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Firman Noor

Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism: Understanding the Political Thinking of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)

Abstraksi: Fundamentalisme ternyata mengenal keragaman dan, dalam praktiknya, tidak selamanya bersifat ekstrem dan radikal. Berbeda dari pandangan umum yang menganggap fundamentalisme Islam cenderung absolutis dan monolitik, tulisan ini menghadirkan apa yang disebut sebagai “fundamentalisme Islam yang moderat” lewat penelusuran pemikiran politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), sebuah partai Islam di Indonesia yang cukup fenomenal dalam beberapa tahun terakhir. Penggunaan cara pandang seperti ini menawarkan sebuah perspektif baru di dalam analisis Islam dan politik di Indonesia dewasa ini, yang acapkali diwarnai oleh semangat fundamentalisme dan radikalisme.

Tulisan ini memaknai fundamentalisme sebagai gagasan yang percaya bahwa Islam merupakan ajaran yang sempurna dan menyeluruh, di mana Al-Qur'an dan Sunnah merupakan dasar-dasar bagi hukum Islam yang final dan utuh. Penulis mengemukakan bahwa, setidaknya dalam kurun waktu 1998-2005, PKS jelas-jelas merupakan kelompok fundamentalis, yang meskipun tumbuh berkembang di kalangan menengah perkotaan, tetap berbeda dari kelompok Islam modernis lainnya seperti Muhammadiyah, Persis, dan sebagainya. Namun, dengan mencermati berbagai pandangan dan praktik politiknya sebagai salah satu partai yang berlaga di dalam pemilu di Indonesia, PKS—yang tetap setia dengan pandangan Islam fundamentalisnya—juga menunjukkan pandangan moderat dalam berbagai hal. Jika dibaca dengan seksama, hal ini menjadikannya berbeda dari kelompok-kelompok fundamentalis lainnya, terutama mereka yang berada di garis keras dan radikal seperti FPI, FKASWJ, Laskar Jihad, ataupun MMI.

Tulisan ini memaparkan bahwa fundamentalisme moderat memiliki setidaknya empat ciri: pertama, percaya akan nilai-nilai fundamentalisme sebagaimana umumnya, seperti obsesi untuk menciptakan masyarakat Islam yang lebih baik dengan menerapkan sistem politik Islam yang universal berdasarkan Al-Qur'an dan Sunnah. Kedua, berbeda dengan fundamentalisme pada umumnya, fundamentalisme moderat menyodorkan model penafsiran yang lebih luwes terhadap nilai-nilai fundamentalisme. Walhasil, kaum fundamentalis moderat masih percaya dengan upaya dialog terbuka, termasuk wacana yang berkenaan dengan tema-tema politik modern seperti konsep negara-bangsa dan demokrasi.

Ketiga, dalam praktik politiknya, fundamentalisme moderat setuju untuk bersikap kooperatif dan kompromis terhadap pihak lain sejauh kepentingan dan tujuan politik mereka juga terakomodasi. Kompromi politik ini ditunjukkan dengan, misalnya, kesediaan kaum fundamentalis moderat untuk bergabung dalam parlemen dan duduk dalam pemerintahan lewat cara-cara konstitusional dan sesuai dengan peraturan yang ada. Meskipun tetap percaya sepenuhnya akan nilai-nilai Islam, kaum fundamentalis moderat cenderung setuju dengan demokrasi, karena dengan demokrasilah mereka bisa eksis, dan memberikan ruang untuk sebuah pemerintahan yang populer berdasarkan nilai-nilai Islam. Keempat, kaum fundamentalis moderat percaya bahwa perkembangan spiritual masyarakat bisa terjadi secara bertahap menuju sebuah tatanan sosial yang dicita-citakan.

Pandangan moderat PKS terwujud dalam berbagai hal: hubungan agama dan negara, pelaksanaan syariat Islam, negara Islam dan demokrasi. PKS cenderung setuju dengan ideologi negara Pancasila dan konsep negara-bangsa, namun tidak dengan serta-merta harus percaya bahwa ideologi negara seperti itu dan bentuk negara-bangsa seperti sekarang ini adalah sesuatu yang final. Pandangannya yang unik mengenai isu-isu ini menjadikan PKS berbeda dari gerakan Islam tradisional, modernis, dan fundamentalis radikal. Meskipun lebih banyak menggunakan pendekatan dan perspektif yang moderat di dalam ideologi politiknya, PKS masih tetap tergolong Islam fundamentalis, bukan hanya karena memiliki pengikut yang militan, tapi juga karena kegigihannya di dalam mengikuti dan mengaplikasikan ideologi dasar, asumsi dan tujuan utama fundamentalisme Islam sebagaimana umumnya.

Akhirnya, PKS masih terbuka untuk berbagai kemungkinan: menjadi semakin moderat dan akomodatif, atau semakin radikal. Masa depan PKS akan sangat tergantung kepada sejauhmana elit PKS mampu mempertahankan sikap moderatnya, di tengah kecenderungan friksi internal yang umum terjadi di partai politik, dan sejauhmana kondusifnya iklim politik nasional bagi keragaman pandangan politik.

Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism: Understanding the Political Thinking of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)

الخلاصة: يتضح أن الأصولية تنوعت وفي واقعها لم تتسم دائما بالتطرف والتشدد. وخلاف عن الراى العام القائل بأن الأصولية الإسلامية تميل إلى انفرادية وتسلطية، هذا البحث يتناول ما يسمى بأصولية إسلامية معتدلة يمثلها حزب العدالة الرفاهية (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) وهو حزب إسلامى مميز فى عدة سنوات آخرة بإندونيسيا. تقدم هذه وجهة النظر رؤية جديدة فى دراسة الإسلام السياسى بإندونيسيا فى الأوان الأخيرة التى تتصف بروح الأصولية والتشددية.

يرى البحث أن الأصولية كفكرة تؤكد أن الإسلام دين شامل ومتكامل حيث يعتبر القرآن والحديث مصادرا أساسية للشريعة الإسلامية الثابتة والمتكاملة . يتناول الباحث أن فى الفترة الزمنية ١٩٩٨-٢٠٠٥، حزب العدالة يمثل الأصوليين الذين تظهر حركتهم فى المدن وتختلف عن الحركة المعاصرة الأخرى مثل جمعية المحمدية و"برسيس" وغير ذلك. لكن بالنظر إلى آرائه وممارسته السياسية كحزب منافس فى الانتخابات الإندونيسية، حزب العدالة الذى يتمسك بأصوليته يعبر عن نظراته المعتدلة فى بعض الأمور. وهذه النظرة، إذا لاحظناها بدقة، تميزه عن الحركات الأصولية الأخرى المتشددة والمتطرفة مثل "جبهة الدفاع عن الإسلام" (ف ب إي) "جبهة و"ف كاسويجي" ز"لاسكار جهاد" أو"م م إي".

يصف لنا هذا البحث بأن للأصولية المعتدلة على الأقل أربعة مميزات، الأول: الاعتقاد بأن قيم الأصولية عامة تقدر على تحقيق مجتمع

إسلامي أفضل بتطبيق نظام الإسلام السياسي العالمي المبني على أساس القرآن والسنة. والثاني : خلافاً عن الأصولية السائدة، الأصولية المعتدلة تقدم لنا منهج التفسير الموسع لمبادئ الأصولية. على ذلك ، ما زال يعتقد أنصار الأصولية المعتدلة بمساعي حوار مفتوح في الموضوعات السياسية الحديثة مثل نظرية الدولة الوطنية والديمقراطية.

والثالث: في ممارستها السياسية، وافق الأصوليون على اتخاذ الموقف التعاوني والتوافقي من الآخرين الذين يتفوقون معهم في مصالحهم السياسية. يتضح موقفهم المتسامح في قبولهم على المشاركة البرلمانية والمناصب الحكومية بوسائل قانونية ولوائح معمولة. رغم من التزامهم الكامل بالتعاليم الإسلامية، لكنهم يتمسكون بالديمقراطية، وبما أثبت وجودهم وأتيحت لهم الفرصة لجعل حكومة شعبية مبنية على القيم الإسلامية. والرابع : يعتقد أنصار الأصولية المعتدلة بأن تطوراً روحياً للمجتمع قد يحدث تدريجياً للوصول إلى نظام اجتماعي مرجو.

ترجع نظرة معتدلة لحزب العدالة إلى الأمور الآتية منها العلاقة بين الدين والدولة، بين تطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية والدولة الإسلامية والديمقراطية. يوافق الحزب على أيديولوجي "بنشاشيلا" (المبادئ الخمسة) وفكرة الدولة الوطنية، لكنه ليس بالضرورة الاعتقاد بأن أيديولوجي الدولة المذكور شكل نهائي للدولة . هذا الموقف الفريد هو الذي يميزه عن التنظيمات الإسلامية الأخرى سواء كانت تقليدية وحديثة أم أصولية. رغم من اتخاذ الحزب هذه النظرة المعتدلة في موقفه السياسية، لكنه يدخل في قائمة الأصولية الإسلامية، التي لم يكن له الملتزمون به فحسب، بل ثبوته في الالتزام بمبادئ أساسية للأصلية الإسلامية السائدة وتطبيقها.

