


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PARTAI Keadilan Sejahtera:
A MAWDUDIAN-MELIORIST VISION
OF ISLAMISM IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA

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Hamdan Juhannis

Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam: A South Sulawesi Formalist Islamic Movement

Abstract: *Tulisan ini mengulas tentang kemunculan KPPSI (Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam) yang secara intens memperjuangkan penerapan syariat Islam di Sulawesi Selatan. Artikel ini memperlihatkan bahwa gerakan formalisasi syariat Islam menjadi bagian dari upaya para aktifis Islam di Sulawesi Selatan untuk memberi kontribusi terhadap perbaikan kehidupan umat Islam pasca reformasi yang dihubungkan dengan dinamika lokal di wilayah tersebut. Secara khusus, artikel ini melihat bahwa timbul kembalinya Islamisme dan juga hubungan sejarah antara KPPSI dan Darul Islam (DI), sebuah gerakan sosial keagamaan yang sempat berkembang di Sulawesi Selatan pada kurun tahun 1950. Ini dicitrakan dengan munculnya aspek romantisme Darul Islam, misalnya pada figur Abdul Aziz Kahar, anak Kahar Muzakkar seorang pemimpin kharismatik yang identik dengan Darul Islam.*

Artikel ini secara cermat memperlihatkan pula bahwa sebagai sebuah gerakan sosial baru, KPPSI tidak serta merta terkait dengan ideologi DI tadi. Apa yang ditawarkan oleh KPPSI sebenarnya memberikan penekanan yang lebih besar terhadap pentingnya memperkenalkan Islam sebagai ideologi alternatif dalam mengatasi krisis moral di Sulawesi Selatan, dalam aspek yang terakhir ini merupakan pemicu sebenarnya bagi kemunculan gerakan ini.

Harus digarisbawahi bahwa KPPSI semenjak awalnya tidak bersifat monolitik karena ia menjadi wadah bagi berbagai elemen aktifisme bagi perjuangan formalisasi Islam dalam kehidupan politik pasca Darul Islam di propinsi ini. Karena itu, pandangan-pandangan yang muncul mere-

spion berbagai tema akan terlihat beragam, dari yang sempit maupun moderat.

Lebih jauh, artikel ini secara seimbang menyuarakan pandangan dan argumentasi dari berbagai elemen-elemen masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan yang kurang sependapat dengan upaya formalisasi syariat Islam baik dari kalangan masyarakat Muslim sendiri maupun non-Muslim. Kekhawatiran kelompok ini tentu beralasan mengingat munculnya gejala dari kelompok yang bergabung dengan KPPSI yang dilihatnya cenderung untuk menafsirkan secara sempit dari syariat dan memaksakan penerapannya secara formal dalam kehidupan masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan yang plural dan heterogen. *Secara khusus, kalangan non Muslim, seperti umat Kristen misalnya, melihat bahwa opsi formalisasi syariat Islam di Sulawesi Selatan tentu akan memiliki imbas bagi jaminan kebebasan kehidupan keberagaman termasuk kebebasan dalam menjalankan ritual agama mereka.

Secara substansial, artikel ini menjelaskan model dan target gerakan KPPSI yakni bahwa sebagai organisasi yang berwujud 'komite', maka gerakan ini akan dengan sendirinya bubar jika upaya penegakan syariat Islam secara formal telah terwujud, maka dengan sendirinya dibubarkan. Targetnya adalah memperjuangkan Otonomi Khusus sebagai rumah politik atau payung politik bagi formalisasi syariat di Sulawesi Selatan. Lebih jauh, artikel ini juga memotret dinamika perkembangan internal KPPSI yang sebelumnya terlihat eksklusif, kurang toleran menjadi gerakan yang cenderung akomodatif dan kreatif. Pergeseran ini terlihat dari model pengerahan massa yang menjadi ciri utama KPPSI pada satu tahun pertama keberadaannya kepada pengerahan konseptualisasi strategi perjuangan pada tahun tahun berikutnya. Dalam konteks ini, terlihat penggalangan kanal sosial dan politik yang lebih substantif daripada sekedar memaksakan formalisasi melalui jalur perjuangan demonstrasi di jalan semata. Karena itu, pada gilirannya penekanan perjuangan mereka yang tidak lagi menekankan pada formalisasi hukum pidana Islam, tetapi juga aspek hukum yang lain. Namun pada sisi lain, pendekatan kepada Pemerintah Daerah dan Pusat secara intensif terus dilakukan untuk mendukung Peraturan Daerah (Perda) yang lebih Islami. Upaya ini tentu diharapkan mampu menambah ekseptansi gerakan ini bagi kalangan masyarakat sendiri maupun elemen pemerintah.

Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam: A South Sulawesi Formalist Islamic Movement

الخلاصة: يتناول هذا البحث على ظهور هيئة استعدادية لتطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية التي تبذل جهدا مكثفا لتطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية في سولاويسي الجنوبية. ويبين لنا أن حركة لتعميم الشريعة الإسلامية أصبحت جزء لا يتجزأ من أعمال النشاط الإسلامي فيها الذين يقدمون مساهمة في إصلاح الحياة الاجتماعية عند المسلمين بعد عصر الإصلاح في البلاد الذي يربط بدناميكية المحلية في هذه المنطقة. ويرى بالتحديد العلاقة بين ظهور الطموحات الإسلامية لمرّة ثانية من ناحية وبين الهيئة الاستعدادية وحركة دار الإسلام من ناحية أخرى التي هي حركة اجتماعية دينية انتشرت عام ١٩٥٠ في منطقة سولاويسي الجنوبية. ويربط ظهور هذه الحركة بشخصية "عبد العزيز قهار" وهو ابن القائد العظيم "قهار مذكر" الذي كان ممثلا لحركة دار الإسلام.

هذا البحث يصور لنا أن الهيئة الاستعدادية كحركة اجتماعية جديدة لم ترتبط مباشرة بمبادئ حركة دار الإسلام، لكن تهتم اهتماما كبيرا بأهمية تعريف الإسلام كبديل لمواجهة الأزمة الأخلاقية في المنطقة ويبدو أنها من أسباب حقيقي لظهور هذه الهيئة.

جدير بالذكر أن الهيئة الاستعدادية منذ إنشائها لم تكن تنظيمة انفرادية، بل تنضم إليها مجموعة من العناصر الناشطة من أجل

الكفاح على تعميم الإسلام من خلال الحياة السياسية بعد عصر حركة دار الإسلام، لذلك نجد أن ردود الفعل على هذه الهيئة تنوع ابتداء من النظرة الضيقة حتى النظرة المعتدلة.

يقدم البحث على آراء عناصر مختلفة من المجتمع السولاويسي سواء كانوا مسلمين أم غيرهم الذين لم يتفوقوا على جهود هيئة استعدادية لتطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية. والشعور بالقلق عند هؤلاء يبدو له مبرر لأن أنصار الهيئة يميلون إلى التفسير الضيق للشريعة الإسلامية ويطبقونها بالقوة الإجبارية داخل المجتمع الذي يتسم بالتعددية الدينية. ويرى الناس من الأديان الأخرى مثل النصراني أن تطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية سيؤثر سلبية على حرية التدين والعبادة لغير المسلمين في سولاويسي الجنوبية .

يبين من ناحية مضمونية شكلا تنظيميا وأهدافا للهيئة، وتمثل هذه التنظيمية بشكل "كوميّتي" (هيئة) أى مؤقتة، وأنها ستنتهي مهمتها تلقائيا بمجرد تحقق تطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية رسميا في المنطقة. وأما غايتها فهي بذل الجهود من أجل الحصول على سلطة محلية خاصة لتستطيع من خلالها على تعميم الشريعة الإسلامية في سولاويسي الجنوبية . وفي النظرة أكثر تفصيلا، يصور لنا البحث صورة لتطور الهيئة من داخلها حيث تتحول نظرتها من الأفق الضيق وقليل التسامح إلى الموقف المائل إلى التعاون مع الغير والمبادرة. هذا يظهر في تحركاتها التي كانت في السنة الأولى من تأسيسها تميزت بطريقتها في تحريك الناس إلى الشوارع، وأما في السنة الثانية فتتسم بنشر أفكارها الاستراتيجية. ومن هذا المنطلق، قامت الهيئة بمحاولات لكسب التأييدات لها من قبل القنوات الاجتماعية والسياسية بدلا من تحريك أنصارها للمظاهرات في الشوارع. من هنا نجد أن اهتمامها ليس فقط بتعميم الشريعة الإسلامية، بل أيضا بالمجالات القانونية الأخرى. بجانب جهودها المتواصلة في إشادة الحكومة المركزية والمحلية لإصدار القوانين واللائحة المتفقة مع الإسلام. وتأمل هذه الجهود طبعا للحصول على القبول المتزايد عليها من قبل المجتمع والحكومة.

Formalist Islam can be defined as the belief that Islam must not be separated from state affairs and that Muslims must struggle to ensure that Islam is the guiding theme in politics and governance. My motivation for employing the term 'formalist Islam' in this thesis is to avoid the pejorative connotation of many existing terms already available to denote Islamic movements whose central tenets are of a political nature, and are often labelled violent, extreme, radical, or fundamentalist. I use the term formalist Islam in reference to an Islamic ideology which may include fundamentalist ideas without actually referring to it as 'fundamentalism'. Others may prefer to call it revivalism,¹ integralism,² Islamic identity³ and confessionalized Islam,⁴ all of which do not carry negative connotations.

There are, furthermore, several conceptual considerations in employing this term. The term 'Islamic fundamentalism' itself is often "loosely and inaccurately"⁵ defined and "the wide diversity of individuals and groups associated with Islamic fundamentalism indicates that it is not a monolithic movement."⁶ The definition of fundamentalism may apply to one Islamic group or movement, but not to another. For example, a generalisation that fundamentalists are primarily political rather than religio-intellectual movements⁷ may not be relevant in the Indonesian case. Hizbut Tahrir (Ar. H{izb 'I-Tahr{ir}⁸ Indonesia (HTI), for example, eschews formal political means in achieving its objectives.

What's more, generalisations of 'fundamentalism' made by experts are often blurred. For example, Mahmud A. Faksh has put forward some major themes of fundamentalism, including the fusion of religion, politics and Islamic universalism.⁹ The inapplicability of this term is evident when it is related to other phenomena of Islam in Indonesia. Should Islamic political parties obsessed with the hope that an Islamic state will one day become a reality – such as Masyumi, which was banned in 1960, and the present Islamic political parties like Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Social Justice Party, PKS) and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP) – be called fundamentalist? Looking at the moderate characters of the leading figures of the parties, I would be inclined to not label them as fundamentalists. Therefore, my preference for 'formalist' Islam over 'fundamentalism' is to emphasise the varied approaches of Islamic movements seeking to institutionalise Islam in state affairs.

