

STUDIA ISLAMIKA

INDONESIAN JOURNAL FOR ISLAMIC STUDIES

Volume 15, Number 3, 2008



**DISTINCTIVE CONTEMPORARY VOICE:
LIBERAL ISLAM THOUGHT IN INDONESIA**

Giora Eliraz

**RELIGION, POLITICS, AND VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA:
LEARNING FROM BANSER'S EXPERIENCE**

Ihsan Ali-Fauzi

**TOWARDS A MIDDLE WAY ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT**

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

STUDIA ISLAMIKA

Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies

Vol. 15, no. 3, 2008

EDITORIAL BOARD:

- M. Quraish Shihab (UIN Jakarta)*
Taufik Abdullah (LIPI Jakarta)
Nur A. Fadhil Lubis (IAIN Sumatra Utara)
M.C. Ricklefs (Melbourne University)
Martin van Bruinessen (Utrecht University)
John R. Bowen (Washington University, St. Louis)
M. Atho Mudzhar (IAIN Yogyakarta)
M. Kamal Hasan (International Islamic University, Kuala Lumpur)
M. Bary Hooker (Australian National University, Australia)
Virginia Matheson Hooker (Australian National University, Australia)

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Azyumardi Azra

EDITORS

- Jajal Burhanuddin*
Saiful Mujani
Jamhari
Fu'ad Jabali
Oman Fathurahma

ASSISTANT TO THE EDITORS

- Setyadi Sulaiman*
Testriono

ENGLISH LANGUAGE ADVISOR

Cheyne Scott

ARABIC LANGUAGE ADVISOR

Masri el-Mahsyar Bidin

COVER DESIGNER

S. Prinka

STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-0492) is a journal published by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta (STT DEPPEN No. 129/SK/DITJEN/PPG/STT/1976). It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular, and South-east Asian Islamic Studies in general, and is intended to communicate original researches and current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contributions from scholars of related disciplines.

All articles published do not necessarily represent the views of the journal, or other institutions to which it is affiliated. They are solely the views of the authors. The articles contained in this journal have been refereed by the Board of Editors.

STUDIA ISLAMIKA has been accredited by The Ministry of National Education, Republic of Indonesia as an academic journal (SK Dirjen Dikti No. 23a/DIKTI/2004).

Giora Eliraz

Distinctive Contemporary Voice: Liberal Islam Thought in Indonesia

Abstraksi: *Narasi Islam liberal kerap diasosiasikan dengan gerakan pembaharuan Islam pada akhir 1960-an dan awal 1970-an, yang dikenal sebagai neo-modernisme. Karena itu istilah neo-modernisme, liberalisme Islam, dan Islam liberal dalam konteks Indonesia kini sering disebut dalam tarikan nafas yang sama. Neo-modernisme Islam di Indonesia ini secara kuat terhubung kepada tokoh-tokoh utama yang menjadi pionirnya, seperti Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005), Abdurrahman Wahid (lahir pada 1940), Harun Nasution (1919-1998), Munawir Syadzali (1925-2004), Djohan Effendi (lahir pada 1939), dan Ahmad Wahib (1924-1973).*

Kemunculan Islam Liberal terkait dengan pertumbuhan radikalisme Islam yang menonjol pada masa post-Soeharto. Beragam organisasi bergabung bersama membentuk diskursus Islam liberal yang sekarang, dan yang terpenting adalah Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL). JIL, beridiri pada 2001, menghadirkan dirinya sebagai forum terbuka untuk mendiskusikan dan mendiseminasikan konsep liberalisme Islam di Indonesia serta untuk mengkaji dan memajukan visi Islam yang toleran, terbuka, dan suportif bagi penguatan demokratisasi.

Artikel ini mencoba melihat kontinuitas intelektual antara generasi tua, gerakan neo-modernisme yang membentuk bagian awal diskursus Islam liberal di Indonesia, dan generasi muda gerakan Islam liberal di Indonesia, yang direpresentasikan oleh JIL, dengan menunjukkan persamaan dan perbedaan masing-masing. Juga dilihat perbedaan konteks historis dan historis antara neo-modernisme dan arus baru Islam liberal di Indonesia tersebut.

Prinsip, gagasan, dan tema-tema neo-modernisme Islam tersebar ke dalam diskursus Islam liberal kontemporer. Aspek teologis menjadi pilar sentral dalam pandangan dunia lingkaran Islam liberal. Selain itu, dipandu oleh pendekatan kontekstual terhadap teks agama dan oleh ideal

liberal, Islam liberal di Indonesia mengusung gagasan persamaan gender. Argumen dan konsep-konsep dasar neo-modernisme terkait hubungan negara-agama—seperti pemisahan agama dan kekuasaan politik—juga dikembangkan lingkaran JIL. Kebebasan beragama, pluralisme, hak-hak asasi manusia, perlindungan terhadap minoritas, dan dialog antar-iman untuk menjembatani agama, adalah di antara tema penting yang didukung Islam liberal.

Beragam penjelasan bisa diberikan terkait berkembangnya pemikiran Islam liberal di Indonesia dalam beberapa dekade, sementara di negara-negara Muslim lain pemikiran hanya didukung sejumlah kecil intelektual. Salah satu yang terpenting adalah tradisi toleransi dan pluralisme yang mengakar dalam nilai-nilai kultural di kepulauan Indonesia. Tradisi ini membuat Islam di Indonesia menjadi lahan subur bagi munculnya arus pemikiran yang beragam. Dari awal masyarakat nusantara bergulat dengan apa yang oleh para ahli sosial disebut sebagai isu modern yang unik, pluralisme kultural.

Situasi historis, yaitu perjumpaan kepentingan antara rezim Soeharto dan neo-modernisme juga bisa memberi penjelasan. Misalnya, argumen religius kelompok neo-modernis yang mendukung Pancasila, termasuk pemisahan antara agama dan politik, menjadi instrumen bagi kepentingan Soeharto menjadikan Pancasila sebagai asas tunggal negara. Tradisi toleransi dan pluralisme di banyak pesantren di wilayah pedesaan di Jawa mendukung penerimaan ide-ide neo-modernis. Gerakan neo-modernis juga diuntungkan keterlibatan banyak pemikir dan aktivasinya dalam birokrasi negara, difasilitasi oleh pandangan mereka yang mendukung harmoni antara negara dan Islam. Dan, narasi pemikiran Islam liberal di Indonesia terkait dengan perubahan Insitut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) pada 1970-an menjadi institusi pendidikan tinggi modern. Kurikulum IAIN terbuka bagi ilmu-ilmu modern dan mendukung upaya kreatif mensintesis studi-studi Islam klasik dengan pendekatan modern-kritis.

Namun, situasi dan atmosfer yang melingkupi generasi baru pembawa bendera Islam liberal kini terlihat kurang menguntungkan. Perjumpaan kepentingan praktis antara gerakan neo-modernis dan rezim Soeharto tak dijumpai dalam era post-Soeharto. Bahkan, JIL kerap berseberangan dengan negara. Lebih dari itu, era reformasi menawarkan keadaan yang problematis dan penuh paradoks bagi pemikiran Islam liberal. Hilangnya pembatasan kebebasan berbicara dan politik, termasuk pembatasan pada politisasi Islam, memungkinkan berkembangnya agenda-agenda politik Islam konservatif melalui mekanisme demokrasi. Bahkan, suara Muslim radikal yang kuat pada aras tertentu tampak seperti harga yang harus dibayar untuk demokrasi dan sebagai hasil tak terelakkan bagi berbagai kesulitan yang dihadapi Indonesia melalui proses transisi demokrasi.

Distinctive Contemporary Voice: Liberal Islam Thought in Indonesia

الخلاصة: تربط رواية الإسلام الليبرالي كثيرا بالحركة التجديدية الإسلامية في أواخر الستينات وأوائل السبعينات التي عرفت بعصرية جديدة. لذلك فهمت من المصطلحات التالية مثل العصرية الجديدة وليبيرالية الإسلام والإسلام التحرري نفس المعنى في السياق الإندونيسي. هناك شخصيات قوية ومعروفة في العصرية الإسلامية الجديدة مثل نور خالص مجيد (١٩٣٩-٢٠٠٥)، وعبد الرحمن وحيد (المولود في ١٩٤٠) وهارون ناسوتيون (١٩١٩-١٩٩٨) ومنور شذلي (١٩٢٥-٢٠٠٤) وجوهان أفندي (المولود في ١٩٣٩) وأحمد واهب (١٩٢٤-١٩٧٣).

إن ظهور الإسلام الليبرالي له علاقة بنشأة التطرف الإسلامي التي اشتدت في عصر بعد الرئيس سوهارتو. قد كونت مختلفة التنظيمات المشتركة على ما يسمى الآن بمقالة "الإسلام التحرري" (الإسلام الليبرالي) وأهمها شبكة الإسلام الليبرالي (Jaringan Islam Liberal/JIL) التي أنشئت عام ٢٠٠١ وتعتبر نفسها منتدى مفتوح لحوار ونشر أفكار ليبرالية الإسلام، كذلك في دراسة وتطوير رؤية إسلامية متسامحة ومفتوحة ومؤيدة للديمقراطية.

تسعى هذه المقالة للنظر إلى استمرارية ثقافية بين الجيل القديم وحركة العصرية الجديدة التي تمهد لظهور أول مقالة للإسلام الليبرالي في إندونيسيا والجيل الجديد لحركة الإسلام الليبرالي في إندونيسيا التي تمثلها شبكة الإسلام الليبرالي (Jaringan Islam Liberal/JIL) مع التشابه والاختلاف في كل منهما. كذلك نرى الفرق التاريخي والسياقي بين اتجاه العصرية الجديدة واتجاه جديد للإسلام الليبرالي الإندونيسي المذكور.

إن مبادئ العصرية الجديدة الإسلامية وأفكارها وموضوعاتها تتسرب في مقالة الإسلام الليبرالي المعاصر. وأصبح عنصرها العقائدي قاعدة رئيسية في نظر أنصار شبكة الإسلام الليبرالي. وعلى أساس التفسير السياقي في النصوص الدينية والمثالي الليبرالي، يرفع أنصار الإسلام الليبرالي في إندونيسيا قضية المساواة الجندرية. كذلك

أفكار ونظريات أساسية للعصرية الجديدة المتعلقة بعلاقة الدين والدولة مثل فصل الدين من السلطة السياسية أصبحت من الموضوعات التي يطورونها. إن حرية التدين والتعددية وحقوق الإنسان وحماية الأقلية والحوار بين الأديان لتحقيق التسامح هي من أهم الموضوعات التي تم تأييدها من قبل أنصار الإسلامى البييرالى.

توجد المعلومات المتنوعة التي نستطيع أن نطرحها فيما يتعلق بانتشار ثقافة الإسلام البييرالى في إندونيسيا في مختلفة العقود بينما لم نجد أنصار نفس الثقافة في العالم الإسلامى الآخر إلا قليلا من المثقفين. هذا الأمر يرجع إلى أن تقاليد التسامح والتعددية تعتبر من القيم الثقافية الراسخة في أرخبيل إندونيسيا. وهذه التقاليد تجعل موضوع الإسلام في إندونيسيا أرضا خصبا لظهور الاتجاهات الفكرية المختلفة. من بدايته يتعامل المجتمع الإندونيسى مع ما يسمى في اصطلاح العلماء الاجتماعيين بـ"قضية معاصرة فريدة والتعددية الثقافية".