وفي الأخير، أن حزب العدالة الرفاهية في القادم قد يتحول إلى أكثر اعتدالاً وتقبلاً أو إلى أكثر تطرفاً وتشدداً. ومستقبل الحزب يتوقف على قدرة صفوته على التمسك بموقفه المعتدل في وسط الصراع الداخلي الغالب حدوثه في أي حزب وعلى الأحوال السياسية الوطنية القادرة على قبول تعدد النظرة السياسية.

Introduction

Islamic Fundamentalism is developing rapidly in the Islamic world today. Like any other religious and political movement, fundamentalism shows many variant and ways of realizing their views, which has led to the emergence of various cultural and political institutions. Fundamentalism is anything but monolithic but nevertheless, to some extent, fundamentalist strands demonstrate rather similar characteristics.¹

As a religious and political phenomenon, fundamentalism has been on the rise in Indonesia. Since the reformation era, after 1998, the impact of fundamentalism on politics has challenged typologies of analysis which usually divide Islamic political groups into modernists and traditionalists. It has foremost influenced the Indonesian political constellation.

The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)—a new Islamic party established at the beginning of the reform era—shows every characteristic of being a fundamentalist party. It has its base mainly among young, intellectual, and urban Muslims. It demonstrates that the Islamic political party situation in Indonesia, in terms of ideology and practice, has basically returned to a situation comparable to that of the 1950s.

Many scholars have categorized the party in various ways. In his comprehensive study, Aay Muhammad Furkon concludes that the PKS is basically a modernist party primarily inspired by the thoughts of the *Al-Ikhwān Al-Muslimun* (Islamic Brotherhood).² Mark Woodward believes the PKS to be one of the outward expressions of Islamic modernism and he therefore groups this party together with other modernist parties in Indonesia.³ Ali Said Damanik, on his turn, believes that the PKS is rooted in fundamentalist culture and is predominantly inspired by the Islamic Brethren.⁴ Other observers, as if wanting to depart from the modernist and fundamentalist dichotomy use other alternative terms to classify the party. Nandang Burhanudin believes that the PKS actually uses a comprehensive approach turning it into an ideal all-encompassing party.⁵ Earlier studies about Islamic politics in Indonesia conducted by scholars such as Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy,⁶ Greg Barton,⁷ Anies Baswedan,⁸ Saiful Mujani, and William Liddle⁹ used the label Islamist to explain PKS's character. Elizabeth Fuller Collins regards the PKS as "a moderate alternative to radical Islamism".¹⁰ Various approaches have been used to understand it, and many technical

terms have been applied in order to describe PKS's position. That the PKS represents a new trend in Indonesian political thinking is, however, a reality.

What has been said above already sufficiently indicates that the PKS is a complex phenomenon which is difficult to comprehend. The lack of studies focusing on the political thoughts and actions of the PKS contributes to this difficulty. Although studies have described the PKS from many points of view, particularly in historical terms, in light of the influence exerted on it by global political and Islamic movements, and the political actions it has taken at the surface, a comprehensive study of PKS's political thoughts and actions has yet to be undertaken.

This article proposed the term 'moderate fundamentalism' as a tool in understanding the defining characteristic of the PKS. In short, the term refers to fundamentalism in a moderate perspective, enabling moderate fundamentalists to be involved in political activities adaptively and without resorting to the use of radical means. Using this term, I argue that the PKS is a part of the fundamentalist faction, differentiating it in principle from other modernist groups or parties in Indonesia. Its moderate nature, however, also differentiates it from the radical camps within the fundamentalist faction. The use of the term moderate fundamentalism allows for the observation of diversity within the fundamentalist faction and contributes to new insights into present-day Indonesian Islamic political parties.

The present research considers the characteristics of moderate fundamentalists to be as follows:¹¹ First, belief in the values of fundamentalism as the basic way of thinking. This includes the obsession to establish a universal Islamic political system based on the Qur'an and the Hadith as an alternative way in creating a better life for the *ummat*. Second, moderate fundamentalism interprets fundamentalist values from a moderate perspective. As a consequence, moderate fundamentalists are willing to engage in a dialogue using common language and discourse, including modern political notions such as nation-state and democracy. Third, moderate fundamentalists tend to compromise and to entertain a cooperative attitude towards other parties, as long as these can bring them to the realization of their political objectives. Moreover this group tends to operate from within the system – by joining parliament and government in constitutional ways and by abiding to the rules of the game

prevalent in the country. They tend not to resort to extreme and violent actions to achieve their political goals. They also tend to accept democracy, since democracy can be used to support their existence as well as the realization of their ideal of setting up some sort of popular or people's government, based on Islamic values. Fourth, moderate fundamentalists believe in a gradual establishment of an ideal social organization in order to improve the spiritual development of society and of individuals.

This article will discuss PKS's thoughts on the relations between Islam and state, the position of the *shari'ah* in the state, and on democracy in the period from 1998 to 2005. I will compare moderate fundamentalists with radical fundamentalists and modernists in order to provide a clearer picture of PKS's political thinking.

It is important to note that the few modernists mentioned in this article are considered to represent the general opinions of this faction. The modernists are represented by several prominent figures such as M. Natsir, M. Amien Rais, and Yusril Mahendra.

The radical fundamentalists in this article consist of various Islamic social organizations such as the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), the now defunct Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah and the Community of the Prophet (FKASWJ), Laskar Jihad, and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI).

Islam and the State

In Indonesia, there are at least three different groups of Islamic political thinking concerning the relations between religion and the state.¹² The first group believes that Islam contains clear and detailed concepts in matters of politics and the state. This view holds that religion and the state are integrated. It is based on the belief that Islam is a perfect and comprehensive religion that deals with every aspect of human life and therefore also with political affairs. This group also thinks that the only ideal political system was the one in place during the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the *Khulafa Rasyidin* (the righteous caliphs). Therefore, they propose that an Islamic State be re-established. The second group believes that Islam offers clear prescriptions regarding the relation between religion and the state and that Islam is an individualistic religion restricted to the private sphere. They are often secularists who believe in the supremacy of the western political system because it has proved to be effective.

The third group believes that Islam has relevance to state matters but that Islam gives general and not detailed guidance. As a consequence Islamic communities are urged to find the most appropriate system while including Islamic ethics and values in their ideas about statehood. The PKS seems to belong to the first group that stresses the close relations between Islam and the state. However, this does not make this party ignore reality or forget the socio-cultural background of Indonesia.

In PKS's view, Islam and the state are inextricably linked.¹³ This is related to Tarbiyah's main doctrine of Islam as *syumuliyah* (holistic teachings).¹⁴ In this regard, Islam is not considered merely as ritual but also as a set of rules that regulate all activities of people, both as individuals and in their capacity as members of society".¹⁵ One PKS document states:

"Islam is a universal system of living which entails all aspects of life. Islam is state and homeland, government and community, morality and power, blessing and justice, culture and constitution, science and judiciary, material and natural resources, seeking livelihood and prosperity, jihad and religious proselytizing, soldiers and thoughts, beliefs and acts of devotion. Muslims have an obligation to comprehensively adhere to these cores of Islamic teachings and to acknowledge their universality. Islam is a system of life that covers religion, politics, state, and society".¹⁶

Thus the PKS believes that Islam offers political guidance to its adherents. The logical consequence of being an expression of human society, the state should be regarded as part of Islamic teachings. The PKS therefore rejects secularism or the separation of secular life from religious matters.

Moreover, the PKS thinks that the relevance of Islam in the state is related to ideological and constitutional matters because, according to senior party figure, Abu Ridha, Islam consists of values and laws that can be and should be formally implemented in the state.¹⁷ The PKS emphasizes that Islamic teachings, originating from the Qur'an and Sunnah, should be used as sources of inspiration for the state and should be the basis of its laws and constitution. Ridha states that God revealed the Qur'an to the Prophet Muhammad to be used as *dustur* (constitution) and as the highest rule for mankind'.¹⁸ The PKS believes therefore that to establish a "*negara religius*" (a religious state) based on Islamic teachings is every Muslim's true obligation.¹⁹ The implication of this point of view is that the PKS believes that

Islam and its laws occupy a formalistic role in the state and it has a tendency to strive for the creation of a formal Islam by using Islam as the ideology for state matters.

The Function of the State

In PKS's point of view, the state has a number of primary obligations, especially with regards to guiding its citizens by protecting their faith and enabling them to attain happiness in this world and in the hereafter. The state has therefore a significant role in Islamic education and in the promotion of Islamic teachings. This education also covers the way to keep religious matters in keeping with the example of Muhammad in Medina.²⁰ Irwan Prayitno, a PKS activist, stated that:

"The state has the right to conduct religious education in society and it even has to support the obligation of its population to read the Qur'an and wear the headscarf and to ensure that these kinds of policy are supported by the whole of society".²¹

This perspective is rooted in the education model of the Tarbiyah movement which attempts to provide continuous education for individuals, the family, society, and the state. This process must be continued even when the ideal state, which is an Islamic state, has been established.²² In fact, it is the primary function of the state to ensure the development of Islamic teachings and to implement the *shari'ah* comprehensively.²³

According to Siddiq, the function of the state in moral education is in fact related to the formation of Muslim identity. By providing Muslims with proper education about Islam, it is expected that the state will offer a proper understanding of the true characteristics of Muslims. Siddiq adds that this is related to the idea of turning Islam into a symbol of identity for every Muslim, so that Muslims behave properly as individuals, as citizens inside the national system, and in their relations with other citizens. Given this function of the state, the PKS believes the role of religion, as mentioned by Bellah,²⁴ to be an identity and a set of instructions for the continuation of the social system. In view of these functions the PKS believes that the state plays a strategic role in the effective implementation of Islamic moral values and teachings.