My further preference for employing the term 'formalist Islam' is based on the notion that in many discourses on fundamentalism, Islam contradicts nationalist principles. On the contrary, many so-called 'fundamentalist' movements are often closely attached to nationalist activities. The history of nation building in many Muslim countries has witnessed the participation of many Muslim nationalists, while on the other hand, they have also struggled to establish an Islamic state. For example, in the first 20 years of Indonesia's independence we witnessed the efforts of Muslim nationalists to propose Islam as the basis of the state and at the same time, to counter un-Islamic ideologies, such as communism.¹⁰ They were more formalist Muslim-nationalists committed to formalising Islam as the ideology of the state. Therefore, Muslim formalists may not necessarily be opposed to nationalism, since they are also Muslim nationalists.

Another important reason to speak of formalist Islam in this thesis is its wider coverage of models of Islamic movements, ranging from aspects identified as fundamentalism up to other terms to characterise an Islamist movement. So, the struggle for formalist Islam may aim for a complete change in Muslim society towards an Islamic state. However, some other Islamic formalist activists often struggle for the objective of gradual change within Muslim society. We may have revolutionary or evolutionary models. Further nuances are also possible: some of the activists of Islamic formalism do not see their target as being to create an Islamic state but the incorporation of the *syariat* into secular state law, in which case they usually struggle through constitutional, not revolutionary means.

'Confessionalized' Islam, mentioned above, describes the efforts of Muslims in Indonesia to bring Islam into the public sphere. This term contrasts with van Nieuwhuijze's 'deconfessionalization' of Muslim concepts in post-colonial Indonesia by offering the case of 'Pancasila' and the operations of the Department of Religious Affairs as examples of how Islam has been 'deconfessionalized'. In these, Islam was acknowledged not through its own clear symbols but through the existence of an apparent secular ideology and organisation.¹¹ 'Confessionalized' Islam, on the other hand, is the term which designates the ways in which Islam is openly acknowledged in political and social symbols. However, since this term tends to be related to a symbolic acknowledgement of Islam only, it is not as useful. Again, the term formalist Islam refers to groups of Muslims in Indonesia for whom there must be more than symbols; they want Islamic teachings to be formally imple-

mented in society, such as in criminal law. Another term, such as 'Islamic integralism', which places more focus on the struggle to integrate religion and state is also useful. However, this term is yet to gain wide currency in discussing Indonesian Islam.

Despite my preference for 'formalist Islam' over 'fundamentalism', I do not mean to imply that movements of formalist Islam avoid expressions of intolerance. The case of Islamic insurgencies in many parts of Indonesia from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s shows how formalism was often associated with violence. Furthermore, the paramilitary wings of contemporary formalist Islamic groups also often resort to violence. However, this is not necessarily true of all formalist Islamic groups.

Formalist Islam does not solely signify the struggle to institute Islam at the national level but can also refer to a particular community within a state that is fighting to form an Islamic territory, whether through insurgency or through a constitutional struggle. It can also be seen in the efforts of Muslim politicians to establish Islamic political parties in which the ideological basis is Islam without necessarily calling for an Islamic state. Islamic formalism can even be related to the more moderate groups of Muslim activists who struggle for Islamic law only as a part of state law.

These various forms of formalist Islam are more popular in contemporary Indonesian Islamic developments, and therefore this term is more applicable. Thus the history of Indonesian Muslims who struggle for the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter¹² in the national constitution and the contemporary struggle for implementing *syariat* in certain regions (as already in place in Aceh, with its Muslim governor and *mahkamah syariat* (Ar. *mahkamah sharī'ah*, Islamic Law Court) may simply be called formalist Islam.

Islam in South Sulawesi has a long and colourful history: From the earliest days of Islamization in South Sulawesi in the early seventeenth century, the Islamic kingdoms, Islam under Dutch rule, Islam under Japanese occupation, and the rise of Darul Islam (DI) in the middle of the 20th century. The phenomenon of formalist Islam in South Sulawesi is a phenomenon of Islamic modernism. This is certainly true for KPPSI; it was the global impact of Islamic modernism at the beginning of the twentieth century that significantly shaped strong formalist Islamic idealism and later shaped the movement. KPPSI is an excellent example of how one aspect of regional Islam, formalism, has always been shaped by aspects of the history of the Islamic community itself.

The Road to KPPSI's Establishment

In South Sulawesi, shortly before the fall of Soeharto, some Muslims saw that considerable potential existed for radical change in Indonesia. Those who picked up on this potential included student activists, who had long been growing increasingly fed up with the 'stagnant' situation brought about by the New Order's policies. It may be argued that Muslims in South Sulawesi responded to the mood for change by offering an alternative vision aimed at relieving the nation's suffering, caused by the multi-dimensional crisis of the New Order government which led to its fall in 1998.

Many Muslim activists in South Sulawesi believed that the New Order had failed to improve the lives of the Indonesian people. Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar argues that the state failed to meet the people's need in every respect: politically, economically, and culturally. Furthermore, he detailed the New Order's failure by pointing out the failure of law enforcement, the economic crisis, the hegemony of secular and western culture, the arrest of many Muslims, and the widespread nature of corrupt practices.¹³ Ahmad Ali, a law professor at the University of Hasanuddin and well-known Muslim intellectual states:

The failure of the New Order was mainly caused by the failure of its national law to defend the integrity of the nation which was endemic with corruption, nepotism and collusion...¹⁴

Aziz's and Ali's criticism of the New Order's corrupt regime can be seen as a relevant argument in the context of the need for an Islamic form of special autonomy in South Sulawesi. However, this kind of argument is risky. If, for example, such special autonomy also failed to deliver good governance, would it be reasonable to blame Islamic teachings? This is an important question of which to be aware, since the argument of these formalists is that the failure of the New Order was mainly because Islamic teachings were not well-implemented in the Muslim community.

Besides the perceived failure of secular law, some Muslim activists also argued that Islam struggled culturally during the New Order regime. Muslim intellectual Abdurrahman A. Basalamah criticised what he saw as the achievement of cultural Islam, saying that while Islamic ceremonies were taking place, the substance of Islam was neglected:

At *maulid* [Ar. *maulid*, the Prophet Muhammad's birthday] celebrations, Muslims celebrate the moment everywhere, but what do we gain from the ritual other than eggs [eggs are freely given out, decorated and coloured]? This tradition does not contribute to the Islamic enlightenment.¹⁵

Jalaluddin Rahman, another local Muslim intellectual, also points out the cultural struggles of Islam:

Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama are mainstream mass Muslim organisations which have struggled for Islamization through cultural ways and did not achieve any great results. These organisations have fought for cultural Islamization in Indonesia for more than 50 years but the result is no more than what we see today. Islam has only changed the numbers of its adherents; the values of Islam are not well actualised.

... The endemic corruption among Muslim people in the bureaucracy and criminality in society are part of the failure of cultural Islam. The problem of the cultural method is that Islamic values were only practised beyond the state, while certain Islamic teachings had to be reinforced by the state; therefore, to make Islamic law effective it has to be formally implemented, a situation in contrast to the New Order regime's interference in the enforcement of the law through the use of formal regulations.¹⁶

However, both Basalamah's and Rahman's criticism of cultural Islam appear to neglect the fact that many Islamic activists in Indonesia, including formalist activists in South Sulawesi, also had a background in such organizations as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Furthermore, Basalamah and Rahman seem not to be aware of the fact that the emergence of cultural Islam in contemporary Indonesian Islamic history was the response of Muslim thinkers who recognised the failure of the political Islam that was active prior to the Soeharto regime (1966).¹⁷ If cultural Islam failed in the New Order, what can these Islamists say for the performance of political Islam before the Soeharto regime in its effort to create good governance? One may say that there was not much success, if not an outright failure.

The emergent belief in the need to implement Islamic law in South Sulawesi was further triggered by broader political events in the country. Soon after the reformation era began, the Habibie government (Soeharto's successor) introduced decentralisation plans in which local government would have greater political and economic autonomy to build and improve their own local areas. Islamic law activists considered this policy to be an effective way of facilitating their participation in local and regional processes. They, therefore, hoped to be able to bring about change in local areas, despite the fact that local autonomy regulations did not in-

clude religion as an area to be managed by local government.¹⁸ This is related to what Morrell states:

Rebuilding local cultures is a means of overcoming the weakening of the *daerah* (regional communities), which occurred during the Soeharto years, when members of those communities had little control over their own affairs, and were permitted only limited political participation.¹⁹

Although Morrell seems to refer to local cultures more as regional identities, among Islamists, they saw that South Sulawesi might not be separated from Islamic culture. Therefore, when they recognized the importance of Islamism in the post-Soeharto era, they saw it as part of their efforts to rebuild their local culture. In addition to this, another political event that provided some impetus to the push for Islamic law in South Sulawesi was the autonomy given to Aceh to implement Islamic law through the Special Autonomy Regulation No. 18 2001.²⁰

To realise the perceived need for a vehicle for the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi, a mass organisation called Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah, (Islamic Brotherhood Forum, FUI) was formed. This body was led by Basalamah, who had long been known as a formalist Muslim. The fall of Soeharto and the emergence of the reformation era also encouraged the Forum to enhance dialogue among Muslim activists to discuss possible steps to be taken in response to this radical change. Through dialogue, a perception emerged among local Islamists of the need to implement Islamic law. These Muslim activists thought that now was the time to offer the formal implementation of Islamic law as the best solution for the multidimensional crisis that the country faced.²¹ According to them, the enforcement of Islamic principles could solve the corruption that plagued the government and bureaucracy, the corruption of the legal system, and the degradation of morality caused by uncontrolled modernisation and globalisation.²²

The efforts of these Muslim activists and thinkers to implement Islamic law began, to some extent, to spread throughout the wider Muslim community. Furthermore, the newly established FUI forum included activists from Islamic mass-organisations, and not only from pro-formalist Islamic organisations, but also from mainstream Islamic organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah.²³ FUI activists in 1999 created a committee called Komite Persiapan Pembentukan Syariat Islam (Preparatory Committee for Uphold-

ing Islamic Law, KPPSI) with the express purpose of implementing Islamic law.²⁴ This small committee was described by Kalmuddin, the vice secretary of KPPSI, as part of the long dialogue required to bring about the formal implementation of Islamic law. Kalmuddin stated that the discussions even touched on the issue of a model for the implementation of Islamic law. Discussions on making an effort to support an Islamic political party that had a program of implementing formalist Islamic law also emerged. According to Kalmuddin, this discourse was strengthened by the idea that forming or supporting a political party would make the movement more inclusive, because the supporters of formalised *syariat* from secular parties or other elements of society could also be embraced.²⁵ Furthermore, he stated that existing political parties were not attractive as they did not gain sufficient votes for parliamentary seats.²⁶ This is in line with the view of Jamaluddin Amien, the prominent leader of Muhammadiyah, who said that the Islamic *syariat* movement had to be formulated to include all political and social elements.²⁷

