


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*Bahtiar Effendy*

## The *Payung* and the Rising Sun: A Study of Javanese *Pangreh Praja* during the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945

**Abstrak:** *Politik kooptasi menjadi satu cara penting bagi pemerintah kolonial untuk mempertahankan kekuasaannya. Pemerintah Belanda menerapkan kebijakan politik ini di wilayah jajahannya di Hindia Belanda. Tujuannya terutama untuk mempertahankan kebijakan divide et empera serta untuk menghindari konflik langsung dengan rakyat negeri jajahan. Dalam hal ini, elite lokal yang telah dikooptasi dapat menjadi alat bagi pemerintah kolonial untuk memecah belah kekuatan masyarakat, sekaligus menjadi benteng penahan (buffer zone) dari serangan langsung kaum pribumi. Dengan cara itu, daerah tempat elite tersebut berada dapat dikuasai.*

*Pemerintahan pendudukan Jepang, bermula pada 8 Maret 1942 setelah penyerahan tanpa syarat kekuasaan Belanda di Kalijati, Jawa Barat, mengikuti pola kolonialisme Belanda. Jepang menerapkan kooptasi politik terhadap elite lokal, yang terdiri dari kaum nasionalis—baik Islam maupun sekular—dan merangkul para elite lokal tersebut untuk bekerjasama dalam kerangka pendudukan Jepang. Pemerintah Jepang memandang kaum nasionalis sebagai kelompok ideal untuk membangun sebuah Jawa yang baru. Mereka dianggap sebagai modern, berorientasi maju, dan menentang kolonialisme Belanda atau Barat—karakteristik-karakteristik yang dinilai sesuai dengan spirit Restorasi Meiji.*

*Sebaliknya, Jepang memandang secara berbeda kepada pejabat sipil tradisional Jawa, dikenal sebagai pangreh praja, kelompok aristokrat Jawa yang menjadi bagian dari sistem feodal kolonial Belanda. Di masa penjajahan Belanda, kelompok ini menjadi tulang punggung bagi sistem pemerintahan kolonial. Mereka memiliki keterampilan administratif untuk menjalankan mesin birokrasi dari kabupaten (regency) sampai ke tingkat pedesaan. Pengetahuan detail mereka tentang masyarakat merupakan aset berharga di mata pemerintah Belanda.*

*Jepang sadar dengan posisi unik yang dimiliki dan peran penting yang dimainkan pangreh praja tersebut. Bagi mereka, membangun aliansi dengan pangreh praja merupakan suatu keharusan, Maka Jepang kemudian memasukkan mereka ke dalam struktur administratif pemerintahannya. Namun, pada saat yang sama, Jepang juga sadar terhadap karakteristik feodal pangreh praja; bahwa mereka sangat dipengaruhi Belanda, serta memiliki hubungan tidak baik dengan kelompok nasionalis dan masyarakat umum. Kenyataan itulah yang membuat Jepang melihat pangreh praja ini secara ambigu: penuh kebencian tapi juga paham bahwa kehadiran mereka berguna. Inilah pola hubungan yang dalam artikel ini disebut sebagai sebuah hubungan cinta-benci.*

*Artikel ini berupaya menghadirkan suatu rekonstruksi dan analisis awal terhadap peran sosial-politik pangreh praja selama masa pendudukan Jepang. Artikel ini menekankan pada penilaian kritis atas sikap Jepang terhadap pangreh praja, dan hubungan pangreh praja dengan kelompok nasionalis, serta masyarakat secara umum. Berdasarkan analisis terhadap sejumlah pokok tersebut, ditemukan pola hubungan segitiga yang unik: Jepang, nasionalis, pangreh praja.*

*Selama masa penjajahan Jepang, hubungan pangreh praja dengan kelompok nasionalis merepresentasikan kebencian, terutama disebabkan adanya kompetisi secara sosial dan politik. Kebencian kaum nasionalis terutama disebabkan fakta bahwa pangreh praja merupakan alat kekuasaan kolonial. Meski, setelah kemerdekaan, terjadi perubahan sikap masing-masing kelompok. Republik yang baru terbentuk menuntut kaum nasionalis dan pangreh praja untuk bekerja sama. Sementara itu, hubungan pangreh praja dengan rakyat juga tidak terjalin baik. Tugas pangreh praja sebagai penarik pajak dan penorganisir kerja paksa membuat mereka dianggap musuh oleh rakyat. Di beberapa daerah, seperti Indramayu dan Pekalongan, terjadi serangan rakyat terhadap pangreh praja. Namun, hal yang sama tidak terjadi di banyak wilayah lain, sehingga tetap tidak bisa disimpulkan bahwa hubungan yang demikian merupakan situasi umum yang terjadi di seantero Jawa dan Madura.*

*Berdasarkan analisisnya, artikel ini menemukan bahwa peran pangreh praja dalam masyarakat Jawa selama masa pendudukan Jepang terus berlangsung. Terkait dengan peranan politik, pangreh praja memang tidak terlibat dalam politik pergerakan seperti halnya kelompok nasionalis. Namun, bahwa pangreh praja menduduki jabatan-jabatan tertentu seperti bupati, wedana, dan camat, peran politik ini terbukti terus berlanjut di masa pendudukan Jepang.*

Bahtiar Effendy

## The *Payung* and the Rising Sun: A Study of Javanese *Pangreh Praja* during the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945

**خلاصة:** إن سياسة الانتقاء قد صارت إحدى الطرق الهامة للحكومة الاستعمارية للحفاظ على سلطاتها؛ لقد طبقت هولندا هذه السياسة في مستعمرتها الهولندية، والهدف منها بصفة أخص هو الاستمرار في سياسة "فرق تسد" وتجنباً للصراع المباشر مع سكان المستعمرة، وفي هذا الصدد يصير النخبة المحلية التي تم انتقاؤهم أداة الحكم الاستعماري لتفرقة القوى الشعبية وفي الوقت نفسه يمثل سداً منيعاً ضد الهجوم المباشر من قبل السكان الأصليين، وهذه الطريقة تخضع المناطق التي أتى منها أولئك النخبة للسيطرة.

وتابعت الحكومة الاحتلالية اليابانية التي بدأت في ٨ مارس ١٩٤٢م بعد استسلام السلطة الهولندية دون شرط في كاليجاتي بجأوه الغربية النمط الاستعماري الهولندي، وطبقت سياسة الانتقاء لأولئك النخبة المحلية الذي يمثلون الاتجاه القومي سواء كانوا مسلمين أم علمانيين، وتبيناهم للتعاون في إطار الاحتلال الياباني، وتعتبرهم طائفة مثالية لبناء جأوه الجديدة، من حيث أنهم عصريون ويقدرون التقدم ويعارضون على الاستعمار الهولندي أو الغربي، وهي أوصاف متمشية مع روح "استعادة ميحي".

وعلى العكس من ذلك تختلف نظرة اليابان إلى أصحاب المناصب التقليدية المعروفين باسم بانجريه براجا *pangreh praja* وهم طائفة الارسطقراطيين الجاويين الذين كانوا جزءاً من نظام الاستعمار الهولندي، حيث كانوا دعامة للنظام الاستعماري لما لهم من قدرات إدارية تمكنهم من إجراء عجلة البروقراطية ابتداءً من مستوى المناطق إلى القرى والأرياف، وكانت معرفتهم الواسعة بالاجتمع تعد شيئاً ثميناً في نظر الحكومة الهولندية.

وتدرك اليابان هذه المكانة المتميزة والدور الهام الذي لعبه أولئك الارسطقراطيون، وكان بناء التحالف معهم أمراً ضرورياً فأدخلتهم في التشكيل الإداري لحكومتها،

ولكنها في نفس الوقت على وعي بما عهد في هؤلاء من خصائص الإقطاعية، وأهم متأثرون بدرجة كبيرة بالهولنديين، وما كانوا عليه من سوء العلاقة مع القوميين والعامية؛ وهي الحقيقة التي جعلت اليابان تتخذ موقفا مزدوجا تجاههم: فهي تكرههم ولكن وجودهم مفيد لها، وهذا هو نمط العلاقة التي يطلق عليها في هذا المقال باسم علاقة الحب مع الكراهية.

هذا المقال يسعى إلى إعادة البناء والقيام بتحليل أولي للدور الاجتماعي والسياسي لأولئك الارسطقراطيين طوال عهد الاحتلال الياباني، وهو يركز على تقييم نقدي لموقف اليابان تجاههم وعلاقتهم بالقوميين والمجتمع بصفة عامة؛ فالقيام بتحليل هذه الموضوعات الأساسية يمكن من العثور على نمط فريد من العلاقات الثلاثية: اليابان والقوميين وأولئك الارسطقراطيين.

وطوال مدة الاحتلال الياباني كانت علاقة أولئك الارسطقراطيين مع القوميين تتسم بالكراهية نتيجة وجود تنافس فيما بينهم اجتماعيا وسياسيا، وكانت كراهية القوميين تنشأ من كون أولئك الارسطقراطيين أداة الحكم الاستعماري، وإن كان موقف كل منهم قد تغير بعد الاستقلال، لأن الجمهورية الجديدة تشكلت وهي في حاجة إلى تعاونهم، وفي الوقت نفسه كانت علاقة أولئك الارسطقراطيين بالشعب غير جيدة أيضا، لأن وظيفتهم في جمع الضرائب وتنظيم العمل القسري أدت إلى اعتبارهم أعداء الشعب؛ وقد حدث في بعض المناطق مثل إنDRAMAYU وبيكالونجان Pekalongan أن هاجم الشعب على أولئك الارسطقراطيين، ولكن لم يقع نفس الحدث في المناطق الأخرى مما لا يمكن معه القول بأن العلاقة بتلك المثابة كانت عامة تحدث في أرجاء جاوه ومادورا.