والحالة التاريخية أى لقاء المصلحة بين الحكومة "سوهارتو" واتجاه العصرية الجديدة تعطينا أيضا المعلومات عن هذا الأمر، على سبيل المثال أن مبررات أنصار اتجاه العصرية الجديدة لتأييد المبادئ الخمسة، بما فيها فصل الدين من السياسة، أصبحت آلة من من الآلات لمصلحة الرئيس سوهارتو لجعل المبادئ الخمسة أساسا وحيدا للدولة. وتقاليد التسامح والتعددية في كثير من المدارس الإسلامية (Pesantren) تساند القبول على نظريات اتجاه العصرية الجديدة. وقد حصلت حركة العصرية الجديدة أيضا مكسبا في مشاركة أنصارها ونشطاؤها في الإدارة الحكومية، على أساس آرائهم التي تؤيد على الانسجام بين الدولة والإسلام. كانت رواية لأفكار الإسلامى البييرالى في إندونيسيا وراء تحول الجامعة الإسلامية الحكومية في السبعينات إلى مؤسسة تعاليمية معاصرة. والمناهج الدراسية فيها مفتوحة لقبول العلوم العصرية والسعى فيها على جهود التوفيق بين العلوم الإسلامية التقليدية والاتجاه التحليلي والنقدي الحديث.

لكن الحالة والحوار المحيط بالجيل الجديد لحاملى لواء الإسلام البييرالى تبدو ليست لمصلحتهم، واللقاء بين مصلحة فعلية لحركة العصرية الجديدة والحكومة "سوهارتو" لم يتم بعد رحيله، بل تقف شبكة الإسلامى البييرالى في كثير من الأحيان موقف التناقض من الدولة. بالإضافة إلى أن عصر الإصلاح يأتي بحالة الصعاب والتناقض مع أفكار الإسلام البييرالى، وانتهاء حالة تحديد حرية التعبير والسياسة بما فيها التسييس الإسلامى تمكن من تطوير برنامج السياسة الإسلامية التقليدية من خلال آليات الديمقراطية. بل أصوات المسلم الراديكالى القوية في اتجاه معين كانت مثل الفاتورة لا بد تدفع لمصلحة الديمقراطية وهي نتيجة ضرورية من مختلفة المشاكل التي تواجهها إندونيسيا من خلال الفترة الانتقالية للديمقراطية.

Introduction

This paper aims to turn attention to an intriguing stream of thought in the multi-faceted and plural Islamic discourse in Indonesia, a home to the largest Muslim community in the world. This stream of thought in Indonesia attempts to connect Islamic doctrine, belief, thinking and knowledge with basic liberal themes such as separation between religion and politics, pluralism, freedom of thought, democracy, progress, human rights, gender equality and interfaith dialogue. Similarly, it also seeks to reinterpret the formative sacred texts through liberal paradigm and through contemporary context.

Historically, Muslim intellectuals from other parts of the Islamic world have preceded Indonesian intellectuals in formulation of liberal Islamic themes and perceptions. The emergence of liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia and its entire narrative are tightly connected with transmission of such ideas to Indonesia from abroad. Thus, liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia is continuously fed through a dialogue with liberal Islamic thinkers worldwide. But whereas in other Muslim countries and communities liberal Islamic thought has been primarily the occupation of a small number of intellectuals,¹ in Indonesia the voice of liberal Islam has clearly imprinted itself on the wider Islamic discourse there.

The narrative of liberal Islam in Indonesia starts from late 1960s and early 1970s. The pioneers of this stream of thought in Indonesia came then from a younger generation of Muslim intellectuals. This new path in the Islamic discourse in Indonesia is largely known as neo-modernism. The term "neo-modernism" was given due to the great influence that Fazlur Rahman, the Pakistani-American neo-modernist Islamic thinker, had on certain Indonesian intellectuals who laid the foundation of the said stream of thought in Indonesia and were his students at the University of Chicago.² Later on, their body of ideas has been identified as an expression of liberal Islamic ideas.³ Today the terms neo-modernism, Islamic liberalism and liberal Islam are often mentioned in the Indonesian context. in the same breath.⁴ This Islamic neo-modernism in Indonesia is strongly linked to the prominent figures who laid down its foundations, such as: Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005), Abdurrahman Wahid (born in 1940), Harun Nasution (1919-1998), Munawir Syadzali (1925-2004), Djohan Effendi (born in 1939), and Ahmad Whahib (1942-1973).

The current new wave of liberal Islam is widely known in Indonesia as *Islam Liberal* (liberal Islam). Its emergence is largely

connected with the growing assertiveness of Islamic radicalism in post-Suharto era.⁵ Varied circles, organized to a large extent as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as if join together to constitute now the liberal Islamic discourse and networks.⁶ Salient among the current circles of liberal Islam stream of thought is *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (JIL, Liberal Islam Network). JIL presents itself as a loose forum for discussing and disseminating the concept of Islamic liberalism in Indonesia and as "a community which is studying and bringing forth a discourse on Islamic vision that is tolerant, open and supportive for the strengthening of Indonesian democratization."⁷ Its establishment in 2001 can be considered to a large extent as a kind of reaction to Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, or as it versed in the website of JIL: "One *raison d'être* of its establishment is to counter the growing influence and activism of militant and radical Islam in Indonesia."⁸ JIL is a very active forum that use variety of media channels, methods and stages to discuss and disseminate its ideas.⁹ Thus JIL which is highly salient in the current liberal Islamic discourse is standing in the focus of this paper side by side with the neo-modernism, the formative movement of liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia that constitutes the first chapter in liberal Islamic discourse in this country.

The current liberal Islamic discourse in Indonesia is argued to rise out of the neo-modernist Islamic movement. As such its hard core has a great deal of respect to the forefathers of the neo-modernists and it is largely inspired by them. Even certain figures who are identified with the older generation of the neo-modernists still participate actively in the current liberal Islamic discourse.¹⁰ An intellectual continuity between the old generation and the young generation of liberal Islamic thinking in Indonesia can also be detected, even though each one of the two discussed chapters in the narrative of liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia has also its own distinctiveness. From this reason and due to difference in the historical context and circumstances as well as in the historical perspective, some sort of distinction is made in this paper between the neo-modernism and the new wave of liberal Islam in Indonesia.

Some Emphases on the Body of Ideas

From the point of view of history of ideas the thought of the neo-modernism enjoys historical perspective of a couple of decades, whereas the current wave of liberal Islam have been born into the present decade and is still in a process of getting shape.

Consequently, ideological aspects of the former seem to be more discussed in academic research than the latter. Therefore, whereas the body of ideas of the neo-modernism is based in this paper on varied products of study, the review of ideas of the latter in the paper is largely based on sampling of writings of those who seem to be part of the current liberal Islamic discourse in Indonesia. It is done mainly through the website of JIL, Jaringan Islam Liberal/ Liberal Islamic Network (<http://islamlib.com/>), but not only.

It has to be noted that the liberal Islamic discourse in Indonesia includes a variety of opinions and varied differences of opinions and disagreements, due to the pluralistic world-view of those who are guided by liberal ideals. Therefore an attempt to portray a solid world-view of the current liberal Islamic discourse in Indonesia is liable to lead to distorted observations, let alone in the case of JIL, whose members do regard variety of ideas among their ranks as an expression of their liberal perception.¹¹ It has to be mentioned that though being salient within current wave of liberal Islamic discourse in Indonesia, JIL is not the only voice in this discourse. But it seems that a view into major themes and arguments in the discourse of JIL, mainly, much can be learned about current liberal Islamic discourse in Indonesia, in general.

The neo-modernism,¹² the older and formative generation of liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia, emerged from the late 1960s and early 1970s, from among the younger generation of intellectuals, into a conceptual antagonism and mutual political suspicion between two opposing world-views; the Indonesian world-view of the secular-oriented government and the Islamic world-view of the Muslim activists and thinkers who wished to see Indonesia as an Islamic state. Seeking an outlet from the principal ideological conflict between these two contradicting world-views and wishing to make the Muslim majority supportive of the state programs of development and much more involved in their realization, the neo-modernists suggested a new theological approach, believing that only through reforming of the theological approach a proper synthesis between the state and Islam will be found.

They argued for the theological approach of *ijtihad*, the independent theological reasoning. They hoped in this way to see contextualization of the interpretation of the Islamic text to suit the contemporary circumstances and particularities of the Indonesian archipelago. They also hoped in this way to urge Indonesian Muslims to adopt positive attitude towards the concept of modernization that was closely tight with the developments programs of the New

Order regime of Suharto. In other words they wished to see Islamic approach that is attentive and responsive to the demands of the modern age and to the temporal, local and modern circumstances of Indonesia. Therefore the term "contextual *ijtihad*" (*ijtihad kontekstual*) is tightly connected with the name of neo-modernism in Indonesia. This approach to *ijtihad* was highly motivated by ambition for renewal the understanding of Islam and by belief that Islam confirms modernity. It was believed that this aim would be realized by going beyond the literal meaning of the text towards the essential meaning of the text, by analyzing the meaning beyond the text. It was presented as alternative to the traditional *taqlid*, the alleged blind and uncritical acceptance of the theological interpretations of the four schools of canon law, *al-madhahib*.

It has to be noted that through the prism of the modern history of Indonesia the concept of *ijtihad* is largely connected with the influential modernist Islamic stream of thought there that preceded the narrative of the neo-modernism in a more than a half century. The adoption of the concept of *ijtihad* as a tool for making Islam more receptive to the demands of the modernity by both the modernist Islamic movement in Indonesia and by the neo-modernists there is strongly connected with the heritage of the Egyptian Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), who laid down systematically the conceptual foundations of the modernist Islamic stream of thought at late nineteenth century. The neo-modernists argued that the application of *ijtihad* would not affect the transcendent teaching of Islam, but would rather affect its social application, namely the realm of the mundane. The influence of 'Abduh is also seem to be evident in this argument, since he made a differentiation between the eternal Islamic teachings about worship of God and the general Islamic principles about relations with other men, saying that these latter category is legitimate sphere of *ijtihad*, being left to human judgment and reason to be applied to all circumstances.¹³

Guided by this theological approach the neo-modernists also argued that the holistic nature of Islam does not require a mixture of the divine values with the profane state matters and state's ideology, nor does it require that Islam should regulate every aspect of life. Rather, Islam should provide moral values that serve as the basic and general guidelines for human life. They also argued that Islam does not have any particular conceptual or theoretical preferences concerning the nature of the state and the system of governing. According to them the implementation of Islam should be done

culturally and not politically, Islamic movements should become cultural movements, religion should remain in the realm of the transcendental, and the Islamization process in Indonesia should not contradict the process of Indonesianization.

Thus, Nurcholish Madjid, who called to secularization of worldly issues, in a sense of temporalization, instead of viewing them as transcendental, stated: "Islam yes, Islamic party no". This phrase seems to be one of the formative slogans of the neo-modernists. Consequently, the adherents of neo-modernism have accepted ideologically the Pancasila as the basis of the Indonesian polity and denied the basic demand of activists of political Islam to establish Indonesia as an Islamic state. They argued among other things that there is no clear-cut evidence that the Qura'n and the Sunnah oblige the Muslims to establish an Islamic state. At the same time they have accepted unequivocally the current political formula of Indonesia and its structure. Some of them have even argued that the existing ideological construct of the state should be regarded as a final goal or destination for Indonesian Muslims, not as a springboard for other goals or other destinations.