These Muslim activists intensified their efforts to create an Islamic formalist movement. On May 28, 2000 FUI conducted an open forum on Islamic law. The aim of the dialogue was to strengthen the commitment of *syariat* activists to struggle for the formal implementation of Islamic law. This dialogue was an important phase in the struggle for Islamic formalism in South Sulawesi. First, these activists brought together Muslim intellectuals and figures from various areas to discuss the significance of establishing Islamic law. Tuan Guru Haji Abd. Hadi Bin Haji Awang, the former Chief Minister of Trengganu (in Malaysia) and the current president of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), offered the model of political Islam in Malaysia through the example of the PAS victory in Trengganu; Mattulada, the well known Muslim anthropologist and historian, discussed the historical perspectives that supported the need for Muslim people in South Sulawesi to implement Islamic law; Ahmad Ali emphasised the importance of formalising Islamic teachings from a legal viewpoint; Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, an economist and chair of the UMI Foundation, talked about the nature of Islamic teaching from an economic perspective; and Husein Umar, General Secretary of DDII, focused on the political aspects of Islamic teachings.²⁸

A possible criticism of the dialogue among these figures is that it represented much more of an effort to strengthen the ideas of the Islamists, rather than looking at the feasibility of implementing Islamic law in South Sulawesi. Most of these people were known to be pro-formalist Islam. Even Mattulada and Ahmad Ali, despite being known as Muslim intellectuals, were known to be in favour of formalist Islam. If these activists had wanted to be more objective in the dialogue and therefore more genuinely inclusive, they would have done better to invite intellectuals such as Qasim Mathar and Hamka Haq, who were well known opponents of Islamic formalism. It may have been feared that the participation of these intellectuals in the dialogue might have caused too much dissent, which would have blurred the perception of formalist Islam among the dialogue participants.

Despite this criticism, the open dialogue resulted in a recommendation that strengthened the importance of enforcing formalist Islamic law in South Sulawesi. The recommendation stated that "Every social problem faced by Muslim peoples was mainly caused by their having left Islamic principles."²⁹ The recommendation added:

It should be realised that today saw the beginning of the setting into motion the enforcement of Islamic law and an effort to actualise it through the conduct of the Kongres Umat Islam Sulawesi Selatan [South Sulawesi Islamic Community Congress].³⁰

The Kongres Umat Islam was conducted in October 2000 and KPPSI was formally established.³¹ For Islamic law activists in South Sulawesi, the emergence of KPPSI in South Sulawesi could be seen within the framework of the long journey of Islam and the nation state. Abdul Aziz Kahar stated:

The phenomenon of KPPSI is a variant of the long dialogue between nationalism and Islam which has taken place in South Sulawesi. It is the result of the effort of some local activists to employ formalist Islamic teachings in national affairs. It is a meeting point of the long logical seeking between national politics and Islamic politics.³²

Jalaluddin suggested that KPPSI and the idea of formalised Islamic *syariat* owed their launch to a democratic sphere which created the opportunity to express constructive ideas to address the crisis faced by the nation. He stated, therefore that Indonesian people should embrace and appreciate this democratic sphere.³³ However, this statement would appear to be overly idealistic if

applied to many other Muslims in South Sulawesi. As will be seen in the next chapter, many activists and activities of KPPSI are stigmatised as being undemocratic.

Inside KPPSI: Factions and Worldviews

The key figures in KPPSI are a diverse group. The movement has been coloured by figures from different backgrounds that, in turn, have shaped their worldview. It is important to recognise the various factions within KPPSI in order to understand that this formalist Islamic movement is not monolithic. Furthermore, it was through the diverse nature of the people involved that the movement was able to strengthen its efforts to avoid being labelled 'fundamentalist'.

This section attempts to group KPPSI activists according to their ideological orientations. The ideological groupings of activists were determined by external factors, such as their educational backgrounds, which considerably shaped their worldview. The figures included in this discussion are those who have a strongly formalist orientation, some with intimidating qualities, to moderate factions, and even to those who were associated with DI. The four factions discussed here are: young formalist constitutionalist, Laskar Jundullah, old Islamist, and moderate wings.

The young formalist constitutionalist group are figures found mainly in the Executive Body of KPPSI. This is the group that, due to the vocal nature of promoting its ideas, has been most commonly associated with KPPSI. These leaders applied an open approach to voicing their demands for the implementation of *syariat*, even calling for the implementation of Islamic law without further explanation of the nature of Islamic law itself. Their ability to voice their demands in an articulate manner was largely due to their background as Islamic activists. This grouping is made up mainly of graduates of secular universities, where they had previously used the campus organisation as the base of their Islamic activism. The main supporters of KPPSI from the youth group were the activists of the hardliner faction of the Muslim Student Organisation, HMI-MPO.³⁴

However, they saw that their struggle for formalist Islam was not to be directed to revolutionary means and resorting to violence. They see DI, for example, as an effort to establish religious authority. They did not agree with this strategy of rebellion against

the republic.³⁵ Therefore, in conducting their struggle for *syariat*, the young constitutionalist group prefers peaceful and legal means, such as through writings or gaining political positions for the improvement of their movement's bargaining position.³⁶

The main figures in the group are the chair, Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, the secretary Aswar Hasan³⁷ and the deputy secretary, Kalmuddin.³⁸

At the time of writing this thesis in 2006, the element of Laskar Jundullah was no longer part of KPPSI. The militia group Laskar Jundullah was not exclusively connected to KPPSI, as the name, meaning 'God's Soldiers', has been used by numerous paramilitary groups throughout such conflict zones as Poso, Central Java and Maluku.³⁹ However, in spite of the term's widespread use, the largest and best known Laskar Jundullah was the one that appeared as the paramilitary wing of KPPSI.⁴⁰

Laskar Jundullah members were recruited from various backgrounds. ICG reported that they had backgrounds in radical Islamic groups and maintained several networks of recruitment. First, members were sourced from youths who were sympathetic to Kahar Muzakkar's DI, especially from the faction of Sanusi Daris, Kahar Muzakkar's Defence Minister. The second group was those who were from the hard line faction, known as HMI-MPO.⁴¹ Greg Fealy of the Australian National University holds a similar opinion to ICG on the relationship between the *laskar* and DI, quoting the *laskar's* claim that members were also members of local gangs in South Sulawesi who acted as semi-criminal vigilante groups.⁴²

Both ICG's and Fealy's reports, however, fail to paint a complete picture of Laskar Jundullah. Like the figures of KPPSI in general, Laskar Jundullah was not monolithic, at least in their recruitment patterns and religious attitudes. Concerning Laskar Jundullah's recruitment, it has already been seen that many members had some paramilitary experience in Maluku and Poso. It is true that some Laskar Jundullah members had a gang background, especially those members who usually guarded KPPSI congress. Many of them came from KPPSI branches where they were not necessarily from gang backgrounds. For example, members of Laskar Jundullah of Parepare who often participate in guarding KPPSI's congresses were recruited from several Remaja Mesjid (Mosque Youths).

There has been an effort on the part of KPPSI to overcome the stigma of Laskar Jundullah. This has been especially apparent since the entry of many moderate intellectuals, many of whom proposed to modify the youth wing of the organisation.⁴³ A committee member registered his objection to joining KPPSI if Laskar Jundullah was still supported. At the Second Congress, it had already been proposed that Laskar Jundullah be changed into Laskar Penegak Syariat Islam (Islamic law Enforcement Brigade) to obviate the impression that the paramilitary wing was focused on war. When the Second Congress board was launched; *laskar* was no longer mentioned. The youth wing of the organisation was plainly referred to as *kepemudaan* (youth department), whose members were nothing to do with Laskar Jundullah.

The old constitutionalist group is another group of KPPSI activists who have a long history of involvement in Islamic activism in South Sulawesi. In KPPSI, they sit mainly as members of the Majelis Syura. The Majelis Syura, besides doing conceptual work, also oversees the young activists in Lajnah Tanfidziyah so that the latter do not act rashly.⁴⁴ It is no exaggeration to say that for many of the young radical activists in KPPSI, this group of senior Islamists has been the most influential in the organisation. Besides being more experienced, this group is considered by the young activists to be critical to the movement's authority, and, therefore, to the credibility of their struggle. Many young formalists often seek advice from activists of this group before conducting activities related to the implementation of Islamic law in the province.

Old constitutionalist Islamists have often expressed concern at any sign of unjust treatment of Muslims or unfounded negative statements of Islam from followers of other religions, be it in the political realm or the economic realm.⁴⁵ This group has been labelled constitutionalist because of their abandonment of any effort to enforce *syariat* through revolutionary or forceful means. There are several 'old Islamists' who can be placed in this group. They include the late Abdurrahman A. Basalamah,⁴⁶ Noer Abdurrahman⁴⁷ and H.M. Sirajuddin.⁴⁸

Finally, a moderate group exists within KPPSI, and their influence on the organizations is mostly in an ideological sense.⁴⁹ Although some of the activists in this group studied at secular educational institutions, the majority consists of academics and graduates of the State Islamic Institutes. Many have specialised in Islamic sciences, such as Islamic law, renewal of Islamic thought,

Islamic history or Islamic education. Most are professors in Islamic institutions, especially the Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute for Islamic Studies, IAIN). Quite often these individuals have studied Islam since childhood and continued through primary school up to university level.

The moderate group in KPPSI is known as such because of their flexible approach to interpreting Islamic teachings. Unlike those who seek the full replacement of national secular law with Islamic law, this group focuses more on the efforts to Islamise national law in a gradual manner.⁵⁰ Rather than criticising the western hegemonies, the moderates tend to focus on consolidating the Muslim community from within in order to challenge western hegemony. Therefore, they see the role of KPPSI as not only to gain special provincial autonomy, but also to voice the needs of the Muslim community, which includes the adoption of Islamic law.