Even though the PKS believes that society is able to organize *dakwah* (religious propagation) by itself without interference of the state, the state and its apparatus can assist this process by formulating policies that protect and foster *dakwah* activities. The state should be one of the most important supporting pillars to strengthen Islam and the state is therefore a prerequisite for the perpetuation of Islam on earth.²⁵ However, the PKS also takes the actual situation into consideration in the process of making Islam the foundation of the state and in ensuring that the state is turned into an institution that indeed fosters Islamic interests. In the present situation, where Indonesian society is generally not fully supporting the role of Islam in the state, the PKS is of the opinion that Islam in the state should focus on universal matters, such as humanity, justice, and social awareness in a national framework.

PKS's political perspectives share points of view with the radical fundamentalist group. To this group, Islam is unique and its uniqueness is the result of its role in societal life. According to the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI= Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), Islam teaches Muslims both as individuals and as members of a community, about matters of individual improvement as well as matters that are related to community life.²⁶ Based on these perceptions and on the belief that Islam includes a set of laws that in the practical context can effectively be used to provide direction and which form the basis of the way the state should be managed, radical fundamentalist groups unequivocally believe that Islam has to be the formal foundation of the state.²⁷ This principle is clearly reflected by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's statement which says:

"According to the example of the Prophet Muhammad, Islam must be wedded to the government and to the nation; it must be the law of the state – this was the example given by the Prophet. It must not be purely a personal matter. Don't follow politicians, don't follow the nation, and don't separate Islam from the nation, that is just wrong".²⁸

Moreover, according to radical fundamentalists, the separation between state and religion is not only intolerable but also absurd. In fact they believe that Islam with all of its tendencies and purposes is both a religion and a state. This is stated by the (LJASWJ)= Laskar

Jihad Ahlussunah Wal-Jamaah) another radikal group of Indonesian Islam: "politics is a main part of Islamic teachings and the Qur'an and Sunnah have to act as Judges".²⁹

Modernists also believe that Islam has a place in solving state problems. This is related to the obligation for Muslims to create the best possible living conditions for humanity in God's favor. Attempts to create such a system are actually regarded as a part of *ibadah* (the religious service), particularly in the horizontal context of social relations among people.³⁰ The PKS shares similar point of view, in this matter with many modernists. Amien Rais, for example, states that a government guided by Islam has two functions: firstly, to guarantee the implementation of Islamic teachings; and secondly to ensure the fulfillment of people's needs. Thus the state has the obligation to meet the spiritual and material needs of the people while Islamic values have to be adopted as the guidelines in attaining these needs.³¹

However, even though modernists and the PKS believe in the inextricability of Islam and the state, modernists stress that this relation need not be realized in a formal context. This is because Islam does not provide detailed directives for such relations. The modernists feel that what Islam offers to Muslims in politics is principally an obligatory recommendation to create a system that is based on the Islamic spirits of justice, equality, and consensus.³² Moreover, the majority of the modernists do not see mentioned in the Qur'an or the Sunnah any kind of fixed or formal shape for the political system. As a result, they consider that Islam only offers general rules about politics and provides freedom to its followers to be creative in the way they want to be engaged in politics. Thus when Muslims have successfully brought the spirit of Islam into the political context, they have essentially fulfilled their obligation.

PKS's formal approach to the implementation of Islamic teachings is shown by its point of view on the relationship between Islam and the state. In this context, the state becomes an independent institution having its own interests in its role of servant of ideology. PKS's model of the state approaches that of the organic state,³³ rather than a pluralist or Marxist one (where the state is the committee for certain classes). Being an organic state has the right and the obligation to encourage all citizens to strive for their common objectives, which in the PKS's context is the establishment and implementation of Islamic teachings at every level of life and ultimately is geared

towards the revival of the caliphate. Apart from PKS's gradual approach to implement its objective, in extreme circumstances an organic state has the opportunity to act in a comprehensive and interventionist role in the name of shared ideals, while weakening civil society and minority groups. Although the PKS believes in the use of a process of consultation in managing the state, its tendency to be supportive of a strong and interventionist state cannot be denied.

Shari'ah: Towards an "Islamic State".

In Indonesia, since before the establishment of the republic, various sections of society aspired to struggle for the implementation of the *shari'ah* and this is evident from the debates between the Indonesian founding fathers regarding the content of the 1945 constitution.³⁴ At present, this desire entertained by various groups to formalize the *shari'ah* at the constitutional level - by incorporating the 'seven words' of the *Piagam Jakarta* (the Jakarta charter, stating that Muslims are required to abide to the *shari'ah*) - and at the local level in several provinces, municipalities, and cities are reflections of this aspiration.³⁵ The role of the *shari'ah* in politics and in the state is ultimately inseparable from the debate about the creation of an Islamic state as the tangible, formal, and comprehensive realization of the *shari'ah*. With its moderate fundamentalism PKS puts forwards the total implementation of the *shari'ah* at every level of life. In the context of present-day Indonesia, however, the PKS favors a gradual approach in *shari'ah* implementation and does not consider the establishment of an Islamic state to be urgent.

The PKS believes that the *shari'ah* is nothing less than the ultimate true guidance for every Muslim. For the PKS, God's law defines the proper relations between the people and God (*hablum min Allah*) and the relations among people (*hablum min al-nas*).³⁶ Therefore, Muslims may not disregard the role the *shari'ah* plays in their life. Moreover, it believes that upholding the *shari'ah* is the logical consequence of being a Muslim. One of the party's principles, *al-shari'ah* (constitution), states that "upholding the *shari'ah*, and obedience and commitment to it, is the obligation of every Muslim as the consequence of his or her belief".³⁷ Ridha stated that:

"Upholding the *shari'ah* is for us not only related to political discourse, but is also an actualization in every part of our life, individually, socially, and politically".³⁸

Hence, the *shari'ah* in PKS's opinion is relevant in daily life, while in the political context it believes that *shari'ah* has universal values and is replete with solutions able to bring happiness to the people.³⁹ Al-Jufri mentions in this connection:

"The only leader or government to obtain help from Allah is a leader or a government that obeys Allah's rules. The Constitution, government regulations, ministerial decisions etc made by the Government have to be in line with God's Laws".⁴⁰

Even though the PKS does not mention in its statutes, (Internal Party Regulations) that the *shari'ah* should become the state's constitution, it does believe that the *shari'ah* has to be implemented in daily life so that in the end it will become an integral part of Indonesian laws and regulations.

The PKS is convinced that, when implemented in its entirety, the *shari'ah* will bring salvation to mankind. This is because it has universal values, acceptable to everyone.⁴¹ The PKS is also of the opinion that if the *shari'ah* is properly implemented, it will not discriminate against adherents of other religions.⁴² It argues that if the Muslims take over power and implement the *shari'ah*, the principle of justice-for-all will guide them and will ensure that the basic rights of every citizen, including those of non-Muslims, will be guaranteed.⁴³ PKS's cadres argue that the history of Islamic rule reveals that minority rights were indeed respected while it also demonstrates that non-Muslim officials participated in the government indicating that there was harmony for all people.

Such arguments cannot, however, take away non-Muslim concerns, given that the *shari'ah* also introduces the concept of *zimmi*,⁴⁴ which has the potential of reducing the right of non-Muslims to be elected as leader of the state and thus, to some extent, induces discrimination. This opinion also finds difficulty in honoring a place to "deviant groups", such as the Ahmadiyah, in the Islamic community. The PKS tends to limit its perception of the universality of the *shari'ah* by supporting the ban on such groups.

Following the principle of *al-tadarruj* (gradualism), the PKS considers the implementation of the *shari'ah* a gradual process that requires a thorough understanding of the contemporary situation. This means that the implementation of the *shari'ah* must be commensurate with the level of Islamic understanding among society. It believes that the development of Islam is closely related to the

success of *dakwah* development, whereby an intensive model of communication and a pattern of flexible *dakwah* development is required. The PKS therefore says:

“A commitment is a manifestation of *al-istimsak* (firmness) and *al-haq* (truth), determination and believing fully in Islam as a righteous and comprehensive teaching that has to be upheld in every aspect of life while still maintaining flexibility as the basis characteristic of the *shari’ah* as well as upholding the aspect of formal legality that is in line with the *shari’ah*”.⁴⁵

The PKS thus believes that the *shari’ah* should not be implemented hastily but first needs to be internalized properly in the heart of every individual Muslim. This argument is in line with the party’s principle namely *qum daulah fi shudurikum, wa qum fil ardhikum* (establish a “state” first in your heart, and then in the world). This means that it also requires every Muslim to be prepared before the *shari’ah* at state level can be realized and this will be a very long process and require serious efforts. The PKS believes that the establishment of an Islamic state will be pointless if the people are basically not ready to uphold and support such a system.⁴⁶

The Islamic State Issue

The emergence of the term Islamic state is basically a critical response from Muslims to the world-wide development of the concept of nation-state. This concept originated in the West because the power over the world was divided in terms of geographically defined territories, based on nationalism and sovereignty. Islam never limited the Islamic people to any one nation based on territory. The development of ideas about the Islamic state has caused sustained contention in Indonesia. Indonesia experienced a long period when a fierce struggle was fought between proponents of Indonesia as an Islamic state and advocates of a *Pancasila* state.⁴⁷ This ideological tension was formally overcome by the acceptance of *Pancasila* as the sole principle of the state in the 1980s. That acceptance had to undergo a long debate and met with resistance from many Islamic organizations and parties.⁴⁸ Over time this national acceptance proved to be artificial. There are many segments among Islamic groups that continue to reject the New Order regime’s effort to unify the many

ideologies in Indonesia. In this *reformasi* era, the Islamic state issue has re-surfaced.

