Islam dan Pergeseran Orientasi: Studi Kasus Alumni Al-Azhar* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1999), 86-92.
66. The translator was A. Mu'thi Nurdin.
67. All Islamic *harakah* share a common denominator in terms of their obsession with the implementation of the *syariah*. They differ from each other, however, on the method *(manhaj)* to achieve this goal. Some consider a cultural or non-political approach as the most effective means, while others consider a political approach the most effective. Those who favor a political approach also differ from each other

on the political system as the space for the implementation of *syariah*. The Brotherhood tolerates representative democracy within the boundary of the nation-state, while *Hizbut Tahrir* rejects representative democracy and the nation-state and is obsessed with the re-creation of the *khalifah* (International Islamic state). This difference in *manhaj* often leads to internal Islamic disputes among members of different *harakah*.

68. Interview with Mutammimul Ula, an early Indonesian follower of the Brotherhood, 3 December 2003).
69. Translated by A. Rakhman Zainuddin, the main message of this book is that only Islamic authenticity can provide authentic guidance.
70. The situation changed in the late 1990s when the *Salafi* movement controlled the institution.
71. Ridho happened to be an activist of PII and HMI.
72. In the 1990s these three activists would become leading figures of the *tarbiyah*-party, *Partai Keadilan* (Justice Party).
73. Interview with Mutammimul Ula, 3 December 2003.
74. Damanik, 96
75. *Ibid.*, 95
76. Abaza, 95-6; 117.
77. The influence of Shi'ah teaching among circles of Indonesian Muslims was countered by the DDII which developed a strong network with the Saudi Arabia-dominated Muslim World League. Saudi Arabia was hostile theologically and politically to the influence of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the DDII expressed similar apprehension about a possible increase in Shi'ah followers in Indonesia.
78. The term *'rausyan fikr'* became popular among Indonesian Islamic activists following the translation of Syari'ati's work, *'Ideologi Kaum Intelektual: Suatu Wawasan'*, by the publisher Mizan in 1984.
79. Interview with Fahri Hamzah, 15 August 1998.
80. For the history of LDK, see Y.S. Hadi, *Masjid Kampus untuk Ummat & Bangsa: Masjid Aricf Rahman Hakim UI* (Jakarta, Masjid ARH UI & LKB-Nusantara, 2000); and A. Rahmat & M. Najib, *Gerakan Perlawanan dari Masjid Kampus* (Surakarta: Purimedia, 2001).
81. For a further discussion on the development of the *tarbiyah* movement in the 1990s, see Hadi (2000), Rahmat & Najib (2001) and Damanik (2002).
82. Interview with Nurcholish Madjid (18/09/1998).
83. *Bang 'Imad: Pemikiran dan Gerakan Dakwahnya*, 34.
84. During his study at the University of Chicago, Madjid was supervised by, among others, the prominent Pakistani liberal ('neo-modernist') Islamic thinker, Fazlur Rahman.

85 Ruth McVey, (1989: 208).

88 Rasjidi got his PhD from Sorbonne University (France) in 1956; Mukti Ali and Anton Timur Jaelani got their Masters from McGill University in 1957 and 1959 respectively; Harun Nasution got his PhD from McGill University in 1968. Kafrawi got his Masters from McGill University in 1969.

87 Interview with Utomo Dananjaya, one of the most enthusiastic supporters of renewal ideas, 29 November 2000.

88 Interview with Dawam Rahardjo, 10 September 1998; and Adi Sasono, 2 September 1998.

89 *Majelis Reboan* was an experiment to develop an open and pluralistic 'public sphere' in situations of authoritarian control. Beginning as an informal discussion

forum of renewal intellectuals with HMI and PII background, such as Nurcholish Madjid, Utomo Dananjaya, Eky Sjahruddin, and Usep Fathuddin, participation in the *Majelis Reboan* was extended to involve intellectuals of diverse backgrounds, including non-Muslim intellectuals such as Franz Magnis Suseno and Mudji Sutrisno (Catholics) and Victor Tanja (a Protestant).

90 Interview with Nurcholish Madjid, 18 September 1998) and Utomo Dananjaya 29 November 2000).

91 For a further explanation of the term 'regimes of truth', see M. Foucault, *Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, trans C. Gordon et.al. (New York: Pantheon Random House, 1980), 12.

92 Leonard Binder is an expert in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies who has written much about Islam. His most important book is *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies* (1988). Interview with Amien Rais, 17 September 2003.

93 Among well-known religious gurus of Socharto's family were Qosim Nurseha and Quraisy Shihab.

94 Habibie told this story to leaders of ICMI's youth forum (MASIKA) on 5 May 1998. Interview with the then Chairman of Masika, A. Hamid, 29 August 1998.

95 Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1971), 16.

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