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Ijtihad-Based Politics: The Muhammadiyah Political Participation in Post-Soeharto Indonesia*

Abstrak: Artikel ini berupaya mengelaborasi peran penting politik Muhammadiyah dalam proses demokratisasi di Indonesia dari perspektif wacana dan implementasi peran politik berbasis 'ijtihad' yang dikembangkannya pasca runtuhnya kekuasaan otoriter Orde Baru. Secara historis, ideologis—meskipun terkadang lebih bersifat superfisial—ijtihad merupakan salah satu fondasi dasar yang mendominasi worldview Muhammadiyah. Oleh karena tidak didukung oleh perangkat dan program pendidikan yang mumpuni untuk melaksanakan ijtihad dalam pengertian sesungguhnya, kosakata ijtihad belakangan terlihat sudah dimaknai dengan amat longgar di kalangan keluarga besar Muhammadiyah. Thus, lahirnya wacana dan praktik politik 'ijtihad politik Muhammadiyah' atau 'ijtihad politik Amien Rais' adalah bentuk kongkrit kasat akal pelanggaran makna dan praktik ijtihad itu.

Sejak Muhammadiyah didirikan pada tahun 1912 yang kemudian diiringi dengan kelahiran Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) tahun 1926 dan beberapa organisasi sosial ke-Islam-an lainnya yang mempunyai karakter sama atau mirip dengan salah satu keduanya pada priode yang sama, tidak diragukan lagi umat Islam Indonesia telah terbelah kedalam dua mainstream secara sosio-ideologi keagamaan. Oleh sebagian peneliti, mereka yang mengikuti atau mirip dengan cara keagamaan Muhammadiyah dikategorikan sebagai kelompok Muslim 'modernis.' Sedangkan mereka yang mengikuti dan mirip dengan cara keagamaan NU dikategorikan sebagai kelompok Muslim 'tradisionalis.' Sampai dekade 1990-an, meskipun ada sejumlah peneliti yang berusaha mengkritisi pengelompokan ini, misalnya telah terjadi overlapping antara modernis-tradisionalis di tubuh keduanya, namun secara umum keberadaan kedua kelompok umat Islam dengan karakter ini terlalu sulit untuk dibantah.

Berawal dari perebutan kekuasaan dalam Masyumi, setelah memasuki masa kemerdekaan, khususnya memasuki dekade 1950-an keberadaan kedua kelompok ini telah mewarnai persaingan politik umat Islam. Khususnya ketika Nahdlatul Ulama memisahkan diri dari Masyumi untuk menjadi Partai Nahdlatul Ulama pada tahun 1952. Fakta dan data statistik tidak pernah dapat men-

jastifikasi persaingan politik antar keduanya dalam pengertian adanya salah satu dari keduanya yang memenangkan sebuah Pemilihan Umum, namun dalam kehidupan sehari-hari umat Islam, sangat sering kedengaran pertanyaan seperti "siapa yang menang? Muhammadiyah atau NU? Padahal yang selalu unggul adalah bukan dari salah satu keduanya.

Meskipun Muhammadiyah telah memainkan peran pentingnya dalam percaturan politik di Indonesia sejak ia didirikan, namun perannya dalam proses demokratisasi di Indonesia sejak jatuhnya Orde Baru sangat penomenal. Hal yang paling menarik dari peran yang dimainkan oleh Muhammadiyah setelah masuknya Era Reformasi adalah hubungan timbal-baliknya dengan PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) yang didirikan oleh Prof. Dr. H. Amien Rais yang pada waktu itu masih menjabat sebagai Ketua Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah. Hal ini terlihat misalnya pada pendirian Pengurus Wilayah, Daerah, Cabang sampai tingkat paling rendah dari PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) oleh para tokoh dan aktivis Muhammadiyah dengan menggunakan semangat 'ijtihad politik'.

Ketika dalam keluarga besar Muhammadiyah masih terdapat varian yang tidak bisa menerima wacana membawa Muhammadiyah ke wilayah politik praktis, maka Amien Rais dengan cerdas mengatakan bahwa apa yang sedang dia lakukan adalah dalam rangka mempraktekkan apa yang selama ini didengung-dengungkan oleh Muhammadiyah, yaitu sebagai ijtihad.

Meskipun Muhammadiyah telah memainkan peran yang amat penting dalam proses demokratisasi di Indonesia sejak jatuhnya rezim Orde Baru, akan tetapi jika dilihat dari kesenjangan antara impian utama para tokoh dan politisi Muhammadiyah, misalnya untuk menduduki jabatan Presiden di negeri ini, maka Muhammadiyah perlu belajar lebih banyak dari lingkungannya. Ada kekhawatiran yang amat besar dalam masyarakat Muslim non-Muhammadiyah di Indonesia bahwa jika Muhammadiyah menguasai pemerintahan Indonesia, maka akan sangat besar kemungkinan Muhammadiyah akan melakukan gerakan purifikasi melalui kekuasaan dan kekuatan negara. Seperti yang ditulis oleh penulis dalam tulisannya yang lain, di wilayah-wilayah di luar Jawa, sesungguhnya gerakan purifikasi ala Wahabi jauh lebih dominant ketimbang apa yang disebut sebagai gerakan modernis. Namun kedua hal ini kelihatannya terlihat diabaikan oleh Muhammadiyah dikarenakan kuatnya spirit purifikasinya.

Dengan melihat kasus di tiga wilayah, Jambi, Banjarmasin dan Makassar, barangkali dapat disarankan bahwa dalam rangka optimalisasi perannya dalam proses demokratisasi yang sedang berlangsung saat ini, Muhammadiyah mungkin perlu memoderatkan sayap puritannya sehingga peran Muhammadiyah dalam proses demokratisasi di Indonesia lebih bisa diterima oleh Muslim non-Muhammadiyah di Indonesia.

Suaidi Asyari

Ijtihad-Based Politics: The Muhammadiyah Political Participation in Post-Soeharto Indonesia*

الخلاصة: هذا البحث يحاول أن يشرح دورا مهما لسياسة الجمعية المحمدية في عملية لتفعيل الديمقراطية في إندونيسيا على أساس وجهة النظر وتنفيذ دور سياسى مبنى على "الاجتهاد" التى يطور بعد سقوط السلطة المستبدة للطريقة الجديدة. يعتبر الاجتهاد من ناحية تاريخية وعقيدية - رغم أنه قد يعمل أكثر إلى الإشراف- من المبادئ الأساسية السائدة فى نظرة المحمدية العالمية. وعدم اعتمادها على الوسائل وبرنامج التعليم القادرة على تطبيق الاجتهاد الحقيقى، يفهم معناه بشكل بسيط وغير متعمق عند أنصار هذه الجمعية. وظهور النظرة والممارسة السياسية المحمدية أو "اجتهاد سياسى لأمين رئيس" دليل جلي على تبسيط معنى الاجتهاد وتطبيقه.

منذ إنشاء المحمدية عام ١٩١٢ ثم ظهور جمعية فحضة العلماء عام ١٩٢٦ والتنظيمات الإسلامية الاجتماعية الأخرى التى لها نفس الميزة أو شبيهها مع إحداها فى الفترة المعينة، لاشك أن المسلمين فى إندونيسيا تنقسمون إلى الاتجاهين الرئيسيين من ناحية اجتماعية دينية وعقيدية. يرى بعض الباحثين أن من ينتمى إلى الجمعية المحمدية يعتبر من المجموعة الإسلامية المعاصرة بينما من ينتمى إلى جمعية فحضة العلماء يعتبر من

المسلمين التقليديين. رغم محاولة من عدة الباحثين -حتى التسعينيات- على الاعتراض على هذا التقسيم على أساس وجود نزعة المعاصرة والتقليدية في كلتي الجمعية، لكن عموما من صعوبة الرفض على واقع وجود أنصار الجمعيتين المذكورتين على أساس هذا التقسيم.

منذ الصراع للسلطة في حزب "ماشومي" وبعد الدخول في عصر الاستقلال بالتحديد في خمسينات، دخلتا الجمعيتان الإسلاميتان في التنافس السياسي عند المسلمين، خاصة بعد انسحاب جمعية هُضة العلماء من حزب "ماشومي" لإنشاء حزب جديد يسمى "حزب هُضة العلماء" عام ١٩٥٢. لم توجد إحصائية أو إثبات التي تحسم التنافس بينهما والتي تحدد أية منهما تفوز في الانتخابات، لكن كثير ما نسمع سؤالاً مطروحا عند الناس "من الفائز؟ الحمدي أم هُضة العلماء؟" وفي الواقع دائما أن الفائز ليس واحدا منهما، لكن حزبا آخر.

رغم الجمعية الحمديّة منذ ظهورها قد لعبت دورا مهما في المجال السياسي في إندونيسيا، لكن لها دور متميزا في عملية تفعيل الديمقراطية في البلاد خاصة بعد سقوط نظام الطريقة الجديدة. مثير للاهتمام في الدور الذي لعبته الحمديّة في عصر الإصلاح هو علاقتها المتبادلة بين حزب الأمانة الوطنية الذي أسسه الأستاذ الدكتور أمين رئيس مع الجمعية الحمديّة التي يرأسها في نفس الوقت. يتضح هذا الأمر في تعيين المناصب الحزبية على مستوى المحافظات والأقاليم من كوادر الحمديّة ونشاطاتها استنادا إلى روح "الاجتهاد السياسي".

عند ما يعترض أنصار الجمعية على فكرة دخولها وخوضها في مجال الممارسة السياسية الفعلية، رد عليهم أمين رئيس بذكاء أن ما فعله ليس إلا تطبيقا على ما تمناه الحمديّة هو الاجتهاد.

Despite the fact that there are Muslims who believe that Islam and democracy is not compatible, there have been many Islamic organizations that have regarded such question should be put to an end. Islamic organization should use democratic sphere in order to play a greater role in the society for a better life of Muslims in the country. One of such Islamic organizations is Muhammadiyah.

Founded in 1912, Muhammadiyah claims to be the largest puritan-modernist Islamic organisation not only in Indonesia but also in the world, with more than 25 million followers. Originally Muhammadiyah was purely a religious organisation. However, after the declaration of Indonesian independence in 1945, particularly after Masyumi—of which Muhammadiyah was one of its special memberships—was transformed into a political party, Muhammadiyah has been involved in Indonesian politics in one way or another. Since it was founded, Muhammadiyah promotes *ijtihad* as opposed to *ijma'* as in the case of the Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest traditionalist Islamic organization founded in 1926. However, it was after the collapse of New Order regime that Muhammadiyah started to associate its political role by combining its basis of worldview that is *ijtihad* with political attitudes of its leaders. Thus, the formation of PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) has been called as a political *ijtihad* of Amien Rais—one of Muhammadiyah leaders—and the endorsement of Muhammadiyah to Rais's presidential candidacy in 2004 is called political *ijtihad* of Muhammadiyah.

Despite the fact that Muhammadiyah supported the formation PAN across Indonesia has significant meaning in the ongoing process of democratization in Indonesia, Rais's endeavor to bring Muhammadiyah into political sphere has resulted in *pros* and *cons* both in Muhammadiyah community and Indonesian people in general. This political development of Muhammadiyah raises several questions; what is socio-religious spirit that drives Muhammadiyah to play a greater role in Indonesian politics; what kind of variants that have been formed as a result of such pro and cons; and how have such pros and cons within Muhammadiyah influenced the role of Muhammadiyah in the legislative and executive elections 2004. In line with those questions, this article attempts to discuss to what extent the role played by Muhammadiyah contributes to the process of democratization in Indonesia?

Ijtihad: From a Religious to a Political Worldview

To examine the role of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's socio-political context, including its relationship with the broader community

of modernist-puritanical Muslims, one should take into account the religious worldview of this organisation, because it is on this worldview the organisation's political and religious networks are constructed and its political force expanded and constantly rejuvenated.

Muhammadiyah's religious-worldview has been based on several aspects. First and the most common referred to is its advocacy of *ijtihad*. Literally, *ijtihad* is defined as "striving," "exerting," "endeavor" or "self-exertion." In the Islamic jurisprudential sense, among its common definitions is "the maximum effort expended by the jurist to master and apply the principles and rules of *usul al-fiqh* (legal theory) for the purpose of discovering God's law.¹ However, there is also other version of definition of *ijtihad*, for example it is defined "'the capacity for making deductions in matters of law in cases to which no express text or rule already determined by *ijma'* (consensus) is applicable."² Such different definition has played important role in making Muslim jurists, scholars and Muslim groups polemically divided. Muhammadiyah and NU are *par excellence*. The first definition and alike indicates that *ijtihad* is an ongoing process of academic quest without any limitation whatsoever in terms of aspect and time. In contrast, the second definition and alike indicates that *ijtihad* can be subject to limitation of aspect, coverage and time.³

In Muhammadiyah, *ijtihad* is understood to be carried out individually or collectively and those who are not capable to do so should employ *ittiba'*; that is to accept or to follow *fatwa* (religious edict) of someone with the condition of knowing principles that such *fatwa* is based upon.⁴ In order to exercise *ijtihad* in Muhammadiyah, it established Council of *tarjih* in 1927 which was mandated "to formulate theological bases for Muhammadiyah...Every idea or theory that have been agreed up by this council can function as logical or philosophical justification for programs and other goals of the (Muhammadiyah) movement"⁵ The initial goal of Council of *tarjih* is to end the hegemony of *madhhab* upon Muslims. However, many people both in Muhammadiyah and outside Muhammadiyah have been concerned that it has become a new *madzhab*, instead.⁶ It appears that the main cause of such tendency is due to the fact that the council has been working merely on religious rituals, such as ablution, prayer, alms, hajj and charity.⁷ In later development, the vocabulary of *ijtihad* has been used in forums other than religious one, namely in the realm of politics. During this Reform Era, Muhammadiyah politicians have often used this term in order to justify their political behaviors. Thus, they had, for example, political *ijtihad* of Amien Rais when Rais founded PAN

in 1997 and the 'political *ijtihad* of Central Axis [*ijtihad politik Poros Tengah*] when modernist politicians forcefully withdrew Abdurrahman Wahid from his power in 2001.⁸

The second aspect of the basis of Muhammadiyah world view is *tajdid*. *Tajdid* (revival, reform), in Muhammadiyah community is referred to the *hadith*: "God will send to this community at the turn of every century one (or: people) who will restore (revive) their religion." (*inna allah yab'ath li-hadhihi al-umma 'ala ra's kulli mi'a sana man yujaddid laha amr diniha*).⁹ According to Syamsul Hidayat, a member of MKSDI and MTDK¹⁰ Central Board of Muhammadiyah, based on this *hadith*, *tajdid* in Muhammadiyah has two operational definitions (i) purification; that involves understanding, internalizing and putting into practice things which are fixed (*al-thawabit* pl. *thabit*) in Islam such as the authenticity of the Qur'an, authentic *hadith*, Islamic theology, religious rituals, Islamic ethics and social relation; (ii) modernization in things which are subject to conditional change (*al-mutaghayyirat*), such as the system of organisation, developing models of education and so on.¹¹

The third aspect of the basis of Muhammadiyah worldview is the notion of *jihad*. In this regard *ijtihad* is also sometime combined with *jihad fi sabilillah* within Muhammadiyah community.¹² *Jihad* literally means "strive" or "struggle." In the Islamic teaching, the concept of *jihad* has been based on verses of the Qur'an and *hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad. Among the verses of the Qur'an are in verses 22:78, and 39-40, 25:52, and 9:20.¹³ In Muhammadiyah, it is acknowledged what have been spelled put by Muslim jurists that *jihad* as an obligation can be performed in four ways, (i) by heart, (ii) by tongue, (iii) by the mind, and (iv) by the sword. However, Muhammadiyah stresses the importance of giving charity in the path of God.¹⁴ Every member of Muhammadiyah are encouraged to strive, conducting *jihad*, for the shake of happiness for others.¹⁵

In addition, *jihad* is also often combined with *birr* (righteousness) in Muhammadiyah.¹⁶ This refers to verse 177 of chapter 2 of the Qur'an with the main contain righteousness. The latest development of the notion of *jihad* within Muhammadiyah can be referred to its joined statement with the NU:

PB Nahdlatul Ulama and PP Muhammadiyah appeal that *jihad* for Muslim *ummah* in Indonesia should be aimed to improve the quality of education, economy, as well as human resources. *Jihad* should be targeted for fighting against ignorance (*kebodohan*), poverty, backwardness, degradation of morality and human dignity."¹⁷

The main goal of these all is *ikhlas*, performing things sincerely for the shake of Allah, is quite clear within Muhammadiyah. In this context, it can be asserted that *tajdid* is the foundation of Muhammadiyah's worldview; *ijtihad* is the intellectual exercises of *tajdid* in the field of social and religious life and *jihad* is one of the ways that these two are implemented. The combination of this all is implemented through the establishment of and the activities organized in its *amal usaha* (Charity and Financial Institutions).