The *Pancasila*, the "secular"-national state ideology, often described as religiously neutral ideology since it treats equally all the recognized religions in the country, has been presented by the neo-modernists ardently as the best political formula for Indonesia. It provides, as it was alleged by thinkers of the neo-modernism, an ideal blueprint for the non-sectarian identity of Indonesia that assures harmonious relations among all faiths and it also establishes a spiritual, ethical, and moral basis for Indonesia's national developments. According to them, the *Pancasila* guarantees at the same time freedom for Muslims to implement their religious teachings and even reflects to a certain extent the substance of Islamic principles. It therefore deserves religio-political acceptance among Muslims. Neo-modernism has even granted a religious-historical legitimacy for Pancasila. The Pancasila, it was argued, ought to be regarded as similar to the Medina Charter, the contract that was signed by the Prophet Muhammad, the Jews, and the polytheists.

At the same time, this charter, that granted Muslims the right to rule in Medina, considered all the inhabitants of the city as members of a single *umma* (in a sense of political community) and guaranteed the rights of the non-Muslims groups as well. Medina Charter, which provided basic political principles to the pluralistic society of Medina was perceived among the adherents of the neo-modernism

as model that is much relevant to the case of Indonesia, suggesting a genuine spirit of plurality of faith and freedom of religion in Islamic context. Thus through reasoning, that is largely based on theological and historical arguments, a creative Islamic stream of thought that incorporates a "middle way" of Islamic political theory has emerged; a middle way that neither shared a strictly orthodox holistic perception of the state as an integral part of Islam, nor a secular perception about the complete partition between Islam and the affairs of the state.¹⁴

Tenets, ideas and themes of the neo-modernism have been diffused into the current liberal Islamic discourse. Thus, the theological aspect is seen to be a central pillar also in the world-view of current circles of liberal Islam in Indonesia. The theological aspect is presented by Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) as the main pivot of liberal Islam: "Liberal Islam (LI) is a new interpretation form of the Islam religion.....".¹⁵ The "openness of *ijtihad*'s gates in the entire aspects" is ranked by JIL as its first insight and the text of JIL continues by saying: "LI believes that *ijtihad* (the rational thinking of Islamic texts) is the main tenet that enables Islam to hold out through any seasons".¹⁶ The contextual approach to the Quranic exegesis, in a sense of response to the needs of the local and temporal circumstances of Indonesia and understanding the temporal context of the formative traditions, is strongly emphasized by the circle of JIL and is presented as a counter response to the to literally and formal approach. The significance of a rational-critical approach as regard the Islamic teaching and observation of the needs of the current context are strongly emphasized by JIL's advocates, or in the words of Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, founder of JIL and its salient moderator a couple of years: "the revelation cannot 'speak' without the context".¹⁷

This call to contextualized interpretation of the text, the Qur'an and the Hadith, is also integrated in basic idea of JIL about the historicity of the text in a sense that both text and context are essential to interpretation. Thus it was argued among other things that the Qur'an has its own context in space and time. Since the Qur'an responded to this particular space and time, its reading and understanding ought to consider the relevant historical context.¹⁸ This contextual approach seems to be strongly connected to another idea that has a hold within JIL about human being as an autonomous agent of the interpretation. As such, people are believed to have an independent right to create a critical understanding of the text. This perception has been followed in JIL, among other things, by empha-

sizing the ethico-religious spirit and the meaning beyond the text, rather than the literal meaning of the text.¹⁹ It was argued for example that textual religious understanding may endorse violence, “although religion should not be misunderstood as the source of violence”²⁰. Naturally, such basic perception of interpretation was also followed by principle of relativeness and plurality of truth.²¹ Thus, for example, it was emphasized that authoritarianism in religious matters is rejected, the text is open to varied interpretations and those are open to a dialogue,²² and that nobody may claim to hold the authority on Islam.²³

Guided by its pivotal contextual approach to the religious texts, the significance of the religious ethics, and by liberal ideals, the forum of JIL strongly demands a gender equality. This issue is salient in the current discourse of liberal Islam in Indonesia. The following themes are evident in the deliberations about this issue by proponents of JIL: Islam stores in its origin a basic ideal of equality between men women; Islam aims basically to improve women status in all aspects as part of its essential ideal of justice, Islam has humanitarian nature and high social values; Islam has brought to the world highly progressive message as regard women rights and their liberation; the fact that the social structure is still based on the patriarchal idea is against the justice idea of Islam; monogamy is the true ideal of Islam. The fact that polygamy was not abolished by Islam is explained also through the contextual prism, namely the social circumstances that prevailed in Arabia when the Qura'n was revealed. Thus it is argued that it was impossible in this early period of Islam to take radical steps as regard women rights and to abolish local traditions with one blow. Hence, there was a need for gradual reform. Indeed the Prophet did not abolish the polygamy, but he put limits on the number of women the man can marry.²⁴

Basic arguments and concepts of the forefathers of the neo-modernism as regard state-religion relations and the issue of Islam and politics are shared by the circle of JIL. Thus call to a separation between religion and the political power is supported. It is argued that the *ukhrawi* (heavenly) and the *duniawi* (worldly) has to be separated from each other and unification of both religious and political power will lead to authoritarianism..²⁵ JIL advocates also argue that “healthy form of state for the religious and political growth is a state where both authorities are separated”,²⁶ religion is a private matter whereas the state is a public,²⁷ and a religious politization “will only contaminate religious holiness itself”.²⁸ It is again the

prophetic tradition as it was modeled by the Medina Charter that sustains a call for pluralistic polity in which the rights of religious minorities are protected,²⁹ and the pluralist spirit of Pancasila is highly appreciated.³⁰

Current advocates of liberal Islam express also reservations about a demand to enforce or formalize *shari'a* in Indonesia. They argue among other things that such a step would be very problematic in the multi-religious society of Indonesia in relation to the principle of citizenship equality, non-discrimination, inclusive pluralism, tolerance and individual freedom.³¹ Similarly, the will of some provinces in Indonesia to implement *shari'a* is strongly rejected as contradictory to the plurality of Indonesian society.³² Naturally, the current young activists of liberal Islam who act in the post-Suharto, the *reformasi* era, express a belief in the idea of democracy in general and in the democratization process in Indonesia in particular, including in the significance of strengthening civil society.³³ It is argued among other things that democracy does not contradict the spirit of Islam, rather the opposite, its values are even compatible with Islam. At the same time the liberal Islamic discourse reveals a sober view about the challenges and difficulties that the process of democratization faces in Indonesia.³⁴

The idea of religious freedom and pluralism also has salient position in the corpus of ideas espoused by the circle of JIL.³⁵ Religious freedom is argued by JIL to be an integral part of the right of every human being for freedom of expression. Such position includes not only approval of the right to observe his or her religion but even an approval of the right not to observe religion at all. Thus JIL declares in its website: "LI [Liberal Islam] considers that the matter of 'being religious' or 'being not religious' is a personal right that should be protected. LI does not abide any prosecution on the base of an opinion or belief."³⁶ As to religious pluralism, JIL's proponents believe that Islam appreciates plurality by nature.³⁷

There are additional important tenets, messages and themes that have become evident in the world-view of the advocates of the current liberal Islamic thought; salient among religious tolerance, human rights, protecting the rights of minorities, and a call for building bridges between religions through sincere process of interfaith dialogue.³⁸ The varied ideas and themes expressed by the circle of JIL seem to be deeply anchored in liberal thought and join together to create a multi-faceted conceptual package that stands as a counter message to a growing voice of radical Muslims in Indonesia.

Main themes discussed by the circle of JIL are common to liberal Islamists worldwide. It attests to the fact the liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia as already mentioned has emerged and developed through inspiration by the forefathers of liberal Islamic thought in the Islamic world, Middle East in particular, and through a great deal of attention to current liberal Islamic thinkers worldwide, including to those of them who live in the West.³⁹ Furthermore, many activists of JIL spent a period of time abroad in centers of study, either in Muslim countries or in the West. At the same time varied themes of liberal Islamic thought have been implemented by the adherents of liberal Islam in Indonesia into the context of their own archipelago.

Liberal Islamic Ideas on Indonesian Soil – Roles and Impacts

As an intellectual movement, neo-modernism is considered to be an elitist phenomenon.⁴⁰ Even though, the movement has had an impact during the last three decades on central issues and developments in Indonesia. Figures of the movement have acquired important positions in Indonesia's intellectual life, influencing many young Muslim intellectuals, and their voice and influence inspired on the wider Islamic discourse in Indonesia and have even crossed its confines to the general public sphere.

Varied explanations can be suggested for the strong hold of the concept of separation between politics and religion in the Muslim mainstream in Indonesia and for its acceptance the *Pancasila*, the "secular"-oriented or religiously neutral ideology. Some insights in this regard can be offered by the narrative of the neo-modernism. Thus it seems that neo-modernists have contributed to some degree to a genuine acceptance of the *Pancasila* by the Muslim mainstream in Suharto era as the conclusive ideological basis of the state.⁴¹ It also seems that they have also helped to anchor among Muslims the idea of separation between politics and religion and to place the concept of "cultural Islam" as an attractive formula against the concept of political Islam. The abovementioned slogan "Islam yes, Islamic party no", for example, launched by Nurcholish Madjid, is seen to influence wider circles. Thus the results of the parliamentary elections in June 1999, in which the majority, the same as in the elections of April 2004, voted for political parties that accept *Pancasila* as the state national ideology, were celebrated within liberal Muslims circles as a victory of "cultural Islam" over political Islam.⁴² By vot-

ing to these parties Muslim majority actually denied an idea of replacing Pancasila by the *shar'ia*.