ويكتشف هذا المقال استنادا إلى التحليل استمرار دور أولئك الارسطقراطيين في المجتمع الجاوي طوال فترة الاحتلال الياباني، وأما عن الدور السياسي فإنهم لم يتورطوا في الحركات السياسية كما كان عليه القوميون، بيد أنهم إذ يحتلون مناصب معينة مثل رئيس المنطقة ورئيس الحي فهذا دور سياسي ثبت استمراره في عهد الاحتلال الياباني.

## Introduction

Being as colonial as the Dutch, political cooptation of the indigenous elites also characterizes the occupation of Indonesia by the Japanese. This strategy was due in part to a shortage of colonial manpower to administer the colony. In the case of the Dutch especially, political cooptation served also as an important instrument for maintaining a policy of *divide et impera* (divide and rule). By implementing this policy, the Dutch could easily manipulate the co-opted local elites into a “buffer zone” to avoid direct conflicts with the ordinary people.<sup>1</sup>

The Japanese military administration followed this colonial pattern in the sense that they too implemented the political cooptation of the local elites. Whether the intention of the Japanese was also to divide and rule<sup>2</sup> or to avoid direct conflicts with the indigenous peoples is an interesting topic to pursue. However, that the Japanese used the local elites, both nationalist—either Islamic or secular—, and the traditional civil servants to cooperate with them throughout the course of the occupation is a well-known fact.

Their use of the nationalists is in many ways easier to explain, because for the Japanese they were the ideal group “to build a New Java”. The Japanese always regarded them as modern, progress-oriented, and against Dutch or Western colonialism and they considered these characteristics consistent with the spirit of the Meiji Restoration.<sup>3</sup>

In contrast to the nationalists, the traditional Javanese civil servants,<sup>4</sup> known collectively as “*pangreh praja*”<sup>5</sup> were closely affiliated with the Dutch colonial-feudal system, and were deeply rooted in aristocratic values. Their intimate association with the Dutch was obvious, since they formed the backbone of the Dutch colonial administrative system. Their administrative knowhow in running the bureaucratic machinery from the regency down to the village level, and their detailed knowledge of local society, were, in the eyes of the Dutch and the Japanese alike, prime assets.

The Japanese were well aware of the *pangreh praja*'s unique position. Realizing their important role, particularly in rural and less-urban areas, it was important for the Japanese to absorb the *pangreh praja* into their administrative structure. At the same time, the Japanese were also aware of the *pangreh praja*'s feudal characteristics and that they were deeply influenced by the Dutch. For the Japanese, the awareness of both

characteristics created ambiguity: between hatred toward the *pangreh praja* and an understanding of their usefulness.

The Japanese thus entertained a love-hate relationship with the *pangreh praja*. Their relationship with the rest of Indonesian elites, both secular (or religiously neutral nationalists) and Islamic nationalists, for some scholars, contained a dimension of favoritism.<sup>6</sup> In this theory the Japanese were considered to favor one group over the other; it was the *pangreh praja* who were seen to be socially and politically deprived. This thesis, however, still remains vague, if not somewhat misleading.

Obviously, the Japanese were, after all, just as colonial as the Dutch, and during the three and half years of their occupation they needed the mass support of all Indonesians for their war efforts, and it was therefore very unlikely that the Japanese deliberately resorted to favoritism. The reconstruction of the Japanese attitude toward the nationalists and the *pangreh praja*, however complicated, would present a clear picture of the Japanese colonial relationships with the local elites.

Looking from this triangle of relationships—Japanese, nationalist, *pangreh praja*—and particularly from the point of view of each group, the *pangreh praja* seems to occupy the most unique position. The fact is that the *pangreh praja* consisted of Dutch-inherited civil servants who had an unfavorable relationship with the nationalists and the general populace, and that, out of necessity, the Japanese were forced to establish an “alliance” with them, only served to confirm their love-hate relationship.

This study is a preliminary attempt to reconstruct and analyse the *pangreh praja*'s social and political role, if any, during the Japanese occupation. Emphasis will be put on a critical assessment of the Japanese attitude toward the *pangreh praja*, and the *pangreh praja*'s relationship with the nationalists, and the general populace. Through such examinations, it is expected that each of their roles can be assessed.

### **The *Pangreh Praja* during the Dutch Period: A General Flashback**

The historical roots of the *pangreh praja* reach back to Dutch colonial history. It is often dated as early as the first installation of the office of the Javanese regents.<sup>7</sup> Such a view seems to be easy to understand as the regents were placed in the highest position in the *pangreh praja*'s administrative hierarchy.



Before further discussing the *pangreh praja* in its historical perspective, it is important to understand briefly the nature and scope of the *pangreh praja*. The *pangreh praja* usually consisted of the *bupati* (regent), *patih* (vice regent), *wedana* (district chief), and *camat* (sub-district chief).<sup>8</sup> There has never been any clear explanation why the *lurah* (village headmen) has never been, officially, included as members of the *pangreh praja* institution. Judging from the *lurah*'s position and their main function, there are no adequate reasons to understand why they were not incorporated in the *pangreh praja*-ship. Moreover, considering the nature of the function of the *pangreh praja* as civil servant, it is possible to argue that village staff who worked under the leadership of the *lurah* could also be viewed as members of the *pangreh praja* at the lowest level.

The term *pangreh praja* mentioned above, on the contrary, also did not officially incorporate higher-ranking Dutch civil servants, such as the *residen* (resident, the head of residency level of administration) and assistant resident. During colonial times, such a case was understandable. It was because the position of resident and assistant resident had never been given in the hands of the indigenous elites. However, toward the end of the Japanese occupation and during the post war period, when these two positions were already in the hands of Indonesians, still they were not officially incorporated into the institution of the *pangreh praja*.

The *bupati* were based in the capital of the regency, while the *wedana* and *camat* usually were based in the district and sub-district capitals respectively. Their relationship was hierarchical in which each subordinate was responsible to his immediate superior.

Their duties were basically administrative in nature, such as collecting taxes, forwarding colonial orders to the people, supervising agricultural production and the like. Yet, during the Dutch period in particular, because of their direct access to the colonial officers, their roles were politically strategic.<sup>9</sup> This was because of their additional duties, at the behest of the Dutch colonials, to keep and maintain *rust en orde* (peace and order) among village society. Such administrative roles and the authority to preserve *rust en orde* sometimes were misused, in which many *pangreh praja* "had recourse to intimidation and bribery".<sup>10</sup> At this stage, their relationship with the villagers deteriorated.

In return for their administrative and “political” function, the *pangreh praja* received a regular monthly salary, land and other financial and manpower advantages from the colonial government.

Because of this, the *pangreh praja* was incorporated into the Dutch administrative bureaucracy, during the Dutch days. Their historical development, however, was not linear in the sense that they experienced rapid structural changes. Such changes, which happened during the governorship of Daendels (1808-1811), and Raffles, his English successor (1811-1816), brought tremendous reduction in the status and power of the *pangreh praja*.<sup>11</sup> Among the structural changes implemented, the impressive name of the *pangreh praja* as rulers of the realm, which suggested honorable status and power, was reduced to that of the lowest level of the Dutch native civil servant corps, whom the Dutch referred as *Inlands Bestuur* (Native Administration).<sup>12</sup>

One might argue that when Governor-General van den Bosch arrived in Java in 1830, the position of the *pangreh praja*, especially the regents, was restored. This was because van den Bosch restored their positions as heads of the regencies. In addition, van den Bosch also restored their influence toward local society; allowed them to hold land; maintained their salaries; and recognized their hereditary rights.<sup>13</sup> By doing so, it would make the regents, said van den Bosch, “feel more content under our [Dutch] administration, than under that of their own princes”.<sup>14</sup> The restoration of the *pangreh praja*’s hereditary rights, however, should be seen in a wider context, that is from the viewpoint of the Dutch interest in attempting to preserve the *pangreh praja* who were continuously dominated by the *priyayi* (aristocratic) families,<sup>15</sup> a class which for so long had sided with Dutch colonial interests.

The restoration of the *pangreh praja*’s political influence was the most significant point in the regents’ political existence. The road to power and domination became even more obvious when the Dutch in 1836 laid out their principle of indirect rule. In the *Regeeringsreglement* (Constitutional Regulation), article 67, it was stated that the native population should be left under the leadership and direct authority of its own rulers.<sup>16</sup>

Following such structural changes was the creation of a dual administrative structure—*Binnenlands Bestuur* (Local Administration, staffed by Europeans) and *Inlands Bestuur* (Native Administration, staffed by Javanese civil servants). Within this dual system, the *Inlands Bestuur*

was to be controlled by the *Binnenlands Bestuur*. In 1874, when the residency was divided into two, corresponding with the regency, both colonial administrations became more bureaucratic in nature. Within the residency, the positions of assistant resident, *controleur*, and *aspirant controleur* were created. The regency itself was divided into districts, sub-districts, and villages. Within this structural breakdown, the official formation of the *pangreh praja*, as to fit the above structure, was created. Each respective head—*wedana* and *camat*—were subordinate to the regent.<sup>17</sup>

As the *pangreh praja*'s social and political roles were preserved, their duties to the people multiplied, and included vaccination, irrigation, tax collection, and others. With respect to the Dutch—*pangreh praja* relationship, in which the former acted as patron and the latter as client, the relationship between the *pangreh praja* and the people followed a similar pattern. In return for the protection the *pangreh praja* provided to the people, they tended to act as their *abdīs* (servants) who were obliged to render compulsory services. Despite the mutual benefit they might gain from this relationship, their relationship also was characterized by repression and exploitation. In the eyes of the people, the *pangreh praja* were nothing more than “the bringers of bad news, police agents, tax collectors, (compulsive) labor organizers, and the introducers of bothersome and bizarre ideas”.<sup>18</sup>

Such stereotyping was the root of antagonism and hostilities between the *pangreh praja* and the people. Peasant revolts<sup>19</sup>—largely because of heavy economic burdens—, and early conflicts with the nationalist elements<sup>20</sup> were inevitable as long as the *pangreh praja* maintained their colonial status.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the *pangreh praja*'s position as colonial administrative bureaucrats became even more official and less personal. Consequently, it required more professional and modern personnel. Education and fluency in the Dutch language, among other things, were important qualifications for *pangreh praja* positions. Within this context, aristocratic family ties alone were not enough as the source of *pangreh praja* legitimacy.<sup>21</sup> This meant that the Dutch, as the *pangreh praja*'s patron, had to carry out two different policies. First, they had to ensure that the *pangreh praja* remained as traditional as they could, in part through *priyayi* family ties, so that they could remain intact with the general traditional populace. Secondly, and at the same

time, coinciding with the shift to liberalism within the Ethical Policy,<sup>22</sup> the Dutch had to provide educational opportunities, especially to aristocratic families, including the *pangreh praja*. In addition, it was under the Ethical Policy that western types of education became mandatory for the *pangreh praja*.