A number of institutions affiliated to or run by Muhammadiyah play important roles in indoctrinating members and followers with the organisation's understanding of Islam. Educational institutions are certainly among them, but it is important to note that every institution of Muhammadiyah has a built-in prayer house for daily prayers where three important religious activities are routinely organized; daily and *Jum'ah* prayers, *dakwah* (preaching activities) and collecting religious donations or charity (*infaq* and *sadaqah*) for internal purposes. This means that those activities are well-organized in more than six thousand prayer houses all over Indonesia.¹⁸ The *dakwah* activities are usually performed after each prayer. The Islamic rituals that are practiced by Muhammadiyah are introduced through direct experience and the reasons for performing such rituals are inserted along with the *dakwah*. Since these activities are internal in nature, only those who have the opportunity or privilege to attend these activities will know their significance. For example, only Muhammadiyah followers who might know the exact contents and the methods used to indoctrinate the followers of Muhammadiyah in exclusive gatherings.¹⁹

In addition, the curriculum in Muhammadiyah schools and universities devotes around 40 percent of class hours to religious subjects. This is accomplished with a number of subjects called *Kemuhammadiyahan* (Muhammadiyahness), which are directed to making someone become a Muhammadiyah follower. However, from a number of interviews conducted during fieldwork I gained the strong impression that followers are not trained to be aware of their Muhammadiyahness more than their Muslimhood. They are simply trained to be ideal Muslims as personified in the doctrine of "commanding right and forbidding wrong." Therefore, regardless of what Muhammadiyah leaders are saying, their commitment to the pristine Islam remains firm.

Furthermore, the knowledge and indoctrination of Islam gained from Muhammadiyah teachers is spread in every *dakwah* activity within their inner circle. For example, their preachers usually (if not al-

ways) introduce their sermons, *khutbah* and other related religious activities by quoting *hadiths* that are popular among Muhammadiyah circles or *Salafi* or Wahhabi in general. For example, "I warn you of the newly invented matters (in the religion), and every newly invented matter is *bid'ah* (innovation), and every *bid'ah* is misguidance, and every misguidance is in the Hellfire." Another *hadith* that usually follows is "Whoever sees a wrong, and is able to put it right with his hand, let him do so; if he can't, then with his tongue; if he can't, then with his heart, and that is the bare minimum of faith." This is a clear way for the sermon giver to identify himself as a Muhammadiyah person. The sermon giver and Muhammadiyah followers are bound by their religious worldviews by means of particular verses of the Qur'an or Hadiths of the Prophet. The strongest glue is produced from a number of verses regarding the dictum of 'commanding right and forbidding wrong', which is found in seven verses of the Qur'an with different phrases, but the same 'key words'.²⁰

The samples of verses of the Qur'an and Hadiths mentioned here seem to be those that are most frequently referred to by Muhammadiyah followers. Significantly, these verses are also those that are usually referred to in many circles of radical Islamists. In fact, the 104th verse of Ali Imran is the famous motto of Muhammadiyah. It reads "Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity."

Muhammadiyah followers believe that their organisation is the group of the seventy three groups of all Muslim groups that deserves to go to *Jannah* (heaven), while the other seventy two groups are being misled and will go to hell. As those who hold the responsibility to command right and forbid wrong, they are convinced that they should call upon other Muslims to join their "pristine" Islam. For them, their intention to call other Muslims to the pristine Islam is not for their group, they would argue, but to save the others from the misleading. Any social and religious problems they face in their community and environment from the smallest scale to the largest one is usually looked at from this worldview.²¹

After being indoctrinated with Muhammadiyah's religious worldview, many followers continue their normal lives as government employees, teachers, doctors, researchers, businessmen, religious preachers, and activists or leaders of other Islamic organisations. Some of them may not publicly identify themselves as Muhammadiyah followers, but their religious worldview, their culture, and their com-

mitment to the “pristine” Islam with the aforementioned responsibility will be, in most cases, firmly held on to.

In other words, many Muslims who have once been exposed to Muhammadiyah’s religious worldview usually continue their normal professional lives in whatever sector they work in. Yet, though they may come from very different professional backgrounds, they are bound together by attending *pengajian* (religious gathering) and the five daily prayers, giving charity both regularly and irregularly, and of course by sharing similar views concerning other Muslims and non-Muslims. Most of them do not have Muhammadiyah ID cards and they are not under the “control” of Muhammadiyah’s organisational structure. But they are under the cultural influence of Muhammadiyah and they can organize “collective actions”, based on that culture. For example, when they encounter social and political problems, they would feel that they could organise collective actions because they view the problems from the same perspective. They would be reminded by the same command of “commanding right and forbidding wrong.” And, as will become clear later on in this paper, it is also important to note that Muhammadiyah leaders tend to cover up the connections for various reasons.

When Muhammadiyah leaders discuss political issues, the most frequently heard term in reference people affiliated with the organisation is *cadre* (*kader*). When talking about cadres, the point of reference are usually those who have been active in one or several of the various autonomous bodies of Muhammadiyah, such as IMM, Pemuda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth), Nasyiatul Aisyiyah (Young Women of Muhammadiyah), Hizbul Wathan and Remaja Muhammadiyah. However, the term ‘cadre’ is also applied to those who have been *Muhammadiyah-ized* through its religious worldview, who have been active in organizing Muhammadiyah-sponsored religious activities and who explicitly promote that worldview, even though they may not have joined any of these autonomous bodies of the organisation. Thus, in a political sense a cadre does not necessarily refer to someone who has been formally trained or who holds an ID card.

Tokoh (figure) or *pimpinan* (leaders or managers), finally, mostly refers to those who are running or used to run Muhammadiyah offices. Their statements represent the official line of Muhammadiyah and no one else who is from outside this circle can make a statement on Muhammadiyah’s stance dealing with either religious or political issues.²² Most of the national executives active in the so-called *Pimpinan Pusat* hold PhD degrees (S3), and many are even honoured pro-

fessors in different fields. Only a few hold Masters degrees (S2) and a few others hold other higher degrees.

The massive expansion of Muhammadiyah and the persistent grass-roots support it has received over the years is very much a result of the influence of its religious worldview, which is largely constructed upon three main notions; *amr ma'ruf nahy munkar*, Q3:104 (commending right—forbidding wrong), *fastabiqul khayrat* (Q2:148), (strive together as in a race) towards all that is good, *tajdid*, *ijitihad* and *jihad* and “be a *kaffah* Muslim” (Q2:208). These three notions are the most powerful recourses of Muhammadiyah’s worldview because they are in line with and embedded in every regular *da’wah* activity and the expansion of the organisation’s structural bodies. Because Muhammadiyah is driven by this worldview, it has steadily advanced since 1912 and there is no indication whatsoever that it will fade away.

Amr ma'ruf nahy munkar (commanding right and forbidding wrong) is the most important phrase in Muhammadiyah circles as it also is in other puritan Islamic movements in general. This verse of the Qur'an was in fact one of the sources of inspiration of the establishment of Muhammadiyah.²³ Therefore, in Muhammadiyah, it is indicated by the fact that it is made as a religious motto on which its vision and mission are based on. Its initial development was very much guided by religious concerns, but over the years the interests of its followers have broadened so that the notion of *amr ma'ruf nahy munkar* has also transcended beyond religious boundaries. As will be seen later, the notion of *amr ma'ruf nahy munkar* has deeply entered the political sphere.

From the ways that Muhammadiyah conducts *amr ma'ruf nahy munkar*, there is one noticeable factor that is derived from the ideology of Wahhabism. The most common types of *munkar* (wrong doings or acts) include TBC (*takhayul*, *bid'a* and *churafat*). Deliar Noer has comprehensively elaborated most of what were regarded as TBC as well as other wrong doings of Muslims during the formation of modernist movements in Indonesia. For example, many of *kyai* exploited the loyalty of their followers for their material benefits. They sold *azimat* (amulets, charms) to their followers for averting evil spirits. For these kinds of practices the followers of the *kyai* gave various rewards to them.²⁴

Looking at the massive and persistent geographic, structural and cultural expansion of Muhammadiyah, it is important to mention the support of its second imperative concept. This is the notion of *fastabiqul khayrat*, which is always embedded in both *da'wah* activities and institutions. As has been known, most Muhammadiyah followers are ur-

ban, well-to-do Muslims. By using the notion of *Fastabiqul khayrat*, Muhammadiyah is very skilful in encouraging its followers to donate their money for Muhammadiyah activities and programs with the aim of exercising *amr ma'ruf nahy munkar*. In almost every building which is controlled by or affiliated with Muhammadiyah one can find a *kotak amal* (charity box). Amazingly, this is also true in most restaurants owned by people of Minangkabau in origin—one of the largest bastion of Muhammadiyah—in most cities in Indonesia. On the box is written, for example, “Kotak Amal untuk membangun *Mushalla* or Rumah Yatim Piatu X” (Charity Box for building a Mosque or Orphanage House X). This way of implementing *fastabiqul khayrat* can be seen as one of the strengths of Muhammadiyah as it basically means that the organisation is an effective fund riser. Muhammadiyah seems to be the only Islamic organisation in Indonesia that can manage and maintain this way of self-funding.²⁵

Finally, the last important concept of Muhammadiyah is “to be a *kaffah* Muslim (Q2:208). The notion of being a *kaffah* (wholly or completely) Muslim is ideally implemented in two broad ways: one is through the implementation of Islamic *syari'a* in all activities and environments and the other is by providing social and public services which are solely based on the Qur'an and the Prophet's traditions.

Muhammadiyah and its *Ijtihad* -Based Political Participation in Post-New Order Era

The roles played by Muhammadiyah in founding the political parties of PAN prior to the 1999 general election were an integral part of Muhammadiyah's political participation. It played a crucial role in the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy.²⁶ As such, it contributed significantly to the process of democratization in Indonesia. This section explores the following questions: (1) what kind of relations exists between Muhammadiyah and the political parties associated with it? (2) How has Muhammadiyah faced the challenges to its religious and political aspirations, while at the same time fulfilling the ambitions and interests of their leaders? (3) How has PAN, and other political parties that are, to varying degrees, affiliated with Muhammadiyah taken advantage of the organisation? (4) How far has it pushed this big Islamic organisation into the new current of Indonesian politics?

PAN, Amien Rais and Muhammadiyah

The formation of PAN is a political *ijtihad* of Amien Rais under the endorsement of Muhammadiyah. Never before had Muhammadiyah had such a close relation with a political party during both a general election and a presidential election, and never before had such dynamic and *open* debates about politics across levels of Muhammadiyah and amongst its leaders taken place. Both organizations played crucial roles in the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy.²⁷ Despite PAN might be the closest party to Muhammadiyah there are two other political parties, PKS and PPP that have been made as alternatives of choices by Muhammadiyah followers in the general election 2004.

It is clear that from the beginning the social and political vehicle that contributed greatly to the role played by Rais was MARA, which then created a political embryo for the formation of PAN. MARA was formed on 14 May 1998 by fifty prominent scholars and pro-democracy activists, whose initial aim was to critically monitor the performance of Suharto's government in his last period in power. Other than Amien Rais, those who joined and supported MARA included Goenawan Muhammad (the founder of *Tempo* Magazine), Rizal Ramli, Faisal Basri (economists), Albert Hasibuan, Baharuddin Lopa, Adnan Buyung Nasution (lawyers), Dawam Rahardjo (Muhammadiyah leader) and Ulil Abshar Abdalla (NU leader). Thus it is evident that MARA was supported by prominent intellectuals and leaders from across ethnic groups, religions, and areas of expertise. Nakamura asserts that "The presence of these two Muslim-based but non-communal political parties seems to provide eloquent evidence of Islam and democracy being indeed compatible. They will be an effective block on the Muslim side against the growth of any tendency leading to religious communalism."²⁸ However, in my view this variety of backgrounds had both positive and negative effects as far as the performance of PAN is concerned; positive because it represents unity and diversity that can lead to the creation of political strength, but also negative because of the potential for conflicting interests. The latter has arguably contributed to PAN's failure to gain greater support in the 1999 and 2004 general elections.

During the early days of PAN formation, the notion of political *ijtihad* (political interpretation) started to play significant role in Muhammadiyah circle. It was particularly significant after Amin Rais getting the endorsement of Muhammadiyah to exercise his political *ijtihad*, and hence can be seen as the greatest change in the nature of Muhammadiyah's involvement in *politik praktis*. Never before had Mu-

hammadiyah made such an open statement that involved it so deeply in Indonesian practical politics. However, Muhammadiyah's endorsement for Rais to establish PAN and to run in the presidential election of 2004 can also be perceived as one of the ways in which Muhammadiyah intended to participate in Indonesian politics in order for democracy to work.²⁹ Schumpeter notes that "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at [a] political decision in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."³⁰ Thus, establishing a political party is a process through which political competition is played out. Not only political parties should play a role in this process, but also religious organizations like Muhammadiyah. This might be the best way to look at the relationship between PAN and Muhammadiyah. There is little doubt that the use of political *ijtihad* was an effort to give political action a religious justification.

The notion of political *ijtihad* became important in Muhammadiyah and Indonesian politics in general once Rais's idea of establishing a political party had been officially announced, after the resignation of Soeharto. However, due to strong resistance from some Muhammadiyah leaders and activists, the relationship between PAN and Muhammadiyah was made ambiguous. It is ambiguous because there is no official organisational relation but most PAN leaders are actually from Muhammadiyah. With this ambiguity, both Muhammadiyah and PAN can benefit from each other, although neither should be disadvantaged by the other's weaknesses. This ambiguous relationship started with the establishment of PAN in August 1998, but the seeds had been sown much earlier, in a series of events that led up to the establishment of PAN. During the Muhammadiyah *Tanwir* of 5-7 July 1998 in Semarang, political issues were debated fiercely. During commission meetings, the participants in the *Tanwir* proposed that Muhammadiyah devise a way for Rais to become the national leader of Indonesia, i.e., the next Indonesian president. This was why it was argued that Muhammadiyah had to establish a political party. However, the cultural wing of Muhammadiyah was too strong to be defeated by the political wing. Thus, no recommendation to establish a political party eventuated. Prior to the *Tanwir*, Rais had been criticized by Lukman Harun (d. April 1999),³¹ who was known to be Rais' rival. Harun said:

"I request Muhammadiyah to keep focusing itself on *dakwah* as usual. Apart from that, Muhammadiyah has to stay unified with the government and ABRI, and does not need to support Rais' activities. The matter of proposing

Rais to be a presidential candidate is Rais's personal matter. It does not involve Muhammadiyah, because Rais's proposal to talk about the succession of national leadership of Indonesia had been rejected by the participants of Muhammadiyah Tanwir in 1993, held in Surabaya."³²

PAN was established after Amien Rais's had failed in an earlier attempt to establish an all-embracing party that would attract supporters from all segments of Indonesian society. He tried to use as many elements as possible in order to ensure general support for the party, from secular nationalists at one end of the spectrum to radical Islamists at the other. These elements included Muslims and non-Muslims, modernists and traditionalists, and senior and junior political players. The broad variety of elements suggested that there was no coherence in the party's direction. One conclusion that can be drawn from this political zigzag was that Rais wanted to use the momentum to change his image. Rais acknowledged this when he said "I now have more appreciation of the plurality of the nation, and feel the necessity of building a strong nation."³³

The final series of events that led to the eventual formation of the new party under the name of PAN on 23 August 1998, rather than PAB happened at the Wisma Tempo Meeting, Sirnagalih Puncak (Bogor, 5-6 August 1998).³⁴ This meeting was attended by members of several factions—Muhammadiyah, MARA, PPP, ex-Masyumi leaders, Gema Madani (Echo of Civil Society),³⁵ PPSK, Tebet Society, and Dewan Dakwah.³⁶ Among those present from Muhammadiyah were Amien Rais, A.M. Fatwa, Mochtar Mas'ood, Amin Aziz, Syamsurizal Panggabean, Dawam Rahardjo and Abdillah Toha; from Dewan Dakwah, Tamsil Linrung and A.M. Luthfi; from MARA, Goenawan Muhammad, Faisal Basri, Toety Herati and Albert Hasibuan; from Gema Madani, Emil Salim, Ismid Hadad and Hamid Basyaib; and from PPP there were Aisyah Aminy, Yusuf Syakir and Faisal Basir. At this meeting yet another name for the party was proposed by Dawam Rahardjo, that of PAR (*Partai Amanat Rakyat*, or People's Mandate Party). In the end, PAB, which had been the originally proposed by Rais, was dropped and only PAN and PAR were left as choices. A vote was taken, and the decision was made in favor of PAN, which won the vote by 16:13 votes. Thus, the party which Rais had originally created under the name PAB was renamed PAN. It is interesting to note, however, that all three names had one important word in common, namely *amanat* (mandate). When Rais was interviewed on the following day about the reason why PAB was changed to PAN, he

claimed that it was easier to translate into English, which might well be the case. However, political considerations were also involved in renaming the party, one of them being that PAB could be translated as "People's Mandate Party", which has leftist connotations. Another reason, according to Fatwa,³⁷ was that PAN could also be more easily associated with the Pan-Islamism of Jamaluddin Al-Afghani.