The neo-modernists can be regarded among other things as agents of modernity and progressive ideas due much to their calling to the use of *ijtihad* as a tool for making Islam receptive to the needs of the modern age. Indeed, this call has been raised earlier, since the first decades of the twentieth century, by the Islamic modernist movement in Indonesia. Inspired by the Islamic modernist movement in the Middle East this movement in Indonesia has adopted the *ijtihad* as main motif in their reformist approach. But the neo-modernism is argued to even show greater intellectual determination than the Islamic modernists, in this regard, to escape the grip of strict traditional percepts.⁴³ Since late 1980s the neo-modernism has also considerably contributed to a building of a massive and influential civil society in Indonesia and to generating a democratization process; progressive ideals of the movement seem to inspire the burgeoning civil society and many of the movement's proponents were involved in building the civil society and fortifying ideals of social justice and human rights through the flourishing NGOs. The fact that Abdurrahman Wahid, the then charismatic leader of Nahdlatul Ulama and later the first democratically elected president of Indonesia, has played a leading role both in the emergence of the neo-modernism and in building of the civil society in Indonesia, clearly illustrates the close interconnection between the two. Perhaps this stream of thought also contributed to the distinctive Indonesian phenomenon; reform-minded Muslims democrats, not secular nationalists, are since the late 1980s the largest audience for democratic and pluralistic ideals.⁴⁴

As to the current wave of liberal Islam that has emerged in the recent years, perhaps it is too earlier to value its historical role and impacts. There is also ground to wonder if it is possible to draw strong generalization about the current wave of liberal Islam just through the case of JIL, though it seems to be the most outspoken in the current liberal Islamic networks in Indonesia. At the same time, one can not ignore the fact that JIL has imprinted itself as a forum that delivers a clear, decisive and systematic counter message to growing voice of radical Muslims in Indonesia. This message explicitly rejects religious extremism and hatred, not to mention militant activity and terror alleged to be carried under the banner of Islam. Even categorical denial of suicide bombing is expressed.⁴⁵

So, this liberal Islamic message, that epitomizes a broader liberal world-view, stands in a sharp contrast to that of the radicals along wide spectrum: contextualized hermeneutic approach and critical theological thinking and reasoning versus strict literal-textual interpretation approach; pluralistic theological approach versus doctrinal self-rightness, self-truthfulness and other-wrongness, or in other words, belief in the plural nature of Islam versus belief that "Islam is one";⁴⁶ perceiving the matter of being religious or not religious as a private matter versus perceiving of religious belief as collective responsibility and religious matters as public matters;⁴⁷ side by side with belief in revelation, a call to use human reason in varied areas of contemporary life versus claim that the revelation is the ultimate and sole source of the truth; modern concept of separation between politics and religion versus deep conviction that Islam is both religion and state. In other words, strict denial of an idea about autonomous political sphere; an acceptance of the concept of democracy versus its denial as an alleged Western import that is entirely alien to the ideal of Islamic state and opposes it; ideal of citizenship equality versus a concept of Muslim hegemony over non-Muslims; pluralistic and loose organizational forums versus organizational structures that impose strict doctrinal conformity on their members; pluralist ideals of peace, harmony and interfaith dialogue versus an hostile and marginalized attitude toward the "other"; gender equality versus sheer patriarchal and inequitable approach; a search for ways to live as Muslims in globalizing age versus fortifying in one's own cultural enclave; inclusive world view versus exclusive approach; concept of cultural Islam versus political Islam; an openness to the Western culture versus hostile attitude toward the West and its cultural heritage. This set of ideas as if defines the polar borders of the spectrum of the current Islamic discourse in Indonesia.⁴⁸

A clear illustration to the distinctive openness to the Western culture, expressed by current activists of liberal Islam in Indonesia, is given by the following two cases. Responding to a question about his conclusion from a visit he made to America, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, a key figure in JIL, says: "Frankly speaking, I try to be like Rifa'ah Rafi' al-Tahtawi".⁴⁹ In this connection he mentions the famous book of al-Tahtawi (1801-1873), *Takhlis Al-Ibriz ila Talkhis Bariz* ("The Refinement of the Gold in a Comprehensive Depiction of Paris"). This book, published in 1834, includes experiences and impressions of al-Tahtawi from a sojourn of a couple of years (1826-

1831) he made in Paris as imam of the first substantial mission sent by Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, to study in Paris. Ulil continues by saying: "the conclusion is that we can learn many positive things from others, whoever they are".⁵⁰ This statement of Ulil and in particular the conceptual imprint that al-Tahtawi made on him strongly show a positive approach towards the West that stands in sharp contrast to the strong negative approach of radical Muslim.

Paris had a deep positive effect on young al-Tahtawi. The five years he made there are regarded to be the most important in his life. Although he was sent to Paris as imam of a group of students and as such he was not required to study there, he significantly proved himself to be a diligent and curious seeker of knowledge. He studied thoroughly French language, poetry and thought as well as Greek philosophy, history and various sciences. He was much affected by the thought of French Enlightenment and met French scholars. During this period of time he also translated books from French to Arabic. At the same time, his enthusiasm from varied aspects in France did not prevent him to observe critically some other aspect in the French life. Anyhow, the stay of al-Tahtawi in Paris opened for him a window to the Western civilization and through it, indirectly, for his contemporary Egyptians. His travel account is also regarded to be a cornerstone in the intellectual heritage of the first generation of Muslim Arab intellectuals who came in contact with the Western civilization.

As such Al-Tahtawi's *Takhliṣ al-Ibriz ila Talkhiṣ Bariz* stores in itself optimism and idealization of Western civilization, an approach that characterized this first generation to contact the Western civilization. This primordial observation of Muslim intellectuals was changed toward the end of the nineteenth century into a more realistic view about applicability of the accomplishments of the Western civilization into their own societies and into an apologetic approach; elements of such change can also be found in a later writing of al-Tahtawi himself.⁵¹ The jump in time made by Ulil, the Indonesian thinker and activist, to the Egyptian al-Tahtawi and to his formative book, *Takhliṣ al-Ibriz ila Talkhiṣ Bariz*, is striking amid current shadows that are flying over the issue of dialogue between civilizations. In other words, in such circumstances Ulil chooses to stretch a virtual line to the optimistic intercultural approach of al-Tahtawi and to his cultural openness.⁵²

The second enlightening example of a distinctive openness to the Western culture expressed among current circles of liberal Islam in Indonesia is given by an interview conducted with Sukidi Mulyadi. This interview with Sukidi was published on the website of *Jaringan Islam Liberal* under the title, "In America I found Islam"⁵³ (Indonesian: Di Amerika Saya Menemukan Islam). Sukidi, than doctor's candidate at University of Harvard, talks positively about Islamic Studies in leading American universities and praises the comparative study of religions implemented by them. According to Sukidi, this scientific method has firstly enabled him to learn about Islam through a broader perspective of the world religions. Furthermore, expressing actually pluralistic idea about variety forms of truth, he says that this method "gives inspiration that Islam is only one road among many roads that head to the presence of God". He continues by explaining that the truth is only one, but each religion searches it in its own way and method. Sukidi also praises the pluralism of American society, including religious pluralism, and the centrality of the concept of freedom. He also argues that plenty of Muslim thinkers have found in America a large space of freedom and that the Muslims in America are also benefited by this freedom. Sukidi asserts that his personal belief also felt more meaningful as the result of meeting with other religious traditions. At the same time his enthusiasm about America does not prevent him of some degree of criticism. Thus he observes in the West not only a positive attitude towards Islam but also what he describes as a cynical and wrong approach.⁵⁴

Through a broader perspective of history of ideas the views of both Ulil and Sukidi as if stand in sharp contrast to the strong negative American experience of the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), the ideological forefather of Islamic radicalism, that his heritage has inspired much radical Muslims worldwide. Towards the end of 1948 Qutb was sent on scholarship to the United States for study of education. It is claimed that one of the purposes behind the decision to send Qutb to the United States was to expose him to the West in the hopes that his stay there would moderate his strong critical approach as regard varied aspects in the then Egyptian reality. This was not happened, rather the contrary. Indeed, he was impressed by American technology. But Qutb observed very negatively the American society during his stay in the United States, both morally and culturally. He sharply criticized alleged extreme materialism, sexual permissiveness and racial discrimina-

tion there. There seem to be a disagreement about whether or not Qutb's stay in the United States in the period Nov. 1948 - Aug. 1950 provoked his shifting to Islamic activism at the beginning of the 1950s.⁵⁵ Anyhow, Qutb's criticism of the Western society is seen to be diffused to some degree into the collective memory of radical Muslims.

Hence, Sukidi's declaration, "In America I found Islam", as though sharply defies Qutb's formative observation of the American society, that was made more than half a century ago, not to mention that it stands in sharp contrasts to Qutb's concept of "new *jahiliyya*", or "modern *jahiliyya*". This concept has become a pivotal one in the current fundamentalist vocabulary. The concept of "new *jahiliyya*", according to radical Islamic perceptions that were largely inspired by Qutb, targets modernity and Western societies that have rejected the divinity of God and God's sovereignty, and hence have legitimized themselves through purely man-made criteria. This definition also epitomizes, in the radical fundamentalist view, the combination of godlessness, barbarism, decadence, and ignorance prevailing among these modern impious societies, conditions similar to those of pre-Islamic Arabia, known as *jahiliyya*. Muslim societies experiencing the process of Westernization are warned by radical fundamentalists lest they be infected by the evils of the "new *jahiliyya*".⁵⁶

Liberal Muslims in Indonesia are not alone in this country in their defiance of manifestations of religious extremism and militancy. The Indonesia government rejects such manifestations. Rejection of religious violence and militancy is also seems to be shared by the majority of the Indonesians. Thus such rejection is manifested within wider circles of the Muslim mainstream in Indonesia, led by its two main pillars, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.⁵⁷ Therefore, liberal Islamic discourse in Indonesia can be regarded as another bulwark in a varied complex bulwarks against increasing voice and presence of Islamic radical fundamentalism in this country.

At the same time, perhaps the determination and vitality shown by liberal Islamic circles in challenging manifestations of religious extremism, intolerance and militancy have their own added value. Indeed, the current liberal Islamic thought is seem to be mainly a domain of elitist, small intellectual circles. It is argued to touch only a small percent of its intended audiences, to gains few members and to be "an urban, elite phenomenon that cannot effectively reach

grassroots Muslims, most of whom live in rural areas".⁵⁸ JIL, the most outspoken forum currently of liberal Islam, has not any formal structure, except a couple of people that are involved with its running daily and its discourse is also argued to be limited to an highly educated circle of young, urban of liberal Muslims.⁵⁹ But it is argued that though being small in size, JIL is "big in name and influence"⁶⁰ and that the conservatives seem to be worried by the scale of presence of the liberals and their influence, fearing that they have even gained ground in the world's two largest Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah and NU.⁶¹

The current liberal Islamic circles, JIL in particular, meet criticism, sometimes very sharp, in Indonesia. Naturally it is strongly rejected by fundamentalist Muslims. They even regard JIL as a threat to Islam.⁶² Liberal Islamic thought also meets a great deal of criticism within the growing tide of Islamic conservatism in Indonesia. Furthermore, this stream of thought, in particular JIL, is seen to be highly controversial within wider circles of the Muslim mainstream. The fact that the name of JIL is largely connected with controversial theological interpretation of religious text seems to make it a target to criticism.⁶³ Varied arguments are included in criticism leveled in Indonesia at the adherents of the current liberal Islam and their discourse; most of these arguments are directed toward JIL. Among these critical arguments: being too identified with Western agenda and being "agents of westernization and secularization",⁶⁴ thinking wrongly that everything is open to interpretation;⁶⁵ being an "American import";⁶⁶ not being in keeping with mainstream of Islamic thought;⁶⁷ taking "provocative actions";⁶⁸ taking things too far;⁶⁹ being elitist circle that is detached from the Indonesian reality, fails to solidly understand the problems faced by Indonesian Muslims, and whose ideas cannot be understood by the majority of Indonesian Muslims.⁷⁰ It is argued that most Indonesians, not only Indonesian Muslims, still assume that liberalism (liberal ideas) "pertain to ideas of free sex, individualism, hedonism, and secularism".⁷¹ It is also said that being liberal is perceived in Indonesia as being an "American with a thin Muslim covering" and that there are many among those who take part of the Islamic liberal discourse in Indonesia who avoid labeling themselves as liberals and prefer other terms as progressive and humanist.⁷²