Access to western education, however, should not be seen as an instrument to modernize the local elites. For the larger part, it was intended merely to give the *pangreh praja* better skills to execute their main duties. Various historical accounts indicate that this was not meant to go beyond administrative purposes. Raden Ajeng Kartini's experience in being dissuaded to further her education in Holland by Abendanon, her family's closest friend, is one of the best examples in this matter.<sup>23</sup> Yet it was precisely through these limited educational opportunities that the Dutch-*pangreh praja* relationship developed stronger.

Looking back to the *pangreh praja*'s role during the Dutch colonial period, it was clear that their leadership domination was mainly centered in the regency down to village levels. In this regard, as compared to the political path of the nationalists in the early 1920s, an idea that after all the *pangreh praja* were not trained in political and leadership affairs beyond regency levels might be correct.<sup>24</sup> After all, the Dutch East Indies were a *beambtenstaat*, an apolitical state where policy was primarily an instrument for the implementation not of competing social demands, but of sound administration *per se*.<sup>25</sup>

Running up to the closing years of Dutch rule in Indonesia, however, precisely in the early 1920s, there seemed to have been some efforts to reform the administrative patterns and to endow some segments of the population with at least the rudiments of self-governing instrumentalities. In such a reform, some *pangreh praja* began to experience "real politics" on a national scale.

The formation of a quasi-representative assembly, the *Volksraad* (People's Council) in 1918, a colonial council without significant political rights, in some ways could be seen as to pave the way for the *pangreh praja*'s entry into the political arena. It was after the creation of the *Volksraad* that some of the regents began to establish a "Regency Council" which was somehow alert to social and political problems in the regency.<sup>26</sup> Again, though without significant political rights, the *Volksraad* was used by the *pangreh praja* to discuss various political issues such as hereditary rights and a self-government proposal known as the Soetardjo Petition. Hereditary rights were discussed and debated

between the progressive and conservative *pangreh praja*. In this debate the progressive *pangreh praja* suggested that hereditary rights should be eliminated. The progressive *pangreh praja* thought that through the elimination of the hereditary rights the administrative succession of the Indonesian civil servants could be carried out in a more professional way and not merely based on family origin. As a result, during the 1920s the composition of the *pangreh praja* began to change, in the sense that a handful of them did not have *priyayi* origin. Sutardjo's petition in 1936 to demand Indonesia's self-government<sup>27</sup> can be seen as the ultimate *pangreh praja* political maneuver on the national level.

### **The *Pangreh Praja* during the Japanese Occupation**

The Japanese occupation of Java began on March 8, 1942, after the unconditional surrender of the Dutch forces in Kalijati, West Java. It was indeed a very quick surrender. The Japanese forces under the command of Lt. General Hitoshi Imamura landed in Banten only a week earlier, on March 1, 1942.<sup>28</sup> Such a quick surrender, as pointed out by many historical accounts, was primarily due to two causes. First, the inadequate defense put up by the Dutch forces. This showed how poorly the Dutch had defended Java. Second, the local population generally welcomed the Japanese,<sup>29</sup> which proved that the Indonesians did not support the Dutch.

Not all Javanese, however, displayed similar reactions. At the beginning of the Japanese arrival, general fear had already appeared on the faces of the *pangreh praja*. This was because of one very obvious reason: fear of losing their positions and privileges, which they had enjoyed during the Dutch period.<sup>30</sup> After all, the *pangreh praja* was a symbol of colonial rule.

At the outset, the Japanese plan was to restore what the Dutch called *rust en orde* (peace and order). It was for this very task that the Japanese established a black-and-white attitude toward the local people: whoever was able to help in restoring peace and order; administrative practices, and the civil service system were approved. On the other hand, those who showed hostile attitudes were closely scrutinized.<sup>31</sup> As time passed, their attitude seemed to have become more sophisticated. To some extent, it even became controversial, particularly when they started to establish relationships with the *pangreh praja*.

## The Japanese Attitude toward the *Pangreh Praja*

The attitude of the Japanese toward the *pangreh praja* was highly ambivalent. On the one hand, they needed these civil servants' expertise and favor to re-establish *rust en orde*; on the other, they were suspicious of the *pangreh praja*, regarding them as feudal, and worse, heavily influenced by the Dutch. Psychologically, the Japanese restrained themselves from having a more favorable political relation with the *pangreh praja*. The Japanese, who, among others, wished to pass on the Meiji spirit, therefore tried to advance a more favorable political relation with the nationalists, whom they saw as the logical possessors of the Meiji spirit. Their relationship, however, for very obvious reasons, was not necessarily sincere.

The above notion is to some extent misleading. The construction of the Japanese-*pangreh praja* relationship was not so simple as to be grasped by using a black and white approach. It involves intertwined social, political, and economic variables as well as hatred and mutual necessity. Considering the fact that not all of *pangreh praja* were the same, and the situation of each regency and district was different, it was difficult for the Japanese to design a single attitude toward the *pangreh praja*. The thing for sure is that the Japanese attitude toward the *pangreh praja*, however complicated as it might have been, would always be in the spirit of the Japanese colonialism.

There is a very unclear historical fact regarding the relationship pattern between the Japanese and the *pangreh praja* during the first months of the occupation. The relationship, it was plain to see, did not go beyond running the bureaucratic machinery. Along with the establishment of the *Chian Iji Kai* (Peace Preservation Committee),<sup>32</sup> the *Gunseibu* (Military Administration Section) asked the *pangreh praja* to cooperate with them and to continue their ordinary function while awaiting instructions from the Japanese Army.<sup>33</sup> In this regard, their initial duties were to conduct local inspections, listing foreign inhabitants, and a variety of other administrative jobs.<sup>34</sup>

By April 1942, when all Dutch civil servants had been interned, the Japanese were forced by the situation to rely on the *pangreh praja*. Suspicious of the *pangreh praja*'s allegiance, the Japanese attempted to impress them and convince them that their presence in Java was to create a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and to make a New Java. Such attempts were carried out through *pangreh praja* conferences

throughout Java. These attempts, however, did not turn out as expected. Instead, the *pangreh praja* to some extent felt closely scrutinized and humiliated. This was primarily because of the harsh nature of the Japanese attitudes toward them. Excellent examples of this kind of historical events were the conferences of the *pangreh praja* held in Bandung and Surabaya. As the Japanese began to lecture at considerable length on their victory during the Bandung conference, held on April 29, 1942, the *pangreh praja* felt that the Japanese were arrogant and intoxicated with victory.<sup>35</sup>

The conferences of the *pangreh praja*, held in Surabaya, on April 22 and June 16, 1942, left the impressions that the Japanese were harsh, distrusted and humiliated the *pangreh praja*. In addition, during the second conference only 10 regents were present as compared to 39 regents in the first conference. The bad impressions left by the Japanese were mainly due to the way they treated the *pangreh praja*. In the Surabaya conference for instance, the Japanese insisted on collecting the *pangreh praja*'s identification papers, and forced them to stay in the hall until the conference was over.<sup>36</sup>

For the Japanese, the *pangreh praja* decision of not attending the conference was an act of insubordination. That event also left a negative impression with the Japanese. As the Japanese relinquished greater responsibilities to the *pangreh praja*, at the same time they paid them less respect than had been the case with the Dutch.

As the Japanese civil administration replaced the military in August 1942, their attitudes toward the *pangreh praja* gradually changed. By this time, the Japanese officially maintained and preserved the essential structure of the *pangreh praja*. With the exception of the governorship and the provincial administration, which they abolished, the Japanese maintained the administrative-backbone of residency (*shu*), under a Japanese resident called *shuchokan*; regency (*ken*), under the Javanese regent called *kencho*; district (*gun*), under the Javanese *wedana* called *guncho*; and sub-district (*son*), under the Javanese *camat* called *soncho*. In addition, the position of *patih* (vice regent), which had no place in the structural hierarchy during the Dutch days, was also maintained, and was called *fuku kencho*.<sup>37</sup>

The *Undang-undang Perubahan Tata Pemerintahan Daerah* (Regulations concerning the changes of local governmental Act) No. 27, not only abolished the dualism in the local administration—which

during the Dutch administration included the *controleur* and the *aspirant controleur* which fitted into the *Europees Bestuur* structure—, but also changed what constituted the *pangreh praja* itself. Here the *pangreh praja* not merely consisted of the “quadrumvirate” of local elites, such as *bupati*, *wakil bupati*, *wedana*, and *camat*, but it also included all civil servants who fell into the category of regency, district, sub-district and village administrative bureaucracy. The *pangreh praja* was extended and included the mayor and the chief of police (*mantri polisi*), village headmen (*lurah*) and still others. During the Japanese occupation, this enlargement of the *pangreh praja* manifested itself in the presence of mayors, and chiefs of police at the *pangreh praja*’s conference.<sup>38</sup>

During the first year of the occupation, some *pangreh praja* occupied higher positions than before. They gained both more power and responsibility than during the Dutch days. Throughout Java, mayoral positions were given to indigenous persons, while during the Dutch only two indigenous persons were able to occupy this position in Bogor and Madiun municipalities (*stadsgemeenten*).<sup>39</sup> The position of mayor became even more important as the Japanese changed their territories into *shi* (municipal) which had an equal status as that of *ken* (regency).