The PKS tends to avoid contentious terminology when speaking about the Islamic State⁴⁹ and it believes that Islamic society has not completely accepted the term. Thus, for the current situation, the important thing to do first is to create Islamic teachings acceptable to all Muslims. This means that a moderate kind of the *shari'ah* in needs to be implemented that accommodates most Muslims while also bearing the real conditions of Indonesian society in mind. Attempts to implement an Islamic State in its entirety at present would only trigger unproductive and sensitive, protracted debates among the people in this country.⁵⁰ For these reasons, the PKS believes that the essence of the state is far more important than its outward form. According to Siddiq:

“What the PKS believes, in terms of the implementation of Islamic teachings, is actually not concerned with labeling, but with how to ensure that Islamic values, teachings, and conceptions can be realized in all aspects of state life”.⁵¹

Matta, one of PKS leaders, stated that whatever the name, as long as the essence of the state concords with Islamic values such as justice and equality it is enough. Furthermore, in his opinion some urgent and real problems such as how to create a better system of education, improve the economy and heighten defense are more important and pressing than a discussion about the name and shape of the state.⁵² For him the existence of such an Islamic state is related to the issue of changing the condition of the state to be a better and more Islamic one.⁵³

The second PKS President Hidayat Nur Wahid thinks along the same lines, saying that the term Islamic State is not the issue. The important thing, according to him, is to ensure the presence of Islamic values in the daily life of all Muslims, so that every Muslim can focus his or her potential to act well and to avoid crimes being committed toward anything and anybody and not to waste time in engaging in pointless debates.⁵⁴ Thus, rather than trying to establish an Islamic state, PKS's main concern should be to create a just and prosperous state.⁵⁵

However, it is interesting to note that this does not mean that the PKS has ceased efforts to try to implement an Islamization process at the higher level, which means the global level, when condi-

tions permit. This is because for the PKS the improvement of Islamic practices and beliefs should not end with the individual, the family, or society, but must extend to the state and even to the world.⁵⁶ As a consequence, PKS's political focus is to continuously develop a system based on Islamic concepts and the enforcement of the *shari'ah* in Indonesia,⁵⁷ with the establishment of an Islamic State as its final goal.⁵⁸ According to Yusroh:

"This process cannot be stopped because we hope for the enforcement of Allah's power on earth. Because we know that every faith acknowledges that when Muslims commit to the values of Islamic teaching, Islam cannot only protect Muslims but also protect Allah's other creatures. So, *amar maruf nahi munkar* is not limited to uphold *daulah* (state), but also to uphold the caliphate, whereby in the end, the *rahmatan lil alamin* is really felt".⁵⁹

Moreover, if PKS's political goal is the legalization of the *shari'ah*, an Islamic state is in essence unavoidable. On the other hand, as stated by Ridha, the creation of an Islamic state is a prerequisite before the *shari'ah* can be enforced because it is unrealistic to expect an all-inclusive implementation of the *shari'ah* in a secular state to be possible.⁶⁰ The PKS also believes that the State of Medina is the perfect example of an Islamic state in the true sense. Ridha believes that although the term Islamic state is not used, the Medina instance offers a framework for the implementation of the *shari'ah*.⁶¹ Moreover, essentially it is the duty of every single Muslim to take the State of Medina as an example and this example can only be emulated within an Islamic state.⁶²

However, in efforts to establish an Islamic state, the PKS values gradual, tolerant, and democratic approaches. Siddiq stated that in principle:

"...if various Islamic elements have different opinions, they can fight for their opinions. However, if there is an Islamic political power that fights for the establishment of an Islamic order in the constitutional manner and is able to manifest that based on agreed universal values, the other Islamic elements must accept it. Therefore, while differences are still possible, we will coexist with those elements".⁶³

Even Ridha admitted the willingness of the people to be a determinant the establishment of an Islamic state, Ridha said:

"The establishment of an ideal state fully depends on the willingness of the majority of the society that inhabits this state because the establishment of a state is the result of consensus. Meaning, an Islamic state cannot possibly be established if its citizen do not fully desire it".⁶⁴

In summary, PKS's view on the Islamic state issue can be seen as an attempt to uphold Islam through formal channels. This attempt defines PKS elites as politicians and *dakwah* conveyors carrying out the mission of awakening the Muslims. Based on past experiences and on their future interest to develop Islamic *dakwah*, the party's elites try to respond to the idea of the establishment of the Islamic state contextually. However, if we look deeper, the effort to implement the *shari'ah* is obviously also a stepping stone towards formalizing Islamic teaching at the level of the state. Thus, even though in its statutes the PKS makes no mention of an Islamic state, this does not mean that it rejects the desirability of such a state.⁶⁵

Like the PKS, the modernists also believe that in essence the *shari'ah* provides direction in life for every Muslim in order to achieve peace and happiness in this world and in the hereafter.⁶⁶ The modernists and the PKS share a similar view about the connection between the *shari'ah* and Muslim activities. However, the modernists are also well aware of the fact that not all human activities are arranged in detail in the *shari'ah*.⁶⁷ To the modernists, the *shari'ah* is essentially flexible and should be implemented by taking into account the current conditions faced by the *ummat*. The *shari'ah* is in the end multi-interpretable as well as contextual so that in the political context, the terminology used in the *shari'ah* basically extends beyond fixed laws and generates many different opinions and perceptions. For modernists, in terms of politics, the *shari'ah* offers universal values, rather than detailed sets of arrangements.

With respect to the idea of establishing an Islamic state, modernists believe that the attempt to establish such a state must be understood as an attempt to create an institution replete with the spirit of Islam. As mentioned previously, for modernists, the form the state has does not matter; as long as it is based on the spirit of Islam, it can be regarded as an Islamic State.⁶⁸

Furthermore, the modernists believe that for Muslims the establishment of a formal Islamic state is not actually an obligation. For them, the establishment of an Islamic state is not urgent because it is in essence only an some Muslim scholars' idea based on their interpretation of Islam.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Islamic teachings do not clearly mention the kind of form a state should have. As a result, Islam provides freedom to its followers to set up a form of state appropriate to them. Further, according to modernists, it would be difficult for modern-day Muslims to re-create a state form based on the one dating back from the seventh century.⁷⁰

In Indonesia, the establishment of an Islamic State would face many obstacles mainly because it has a plural society and because of the availability of various internal interpretations on this concept among Muslim scholars. For Rais, the Islamic state is therefore not an appropriate model for Indonesia, precisely because of its diversity.⁷¹ In fact most modernists reject the idea of re-adding the 'seven words' of the Jakarta Charter to the constitution, which would in potential allow the state to legally and formally implement the *shari'ah*.⁷² Meanwhile, the United Development Party (PPP= Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB= Partai Bulan Bintang) both propose the idea that the main aim of such an effort is to clarify revise Indonesian history⁷³ and actually has nothing to do with an Islamic state.⁷⁴ In the MPR (People's Consultative Council) Annual Meeting, the PPP stated that:

"The proposal for the return to the seven words is not intended to create an Islamic state, but for strengthening Indonesian nationality in the framework of a united state based on the Pancasila".⁷⁵

The PKS does not, however, totally accept the perspective that proposes only to give priority to substantial aspects. The emphasize on cultural aspects should, in their eyes, not obscure the importance of the establishment of the *shari'ah* at the constitutional level. The PKS believes that someday the *shari'ah* should concretely be manifest in the national constitution. PKS's thoughts in this matter clearly agree with the understanding of the fundamentalists, who firmly believe in the role of Islam in the state.

Radical fundamentalists think that the *shari'ah* alone, as divine law decreed by God, should be applied in every aspect of life. According to M. Thalib, the leader of the MMI, the almighty *shari'ah* is incomparable to secular laws,⁷⁶ and every Muslim is obliged to implement it

in its entirety while they have to reject every kind of man-made law. In Indonesia the implementation of the *shari'ah* is deemed possible, because by its innate nature it can be implemented everywhere and especially in a country like Indonesia where Muslims are the overwhelming majority. According to LJASWJ, the now defunct radical fundamentalist group, any Muslim who rejects the imposition of the *shari'ah* has essentially renounced Islam.⁷⁷ In the view of the chairman of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Habib Rizieq Shihab, basing the state on the foundation of the *shari'ah* means that society has in essence established an Islamic state.⁷⁸

However in contrast to the PKS who believes that the *shari'ah* should be implemented gradually and from bottom up, and who deals with this issue sensitively, radical fundamentalists do not propose such an approach. Because of their textual and literal understanding of Islam, they refuse to understand and interpret the *shari'ah* in a substantial way. To them, the Qur'an and the Sunnah have clearly explained every dimension of humankind, and the words of God are unequivocal. What all Muslims need to do is to simply abide to each and every single word of God's teachings.⁷⁹ The difference between the PKS and radical fundamentalists can also be seen in their concept of the various stages needed for the implementation of the *shari'ah*. To radical fundamentalists, the *shari'ah* has to be established as a constitution first, and should be implemented all at once for everyone.⁸⁰ This perspective differs from the belief of PKS which regards the Islamization of the constitution as the ultimate stage of a long process.