Furthermore, Greg Fealy suggests that the numerous controversies in which a number of liberal Islam groups were involved in the recent years have brought an anti-liberal backlash in Indonesia and

have helped to swing opinion within the larger Islamic organizations, including NU and Muhammadiyah, against the Islamic liberal agenda. He emphasizes that many leaders of these organizations openly oppose now liberal ideas, whereas they had previously been tolerant, if not supportive of them. Fealy mentions in this regard a controversy that was surrounding changes to the Indonesian Islamic family law proposed in the "Counter Legal Draft on the Islamic Law Compilation", produced within the Ministry of Religion's Research and Development Division in October 2004. He adds that the attention focused mainly on the sections of the draft which called for banning polygamy and giving women equal inheritance rights to those of men and equal rights to initiate divorce and reconciliation. Many senior NU and Muhammadiyah 'ulama, says Fealy, declared this proposal contrary to God's commands and criticized liberal intellectuals for sinful behaviour. According to Fealy the "provocative actions" of the more outspoken liberal groups helped to spark a conservative backlash, even in the NU and Muhammadiyah, and their "confrontational approach" have alienated many mainstream Muslims and provided ammunition for their opponents.⁷³

The current controversial image of the liberal Islamic thought in wider circles, and perhaps even the suggested anti-liberal backlash, have become more evident by the opposition it has met from Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). The MUI, that is considered to be the country's highest Islamic authority, issued in July 2005 *fatwa* (Islamic legal opinion) saying that pluralism, secularism and religious liberalism contradict the teaching of Islam and that the Islamic community of believers (Indonesian: *umat Islam*) is forbidden to follow these three doctrines (Indonesian: *faham*).⁷⁴ Indeed, this *fatwa* was criticized by significant and influential figures in the Muslim mainstream, but yet a support in this *fatwa* was also voiced out in Indonesia. Muslim hardliners have even seemed to be encouraged by this *fatwa*;⁷⁵ shortly after it was issued they pushed for the expulsion of JIL from its offices in East Jakarta, arguing that this body was illegal. Not a few suspected that by issuing the *fatwa* on religious liberalism Indonesian Ulama Council has targeted the controversial Islamic Liberal Network from the beginning.

Habitat for Islamic liberal Ideas – Why is it Precisely Indonesia?

Naturally an intriguing question is raising how it has happened that a liberal Islamic thought has taken roots in Indonesia. Furthermore, how it has happened that liberal Islamic thought in

Indonesia has developed to become a stream of thought that imprints itself on the Islamic discourse there in the recent decades, whereas in other Muslim countries and communities, as was already mentioned, liberal Islamic thought has been primarily the occupation of a small number of intellectuals only.

Varied explanations can be suggested. Significant among them is tradition of tolerance and pluralism that is deeply grounded in the cultural values of the Indonesian archipelago. This tradition has made the Islam in Indonesia, among other things, a hotbed for emergence of varied streams of thoughts. A tradition of intellectual and organizational pluralism is considered to be, for centuries, the most distinctive quality of Islam in Indonesia. Even in pre-modern times neither the courts nor the *‘ulama* exercised an effective monopoly of power over the moral and intellectual life of the Muslim community in the Malay-Indonesian world. There were diverse alternative ideas and religious views as well as multiple ways concerning how to be a good Muslim. From the beginning, the people of the archipelago, says Robert W. Hefner, grappled with what social theorists today often regard as a uniquely modern issue, that is, cultural pluralism.⁷⁶

The historical circumstances in which the neo-modernism emerged also have high explanatory value. Significant among them is a meeting of interests which was created between Suharto's regime and the neo-modernism. Suharto made vigorous efforts to achieve unequivocal recognition of the established Muslim mainstream in the Pancasila as the sole ideological foundation of the state. By offering Suharto regime religious arguments that support the Pancasila, including the ideological position about separation between religion and politics, the neo-modernists were found as instrumental through prism of the state interests. In addition, the advancement of the theological concept of *ijtihad* by the neo-modernists has actually made religion more receptive to the contemporary needs of the state and its national goals, such as development and modernization. More than that, the neo-modernism asked also to involve the Muslim society in the ideology of development held by Suharto's regime.⁷⁷ Restrictions put by Suharto's regime on political manifestations of Islam also created a convenient setting for the neo-modernists. This policy of constraining and containing of Islamic politics is argued to provide "a fertile and sheltered environment for the development of a new movement of Islamic thought, neo-Modernism".⁷⁸ Thus, it is argued that synergies did exist between New Order's government and liberal Islam.⁷⁹

The acceptance of the ideas of the neo-modernists was also supported by a tradition of tolerance and pluralism which marks many *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) in the rural areas of Java. Therefore there is no wonder that many of those who are identified with liberal Islamic thought made there formative Islamic studies in such *pesantren*,⁸⁰ let alone that Sufi tradition of tolerance has also imprinted itself on the rural area of Java. It also partly explains the fact that NU, the huge organizational platform of traditional Islam that is deeply rooted the rural areas of Java, has shown itself as a hotbed for many adherents of liberal Islam thought.⁸¹ Influence of liberal Islamic thought is said to be found also among the ranks of Muhammadiyah, the huge Islamic modernist organization.⁸² Thus, several liberal Islamic NGO's have been established within both the NU and Muhammadiyah.⁸³ Muhammadiyah has also proved itself for years to be essentially moderate and a significant stage for national ideals of tolerance and plurality.

Similar to the NU it was active in setting up NGOs that greatly assisted in the process of building of a civil society during Suharto's era, a process that contributed much to the political change in Indonesia in 1998. Just as the NU, Muhammadiyah also accepts *Pancasila* as the sole ideological basis of the state and rejects an idea of replacing the *Pancasila* by the *shari'a*. The two organizations are even argued to constitute "the first block to be passed by new Islamic movements promoting Islamic sharia as the solution".⁸⁴ The NU, claims 35-40 million members, and Muhammadiyah, claims about 30 million., can also be described as significant element in the cordon sanitaire against radical Islamic fundamentalist and Islamic extremism and as guardians of the distinctive pluralistic and tolerant nature of Islam in Indonesia.

It seems that the neo-modernist movement also benefited from the involvement of many of its thinkers and activists in the state bureaucratic agencies. The co-option of neo-modernists into varied governmental agencies likely to be facilitated by their world-view that encourages harmony between the state and Islam, recognizes the *Pancasila* and offers religious legitimacy to it, and disagrees with an idea of an Islamic state. Their involvement in the state apparatus can be also partly explained by their agenda of socio-economic reform that aimed to achieve egalitarian goals and to advance social transformation programs. Since the centralized and authoritarian regime of Suharto regulated many aspects of the Indonesian society, personal involvement in its apparatus was imperative for pro-

moting any socio-economic agenda. Guided by their social agenda, proponents of the neo-modernism were actually involved in community development programs, such as programs that aimed to create small-scale industries. They were also involved in *pesantren* development programs, that were connected with the Department of Religion, one of the government bureaucratic bodies that attracted adherents of the neo-modernism.⁸⁵ Side by side with their involvement in the state institutions, adherents of the neo-modernism worked also through NGOs to promote their ideas. The narrative of the contemporary NGOs in Indonesia is strongly connected with formative efforts done during Suharto era to build a civil society. The emerging civil society had proved itself, to the long run, to be one of the significant force behind the downfall of the authoritarian regime of Suharto. Thus ironically, the neo-modernism, that emerged through cooperation with Suharto regime, seems to contribute historically, to some extent, to the processes that led to the *reformasi* that marks the end of Suharto era.

The narrative of liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia is connected, among other things, with the Islamic institute for higher education, Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN, "State Institutes of Islamic Religion"). This connection seems to offer an additional insight to the question how it has happened that a liberal Islamic thought has taken roots in Indonesia. In the 1970s the IAIN underwent a reform initiated by strongly motivated Islamic scholars in both the IAIN and at the top of Ministry of Religion that has changed it to a modern institution of higher education. Consequently, the curriculum of the IAIN has exposed great number of students there to various Islamic schools of law and theology, to other religions, and to modern sciences. It has also encouraged them to be creative and to synthesize classical Islamic studies with modern critical approaches.

Likewise, the idea of using Islamic scholarship for finding solutions to modern questions has been promoted there for years the importance of *ijtihad*.⁸⁶ Over the years many thousands of students have also been taught at the IAIN to the ideals of the state, including pluralism and religious tolerance. The fact that many of religious teachers, Islamic intellectuals, community leaders, and Islamic functionaries in Indonesia are graduates of the IAIN, whose campuses are spread out across the Indonesian archipelago, likely to facilitate a diffusion of liberal ideas. It is not surprising then that the IAIN's campuses, in particular IAIN Jakarta known now as UIN Jakarta and IAIN Yogyakarta known now as UIN Yogyakarta, are regarded

to be highly significant hotbed for liberal Islamic thought during the recent decades and that their graduates have played an important role in building civil society in Indonesia.⁸⁷

The hold of modernist Islamic ideas in Indonesia, in particular those of Muhammad 'Abduh's heritage, since the first decades of the twentieth century, has also fed progressive attitude in the Islamic discourse in Indonesia. Indeed, this conceptual heritage, that was transmitted to the Malay-Indonesian world from the Middle East, is alleged to have lost in Indonesia some of its earlier intellectual momentum and original ideological determination there. Furthermore, it is even alleged that in compare to earlier stages, Abduh's heritage in Indonesia has started to show more of a link with Rashid Rida's salafism, in a sense of a call to return to the puritan way and formative values of the first generations of Islam, than with the modernist ideas of 'Abduh, and to adopt a position of "neo-salafism" including an ideological emphasis on a return to pristine Islam and strict Scripturalism.⁸⁸ But on the other hand it seems that the original voice of 'Abduh is still persists to certain degree in Indonesia and inspires there progressive ideas. Furthermore, as was already mentioned, Muhammadiyah, the leading modernist Islamic organization in Indonesia, has proved itself as a significant pillar of the moderate mainstream in Indonesia. It is also likely that the strong imprint of 'Abduh's heritage has made it easier to liberal Islamic thought to further advance the idea of *ijtihad*, a significant tenet in the heritage of Muhammad 'Abduh. Even the call of liberal Islamic thinkers to a theological differentiation between the sacred and the profane can also be traced back to Muhammad 'Abduh.⁸⁹

The Islamic resurgence in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Islamic world, that has taken place since the end of the 1960s, is closely connected with a growing pietism, a strengthening of Islamic conservatism and the promotion of political Islam, fundamentalist ideology and Islamic radicalism and militancy. The Islamic resurgence has not left the huge Muslim population in Indonesia untouched and it originated there in late 1970s. Consequently, more Muslims have turned to a more devout observation of religious duties and a strict orthodox way of life, such as observing daily the prayer, the fasting in Ramadan, paying the *zakat* (the alms tax), making the *hajj* to Mecca and consuming religiously approved food (*halal*).