The 'moderation' of this group is also evident from its efforts to argue for and defend the relevance of Islamic *syariat* in the modern world, using modern interpretations. This includes their guarantee of the safeguarding of religious minorities if *syariat* were to be formally implemented.⁵¹ They emphasise the need for KPPSI to employ modern systems of campaigning for *syariat*, including the necessity to avoid terms of struggle that depict images of force or violence.⁵²

The most prominent figures of the KPPSI board who belong to the moderate faction are Abdul Muin Salim (Chair of the Consultative Council),⁵³ Jalaluddin Rahman⁵⁴ (Vice Chair of the Consultative Council), Ahmad Ali⁵⁵ (chair of the Intellectual Body), and Fuad Rumi⁵⁶ (vice chair of the Executive body),⁵⁷ Hasyim Aidid⁵⁸ (Secretary of the Intellectual Body) and Ahmad M. Sewang (a member of the Majelis Syura).⁵⁹

Political House for Formalized *syariat*

When KPPSI was first established, an issue which emerged was whether KPPSI would be as obsessive about establishing an Islamic state as Kahar Muzakkar's DI had been. This issue was raised understandably due to the fact that the leader of the Executive Body of KPPSI is Abdul Aziz, the son of Kahar Muzakkar. Also, many KPPSI sympathisers were from former DI areas. However, KPPSI has already emphasised that its struggle is not to create an Islamic state, but to gain a province with special autonomy for the

implementation of Islamic law. This target was re-emphasised in its Second Congress. The question next often addressed by those who are not in favour of KPPSI's demands is how Islamic law should be implemented in the pluralistic society of South Sulawesi today.

At its First Congress, KPPSI activists argued that special autonomy had to be granted first, then Islamic law could be further discussed by South Sulawesi Muslims. The importance of special autonomy is that the autonomous state can act as 'a political house' for the implementation of Islamic law. The house is filled first with the most basic needs, such as a kitchen and beds. Then, it can be better equipped later, according to the preference of its owner.⁶⁰

Based on this analogy, KPPSI activists argue that the importance of a political house is that it is impossible to provide all the facilities before the house has been built. Therefore, the implementation of Islamic law must be preceded by a grant of special autonomy. This analogy gives the impression that Islamic law's implementation should be based on the Muslim people's consensus.⁶¹ KPPSI was of the opinion that it was not difficult to produce concepts of Islamic law since many of its committee members are experts on legal studies, including Islamic law,⁶² but the problem that KPPSI faces is that if it produces a concept, people may be inclined to label laws as being created by KPPSI alone. Other communities might then claim that it was only KPPSI's version of Islamic law that was being implemented, and that they themselves had a different understanding of Islamic law.⁶³ KPPSI believes therefore that when Islamic law is to be implemented, it should be done according to the consensus of the community of South Sulawesi.

At first, KPPSI activists seemed to be reluctant to respond to the challenges, but later, they began to talk and write more about KPPSI's concepts of Islamic law. It was only when several elements of society responded to KPPSI by questioning its concepts of Islamic law and challenged it by showing the complexity of Islamic law that KPPSI began to work on refining the concepts that it promoted. Even though the analogy of the 'political house' was still used, KPPSI now realised the importance of stressing the nature of the Islamic law. The provincial government had also asked KPPSI to discuss concepts of Islamic law, because the government saw that KPPSI's analogy was insufficient to convince the central government of the nature of KPPSI's demands. The former chief of the provincial government's official research body, H.S.

Ruslan, for example, in responding to their analogy, stated that the implementation of Islamic law could not be granted by the central government if the concept of this implementation was not yet clear.⁶⁴

Opposition from Muslim Intellectuals: Which Version of Islamic Law?

Formalist Islamic groups such as KPPSI are often seen as uncompromising on issues of doctrine and strategy. This perception is evident in the frequency with which scholars and journalists use terms such as 'hard-line', 'militant' and 'fanatical' to describe these groups. KPPSI is no exception, and it has been the subject of much criticism because of its uncompromising stance on certain ideological issues. The criticism surrounds problems and/or negative impact that might result from the introduction of formalised Islamic law in South Sulawesi. The most common criticism concerns the effectiveness of formalised Islamic law in improving the lives of Muslims in the province.

The response of Muslim intellectuals to KPPSI's struggle for the formal implementation of Islamic law has also been a significant challenge to KPPSI.⁶⁵ Even though only a small number of Muslim intellectuals have voiced their concerns, their ideas have become known largely due to the fact that they were considered to be authoritative in issues of Islamic law. These academics have typically come from State Islamic Universities (Universitas Islam Negeri, or UIN), with a background in Islamic law and theology. The three best known liberal intellectuals from UIN Alauddin Makassar who voiced concern over KPPSI's efforts to implement Islamic law were: Hamka Haq (Professor of theology and Islamic law), M. Qasim Mathar (PhD in Theology), and Harifuddin Cawidu (PhD in Theology).⁶⁶

In general, these intellectuals have questioned KPPSI's interpretations of Islamic law. The most productive and systematic challenge of these intellectuals comes from Hamka Haq. In his book, *Syariat Islam: Wacana dan Penerapannya* (Islamic Law: Its Discourse and Implementation),⁶⁷ Haq argues that people should understand the nature of Islamic law if they wanted to formalise it, because misperceptions would make their struggle ineffective:

The term law itself was part of the *syariat*. In other words, the word *syariat* was not identical with law. Therefore, we can say that in Indonesia, *syariat*

from the perspective of *aqidah* [Ar. *aqidah*, Islamic creed] and *akhlak* has been implemented, even though not yet to the maximum.⁶⁸

Furthermore, he states:

Maybe the aspect of Islamic law which has not been touched on is *jinayah* [Ar. *jinayah*, criminal law] that cover sanctions such as *qishash* (retaliation), *hadd* (prescribed penalty) and *ta'zir* [Ar. *ta'zir*, deterrence], that is, the discretionary penalties determined by judges. The *jinayah* was only a small part of *syariat*. Therefore, it would easily be understood if the effort of upholding Islamic law was merely defined as upholding the Islamic criminal law without using the term *syariat*, which is larger in scope.⁶⁹

Haq also describes the application of the legal aspects of *syariat* in the life of Indonesian Muslims. He pointed out the legalised applications of *munakahat* (marriage and divorce), *mawaris*, (Ar. *mawāriṭh*), *hibah* (Ar. *hibah*), *waqaf* (Ar. *waqf*) which are all charitable endowment, as found in the regulations No. 1 1974 in the Compilation of Islamic Law.⁷⁰ Haq also discusses the application of Islamic law in regards to *muamalah*, in which the prevailing constitution allowed the application of economic transactions based on Islamic law, such as the establishment of *syariat* banks and insurance institutions.⁷¹ Haq pointed out other aspects of national law such as anti-monopoly regulations, environmental law, workforce regulations and some parts of criminal law which reflected *syariat*.⁷² The only aspect which was not implemented is the *jinayah*, and therefore, as quoted initially, implementation of Islamic *syariat* should only be directed to the effort of implementing the *jinayah*.

Haq, however, contended that the implementation of Islamic law had to be discussed with the new spirit of *ijtihad*. Haq states:

The spirit of *jihad* in implementing Islamic law which is not equipped with the spirit of the true *ijtihad* can make the effort appear threatening, forceful, and thus, the spirit of Islamic *syariat* as *rahmatan lil'alamīn* [Ar. *rahmatan lil'alamīn*, a blessing for all the world] was not well reflected.⁷³

Direct criticism of KPPSI's understanding of the scope of Islamic law was also voiced by M. Qasim Mathar,⁷⁴ who stated that there are a number of different understandings of *syariat*. In his view, Islamic law could be broken up into three parts: first, Islamic teachings; second, Islamic jurisprudence; and third Islamic criminal law. Mathar's main concern is that many KPPSI members understand *syariat* only in terms of Islamic criminal law. Like Haq, Mathar stated that the Islamic criminal law was only a small part of *syariat*. However, Mathar was more specific in criticising what he saw as the improper understanding of many KPPSI activists

regarding the nature of *syariat* which they struggled to implement. Therefore, he stated that a limited understanding of Islamic law would only result in people maintaining a narrow and misguided view that when criminal law was not upheld properly, Islamic law itself was not upheld.⁷⁵

Mathar also claims that the model of the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi demanded by KPPSI activists contradicts the sociological method of the Prophet in practicing Islam. He writes:

One of the characteristics of implementing Islamic law was through sociological and cultural roots. We are of the Malay people, Bugis-Makassarese, Mandar, Toraja, Sunda, Batak, Ambonese, Acehnese, Minangkabau and others who are neither Arabs nor *Barat* (Western people). Islam in Indonesia has to be based on Malay nuances not on Arabic or Western ways, because existing values based on sociological and cultural aspects of society will last longer.⁷⁶

Harifuddin Cawidu, another liberal and influential Muslim intellectual in South Sulawesi has also voiced his opposition to the idea of Islamic formalism. In a seminar paper, he dealt in detail with the cultural struggle of Islamic law in Indonesia, as performed by the NU, the organisation in which he is active. Like Haq, Cawidu describes the activists of cultural Islam in Indonesia as contextual, not as many KPPSI activists understand the nature of Islamic law, which had to be understood textually. Cawidu writes:

The implementation of Islamic law should not necessarily be translated in textual ways, especially the *hudud* as found explicitly in the Qur'an...The establishment of *hudud* is not the substance of the religion but it motivates the Muslim people to be properly Islamic. This means that if the Muslim community could live well without being threatened by *hudud*, the wish to implement Islamic law has been achieved.⁷⁷

Cawidu's more obvious opposition to Islamic formalism was found in another of his writings, in which he stated that holding to formalistic Islam could also lead to intolerance by people with different religious beliefs. He writes:

The existence of intolerant attitudes is due to the degradation of the understanding of basic Islamic values. Islam is only understood in the formal meaning not in the substantial; Islam is only understood in a literal way, not in the contextual meaning; Islam is only understood partially, not comprehensively. It is these ways of understanding Islam which create a poor image of this religion, thus relating it to terrorism, fundamentalism, and radicalism.⁷⁸

Cawidu did not directly accuse KPPSI of being religiously intolerant. However due to this characterisation of KPPSI as formalist, it may be concluded that he is inclined to opine that KPPSI tends to degrade the substantial values of Islam. Unlike Mathar, however, Cawidu's writings never openly opposed the existence of KPPSI. What is clear is that he was in favour of a cultural struggle for the implementation of *syariat*, not a legalistic one.