By emphasizing that non-state elements should be ready before the *shari'ah* is to be established at the level of the state, the PKS shows its belief in the importance of a cultural approach in achieving Islamic objectives and emphasizes that non-state elements should be ready before the *shari'ah* is to be implemented. As a political party, the PKS combines formal and cultural approaches into a holistic approach, which influences its attitude towards social problems. In a broad sense, their approach makes a rigid dichotomy between cultural and formal approaches difficult to uphold, particularly in the Indonesian Islamic political context. This is not only because the idea that a cultural approach may in essence be some kind of political expression in response to specific political situations, such as was the case during the New Order era,⁸¹ but is also related to the existence of groups that combine both approaches in

attaining their ideals, as was attempted by the Tarbiyah and the PKS in the *Reformasi* era.

Democracy and *Shura* (Consultation)

Democracy is a philosophy born and nurtured in the West. In its development democracy has been defined and interpreted in many ways which, however, according to Amin Saikal, basically agree with the notion that democracy is "a process of public participation whereby power and authority can be transferred in an orderly and peaceful fashion".⁸² Democracy is related to people's government, freedom, equality, pluralism, and fraternity.⁸³ All of these are based upon a civic foundation, as succinctly formulated by Abraham Lincoln as "the government of the people, for the people, and by the people".⁸⁴ Democracy is a notion that the majority of the people determine political life.⁸⁵ By putting universal values to the fore democracy has been able to impress and attract the attention of most of the world's leaders and political thinkers, also in Muslim countries.⁸⁶ In the Islamic world, there have been many approaches to democracy both as a governmental system and as a way of life/ideology that is imbued with philosophical values.

In Islam there are at least three groups who have different ways of political thinking about democracy.⁸⁷ The first group includes those who reject the idea of democracy completely. People belonging to this group think that democracy is not in line with Islamic values, especially in the context of the sovereignty of the people. They also think that democracy might trigger a divide between Muslims, especially when a multiparty system is in use. The second group is those who accept democracy but recognize that there are differences between democracy and Islamic political concepts. For this group, democracy agrees with Islamic values and provides in practice an opportunity for the development of Islamic politics. However, this group is also critical of the shortcomings of democracy, whereby the interests of the majority of the people for most part determines everything in politics so that there is a possibility that democracy might potentially obliterate the spirit and role of religion in government. The third group is those who accept democracy completely. They consider democracy to be a Muslim expression in government and in the political arena. This group believes that democracy is

identical with the values and spirit of Islam although they reside in different areas.

Over time, a new sub-group has emerged out of the second group. This group recognizes democracy as a political mechanism that shares various similarities with Islamic political concepts. However, democracy can only be a temporary solution for Muslims. This group is of the opinion that the concept of *shura* (consultation) must be enforced because it will guarantee the maintenance of Islamic values without having to use the mechanism of majority voting. The PKS can be seen as a proponent of this sub-group.

The PKS generally recognizes that democracy is an objective reality and understands it to include political notions that are similar to contemporary Islamic political concepts. It believes that in substance, democracy has a universal spirit much like Islamic teaching.⁸⁸ It recognizes that values, such as equality, justice, and consultation, are basic principles enshrined in the Qur'an which had been implemented by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina. Democracy is also considered to correspond with the spirit of Islamic teaching, because it also rejects exclusive authority and gives priority to *shura*, which involves society's participation in decision making. Ridha has stated:

"The Islamic governmental system does not support the total protecting of a ruler, because it might in the end facilitate state exploitation. In the Islamic system, Islamic people are given the chance to topple a leader if he/she resorts to tyranny".⁸⁹

Furthermore, according to the PKS, political participation is central to both democracy and Islamic political concepts⁹⁰ and democracy is therefore in line with the Islamic spirit.⁹¹ Democracy is at present generally regarded as a proper medium for Muslims to be involved in the political arena. With its emphasis on individual freedom, according to Matta, democracy allows Muslim to exist, to practice their faith, and to develop their ways of thinking, particularly in order to improve people's living conditions. In other words, by accepting democracy, Muslims will have the opportunity to find solutions to life's problems.⁹² The PKS sees democracy as a means for *dakwah* activists to convince people (about Islam) which makes it preferable to authoritarian or totalitarian regimes which curb *dakwah*.⁹³ Thus the PKS understands democracy as a mechanism en-

abling Muslims to be involved in politics while at the same time being able to achieve their Islamic ideals.

The acceptance of democracy in PKS's opinion is also related to *dakwah*. Democracy is a widespread political mechanism accepted by the majority of Indonesians, and therefore by Muslims. Democracy is a popular term and can be used to support efforts to expand the conveyance of *dakwah*. According to Hantoni Hasan, the PKS activist at the Bandar Lampung DPRD (Regional Parliament), the PKS – with its tolerant *dakwah* methods – believes that it is futile to use unfamiliar jargon such as *shura*, when conducting *dakwah* about Islam and Islamic politics.⁹⁴ Democracy is a much wider known concept and the party's political activists therefore have to accept it in their *dakwah* efforts.

Between Divine and Popular Sovereignty

Although the PKS sees some similarity between Islam and democracy, it has never acknowledged democracy as a political philosophy in the way it is understood and applied by the Westerners. Indeed, it has always been ambivalent in its reaction to democracy.⁹⁵ It also does not consider the majority voice as absolute. It does, however, accept a role of society and the people in the government and the state.⁹⁶ This is because in principle, according to the PKS, the majority is not always right.⁹⁷ What is right is only to be found within Islamic law and teaching. Theoretically, anybody is free to interpret Quranic verses, but, in practice, it is the prerogative of only a handful of experts. This means that in democracy the majority has the power whereas they do not have enough knowledge about the truth, which is in the hand of a small minority. The majority may thus vote out of ignorance and follow their own interests, potentially causing them to contradict God's Law, which is of course inconceivable. This is acknowledged by Matta who says that:

“The basic difference between secular democracy and the Islamic political concept is related to the perspective about the holder of sovereignty. Secular democracy renders the sovereignty to the people, and says that sovereignty is in the hands of the people; they believe that the voice of the people is the voice of God. On the other hand, in the Islamic concept, sovereignty belongs solely to God; therefore the voice of God must be the voice of the people. As a consequence, in secular democracy the law is a general agreement which is produced within the

limits of the constitution, while in Islam the law is God-given and the function of the constitution is to realize it".⁹⁸

However, the PKS does not recognize the clerical essence of religious scholars as the institutionalization of God's existence on earth. It refuses the concept of the existence of exclusive groups of *ulama* with the right to decide all matters for the sake of the *ummat*. To the PKS, the role of society has to be accommodated, and the people should have the right to directly elect the best leader and to have the right to control the executive.⁹⁹ Any elimination of the rights of the people is not in line with the substance of Islam.

In PKS's opinion, the *shura* mechanism is intended as a means to bridge the gap between God and the sovereignty of the people. The *shura* mechanism allows for the possibility to ask experts' opinions about certain problems so that people can improve the situation for all.¹⁰⁰ The PKS thinks that by using this mechanism the real truth will prevail instead of the voice of the majority because the reasoning and argumentation will be in accordance with the *shari'ah*. However, this does not mean that this mechanism completely silences the role of the majority voice. This is because the people keep the right to select the persons eligible to hold positions in the *shura*. Thus to the PKS, the *shura* is a decision-making mechanism that enables the accommodation of people's rights and aspirations in the government by appointing experts and pious leaders, which ensures the protection of religious values.

On this basis, the PKS sees the *shura* as the most appropriate mechanism for Muslims, whilst democracy may at best offer only a temporary solution.¹⁰¹ The party has been implementing the *shura* internally by recognizing the institution of *ahlul halli wal aqdi* (an expert group which is elected to determine the policy-making process).¹⁰² The formation of the *Majelis Syuro (Shura Council)* is the implementation of this concept. PKS's statutes states that the *Shura Council* is the party's highest institution and functions as PKS's *ahlul halli wal aqdi* institution.¹⁰³

The role of this *Shura Council* in the PKS is interesting. Other Islamic parties have similar councils, but in reality those parties' executive bodies' role is still dominant. In the PKS, this *ahlul halli wal aqdi* is gaining an increasingly more important role. In the party, the dominant role of the *Shura Council* activates a kind of command mechanism which can support the party's activities effectively and

efficiently. It not only supports the party's unity, at least compared to other Indonesian Islamic political parties, but also offers the means to a faster implementation of the party's decisions in disciplinary matters.¹⁰⁴ This system has the potential to develop into the party's oligarchic iron law when the party comes to consider that hegemony is acceptable under certain circumstances, when it is related to matters of truth.¹⁰⁵

Moreover, the *shura* and the establishment of the *ahlul halli wal aqdi*, which acknowledge Islamic law as its main source, could mean that *ulamas* will have the main say in the decision-making process about virtually all aspects of life. This may cause problems in a plural society such as Indonesia which not only has a variety of religions and beliefs among different communities, but also within the Muslim community itself. As a consequence, it is not an easy task to select the right person to be in charge in the *shura* institution.¹⁰⁶