One day before the declaration of PAN, Rais, who was still the Chairman of Muhammadiyah, invited all provincial chairmen of Muhammadiyah to the National Office at Kuningan, Jakarta. Several important issues were discussed at this meeting. Firstly, Rais announced his resignation as National Chairman. It was at this meeting, too, that Rais instructed that all provincial chairmen of Muhammadiyah had to attend the declaration of PAN the following day. While there was no resistance to this instruction, his intention to resign completely from Muhammadiyah was rejected. At this time, then, Rais was arguably still successful in maintaining the "high politics" of Muhammadiyah.

Structure of Political Variants: Rejectionist, Opportunist and Accommodationist

The policy of formal political openness, which is sometimes ambivalent but has been taken advantage of by Muhammadiyah and the opening up of political opportunities in post New Order Indonesian politics, have made the followers of Muhammadiyah view politics in different ways. In general, the political views of Muhammadiyah leaders and activists can be categorized into three political variants. One variant which I call "political rejectionist" involves the complete rejection of the idea of a PAN-Muhammadiyah connection, or even the idea or discourse of associating Muhammadiyah with any political party. Such people have been referred to as part of the civil society or the cultural and moral approach as opposed to a political approach.³⁸ However, categorisation is not adequate to explain the views of those who totally reject any attempt to bring their religious organisation into the political arena. Generally speaking, political rejectionists can be characterized as those who prefer to work for the *amal usaha* [charitable Institutions] of Muhammadiyah rather than for the political struggle for power. They also prefer to work as *dai'i* (religious preacher) to improve the quality of the Muslim *ummah*.

The arguments the supporters of political rejectionism put forward are usually based on the view that politics is corrupt and reli-

gious values cannot be implemented through corrupt ways. Another reason seems to be that in politics, as in the case of PAN, there is the possibility that Muslims might cooperate with non-Muslims, who have their own (religious) agenda. Those who can fall under this variant are those who involved in the *amal usaha*, through which the interests of Muhammadiyah followers can be promoted, taught, implemented and socialized. This variant appears to overlook the possibility of achieving the same through the mediums of politics. By and large, the main aim of this variant is that Muhammadiyah is for Muhammadiyah, Muhammadiyah is for religion and religion is for the hereafter. Although it may be somewhat of over generalization of a complex issue that needs to be more deeply explored, it is evident that the majority of those who belonging to this variant are those who have successfully developed the *amal usaha* of Muhammadiyah and those who are a bit distant from politics in their day to day lives.

However, these are also part the same interpretation of Islam that has been classified as "fundamentalist" or "radical." Based on a number of interviews particularly in South Sulawesi, this author is in agreement with Ricklefs who asserts that "[t]here are about a dozen such universities and most are places of constructive, liberal thought. Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta (Solo) may, however, be an exception. My impression is that it maybe a significant intellectual base for radicalism."³⁹ The relevance of this is that there is possibility that radical Islam will grow out of Muhammadiyah educational institutions. In this group then there are those who ultimately reject politics on the grounds that in politics Muslims may collaborate with non-Muslims and use Western systems of politics, such as democracy, which is not derived from Islamic values but from Western values.⁴⁰

The way how Muhammadiyah leaders reject the association of Muhammadiyah with politics or a political party varies from person to person. For example, Sulkan, a leader of Muhammadiyah in Banjarmasin, says:

"There is no obligation whatsoever for Muhammadiyah followers to vote for a particular political party, there is no political contract [with PAN]. So Muhammadiyah does not play in politics (*Muhammadiyah tidak berpolitik*), even though Muhammadiyah must not be blind to politics."⁴¹

Another leader of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi [who requested not to be named] said that:

"[T]he members of Rais's campaign team (*jurkam* or *juru kampanye*) are not allowed to use the Muhammadiyah name or have access to Muhammadiyah.

Why? Because Muhammadiyah does not want to create "disease" from all (politics). It is stupid (*itu bodoh namanya*).⁴²

The second variant consists of those who see a political party as a channel for Muhammadiyah politicians, *with* or *without* considering the importance of the structural connection to Muhammadiyah. This can be called the "political opportunist" variant. "Political opportunist" means one who takes advantage of any opportunity to achieve an end, often with no regard for principles or consequences. I use the term here to define those who make every effort to use both Muhammadiyah as an organisation and its leaders as a political force or as a shadow, in order to achieve their political goals. In the extreme action, the supporters of this variant would want to make Muhammadiyah a political party, or to create a political party which is officially acknowledged by the Muhammadiyah leadership. For instance, Jamaluddin Amin, the Chairman of PAN of South Sulawesi (former chairman of Muhammadiyah in that region) stated:

"I think PAN should be regarded as the Muhammadiyah political party, because it has the same ideology. It does not have to be affiliated, but we can say that PAN is supervised by Muhammadiyah. So we can join only one political party. I know that it is difficult [*now*] because in the Central Board of Muhammadiyah there are a number of those who have already joined Golkar, such as Malik Fajar and Ardianto."⁴³

To support his argument, Amin went on to say:

"As far as I know, Muhammadiyah has never left off supervising (*membina*) a political party. This is based on *Khiitah Ponorogo* which states that in order for Muhammadiyah to reach its goal, there must be a political party to accompany it. That is the conclusion. That is why Muhammadiyah gave birth to Masyumi, then Parmusi. Why then was *khiitah Ujung Pandang* born? Because by that time there was nothing that had anything more [*to offer to Muhammadiyah*]."⁴⁴

Khiitah Ponorogo was the result of 1969 Tanwir held in Ponorogo East Java which affirmed that the "ideals and the struggle of Muhammadiyah can only be actualized through Islamic *da'wah* via two channels simultaneously; that is political channel by means of political party and community channel by means of non-political organisation."⁴⁵ The *khiitah Ujung Pandang* was revealed in 1971 during the 38th congress of Muhammadiyah which eliminated the political role of Muhammadiyah through political parties as of the *khiitah Ponorogo*. Muhammadiyah took this stance after there were dual boards of Parmusi; one which was led by Djar-

nawi Hadikustuma and Lukman Harun of Muhammadiyah (as the Chairman and General Secretary consecutively) and the other one was led by Djailani Naro and Imran Kadir. The conflicts were resolved after Soeharto government intervened by appointing Mintareja and Sulastomo as the Chairman and General Secretary.⁴⁶

In claiming that PAN and Muhammadiyah have the same ideology, Amin's arguments seem to refer to principles. This is, in fact, exactly the opportunist approach. PAN is a political party open to collaboration with those of non-Islamic ideology. The open ideology is against the very core ideology of Muhammadiyah, (mentioned elsewhere in my other paper).

There are those who oppose the way proponents of political opportunism made use of Muhammadiyah but did not act like what Muhammadiyah leaders. When the author asked how the opponents of political opportunist viewed the opportunists in Muhammadiyah, Muhammad Ramli of Muhammadiyah South Kalimantan pointed out a number of local members of DPR who have created disillusionment within Muhammadiyah:

"This is a good example, out of seven members of DPR from PAN in the Municipality of Banjarmasin, there are at least five who are Muhammadiyah. None of them did not receive it (*corrupted payments*), there was no one from the Muhammadiyah element who did not receive the money. This created disillusionment because they are not consistent with Muhammadiyah *ideals*."⁴⁷

These two examples illustrate how the two camps compete with one another within Muhammadiyah. Yet they are significant for its internal dynamics.

The third variant consists of those see PAN as a political party that was formed by Muhammadiyah, and make the former subordinate to the latter. This can be called "political accommodationist." I define *political accommodationist* here as those who support the idea of creating a *formal political channel* for Muhammadiyah cadres when it is possible to do so, so as to accommodate those who want to play a role in politics for Muhammadiyah ideals. One proponent of this view is Adiani al-Alaby, a co-chairman of Muhammadiyah South Kalimantan, who stated:

"Muhammadiyah leaders are unorganized and have joined various political parties, PPP, Golkar, and PDIP, even though they are very few in number. Muhammadiyah followers have to support those of their politicians who will play the best role. Then PAN was formed in which Muhammadiyah played a role sociologically and historically. Generally speaking, Muhammadiyah followers are obliged to make PAN a success."⁴⁸

Al-Alaby stated further:

"Even though there is no written commitment, in a number of provincial and regional meetings (*musyawarah*), it was always conveyed to the representatives of all autonomous bodies - Pemuda Muhammadiyah, IMM, Nasyiatul Aisyiyah and others - that all Muhammadiyah followers have to make PAN successful, except when there are (*important*) local circumstances, then such regions can make their own considerations."⁴⁹

A clear difference can be seen between the political opportunist and political accommodationist view from what Muhammad Ramli said "PAN's supporters depend on Muhammadiyah, we have to acknowledge that. However, this only happens if Amien Rais is still holding the position of National Chairman of PAN."⁵⁰

The most minor goal of this variant is to create a connection between PAN and Muhammadiyah to the advantage of both. Adherents of this view try to accommodate Muhammadiyah ideals to the political situation. However, they still aim for their goal, which is to implement Muhammadiyah ideals by way of politics. The motto *amr ma'ruf nahy munkar* is often used by this variant. It is here that the difference can be clearly seen between this variant and the second variant.

There are three main goals of the political accommodationist: (i) to accommodate Muhammadiyah cadres who tend to play their roles through politics; (ii) to channel and promote Muhammadiyah ideals and interests through politics, and (iii) to balance the power of other religious groups who are also active in politics.

Who are Muhammadiyah at a Local Level?

In *Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree*, Nakamura has addressed the question of "who Muhammadiyah members are?" by examining the membership book of Muhammadiyah of Kotagede, Yogyakarta, where he carried out his research.⁵¹ However, as was argued above, in order to examine the political role of Muhammadiyah one has to go beyond what is simply recorded in the membership book, to look at the religious worldview of Muhammadiyah and how this worldview functions to create strong bonds between Muhammadiyah as an organisation and Muslims who are influenced by this worldview. Here, two interrelated aspects are important in any discussion of the political role of Muhammadiyah at the local level. One involves with the people, the followers of Muhammadiyah, and the other the organisa-

tions's institutions and related *dakwah* activities. One of the most important arguments for this is that the number of Muhammadiyah followers who decide not to apply for Muhammadiyah ID is far larger than those who do 1:30.⁵² But this does not mean that the 'Muhammadiyahness' of the former is less strong than that of the latter. In addition, there may be particular interests, such as access to facilities and other privileges that motivate those who decide to apply for membership, because the platform of Muhammadiyah states that only those who have Muhammadiyah ID can be elected to positions in the Muhammadiyah organisational structure.

A number of interviews with local leaders of Muhammadiyah revealed that a Muslim becomes associated with Muhammadiyah in four main ways: through family linkages, education, *dakwah* activities, or autonomous organisations of Muhammadiyah, such as IMM, IRM, Nasyiatul Aisyiah and others. The first question posed to informants about Muhammadiyah was "how did you become a member of Muhammadiyah?" Interestingly, most of the informants began to answer the question by referring to their parents who had Muhammadiyah backgrounds by culture and religious practices. Some of them added their explanation that they went to Muhammadiyah Islamic schools or Muhammadiyah general schools until senior high schools. Even though a number of informants had periods when they attended schools other than of Muhammadiyah, when they continued on university, they started again to be associated with Muhammadiyah, for example joining IMM (Association of Muhammadiyah Students). Muhammad Ramli MA, the Vice Chairperson of KPU of South Kalimantan, stated that his parents have a Muhammadiyah background not only by culture or religious practices but also by virtue of holding positions on Muhammadiyah boards, such as being the Chairman of Muhammadiyah, Banjarmasin. However, Ramli also stressed that he joined Muhammadiyah and still holds fast to it because "Muhammadiyah is a worldview; Muhammadiyah teaches me how to think rationally and logically because Islam is the religion of logic, there are organisations that appreciate [local] tradition [which is *syirk* or *khurafat*]"⁵³

In those cases where one of their parents had NU background, most of the informants tended to choose Muhammadiyah as their organisational affiliation, rather than NU. The three most commonly mentioned reasons were the spirit of anti-TBC, professional *dakwah* activities, and the spirit of religious thought of Muhammadiyah. What this suggests is that there is a spirit of agency for social


and religious change in Muslim community where they live. For example, Sulkan, Head of the Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) of Banjarmasin and a former member of Human Rights Commission of Muhammadiyah Youth of South Kalimantan, revealed that his father has a Muhammadiyah background while his mother is NU. He went to an Islamic junior high school affiliated with NU. However, when he studied at the university he chose to join Muhammadiyah Youth.⁵⁴

Another way to address the question of who Muhammadiyah is at the local level is to look at the public services (*amal usaha*) Muhammadiyah provides, not only for the Muhammadiyah community, but also for other Muslims who live in surrounding areas where these services are available. The two most important examples of these are the hospitals or health clinics, and the houses of prayers (mosques, *mushalla* or *langgar*). Although those who have changed their way of performing Islamic rituals to follow Muhammadiyah ways might not have applied for membership of the organisation, they would be closer to Muhammadiyah than to NU or any other Islamic organisations in particular regions. Regular attendance of prayers three to five times a day will have a significant impact on the awareness of local Muslims that they are practicing the Muhammadiyah version of Islamic rituals. Even though the same Muslims might sometimes go to traditionalist mosques, *mushalla* or *langgar*, they will not feel that such mosques are run by NU.

Intermediary Organisations and the Future of Indonesian Democracy

This section examines how Muhammadiyah plays its roles as intermediary organisations in a procedural democracy, and particularly in general elections. It takes a closer look at their roles in the general election of 2004 and the first direct presidential election in the history of Indonesia also held in 2004. The central issue is how the historical backgrounds of their associated political parties and the candidates for president and vice-president are transformed into the dynamics of local politics.

The pattern of state-society relations in the current trend of Indonesia's democratic transition can be understood in the following way:



Four linkages can be seen in this diagram: (i) the *direct mass pattern* (A), (ii) the *intermediary organisation pattern* (B), (iii) the *intermediary organisations political parties pattern* (C), and (iv) the *political parties without intermediary organisations pattern* (D). Of course, there are always overlaps across patterns, but the differences between them are significant and determinative. Pattern A usually operates in the form of mass appeals such as street demonstrations, without the direct involvement of intermediary organisations. The objectives of this pattern most often depend on who is organising it, and also on who is providing funds for particular activities. Therefore, it is relatively unstable, particularly when the interests of those involved in the demon-

strations are merely in money and the like. Pattern B usually operates in the form of communications between government and leaders of organisations about the issues and interests of organisations' followers and the people in general. Because most intermediary organisations are well-established in terms of mass basis, objectives, and to some degree sources of funding, this pattern operates frequently and can be evaluated regularly. As a result, it can be more effective than pattern A. Pattern C usually operates when intermediary organisations communicate the interests of the people to politicians of the political parties such that these interests are then voiced by the political parties. Finally, pattern D usually operates through the interests of the people are being voiced by political parties directly, without the involvement of intermediary organisations.

Each pattern has its weaknesses and strengths. Examination of these serves to show the importance of the roles of intermediary organisations such as Muhammadiyah and NU. Pattern A has at least two major weaknesses. One is that it is easy to manipulate, particularly by a group whose objectives may well be contrary to democratic values. The other is that it usually gets constituted spontaneously, and is thus short-lived. Although this pattern might be important, it is often the case that government encounters difficulties in having a direct and continued communication dealing with the issues raised. The weakness of pattern C is that there are always conflicts between the interests of the political parties and those of the intermediary organisations. Moreover, there are sometimes conflicts of authority among leaders of political parties and leaders of intermediary organisations. Nevertheless, it is still more effective than pattern A. The main weakness of pattern D is that there are people at the grassroots far away from urban areas whose interests are not voiced. To make it worse, they can become the political victims of such a pattern of relations. Their only possibility of being heard is when journalists help them voice their interests. In a society that includes the very poor and the very rich, with all their characteristics, such a pattern can be manipulated easily. Pattern D appears to be the pattern at work in many developed countries, where all means necessary for communication between people at the grassroots, including those who live in rural areas, are widely available and well-maintained. In such context pattern D operates effectively. However, such means have not yet spread evenly in developing countries such as Indonesia. Therefore, the roles of intermediary organisations are integral and

vital. Out of the four patterns, then, pattern B is the most effective and efficient, because compared to pattern A, it is controllable and compared to pattern D it has less vested interests.

The attachment between Muhammadiyah and the political parties closely affiliated with each of them, as well as their roles in the Indonesian democratic transition can be analysed using the above models of state-society relations. First, however, one important point to restate again is that the formation of PAN and PKB, which did not adopt 'Islam' as their political ideology, has been significant for the attitudes of the board members of Muhammadiyah and NU and their followers in general in the two elections mentioned previously. Although there is a small segment of Muhammadiyah that still considers Islamic ideology to be important in politics, most of those interviewed did not explicitly express Islamic ideology as an important concern. Conversely, no local leader of NU could be found who indicated, either explicitly or implicitly, that the open ideology of PKB mattered to them. Another important point for the discussion in this section is that the founding chairmen of PAN (Amien Rais) and PKB (Abdurrahman Wahid) both play important roles in the internal political dynamics of the Muhammadiyah and NU communities. Earlier in this paper I have showed how Muhammadiyah and NU were founded in provinces in the outer islands. In this section I will now examine how PAN and PKB were established using the already existing Muhammadiyah and NU networks with the modalities mentioned earlier. By using patterns B and C, it can be shown that these networks have contributed greatly to the formation of PAN and PKB. In the same way, Muhammadiyah and NU politicians have also used their previous positions in their organisations to gain support for recommendation for particular posts in PAN or PKB, respectively.