This process in Indonesia has also included, among other things, growing Islamic-oriented activity on university campuses, wearing veil by more women, increasing public interest in Islamic is-

sues and an upsurge in the construction of mosques. A process of "santri-isation" has also been included in the Islamic resurgence; Indonesian "syncretic" Muslims, *abangan*, in particular among the urban middleclass, have become pious and consequently much more Indonesian Muslims have been shifted from the category of *abangan* into the category of *santri*, orthodox Muslims.⁹⁰ But whereas in many Muslim communities in the world the Islam resurgence has evidently provided, among other things, a setting for growing of varied manifestations of political Islam, in Indonesia Islamic resurgence has been marked by a high degree of tolerance and general acceptance of the basic ideal of religious pluralism. Since the 1980s, the increasing interest in Islam has exposed Muslim intellectuals and many of the Muslim urban middle class to the ideals of Islamic liberalism and has offered them a progressive understanding of Islam. Similarly, while Islamic resurgence in Indonesia has provided the Islamic political dimension with only a marginal role, it has enabled democratic and pluralistic ideas to further establish their position within the mainstream Islam in Indonesia.⁹¹

The strong influence that Sufism has had for centuries on Islam in Indonesia seems also to facilitate the hold of liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia. The history of the expansion of Islam to Indonesia is strongly connected with the Sufi mystical *tarikats*. Consequently, Sufism, known for its inclusive nature, has contributed over centuries to religious tolerance and pluralism in Indonesia. Therefore it has been significant that the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia since the late 1970s has also included an increasing popularity of Sufism, as Islam's "inner" (*batin*) spiritual expression. Thus the mystical dimension of Islam in Indonesia has expanded beyond its traditional popular and rural space to include even the educated urban sectors, whereas the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East was largely scripturalist in its nature and as such tended to reject Sufi traditions as idolatrous innovations.⁹² Therefore, the Sufism with its inclusive and pluralistic approach is likely to constitute a noteworthy element in a setting that has encouraged the emergence of liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia. Contemporary adaptations of Sufism in Indonesia is even argued to be "an important but little-noted component of the liberal 'Neo-Modernist' movement".⁹³

Through a broader scrutiny of the narrative of the liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia it can be said that the neo-modernists emerged in late 1960s and in the 1970s into relatively encouraging circumstances. Even though, the neo-modernists, the formative generation

of liberal Islamic thoughts in Indonesia, are argued to spark controversy from the outset, attempting to critique and transform Islamic thinking.⁹⁴ The circumstances and the atmosphere that encircle the current new generation that carry the banner of liberal Islamic ideas seem to be much less encouraging and favorable for delivering such ideas. The broad practical meeting of interests that did exist between the neo-modernist movement and Suharto's regime does not seem to exist in post Suharto era between the circles of liberal Islam and the government. It is even said that JIL has some disagreement with the state.⁹⁵ More than that, the *reformasi* era, namely post-Suharto era, in which ideals of liberal democracy have started to be realized, offers paradoxically problematic circumstances for liberal Islamic thought. Limits on freedom of speech and political actions, including restrictions on politicization of Islam, have been removed and calls for conservative Islamic political agendas through the democratic mechanism have been enabled. Even stronger voice of radical Muslims appears to a large extent as unavoidable "price" to be paid for democracy and as an unavoidable outcome of the difficulties that Indonesia has faced through its transition to democracy.

Concluding Words

Through a broad brush stroke over the last three-four decades, in referring to both the local Indonesian context and the entire Islamic world, liberal Islamic thought in the Indonesian archipelago can be portrayed as a distinctive case study. It is much easier to defend this argument as regard the neo-modernists, the first generation of the liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia. This is due much to varied impacts and imprint that neo-modernism has had on the Islamic space in Indonesia and beyond, such as: redefining relations between Islam and the state, including strengthening the hold of the Pancasila, the secular or religiously neutral ideology of the state, among the Muslim mainstream; encouraging compatibility between the Islamic identity and the requirements of nation-building, modernity and development; supporting a building of civil society; strengthening ideals of pluralism, tolerance, human rights, equality and so on. The case of neo-modernism also enjoys the benefits of a retrospect of more than three decades that gives some solid ground to the observer, whereas the new wave of liberal Islam is mainly a product of less than a decade.

But certainly it is not only the historical perspective that makes the difference. While the list of accomplishments and impacts of the neo-modernism in Indonesia is seen impressive, the controversial image of the current wave of liberal Islam is salient. Perhaps both intrinsic reasons that are connected with the liberal Islamic networks and discourse and exogenic reasons that are connected with the historical circumstances join together to build this controversial image. Yet being controversial, relatively small and elitist platform of educated Muslims, it seems that the presence of this stream of thought in the Islamic discourse in Indonesia can not be ignored.⁹⁶ In 2004 Ahmad Bunyan Wahib stated at the end of his enlightening Master thesis, focused on the attitude of JIL towards religious freedom and pluralism, that JIL had gained popularity over then last two years and that it is "hot phenomenon in Indonesia". He adds that JIL stimulates many Indonesian Muslims to voice their opinions and that to follow its development is no easy task; "Muslim responses to JIL develop rapidly..."⁹⁷. Indeed, much has happened since 2004 and liberal Islam in Indonesia, JIL in particular, seems to lose much of its popularity among mainstream Muslims in Indonesia. Even though, the fact that this distinctive Islamic stream of thought has pulled growing criticism in the recent years can be brought as an evidence to its vitality and presence.

It is still to earlier, historically, to evaluate the accomplishments of the current wave of liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia. However, one cannot ignore its role as a religious actor that delivers a clear, comprehensive counter-response to growing hold of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia; a determined counter-response of religious pluralism and tolerance, democracy, citizenship equality, interfaith dialogue, gender equality, progress and cultural openness. As such the liberal Islamic thought, even though controversy, seems to constitute a significant chain in the multi-faceted "cordon sanitaire" that has been shaped in Indonesia, as a polity and society, against radicals and militants. Indeed, concepts and ideals of human rights, religious freedom and pluralism and tolerance, interfaith dialogue as well as progressive thought in Islamic context as well as rebuffing of Islamic radicalism are shared by many in the Muslim mainstream and have considerable presence in the ranks of its two salient pillars, Muhammadiyah and NU. Even though, it seems that the conceptual messages, expressed by the networks of liberal Islamic thought, has its own distinctiveness in the multi-facet complex of bulwarks against religious zeal and extremism in Indonesia.⁹⁸

"One of a number of reasons why Indonesian Islam is so oriented toward progressive and liberal ideas", wrote Greg Barton a couple of years ago, "is the influence of what was initially a small liberal movement of Islamic thought that began in the late 1960s and early 1970s and which today has become broadly influential".⁹⁹ It is worth noting that this distinctive Islamic stream of thought is a product of unique local cultural context that is marked by pluralistic and inclusive approach. This local context has given birth to a deep-rooted local Islamic tradition of moderation, pluralism and inclusiveness that is shared currently by many in the Muslim mainstream in Indonesia, and has contributed much to establish Indonesia impressively as a democratic polity.

Endnotes

1. See Emmanuel Sivan, "The Clash within Islam", *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 34-41.
2. See Greg Barton, "Neo-Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 3 (1995), pp. 7-9; Greg Barton, "Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual 'Ulama': The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in neo-Modernist Thought", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1977, pp. 42-43; Greg Barton, "Islamic Liberalism and the Prospects for Democracy in Indonesia". In *Democracy in Asia*, edited by Michele Schmiegelow (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 436-437; Greg Barton, "Islam and Politics in the New Indonesia". In *Islam in Asia*, edited by Jason F. Isaacson and Colin Rubenstein (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), pp. 16-20.
3. About the appearance of the term "Liberal Islam" in the Indonesian context see M. Ali Hisyam, "Fazlur Rahman and Islamic Liberalism (in) Indonesia", *Liberal Islam Network*, December 23, 2003, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=556> (last accessed: October 7, 2007); Ahmad Ali Nurdin, "Islam and State: A Study of the Liberal Islamic Network in Indonesia, 1999-2004", *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (December, 2005), p. 24-27. About the term Liberal Islam see also Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia: The Attitude of Jaringan Islam Liberal Towards Religious Freedom and Pluralism*. M.A. thesis, Universiteit Leiden, 2004, pp. 7-10.
4. The intellectual circle that is known as neo-modernism is termed by Bahtiar Effendy as "new Islamic intellectualism": See Bahatir Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 2003, pp. 65-123; Bahtiar Effendy, "Islam and the State in Indonesia: Munawir Sjadzali and the Development of a New Theological Underpinning of Political Islam", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1995), pp. 97-121. Certain intellectual groups in Indonesia that actually share to a large extent ideas and themes common to the liberal Islamic thought, avoid intentionally the label liberal from varied reasons, preferring other labels such as progres-

- sive and humanist, for example. See Remy El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment: Clash or Symbiosis?: A Comparative Analysis of the Dutch and Indonesian Discourse on Liberal Islam", *Liberal Islam Network*, December 4, 2005, the attached report, pp. 23-25, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=930> (last accessed: October 21, 2007), pp. 26-27.
5. See Maarof Salleh, "Indonesia's Muslim ferment: Fundamentalist, mainstream and liberal groups vie for influence", *The Straits Times*, November 1, 2004.
 6. See El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, pp. 23-25; Greg Fealy, "A conservative turn: Liberal Islamic groups have prompted a backlash", *Inside Indonesia*, no. 87 (July-September 2006), pp. 24; Maarof Salleh, "Indonesia's Muslim ferment".
 7. "Background & Activities", *Liberal Islam Network*, online at <http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Indonesian/Islam/JIL-background.htm> (last accessed: December 2, 2007). As to the term "liberal Islam" in the concept of JIL, see Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 2, 14-15.
 8. "Background & Activities". See also Nurdin, "Islam and State", p. 23.
 9. About Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network) see: "About Liberal Islam Network", *Liberal Islam Network*, on-line at <http://islamlib.com/en/aboutus.php> (last Accessed: December 2, 2007); "Background & Activities"; "Liberal Islam Network's Program", *Liberal Islam Network*, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/program.php> (last accessed: December 2, 2007); Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*; El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report; Nurdin, "Islam and State", pp. 20-39; Mohamad Ihsan Alief, "Political Islam and Democracy: A Closer Look at the Liberal Muslims", in *Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics*, Asia Program Special Report, no. 110, edited by Amy McCreedy (Woodrow Wilson Center, Asia Program, April 2003), pp. 14-19, online at http://hwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/asiarpt_110.pdf (last accessed: December 2, 2007). JIL's website, in both Indonesian and English, plays significant role in its activity and discourse (<http://www.islamlib.com>).
 10. El Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, pp. 16-19. See also p. 35. For conceptual similarities and differences between the neo-modernism and JIL, see Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 29-35.
 11. El Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, p. 14. There are intellectual groups in Indonesia that though share to a large extent ideas and themes common to the liberal Islamic thought, avoid intentionally the label liberal from varied reasons and preferred other labels such as progressive and humanist for example: see *ibid*, pp. 26-27.
 12. This movement was originally named *Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam* (The Renewal of Islamic Thought) - Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, p. 28; Fealy, "A Conservative Turn", p. 23.
 13. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 146-148.
 14. The discussion in this chapter about the body of ideas of the neo-modernism is based mainly on the following works: Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia*, pp. 65-123; Effendy, "Islam and the State in Indonesia", pp. 97-121; M. Din Syamsuddin, "Islamic Political Thought and Cultural Re-