The PKS and modernist factions share a similar understanding of the positive sides of democracy. They believe that there are universal values in democracy and accept that Muslims may use it as a appropriate mechanism to realize their agendas. The modernists believe that in terms of politics, the Qur'an and Sunnah basically order every Muslims to uphold the universal values of justice, affection, and equality for humankind. Modernists believe that any kind of government established by Muslims have to implement those values. Using *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), modernists argue that in the modern era, democracy is the only a type of governmental system that approaches the spirit of Islam.¹⁰⁷

Democracy is accepted based on two other considerations. First, the modernists are not bothered about the origin of democracy and do not see it as something that belongs exclusively to the West. To the modernists, democracy is in essence a universal teaching that contains universal values appropriate for every society, including the Indonesian society. They also believe that the notion of people's sovereignty, as the main element of democracy, is also in line with Islamic political goals.¹⁰⁸ Rais therefore stated that he totally believes in democracy because it runs parallel with basic Islamic teaching.¹⁰⁹ The second is a practical reason. Modernists argue that the backwardness of Indonesian society today is caused by the uncontrolled,

exclusivist, and oligarchic New Order government. To address this situation, it is acceptable that Muslims learn the way of democracy from the West and apply this system.¹¹⁰

In the context of people's sovereignty there are also similarities between the PKS and the radical fundamentalists. According to the radical fundamentalists, the main problem of democracy is the concept of the sovereignty of the people,¹¹¹ precisely because the political system and political activities depend on the voice of the people. Radical fundamentalists contrast that with Islamic teachings in which one of the main principles is the belief in sovereignty of God. In this conception there is no other element beside God can have the right to be sovereign. In other words, the concept of people's sovereignty is contradictory to Islam. Moreover, this group believes that the Qur'an and Sunnah are the ultimate sources of a set of laws that arrange every aspect of human life. Thus, Muslims have no need to look for other sources to guide them in their life.¹¹² Rizieq indicates that there are only some minor aspects in life that are not arranged in detail in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Therefore, Muslims are permitted to enter into *musyawarah* (discussion) to contemplate these matters. Generally speaking, however, Muslims have to submit to God's law and to His sovereignty.¹¹³

Based on this standpoint, the concept of democracy which allows (the majority of) the people to have their own opinions and to run their own activities based on their own ideas and interests (which to some extent demonstrates the people's sovereignty), is unacceptable. Furthermore, to the radical fundamentalists, the majority is not totally superior in Islam. In fact, for them, a model of government which basically glorifies the majority is unprecedented in Islamic history. To them, in Islam, the truth is the most important thing and this has nothing to do with popularity or majority.

However, the radical fundamentalists and the PKS do not see democracy in the same way. The PKS acknowledges that some democratic values agree with the spirit of Islam and that democracy is a mechanism that can be used to struggle for Islamic interests. According to Awwas, one of the leaders of MMI, however, democracy is an infidel system which is not only inspired by secular and Western teachings, but also has caused the failure of Muslims to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.¹¹⁴ For the radical fundamentalists, events during the 1950s and at the beginning of the reform period have indicated that Muslims cannot trust the democratic

system (which was prominently represented by the very existence of a parliament) to be used as a means to strive for their goals, especially in dealing with the establishment of an Islamic state. Awwas concludes that “the biggest obstacle to Islamic law being adopted in Indonesia is democracy”.¹¹⁵ Moreover, democracy is also recognized as a system that may potentially threaten the implementation of Islamic teachings. Logically, by accepting the opinion of the majority as the basis of its policy, the government has to implement the interests of that majority. This means the government will potentially put into practice many opinions, including those which fundamentally contradict God’s law. This situation, in the opinion of the radical fundamentalists, will endanger all people and Muslims in particular.¹¹⁶

Conclusion

From the discussion above it has become clear that the moderate perspective is a core characteristic of PKS’s political ideology. It shows that PKS’s Islamic political orientation is based on the aim to create an Islamic political system in the sense that Islam should be an ideology of the state. However in doing so, it emphasizes a moderate approach by taking into account the readiness of Muslims and society before implementing Islamic political ideals at the state level, as well as honoring Indonesia’s nature as a plural nation. This perspective leads the PKS to accept Pancasila and the existence of the nation-state, without believing that this is the final end for the Muslims. Democracy is accepted as a tool to strengthen the political position of the *ummat*. However, even though the PKS believes that democracy approaches the spirit of Islamic teachings, the *shura* mechanism which fills the gap between the majority and the truth is regarded as the most appropriate for Muslims. In the context of Indonesian political thinking, PKS’s political view reveals a new approach, which is a demonstration of added diversity in Islamic politics in Indonesia. On the one hand, the PKS and other fundamentalists occupy a position on the the right wing of the Islamic political spectrum as opposed to the modernists which in Indonesia today is becoming increasingly obvious. On the other hand, PKS’s points of view indicate the existence of diversity within the fundamentalist movement.

The future of PKS's moderate attitudes depends on first, how capable the PKS elites are in maintaining moderate values, and second, how conducive the national political environment remains for the distribution of pluralism. Changes in these two factors can affect PKS's perspectives and attitudes. The PKS will continue to appear to be a more moderate political power if its moderate elites remain in power or are replaced by younger pragmatic groups. This moderate attitude will grow further if the Indonesian political environment remains conducive to pluralism. In such a political configuration, the PKS will regard the implementation of moderate values as a possible legitimate way to gain support, to increase the number of votes, and to maintain its position in the government.

Nevertheless, the PKS is a fundamentalist faction which also includes a number of militant supporters, and thus the possibility remains open for this party to be radicalized. This situation could occur if the militant groups, who want the PKS to be straightforward, are able to take over key positions in the party. Such a possibility could also emerge if Indonesian politics were to become more conducive to the idea of Islamization. In such circumstances, the PKS would consider to become more accommodative to this idea and to adopt it as their priority. Current conditions show that such a process is not unprecedented. The rise of the number of votes for Islamic parties, the significant support for the implementation of Islamic law and demands for regulations based on Islamic interests in a number of local areas indicate, to some extent, the possibility of an increase in Islamization in the future.

This second possibility also shows that the potential for fractionalization inside the PKS is related to the degree of militancy and rigidity in interpreting and implementing the basic principles of Islamic fundamentalism, rather than to the Islamic background of the cadres (whether NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, and so on). This is because the Tarbiyah process has unified a variety of its members' backgrounds into a new paradigm. Thus, how rigidly such a paradigm is understood and how strictly it is carried out will be one of the latent causes for internal fractionalization and will decide the political thinking and actions of the PKS in the future.

Endnotes

- 1 Munson for example divides fundamentalism into "traditionalistic", "mainstream", and "radically ideological", in Henry Munson, *Religion and Power in Morocco*, chapter 6, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). Dekmejian divides fundamentalists into: (1) Gradualist-adaptionist (2) Revolutionary Shia, (3) Revolutionary Sunni, and (4) Messianic-Primitivist. He argues that the "Gradualist-adaptionist" group is the largest: "in their quest for the eventual establishment of an Islamic order, this group shows its willingness to operate inside the legal system, put forward gradualism, flexibility, and readiness to adapt their ideologies and program to modern conditions", see in R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Islamic Revival: Catalyst, Categories, and Consequences" in Shireen T. Hunter, (ed.), *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism*, (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1988), pp. 10-14. Arjomand divides fundamentalist groups into, (1) Scriptural Pre-modern, (2) Scriptural Contemporary, (3) Political Pragmatic, (4) Political Ideological Constitutionalist, (5) Political Clericalist and (6) Political Revolutionary Sectarian, in Said Amir Arjomand, "Unity and Diversity in Islamic Fundamentalism", in Martin E. Marty and Scott Appleby, (eds.), *Fundamentalism Comprehended*, (Chicago: The UCP, 1991), p. 193.
- 2 Aay Muhammad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda Kontemporer*, (Bandung: Teraju, 2004).
- 3 Mark R. Woodward, "Indonesia, Islam and the Prospect for Democracy", *SAIS Review* Vol. XXI, No. 2 (Summer-Fall, 2001), pp. 33-34.
- 4 Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomen Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia*, (Bandung: Teraju, 2002).
- 5 Nandang Burhanudin, *Penegakan Syariat Islam Menurut Partai Keadilan*, (Jakarta: Al-Jannah, 2004).
- 6 Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia*, (Alexandria: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005).
- 7 Greg Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle, Jamaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam*, (Sydney: NSW Press, 2004).
- 8 Anies Rasyid Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia, Present and Future Trajectory", in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, September/October.
- 9 Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, "Indonesia's Approaching Election: Politics, Islam and Public Opinion", in *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2004.
- 10 Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Islam is the Solution", *Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia*", see <http://www.classic.ohio.edu/faculty/collins/islamsolution.pdf>.
- 11 For this term and some part of the definitions, the author is mainly inspired by the studies on fundamentalism by Ahmed S. Moussalli in his *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism; The ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Quth*, (Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1992); *Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy and Islamic State*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999); and "Modern Islamic Fundamentalism Discourse on Civil Society, Pluralism and Democracy", in