The explanations of these three local Muslim intellectuals on the nature of Islamic law showed a questioning of which *mazhab* (school of Islamic jurisprudence) law should be supported by KPPSI. Their explanation of the complexity of the definition of the Islamic law, various methods of implementing Islamic law which are historically justified, and the need to understand the substance of Islamic law showed that they disagreed with an extreme interpretation of aspects of formalised Islamic law. They believed that there might be more excesses in the lives of Muslims who had a low level of understanding of Islamic teaching and of a religiously pluralist society. Furthermore, their questions on which Islamic law should be implemented was based on their assumption that many parts of Islamic law had been legalised by the Indonesian government and further aspects of Islamic law are on the way to being formalised.

Opposition from the Minorities: Can Churches still be Built?

Religious minorities are another major source of opposition to KPPSI. Even though 87.46 percent of the total population of South Sulawesi (7,802,732) is Muslim, four other religions are also acknowledged in Indonesia and all exist in South Sulawesi.⁷⁹

The protestant community as the largest minority (8.73%) has been particularly strong in voicing their concerns over the efforts of KPPSI to struggle for formalised *syariat* in an area where other religious adherents exist.

At least two prominent South Sulawesi Protestant clergymen voiced their challenges to the efforts of KPPSI's proposals. They were Zakaria J. Ngelow and M. Soepamena, both lecturers at the *Sekolah Tinggi Teologi Indonesia Timur* (East Indonesian Institute of Theology) in Makassar. Zakaria J. Ngelow is also well known as a Christian theologian. Their ideas were expressed in a paper which they presented, as well as through research they conducted on the discourse of implementing Islamic law. Often, they claimed

that their ideas represent the perceptions of many Christian communities in South Sulawesi.

Their concerns about Islamic formalism focused on whether it could still guarantee the freedom of religious followers to perform their own religious rituals. Their concerns on religious freedom originated in the Islamic law activism in this country, which was characterised by discrimination and violent behaviour towards religious minorities. In commenting on KPPSI's demand for Special Autonomy and formalised Islamic law, J. Ngelow states:

Sulawesi Selatan is not the same as Aceh. Aceh has almost a 100 percent Muslim population but in South Sulawesi, there are other religious followers. Tana Toraja, one *kabupaten* in South Sulawesi, is even predominantly Christian. We were, since early times, part of the province and contributed to the establishment of South Sulawesi's identity.⁸¹

J. Ngelow fears that Christians might become second-class citizens in South Sulawesi. He stated that if Islamic law were to be implemented, the Christian community and other religious minorities would automatically be discriminated against because they would have limited political rights compared to the Muslim majority.⁸¹ J. Ngelow's rejection of Islamic law can be put down to the inclusion of one item of the Special Autonomy regulation proposed by the Second Congress of KPPSI that clearly states that the governor of South Sulawesi must be a Muslim.⁸² He criticised the term *dilindungi* (protected) which was often used by Islamists when speaking about religious minorities, due to the connotations of this term, representing these minorities as being 'weak' and 'second-class'.⁸³

Soepamena similarly voiced his concerns over the possibility of Christian people being discriminated against if Islamic law is introduced:

In Islamic law there is a term *dhimmi* for the minority in the area of Muslim authority. However, this referred to the time when Muslims were politically dominant or when a non-Muslim group was taken by force by a Muslim kingdom, while the Christian existence in South Sulawesi is different. We have the same homeland and we were equally colonised by the Dutch.⁸⁴

Soepamena supported J. Ngelow's rejection of a second class community. Soepamena stated that *dhimmi* is not a concept incorporating sameness, because the concept is talking about *melindungi* (to protect) and *dilindungi* (to be protected). He interpreted protected people to imply that they were not equal to those who

protected them.⁸⁵ According to Soepamena, in spite of the fact that Christians are a minority in South Sulawesi, equality with Muslims is due to the need to acknowledge that the Christian community contributed to the building of the nation in general and the South Sulawesi province in particular, along with the major Muslim community. This acknowledgement enhances religious tolerance in the area which can bring about peaceful relationships.

In a small survey (37 Christian respondents in Makassar) carried out by Soepamena,⁸⁶ it was found that among the Christians there were three main attitudes. First is the 'wait and see' response. According to Soepamena, this response reflects contentiousness in the Christian community. Soepamena stated that this response comes mainly from the Christians who are not sure what Islamic law is and what is meant by formalised Islamic law. The second view is to support KPPSI's agenda. According to Soepamena, the Christians who held this opinion are those who have a solid understanding of the nature of Islamic teaching, including an understanding of its teachings on religious tolerance. The third opinion is fear of discrimination. Soepamena stated this feeling was based on Christians who saw the reality of many radical Islamic movements, whereby the Christian minority became a popular target.

Soepamena stated that of these three opinions, fear of discrimination is the dominant one. He offered several reasons for the strength of this opinion. First, there is the fact that even with non-formalised Islamic law, churches were already difficult to establish; the assumption is that the establishment of churches would be even harder under a full *syariat* system. Second, Christian people perceive many KPPSI members to be intolerant. Soepamena referred to the rude and intolerant attitude of many KPPSI's former Laskar Jundullah towards people who had different beliefs concerning Islamic law from those of KPPSI, as evidence of what it will be like to live under KPPSI-formulated Islamic law.⁸⁷ This is in line with the comment of Anto Obe, the adviser of the South Sulawesi Indonesian-Chinese Association, who suspected that if *syariat* were to be formally implemented, then religious minorities and Chinese-Indonesians would be trampled on in the future.⁸⁸

KPPSI's Change of Strategies and Softening Stance

From 2002, KPPSI began to pursue a moderate agenda. Moderation here refers to the efforts of the movement to show a softer

attitude towards formalising Islamic law. For example, it has attempted to control its activities so that it should not be identified with resorting to violence. This moderate stance was observable in KPPSI's outline of actions in its Second Congress in 2002. Even in its Third Congress in 2005, when talking of various strategies of Islamization. KPPSI was no longer strictly speaking Special Autonomy. It began to be more aware that struggling for formalist Islam in South Sulawesi could be pursued better by employing various efforts rather than strictly focusing on efforts to win Special Autonomy.

There are several factors in KPPSI's change to a more moderate organization. First, KPPSI was more aware that it was unlikely that the central government would accede to their demands if they maintained a hard-line approach. Second, the increasing participation of mainstream elements in the movement contributed to its moderation. Third and most important, the impact of criticism from several elements of society as discussed above, on the nature of the Islamic law for which KPPSI was struggling, inspired this movement to re-orient itself.

KPPSI's new stance on the fight for the implementation of Islamic law is summarized in the following discussion.

Not Emphasising the Implementation of Islamic Criminal Law

Some time ago, KPPSI activists began to realise the complexities of formalising Islamic law, as voiced by liberal Islamic intellectuals, such as Hamka Haq. Through discussions and debates with those who challenged the formal implementation of Islamic *syariat*, KPPSI began to become aware of the implications of demanding the implementation of Islamic law in the context of the South Sulawesi province.

The criticism of Muslim intellectuals, which previously many KPPSI activists had considered to be destructive, was now slowly beginning to be accepted as an instructive contribution. Jalaluddin Rahman advised many other KPPSI activists to see criticism, such as that which Qasim Mathar addressed to the organisation, as a way to improve and to make KPPSI more creative in its demands.⁸⁹ Part of this meant greater concentration on aspects of Islamic law that could be upheld while waiting for the opportunity to gain a *rumah politik* (political house). The moderate views of KPPSI are seen in its interpretation that the present constitution permits the Muslim people to struggle to formalise most aspects

of Islamic law. With the present constitution, the only aspect of Islamic law that they could not directly struggle to uphold is Islamic criminal law. KPPSI is now more aware that Special Autonomy was needed only in upholding the criminal law of Islam.

KPPSI now realises that this struggle should not be given a high priority, since the reality is that the Indonesian government will reject their demands. Furthermore, it has found that it might be more effective for the organization to achieve success in social enforcement through formalisation of *dakwah* and the educational system.

Another interesting development has been that of KPPSI's efforts to enforce Islamic private law. Hartono Mardjono, a prominent Islamic legal expert, suggested parts of Islamic civil law that could be implemented within sections of the national constitution.⁹⁰ Even though KPPSI continues to consider the importance of gaining Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law in Islamic criminal law, it responded positively to Mardjono's concept of Islamic private law within a national constitution, and its significance by pioneering the establishment of an institution of arbitration.⁹¹ Mardjono's idea therefore encouraged KPPSI to be more moderate in its strategy for implementing Islamic law in South Sulawesi. For the purpose of the arbitration body, KPPSI first invited MUI South Sulawesi to work together with them to establish the institution.⁹² Mardjono's influence on KPPSI is also reflected in Aziz Kahar's statement that struggling for Islamic private law could now be prioritised to make society more Islamic in its daily activities,⁹³ and that to achieve this would depend on the political will of the Muslim politicians and bureaucrats. Aziz Kahar said that to realise this, they must prepare concepts, provide human resources and promote awareness of the issue within the Muslim community.⁹⁴ Momentum for this initiative, however, waned somewhat with the passing of Hartono Mardjono in 2003.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, this still demonstrates KPPSI's willingness and efforts to draw on aspects of existing civil code to implement Islamic law.

Islamising Peraturan Daerah (Regional Regulations, or Perda)

KPPSI saw the possibility of producing Perda to strengthen Islamic law as a promising channel for '*syariat-isation*', without forcing the issue of Special Autonomy legislation. KPPSI saw that Regional Autonomy Regulation No. 22 year 1999, could be used to

work with local governments to produce Perda that uphold the implementation of Islamic law.⁹⁶

KPPSI has directly supported the creation of Islamic Perda in several *kabupaten* in South Sulawesi. In Bulukumba, South Sulawesi, for example, the local government had already produced four Perda which banned liquor (*Minuman Keras*) and gambling (*Judi*), and enforced the wearing of the Veil (*Jilbab*) and giving alms (*Zakat*).⁹⁷ It is believed that a Perda on *Baca Qur'an* (being able to read Qur'an) is now being processed. Bupati of Bulukumba, A. Patabai Pabokori, said that the creation of several Islamic Perda, such as on liquor and gambling, significantly reduced crime in the region by up to 80 %, especially among the youth. Patabai supported his statement by referring to the statistics of the *kabupaten* police office.⁹⁸ Similar statements had also been made by other people in the region. Several youths who had no connection to the *syariat* movement also acknowledged the impact of Perda in that Kabupaten. Furthermore, there is no other variable to explain the drop in crime in the area, except for the introduction of the Islamic Perda.