The promotion of some of the *pangreh praja* was mainly due to their capability and efficiency in administering and carrying out their main functions. Therefore, in the Japanese eyes, their promotion was regarded as a token of their appreciation and as a reward for the *pangreh praja*.

However, these promotions do not suggest that a sincere relationship between the two had been established. Gradual changes occurred in their relationship as compared to the first months of the occupation. Yet suspicions between them prevailed. Understandably, not all *pangreh praja* deserved promotion. During the first year of the occupation, a considerable number of the *pangreh praja* even lost their positions. This was either because of inefficiency or because of corruption. In this period the regents of Demak, Kendal, Sukabumi, Jepara, Semarang, Grobogan, Pamekasan, Probolinggo, Bojonegoro, Kudus, and Blora were dismissed.<sup>40</sup>

One year of occupation proved to be not enough for the Japanese to shift the *pangreh praja*’s feudal mentality and morality, and in acquiring their total loyalty. In order to achieve this, the Japanese designed various training programs and indoctrinations. The first training and



indoctrination program was executed in Jakarta on March 1-20, 1943, and in Surabaya on November 16-26, 1943. These trainings were not institutionalized until the beginning of early 1944.<sup>41</sup>

Different from the earlier conferences in 1942, the Japanese designed the program based on the position of each member of the *pangreh praja*. For instance, the training would last only two weeks for *kencho*, three weeks for *guncho*, while for *soncho*, the training lasted one month.<sup>42</sup> By this design, the Japanese deliberately ensured that the lower level of the *pangreh praja* acquired more days of training than the higher-level civil servants.

While the number of days for training among the *pangreh praja* varied, it was not clear whether the subjects of the training were also different. However, since the training was primarily meant to improve the administrative skills of the *pangreh praja* and to indoctrinate them with Japanese values, as to ensure their loyalties, the general subjects included local administration, agriculture, economy, sanitation, nutrition, transportation, politics, moral education, etiquette, and Japanese culture.<sup>43</sup>

The Japanese carried out these training and indoctrination programs with the purpose to change the *pangreh praja's* attitude and character into a Japanese-type. They were also intended to improve the *pangreh praja's* administrative ability. To what extent such trainings satisfactorily met Japanese ambition remains a big question. However, there had been several indicators that they were likely to fail. This was in part due to the Japanese ignorance of the *pangreh praja* feudal mentality. This lack of understanding of the *pangreh praja* resulted in an improper approach in which the Japanese were perceived as intending to downgrade and humiliate the *pangreh praja*. Once they felt humiliated, the whole program was inevitably perceived negatively. Gandasubrata, prominent *kencho* of Banyumas, for instance, pointed out that the training was nothing more than simply indoctrination and Nipponization, in which all regents should adopt Japanese customs, language, outlook, and such like. As the Japanese executed military discipline during the training, the regents felt they were being humiliated. As a result, some of them lost their confidence in the Japanese.<sup>44</sup>

Gandasubrata's opinion certainly does not represent the attitude of the entire *kencho* level toward the Japanese. Nevertheless, it indicates that the *pangreh praja* had no desire to be indoctrinated, especially not

to be taught Japanese-types administrative skills. This showed the *pangreh praja's* reliance on their own knowledge to handle their own business. For this reason, even a sincere attempt to teach the *pangreh praja* Japanese farming systems was easily misinterpreted as a humiliation.

Not every *pangreh praja*, however, was seen by the Japanese as having a feudal mentality. Several of them even possessed highly moral purposes, adopted non-elitist orientations, and were eager to cooperate with the Japanese for the benefit of the people. R.M.T.A. Soerjo, resident of Bojonegoro; Koesoemo Oetojo, whom the Japanese described as a modern regent; Soetardjo, resident of Jakarta, and R.P. Soeroso, resident of Magelang were some of the best examples of this sort of civil servant. Such cooperative action not only brought them to higher status, but also to positions that were politically on equal level as the nationalists. In this respect, Koesoemo Oetojo not only became a member of the *Chuo Sangi In* (Central Advisory Council),<sup>45</sup> but also became one of its chairmen.<sup>46</sup> While Soetardjo, R.P. Soeroso and R.M.T.A. Soerjo respectively became governors of West Java, Central Java and East Java.<sup>47</sup>

Until the end of the occupation, the relationship between the Japanese and the *pangreh praja* was characterized by dualism. Distrust and inevitability caused constant tension. Yet, the Japanese worked hard to pursue the *pangreh praja's* loyalty, which was not only manifested in their allegiance to the Japanese *per se*, but, and most importantly, expressed in their involvement in the Japanese war efforts. To encourage productivity, especially of rice and other foodstuffs, mass mobilization including *romusha*<sup>48</sup> recruitment were among the test cases of the *pangreh praja's* loyalty.

By 1944 when the occupation government faced tremendous rice shortages, the Japanese were more inclined to favor the lowest level of *pangreh praja*—the *lurah* (village headman) and his staff. The Japanese thought that they were at the forefront of the *pangreh praja* in dealing with the villagers while they remained harsh toward the other *pangreh praja*. It was during this period that *pangreh praja* replacements and dismissals reached their peak. There were 67 cases of *kencho* replacements throughout the occupation of which forty-six occurred between January 1944 and August 1945.<sup>49</sup> According to *Kan Po*, the official journal of the Japanese administration during the occupation, the reasons behind the replacements and dismissals varied, ranging from inefficiency to corruption and to anti-Japanese activities. This indicated

that even toward the end of the occupation, in the eyes of the Japanese, the *pangreh praja* were still not to be trusted.

The creation of *Jawa Hokokai* (*Himpunan Kebaktian Rakyat* or People's Service Association) did not establish a more sincere relationship, because a considerable degree of Japanese inspection still prevailed. However, compared to other occasions, the formation of the new organization to replace the *Putera* is often perceived as providing the *pangreh praja* with a "political" role, in the sense that they were engaged in leading the organization from the regency up to the village level. There is however no clear picture of how political their role was. Compared to their exclusion from both the Triple A Movement and the *Putera*, however, the *Jawa Hokokai* provided the *pangreh praja* with a better opportunity to expand their regional political leadership.

It is important to note here that neither the Triple A Movement nor the *Putera* were designed to be political organizations,<sup>50</sup> neither was the *Jawa Hokokai*. On this, Kanahole stated:

... the *Djawa Hookookai* was established in order to realize the "divine mission of the Great East Asia Holy War". The new design was to achieve maximum mobilization of Java's human resources by integrating the Japanese, Indonesians ... into one all-exclusive "fraternal order". ... The *Djawa Hookookai* was a masterful construction for achieving organizational control of Java's populace.<sup>51</sup>

It is therefore clear that political leadership given to the *pangreh praja* in the *Jawa Hokokai* was essentially due to the Japanese need for total human mobilization which the *Putera* had been unable to carry out.

During the occupation, the Japanese deliberately tried to change the requirement of specific social origins of the *pangreh praja*, by giving non-*priyayi* people opportunities of becoming *pangreh praja*. This was done in the Japanese way. Civil servant candidates did not have to go through a *magang* period (a period of waiting to become *pangreh praja* by serving temporarily in the lowest hierarchy) as happened during the Dutch days,<sup>52</sup> but simply through official examinations.<sup>53</sup> Through this system, more non-*priyayi* were admitted to the *pangreh praja* bureaucracy than ever before.

This shows that besides the dual attitude of the Japanese toward the *pangreh praja*, the Japanese intentionally tried to change both the mentality and the social make-up of the *pangreh praja* institution.

### ***The Pangreh Praja and the Nationalists***

It would be misleading to analyze the nature of the relationship between the *pangreh praja* and the nationalists by solely examining what happened between these two groups during the Japanese occupation. Previous interactions between these two groups during the Dutch period should also be taken into consideration. However, emphasis should be put on the Japanese occupation because the Japanese established a very different relationship with the nationalists than the Dutch. During the occupation, the Japanese viewed the nationalists as their allies, while the Dutch perceived them as their enemies.

The Japanese's choice to work with the nationalists<sup>54</sup> was primarily inspired by the nationalists' access to modernity, intelligence and their anti-Dutch colonialist attitude. In addition to that, there was another aspect worth mentioning regarding this issue, the fact that some nationalists had been with Japanese before invasion contacts of 1942.<sup>55</sup> How far these contacts influenced the Japanese choice to work more closely with the nationalists remains an interesting topic to be pursued. The Japanese decisions to release nationalist figures that were imprisoned by the Dutch, to elevate them socially and politically, and to allow them to organize and lead various organizations, are indicators of their initial preference for the nationalists.

Political and social domination was part of the nature of nationalist-*pangreh praja* hostility, in which the former tried to exclude the latter. Regarding this, Kanahele stated:

... one of their (nationalist and *pergerakan*) main targets were their traditional antagonists, the *priyayi* officials whom they violently accused of being loyal to the Dutch, of being anti-Japanese. These open charges were obviously designed to discredit the *priyayi* in their eyes and thereby enhance nationalist chances of moving into power.<sup>56</sup>

The retention of the *pangreh praja's* position as the administrative apparatus and their promotion to higher ranks explained the nationalists' antipathy to them. However, such antipathy did not manifest itself

in physical violence, but in sharp criticism and exclusion of the *pangreh praja* from all social and political positions whenever this allowed.<sup>57</sup> The absence of *pangreh praja* in the *Komite Rakyat* (People's Committee), the *Komite Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Committee), the *Komite Barisan Kebangsaan Indonesia* (Committee on Indonesian People's Corps), and the Triple A Movement, was an obvious example of this effort during the early days of the occupation.

Throughout the occupation, however, not all of these attempts were successful. In the case of the *Putera*, it was the *pangreh praja* who were able to block *Putera's* programs leading to its failure.