- Augustus Richard Norton, *Civil Society in the Middle East*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995).
- 12 Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara: Ajaran, Sejarah dan Pemikiran*, (Jakarta: UI Press, 1990), pp. 1-2. M. Din Sjamsuddin, "Usaha Pencarian Konsep Negara dalam Sejarah Pemikiran Politik Islam", *Ulumul Qur'an*, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1993.
 - 13 Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, pp. 185-187. On PKS's opinion about the relation between politics and *dakwah* see, for example, Abu Ridha, Untung Wahono, Syamsul Balda, *Politik Dakwah Partai Keadilan*, (Jakarta: DPP PK, 2000).
 - 14 For more details about *syumuliyah* see, *Syumuliyatul Islam*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiyatuna, 2002), pp. 30-42.
 - 15 *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.
 - 16 "Jatidiri Partai Keadilan", in Sahar L. Hassan, Kuart Sukardiyono and Dadi M.H. Basri (eds), *Memilih Partai Islam, Visi, Misi dan Persepsi*, (Jakarta, Gema Insani Press, 1998), p. 34.
 - 17 Abu Ridha, *Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik*, (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004), p. 73.
 - 18 *Ibid.*, p. 73.
 - 19 From a transcript of an interview with Almuzammil Yusuf by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 7 June 2004. I am grateful to Hurriyah for making these available.
 - 20 Ridha, p. *Negara dan Cita-cita Politik*, p. 54.
 - 21 Interview with Irwan Prayitno in Jakarta, 9 December 2005.
 - 22 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005, and with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 November 2005.
 - 23 Interview with Abdul Hakim in Jakarta, 25 November 2005; with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005, and with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 November 2005.
 - 24 Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a post-Traditional World*, (New York: Harper and Row Publisher, 1970), p. 11.
 - 25 Abu Ridha, *Amal Siyasi Gerakan Politik dalam Dakwah. Seri Tarbiyah Siyasiyah 04*, (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004), pp. 35-36.
 - 26 Ika Rochjatun Sastrahidayat, "Shari'ah Islam Menuju Indonesia Sejahtera", in *Bulletin Risalah Mujahidin*, 06/March 2001, p. 5.
 - 27 Irfan S. Awwas, the chairman of MMI states that: "Islam regulates all dimensions of humankind, including society, economics, and politics. From this point, we as Muslims believe that Islam has a conception about *bersatunya agama dan Negara* (the integration of religion and state)". Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia*, (Bandung: Teraju, 2002), pp. 102-103.
 - 28 See such statement in Breck Batley, *The Complexities of Dealing With Radical Islam in Southeast Asia, A Case Study of Jemaah Islamiyah*, (Canberra: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, 2003), p. 87.
 - 29 Zada, *Islam Radikal*, pp. 103-104.
 - 30 See Mohammad Natsir, *Agama dan Negara dalam Perspektif Islam*, (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 2001), p. 78; Amien Rais, "Arti dan Fungsi Tauhid", *Cakrawala Islam: Antara Cita dan Fakta*, (Bandung: Mizan, 1996); pp. 15-16. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Modernisme Islam dan Demokrasi: Pandangan

- Politik Mohammad Natsir”, in *Islamika* No. 3, (Bandung: Mizan dan MISI, 1994), p. 68. See also the role of religion in the state in Amien Rais, “Beberapa Catatan Kecil Tentang Pemerintahan Islam”, in Salim Azzam (ed.), *Beberapa Pandangan Tentang Pemerintahan Islam*, (Bandung: Mizan, 1984).
- 31 Amien Rais, *Cakrawala Islam*, p. 54.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 55.
- 33 The idea of an “organic state” derives from Hegel’s concept on an ideal state. This kind of state brings the people to the ultimate condition where the spirit or God (the ideal) will have fully unfolded itself in the universe. This kind of state has an obligation to intervene in people’s life to ensure the establishment of the ideal situation in the future. Based on its objective, the organic state works for its own interest and different from the Marxist and Pluralist State, the organic state is an independent body and not a committee for the interests of a particular group, be they the bourgeoisie or the majority of the people. On the concept of the organic state, see Alfred Stepan, *The State and Civil Society*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
- 34 On this debate, see Moh. Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, I-II*, (Jakarta: Jajasan Prapanca, 1959). Endang Saefuddin Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945*, (Bandung: Pustaka-Perpustakaan Salman ITB, 1981).
- 35 On the attempts of *shari’ah* implementation at the local governmental levels, see Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, *Politik Syariat Islam dari Indonesia hingga Nigeria*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet, 2004), pp. 82-100. On some organizations that support such attempts, see Imam Tolkhah and Choirul Fuad, *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Era Reformasi*, (Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama and Diklat Keagamaan, Departemen Agama RI, 2002); Lili Romli, “Partai Politik Islam Era Reformasi dan Piagam Jakarta dalam Sidang Tahunan MPR 2000”, Thesis, (Jakarta: Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Indonesia, 2001). “Menggapai Syariah Tanpa Darah”, *Forum Keadilan*, No. 39, 31 December 2000.
- 36 “Prinsip Kebijakan” in *Buku Anggaran Dasar Partai Keadilan*, (Depok: Dewan Pimpinan Daerah Partai Keadilan Depok), p. 39.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 39.
- 38 From a transcript of an interview with Abu Ridha by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 14 April 2004.
- 39 In the official document the PKS states that “a nation will be free from all kinds of disaster if that nation is able to purify its belief in Allah and consistently realizes His Laws”, in “Kebijakan Dasar Partai Keadilan” in *Buku Anggaran Dasar PK*, p. 35.
- 40 Salim Segaf Al Jufri, “Pengantar” in Bukhori Yusuf and Iman Santoso, *Penerapan Syariat Islam di Indonesia antara Peluang dan Tantangan*, (Jakarta: Globalmedia Cipta Publishing and Pusat Konsultasi Syariah, 2004), p. 22.
- 41 Interview with Mustafa Kamal in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; with Irwan Prayitno in Jakarta, 9 December 2005.
- 42 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, *Menyelamatkan Bangsa Platform Kebijakan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, (Jakarta: Al-Itishom, 2004), p. 128.
- 43 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005.

- 44 A *zimmī* is a non-Muslim person (or a group of people) who have entered into a peace agreement (*zimmah*) with Muslims inside Muslim territory, and therefore have the right to self determination, to carrying out their religious obligations, be equal before the law, and to hold positions as state officers, as a reflection of their political and civil rights. During the time of the Prophet, the *zimmī* included the Jews and Christians (the People of the book).
- 45 *Buku Anggaran Dasar PK*, p. 39.
- 46 See Anis Matta's point of view in Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 236.
- 47 Deliar Nur uses the terms "Nasionalis Sekular" (secular nationalist) and "Nasionalis Islam" (Islamic Nationalist) to explain two modes of political thinking in Indonesia, namely those who believe in secular ideology and those who believe in Islam. These terms are appropriate in order to avoid biased connotations about the actual situation in Indonesia, for instance, the perception that the nationalist attitude is only related to the non-Muslim groups and Muslims in Indonesia are not or anti nationalist. See the use of these terms in Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980). On the Muslim struggle to establish a state based on Islam or an "Islamic State", see Adnan Buyung Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-Legal Study of The Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1959*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992); Ahmad Syafii Maarif *Islam dan Politik: Teori Belah Bambu Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965)*, (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996). Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985); Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Politik Nasional: 1945-1965*, (Jakarta: Grafitti Press, 1987).
- 48 Abdul Azis Thaba, *Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orde Baru*, (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), pp. 264-275; Deliar Noer, "Islam dan Politik: Mayoritas atau Minoritas?", in *Prisma*, No. 5, year XVII, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988).
- 49 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq in Jakarta, 5 December 2005; with Irwan Prayitno in Jakarta, 9 December 2005.
- 50 Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, pp. 234-235.
- 51 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq in Jakarta, 5 December 2005.
- 52 Matta argues that "during his leadership in Medina the Prophet Muhammad never used the term "Daulah Islamiyah" ("Islamic State"), in fact he simply calls his state "Al-Madinah Al-Munawwarrah", Furkon, *ibid.*, p. 233.
- 53 *Ibid.*, p. 240.
- 54 *Ibid.*, p. 234.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p. 240.
- 56 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 November 2005; with Amri Yusra in Depok, 18 November 2005; with Ahmad Syaichu in Bekasi, 6 December 2005; and with Ahmad Burhanudin in Jakarta, 20 November 2005.
- 57 *Buku AD PK*, pp. 45-46. Interview with Hidayat in Tangerang, 26 November 2005.
- 58 Ridha claims that "so long as the Islamic state still does not exist, it is obligation of every Muslim to establish it", in Ridha, *Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik*, p. 37.
- 59 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005.
- 60 Ridha, *Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik*, p. 32.