It is interesting to note that Perda on liquor consumption in Bulukumba does not forbid its consumption but legislates its usage. According to A. Patongai, the former member of the local DPRD, the word 'prohibition' should not appear in the regulation, to accommodate other religious followers who may wish to consume alcoholic drinks, especially overseas tourists who visit the area. The regulation required only that alcoholic drinks should not be served less than five hundred meters from mosques and housing. A. Patongai felt that this regulation should be sufficient to preserve the Muslim community from consuming alcohol.⁹⁹ Asaad Salam, KPPSI head in the area, saw that even though this regulation did not state that the consumption of liquor was *haram* (Ar. *hāram*, prohibited), it helped to protect the Muslim community from this prohibited drink. He stated that there would no longer be an opportunity for the Muslim community to consume alcoholic drinks, because mosques and houses were no more than 500 meters away.¹⁰⁰ Iwan, a youth in Bulukumba, stated that the regulations had brought significant improvement in the security of the people, since there were no more liquor parties held by juvenile delinquents.¹⁰¹

The seriousness of KPPSI in looking at the *kabupaten* as an important base for the implementation of Islamic law is the result of meetings held on 12 – 13 June 2004 attended by all KPPSI branch-

es. They concentrated on anticipating political events in the country, following the 2004 legislative general elections. At this meeting KPPSI focused on how other *kabupaten* in South Sulawesi could produce more Perda like Bulukumba within two years. This expectation was based on the growing number of KPPSI activists who were elected as members of the local DPRD and are expected to help struggle for the introduction of more Islamic Perda.¹⁰² These strategies anticipate that if local leaders and politicians are made more aware of 'syariat-isation', they will support the position of KPPSI with respect to the national government, to legislate for Special Autonomy. Minimally, KPPSI will have set in place support for the common concern of South Sulawesi Muslims on the importance of the implementation of *syariat* in the region. In addition to this objective, the above meeting was also aimed at preserving the struggle for the formal implementation of Islamic law, especially among activists who lacked this motivation.¹⁰³

However, the struggle for the implementation of Islamic law through the channels of Perda was much criticised by many liberal intellectuals. Zakaria J. Ngelow criticised the issue of the Islamic Perda in several areas, seeing it as a symbol, rather than as the substance of Islamic teaching. He questioned the concern of the *kabupaten* government supported by Islamic *syariat* activists, to regulate symbolic aspects of Islamic teachings such, as veiling regulations rather than more urgent aspects of concern for Muslim people, that is, corruption and collusion. Even though such issues are covered by criminal law, it could only be upheld through the political will of the *kabupaten* government, and there seems to be more concern with symbolic Islam as opposed to these issues.¹⁰⁴

Further criticism of the phenomenon of Islamic Perda was the 'insubstantial' aspect of its regulations. This view is, for example, held by a well known Muslim intellectual, M. Dawam Rahardjo. He saw the implementation of Islamic law as ridiculous. He pointed out that most *kabupaten* in Indonesia implementing Islamic law produced Perda, such as the wearing of veils for the female staff of the *kabupaten* government and the reading of the Qur'an before starting work, a violation of Islamic teachings because they were making obligatory that which was not obligatory in Islamic teachings. Rahardjo pointed to the case of the reading the Qur'an; there is no obligation to read it prior to work.¹⁰⁵

Moreover, critics saw this Islamic Perda as a distortion of Islamic Law. This is held, for example, by Azyumardi Azra who

argued that the regulation will cause the spread of the wrong kind of understanding of Islam, if it is to be limited to these regulations.¹⁰⁶ Azra, furthermore, saw that such Islamic Perda was contradicted by the national basic constitution, UUD 1945, because the constitution regulated freedom to perform religious rituals, without specifying the implementation of Islamic law. Azra's opinion on this issue seems to be contradicted by Mardjono's understanding based on the UUD 1945, since in his opinion, the term *ibadah* in chapter 33 of the UUD 1945 would mean the implementation of Islamic law.

The criticism by these intellectuals of the symbolic nature of *syariat* may be based on the political motives of several *kabupaten* authorities in backing the Perda. However, criticism of the violation of Islamic teaching through Perda seems to be exaggerated. Even though there is a little scientific data to prove the impact of the Perda in Bulukumba, it is evident that many housewives are very happy that their husbands no longer go out gambling or buy alcoholic drinks.¹⁰⁷

Activating Formal Political Channels

Apart from the above strategy to implement Islamic law in district areas, this last strategy shows KPPSI acting as a formalist Islamic movement, that is, using political means to reach its ultimate goal of Islamic autonomy. Through his DPD membership, Abdul Aziz Kahar is expected to be a voice for the demands of KPPSI.¹⁰⁸ Many are pessimistic of the effectiveness of Aziz's presence in Jakarta, due to the lack of strong support for KPPSI's struggle in the parliament.

In an effort to overcome this perceived hurdle, KPPSI personnel travelled to Jakarta on 8 October 2004 to approach the newly elected government. The KPPSI team was represented by figures from various organisations in the province, such as Muhammadiyah, NU, Wahdah Islamiyah, Badan Komunikasi Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid Indonesia (Communication Body of Indonesian Mosque Youth, BKPRMI), MUI and Forum Masyarakat Islam (Islamic Society Forum, Formasi), which was led by the chairman of Majelis Syura, Abdul Muin Salim. This team successfully met the speaker of MPR, Hidayat Nurwahid and newly elected Vice President, Jusuf Kalla accompanied by the elected vice chairmen of MPR, A.M. Fatwa. KPPSI's objective was to renew its demand and to remind the newly elected government of the aspirations of the

Muslim community in South Sulawesi for formalised *syariat*, as was permitted in Aceh.

It's understandable that KPPSI used this opportunity to push their demands since the Speaker of the MPR is from an Islamic political party, PKS, and the elected vice president is from South Sulawesi; he knew of the nature of the demand and once opened a KPPSI congress. The trip, however, appears to have brought little benefit to their struggle.

Another of KPPSI's activities to pursue political channels for implementing *syariat* is its active role in campaigning for the need for South Sulawesi to elect political leaders; a governor and *bupati* who will support the formalised *syariat* in South Sulawesi. As found in its political recommendation in the Third Congress, KPPSI called for the Muslim community to vote for candidates for Governor and Bupati who are Islamic and supportive of *syariat*. This recommendation was issued close to the time of elections for the *bupati* in South Sulawesi.

Regarding the political moves of KPPSI, it can be argued that this will be risky for KPPSI's Islamic formalism commitment due to the possible suspicion that the movement is now busy thinking of political power rather than religiosity. At the end of 2005, KPPSI's rhetoric was loaded with discourse on candidates of South Sulawesi for the gubernatorial elections to be held in 2007, and there are those among KPPSI activists who are concerned that KPPSI may become entrapped in the political jungle and thus forget its main goals. Since this is a new development, this thesis cannot report on the result of KPPSI's move.¹⁰⁹

Conclusion

This article has examined the dynamics of the formation of KPPSI, its emergence and the character of its supporters. It can be concluded that the legacy of DI is clearly observable in the former DI followers who supported the establishment of the movement. Aziz Kahar Muzakkar is the son of Kahar Muzakkar. However, the DI factor cannot wholly explain the emergence of KPPSI. My discussion has shown that there were many other Islamists in KPPSI who had no DI ties. This attests to the continuing influence of Islamic modernism, including the role of Muhammadiyah educational training in the radicalisation of Islamism in the region. Furthermore, young Islamists have begun to be shaped by broader Islamist movements due to their access to global Islam. To some

extent, KPPSI also attracted young activists with attitudes of intolerance to others.

In looking at the activists of KPPSI, one can state that they have various organisational and professional backgrounds but were brought together by their shared belief that the only way to maximise the implementation of Islamic teachings was through formalist Islam. This awareness was triggered also by their belief that the failure of the New Order Regime in 1998 represented the failure of secular law to manage Indonesian society effectively. *Syariat* was the alternative.

This writing has also covered religious opposition to the efforts of promoting formalist Islam in South Sulawesi, launched by KPPSI. As shown above, the moderation of KPPSI is significantly influenced by the existence of this opposition. Therefore, my concluding point is that the existence of the opposition cannot be seen as a destructive aspect of the promotion of formalist Islam in South Sulawesi. They did not reach the stage of seizing the demand for formalist Islam in the province. Instead, they have provided constructive input that directed the movement to be more moderate.

KPPSI holds a belief in the importance of political power to implement Islamic teachings. This is clear in KPPSI with its ultimate goal of gaining Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law, and where Muslim people in South Sulawesi will be given legitimate power to run a government based on Islamic teachings. Another part of the Islamic formalist orientation is that KPPSI has the idea that Islam has to be implemented in the public sphere rather than being a purely private matter. This is, for example, seen in the Perda introduced in recent times, much at the behest of KPPSI. This movement has also emphasised the importance of the open acknowledgment of Islamic expressions, such as that an Islamic greeting should be read before public announcements or printed in every letter.

Endnotes

1. John L. Esposito, *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 19.
2. Alexander Flores, "Secularism, Integralism, and Political Islam: The Egyptian Debate," *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report*, eds. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997).
3. Jillian Schwedler, "Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace, or Mobiliser?" *SAIS Review* vol. XXI, No. 2, Summer-Fall, 2001. See also Arskal Salim, "Syariat From Below in Aceh (1930s-1960s): Islamic Identity and the Right to Self-Determination with Comparative Reference to the Moro Islamic Liberation (MILF)," *Indonesia and the Malay World*, Vol. 32, No.92, Mar. 2004: 80 -99.
4. The term is the antonym of van Nieuwenhuijze's "deconfessionalised Islam". See C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia* (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd, 1958): 180 – 243.
5. Bernard Lewis, *Islam and the West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 184.
6. John O.Voll, "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World," *Fundamentalisms Observed*, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1991) 347; See also Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, translated by Carol Volk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994) 35-48.
7. Jamāat Islāmī, for example, is an Islamist revivalist movement party in Pakistan founded in Lahore in 1941 by Maulana Sayyid Abu al-A'lā Maudūdī. For more information on this movement, see Bahadur Kalim, *The Jamā'at-i-Islāmī of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political Action* (New Delhi: Chetana Publication, 1977). Another group of a similar mould is Jamāat Tablīghī, a grassroots Islamic movement founded in Mewat, India in 1926. The movement seeks the revitalization of faith and reaffirmation of Muslim religio-cultural identity. See Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat," *Fundamentalisms Observed*, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1991) 457 – 530.
8. It was founded in 1952 in al-Quds in order to resume the Islamic way of life and carry the Islamic call to the world. See Amnon Cohen, *Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949 – 1967* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982).
9. Mahmud A. Faksh, *The Future of Islam in the Middle East: Fundamentalism in Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia* (Wesport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997) 4-12.
10. A system of government in which the state plans and controls the economy and a single, often authoritarian party holds power, claiming to make progress toward a higher social order in which all goods are equally shared by people.
11. Nieuwenhuijze, 180-243.
12. The Jakarta Charter originally contained the phrase 'the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents', which was left out as a compromise as a result of Muslim and secular nationalists who sat on the investigating committee for Indonesian independence on state ideology on 22 June 1945. This preamble contains the phrase 'For more information on the debate on the creation of this charter and its controversy, see Saifuddin Anshari, *The Jakarta Charter 1945: The Struggle for an Islamic Constitution in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur, ABIM, 1979).
13. "Aziz Kahar: Kita Salah Mengatur Negara," *Pure Pos*, 26 Agustus 2002. See also "KPPSI Bukan Bentuk Aziz Kahar Muzakkar," *Fajar*, 16 January 2001; and Abdul Aziz Mudzakkar, "KPPSI dalam Wacana dan Praksis," *Fajar*, 20 Oktober 2003.
14. Ahmad Ali, "Syariat Islam sebagai Solusi Mengatasi Keterpurukan Hukum", Paper presented in a seminar discussing the Islamic *syariat* in various disciplines held at STAI DDI Mangkoso on 9 June 2002.
15. Interview with Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, 20 February 2003. See "Akomodasi Mayoritas tanpa menysihihkan Minoritas," *Fajar*, 26 November 2000.

16. Interview with Jalaluddin Rahman, 15 March 2002.
17. For more information on this issue, see Bahtiar Effendy, "Islam and the State: The Transformation of Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia," PhD Thesis, Ohio State University, 1994.
18. For more information on the Local Autonomy Regulations, see Minako Sakai, *Beyond Jakarta: Regional Autonomy and Local Societies in Indonesia* (Belair, South Australia: Crawford House, 2002). For an account by an Indonesian writer experiencing the application of regional autonomy in Indonesia, see S. Usman, "Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: Field Experiences and Emerging Challenges," Paper prepared for SMERU Research Institute, Bali, 2002.
19. Elizabeth Morrell, "Strengthening the Local in National Reform: A Cultural Approach to Political Change," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 32 (3), Oct. 2001: 437-449.
20. For further information on Islamic Autonomy granted to Aceh see, Rifyal Ka'bah, *Penegakan Syariat Islam di Indonesia* (Surabaya: Khairul Bayan, 2004) 16-35.
21. See Mulyani Mudis Taruna, "Gerakan Islam Radikal Kontemporer di Indonesia: Studi Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI) di Sulawesi Selatan," 27.
22. Jennifer Donohoe, "Islamic Law and Competition for Power in the Reformasi Era: The KPSI of South Sulawesi," 32.
23. Taruna, 27.
24. "Perjalanan Penegakan Syariat Islam di Sulsel," *Fajar*, 26 November 2001.
25. Interview with H. M. Sirajuddin, 6 Maret 2003.
26. Interview with Jamahuddin Amien, 3 Maret 2003.
27. Interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, 23 Juni 2004.
28. KPPSI "Rumusan Hasil Dialogue Terbuka Pencagakan Syariat Islam di Sulsel," Unpublished Report by KPPSI, 2000. For the result of this dialogue, see Appendix IX.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. The long process toward establishing an Islamic law movement in South Sulawesi was part of the desire of many Muslims to establish an Islamic *syariat* movement in the global context. It should be noted that within these times of dialogue, many other Muslim activists in the rest of the country campaigned for the implementation of Islamic law to solve national problems. In formal politics, it was found that in 1999 the Islamic political parties elected to parliament struggled for the reinsertion of the 'seven words' of the Jakarta Charter in order to gain a constitutional basis for Islamic law in the country. Outside of formal efforts, there had been many Muslim organizations who united to form a movement to implement Islamic law, such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). For more information about the organization and its First Congress, see Irfan Suryahardi Awwas, ed., *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syariat Islam* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2002).

The relationship of South Sulawesi Islamic *syariat* activists with other Islamic *syariat* activists was seen in the MMI Congress in Yogyakarta, in August 2000 which Muslim scholars from South Sulawesi attended and became part of its board. Some scholars saw the efforts of MMI to portray itself as an umbrella organization for all pro-*syariat* groups. Many people speculated that the idea of formalist Islamic *syariat* in South Sulawesi was part of these national influences. However, Husein Umar countered that the idea was earlier than the MMI congress and therefore the formation of KPPSI as an Islamic law movement was more genuine. Open dialogue with Islamic law had begun in May 2000, while the MMI congress was held in August. Husein Umar argued that the Kongres Umat Islam in South Sulawesi in October 2000 was just the continuation of the previous open dialogue. Interview with Husein Umar, 7 August 2003.

32. Abdul Aziz Muzakkar, "KPPSI dalam Wacana dan Praksis," *Fajar*, 20 October 2003.
33. Endang Turmudi, (ed.) *Pengaruh Modernitas Terhadap Sikap Keberagamaan Masyarakat: Penerapan dan Diskursus Politik Syariah Islam Studi Kasus di Cianjur, Sulawesi Selatan dan Jombang*, 73.
34. This is at least seen in the executive board of KPPSI 2002. Abdul Aziz Kahar, chair of executive board and Kalmuddin vice secretary were former prominent activists of HMI MPO. Interview with Kalmuddin, 22 January 2005.
35. Interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, 23 June 2003; Aswar Hasan, 14 December 2004; Kamuddin, 22 January 2005.
36. Abdul Aziz Kahar and Aswar Hasan have often written in the local newspapers to explain the nature of KPPSI.
37. Aswar Hasan is also known as a Muslim activist, academic and writer in Makassar. Besides being active in KPPSI, he is also the chairman of the *Komite Penyiaran Indonesia* (Indonesian Broadcasting Committee) South Sulawesi region. His background is in the department of Politics, Hasanuddin University, where he later taught. He was a former activist of PII where he was close to Abdul Aziz Kahar and Tamsil Linrung.
38. His ideas are disseminated through his seminar papers, his comments as a political analyst and his writings in both local and national newspapers.
39. His formal educational background is the faculty of Education, Teachers' Training Institute which was commonly known as IKIP (*Institute Keguruan dan Ilmu Pengetahuan*) now known as UNM (Universitas Negeri Makassar, State University of Makassar). It was in this university that he began his Islamic activism, through his involvement in the HMI MPO of the commissariat of IKIP since 1991. His formalist Islamic vision was gained through his long involvement in this organization. He was even the general chair of the HMI MPO Makassar from 1995-1996. From 1997, he was active as secretary up to the present in the Forum *Ukhuwah Islamiyah* (FUI), while the chair was held by the late Abdurrahman A. Basalamah. FUI was an organization established early 1997 with the mission to strengthen the Muslim brotherhood, and with an Islamic formalist orientation.
40. International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jamaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," 20. This document can be obtained from: <http://www.icg.org>
41. Information on the establishment and development of Laskar Jundullah is difficult to provide since little research has been done on it. A problem is the reluctance of many informants to tell their side of story due to rumours of the spread of foreign intelligence at the time when terrorism was related to Muslim fundamentalists and also that it would be used in intelligence work. Indeed, some scholars admitted the distribution of several Western agencies in the suspected areas.
However, Jennifer Donohoe found out how Laskar Jundullah was first established. She states it was the result of the cooperation of the Yayasan Wirabuana, a charity organization connected to the Wirabuana Seventh Regional Military Command based in Makassar Kompak. Kompak was established to distribute aid from Middle Eastern countries to Indonesian conflict areas, especially Ambon and Poso. According to Donohoe, the two organizations then established the Laskar Jundullah paramilitary group to help facilitate the transfer of 'volunteers' to the Poso and Ambon conflicts. See Jennifer Donohoe, "Islamic Law and Competition for Power in the Reformasi Era: The KPSI of South Sulawesi," 69 - 70.
42. International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jamaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," 21.
43. Greg Fealy, "Radical Islam in Indonesia," a paper presented in the conference on From Terrorism to Revolution - The Jihadist Threat to Regime Survival in Societies:

Historical Cases and Current Prospects," held in Washington D.C., on 22 November 2002.

44. Interview with Jalaluddin Rahman, 15 March 2003.
45. Interview with Noer Bahri Noer, 4 March 2003.
46. See, for examples, articles written by Nur Abdurrahman, "Jama'ah Islamiyah," *Fajar*, 17 November 2002; Nur Abdurrahman, "Jama'ah Islamiyah Menurut Nash dan Menurut DK-PBB," *Fajar*, 2 February 2003; H.M. Sirajuddin, Korupsi, Terorisme, dan Jihad," *Fajar*, 29 January 2005.
47. Abdurrahman A. Basalamah can be considered the most important figure in KPPSI. He was called 'the father of Islamic law in South Sulawesi' within KPPSI circle. If this title is related to his contribution to the struggle for the implementation of *syariat*, it is not an exaggeration. Basalamah came from a family traditionally oriented towards Islam. His interest in formalist Islam was due to his involvement with modernist Islamic movements, in which he saw the significance of formalist Islam in Indonesia, especially in South Sulawesi. He was involved in the early pioneering efforts to establish KPPSI through the organization he led, Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah.

Abdurrahman A. Basalamah was well-known for his academic and social activities. He was a prominent economist, the former Rector of UMI Makassar, and until his death he was the chair of UMI foundation. In social organizations, he was also the vice-chair of ICMI, South Sulawesi. He was very active in local and national seminars. His thought contributed much to efforts to establish *syariat*, especially in its economic aspects. His death in 2004 significantly affected the dynamics of Islamic intellectualism in South Sulawesi and particularly KPPSI activism, the movement that he pioneered.

48. Noer Abdurrahman is well known as a Muslim activist and columnist. In Muslim organizations, he was active in *Ikatan Majelis Muslimin Indonesia Mujtahidah* (IMMIM) an organization working on *da'i* (Muslim speakers) and in other religious activities. He is a weekly columnist for the newspaper *Fajar*. His main interests are the topics of "*wahyu* and *akal*" (revelation and reason). He is a retired academic of the Hasanuddin University. He was a graduate of engineering and a former dean of the Engineering Faculty. His Islamic knowledge began in childhood, studying with his grandfather, who was a well-known *ulama* in Selayar, South Sulawesi. His thorough understanding of Islam is reflected in his mastery of the Arabic language. Interview with Noer Abdurrahman, 16 March 2005.
49. Sirajuddin was vice-secretary of the Consultative Body of KPPSI. He attended secular schools and finished his studies at Teacher's Training College in Yogyakarta. Due to his background in teaching he once served as an instructor to the PLN, the state electricity company in Makassar, where, because of his concern for Islamic activism he stopped working as a permanent employee. His Islamic knowledge was gained through cultural education. His father was an activist of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi during the time of the Dutch, and Sirajuddin was also a Muhammadiyah youth activist. At the time this thesis was written, he was the vice chair of Muhammadiyah, Makassar Branch.