During the first months of the occupation, the nationalists' criticism of the *pangreh praja* appeared in regular newspaper columns. In the case of *Soeara Asia*, a Surabaya daily newspaper, for instance, critiques quite regularly appeared in the eight column of page three. Their criticism always referred to *pangreh praja's* social and political involvement and their loyalty to the Dutch colonials. Therefore, it was quite logical for the nationalists also to accuse the Dutch of being the *pangreh praja's* colonial master.

With regard to the hostile relationship between the *pangreh praja* and the nationalists, there had been a general notion that the attacks and criticism usually came from the nationalists' side. This was not entirely true in the case of the *Putera*. There are no clear data to indicate the *pangreh praja's* response of being left out from the *Putera*.<sup>58</sup> However, they felt being humiliated and sensed the danger of the penetration when the *Putera* began to penetrate their turf — though they did not intend to go below the regency level.<sup>59</sup> The fact was that the *Putera's* local branch leaders were permitted to lecture *pangreh praja* regarding their responsibilities in the establishment of New Java; the using of new production methods to provide supports to the government; and not to follow the old Dutch ways.<sup>60</sup> To stop nationalist influence, the *pangreh praja* choose to block the *Putera's* program, particularly in the *daerah*, and more especially in the district and sub-district levels. On the other hand, they also intended to maintain their own existence. It was rather surprising that their blocking caused severe problems for the *Putera*. By January 1944, for instance, except in Malang and Jakarta, the *Putera* had been unable even to expand their sub-branches to any degree.<sup>61</sup> The success of the blocking was in part because of the Japanese

*shu chokans*' support, showing that the *pangreh praja* after all still had significant influence among the people.

It was a rather strange phenomenon that the *shu chokans* worked in concert with the *pangreh praja* in blocking *Putera*'s programs. Assuming that their cooperation was right, the best explanation for this phenomenon was—again by realizing Japanese colonial interests—because of the Japanese displeasure of how the *Putera* had turned out.

By 1944, the Japanese were already disappointed with the *Putera* due to several factors. First was the fact that the *Putera* faced challenges from the *pangreh praja*. Without the *pangreh praja*'s support, it was almost impossible for the Japanese to expect total mobilization and to increase agricultural production.

Second, the fact that the *Putera* was organized and led by nationalist politicians who saw themselves as the inheritors of postwar national leadership and had been able to establish a sort of bureaucratic network down to the district level. For the Japanese this was enough to consider the *Putera* as a meddling political organization that served no good purposes. Therefore, the Japanese, through their ruthless *kenpeitai*<sup>62</sup> had to be harsh towards *Putera*'s leaders. In the district areas, particularly, "the *kenpeitai* frequently harassed the *Putera*'s staff and members by threats or outright interference".<sup>63</sup> This brought the downfall of the *Putera* and the creation of a new body, which was thought to be, borrowing General Herada's words, a "more patriotic service movement" the *Jawa Hokokai* on March 1, 1944.<sup>64</sup>

With the foundation of the *Jawa Hokokai*, attacks from the nationalists continued. This was because of the fact that on regency and village levels, the leadership was in the hands of the *pangreh praja*.<sup>65</sup> In addition, most of all with the interlocking system of the local *Jawa Hokokai* that is *Tonarigumi* (*Rukun Tetangga* or R.T. or Neighborhood Association), the *pangreh praja*'s domination in the regions obviously threatened the influence of the nationalists. On the national level, however, the *Jawa Hokokai* was always in the hands of the nationalist leaders.<sup>66</sup>

Criticism of the *pangreh praja* did not only come from secular nationalists. Ignoring the call of *syumukatyo* (residency religious officer) K.H. Abdul Karim who felt the necessity of *pangreh praja*-nationalist cooperation in achieving the final victory, Isa Ansari, a Sundanese militant leader of the young Muslims, bitterly criticized the *pangreh praja* by saying that they were repressive and collaborating with the Japanese, and therefore against the national interests.<sup>67</sup>

That the *pangreh praja*-nationalist conflict was to a large extent due to their social and political competition became even more obvious after the Declaration of Independence on August 17, 1945. As the nationalists dominated the national leadership, the *pangreh praja*, as voiced by their spokesman Soetardjo, threatened not to support the republic unless their positions were maintained or to some degree elevated.<sup>68</sup> Alarmed with such a threat and having learned from the past conflicts, Soekarno and Hatta agreed to preserve their positions. In fact, they elevated all vice-residents, except the resident of Pekalongan, to succeed their former superiors—the Japanese residents.<sup>69</sup> The Java *pangreh praja*'s conference on August 30, 1945, in which the republican government explained the future position of the *pangreh praja*, indicated the sincere attitude of the nationalist leaders to give the *pangreh praja* a proper place.

### ***The Pangreh Praja and Commoners: The Final Attacks***

Due to the nature of the *pangreh praja* as a foundation of the colonial political system, their relationship with the commoners had always been uneasy. Their main duties as tax collectors and *corvee* labor organizers put them in a position easily to be perceived as the enemies of the people. The People's discontent exacerbated when they watched the *pangreh praja* start to display their exploitative leadership. Their discontents, as manifested in various social and agricultural unrests, were indicators of their long hostility, which had rooted even before the Japanese arrival. However, since the Dutch always protected and maintained the *pangreh praja*'s dignity,<sup>70</sup> there were fewer attacks on them during the Dutch times.

During the occupation, the Japanese put the civil servant in a more direct contact with the common people. By establishing such a policy, the *pangreh praja* was forced to make direct contact with the people, thus making themselves as colonial instruments more visible in society. Their unpopular duties, as tax collectors among others, rendered them exploitative colonial instruments. And, when the Japanese decreased their salaries, confiscated their *bengkok* (land), and forced them to work with the people, they felt humiliated. And the people perceived it as the end of the *pangreh praja*'s dignitary attributes. There was no need for the people, therefore, to pay their respects.

As the people's economic burdens grew heavier, especially in the areas where rice shortage was severe, they revolted against the *pangreh praja*. Toward the end of, and after, the occupation, due to their accumulated hatred, their attacks on the *pangreh praja* turned violent.

The Japanese adopted an intended policy to put the *pangreh praja* into direct contact with the people. This policy was in part in concert with the spirit of the Meiji Restoration where a sense of egalitarianism was encouraged. In this respect, the *pangreh praja* was forced to go to the villages quite frequently. Concerning the implementation of the government's new agricultural system, for instance, the *pangreh praja* had to give direct examples to the villagers. For that purpose, they had to step into the muddy paddy fields.

The *pangreh praja* regarded this experience as a humiliation. However, there is no clear evidence that the Japanese deliberately intended to humiliate them. In fact, the Japanese *shu chokans*, such as Takemasa, quite often himself stepped into the rice field to show the peasants how to plant rice in the Japanese way,<sup>71</sup> a style which the Japanese decided the people has to follow. The people perceived this as a sign of the decreasing dignity of the *pangreh praja*.

The people's attacks on the *pangreh praja* in this regard was generally based on two factors. First, as the *pangreh praja* was afraid the Japanese might dismiss them for not being able to carry out their tasks satisfactorily, they had to force the people to carry out their duties. Second, while carrying out their duties, for instance collecting forced delivery of paddy and tax, distributing cloth and food rations, the *pangreh praja* collected more than the amount the Japanese had determined. In addition, there were also many obvious signs that indicated that they were corrupt.<sup>72</sup>

The Japanese's extraordinarily tight control over the *pangreh praja* ironically resulted in a significant increase in paddy collection. In Besuki regency, East Java, for instance, in 1943 303,945 tons was collected, while in 1944 the figure rose to 378,000 tons.<sup>73</sup> The increase in paddy production in Besuki meant that the people in that regency had to deliver more rice to the Japanese. At that time, the people were obliged to deliver up to about half of their total paddy production.

There had been no explanation offered why the people in Besuki regency did not revolt, although they had to deliver about half of their total production to the Japanese government. One of the explanations



that might be offered is, inferring from the case of Indramayu regency, which resulted a rather shocking series of uprisings, that the people in Besuki had been able to maintain their lives on a subsistence level.

In Indramayu, villagers had to deliver an extraordinarily high quota of paddy, several times higher than other regencies. Generally, peasants in Indramayu had to deliver, as reported by Mr. Prawoto Soemodilogo, *Gunseikanbu Sangyobu Sanjo*, 15 quintals per hectare of rice field. While other regencies, such as Cirebon, only delivered 3 ½ - 4 quintals per hectare.<sup>74</sup> In addition, as to show how corrupted the *pangreh praja* were, especially in this regency, they often asked villagers to deliver beyond the amount already decided by the Japanese. If a *soncho* was asked to collect 1,000 tons of rice for his sub-district, he ordered villagers to deliver 1,200 tons.<sup>75</sup> *Pangreh praja*'s corrupt practices occurred also in cloth distribution. The people considered the way they distributed these goods as unjust. This was because they often first distributed the cloth among themselves, their relatives, their members, and then gave the remainder to the people.<sup>76</sup> In the case of Pematang regency, cloth was stockpiled in the *pendopo* (pavilion hall) and remained undistributed.<sup>77</sup>

These corrupt practices should be seen also from the point of view of Japanese policy. During the occupation, the Japanese had considerably reduced the amount of *pangreh praja*'s salary. A regent, for instance, while receiving f 12,000 per year with additional foodstuff in the Dutch days, during the Japanese occupation only received f 300-600.<sup>78</sup> That amount was of course not enough to cover their daily expenditures. Experiencing luxurious life during the Dutch period, the *pangreh praja* became corrupt to provide them with additional income.