- vival in Modern Indonesia", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 4 (1995), pp. 47-68; Greg Barton, "Islamic Liberalism and the Prospects for Democracy in Indonesia". In *Democracy in Asia*, edited by Michèle Schmiegelow (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 427-51; Greg Barton, "Neo-Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia". *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 3 (1995), pp. 1-75; "Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual 'Ulama': The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in neo-Modernist Thought". *Studia Islamika*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1997), pp. 29-81; Hendro Prasetyo, "Interview with Munawir Sjadazli", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 1, no. 1 (April-June 1994), pp. 185-205. About the Medina Charter, see Ali Bulac, "The Medina Document", in *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook*, edited by Charles Kurzman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 169-78. See also El Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, pp. 16-19; Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 29-36, 80, 87.; Howard M. Federspiel, *Indonesia in Transition: Muslim Intellectuals and National Developmen* (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp-104-105.
15. "About Liberal Islam Network".
 16. Ibid. See also Nurdin, "Islam and State", p. 27.
 17. El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, p. 15. See also Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, p. 62.
 18. Taufik Adnan Amal, "Lihatlah Alquran dalam konteks sejarahnya!" (interview conducted by Ulil Abshar-Abdalla), *Jaringan Islam Liberal*, (November 11, 2001, online at <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=183> (last accessed: December 8, 2007).
 19. Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 18-23, 51-55 84.
 20. Jajang Jahroni, "Textualism, Islamism, and Religious Violence", *Liberal Islam Network*, August 7, 2006, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=1120> (last accessed: December 8, 2008).
 21. Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 19, 21.
 22. See Burhanuddin, "Building Qur'anic Plurality", *Liberal Islam Network*, August 26, 2001, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=440> (last accessed: December 8, 2007); M Hilaly Basya, "Radicalism and authoritarianism", *The Jakarta Post* (online), January 30, 2006; Oddbjørn Leirvik, "Report from a Delegation Visit to Indonesia by the Oslo Coalition of Freedom of Religion or Belief, July 29 - August 11, 2002", *The Oslo Coalition of Freedom of Religion or Belief*, online at http://www.oslocoalition.org/html/project_indonesia/indonesia_project_report.html (last accessed: December 8, 2008); El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, pp. 15-16.
 23. Burhanuddin, "Islamic Sharia: Liberal Muslim Perspective", *Liberal Islam Network*, August 3, 2003, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=674> (last accessed: December 8, 2007).
 24. See for example: Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir, "Even the Prophet Performed a Loyal Monogamy". *Liberal Islam Network*, June 1, 2003, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&mode=print&id=488>, (last accessed: December 8, 2007); Novriantonti, "Polygamy and Justice", *Liberal Islam Network*, April 28, 2002 (see on-line at: <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=497>) (last accessed: December 8, 2007); Nong Darol Mahmada, "Fatima Mernissi: Rebel for the Sake of Women". *Liberal Is-*

- lam Network*, December 10, 2003. (see on-line at: <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=461>) (last accessed: December 8, 2007); Nong Darol Mahmada, "Woman's Limitation in the Public Area". *Liberal Islam Network*, November 25, 2001, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=593>) (last accessed: December 8, 2007); Nasarudin Umar, "Women's Liberation Theology". *Liberal Islam Network*, July 29, 2001, online at: <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=443>) (last accessed: December 8, 2007); Nasarudin Umar, "Holy Books are Gender Biased!". *Liberal Islam Network*, August 28, 2004 (see on-line at: <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=660>) (last accessed: December 8, 2007); "About Liberal Islam Network".
25. Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*. pp. 23-24.
 26. "About Liberal Islam Network".
 27. Rumadi, "Democracy and Religious Radicalism", *Liberal Islam Network*, July 7, 2002, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=487>) (last accessed: December 8, 2007).
 28. Rumadi, "Suppressing Religious Politics in the 2004 Electoral Campaign", *Liberal Islam Network*, March 15, 2004, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=594>) (last accessed: December 8, 2007); See also "About Liberal Islam Network"; Hatim Gazali, "Religion in a New Print", *Liberal Islam Network*, December 8, 2003, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=540> (last accessed: December 8, 2007); Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, p. 23.
 29. See for example Hamka Hak, "Indonesian Non-muslims are not *Dhimmi*", *Liberal Islam Network*, December 23, 2001, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=560>) (<http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=560>) (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, "Muhammad: Prophet and Politician", *Liberal Islam Network*, September 4, 2004, online at <http://www.islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=699> (last accessed: December 8, 2007). See also Fu'ad Jabali, "A Critical Study of the Concept of Aswaja", *Liberal Islam network*, November 11, 2001, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=601> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Saiful Mujani, "Islamic Sharia and the Limits of Democracy". *Liberal Islam Network*, August 5, 2001, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=597> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, p. 16. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla appreciates the political achievements of the Prophet in Medina and agrees that it is acceptable for modern Muslim intellectuals to search for inspiration for managing modern society through the example of the Prophet there. But he does not agree with is whether the Prophet's entire policy in Medina must be copied for the current time, arguing that this example belongs to a specific social and historical context. He adds that the model set by the Prophet in Medina can be an inspiration to search for forms of management of Muslim society, but it is not a 'blueprint' which must be copied in detail. According to Ulil Abshar-Abdalla "Muslim society must formulate new models in accordance with current challenges". – Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, "Muhammad: Prophet and Politician", *Liberal Islam Network*, September 4, 2004, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=699> (last accessed: December 19, 2007).

30. See Muhamad Ali, "Exclusive bylaws at odds with state ideology of Pancasila", *The Jakarta Post* (online), June 19, 2006.
31. See Arskal Salim, "Islam between Two Models of Democracy", *Liberal Islam Network*, September 2, 2001, see online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=558> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Taufik Adnan Amal, "A Precious Lesson from Pakistan", *Liberal Islam Network*, September 16, 2001, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&mode=print&id=596> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Rumadi, "Suppressing Religious Politics in the 2004 Electoral Campaign"; Saiful Mujani, "Islamic Sharia and the Limits of Democracy"; Abubakar Eby Hara, "There Are No Clear Boundaries Between The Public and Private Spheres" (interview with Azyumardi Azra), *ICIP Journal*, vol. 1, no. 1 (January-April 2004), online at http://www.icipglobal.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=110&Itemid=26 (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Syafiq Hasyim, "The Face of Liberal Islam and its Challenges" (review of *Wajah Liberal Islam di Indonesia* by Luthfi Assyaukani) *ICIP Journal*, *ICIP Journal*, vol 1, no. 1 (January-April 2004) p. 4, online at http://www.icipglobal.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=110&Itemid=26 (last accessed: December 19, 2007).
32. Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, p. 35.
33. The neo-modernist preceded the current wave of liberal Islam also by supporting the idea of democratization. See Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 28-30.
34. About the discussion on democracy and the process of democratization in Indonesia in the discourse of JIL see Bahtiar Effendy, "Without Trust, Democracy would not be Sound", *Liberal Islam Network*, August 4, 2003, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=483> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Rumadi, "Democracy and Religious Radicalism"; Saiful Mujani, "Islamic Sharia and the Limits of Democracy"; Saiful Mujani, "Nahdliyin Rituals, the Social Capital of Democracy", *Liberal Islam Network*, July 13, 2003, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=555> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Pradana Boy ZIF, "Utopisme dan Irasionalitas Sistem Khilafah", *Jaringan Islam Liberal*, May 23, 2005, online at <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=820> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Luthfi Assyaukani, "The Dilemma of 'Public Islam'", *Liberal Islam Network*, October 15, 2002, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=359> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Muhammad Sholehuddin, "Islamic Political Desecration", *Liberal Islam Network*, September 3, 2004, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=666> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Ace Hasan Syadzily, "Democracy and Trust", *Liberal Islam Network*, March 3, 2002, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=486> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); AE Priyono, "Popular Islam", *Liberal Islam Network*, September 2, 2001, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=559> (last accessed: December 19, 2007). About the issue of Islam-state relations in the discourse of JIL see also Nurdin, "Islam and State", pp. 27-30.
35. For in depth discussion about the concept of religious freedom and pluralism in the world view of JIL's advocates see Wahib, *Liberal Islam in*

- Indonesia*, pp. 37-55. See also Sukidi, "Iman untuk Toleransi", Jaringan Islam Liberal, June 5, 2006, online at <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=1059> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Zuhairi Misrawi, "The Urgency of Being a Progressive Muslim: Averroes In Memoriam", *Liberal Islam Network*, January 5, 2004, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=520> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); "About Liberal Islam Network"; M. Guntur Romli, "Quran, Christmas and Religious Pluralism", *Liberal Islam Network*, January 1, 2006, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=979> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); M. Hilaly Basya, "Radicalism and the Construction of Civilizations", *The Jakarta Post* (online), March 11, 2006; Ahmad Fuad Fanani, "Islam, Pluralism, and Freedom of Religion", *Liberal Islam Network*, September 12, 2005, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=1116> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Suranto, "Pluralitas Makna Pluralisme (Agama)", *Jaringan Islam Liberal*, September 7, 2005, online at <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=879> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Suranto, "Eden Community and the Freedom of Religion", *The Jakarta Post* (online), January 7, 2006; Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 21-23; Muhamad Ali, "Winning over Indonesia's pluralism skeptics", *The Jakarta Post* (online), August 24, 2007.
36. "About Liberal Islam Network". See also Nurdin, "Islam and State", p. 34.
37. Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*. p. 62.
38. See for example M. Syafi'i Anwar, "Interfaith Dialog Crucial in Dealing with Radicalism" (interview conducted by M. Taufiqurrahman), *The Jakarta Post* (online), December 6, 2004; Muhamad Ali, "Pope, Islam and Future of Interfaith Dialog", *The Jakarta Post* (online), September 21, 2006; Muhamad Ali, "Building Interfaith Trust", *Liberal Islam Network*, May 23, 2003, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=329> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, "Dialog, not Confrontation", *Liberal Islam Network*, October 7, 2001, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=553> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Suranto, "Eden Community and the Freedom of Religion", *The Jakarta Post* (online), January 7, 2006; Hatim Gazali, "Religion in a New Print", *Liberal Islam Network*, December 8, 2003, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=540> (last accessed: December 19, 2007).
39. The formative book of Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939* (London: Oxford University Press) as well as Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A critique of Development Ideologies* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press) and Charles Kurzman (ed.), *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook* (New York: Oxford, University Press) seem to be popular among the circles of liberal Islam in Indonesia. Kurzman's book is argued to play a crucial role in the birth of Jaringan Islam Liberal and the term liberal Islam adopted by JIL is argued to be much influenced by the definitions made by both of them - see Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 12-13, 87-88; El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, p. 12; Nurdin, "Islam and State", p. 24. Egyptian intellectuals seem to be salient among those who have inspired the circles of liberal Islam in Indonesia. Thus for example; Qasim Amin (1865-1905), 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966), Taha Husayn (1889-1973) and contemporary Egyptian thinkers such as Hassan Hanafi, Muhammad Sa'id al-Asymawi