The section will also examine how Muhammadiyah and NU play their roles in the process of procedural democracy; the impact of such roles on the freedom and loyalty of their constituencies; and the result of the general election and presidential election of 2004 in terms of their relations between PAN and PKB with Muhammadiyah or NU respectively. As Hefner reminds us:

voluntary organizations that characterize Islam in Indonesia have the potential to be agents of civil society and democratization by promoting civil participation, if they are able to transcend sectarianism and promote a "public culture of equality, justice, and universal citizenship."²⁵

The Formation of PAN in the Outer Islands

As has been argued earlier, there were two main factors that encouraged local leaders of Muhammadiyah to take serious initiatives in establishing PAN. One deals with the discourses of local leaders during national meetings in dealing with political issues. The other is Amien Rais's invitation to provincial leaders of Muhammadiyah on the day before the national declaration of PAN in Jakarta in August 1998. What comes into view is that local leaders of Muhammadiyah have understood these two factors to mean that the only thing they could not do was to make PAN officially a part of Muhammadiyah and vice versa. All other actions to advance their political role were possible. Therefore, up to this point there was no significant barrier to initiating the establishment of PAN regional boards. However, as will be shown below, most Muhammadiyah leaders who were civil servants (PNS) faced a dilemma when they had to choose between PAN and their employment, because of the issuance of Government Regulation Number 12 1999 (hereafter PP No. 12 1999) regarding civil servants and ABRI involved in running political parties. This was and still is the real issue facing Muhammadiyah leaders at the local level and one that made Muhammadiyah-PAN relations problematic, because many of those who were involved in founding PAN cannot gain direct benefits from the party.

According to PP No. 12 1999 (which is an amendment of PP No. 5 1999, article 7, point one through four and articles 8 and 9), civil servants have to be neutral in politics. Therefore, if they want to be members of the board of a political party, they have to officially terminate their status as civil servants. Because of this regulation, many of those who initiated the formation of PAN could not actually run the party, whereas many Muhammadiyah leaders who were not civil servants and did not fully participate in the formation of the party could gain advantages from the situation. As a result, Muhammadiyah politicians in PAN cannot always get full access to Muhammadiyah activities. As will be discussed below, this situation is very likely to have contributed to PAN's rather poor election results.

In Jambi the initiators of the formation of PAN were all from Muhammadiyah. The head of the initiator team was Drs. H. Syar'i A. Roni (Chairman of Muhammadiyah, Jambi Province), while Drs. Risnal Mawardi (a leader of Muhammadiyah Jambi and the Head of Jambi National Museum) was the secretary, and Drs. H. Hatta, MA (a lecturer of IAIN STS Jambi and a senior leader of Muhammadiyah Jambi) was the treasurer. None of these founders was to continue running the party; all the

top leadership position in the first PAN board had to be given to those who actually played lesser roles in the days of leading up to PAN's formation.⁵⁶ The first Regional Congress of PAN in Jambi was held on 24-25 October 1998 in Kota Baru Jambi. According to letter number 004/KPW-PAN/10-1998,⁵⁷ in less than five weeks, all six regencies in Jambi had established KPD (Committee for Regency Formation of PAN), more than 40 out of 64 sub-districts had KPC (Committee for Sub-district Formation) and there were a number of KPR (Committee for Hamlet/Sub-urb Formation). There were 111 members of KPW (Committee for Provincial Formation of PAN), most of whom were graduates (S1). Some of them held MAs and some were PhDs. It was thanks to Muhammadiyah networks that these massive human resources were available to establish PAN within such a short period of time.⁵⁸

The list of committee members involved in the preparations for PAN in Jambi can be broadly categorized according to four backgrounds: their affiliation to religious organisation, ethnicity, intellectual, and entrepreneur profession. This variety, which disregards the puritan ideology of Muhammadiyah, shows the professional and mature attitude of Muhammadiyah leaders in politics in the outer islands. In this respect, Mietzner was only partly right when he said that PAN's leadership was recruited largely from Muhammadiyah, particularly the regional boards.⁵⁹ Relating to religious organisations, modernist background comes into sight to be the most prioritized consideration. This includes Masyumi, HMI, and autonomous Muhammadiyah organisations. Among those who can be included in this category are Hasyim Hanafi (Masyumi) and Normal Yahya (HMI). For ethnicity, it is quite apparent that Minangkabau background has priority. This is understandable as the Minangkabau have two advantages: first as traders they have business networks in all centers of business in the province; second most, if not all,⁶⁰ are Muhammadiyah followers.⁶¹ Most of the intellectuals were recruited from IAIN Sulthan Thaha Jambi and Jambi University. Even though most of those recruited left the party after the introduction of Law Number 12 1999. The fact that they were recruited in the first place clearly indicates the professionalism of Muhammadiyah leaders and the decrease in organisational loyalty, or at least that the organisation is no longer the only or the main consideration when Muhammadiyah engaged in external political competitions. For the category of entrepreneurship, the team of initiators chose Zulkifli Nurdin, son of Nurdin Hamzah, hitherto the most successful businessman in Jambi. Nurdin is well known not only because of his father, but also because he has successfully continued the business after his father's death. The inclusion of individuals with these

various backgrounds contesting with the nature of Muhammadiyah ideology among the initiators of PAN indicates not only how local leaders of Muhammadiyah have put pluralism into practice, but also a mature strategy in facing competition on a wider political scope.

In South Kalimantan, the formation of PAN was less progressive than in Jambi. The initiators were all from Muhammadiyah backgrounds, although the recruitment of the initial members of the board of PAN was actually based on two criteria, Muhammadiyah background and entrepreneurship. Among the initiators were H. Abdorrivai (former Acting Chairman of Muhammadiyah South Kalimantan), H. Noor Adenan Razak (former Vice-Chairman), H. Muhammad Rusli SHI (former Chairman of Muhammadiyah), Muhammad Ramli (current Chairman of Muhammadiyah),⁶² H. Ridhani Fidzi (former Vice-Secretary of Muhammadiyah). Three of these (H. Abdorrivai, H. Adenan Razak (Chairman of PAN) and H. Muhammad Rusli) chose to continue running the party, while the others, such as Muhammad Ramli, chose to remain government employees.

In South Sulawesi, however, the initiative of creating an image of such an inclusive party is blurred. Initiatives to invite those of different backgrounds were not taken seriously. Among the active initiators were Prof. Dr. Muhammad Askin, Baharuddin Abidin, Hammadu Tantu, Kausar Baisuri, Kahar Mustari, Yunus Tekeng, Ishak Ngeljeratan, Sohra Ahmad Baso, Halim Kalla, Qasim Mathar, Tajuddin Rahman, Abraham Samad, Jalaluddin Rahman and Jamaluddin Amin. All of these initiators were active leaders of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi. For example, Jamaluddin Amin was the provincial chairman of Muhammadiyah. In addition, the initiators of PAN in South Sulawesi also included Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar. The latter's father, Kahar Muzakkar was a leader of Muhammadiyah, who had led the Darul Islam rebellion movement. Up to the present, most South Sulawesians have regarded him as a hero rather than a rebel. The choice of Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar as one of the initiators seems to have been an effort to make use of the sentiment towards such a heroic figure.

Soon after the formation of PAN at the local level, Muhammadiyah politicians were faced with a political dilemma due to PP No. 12 1999. This caused many who were using their organisational mass support for political competition to face a dilemma between "realpolitik" and "moralpolitik": to continue leading their organisations or to shift to the struggle for power.⁶³ According to Risnal Mawardi, although many leaders of Muhammadiyah argued that part of the reason they did not choose to become functionaries of PAN was because Muhammadiyah

was not a political party, the truth was that this choice was determined by PP No. 12 1999. It has to be added here that in Indonesian society, the status of a civil servant is prestigious, despite the fact that the salaries involved are low compared to those in the private sector.

After the issuance of PP No. 12 1999, many involved in the establishment of PAN had to leave the newly born political party. In Jambi, for example, none of the three initiators mentioned above stayed to run the party. They elected Zulkifli Nurdin to the office of Chairman, even though by Islamic rituals, Nurdin acknowledged that he and his parents were from a traditional background by religious practice. For example, they practice *qunut* and *talqin*.⁶⁴ As a successful businessman, he was familiar in Jambian society particularly for the charitable donations to Muslims in the province. A parallel can be found in South Kalimantan, where Muhammad Ramli chose not to run the party, instead remaining a lecturer at IAIN Antasari Banjarmasin.⁶⁵

The main reason why local leaders of Muhammadiyah took the initiative of establishing PAN was twofold: first was the historical fact that Rais was the Chairman of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah while he was establishing PAN; second, and perhaps stronger, was Rais' intention to fight against KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism) and other wrongdoings of Indonesian bureaucrats and politicians, a position that is part of the exercise of *commanding right and forbidding wrong*. According to Muhammad Ramli, MA, the main reason many Muhammadiyah leaders supported Amien Rais was because they shared the same value orientation (*orientasi nilai*). This view is shared by some other local leaders of Muhammadiyah, such as Asnawi Mukti in Jambi and Nasaruddin Razak in South Sulawesi. However, few Muhammadiyah leaders looked at PAN in terms of the possible consequences of the PAN platform, which allows non-Muslims to run the party and to be elected as Members of Parliament. Adiyani Al-Alabij from South Kalimantan, for example, stated that he was of the same opinion as Muhammadiyah leaders from Papua and Central Kalimantan Provinces. He argued that in the case of regions where the number of non-Muslims is greater than the number of Muslims who represent PAN, Muhammadiyah followers do not have to support the party. They can instead choose other political parties, such as PKS, PPP or Golkar. Adiyani argued that in regions where many PAN officials are non-Muslims, such as in Papua, there is a strong possibility that they will be elected, which contravenes an unwritten commitment they have.⁶⁶ Adiyani stated: "Because from the beginning PAN is said to be an open party, non Muslims can also enter, so we have an unwritten

commitment where there are candidates who are from non-Muslims. We have to vote for a party other than PAN.”⁶⁷

Although there are Muhammadiyah leaders who pay attention to the implications of PAN’s open platform, it is quite clear that this is only a consideration where the majority of PAN office-bearers are non-Muslims. In other words, they are not particularly against the platform as a whole, which supports pluralism. It seems that Muhammadiyah leaders would allow politicians of other religions to compete by using PAN without the hope that Muhammadiyah followers in PAN will also support them. This lack of support from followers appears to be guided by the religious worldview of Muhammadiyah discussed above which would be contravened if they support non-Muslims politicians who might have different religious goals.

The fact that many Muhammadiyah leaders who took the initiative to establish PAN later on had to give up and let others run the party contributed to some extent to the uneasy relations between Muhammadiyah and PAN. However, Muhammadiyah politicians in PAN were aware of this problem and therefore they tried to make every effort possible to strengthen the relation.

Response to PAN Ideology and Gender Issues

In the face of PAN’s open ideology, Muhammadiyah leaders split into two broad camps. Those who belong to the younger generation tend to be aware of the importance of inclusiveness and pluralism. A few senior leaders interviewed expressed the same view. However, those who belong to the older generation are still stricter about the original puritanical mission of Muhammadiyah. For most of the younger generation in the three provinces, PAN’s platform was not of great concern, with a few exceptions in each province. There is a significant shift in the attitude of this generation as far as puritan ideology is concerned, particularly towards the involvement of non-Muslims in PAN. However, despite there being many other issues, most Muhammadiyah local leaders were attracted by the anti-KKN stance of Amien Rais, which is strongly connected to ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong,’ one of the basic principles of Muhammadiyah religious worldview. This might also be due to other views of the platform that are in line with this worldview, as discussed elsewhere. The pluralist aspect of PAN’s platform, which makes the party open to everyone, is not very apparent to most leaders of Muhammadiyah interviewed. According to Suwardi, the Chairman of Muhammadiyah Youth of Jambi

2002-2007, the main reason why Muhammadiyah should support PAN in the 2004 elections was that through PAN they could possibly prepare Amien Rais, 'Bapak Reformasi' (Father of Reform), to become Indonesian president. In addition, the war against KKN could possibly be won if Rais could be elected.⁶⁸ When asked more specifically about the possibility that PAN would also accommodate the interests of non-Muslims, Suwardi stated clearly that 'as a young generation of Muhammadiyah and personally speaking, I strongly support the programs or platform of PAN.' Thus, the most important aspect here is not the ideology, but the programs.

However, as discussed, the original orientation of Muhammadiyah was highly exclusive, not only towards other groups of Muslims with different ways of practicing Islam, but also towards non-Muslims, particularly Christians. There were leaders of Muhammadiyah who view the platform of PAN as not in line with Muhammadiyah's mission because it holds the possibility that non-Muslims too can promote their interests through the work of this political party. Such a view is held by most of the senior leaders interviewed including Asnawi Mukti of Jambi and Adiyani Al-Alabij of South Kalimantan. For these individuals, the circumstance that the PAN platform indicates openness to non-Muslims gives rise to a particular commitment on the part of Muhammadiyah leaders as stated by Al-Alabij above.

The discussion among local leaders of Muhammadiyah about PAN's platform, the inability of those who initiated the formation of PAN to join the party because of PP No. 22, 1999, and leadership recruitment which paid less attention to the younger generation of Muhammadiyah have all contributed to later developments in the relations between PAN and Muhammadiyah. This can be evaluated by looking at the number of votes PAN received in the 2004 general election, as will be discussed below.

Turning to gender issues now, placing a strong importance on gender issues is a characteristic of democratic values. Muhammadiyah has not given a signal of progressive through PAN. In general, the issue of whether to grant equal rights in Indonesian politics to women and men is very much an ongoing process of debate. This is also true with Muhammadiyah and PAN. It is explicit in the political regulations, but it is far from being actually implemented in the field. The situation is even worse in the outer islands. According to PP No. 12, 2003 Part 65, Article 1, every political party is encouraged to field at least 30% of female candidates for legislative elections. This has become known as the '30% quota'. It is important to note that although many claim that

Muhammadiyah is a modernist Islamic movement, in regards to gender disparity it is little different from other Islamic organisations in Indonesia. Most such organisations have a separate board or autonomous bodies for women. As a result, if a woman is given a role in such a male-dominated organisation, it would only be a minor one, for example in social and women affairs, not in the actual leadership section. This seems to reflect the dominant view in Islamic society, where women are usually deemed to have a secondary or purely domestic position. Muhammadiyah politicians in PAN are no exception to this view. In Jambi, for example, there were only seven women out of ninety-six members (7.29%) on the first PAN board. They were Hj. Auda Syafri, Hj. Alisma Kuris, and Miami in the section of Health and Social Welfare, and Aminah Payung, Hj. Rahman Tamin, Hj. Nurjanah and Farida Manin in the section of Women's Empowerment. In South Sulawesi there were two out of twenty-six in the second PAN board. Nevertheless, in this province women were given more important roles. Hj A. Yuliani Paris was in charge as secretary, Hj A. Tjendranawati was one of the four vice-treasurers. Yet, in general, even if women are included on the board, men are often dominant in decision-making processes. Women are rarely seen representing PAN in responding to political issues in the local news media.

Putra terbaik: Its Internal and External Significance

A discussion of *putra terbaik* (the best man) or sometimes *kader terbaik* (the best cadre) can be used to analyze how democratic values are implemented in the internal organisation of Muhammadiyah when there is an election for chairman of the organisation, and how this competitive exercise contributes to external competition in Indonesian politics during the process of democratic transition.⁶⁹ The term *putra terbaik* or *kader terbaik* became highly significant as an icon of Muhammadiyah's role in Indonesian politics in the run up to the 2004 presidential election, because it was one of the discourses that drove Muhammadiyah deeper into the arena of *politik praktis*.

Broadly speaking, as concerns politics since the inception of *reformasi*, the followers of Muhammadiyah are divided into two camps: *pragmatic* or *low politics* (P/LP) and *idealist* or *high politics* (I/HP). P/LP refers to those Muhammadiyah activists who clearly support pragmatic politics in order to gain power. As discussed in the previous section, the main objective here is power. I/HP, on the other hand, refers to those who have been working hard to prevent Muhammad-

iyah from getting too deeply involved in *politik praktis*. In relation to this, after the extended meeting in 2004, held in Jakarta, Muhammadiyah revealed that

it fully supports the efforts of Prof. Dr. Amien Rais as the best cadre, previous Chairman of the National Board of Muhammadiyah as well as the *reformasi* leader to struggle for the continuation of *reformasi* and to a safe Indonesian nation in the upcoming Presidential Election 2004.⁷⁰

Although there is no reliable record, my interviews with local leaders of Muhammadiyah revealed that the icon of *putra terbaik* has actually been familiar to Muhammadiyah's larger constituency (*keluarga besar*) for much longer than the period just before the 2004 presidential election. During political campaigns and in the result of every national congress, and conferences of provincial boards, *putra terbaik* has always been well-recognized. Whoever intends to become an office-bearer in Muhammadiyah has to complete a form from which the leaders and followers of Muhammadiyah can judge whether he or she is a *putra terbaik* of Muhammadiyah and thus eligible to run for Muhammadiyah office.