Within such a corrupted situation, peasant uprisings against both the *pangreh praja* and the Japanese occurred in Indramayu. The uprising which occurred in April through August 1944, spilled over to several neighboring villages—Kaplongan, Sindang, Lohbener and Bugis.<sup>79</sup> Soon after the uprisings ceased, a series of dismissals, transfers and replacements of the *pangreh praja* followed. On August 8, 1944, R.T.A.A. Mohammad Soediono, the regent of Indramayu, was replaced by Dr. M. Moerdjani.<sup>80</sup> Attacks that were more serious occurred after the independence on August 17, 1945. Anti-*pangreh praja* movements occurred in several areas in West and Central Java. In West Java, as early as October 8, 1945, attacks occurred in Tangerang in which mass actions

forced the resignation of virtually all of the local *pangreh praja*. The *Bupati* of this regency was even forced to flee for his life.<sup>81</sup> In Central Java, the revolts against the *pangreh praja* took place in Pekalongan, Brebes, Tegal, Pemalang, Surakarta, and Delanggu. Among these revolts, the *Pemberontakan Tiga Daerah* (Three Region Revolt, known as Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang) were the most severe and even killings took place. The main causes of the attacks were the deterioration of *pangreh praja*-commoner relationship; the *pangreh praja*'s loss of nationalist sympathy; and corruption. All of these phenomena created a strong inclination for revenge among the people.

In Pekalongan itself, similar events took place where there were at least two reasons behind the revolt. First, the *pangreh praja* was still perceived as exploiters. Second, they were suspected of being Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) spies; anti-republic; and in favor of the return of the Dutch.<sup>82</sup> These accusations were partly because of the *pangreh praja*'s ignorance of the reality that independence had been declared. Their ignorance was in part because they had no access to information except from information provided by the Japanese. Soetardjo, the prominent spokesman of the *pangreh praja*, travelled around Java between June and July 1945, telling that they had to prepare for independence. However, this announcement was interpreted in a very different way. In the case of Sarimin, the regent of Brebes, for instance, independence was thought to be a Dutch type of independence, which would take the form of a commonwealth, a notion that originated from Queen Wilhelmina's speech in 1942.<sup>83</sup> Therefore, they did not believe that independence had been reached. The *pangreh praja*'s reluctance and disobedience to raise the "red and white" flag, which created severe conflict with the *pemuda*, was mainly due to their ignorance and their common perception that the Dutch would reoccupy the country.

Although as early as September, the top *pangreh praja* in Jakarta and Soekarno had made gentleman's agreements of mutual support, nothing of that sort occurred, especially in Pekalongan residency. This led to the quick development of a power vacuum in the area. With the absence of a clear power structure in the area, severe conflicts between the *pangreh praja* and the *pemuda* and the rest of the people occurred. A clash that happened in early October, for instance, took the life of some *pergerakan* members. Because of the involvement of the *kenpeitai*, there was nobody else to blame but the higher level of *pangreh praja*.

The pemuda's blamed Mr. Moh. Besar, who was then the resident of Pekalongan, and he was attacked. Besides the incident that took the lives of some members of the *pergerakan*, the blame was also caused by the mutual suspicion that existed between the *pangreh praja*, represented by the Resident, and the people.

The social and political unrest, which occurred in that particular area, proved Mr. Besar's inability to exercise his real authority to maintain law and order.<sup>84</sup> For this reason, there was nothing else that the Resident could do but to leave and give up his residency. Mr. Besar was subsequently transferred to Semarang.

The people's attack toward the *pangreh praja* did not cease with the transfer of the Resident of Pekalongan. Not only limiting themselves to attacking other members of the *pangreh praja* in the region, to revenge themselves, the commoners and the *pemuda* moved forcefully to confiscate the *pangreh praja's* property, and to distribute it among the people.<sup>85</sup>

Through the proclamation of independence, which was largely initiated and spearheaded by the nationalists, members of the *pergerakan*, and the *pemuda*, the nationalists, who were represented by Soekarno and Hatta, emerged as the main inheritors of the new republic and its national leadership. Consequently, they were in charge of and responsible for restoring and preserving *rust en orde*—like the colonials. One of the most important things the nationalists had to do was to improve relationships with the *pangreh praja*. Again, as it happened during Dutch colonialism and the Japanese occupation, it was obvious that the nationalists needed to incorporate the *pangreh praja* into their leadership. This was, in part, because of the necessity to run the regional administrative bureaucracy, and partly because of the *pangreh praja's* threat to withhold support for the republic if their positions were not preserved. Thus, bureaucratic continuity prevailed.

Learning from previous experiences, the nationalists preserved the position of the *pangreh praja*. And yet, while maintaining the *pangreh praja's* administrative status, by 1947 the republican government symbolically changed the name *pangreh praja* (ruler of the realm) into *pamong praja*<sup>86</sup> (servant of the people). How far this symbolical change influenced the shifting of the *pangreh praja's* orientation and mentality needs to be discussed within the context of post independent Indonesia.<sup>87</sup>

## Conclusion

From the above analysis, it is clear that the *pangreh praja*'s role in the Javanese society during the Japanese occupation still prevailed. However, with regard to their "political" role, the central problem of this study, it is necessary to determine more clearly what "political role" means. If political role means involvement in the *pergerakan*<sup>88</sup> movement, it is clear that most of the *pangreh praja* were not involved in such a movement. However, if by political role is meant the enjoyment of a certain status, such as being the head of the regency, district or sub-district, and therefore eligible to be considered as the regency, district or sub-district's political elites, it is clear that the *pangreh praja* did have that sort of "political" role.

Instead of being trapped into political jargon, this contribution tends to conclude that the *pangreh praja*'s administrative leadership was obvious and dominated the life of Javanese and perhaps also Indonesian society in a wider sense. Yet, there were several *pangreh praja* elites who were involved in the national leadership along with other nationalists.

As the nature of the Japanese colonial rule was somehow different from that of the Dutch, it is rather misleading to conclude that the Japanese deliberately intended to favor the nationalists over the *pangreh praja*. In fact, to some degree, the occupation did provide for a better opportunity for the *pangreh praja* to lead the *Jawa Hokokai* on the regional level.<sup>89</sup> It is in this context that their leadership should be perceived. Since the emergence of the nationalist movement in the early 1930s, the nationalists on the other hand, concerned themselves with the national leadership. Thus, it is clear that between the two they had a very different functions and roles.

The Japanese attitude toward the *pangreh praja*, as well as to the nationalists, clearly reflected their colonial interests. It was true that they viewed the *pangreh praja* as having a feudal mentality, and deliberately tried to change it. Yet it did not waive the necessity to co-opt this civil servant corps. It was in part because of the Japanese's harsh approach, which was due to their ignorance of Indonesian society at large, and especially of the *pangreh praja*, that created the *pangreh praja*'s negative attitude toward the Japanese. At the same time, the attitude of some *pangreh praja*, which could be interpreted as an expectation of a return of the Dutch, caused the Japanese to remain suspicious of them.

During the occupation, the *pangreh praja*'s relationship with the nationalists represented bilateral hostilities, which in part was due to social and political competition. For the nationalists, the fact that the *pangreh praja* was a colonial instrument became a primary cause of their disrespect. And it was partly because of such a notion, and due to the economic discrepancies, which in part were accelerated by the *pangreh praja* through their corrupt practices, that resulted in attacks on them, especially at the end of the occupation and just after. At the end, there seemed to be a mutual understanding between the nationalists and the *pangreh praja*, as the new republic emerged, which encouraged both to work more cooperatively.

## Endnotes

1. During the Dutch era, there were many examples of wars that testify to the Dutch divide and rule policy, such as the Paderi War (1821-1827), the Java War (1825-1830), and the Aceh War (1873-1903). In these wars, the Dutch co-opted certain Javanese *keraton* (palace) elites, and *uleebalang* (Acehnese aristocrats), used them as buffers to divide the local forces, and then occupied their areas. For details, see. B.J. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, Volume II, The Hague-Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1955; de Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy*, Volume II, translated from Dutch by G.J. Renier, Ph.D., Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1931; H.A. Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985, especially chapter III; Anthony Reid, *The Blood of the People*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974, especially the section "Dutch Occupied Aceh".
2. The divide and rule issue during the Japanese occupation was discussed in Alfred McCoy's (ed.) "Introduction" to *Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation*, New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph No. 22, second printing, 1985. It also appeared in Willard Elsbree's *Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements: 1940-1945*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1953; and Harry J. Benda's *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958.
3. Meiji Restoration refers to the Japanese "revolution" in 1868, in which young princes initiated radical and progressive changes against the old static *shogunate*. The revolution took the form of a battle against feudalism, traditionalism, and insistence on progress, modernity, and discipline. See William H. Frederick, "Indonesian Urban Society in Transition: Surabaya 1926-1946", Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Hawaii, 1978, p. 209.
4. The term "Javanese" is not intended to refer only to Javanese civil servants, but also includes those in Madura, since Madura was incorporated into the Javanese administration. At the same time, it also does not imply that civil servants only existed in Java, since they also existed in other islands.
5. This term refers to the elite Javanese civil servants who served in the administrative apparatus both during the Dutch and Japanese periods. Literally meaning "Rules of the Realm" the corps during the Dutch days consisted of *bupati* (regent), *patih* (vice regent or regent's chief minister), *wedana* (district chief), and *camat* (sub district chief). As will be discussed later, during the Japanese occupation the composition of the *pangreh praja* changed to include other administrative apparatus, which fit in the category of regency-village administration.
6. Benda, in his *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* suggests that the Japanese favored Muslims over secular nationalists and the *pangreh praja*. This became even more obvious when the Japanese abolished all social and political organizations except Islamic ones, namely the Nahdlatul Ulama (traditionalist Muslim organization) and the Muhammadiyah (modernist Muslim organization). Later, in November 1943, the Japanese formed the supreme body of Islamic organizations called Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, or better known as Masyumi.
7. The earliest regency period reached back to the Mataram Kingdom in the sixteenth century, the most well known Javanese kingdom in central Java after the fall of Majapahit. Many historical accounts indicate that it was Mataram that engineered provincial administrative rulers in the hand of the regents, which later occupied the highest hierarchy within the *pangreh praja* structure. For this, see among others, Schrieke, *op. cit.*, p. 185; Heather Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite*, Singapore-Kuala