- and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, who lives in exile in the Netherlands. Mohammad Arkoun and Khalid Abou el-Fadl, for example, are among significant Muslim scholars who live in the West and seem to inspire currently circles of liberal Islam in Indonesia.
40. Barton, "Islamic Liberalism and the Prospects for Democracy in Indonesia", p. 439.
 41. See Azyumardi Azra, "Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy: Assessing Impacts of Islamic Revivalism during the Soeharto Era", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 7, no. 3 (2000), p. 5.
 42. Greg Fealy, "Islamic Politics: A Rising or Declining Force?". In *Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition*, edited by Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiaman (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2001), pp. 124-125.
 43. See Barton, "Neo-Modernism", pp. 7-9; Barton, "Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual 'Ulama'", p. 67; Barton, "Islamic Liberalism and the Prospects for Democracy in Indonesia", pp. 434-440.
 44. See Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000); Robert W. Hefner, "Islam and Nation in the Post-Suharto Era". In *The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia*, edited by Adam Schwarz and Johnathan Pairs (Singapore: Raffles, 1999), pp. 49, 64; Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*. 2nd edition (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 328-329; Michael Vatikiotis, "Mixing religion, politics", *The Jakarta Post* (online), September 21, 2007.
 45. See Syu'bah Asa, "The Terrorist's Propaganda Works!" (Interview conducted by Novriantoni and Mohamad Guntur Romli), *Liberal Islam Network*, December 5, 2005, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=947> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Human Rights Are Above God's Rights (interview conducted by Novriantoni and Ramy El-Dardiry during Khaled Abou El Fadl's visit to Indonesia), *Liberal Islam Network*, August 8, 2005, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=875> (last accessed: December 19, 2007). See also Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, "Modern Khawarij", *Liberal Islam Network*, October 10, 2004, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=700> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Luthfi Assyaukanie, "Islamic Studies Textbook and Violence", *Liberal Islam Network*, November 20, 2006, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=1202> (last accessed: December 19, 2007); Taufik Adnan Amal, "Doktrin Jihad Banyak Disalahartikan" (interview conducted by Ulil Abshar-Abdalla), *Jaringan Islam Liberal*, December 1, 2002, online at <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=296> (last accessed: December 19, 2007).
 46. See El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, pp. 8, 16; Hasyim, "The Face of Liberal Islam and its Challenges", p. 2.
 47. Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, p. 61.
 48. To the differences of opinions between fundamentalist Islam and liberal Islam, see also Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 60-64.
 49. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, "I Try to Be Like Al-Tahtawi" (interview conducted by Hamid Basyaib), *Liberal Islam Network* January 12, 2004, online at

- <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=599> (last accessed: December 28, 2007).
50. Ibid.
 51. See Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, pp. 69-83; John W. Livingston, "Western Science and Educational Reform in the Thought of Shaykh Riffaa al-Tahtawi", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 28, no. 4 (Nov., 1996), pp. 543-564.
 52. It seems that Rifa'ah Rafi' al-Tahtawi do arouses interest among the circles of the liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia: see Ahmad Sahal, "Free and Liberal", *Liberal Islamic Network*, August 22, 2006, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=1130> (last accessed: December 28, 2007); Sukidi, "Di Paris Tahtāwī Terpesona pada Pencerahan", *Kompas* (online), August 5, 2006; Luthfi Assyaukanie, "Khairuddin Al-Tunisi", *Liberal Islamic Network*, June 15, 2003, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=1163> (last accessed: December 28, 2007).
 53. Sukidi Mulyadi, "Di Amerika Saya Menemukan Islam", *Jaringan Islam Liberal*, July 11, 2005, online at <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=846> (Last accessed: September 26, 2007).
 54. Sukidi, "Di Amerika Saya Menemukan Islam".
 55. John Calvert and William Shepard, translator's introduction to Sayyid Qutb, *A Child from the Village* (Syracuse and New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), pp. XIII-XXXII; Olivier Carré, *Mysticism and Politics: A Critical Reading of Fi Zilal al-Qur'an by Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966)*. Translated from French by Carol Artigues and revised by W. Shepard (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 2-3; Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*, enlarged edition (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 22.
 56. Giora Eliraz, *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism and the Middle East Dimension* (Brighton & Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), p.32.
 57. See Ridwan Max Sijabat, "Major Muslim groups spearhead moderate campaign", *The Jakarta Post* (online), June 23, 2006.
 58. Mohamad Abdun Nasir, "The Gist of Moderate Islam", *The Jakarta Post* (online), January 4, 2006.
 59. El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, pp.13-14. Tom McCawley, "In Indonesia, the struggle within Islam", *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 5, 2005, online at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1005/p01s03-woap.html> (last accessed: December 28, 2007); Alief, "Political Islam and Democracy", pp. 15, 17. See also Linda Christanty, "Is There a Rainbow in Islam?", *Liberal Islam Network* September 29, 2003, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=424> (last accessed: December 28, 2007).
 60. Amy Chew, "Indonesian radicals in aggressive mode", *New Straits Times* (online), September 20, 2005.
 61. McCawley, "In Indonesia, the Struggle within Islam".
 62. See Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 88-89.
 63. See Fealy, "A Conservative Turn", pp. 23-24.
 64. Nasir, "The Gist of Moderate Islam". See also Alief, "Political Islam and Democracy", pp. 14-19.
 65. McCawley, "In Indonesia, the struggle within Islam".
 66. Ibid.

67. M. Syafi'i Anwar, "Interfaith Dialog Crucial in Dealing with Radicalism" (interview conducted by M. Taufiqurrahman), *The Jakarta Post* (online), December 6, 2004.
68. Fealy, "A Conservative Turn", p. 24.
69. Dean Yates, "Indonesia's moderate Islamic image under threat", *Reuters* (online), September 16, 2005
70. Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 53-55, 84-85. See also Nurdin, "Islam and State", p. 34.
71. Hasyim, "The Face of Liberal Islam and its Challenges", p.1.
72. El Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, pp. 25-27. See also Ahmad Sahal, "Free and Liberal". On the critique to JIL see Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 64-86, 89-90.
73. Fealy, "A Conservative Turn", pp. 23-24.
74. Keputusan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Nomor: 7/Munas VII/MUI/II/2005, Tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme Agama, *MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, online at: <http://www.mui.or.id/> (last accessed: January 19, 2008). See Dean Yates, "Indonesia's moderate Islamic image under threat", *Reuters* (online), September 16, 2005; McCawley, "In Indonesia, the struggle within Islam"; El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment: Clash or Symbiosis?", the attached report, pp. 20-21.
75. See Yates, "Indonesia's moderate Islamic image under threat"; McCawley, "In Indonesia, the struggle within Islam"; El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment: Clash or Symbiosis?", pp. 20-21; Fealy, "A Conservative Turn", p. 24.
76. Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 14; Robert W. Hefner, "Modernity and the Challenge of Pluralism: Some Indonesian Lessons", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 4 (1995), p. 41; Robert W. Hefner, "Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia". In *Islam in an Era of Nations-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia*, edited by Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatic, (University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), p. 29. See also C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia: Since c. 1200*, 3rd edition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 17, 36-58.
77. See Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 28-29..36.
78. Barton, "Islam and Politics in the New Indonesia", p. 18.
79. See Malcolm Cone, "Neo-Modern Islam in Suharto's Indonesia", *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 4, no. 2 (December, 2002), pp. 52-67.
80. El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, pp. 22-23, 35.
81. See Mark W. Woodward, "Conversations with Abdurrahman Wahid". In *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought*, edited by Mark R. Woodward (Tempe: Arizona State University, Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), pp. 133-153; Greg Barton, "The Prospects for Islam". In *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History*, edited by in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001, p. 252; Greg Barton, "The Ties That Do No Bind: How Malaysia and Indonesia differ over political Islam", *Asiaweek*, June 16, 2000, vol. 29, no. 23; ICG (International Crisis Group), *Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims*, ICG Indonesia Briefing (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, October 10, 2001), p. 11, online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1776&l=1> (last accessed: January 19, 2006); Christian Kiem, "Re-

- Islamization among Muslims Youth in Ternate Town, Eastern Indonesia", *Sojourn*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1993), p. 104.
82. Oddbjørn Leirvik, *Report from a delegation visit to Indonesia by the Oslo Coalition of Freedom of Religion or Belief*.
83. See El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, pp. 23-25, 35.
84. Burhanuddin, "Islamic Sharia". See also Bill Guerin, "Indonesia: Defending Islam against Itself", *Asia Times online*, October 9, 2002, online at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/DJ09Ae01.html (last accessed: January 19, 2008); Shawn Donnan, "Moderate Indonesia is Put to the Test", *Financial Times* (London) October 14, 2003; Indra Harsaputra, "NU States Opposition to Sharia Bylaws", *The Jakarta Post* (online), July 29, 2006; Jamal Ma'mur Asmani, "Radical Salafi, Pesantren and Terrorism", *Liberal Islam network*, September 1, 2003, online at <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=661> (last accessed: January 19, 2008); Nurdin, "Islam and State", p. 34. Yet, it seems that even among the millions of members of both Muhammadiyah and the NU there are those who support an idea of making the shari'a as the sole foundation of Indonesian law. See Barton, "Islam and Politics in the New Indonesia", pp. 4-5, 47-49; Marcus Mietzner, "Nationalism and Islamic Politics: Political Islam in the post-Suharto Era". In *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*, edited by Arief Budiman, Barbara Haltey and Damien Kingsbury (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), pp. 179-82; ICG, *Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims*, p. 11; Robin L. Bush, "Redefining 'Political Islam' in Indonesia: Nahdlatul Ulama and Khittah '26", *Studia Islamika*, vol 7, no. 2 (2000), pp. 59-86.
85. See Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia*, pp. 80-90, 112-117.
86. On the IAIN and its reforming, See Abdullah Saced, "Towards Religious Tolerance through Reform in Islamic Education: The Case of the State Institute of Islamic Studies of Indonesia", *Indonesia and the Malay World*, vol. 27, no. 79 (1999), pp. 177-191. See also Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 120; Cone, "Neo-Modern Islam in Suharto's Indonesia", pp. 52-67; Federspiel, *Indonesia in Transition*, pp. 190-193. IAIN is going now a process of transformation to become State Islamic University, UIN. Thus the formerly IAIN Jakarta is known now as UIN Jakarta, and the formerly IAIN Yogyakarta is known now as UIN Yogyakarta.
87. See Greg Barton, "Islam and Politics in the New Indonesia", pp. 18-20; Greg Barton, "The Prospects for Islam", p. 252. Many from the formative generation of the neo-modernism, who were involved in the significant student organization, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Islamic University Student Association) were based either at IAIN in Jakarta or at the IAIN in Yogyakarta: see El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, p. 23.
88. M. Din Syamsuddin, *Religion and Politics in Islam: The Case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order* (Ph.D. dissertation, Los Angeles: University of California, 1991), pp. 268-70, 287-8; M. Din Syamsuddin, "The Muhammadiyah Da'wah and Allocative Politics in the New Order Indonesia", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1995), pp. 63-64. See also Azyumardi Azra, "The Transmission of *al-Manar's* Reformism to the Malay-Indonesian World: The Cases of *al-Imam* and *al-Munir*". *Studia Islamika*, vol. 6, no. 3 (1999), p. 97.

89. See Hourani, , *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, pp. 146-148.
90. Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting*, p. 327; See Barton, "Islamic Liberalism and the Prospects for Democracy in Indonesia", p.245; Greg Fealy, "Islamic Politics: A Rising or Declining Force ?", p. 120.
91. See Barton, "Islamic Liberalism and the Prospects for Democracy in Indonesia", pp. 430-431, 435; Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 18 (see also pp. 128-213).
92. Julia Day Howell, "Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 60, no. 3 (August 2001), pp. 701-729.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 703.
94. Greg Fealy, "A Conservative Turn". See also Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 80-86.
95. See Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 35-36. See also pp. 53-54.
96. El-Dardiry, "Islam Encountering Enlightenment", the attached report, p. 8.
97. Wahib, *Liberal Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 90-91.
98. On the significant of JIL see also Nurdin, "Islam and State", pp. 32-36.
99. Greg Barton, "Islam and Politics in the New Indonesia", p. 17.

Giora Eliraz holds a Ph.D from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a Research Fellow at the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Research Fellow at the Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. Dr. Eliraz is also a member of the Board of Trustees of the Strategic Dialogue Center at Netanya College, Israel.