On the form CPCPM (Main Record of Candidates of Muhammadiyah Leaders), a candidate has to put his ID number, his formal and non-formal educational background, his work experience, his organisational experience in Muhammadiyah, and his wife's involvement in the autonomous bodies of Muhammadiyah.⁷¹ "This is what we base the judgment of *kader terbaik* of Muhammadiyah on," said Asnawi Mukti, one of the vice-chairmen of Muhammadiyah Jambi.⁷² Thus, based on these, *kader terbaik* is an honorary title given to a Muhammadiyah leader which has to be based on his leadership achievements within Muhammadiyah. The assessment can be based on leadership, morality, academic and political records. This way of selecting a leader fully satisfies the criteria of democracy in a modern system of organisation. No one was elected to chair Muhammadiyah at any level just because he had many supporters or *santri*.

However, when the discourse of *kader terbaik* is brought into a wider spectrum, the assessment within the Muhammadiyah community has to face a greater challenge. Prior to the 2004 presidential election, there was a heated debate on the issue of *putra terbaik* that then attracted a wider audience. This included two important issues: first whether or not there is *only* one *kader terbaik* and whether or not a particular name should be openly stated;⁷³ second, whether Muhammadiyah *kader terbaik* is relevant to Indonesian society as a whole.

It is clear that this last issue attracted the attention of people outside the Muhammadiyah community.

Chronologically, the discourse of *putra terbaik* in relation to the candidacy for president was initially raised by Amien Rais himself during the Banjarmasin *Tanwir* on 13-15 December 1996. When asked about the criteria for a potential successor of Soeharto, Rais replied, "the criterion that has been addressed is almost perfect, what is left is how *putra terbaik bangsa* (the best man of the nation) should be recruited."⁷⁴ Rais then continued, "do not worry we have got the name in the office."⁷⁵ This seemed to indicate that this notion had motivated leaders of Muhammadiyah to interpret *kader terbaik bangsa* as equivalent to *kader terbaik Muhammadiyah*, and or vice-versa.

During the Bali *Tanwir* of 2002, Muhammadiyah leaders raised two determinative issues for the present study. One concerned the proposal for the candidate of Indonesia's next president. The other concerned the proposal of including women in the next office of Muhammadiyah's national leadership (2005-2010).⁷⁶ Prof. Syafi'i Ma'arif stated that "*kader terbaik Muhammadiyah* has to get prepared in case he has to take over the national mandate as the leader (president) of the country."⁷⁷ However, when Ma'arif was asked whether by *kader terbaik* he meant Amien Rais, he replied that *kader terbaik* did not mean *only* Amien Rais because Muhammadiyah had never mentioned a name nor had it affiliated itself with a particular political party.⁷⁸ Ma'arif then continued by saying that "there should be no *fatwa* of politics [by explicitly mentioning a name] because the Muhammadiyah family are so clever in understanding the language of gestures (*bahasa isyarat*) or implicit communication that was delivered by their leaders."⁷⁹

The discourse of *kader terbaik* attracted further attention from participants of the Makassar *Tanwir* 2003, but the dispute over whether Rais's name should be mentioned remained unresolved. The P/LP element of Muhammadiyah had to wait until this discourse reached its climax during an extended meeting held from 9-10 February 2004 in Yogyakarta where Muhammadiyah issued a crucial decision as far as the development of democratic process in Indonesia is concerned by mentioning Amien Rais alone by name as *kader terbaik* of Muhammadiyah as well as the champion of *reformasi* in the struggle to continue *reformasi* and to save the nation in the 2004 Presidential election.⁸⁰ By connecting *kader terbaik* of Muhammadiyah to champion of *reformasi*, Muhammadiyah leaders attempted to convince the wider community of Indonesians that the *putra terbaik* of Muhammadiyah was indeed the *putra terbaik* of the nation.

Despite disputes over whether a specific name should be explicitly mentioned (during the Bali *Tanwir* 2002), the battle between these two wings was more clearly expressed during the 26th National Congress of Pemuda Muhammadiyah, held in Surabaya in July 2002. After a long debate, section C of the Committee responsible for completing the recommendations of the congress, decided to mention Rais' name (the current Spokesperson of MPR). However, when Raja Juli Antonio, who was in charge of announcing the decisions made by his section, did not mention Rais, he received a strong reaction from the members of his section. In the end, Syafruddin Anhar (the chairperson of that particular session of the congress) came forward and asserted that the recommendation of candidate for president should not mention Amien Rais by name. It was enough to state that Pemuda Muhammadiyah supported *kader terbaik* of Muhammadiyah for the 2004 presidential election. Anhar stated that "Pemuda Muhammadiyah is not a political institution, but it is a moral institution."⁸¹ Supporting this, Mu'thi, the elected national chairman of Pemuda Muhammadiyah 2002-2005, said, "when there is a recommendation, I think it is to provide a space. It is up to an individual to do it (mentioning the name), but institutionally we may not give such a stamp."⁸²

Conversely, the cultural element activists who advocated *idealistic* or *high politics* (I/HP) argued that Muhammadiyah should not mention a particular name despite the fact that they agreed that Muhammadiyah should support *putra terbaik* of Muhammadiyah to run in the presidential election in 2004. In the end, the winner was P/LP. Amien Rais was finally mentioned explicitly. But when it became apparent that Rais was highly unlikely to win the election, Muhammadiyah as a whole suffered the political consequences because as a defeated competitor they would lose their share in positions in the upcoming cabinet of the new government.

At the provincial level, the discourse about *putra* or *kader terbaik* involved different approaches. These were mainly the results of the views of local Muhammadiyah leaders toward politics in general, and the relationships between PAN and Muhammadiyah in the respective provinces. From the perspective of *putra terbaik*, the relationship between PAN and Muhammadiyah in the three provinces varied significantly. In Makassar, for example, there was strong resistance to Amien Rais among the Buginese-Makassarese Muslims, for two reasons. One had to do with the slip of tongue by Rais when responding to a journalist's question asking whether there was a negative campaign against him in eastern Indonesia, such as in South

Sulawesi, where a t-shirt written "PAN and Habibie for President" could be found. In responding to the amendment of Law No. 22 and no. 25 1999 on regional autonomy, Rais stated:

since the implementation of the regional autonomy law, local ethno-centrism has appeared, thereby sometimes there comes someone who asserts that someone who can be appointed to be local government employee must be from that region and those who are from other ethnicities cannot be accepted. This is modern political ignorant paganism.⁹³

Rais' overly high political profile seemed to have undermined the ethnic sensitivity of the Buginese and Makassarese, including the followers of Muhammadiyah in this region.

Another cause of resistance to Rais was the fact that Jusuf Kalla, a prominent businessman from South Sulawesi, was also running for the vice-presidency with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. By organisational affiliation, Kalla was one of the Mukhtasar (Advisor) of NU, South Sulawesi. He was and still is one of the influential Buginese figures both under Soeharto and during the *Reformasi* era. As a successful Buginese businessman who owns a number of large businesses in eastern Indonesia, Kalla has provided much support to various social and religious causes.

The emergence of the three elements in Muhammadiyah discussed above is a product of how democratic values are respected within this organisation. Through the use of procedural democracy at the National Congress in July 2005, the liberal progressive and political pragmatic elements have been excluded from the stage, at least temporarily. There is an open possibility for this process to alienate those who promote normative democratic values through procedural democracy, because the power to reject pro-democracy has its roots in the Muhammadiyah constitution (AD/ART). It is quite possible that such free spaces in Muhammadiyah are facing even greater challenges. In other words, modernist-puritans, such as Muhammadiyah, can adopt and use procedural democracy, but there is a dilemma when this touches on normative democratic values, particularly when it confronts their ideology. From this perspective, there is a real dilemma both in Islam and democracy.

Despite the fact that, since mid-1995, there has been some development in Muhammadiyah toward democratic values, two conditions have always been obstacles: One is the style of individual leadership which depends greatly upon the majority who have the right to vote

during the National Congress; the other is the puritanical ideology that has been the main force keeping this organisation in existence. Muhammadiyah is, therefore, an organisation that has reformist ideals, is institutionally modern, but ideologically radical-puritan.

Elections: Exercising Freedom or Demonstrating Loyalties?

Before going further into the discussion of the 2004 election results at the local level, it is important to recall several facts of the results at the national level. One of the most significant aspects of the election results which has received little attention from political analysts and politicians alike is the fact that there is a big discrepancy between the number of votes received and the number of seats gained for parties like PAN and PKB. As Table 10 shows, PKB received 10.57% of the vote, but only gained 9.45% of parliamentary seats (52). PAN, on the other hand, gained only 6.44% of the popular vote, but was awarded 53 seats (9.64%).

Table 17:
Post-election Distributions of DPR Seats of 2004
among Seven Large Parties*

Political Party	% of Votes	No. of Seats	% of Seats	Diff.
GOLKAR	21.62	128	8.18	+1.65
PDIP	18.31	109	23.27	+1.51
PPP	8.16	58	19.82	+2.39
DEMOKRAT	7.46	55	10.55	+2.54
PAN	6.41	53	10.00	+3.23
PKB	10.61	52	9.64	-1.16
PKS	7.2	45	9.45	+0.98

Adapted from <http://www.kpu.go.id/>

Another important fact is that in most provinces in the outer islands, including those relevant for this study, the approximations of the followers of traditionalist Islam are far larger than those of modernist-puritanical Islam (60%:15%). However, PKB, the party closest to NU, gained no DPR seats in South Sulawesi or Jambi.⁸⁴ Similarly, in the provincial DPRD's the party also failed to gain any seats. These phenomena lead to some important inquiries: Is the alleged "absolute" obedience of followers of traditionalist Islam toward *kyai* myth or reality?⁸⁵ Are there differences between Javanese traditionalist Muslims and their counterparts in the outer islands? In other words, is obedience toward *kyai* predominantly determined by traditionalist religiosity as such or rather by ethnicity? Is the disobedience in the outer islands caused by rational calculations or by different degrees of respect toward *kyai*? Can, on the other hand, the fact that most Muhammadiyah followers did vote for PAN be explained as a result of stricter obedience toward their leaders' appeal or was it rather a result of rational thinking? Answering these questions will show how important it is to understand the significance of local politics in Indonesia.

Local Response to Issues and Guidelines for Elections

To start with, there are three aspects that need to be examined in relation to the guidelines for the 2004 general elections in their relations to the role of Muhammadiyah as intermediary organisation in a procedural democracy: first, the responses of local Muhammadiyah-followers to these organizational guidelines; second, issues that have significant meanings from the perspective of democracy; and third, the degree of loyalty that might have influenced the followers of NU and Muhammadiyah in both general election and presidential election.

Well before the actual campaign period of the 2004 parliamentary and presidential election, the National Board of Muhammadiyah had already addressed these two critical events at the annual *Tanwir*s (2002 in Bali, 2003 in Makassar and also in the expanded plenary meeting in February 2004 in Yogyakarta). These initiatives sent a clear message that Muhammadiyah wanted to be involved actively in moulding the Indonesian transition to democracy. It was done so by means of participating in the process of determining presidential and

legislative candidates for the elections. Muhammadiyah leaders enthusiastically followed every political development surrounding the two elections. These initial efforts were followed up by the issuance of political guidelines for Muhammadiyah followers, which were distributed nationally. These guidelines were particularly finalized at the extended plenary meeting of the Central Board in Yogyakarta on February 2004.⁸⁶

These opening words of the appeal of Muhammadiyah for the general elections and the presidential election are very crucial in the sense that they can make the followers of Muhammadiyah aware of the values of their participation in the process of democratisation. This can be ascertained from the key issues that are included in the abovementioned preamble. For example, Muhammadiyah regarded the general elections as an opportunity to end the multifaceted crisis in Indonesia for every segment of the society. In order to end the crisis, the Indonesian people had to be involved in creating an agenda for active involvement, particularly through their participation in the legislative and the presidential elections. In addition, their participation was not only regarded as giving their vote, but also as making sure that the elections would be carried out in accordance with the principles of democracy, namely critically, honestly, peacefully, and free from any oppression.

Furthermore, Muhammadiyah gave a gentle reminder that in order to implement democratic values everyone had to stay away from money politics, violence and other non-democratic activities. Pointing out these issues is imperative because such issues are the real problems the country faces. Finally, in order to reduce the social and economic costs of democratic consolidation, Muhammadiyah urged everyone to accept the election results, regardless of who would win. These key issues show us an advanced and mature attitude of Muhammadiyah in participating in procedural democracy.

For the legislative election, the appeal read as follows:

The legislative institution and the Indonesian system of politics during the era of *reformasi* has to be the checks and balances factor against the executive, and it also has to run the political functions for the benefit of the people. Therefore, legislative members for DPR, DPRD and DPD are needed who truly have responsibility, morality, vision and a high ability to struggle for the real interests of the people.

In relation to this, Muhammadiyah urged all the followers of Muhammadiyah:

1. to vote for legislative candidates who really possess a high quality of moral (*akhlak*), responsibility, capability, and quality mission as well as a high commitment to struggling for Muhammadiyah's mission for the interests of the *ummat* and the nation;
2. to vote for legislative candidates and the political party which can give a great and direct chance for the election of the best cadre of Muhammadiyah in the Presidential Election 2004;
3. to vote for a DPD candidate (Regional Representative Council) from Muhammadiyah who is recommended and represents the majority aspirations of each region/province;
4. to vote for female legislative candidates from Muhammadiyah in the 2004 general election; and
5. to not vote for legislative candidates who have problems and are involved in cases of immorality, corruption, human rights violations, violation of the public interest and (other) legal matters.⁸⁷

There are several points that can be made from the above political guidelines of Muhammadiyah. First, Muhammadiyah intends to educate its followers as to how they should participate in the current democratisation process. Even though the document has the character of an official guideline, it did not mention any organisational punishment for those who did not obey it. Therefore, it could be argued that this kind of guideline does not set limits to the freedom of choice for the followers of Muhammadiyah. The loyalty of the followers of Muhammadiyah should not be measured along the question whether or not they obey such a guideline, but it should rather be measured by looking at the substantial meanings of the political guidelines in the process of maturing democracy in the country.

Second, as a religious organisation with a large number of followers Muhammadiyah would like to participate in the Indonesian democratisation process by means of gaining political power without becoming a political party. This effectively means that Muhammadiyah will maintain its character as a civil society organization as opposed to practical politics. The experience of being involved in practical politics in the 1950s when it joined Masyumi appears to have become not only a political trauma but also a good political lesson for Muhammadiyah. It can also be interpreted that Muhammadiyah has learnt from the experience of other Islamic organisations such as NU

that have experienced many internal conflicts due to its direct political involvement. Therefore, despite its eagerness to participate in politics, strong efforts were also made to anticipate unintended disadvantages that may come with direct involvement. This approach seems to be in line with the logic of “high politics” mentioned elsewhere.

The encouragement to support candidates for the DPD was very strategic because Muhammadiyah leaders who are government employees did not have to be bound by political regulations in which they have to choose between their work and a political party.⁸⁸ DPD candidates stood as individuals but not as members of political parties. In regards to this, Muhammad Ramli stated:

[if I joined a political party] I will be together with various [bad political] attitudes which are difficult to manage and control. There will be internal conflicts. For example, the existing political parties nowadays are on average split. There are those who established their own new political parties [because of conflicts], though in PAN this reality is not that apparent. I am going to be a regional representative. This means that every party can vote for me because I am not representing any political party.⁸⁹

The third important point is that Muhammadiyah did not advise its followers to vote for any particular candidates. Significantly, no particular name was mentioned in the guideline. However, there was a growing pragmatic segment within the Muhammadiyah community that had a strong political desire (as in the case of NU mentioned later) to bring Muhammadiyah deeper into *politik praktis*. This was indicated during a national meeting of regional boards of Muhammadiyah at the Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta (UMY) on 20 February 2004. At this meeting a new guideline of how to use Muhammadiyah networks in all remote areas (*pelosok*) of Indonesia was intensely discussed. As a result, Muhammadiyah cadres are not only advised to use the organization's networks, but also to conduct a door-to-door campaign of Indonesian Muslims for Amien Rais-Siswono Yudhohusodo.⁹⁰ Even Syafi'i Ma'arif stated that the action plan (for campaigning for Amien Rais-Siswono) to use Muhammadiyah networks from national level to remote areas has been made at the UMY meeting.⁹¹

This explicit mentioning of Amien Rais' name, I would argue, was not the intention of Muhammadiyah as a whole, but it was rather the ambition of Rais's team to make use of Muhammadiyah networks. The main supporters of this kind of “misleading guideline”⁹² were Muhammadiyah leaders who were given important positions in PAN as a trade off. It was not purely the initiative of Muhammadiyah as

an organisation. There was a kind of battle between the political wing of Muhammadiyah community and the civil wing. By the issuance of this misleading guideline, the political wing of Muhammadiyah had temporarily won the battle. Therefore, when the results of both elections were not as great as expected, not all Muhammadiyah leaders and followers shared the feeling of being defeated.

However, to show how mature the political attitudes of many followers of Muhammadiyah are in general, it is important to point out how difficult it was to implement such a clear guideline both for PAN and Amien Rais from the national board of Muhammadiyah at the local level. There were many unanticipated factors that were not considered by the Muhammadiyah-PAN team in making all the points in the guideline to be effective. Every region has its own social and political problems in this regard. For example, in South Sulawesi the most important consideration for Buginese and Makassarese when they cast their vote was their ethnic identity as Buginese or Makassarese. It is quite convincing that ethnic attachment that was discussed earlier still has a strong influence in the current politics in South Sulawesi. The second is being a Muslim, and only the third most important factor might be affiliation to a religious organisation. Therefore, followers of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi might have voted for legislative candidates of PAN because these candidates are Buginese or Makassarese, but the same people might not have voted for Amien Rais to become president. This can be seen from the comparison between the election result (see the details of general election and presidential election below).

For the presidential elections, the political appeal of Muhammadiyah stresses on the development of democracy as a momentum of change for continuing the reform and saving the country (see Appendix I). In accordance with the decision of the Denpasar *Tanwir*, 2002, and Makassar *Tanwir* 2003, Muhammadiyah announced that it fully support the initiatives of Prof. Dr. H. M. Amien Rais as the *kader terbaik* to struggle for the continuation of *reformasi* and to save the nation in the presidential election 2004 (see Appendix I). In addition, it is stated:

1. It is hoped that the president of Indonesia who will be elected in the 2004 election will: struggle for the continuation of *reformasi* and salvation of the nation; be a reformist leader, clear from KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism); run good governance; have a broad vision about the nation; be determined and dignified in bringing the nation to the middle of international friendships; be

- able to increase the welfare of the people, and to advance the life of the nation heading to a better future.
2. Urging the followers of Muhammadiyah and ask the people (of the country) to support the election of President and Vice-President who is able to perform the mandate of the *reformasi* as well as to save the nation.⁹³

However, despite the comprehensive aforementioned guidelines, followers of Muhammadiyah at the local level are politically divided into three main groups. The first group came with the slogan "Amien Rais Yes, PAN No." The slogan was coined for two different reasons. The first is based on the fact that Muhammadiyah politicians are not only members of PAN, but they have spread to other major parties as well, including Golkar, PPP, and PKS. The second reason is the open ideology of PAN which opens the door to cooperate not only with Muslims from Muhammadiyah, but also with non-affiliated Muslims and non-Muslims. For those who adhere strictly to the worldview of Muhammadiyah, such a possibility will undermine their faith to the worldview of Muhammadiyah. Although supporters of this group can be found in all three provinces, the explicit slogan was only found in South Kalimantan. The main reason this slogan was used during the campaigns for the legislative and presidential elections was the open ideology of PAN. Muhammad Ramli (the Chairman of Muhammadiyah of South Kalimantan) argued "our support for Amien Rais is 100% but for PAN there is a slogan "Amien Rais Yes, PAN no" ... because PAN is an open political party which every segment of the society can join, even infidels (*orang kafir*). There are Chinese and Christians."⁹⁴

Another reason was the negative campaign against unpopular PAN politicians who had earlier been elected as members of regional legislatures to accommodate, promote and protect the interests of Muhammadiyah. In South Kalimantan, for example, there was once a group of Muhammadiyah youths that wished to leave PAN because they thought that PAN did not accommodate the interests of Muhammadiyah. During a joint closed meeting between members of DPRD South Kalimantan and Muhammadiyah leaders and activists, a number of Muhammadiyah youths came out with a proposal, "*Pak Ramly kami Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah siap mendeklarasikan keluar dari PAN.*"⁹⁵ This is significant because the emphasis was put on 'the interests of Muhammadiyah'. However, Ramly rejected their proposal.

What do the interests of Muhammadiyah mean for Muhammadiyah leaders in this context? I found that there are two main meanings of 'interests' when Muhammadiyah leaders or activists use this word in relation to PAN and Indonesian politics in general. One meaning deals very much with the worldview of Muhammadiyah against the open ideology of PAN. In the constitution of Muhammadiyah it is written that the objective of Muhammadiyah is "to perform and highly respect Islamic teachings so that the truest Islamic society can be created."⁹⁶ According to this view, the open ideology of PAN, especially the fact that the party is open to non-Muslims, is against the interests of Muhammadiyah. The other meaning of 'interest' is more pragmatic and political. In Jambi, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi, most of the politicians of Muhammadiyah who were recruited by PAN were senior leaders of Muhammadiyah while there were many younger activists who were not recruited even though they wished to be. The regular cadre recruitment through Muhammadiyah Youth and Muhammadiyah Student Association has been too fast compared to the limited posts available for them such as in both in PAN and Muhammadiyah board. Therefore, when PAN recruited non-Muhammadiyah people while ignoring the aspirations of Muhammadiyah people, many in Muhammadiyah regarded that as a failure to accommodate the interests of Muhammadiyah. However, the most important meaning of 'the interests of Muhammadiyah' seems to deal with its religious worldview that is *commanding right and forbidding wrong*. The failure of politicians of PAN in fighting against corruption in South Kalimantan, according to Muhammad Ramli, is part of the failure of Muhammadiyah politicians in promoting the interests of Muhammadiyah.⁹⁷


However, there were also several leaders in the local Muhammadiyah communities who argued that their support for Amien Rais was not merely because Rais was a Muhammadiyah leader, but rather because they shared his ideals in many respects. Muhammad Ramli, MA., for example stated:

I do not want to be trapped with "we are all Muhammadiyah" or "we are all HMI" or "we are all NU", therefore we have to work and help each other (*saling tolong menolong*). I do not want to be like that. What makes me close to Amien Rais, for example, or with others is not because of Muhammadiyah, NU, or PMII, but because we share similar value orientations; anti corruption, for example.⁹⁸

The second group came with the slogan of “*sesuai hati nurani*” (in accordance with one’s conscience). This slogan was quite familiar within Muhammadiyah constituencies during the campaign period in March 2004. Local followers of Muhammadiyah had their own interpretations of the guidelines issued by the national board. Therefore, two totally different messages of the mottos could be heard. Based on the responses of many informants, it is clear that this slogan was quite significant in meaning for many Muhammadiyah followers in making their decisions during the parliamentary and presidential election 2004. In general, even though there are different ways of how Muhammadiyah leaders responded to the guideline mentioned above, it is clear that their goal was basically how to win the election which was implicitly found in the above guideline and statement of their leaders. This is actually an essence of *ijtihad* democratic participation as discussed earlier. Muhammadiyah’s political behaviour is not merely to participate democratically but also to win.⁹⁹

Legislative Election 2004: The Decline of Religious Loyalty?


The results of the 2004 legislative elections in Jambi, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi show that many traditionalist Muslims have not voted for political parties connected to traditionalist Islamic organisations like NU. Their political choices were not based on religious loyalty, but on rational calculations about what would suit them best in a democratic political sense. This can be seen from the number of those who voted for PKB, which was nowhere near the approximate number of followers of NU in the respective provinces. On the other hand, PAN received greater support compared to PKB. It received even larger than the approximation of the followers of Muhammadiyah. There is a big discrepancy between the approximation of the number of traditionalist Muslims and those who voted for PKB. As can be seen from Charts III, IV and V, PAN achieved better results than PKB in all three relevant provinces.



These figures are adapted from www.kpu.go.id and Kompas, *Peta Politik Pemilihan Umum*, p. 3.

As can be seen from Chart III, PAN received a far bigger proportion of votes, more than three times bigger than PKB did. Even if the figures of other political parties that are also associated with NU (PBR and PPP) are combined with those of PKB, PAN's vote is still higher than the votes of these three parties together. If the figures of PKB in Jambi are compared to the votes the party received in Java, it is clear that the number of PKB votes in Java is around three times higher than in Jambi. Interestingly, it is exactly the opposite in the case of PAN. This party achieved a much better result in Jambi than in Java. Another important evidence from the chart is that those who voted for Golkar in 1999 probably moved to PAN in the 2004 election, not to PKB. Golkar received 34.70 percent in 1999, but fell to 24.72 percent in 2004.¹⁰⁰ In sum, the majority of traditionalist Muslims


in Jambi did not vote for parties that are associated with NU, whereas it appeared that most, if not all, of the followers of modernist Islam which are associated with Muhammadiyah voted for PAN or PKS. In other words, Muhammadiyah supporters apparently largely followed the guidelines of their organization, which had not only urged them to make the election a political success, but also to vote for PAN.



These figures are adapted from www.kpu.go.id and Kompas, *Peta Politik Pemilihan Umum*, p. 3.

Chart IV shows us even more valuable information as far as the general knowledge about Muhammadiyah is concerned. The figures in the chart also contradict the general knowledge about NU and the political attitudes of the followers of each organisation. Muhammadiyah followers have been regarded as difficult to be managed politically, while NU followers are regarded as 'absolutely obedient to their kyai'.¹⁰¹ In addition, South Kalimantan has been acknowledged to be one of the few strongholds of traditionalist Muslims in the

outer islands. As can be seen, however, PAN received a much bigger vote share than PKB in this province. Yet, the most intriguing fact from the chart is that it was neither PAN nor PKB, but PKS which achieved the best result of all new Islam-based parties.



These figures are adapted from www.kpu.go.id and Kompas, *Peta Politik Pemilihan Umum*, p. 3.

Chart V shows a totally different picture as far as PKB and NU are concerned. PKB only finished eleventh in South Sulawesi, far below other Islam-based parties. PKS, on the other hand, managed to come in second, just after Golkar. PAN received nearly the same percentage of votes as in Java. According to Jamaluddin Amin and Nasarud-

din Razak, in addition to those who have clearly stated that they supported PAN, there were those whose backgrounds are Muhammadiyah but in practical politics preferred to join PKS, PPP, PBB and Golkar.¹⁰² This seems to indicate that the number of the followers of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi is bigger than commonly estimated (less than 10 percent of South Sulawesi *santri* Muslims).

Looking at the results from a comparative Java-Outer Islands perspective, there are a number of possible reasons as to why PAN received a bigger number of votes than PKB. First, let us look at PAN and Muhammadiyah, which show a better performance compared to PKB. Here are some possible explanations. Firstly, the political guideline of Muhammadiyah was explicitly aimed at both making the election a success and making PAN the party of choice for Muhammadiyah followers. In order to pave the way for Amien Rais to become a presidential candidate, Muhammadiyah followers would also have to vote for PAN. Jamaluddin Amin, the Chairman of PAN South Sulawesi and former Chairman of Muhammadiyah of South Sulawesi, in this regards said:

So, Semarang Tanwir decided that there should be a change in Muhammadiyah. It was there that Amien Rais was given a mandate to perform his political *ijtihad*, so that PAN was established. PAN was actually born from Muhammadiyah. That is why I joined PAN, because I feel that I also established PAN. ... Muhammadiyah is *amr ma'ruf nahi munkar* from the social aspect, whereas PAN is from a political aspect. Muhammadiyah has to be supported by a political party in conducting *amr ma'ruf nahi munkar* in this country.¹⁰³

Secondly, the attachment of politicians of Muhammadiyah with their organisations and constituents is stronger compared to PKB politicians to NU. Activities of institutions of Muhammadiyah constantly maintain the attachment between the leaders and their followers. Therefore, supporting politicians of Muhammadiyah in PAN would mean supporting Muhammadiyah leaders. Chairul Naim and Syafri Sofyan (both candidates of PAN in Jambi) acknowledged that in order for PAN to gain greater support from the Muhammadiyah community they used a personal approach. This personal approach seemed to be based on two important considerations. One has something to do with the independence of Muhammadiyah from politics. It can be generalized that while most Muhammadiyah leaders did not want to drag Muhammadiyah into *politik praktis*, they wanted to gain advantages from political situations. Therefore, Muhammadiyah leaders who did not join PAN, such as Asnawi Mukti and others,

allowed any kind of actions taken by PAN-Muhammadiyah politicians as long as they were not openly expressed. Chairul Naim stated "most of the time we approached figures of Muhammadiyah after every activity of *pengajian*, usually during breaks (*ramah tamah*). They are the ones who spread our names in Muhammadiyah circles."¹⁰⁴

Thirdly, the general approximation of Muhammadiyah followers might only be accurate in Java, but not in the outer islands. In addition, traditionalist Muslims who might also have used the religious institutions of Muhammadiyah, such as mosques, *mushalla* and *langgar* perhaps have politically supported politicians of Muhammadiyah whom they might be familiar with. In the case of South Sulawesi, it is clear who follows Muhammadiyah while those who do not follow Muhammadiyah cannot automatically be regarded as followers of NU. This is even less accurate in terms of political support. It is safe to assume that the majority of Muhammadiyah followers have voted for PAN in all three regions with a small exception in South Sulawesi.

The 2004 Presidential Election: The Decline of Religious-Charismatic Authority?

There were five pairs running for Indonesian President in the 2004 Presidential election: Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono with Jusuf Kalla from the Democrat Party (SBY-Kalla), Megawati Soekarno Putri with Hasyim Muzadi from PDIP (Megawati-Hasyim), Amien Rais with Siswono Yudo Husodo from PAN (Amien-Siswono), Wiranto with Salahuddin Wahid from Golkar Party Wiranto-Salahuddin, and Hamzah Haz with Agum Gumelar from PPP (Hamzah-Agum).


In one way or another, all the five running pairs of candidates in the 2004 presidential election were associated with leaders of Islamic organizations or parties. First, Amien Rais was the former National Chairman of Muhammadiyah. Regarding candidates associated with NU, four out of the five running mates of the presidential candidates had NU backgrounds. First, Jusuf Kalla was a member of Mustasyar (Advisor Board) of NU of South Sulawesi. It has to be acknowledged, however, that despite the fact that Kalla had an NU background, his political career, arguably, had less to do with his background as an NU leader. There were four integrated main factors that have supported his political career. Kalla was a member of HMI and KAHMI that used to have strong links of networks in Indonesian politics.¹⁰⁵ Also, using those networks later significantly contributed to his 39 year involvement in Golkar. Additionally, as a successful business-

man, he was well acquainted with Muslims in the eastern part of Indonesia. And finally his name became even more well-known as an important national leader after he initiated the Malino peace process for Poso and Maluku. In addition to this all, when his name was combined with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Javanese name, he could also be seen to represent the outer islanders, similar to the case of Soekarno-Hatta in which the latter was from Sumatra.¹⁰⁶

Second, Hasyim Muzadi was the national Chairman of NU though he relinquished his position in the organisation just after he was appointed as the vice-presidential candidate of Megawati Soekarnoputri. It was solely due to his position as the National Chairman of NU that Megawati and her PDIP invited him to be her running mate. Third, Salahuddin Wahid was a Vice-Chairman of the National Board of NU and was also a brother of Abdurrahman Wahid (former President of Indonesia and the former National Chairman of NU). He was also the Head of National Human Right Commission that was involved in investigating human rights violation in East Timor. Although Salahuddin was a leader of ICMI, it appeared that this factor was less significant in making him be a running mate of Wiranto compared to his background as an NU leader. Fourth, Hamzah Haz from Banjar in South Kalimantan, had been Chairman of PPP and was strongly associated with NU. He was accompanied by Agum Gumelar. Although, it is common that presidential candidates are more significant than vice-presidential candidates, the role of religious affiliations of the vice-presidential candidates in the 2004 presidential election is quite significant in meaning. This was because it was this issue that made vice-presidential candidates to be considered in getting votes.

As can be seen from Chart VI below, the result of the first round of the 2004 presidential election showed that none of the candidates that were associated with religious leadership fared particularly well in the election with the exception of Jusuf Kalla. Nationally, Amien-Siswono, Megawati-Hasyim, Wiranto-Salahuddin, and Hamzah-Agum received only between 3.01 percent (Hamzah-Agum) and 26.61 percent (Megawati-Muzadi). On the other hand, SBY-Kalla with less association with religious leadership received many more votes than their nearest rivals, Megawati-Hasyim. Of course there were a number of interconnected factors at play that accounted for the results, but from the perspective of religious sentiment and affiliation, it is significant to note those who were associated with religious leadership were mostly eliminated in the first round. Of the three candidates of Vice-President with an NU background only Megawati-


Hasyim managed to pass through to the second round as runner up. This brief review shows that in such a free election, most Indonesian Muslims did not base their electoral preference on Islamic charismatic leadership. In the following paragraphs, we will now look at the election results from the perspective of the outer islands and examine what the results can tell us about the role of Islamic organisations in Indonesia's democratic transition.



*Adapted from kpu.go.id

From the chart above, there are several points that merit discussion as far as the role of Muhammadiyah and NU is concerned, particularly regarding the estimate of the numbers of Muhammadiyah followers, their loyalty and their freedom of choice. First, the percentage of votes received by Amien-Siswono was consistently higher than the percentage of Muhammadiyah followers in each area, as estimated by Muhammadiyah leaders. As indicated elsewhere, most Muhammadiyah leaders interviewed stated that Muhammadiyah followers in Jambi, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi made up approximately from 7% to 10% of the *santri* Muslims. As briefly suggested much earlier, Muslims made up around 88% of Indonesian population. *Santri* Muslims are around 60% of Indonesian Muslims. So, there are roughly 4-5% Muhammadiyah followers of the total population in the three provinces. Yet we see from the chart that Amien-Siswono received 11.61% of the votes in Jambi, 21.12% in South Kalimantan and 10.71% in South Sulawesi. This could suggest that the numbers of followers of Muhammadiyah in those provinces are perhaps greater than the estimation that was made by the religious leaders interviewed. It can also be argued that Amien Rais successfully gained support not only from Muhammadiyah but also gained limited support from non-Muhammadiyah constituencies. Second, it was unexpected that in South Kalimantan, which has commonly been regarded as a strong base for traditionalist Muslims in the outer islands, Amien-Siswono scored a very good result. This could mean either there has been an increase in the number of Muhammadiyah followers in this province, the generally held estimate about the number of followers was simply wrong, or for some reason these candidates were able to garner exceptionally large support outside of Muhammadiyah followers in this province. The spread of resistance toward a woman president as a result of the fatwa of Langitan *kyai* (discussed below on the failure of Megawati-Hasyim) could be an important factor in favouring Amien-Siswono (and also SBY-Kalla) over Megawati-Hasyim. Third, in Jambi, where PAN received more than 17 percent in the parliamentary election, Rais-Siswono only received 11.61 percent of the presidential vote. As discussed earlier there were many traditionalist Muslims who voted for PAN because of the Zulkfli factor (but not voting for Amien Rais as their candidate of President). As indicated previously, ethnic sentiment might also have played some role in this province. The fact that Kalla's wife was of Minangkabau background might have made Minangkabau people in Jambi voted for SBY-Kalla instead of Amien-Siswono.

Chart VII:
Comparison of First and Second Round Presidential Elections
in Jambi South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi in Per Cent*



*Adapted from kpu.go.id

The second round of the presidential election shows even more fascinating results. Though there were other factors that can be considered, it was clear that there were no correlations between affiliation of religious organisation and political choice. Most of those who voted for candidates other than Megawati-Hasyim in the first round voted for SBY-Kalla in the second round, no matter whether a province was a basis of traditionalist Muslims or not. In many cases, even

in villages surrounding *pesantren*, the large majority of those who lived there did not vote for Megawati-Hasyim, but for SBY-Kalla.

There are several points that can be taken from the above facts as far as the connection between religious affiliation and a free political choice are concerned. First of all, there is strong evidence presented above that most Muhammadiyah followers voted for Amien-Siswono in the first round of the presidential election. However, Muhammadiyah leaders interviewed have suggested that their loyalty to their leader is not because of their Muhammadiyah membership per se, but because of their commitment to the Muhammadiyah religious worldview. One can also speculate that when there was competition particularly from NU they would support leaders who have a commitment to the Muhammadiyah worldview.¹⁰⁷

In South Kalimantan, Muhammad Ramli, the current Chairman of Muhammadiyah stated: "Our support for Amien Rais is 100%, ... This means that in order to support Amien Rais, Muhammadiyah has given 100% guarantee."¹⁰⁸

The second important point that can be seen from the chart is that there was an exception in this regard, namely in South Sulawesi. In this province, which is the home of Jusuf Kalla, leaders of Muhammadiyah were divided into two main camps. This division seemed to be caused by the fact that Kalla was of Bugis origin. One camp gave full support for Amien Rais while another camp gave their followers freedom of choice between Rais and Kalla. From the first camp, Jamaluddin Amin, the former Chairman of Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi, argued that Muhammadiyah followers should give full support for both Amien Rais and PAN because the political vehicle for Amien Rais was PAN. Therefore, Jamaluddin Amin complained about the motto "Amien Rais Yes, PAN No" because it did not show that Muhammadiyah followers were clever. He acknowledged this by saying that "Muhammadiyah followers are clever, but they very often make a slip of the tongue (*keseleo lidah*)."¹⁰⁹ Thus, according to Jamaluddin Amin such a motto was a slip of the tongue by the (usually) clever Muhammadiyah. From the second camp, Nasaruddin Razak, the current Chairman of Muhammadiyah, stated "Muhammadiyah followers wish to work hard to support Amien Rais in the competition for president, but Muhammadiyah has to be fifty-fifty".¹¹⁰ In other words, Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi tried to be politically realistic. For those who preferred to vote for SBY-Kalla, the door was open, too.

In playing such a role Muhammadiyah has provided an open and controllable space for different views in its community. This, in turn, has become an important factor in shaping the Indonesian democratization process. Although the potential of radical puritan elements remains strong in this organisation, the way its political *ijtihad* is exercised shows that such radical elements have become part of a less determinant factor. The preeminence of PAN over PKB in the outer islands, which was supported by the network of Muhammadiyah, is the result of a political trade-off from Muhammadiyah followers who have enjoyed services from the social and religious institutions of this organisation. The mixture of religious, political and rational justification provided by Muhammadiyah leaders reflects the way democratic values should be appropriated in Indonesia. By using such a mixture, then, objectively speaking, Muhammadiyah has successfully persuaded their follower to remain loyal to their organisation and leaders, even though it is not a traditional loyalty in nature. Where Muhammadiyah, and accordingly, PAN, has failed is in its attempt to attract Indonesians from outside their own community in order to support their religious-political mission which is based on its religious worldview, which is "commanding right and forbidding wrong."

Conclusion

This study set out to examine whether loyalty and affiliation to religious (Islamic) organisations will matter for the implementation of democratic values, such as freedom of expression and political choice. Following the discussion of the original bases of Muhammadiyah as voluntary organisation by pointing out that it been based on *ijtihad*, the study has provided examples of how these bases were implemented when Muhammadiyah established a political party closely associated with it.

Considering all the data presented above, it is fair to conclude that loyalty and affiliation to Islamic organisations does not hinder the implementation of democratic values, neither in day-to-day life nor in specific aspects of procedural democracy, i.e. elections. There are, however, a few notes that have to be made. As a matter of fact, affiliation to an Islamic organisation can speed up the process of democratisation. The loyalty and affiliation of modernist-puritanical Muslims to Muhammadiyah are generally for religious understandings and rituals. In the three provinces that were scrutinized for this

study, this loyalty on religious grounds has translated into different degrees of loyalty to the political parties that were established with the endorsement of the national leaderships of the two organizations. The political loyalty of Muhammadiyah supporters toward PAN and its politicians as well as for Amien Rais during the presidential election was mostly justified in accordance with the principles of democracy. Muhammadiyah followers were free to make their own judgment as to how the relation between PAN and Muhammadiyah should be understood. However, the religious worldview of Muhammadiyah has significantly contributed to the way they see the relation between the two. Yet, in the end, it was their freedom that determined their political choices.

In regard to the question as to how Muhammadiyah participated in the ongoing process of democratisation in Indonesia, this study has shown that Muhammadiyah has implemented what this study termed as the *intermediary organisation pattern* and the *intermediary organisations political parties pattern*. In other words, Muhammadiyah was playing two roles simultaneously. As for the *intermediary organisation pattern*, Muhammadiyah has participated in advancing the understanding of their followers of how they should participate democratically during the election.

However, due to the different bases of their trajectory of political participation — *ijtihad*-based political participation of Muhammadiyah and *ijma'*-based political participation of NU — the goals to be achieved through their political participation were different. For Muhammadiyah, success in the parliamentary and presidential election was equivalent to success for PAN as the political vehicle of Amien Rais and for Amien Rais himself as a presidential candidate. Generally speaking, by using the political *ijtihad* participation, Muhammadiyah was successful in uniting the Muhammadiyah followers without any meaningful suppression to vote for PAN and Amien Rais, with only a minor exception in South Sulawesi. However, by the same token, Muhammadiyah failed to attract voters from outside the Muhammadiyah community. Voters other than those affiliated with Muhammadiyah were regarded to be politically and religiously incorrect. Those who were accused of their incorrectness could hardly be persuaded of the values of political *ijtihad* and were naturally reluctant to support political stance of Muhammadiyah politicians.

As for the *intermediary organisations political party pattern*, Muhammadiyah allowed its networks to be dedicated to the basis of their foundation and as the main sources of leadership recruitment for

PAN and Muhammadiyah respectively. As such, they were successful in maintaining their independence from a party even though they allowed different views to exist. The limited number of leadership positions in Muhammadiyah board in any level can now be allocated through the existence of political parties associated with it. It has to be acknowledged, however, that the question of how the elected politicians of PAN have contributed to the ongoing process of democratisation in the regional houses of parliaments in the outer islands can be an object of further studies.

Despite the success of Muhammadiyah in advancing the aura of democracy in Indonesia, the way each implements democratic values causes a dilemma in the short term. This can be seen from the failure of the top leaders of Muhammadiyah (Amien Rais) to become president to be the President. The dilemma for Muhammadiyah lies in the problem related to its strict reference to the notion of *ijtihad* political participation coupled with puritanical Islam. While the influence of the Muhammadiyah worldview on Amien Rais's view of national social and political problems might be ideal, it tends to be less attractive to voters other than Muhammadiyah followers. Lacking an anticipation of the contemporary challenge of democratic competition is the real main cause of its failure in the presidential competition. Thus, Muhammadiyah has to learn to be more persuasive, flexible and moderate to attract more supporters from outside established Muhammadiyah circles.

Muhammadiyah was originally established for promoting the importance of *ijtihad* and to be an agent of change for Muslims' understanding toward their religion. Several decades after its establishment, the organization has moved beyond its religious boundaries and is now an influential political actor. This kind of development is inevitable by nature. Such political influence is a by-product of its religious worldview and the steady expansion of its *amal usaha* (charity and financial institutions), as elucidated earlier. Muhammadiyah is no longer just a religious organisation, but also a political force. Even though it has never been a political party, its role in Indonesian socio-politics is crucial to be considered for the future of Indonesian democracy. Its *amal usaha*, which is free from government interference, exists across the archipelago and has become the strongest contributors in developing human resources and maintaining bonds between Muslims across the country. There is no doubt that the alumni of its education and training programs form a substantial pool of

human resources which can help to balance the power of the state and radical elements within the Muslim community.

Political participation of Muhammadiyah after the collapse of the New Order was mainly focused on the implementation of political *ijtihad* of Amien Rais through the establishment of PAN. Although there were debates over the relation between PAN, Muhammadiyah and Amien Rais, the endorsement of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah toward the political *ijtihad* of Amien Rais made the relation between them politically well-built.

While many other observers have probably come to the same conclusion in regards to the roles of Muhammadiyah in Indonesian politics, my examination of political *ijtihad* of Muhammadiyah shows that Muhammadiyah is not only a social organization, but also a strong political force, which is imperative for the process of democratisation in the country. The formation of the political party by its leaders can be seen as a political wing in which its religious understanding can be implemented on a broader scale.

In a pluralist society like Indonesia, the ongoing participation of Muhammadiyah as intermediary organisation is crucial in supporting the process of democratisation. Despite the fact that Muslims comprise nearly 90 percent, the country is *de facto* a pluralist society. However, the majoritarian democracy which is based on religious belief and thereby can cause vulnerability for minority groups, will not have potential. Therefore, the consensual democracy which is embedded in the political participation of NU as I discussed in my other paper can be promoted and maintained. Muhammadiyah might want to learn from this fellow organization.

This study has demonstrated that the future trajectory of democracy in the outer islands is more promising. The political behavior of Muslims in the outer islands is not influenced by fanaticism or irrational loyalty toward their affiliated organization, but rather the situational logic which benefits the community as a whole.

Endnotes

- * This article is part of my dissertation at Australian National University Canberra. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to some people who greatly contributed to the writing of the article: MC Ricklef, Arif Budiman, Michael Leigh, Michael Ewing, Timoty Lindsey and Azyumardi Azra. I have also to express sincere appreciation to my friends at PPIM who encouraged me to publish this article.
1. Wael B. Hallaq, "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), p. 3. See also M.M. Bravman, *The Spiritual Background of Early Islam: studies in ancient Arab concepts*, Brill, Leiden, 1972, p. 189.
 2. Abdul Rahim, *The Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence According to the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali Schools*, Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1981, p.168. as quoted by Shaista P. Ali-Karamali and Fiona Dunne, "The Ijtihad Controversy," *Arab Law Quarterly*, vol. 9, No. 3 (1999), p. 238.
 3. For excellent accounts of this issue from the perspective of its controversy, see Hallaq, "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed," and his other paper "On the Origins of the Controversy about the Existence of Mujtahids and the Gate of Ijtihad," *Studia Islamica*, No. 63. (1986), pp. 129-141, see also Shaista P. Ali-Karamali and Fiona Dunne, "The Ijtihad Controversy."
 4. Ahmad Jainuri, *Ideologi Kaum Reformis: Melacak Pandangan Keagamaan Muhammadiyah Priode Awal*, Ipam, Surabaya: 2002, p. 105.
 5. Jainuri, *Ideologi Kaum Reformis*, p. 107.
 6. Jainuri, *Ideologi Kaum Reformis*, p. 110.
 7. Jainuri, *Ideologi Kaum Reformis*, p. 110.
 8. See Muhammad Najib, *Ijtihad Politik: Poros Tengah dan Dinamika Partai Amanat Nasional*, Jakarta; Serambi, 2000.
 9. Abu Daud, *Sunan*, vol. IV, ed. M.M. 'Abd al-Hamid, Cairo, 1951, p. 156.
 10. MPKSDI stands for *Majelis Pengembangan Kader dan Sumber Daya Insani*, or Council of Cadre Empowerment and Human Resources and MIDK stands for *Majlis Tabligh dan Dakwah Khusus* or Council of Tabligh and Special Dakwah.
 11. Syamsul Hidayat, "Salah Tafsir Tajdid Muhammadiyah," *Republika*, 28 June 2005. This article was written by Hidayat as a rejection to the idea of *tajdid* proposed by progressive figures of Muhammadiyah who attempted to store secular liberalism into the definition of Muhammadiyah's *tajdid* in the lead up to the 2005 Congress of Muhammadiyah.
 12. Based on my personal experience in attending religious rituals in mosques belong to Muhammadiyah, the phrase of *jihad fi sabilillah* is usually stated with such a complete way. Thus, there has been rarely heard that *jihad* is stated with such a single word.
 13. There are plenty of hadith that refer to *jihad* which can be found in most books of hadith. Among the hadiths are Aisha, wife of the Prophet(S) asked, "O Messenger of Allah, we see jihad as the best of deeds, so shouldn't we join it?," "But, the best of jihad is a perfect hajj (pilgrimage to Makkah), in Sahid Al-Bukhari # 2784, (ii) *A man came to the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) asking his permission to take part in Jihad. The Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) asked him, "Are your parents alive?" He replied in the affirmative. The Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) said to him, "Then exert yourself in their service."* Sahih Al-Bukhari #5972, (iii) "What kind of jihad is better?" He replied, "A word of truth in front of an oppressive ruler!," *Sunan Al-Nasa'i* #4209, (iv)

- "... the *mujahid* (one who carries out jihad) is he who strives against himself for the sake of obeying Allah, and the *muhajir* (one who emigrates) is he who abandons evil deeds and sin," Sahih Ibn Hibban #4862.
14. Jainuri, *Ideologi Kaum Reformis*, p. 174.
 15. Jainuri, *Ideologi Kaum Reformis*, p. 174.
 16. Jainuri, *Ideologi Kaum Reformis*, p. 172.
 17. Available at <<http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id>> accessed on 12 December 2006.
 18. During my field work in Jambi, I was told by a Muhammadiyah leader of West Sumatran origin that in many places of religious activities they no longer use the name and symbol of Muhammadiyah. Because all they need is Muhammadiyah religious understandings and messages that are delivered and practiced. "We are aware of this all," he said. This means that there have been even bigger numbers of activities that are actually organized by Muhammadiyah followers. Interview with the author, 24 June 2006.
 19. The author is pretty sure that until recently only very limited number of the most flexible non-Muhammadiyah followers have an opportunity to attend Muhammadiyah religious ritual activities and understand their indoctrination processes. Most Muslims, let alone non-Muslims would never have the opportunity to witness and understand these. In other words these unwritten activities have rarely been touched by Indonesianists. However, in the last four or five years that have a number of younger intellectuals of Muhammadiyah who have bravely and loudly spoken about what Muhammadiyah is all about regarding their religious-world view and its relations with what are regarded radical movement.
 20. See Q3:104, Q3:110, Q3:114, Q7:157, Q9:112, Q22:41, and Q31:17.
 21. In the last few years, there has been a process of "metamorphosis" within Muhammadiyah. One section (JIMM, The Network of Young Intellectuals of Muhammadiyah) of the organisation has softened its views from such radical worldviews. But JIMM has been marginalized since Din Syamsudin became National Chairman of Muhammadiyah. Suaidi Asyari, "Muhammadiyah and Radical Islam: Identity 'Metamorphosis' and a Real Threat from Within," presented at International Postgraduate Seminar, Centre for Contemporary Islamic Studies, Faculty of Law, The University of Melbourne, Australia, 22 October 2005.
 22. As we shall see later on, this is in contrast to the culture of NU where senior *kyai* (religious clerics) from outside the inner circle of the NU board can still issue *fatwa* (religious edicts) "on behalf of NU", though the implementation of such *fatwa* is limited to their own clients.
 23. Achmad Jainuri, *Ideologi Kaum Reformis: Melacak Pandangan Keagamaan Muhammadiyah Periode Awal* [The Ideology of Reformists: Searching Religious World-view of Muhammadiyah in the Early Period], Surabaya: Ipam, 2002, p. 175.
 24. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, p. 11.
 25. However, this is not to say that the organisation does not receive any funds from international donors from the Middle East or Western countries. However, international donations are not regular in nature and they are usually intended for specific expenses, such as building mosques or schools.
 26. See Guillermo O'Donnell, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, and Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative*

Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

27. See Guillermo O'Donnell, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, and Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
28. Nakamura, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Observations on the 2004 General and Presidential Elections*, Islamic Legal Studies Program Harvard Law School, the United States of America, 2005, p. 27.
29. As Geraint Parry and George Moyser acknowledge, being involved in establishing a political party is part of participatory democracy. See Parry and Moyser, "More Participation, More Democracy,".
30. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 3rd ed., New York: Harper, 1950, p. 269.
31. By the time he criticized Rais (1999) Harun was a member of the DPR for Golkar, the former regime party of the New Order government. He also criticized Rais prior to the fall of Suharto when Rais bluntly criticized Suharto's government. Harun said that "in my opinion, nowadays, the situation everywhere is in favour of Muhammadiyah. Is it not Suharto Muhammadiyah, Feisal Tanjung Muhammadiyah? If there are problems why don't we just address them in a good manner." ... Harun justified his critics by referring to a basis of the world view of Muhammadiyah by stating "commanding right and forbidding wrong should be done wisely." See 'Saya Tidak Menghantam Amien Rais' [I am not attacking Amien Rais] *Tempo*, 16 March 1997.
32. *Media Indonesia*, 20 January 1998. See also Harun's other criticisms in *Ummat*, No. 19/II, 3 March 1997. In this article he says that, when many ministers of the Suharto regime acknowledged that they were Muhammadiyah or sympathizers of Muhammadiyah, Rais openly criticized them. For Harun it was the best time for Islam (Muhammadiyah) and he therefore asked why Rais did not take advantage of the opportunity.
33. This was Rais's response to Hisanori Kato, when the latter asked him "Did you change?" It appears that Rais was well aware of his attitudes towards particular important issues in Indonesia. He used to be anti-Chinese, anti-Jewish, and anti-Christian.
34. This historic meeting was later known in PAN circles as *pertemuan Sirmagalih* (Sirmagalih meeting). See for example A.M. Fatwa, *op. cit.*, and Muhammad Nadjib, "Sejarah Partai Amanat Nasional dan Peran Amien Rais," available at <<http://www.amanatnasional.net/tiki-index.php>>, accessed on 17 April 2006).
35. At first Gema Madani was a short form of *Gerakan Masyarakat Madani* (Civil Society Movement) which was established during the uncertain political situation in Indonesia in mid-1998. It was later shortened to Gema Madani, translated as Echo of Civil Society. Most of the members of this organisation are senior professors from Gajah Mada University and the University of Indonesia, among them Emil Salim.

36. If we use the traditionalist-modernist categories, most of the individuals in each element were modernist; if we use the *santri*-*abangan* categories, then the majority would automatically be the former.
37. Fatwa, *PAN Menyongyong Era*, p. 24.
38. Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
39. Merle Ricklefs, "Islamizing Indonesia: Religion and Politics in Singapore's Giant Neighbor," Public Lecture, presented at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore Asian/Civilizations Museum, 23 September 2004.
40. This part is a summary of an interview between the author and Alwi Yuddin, 27 March 2004.
41. Interview with the author in Banjarmasin, 23 March 2004.
42. Interview with the author, 27 March 2004.
43. Interview with the author, 29 March 2004.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Syaifullah, Syaifullah *Gerak Politik Muhammadiyah dalam*, pp. 233-234.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Interview with author, 13 March 2005.
48. Interview with the author, 24 March 2004 in Banjarmasin.
49. *Ibid.*
50. Interview with author in Banjarmasin, 23 March 2004.
51. For examinations of Muhammadiyah from the perspective of written membership see Achmad Musyidi, *Profile Anggota Muhammadiyah* [Profile of Muhammadiyah Memberships], Yogyakarta: LP3-UMY, 2000 and Mitsuho Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree*, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983, pp. 117-126.
52. See section 2 for the details of this.
53. Interview with the author, 23 March 2004.
54. Interview with the author, 23 March 2004.
55. Robert Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 20.
56. Risnal Mawardi, interview with the author, 27 June 2006.
57. My deepest thanks to Mr. Risnal Mawardi for providing me with copies of some of the documents relating to the formation of PAN in Jambi.
58. Risnal Mawardi, Interview with the author, 27 June 2006.
59. Marcus Mietzner, "Indonesian Civil-Military Relations: The Armed Forces and Political Islam in Transition, 1997-2004, PhD Thesis, 2004, p. 234.
60. There is no statistic available on this. However, in most centers of businesses in every regency and the city of Jambi we can see clearly how Minangkabau people dominates. Most of the time, even the language used in trading communication is the Minangkabau dialect. One good example of this is in the Center of Pasar Tanah Pilih, in the Jambi city.
61. See related section on the history of the formation of Muhammadiyah in Jambi and the significant role of Minangkabau traders.
62. There are two individuals with the names of Muhammad Ramli in Muhammadiyah South Kalimantan, one who held the position of chairman of Muhammadiyah of South Kalimantan, the other the chairman of the *Dakwah* section. In order to distinguish between the two, I will refer to the chairperson of *Dakwah* as Muhammad Ramli, MA.

63. In this context "realpolitik" simply means politics as a way of struggling for power, such as through a political party, while "moralpolitik" means politics for promoting the advance of morality without having to be involved in a political party. This notion is inspired by Eric Langenbacher's article "Moralpolitik versus Moralpolitik: Recent Struggles over the Construction of Cultural Memory in Germany" in *German Politics and Society*, 23.3 (Fall 2005) p. 106-135. I am using the title of this article as found in the journal, although the author might well mean 'Moralpolitik versus Realpolitik', as can be found in one section of his article.
64. Zulkifli Nurdin, Interview with the author, 15 March 2004.
65. Muhammad Ramli later found his own way by running for DPD the (Regional Representative Council) seat, which was included in PP No. 12 1999, Ramli convincingly won the position to represent South Kalimantan. See *Wajah DPR dan DPD 2004-2009*. Kompas, Jakarta: 2005, p. 689.
66. Interview with the author, 24 March 2004.
67. Adijani did not elaborate further as to what kind of commitment they had agreed upon such that followers of Muhammadiyah have to vote for political parties other than PAN. It might be due to one of the verses in the Qur'an that says "O YOU who have attained to faith! Do not take the Jews and the Christians for your *allies*: they are but allies of one another and whoever of you allies himself with them becomes, verily, one of them; behold, God does not guide such evildoers" (Q 5:51). Interview with the author, 24 March 2004 in Banjarmasin.
68. Interview with the author, 14 March 2004.
69. "Kader terbaik" is often used interchangeably with "putra terbaik." However, there is a difference of emphasis. "Kader terbaik" refers to the experience and organisational career gained through Muhammadiyah that makes one the best man. "Putra terbaik" refers in both the professional context and the family lineage context to a man who comes from the *keluarga besar* of Muhammadiyah. This interpretation can be drawn from arguments that have appeared in the debates on the issue.
70. Sudar Siandes (ed), *Muhammadiyah: Eksperimen Politik dalam Pemilu Presiden 2004* [Muhammadiyah: Political Experiment in Presidential Election 2004], Jakarta: Rinca Cipta, 2004, p. 9
71. See appendix II: Sample of "Catatan Pokok Calon Pimpinan Muhammadiyah."
72. Interview with Asnawi Mukti 28-03-2005.
73. i.e., from the use of the term *putra terbaik*, everyone will assume that it refers specifically to Amien Rais.
74. See *Kompas*, 16 December 1996: <http://www.kompas.com/9612/16/POLITIK/muha.htm>. During this period, Amien Rais played an important role in creating and promoting the issue of *suksesi* (succession), a campaign to urge Soeharto to step down as president. For more on Amien Rais's role on this from a perspective internal to Muhammadiyah, see Muhammad Najib and Kuat Sukardiyono (eds), *Amien Rais sang demokrat : dilengkapi catatan harian sampai jatuhnya Soeharto*, Jakarta : Gema Insani, 1998.
75. See *Kompas*, 16 December 1996.
76. The second issue resulted in the changing of ART Muhammadiyah article 8 to "Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah dipimpin oleh laki-laki dan perempuan

- puan," from the previous version which stated "Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah dipimpin oleh laki-laki."
77. Kompas, 28 January 2002.
 78. Kompas, 28 January 2002.
 79. Muhammad Najib and Kwat Sukardiyono (eds), *Amien Rais sang demokrat*, p. 13.
 80. Sudar Siandes (ed), *Muhammadiyah: Eksperimen Politik dalam Pemilu Presiden 2004*, p. 9.
 81. "Mu'thi Pimpin Muhammadiyah, Nama Amien Dipersoalkan" *Suara Merdeka*, 11 July 2002.
 82. "Mu'thi Pimpin Muhammadiyah, Nama Amien Dipersoalkan."
 83. This statement can be found in different versions in a number of newspapers and weekly journals but with the same issue, See for example, "Urgensi Amandemen Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah" *Pikiran Rakyat*, 3 February 2003.
 84. As noted elsewhere, South Kalimantan is an exception in many respects. Here, PKB could gain one seat in the 2004 election.
 85. See, Suzaina Abdul Kadir, *Traditional Islamic Society and the State in Indonesia: The Nahdlatul Ulama, Political Accommodation and the Preservation of Autonomy*. PhD Thesis, The University of Wisconsin, 1999, Robin Bush, *Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia: The Case of the Nahdlatul Ulama*. PhD Thesis, University of Washington, 2002 and Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam in Java*. Arizona: Program for Southeast Asian Studies Arizona State University, 1999.
 86. See "The Decision of Plenary Session of the Central Leadership of Muhammadiyah." My deepest and sincere thanks to Nasaruddin Razak, the Chairman of Provincial Board of Muhammadiyah of South Sulawesi who provided relevant materials for research and invited other leaders of Muhammadiyah to be interviewed at the Provincial Office of Muhammadiyah in Makassar. Such an arrangement of interview made it much easier for me to communicate with them.
 87. See "The Decision of Plenary Session of the Central Leadership of Muhammadiyah."
 88. See Government Regulation (*Peraturan Pemerintah*), no. 2, year 1999 about government employee who becomes members of political party. Article VI section A and B states that a civil servant has to withdraw from government employee if he chose to become a member of a political party. As mentioned elsewhere there were many initiators of PAN and PKB at local level who had to let others, some of who did not involve in establishing the parties, to run the respective parties due to this regulation.
 89. Muhammad Ramli was a candidate of DPD of South Kalimantan during this interview took place and he won enough support to gain that position of the election. Interview with the author, 24 March 2004.
 90. *Tempo*, 20 May 2004.
 91. *Tempo*, 20 May 2004.
 92. It is misleading because not all local leaders of Muhammadiyah in the agreement to state such explicit support for Amien Rais as well as the using of Muhammadiyah networks.
 93. See "Joined Decision of Plenary Assembly of the Muhammadiyah Central Board and Provincial Boards about Muhammadiyah Policy in Facing The

- 2004 Election" appendix I.
94. Muhammad Ramli, interview with the author, 24 March 2004.
 95. "Mr. Ramly, we, Muhammadiyah Youths are ready to declare that we want to leave PAN." This statement was quoted by Ramly when I was interviewing him on the same date above. Interestingly, such debates or internal conflicts within the Muhammadiyah community are rarely covered by the media. Muhammadiyah leaders or activists are very keen on keeping internal conflict out of the reach of journalists. There are a number of other examples of severe fights within Muhammadiyah leaderships that are well kept internally.
 96. PP Muhammadiyah, 2002, p. 3.
 97. Interview 24 March 2004.
 98. Interview with the author, 23 March 2004. Ramli also gave a further example of his commitment to democratic values by acknowledging: "I once wrestled with my own thought. At that time there were five of us (HMI) against one from another group in the KPU (NU) and one was to be elected as the head of the office. Because we did not have the same value orientation, I did not support them (HMI). The one who was elected was from NU." At a different time, but the same place, I was told by Prof. Dr. Hafiz Anshary AZ, MA, the Head of KPU South Kalimantan that he was elected among the majority of those who voted were not from NU background. Interview with the author, 24 March 2004.
 99. See further below for a discussion of how the political guideline and responses from local leaders of Muhammadiyah to this guideline influenced the result of the election.
 100. Kompas, *Peta Politik Pemilihan Umum 1999-2004*, Jakarta: Kompas, p. 3.
 101. See, Suzaina Abdul Kadir, *Traditional Islamic Society and the State in Indonesia: The Nahdlatul Ulama, Political Accommodation and the Preservation of Autonomy*. PhD Thesis, The University of Wisconsin, 1999, Robin Bush, *Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia: The Case of the Nahdlatul Ulama*. PhD Thesis, University of Washington, 2002 and Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam in Java*. Arizona: Program for Southeast Asian Studies Arizona State University, 1999.
 102. Interviewed with the author 28 March 2004 and 31 March 2004 respectively.
 103. Interview with the author, 29 March 2004.
 104. Interview with the Author, 15 February 2005.
 105. For information about HMI and KAHMI see among others Sidratahta Mukhtar, *HMI dan Kekuasaan: Kaderisasi HMI Dalam Mengisi Struktur Kekuasaan*, Jakarta: Prestasi Pustaka, 2006, Agus Salim Sitompul, *HMI Dalam Pandangan Seorang Pendeta: Antara Impian dan Kenyataan*, Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1982 and Ambia B. Boestam [et al.], *KAHMI, Reformasi, dan Civil Society*, Jakarta: Majelis Nasional KAHMI, 2000.
 106. For all this information about Jusuf Kalla, visit <<http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/j/index.shtml>>, accessed on 12 December 2007.
 107. See note 318 above.
 108. Interview with the author, 24 March 2004.
 109. Interview with the author, 29 March 2004.
 110. Interview with the author, 25 March 2004.

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List of Interviewees

Ariffudin Ahmad, Head of Missionary Division of Muhammadiyah of South Sulawesi.

Asnawi Mukti, the Chairman of Dakwah Council of Muhammadiyah Jambi.

Daniel Sa'aduddin, former Vice-Chairman of Muhammadiyah Jambi.

Hidayatul Akbar, the Spokesperson of Hizbut Tahrir of South Kalimantan, a Member of Muhammadiyah of South Kalimantan.

Ibnu Sina Spi, Drs. Secretary of PKS South Sulawesi from Muhammadiyah background.

Jamaluddin Amin, former Chairman of Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi and the current Chairman of PAN, South Sulawesi.

Muhammad Amien Abdullah, Prof. Dr., former National Vice-Chairman of Muhammadiyah.

Muhammad Ramli Al-Hafid, H. chairman of Muhammadiyah South Kalimantan.

Nasurddin Razak, the Chairman of Muhammadiyah of South Sulawesi.

Natsir Anwar, former Chariman of Pemuda Muhammadiyah Jambi.

Razali Abdullah, Chairman of General Election Commission of Jambi.

Sulkam, SM Spd., Chairman of Muhammadiyah of Banjarmasin Municipality.

Sulkan, a Member of PANWASLU of South Sulawesi (a member of Human Rights Board Division of Muhammadiyah Youth of South Sulawesi).

Suwardi, Chairman of Muhammadiyah Youth of Jambi.

Syafi'i Ma'arif, Prof. Dr., former National Chairman of Muhammadiyah.

Syar'i, Drs. H. Chairman of Muhammadiyah of Jambi

Zulfa Ahmad, Prof. Dr. Hj. a Vice Chairman of General Election Commission (KPU) of Jambi.

Zulkifli Nurdin, Chairman of PAN of Jambi (former and current Governor) of Jambi.

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