- Lumpur-Hong Kong: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., ASAA Southeast Asia Publication Series, 1979, p. 3; Leslie H. Palmier, *Social Status and Power in Java*, London: Athlone Press, 1969, p. 29.
8. This was the *pangreh praja* hierarchy in the late of nineteenth century. See Sutherland, *The Making ...*, p. 25.
  9. See Sutherland, *The Making ...*, pp. 1-18.
  10. See Sutherland, *Ibid.*, p. 26.
  11. Schrieke, *ibid.*, p. 209-215; Palmier, *loc. cit.*, p. 30.
  12. Sutherland, *loc. cit.*, p. 1.
  13. The land holding which first was given by Raffles to a regent was known as *particuliere landerijen* (private land). In the case of the Brebes Regency in Central Java, the land measured as much as 2,440 hectares. In 1856, after van den Bosch's restoration, besides hereditary *particuliere landerijen*, a regent also received 2,000 *pikul* (one *pikul* is equivalent to 61.76 kilogram) of rice per annum to feed his families and visitors. See Anton Lucas, "The Bamboo-Spear Pierces the Payung: The Revolution against the Bureaucratic Elite in North Central Java", Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1980, p. 6. In 1900, the salary of a regent was f. 12,000; a *wedana* earned f. 2,500; while a *camat's* salary was f. 780-1,200. See Clive Day, *The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 418. By 1926, there were 70 regents; 400 *wedanas*, and 1200 *camats*.
  14. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, p. 220.
  15. Heather Sutherland discusses details on the Javanese regents' families in her "Notes on Java's Regent Families" in *Indonesia*, No. 16 and 19, Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asia Studies, Cornell University, 1973 and 1974.
  16. Schrieke, *loc. cit.*, p. 188.
  17. Schrieke, *ibid.*, p. 282; Palmier, *op. cit.*, p. 33; Sutherland, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
  18. Sutherland, *ibid.*, p. 63.
  19. Some excellent works on this topic are Sartono Kartodirdjo's *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel; A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia*, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966; *Protest Movement in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973; "Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development" in Claire Holt (ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972, pp. 71-125.
  20. See Sutherland, *op. cit.*, especially chapter 6, "Colonial Reform and *Pangreh Praja* Response", pp. 67-85. Their conflict was dramatized in Semaun's novel, *Hikayat Kadirun*, Semarang: Kantor PKI, 1920.
  21. Aiko Kurasawa, "The Transformation of Native Civil Servants *Pangreh Praja*", chapter VIII of her Ph.D. dissertation, Ithaca: University of Cornell, 1987, p. 6.
  22. This policy was also known as *Politik Etis*. Since the Dutch felt the need to improve "the quality" of the indigenous people, they provided them with a very limited access for education. However, only those who had a *priyayi* background were able to gain higher education, while commoners in general remained uneducated.
  23. The intention of bringing up Kartini's experience as the best example here is not to suggest that she was a member of the *pangreh praja*, though her father was certainly among the respected *pangreh praja* elite. It is merely intended to indicate that the Dutch ethical policy expressed in the educational opportunities given to the local elites and their families were not "fully" implemented. In other words, it was not deliberately intended to create Indonesian intellectuals who were aware of their own

- social, economic, and political situation. Within this context, Abendanon's successful efforts to dissuade Kartini not to further her education in Holland confirmed the real intention of the Dutch educational policy toward the indigenous elites. See Hildred Geertz's "Introduction" in R. A. Kartini, *Letters of A Javanese Princess*, Lenham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1985, p. 21.
24. Benedict Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946*, Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1972, p. 108.
  25. Harry J. Benda, "The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia" in *Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia: Collected Journal Articles of Harry J. Benda*, New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series No. 18, 1972, p. 236.
  26. Sutherland, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-124.
  27. John Ingleson, *Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement*, Canberra: ASAA, Southeast Asian Publication Series, 1979, p. 95. See also Susan Abeyasekere, "The Soetardjo Petition" in *Indonesia*, Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, No. XV, April 1973.
  28. Actually, on March 1, 1942, there were two other simultaneous landings of the Japanese forces. Besides Banten, the Japanese troops landed in Eretan Wetan (West Java) and Kragan (Central Java). The earliest landings took place in the outer island of Kalimantan (January 11 – February 10, 1942).  
The geographic location of Java explains why it was not the first island to be occupied, despite its social and political significant in the country. As the Japanese divided Indonesia into three military administrations—the 25<sup>th</sup> Army occupied Sumatra, the Second South Navy controlled East Indonesia, including Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Maluku, and the 16<sup>th</sup> Army administered Java—, it was not really politically important that Java was not the first area to be occupied. See Marwati Djoened and Nugroho Notosusanto, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, Volume VI, Jakarta: Departemen PDK, PN Balai Pustaka, 1984, pp. 1-5.
  29. For details, see George S. Kanahale, *The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence*, a doctoral thesis, Ithaca: Cornell University, 1967, pp. 19-24. For personal accounts on this event, see Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (eds.), *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945*, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 27, 1986, pp. 31-77.  
The unexpected welcome by the general populace, from the indigenous people's point of view was partly because of their belief in the Joyoboyo prophecy, which stated that the Dutch would be wiped out and defeated by the "yellow skin". The "yellow skin" was believed to be the Japanese. See Tjantrik Mataram, *Peranan Ramalan Djojobojo dalam Revolusi Kita*, Bandung: Masa Baru, 1966.
  30. Kanahale, *ibid.*, p. 25.
  31. See William Frederick in his "Introduction" to Mohammad Hatta's *Putera Reports: Problem in Indonesian-Japanese Wartime Cooperation*, translated with an introduction by William H. Frederick, Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1971, p. 21.
  32. The main duties of this body were to restore civil order, maintaining public utilities and other administrative functions. See *Asia Raja*, May 5, 1942; see also Kanahale, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
  33. R.A.A.S.M. Gandasubrata, *An Account of the Japanese Occupation of Banjumas Residency, Java, March 1942 to August 1945*, translated by Leslie H. Palmier, Ithaca, New York: Data Paper Number 10, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern



Studies, Cornell University, 1953, p. 1. The book originally came from Gandasubrata's personal memoir entitled *Kenang-Kenangan 1933-1950*, written in 1952. Palmier's translation served as the only pertinent account on the Japanese occupation.

34. See Gandasubrata, *ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
35. Gandasubrata, *ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
36. Frederick, "Indonesian Urban Society", p. 207.
37. In many editions, *Kan Po*, the official journal of the Japanese administration published by the *Gunseibu*, revealed the position of the *patih* as the *wakil bupati* (vice-regent). This term, compared to the "regent's chief minister" was more indicative of the exact position of the *patih*. In *Kan Po*, the term *wakil bupati* appeared whenever they had to sign official decisions.
38. Gandasubrata, *op. cit.*, p. 5. See also George D. Larson, "PETA: The Early Origins of the Indonesian Army, M.A. thesis, Department of History, University of Hawaii, 1970, p. 66. Many scholars still believe that even during the Japanese occupation the *pangreh praja* simply consisted of "quadrumvirate" local elites, as the Dutch structured it in 1874. Heather Sutherland and Aiko Kurasawa are among the representatives of this school of thought.

The other significant feature regarding changes in the *pangreh praja* were the origins of these civil servant. As early as the 1920s there were few members of the *pangreh praja* who had no *priyayi* background. This was in part because of the issue of hereditary rights, which some members of the progressive *pangreh praja* in the *Volksraad* had been debating against and had attempted to do away with. During the Japanese period, these changes became more obvious. The appointment of Dr. Murdjani, Mr. Moh Besar and others as *pangreh praja* confirmed the idea that not every *pangreh praja* had to have *priyayi* origins. In addition, the attacks against the *pangreh praja* at the end of the colonial era and after the Japanese occupation strengthened this idea. However, in Javanese eyes, by becoming *pangreh praja* a person could be regarded as a *priyayi*. Thus, though not every *pangreh praja* had *priyayi* origins, the general populace considered every *pangreh praja* as *priyayi*.

Even today for some villagers still view an *ambtenaar* or *pegawai negeri* (government official), intellectuals, rich and urban person as *priyayi*.

39. See Abdul Ghafar Pringgodigdo, *Tata Negara di Djawa pada Waktu Pendudukan Djepang: Dari Bulan Maret Sampai Bulan Desember 1942*, Djogjakarta, 1952, p. 27. According to *Kan Po* No. 3, 4, 5 and 6, 1942-1943, some mayors were: 1) Mr. Dr. R. Ngabei Soebroto of Bogor, 2) Mr. Mas Soewarso Tirtowigijjo of Malang, 3) Raden Ronggo Adiwikarta of Sukabumi, 4) R. Djanoei Soemadi of Kediri, 5) R. Dradjat Sosrohadi-soebroto of Blitar, 6) Gondo Martosoeprodjo of Magelang, 7) Mas Sewaka of Cirebon, 8) R.A. Admadinata of Bandung, 9) R. Soempeno of Pekalongan, 10) Mr. Mas Besar of Tegal, 11) R. Soedardjo of Salatiga, 12) R. Mas Soesanto of Madiun, 13) R. Soedono of Probolinggo, 14) R. Adipati Ario Reksomiprodjo of Mojokerto, 15) R. Toemenggoeng Ario Hoepoedijo of Pasuruan.
40. According to *Soeara Asia*, January 5, 1943, the regent of Pamekasan, R.A.A. Abdul Aziz was dismissed and finally imprisoned because of corruption. Aiko Kurasawa, however, citing from Brugmans' *Nederlands Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*, p. 160, stated that the Pamekasan regent was dismissed because of his anti-Japanese subversive movement, in which he was charged as preparing a revolt against the Japanese, particularly, when the Allied forces would launch their attack. A considerable number of *pangreh praja* was also arrested and killed by the *kenpeitai* (the Japanese military police). In the case of the Panarukan residency, there were about thirty members of *pangreh praja*, consisted of *kencho* and *guncho* who were killed. Kurasawa, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