It was through his involvement in Muhammadiyah that Sirajuddin's views on formalist Islam became more pronounced. Muhammadiyah, as a modernist organization, had been working to modernise Muslims' understanding of their religion through education. Since this was only a culturally-based struggle, he saw that it could not implement Islamic teachings well. Therefore, he saw that KPPSI's struggle for the formal implementation of *syariat* was in line with his ideas.

50. Dias Pradadimara and Burhan Junedding, "Who is Calling for Islamic Law?: The Struggle to implement Islamic Law in South Sulawesi," 25.
51. See Abdul Mutin Salim, "Aktualisasi Hukum Islam dalam Sistem Hukum dan Pranata Sosial Era Rofermasi," Unpublished Paper, 3.

52. Jalaluddin Rahman, "Posisi Non-Muslim Di Tengah Masyarakat Islam Dalam Kehidupan Berbangsa," a paper presented in a One Day Seminar, held by the South Sulawesi Provincial Government in Marannu City Hotel, 8 November 2001.
53. Fuad Rumi, "Lagu Dangdut dan Syariah Islam," *Fajar*, 22 November 2000.
54. Abdul Muin Salim is a former rector of IAIN Alauddin Makassar and now rector of the University of East Indonesia. He is a professor of Islamic law, holding his doctorate in the Politics in the Holy Qur'an, already published.⁵⁵ He is active in academia and in Muslim organizations. He holds the chairs of *Majelis Syura* in KPPSI and *Persaudaraan Muslim Sedunia* (International Moslem Brotherhood, PMS) in South Sulawesi. He is very active in attending seminars, speaking out on the need for Muslims to uphold *syariat*. His talks on *syariat* and politics have stimulated many people into thinking about the issues around formalised *syariat*.
56. Jalaluddin Rahman is well known as the professor of Renewal of Islamic thought at IAIN Alauddin Makassar. Though his ideas are usually launched in Muslim gatherings, he is widely known as the most controversial Muslim intellectual in the region. He holds a doctorate from IAIN Jakarta (now known as UIN) with a thesis on exegesis on human deeds in the Qur'an. He is also known as an active writer in local newspapers. He writes especially on social and political developments in relation to Islamic teachings and promotes his ideas on the need to formalise Islamic law. He is active as the chair of the South Sulawesi Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) and as the vice chair of *Majelis Syura*, KPPSI. His involvement in KPPSI began in the Second Congress of KPPSI. His later involvement was based on his conviction of the ineffectivity of KPPSI but shortly before the Second Congress, he felt that he could help to empower the movement in line with his own interests.
57. Unlike the majority of the figures of KPPSI, Ahmad Ali is prominent at both local and national levels. Locally, he is known as an academic, as dean of the faculty of Law, Hasanuddin University, the most prestigious university in South Sulawesi. He is also known as the columnist for *Fajar*, the local newspaper on legal and social problems in society and promotes his views on the need for *syariat* to be formalised. Nationally, he is known as an expert in legal studies, and is recognised as among the few national figures with great personal integrity.
- Ahmad Ali's sympathy with the struggle of KPPSI dates to the time when it was pioneered. In an open dialogue held by KPPSI, he spoke in support of the efforts of the demands for Special Autonomy and formalised *syariat*, issues which he also supports in his frequent writings. As a graduate of a secular university from bachelor to doctorate, his knowledge of Islam was acquired culturally, through his parents. His understanding of Islamic law calls upon his tremendous acquaintance with Islamic and secular law and believes that formalised Islamic law is natural to the life of Muslim people.
58. Fuad Rumi is vice chair of the Executive Body of KPPSI. He is an academic at the Muslim University of Indonesia (UMI). He was active in the foundation of UMI, which was led by the late Abdurrahman A. Basalamah. He graduated as a technical engineer from Gajah Mada University. His Islamic schooling was received at the Muallimin school of Muhammadiyah at Toli-Toli, Southeast Sulawesi. He admits that he was never active in well known student organizations or in Islamic organizations, such as HMI or PII. Although he was a pivotal figure at UMI, his Islamic understanding was not as radical as Basalamah's. He too is a weekly columnist for *Fajar* under 'gelitik' ('The Goad') where he discusses matters from the trivial to the serious, followed by his own analysis in the light of Islamic teachings.
59. The position of these figures is based on the structure of KPPSI board 2002.
60. Hasyim Aidid is the secretary of the Intellectual Body of KPPSI. He is a senior lecturer in Islamic law at IAIN Alauddin Makassar. His master degree is from The Australian National University and his Ph.D from Hasanuddin University.

74. *Ibid.*
75. *Ibid.*, 3.
76. His criticism is seen in M. Qasim Mathar, "Syariat Islam: Rahmat Atau Petaka." His Newspaper articles are: "Saya Takut Pada Kelompok Penegak Syariat Islam," *Fajar*, 11 November 2001, "Syariat Islam Versi Kang Jalal," *Fajar*, 22 January 2001; His criticism of KPPSI can also be found in Burhanuddin (ed.), *Syariat Islam: Pandangan Muslim Liberal*, 237-238.
77. Interview with M. Qasim Mathar, 23 February 2003.
78. M. Qasim Mathar, "Syariat Islam: Rahmat atau Petaka," 8.
79. Harifuddin Cawidu, "Penegakan Syariat Islam Secara Kultural dan Substansial," a paper presented at the seminar on Pioneering the Upholding of Islamic Law from Different Perspectives, held by STAI DDI Mangkoso, Makassar, 9 June 2002.
80. Harifuddin Cawidu, "Posisi Non-Muslim di Tengah-Tengah Masyarakat Muslim Dalam Berbangsa dan Bernegara," a paper presented at the Seminar for the Survey of the Upholding of Islamic Law held by South Sulawesi Government, Makassar, 8 November 2001.
81. Other religious followers were less than 2 percent: Catholics (1.75 %), Hindu (1.65 %), Buddhists (0.41 %). See *Sulsel Dalam Angka*, 2000.
82. Interview with Zakaria J. Ngelow, 16 March 2003.
83. *Ibid.*
84. See the discussion of this issue in the discussion of the proposed draft constitution by KPPSI in Chapter Seven.
85. Interview with Zakaria J. Ngelow, 16 March 2003.
86. Interview with Soepamena, 17 March 2004.
87. *Ibid.*
88. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain the written report of the survey conducted by Soepamena.
89. Interview with Soepamena, 17 March 2004.
90. "Syariat advocates await their day of triumph in S. Sulawesi," *The Jakarta Post*, February 10, 2006.
91. Interview with Jalaluddin Rahman, 15 March 2004.
92. For more information on Hartono Mardjono's ideas, see Hartono Mardjono, "Hukum Nasional & Impelementasi Syari'at Islam: Strategi Politik dalam Legislasi & Implementasi Syaria't Islam dalam Bingkai UUD Negara RI Tahun 1945," a paper presented at the Seminar of upholding Islamic Syariat in Private Law, held by KPPSI and MUI Sulawesi Selatan on 14 June 2003. For more information of Hartono Mardjono's ideas on implementing Islamic private law in Indonesia, see Hartono Mardjono, *Menegakkan Syariat Islam dalam Konteks Keindonesiaan* (Bandung, Mizan, 1997).
93. KPPSI especially invited the late Hartono Mardjono to speak on this issue at its seminar in Makassar as mentioned in the previous footnote.
94. The significance of KPPSI's approaching MUI was due to first, the importance of the Islamic law scholars' involvement in the arbitration Institution, and second, the central MUI has already established an arbitration Institution called 'Body of Syariat Arbitration', under the auspices of central MUI and led by Hartono Marjono.
95. Abdul Aziz Mudzakkar, "KPPSI dalam Wacana dan Praksis," *Fajar*, 20 Oktober 2003.
96. *Ibid.*
97. Interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, 23 June 2004.
98. See "Program Perjuangan," in KPPSI, "Hasil Keputusan Kongres II Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan." See also Appendix XVII.
99. Another impact of KPPSI's effort to look to Perda as a channel of Islamic law is seen in Maros, the outskirts of Makassar, a Kabupaten in South Sulawesi. In this city, there had already been PERDA on liquor and PERDA on Qur'anic reading

ability. The local apparatus in these areas discussed with society leaders and other elements of society, potential for implementation of aspects of Islamic law. Even the Bupati was very active in calling Muslim community in the area to uphold Islamic law. He started, with his staff, to ask all his Muslim female members to wear veils, and asking the Muslims to practice congregational prayers. He also advised Muslim people to save their money in the *syariat* bank and not in the secular conventional banks that still use interest which is prohibited under Islamic law. See Andi Nadjamuddin Aminullah, "Memegang Kekuasaan, Kesempatan Tegakkan Syiar Islam," *Laporan Khusus Suara Hidayatullah*, 02/XVI/June 2003: 40.

100. Telephone interview with A Patabai Pabokori, 17 February 2006.
101. Interview with A. Patongai, 4 April, 2003. More information on *syariat* in Bulukumba can be found in "Membangun Syariat Islam di Bulukumba (1): Pupuk Kedisiplinan dengan Perda," *Fajar*, 13 November 2003; "Membangun Syariat Islam di Bulukumba (2): Syiar Islam Wajib Dilaksanakan," *Fajar*, 14 November 2003; "Perda Syiar Islam Berjalan Efektif," *Fajar*, 8 November 2003.
102. Interview with Asaad Salam, 3 April, 2003.
103. Interview with M. Ridwan, 4 April, 2003.
104. When I asked Abdul Aziz Kahar, he could not give the exact number of KPPSI activists elected to be members of the DPRD since many of them were not the board of KPPSI branches but supported the KPPSI's agenda.
105. Interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, 23 June 2004; H.M. Sirajuddin, 25 June 2004.
106. Interview with Zakaria J. Ngelow, 16 March 2004.
107. M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Syariat Islam Yes, Syariat Islam No," *Panji Masyarakat*, 27 November-12 December 2002: 34-35.
108. *Panji Masyarakat*, 27 November 2002 - 12 December 2002: 38.
109. Interview with H. Tjamiruddin, 5 April 2003.
110. Interview with Aziz Kahar, 23 June 2004.
111. *Tribun Timur*, 7 February 2006.

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