- 61 *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- 62 *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- 63 From transcript of interview with Untung Wahono by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 15 April 2004.
- 64 Ridha, *Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik*, p. 30.
- 65 One of the interviewees says that the fact that we cannot find the words "Islamic state" in PKS's AD/ART is just a matter of *pelembutan bahasa* (euphemism). In fact in some other formal documents we meet words like "daulah Islamiyah" and "Caliphate system", see for example in the explanation the principal of (Al-Mustaqbaliyah) the future orientation, in "Basic Policy of PK 2000-2005" in *Buku AD/RT PK Masa Bhakti 2000-2005*, (Depok, DPD Partai Keadilan), p. 43.
- 66 About the role of the *shari'ah*, see for example, Abdul Asri Harahap, *PPP: Sintesa Nasionalisme dan Religiusitas*, (Jakarta: Integritas Dinamika Press: 2004), pp. 137-170.
- 67 To the modernists God actually provides Muslims with the freedom to develop a method of thought that, however, must agree with Islamic teachings, as well as rational and objective. In developing such a method, Muslims are actually permitted to use ideas common in their time. In other words, for most modernists it is possible for Muslims to implement "a synthesis system" made up of many different currents of political thought, including Western points of view. See Amien Rais, "Wawasan Islam tentang Ketatanegaraan", *Cakrawala Islam*, pp. 51-52. M. Natsir, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-88.
- 68 According to Rais "without using an Islamic label but taking the essence of Islam, we can demonstrate that we are able to build a fair economic system, an honest legal system, a non-feudal education system - that's what Islam wants. So it is easy. I will not emphasize the label, but the vision. Because it is possible to create a state, which, in fact, is more Islamic, without using an Islamic label". See Idy S. Ibrahim, *Amien Rais Membangun Politik Adiluhung*, (Bandung: Zaman Wacana Mulia, 1998), p. 90.
- 69 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, *Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jamaat-i Islam (Pakistan)*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), p. 204.
- 70 Amien Rais, "Beberapa Catatan", p. 44.
- 71 *Tempo Interaktif*, 11 January 1999.
- 72 See Umar Basalim, *Pro Kontra Piagam Jakarta di Era Reformasi*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Indonesia Satu, 2002), pp. 174-254.
- 73 This is in particular directed to Soekarno's testimonial which stated that the UUD 1945 (the Indonesian Constitution) actually included the Jakarta Charter. To some extent these groups see the restoration of the Jakarta Charter as an attempt to correct the historical betrayal of Indonesia's Islamic struggle, Greg Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?", in *Southeast Asian Affairs 2004*, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004), p. 4.
- 74 Romli, "Partai Politik Islam", p. 206.
- 75 See in Basalim, *Pro Kontra Piagam Jakarta*, p. 184.
- 76 Zada, *Islam Radikal*, p. 121.
- 77 Muhammad Umar As-Sewed. "Syariat Islam di Hujat", in "Buletin Laskar Jihad Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jamaah", Edisi VII/June/2001, p. 4, in *ibid.*, p. 122.
- 78 *Ibid.*, p. 114.

- 79 *Ibid.*, p. 122.
- 80 See in Zada, *ibid.*, p. 124.
- 81 Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia*, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 102-140.
- 82 Amin Saikal, *Islam and the West Conflict or Cooperation*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003), p. 112.
- 83 David Held, *Models of Democracy*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 15-16; Roy C. Macridis, *Contemporary Political Ideologies. Movements and Regimes*, second edition, (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company 1983), pp. 19-20; Larry Arnhart, *Political Questions. Political Philosophy from Plato to Rawls*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 340-342.
- 84 William Ebenstein, "Democracy" in William D. Hasley & Bernhard Johnston (eds), *Collier's Encyclopedia*, (New York: Macmillan Educational Company, 1988), VIII: p. 75.
- 85 Henry B. Mayo, *An Introduction to Democratic Theory*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960); Sidney Hook, "Democracy" in *Encyclopedia Americana*, Vol. 8, (Connecticut: Golier Incorporated, 1984), p. 683; Robert A. Dahl, *Demokrasi dan Para Pengkritiknya*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 1992), pp. 3-4; Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 38-45.
- 86 John L. Esposito, *Demokrasi di Negara-Negara Muslim*, (Bandung: Mizan 1999) and John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- 87 Sukron Kamil, *Islam dan Demokrasi Telaah Konseptual dan Historis*, (Jakarta: Gaya Media Pratama, 2002), pp. 47-66. For more explanation about Muslim Intellectuals' response to democracy in Indonesia see Masykuri Abdillah, *Demokrasi di Persimpangan Makna, Respons Intelektual Muslim Indonesia terhadap Konsep Demokrasi (1966-1993)*, (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana Yogya, 1999).
- 88 See *Panduan Pengambilan Kebijakan dalam Musyawarah Partai Keadilan*, (Jakarta: Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (MPP) Partai Keadilan, 2000), pp. 46-47.
- 89 Ridha, *Negara dan Cita-cita Politik*, p. 64.
- 90 See Nurmahmudi Isma'il, "Jatidiri Partai Keadilan", p. 46. See also Anis Matta, "Dakwah, Politik dan Strategi", in *Saksi*, no. 11, year III, 6 March 2001. On political participation, see Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation. How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?*, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965).
- 91 Anis Matta, *Menikmati Demokrasi, Strategi Dakwah Meraih Kemenangan*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Saksi, 2002), pp. 22.
- 92 *Ibid.*, pp. 19-23.
- 93 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat PKS, *Menyelamatkan Bangsa*, p. 87. Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; with Abdul Hakim in Jakarta, 25 November; with Agus Kurniawan in Bandar Lampung, 23 November 2005.
- 94 Interview with Hantoni Hasan in Bandar Lampung, 22 November 2005.
- 95 This ambivalence is reflected in Fahri Hamzah's statement that "today democracy is our playing field, but we cannot abandon our religious

- ambitions", in Dini Jalal, "Divided we fall", in *Far Eastern Economic Review*; March 22, 2001, p. 28.
- 96 PKS cadres, especially those who are in local and center legislative bodies often complain about the concept of majority vote; interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; with Arkeno in Jakarta, 18 November 2005; with Amri Yusra in Depok, 18 November 2005; with Hantoni Hasan in Bandar Lampung, 22 November 2005, and with Hidayat in Tangerang, 26 November 2005.
- 97 Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (MPP) Partai Keadilan, *Panduan Pengambilan Kebijakan dalam Musyawarah Partai Keadilan*, (Jakarta: 2000), p. 42. Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; with Hidayat in Tangerang, 26 November 2005.
- 98 Matta, "Dakwah, Politik dan Strategi".
- 99 Ridha stated that in the government of the Islamic state — especially in the era of the four Caliphates — the people also had an important role as they had the legitimate power to elect their leaders. See Ridha, *Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik*, p. 32.
- 100 MPP PK, *Panduan Pengambilan Kebijakan*, p. 34.
- 101 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005. According to Almuzammil Yusuf, the urgency of the *shura* is related to several matters: first, as a reflection of the worship of Allah; second, as a part of piousness and honoring God's Laws; and third, a belief that the people can gain the best results only by using the *shura* mechanism, which allows for many different opinions; from a transcript of an interview with Almuzammil Yusuf by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 7 June 2004.
- 102 From a transcript of an interview with Almuzammil Yusuf by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 7 June 2004. For him, this institution derives from the Islamic political tradition aimed to provide advice in decision making processes.
- 103 See Chapter V, Article 11, AD/ART PKS, in www.pk-sejahtera.org.
- 104 For example, the party's decision to prohibit the use of dirty money within the executive body can be implemented simultaneously in almost every part of the country.
- 105 From a transcript of an interview with Untung Wahono by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 15 April 2004. For example, to describe this situation, in the BBM case, according to Kamarudin who is also a lecturer in the Department of Political Science in the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Indonesia, most Tarbiyah cadres actually want the PKS to quit from Yudhoyono's coalition administration, because of the negative impact for their political and *dakwah* movements in their regions, but the role of Majelis Syura has impeded this willingness. Interview with Kamarudin, 30 November 2005.
- 106 Most members of the *ahlu halli wal aqd* are *ulamas* or scholars who are experts in Islamic teachings, whether in *shari'ah* or *Hadith* studies. However, Ridha thinks that the membership of this body should be balanced equally among religious and non-religious expert. On the concept of *ahlul halli wal aqdi* in Ridha's perspective, see Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, pp. 133-137. The PKS itself tends to believe that people qualified in religious matters should form the majority in the *ahlul halli wal aqdi*, rather than an

- equal balance with non-Islamic experts, as proposed by Rasyid Ridha. On this attitude see *Panduan Pengambilan Kebijakan dalam Musyawarah Partai Keadilan*, (Jakarta: Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (MPP) Partai Keadilan, 2000), pp. 39-40.
- 107 Mahendra, *Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam*, p. 222.
- 108 Harahap, *PPP: Sintesa Nasionalisme dan Religiusitas*, pp. 114-115.
- 109 Arief Affandi, (ed.), *Islam Demokrasi Atas Bawah*, (Yogyakarta: Dinamika, 1997). On Amien's political thinking on democracy, see Amien Rais, "Pengantar", in *Demokrasi dan Proses Politik*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988) and Idris Thaha, *Demokrasi Religius, Pemikiran Politik Nurcholish Madjid dan M. Amien Rais*, (Jakarta: Teraju, 2005).
- 110 For these reasons Uhlin believes that the modernists' ideas about democracy are influenced and actually similar to Western democracy, although they use Islamic language, see in Uhlin, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
- 111 This is the main reason for all radical fundamentalists to reject the idea of democracy. See, for example, Fauzan Al-Anshari, "Demokrasi Syirik", in www.majelis.mujaahidin.or.id.
- 112 Interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in Yunanto, p. 54.
- 113 Interview with Habib Rizieq, in Zada *Islam Radikal*, p. 136.
- 114 *Ibid.*, p. 132.
- 115 Irfan S. Awwas sets out his vision for Islamic law in Indonesia in "Islam and democracy cannot meet", *Inside Indonesia*, July-September 2004.
- 116 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, in Zada, *op. cit.*, p. 133 and see also Ba'asyir's statement in A.M. Abegebriel and Muhammad Iqbal, "MMI dan HTI; The Image of The Others", in A.M. Abegebriel, A Yani Abeveiro, SR-Ins Team, *Negara Tuhan. The Thematic Encyclopaedia*, (Jakarta: SR-Ins Publishing), p. 688.

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