41. Kurasawa, "Transformation ...", p. 19.
42. See *Asia Raja*, January 13 and July 17, 1944; January 18 and April 10, 1945. See also Kurasawa, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
43. Kurasawa, *ibid.*, p. 20.
44. Gandasubrata, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.
45. Details on *Chuo Sangi In* see Arniati P. Herkusumo, *Chuo Sangi In: Dewan Pertimbangan Pusat pada Masa Pendudukan Jepang*, Jakarta: P.T. Rosda Jayapura, 1982.
46. See *Djawa Baroe*, No. 19 and 21, 1943.
47. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 114. See also *Kan Po*, No. 31, November 25, 1943; *Pandji Poestaka*, No. 2 January 15, 1945, p. 57.
48. *Romusha* were forced laborers or *corvee* laborers, used by the Japanese particularly for mining and construction projects, mainly in Indonesia, Thailand and Burma. They were drafted with promises of high salary and good living conditions. During the Japanese occupation, thousands of *Romushas* died mainly because of malnutrition, poor health conditions and malaria. For details, see Mohammad Abdul Aziz, *Japan's Colonialism in Indonesia*, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955, p. 242. See also Benedict Anderson, *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation*, Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1961, p. 13.
49. Kurasawa, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
50. The Triple A Movement was not a political movement in its sort. Under the leadership of Mr. Raden Samsuodin, a former Parindra leader, it served as propaganda instrument. "Nippon the Light of Asia", "Nippon the Protector of Asia", and "Nippon the Leader of Asia" were their main slogans. As it did not have any cohesive ideological framework, their basic appeals were intended to capture Asian Solidarity emotionalism, such as Asia for Asians, as a bulwark against any insidious form of Western encroachment. See Kanahale, *loc. cit.*, pp. 45-46.
51. Kanahale, *ibid.*, p. 142.
52. See Sutherland, *The Making of A Bureaucratic Elite*, pp. 31-34. See also Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, p. 195.
53. *Kan Po* continuously reported the government announcement regarding the civil service examination. The announcement usually was accompanied by detailed information of the administrative positions open to the public, and how to apply for the examination.
54. Not all nationalists were willing to work with the Japanese. Sjahrir and Cipto Mangunkusumo, for instance, deliberately avoided all direct contact with the Japanese. For the latter, it was because of political reasons and poor health. While Sjahrir retreated to the countryside and organized an anti-Japanese underground movement. According to Soekarno, Sjahrir's position as the leader of the underground movement was part of the consensus between Soekarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir. See Kanahale, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
55. The contacts were not done by the higher-ranking nationalist figures, since most of them were in jail. However, they did serve as valuable instruments in propagandizing Japan in Java. See Kanahale, *ibid.*, pp. 1-28.
56. Kanahale, *ibid.*, pp. 30-31.
57. Larson seems to challenge the idea of social and political exclusion by the nationalists. Referring to the *Peta* organization, he mentions that there were numbers of the *pangreh praja* who occupied various positions in this semi-military organization. *op. cit.*, pp. 65-70.

58. In his book Kanahale cites a report from *Beppan* (*Sambobu Tokubetsu-ham*) or Intelligence Agency in the Sixteenth Army), which states that upon the formation of the *Putera* on March 9, 1943, the nationalists attempted to incorporate the *pangreh praja* into the organization. Their membership in the *Putera* never occurred. This was not because of nationalists' denial, but because of Japanese disapproval. The reason behind the disapproval was, in the eyes of the Japanese, that the *pangreh praja's* involvement in the *Putera* might well conflict with their administrative responsibilities. Kanahale, "The Japanese Occupation ...", pp. 73-74.
59. The reasons why the *Putera* intended to go below the regency levels were to bring people closer to the government and place direct check toward who oppressed the new spirit and those who abused the power. Hatta, *op. cit.*, p. 33. Seen from the whole perspective of the nationalist perception toward the *pangreh praja*, it was clear that the second reason was an attempt to supervise the latter's activities.
60. See *Soeara Asia*, October 19, November 16, 21, 27, and 29, 1943; *Kan Po*, No. 17, 1943. Both nationalists' advice and lecture to the *pangreh praja* reminded them of the Japanese indoctrination and training programs. For the *pangreh praja*, this meant that nationalists were proud of themselves and ignored the *pangreh praja's* capabilities in dealing with their administrative function. For them, the word "lecture" meant "*mengguru*" (literally meaning "to teach") which always left a negative impression.
61. Hatta listed 39 items of the *Putera's* problems that were caused by the *pangreh praja's* hostile attitude toward them. This included ignoring inquiries, withholding information, disregarding petitions, complaints and other devious means bureaucratic subversion. See Hatta, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-104; and Kanahale, *op. cit.*, p. 134. On the surface, however, there were some *pangreh praja* who showed sympathy to the *Putera*. In the formation of the Surabaya branch, for instance, the *kencho* of Jombang agreed to deliver his opening remarks. In his speech, he called for mutual understanding and cooperation. See *Soeara Asia*, July 21, 1943.
62. For details on the ruthlessness of the *kenpeitai*, see *The Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra: Selections from Nihon Kenpei Seishi*, translated by Barbara Gifford and Guy Hobbs, Ithaca, New York: Translation Series, Publication No. 65, Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1968.
63. Kanahale, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
64. The official reason of the *Jawa Hokokai's* formation was to unify all people (*Soeara Asia*, January 9 and February 3, 1944). Yet, it served Japanese interests, especially in order to achieve maximum mobilization of the Java's human resources. Through this organization, the Japanese could more easily control the general populace.
65. *Soeara Asia*, January 28 and February 8-9, 1944.
66. The Japanese *Gunseikan* was the chairman of the organization was. The *Somubuchō* (Director of the General Affairs) acted as vice chairman, while Hayashi Kyujiro served as the head of the central council. The secretariat was dominated by nationalist figures. Soekarno acted as the director, assisted by Hatta as vice-director. While Sartono, Anwar Tjokroaminoto and Mohammad Yamin respectively served as the head of the education section, the propaganda section, and as assistant to the chairman. Kanahale, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-143.
67. *Soeara Asia*, May 20, 1944.
68. Anderson, *Java*, p. 114.
69. Anderson, *Ibid.*, p. 115.
70. The Dutch protected *pangreh praja's* dignity by various means: 1) by giving them high salaries that allowed them to live luxurious lives, so that the economical differences between them and the commoners were obvious; 2) allowing them to use Dutch

- names, as in the case of Pekalongan town hall secretary who called himself Harso van de Wil; 3) treated them in court in the same way as Europeans, and so forth. Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
71. See *Djawa Baroe*, Number 18, 1943, p. 43.
  72. Not every *pangreh praja* was corrupt. Some of them, as in the case of *camat* of Brebes and Taman, north Central Java, were very honest. For them, it was ethically wrong and a disgrace if a member of the *pangreh praja* made himself rich during his career, while other people suffered. See Lucas, *op. cit.*, pp. 8 and 51.
  73. Kurasawa, "Transformation", p. 37.
  74. See Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS). Report by Mr. Prawoto Soemodilogo entitled "Survey of the Situation of Indramajoe", Part 1, dated December 20, 1945, p. 1.
  75. Kurasawa, "Forced Delivery of Paddy and Peasant Uprisings in Indramayu, Indonesia" in *The Developing Economies*, Volume XXI, March 1983, Number 1, Tokyo, Japan: Institute of Developing Economics, p. 56.
  76. Prawoto's report, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
  77. Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
  78. See *Kan Po*, No. 22, July 10, 1943.
  79. Kurasawa, "Forced Delivery ...", pp. 60-66.
  80. Since the peace situation was not likely to occur, Mr. Prawoto in his report objected to the appointment of Dr. Moerdjani whom he considered incapable in handling the situation. He was thought willing to establish a more egalitarian leadership, which would result in social dislocation. See Prawoto's report, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.
  81. Anderson, *Java*, p. 169.
  82. Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 90.
  83. Lucas, "The Bamboo ...", p. 115.
  84. Lucas, "Social Revolution ...", p. 100.
  85. Anderson, *Java*, p. 339.
  86. The word *pamong* derives from *among* or *momong*, literally meaning "to take care" or "to guard".
  87. Several works have been written about the *pangreh praja* in post-independent Indonesia. However, none of these have specifically dealt with the issue of the *pangreh praja's* mentality and orientation to changes. See for instance, Djunaidi Hadisumarto, "The Indonesian Civil Service and Its Reform Movement". PhD dissertation. University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1974; John D. Legge, *Problems of Regional Autonomy in Contemporary Indonesia*, Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1957; Sondang P. Siagian, "The Development and Problems of Indigenous Bureaucratic Leadership in Indonesia" PhD dissertation, Department of Government, Indiana University, 1964.
  88. *Pergerakan* literally meaning "the movement". Within the Indonesian political context, this term means actively engaging in political activities and fighting for Indonesian independence. Therefore, not everybody involved in the *pergerakan* were likely to side with colonial interests.
  89. There has been a notion that some members of the *pangreh praja* perceived their experiences in the *Jawa Hokokai* as terrible. They were even terrified to be involved in the organization. As to what extent this notion was shared among the *pangreh praja* has not been explored comprehensively. Therefore, considering such a notion, the above term of "better opportunity" remains neutral, in the sense that this term is not concerned with the issue whether the *pangreh praja* liked or disliked to be given the opportunity to lead the *Jawa Hokokai*. The bottom line of this "better opportunity"

thesis is merely intended to indicate the *pangreh praja's* involvement in the Japanese-made organization compared to their exclusion from previous organizations, such as the Triple A Movement and the *Putera*.

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Bahtiar Effendy is the Dean of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta.