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

The Muslim Minority Movement in Southmost Thailand: From the Periphery to the Centre

Ahmad Suaedy

Praxis and Religious Authority in Islam: The Case of Ahmad Dahlan, Founder of Muhammadiyah

Hyung-Jun Kim

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Ahmad Suaedy

The Muslim Minority Movement in Southmost Thailand: From the Periphery to the Centre

Abstrak: *Kedudukan minoritas tampak penting dan memperoleh perhatian luas dalam proses perubahan di era globalisasi ini. Setelah berbagai kelompok minoritas, khususnya Islam di bagian timur bekas negara Uni Soviet dan Balkan memperoleh hak yang kian kuat, baik dengan memperoleh kemerdekaan maupun otonomi atau menjadi minoritas dengan persamaan hak dengan mayoritas, sejak awal 1990-an, minoritas di negara-negara demokrasi menyusul bangkit dan menuntut hal yang sama. Fenomena ini pada gilirannya menyebar di banyak bagian dunia.*

Namun berbeda dengan di negara-negara bekas komunis di mana minoritas bangkit karena represi dan penindasan, maka di negara-negara demokrasi mereka justru merasa terabaikan karena penekanannya yang terlalu besar pada hak individu sehingga mengabaikan hak-hak kolektif atau komunitas dan minoritas. Sehingga, terlacak bahwa pergerakan Muslim minoritas setidaknya terkonsentrasikan pada upaya mengidentifikasi diri, seraya mengelola isu yang ada, dalam sebuah gelombang perubahan.

Artikel ini mengambil starting point *pada hal tersebut. Dengan menjadikan gerakan Muslim minoritas di Thailand Selatan sebagai contoh kasus, artikel ini berupaya mencari jawab perihal pergerakan kelompok Muslim minoritas dalam proses mengidentifikasi dirinya dalam pusaran dominasi pemerintah Thailand. Lebih jauh, artikel ini juga berupaya melacak peran aktor, baik kelompok ataupun individu, dalam keberlangsungan gerakan sosial di Thailand Selatan yang sempat diwarnai oleh aksi pemberontakan dan gerakan separatisme.*

Secara teoritis, rekam jejak pergerakan komunitas Muslim minoritas tersebut setidaknya dapat dilihat dengan sebuah pendekatan collective memory, *yang jika ditelisik lebih jauh, nyatanya berhasil memunculkan empat lapis identitas (*multiple identities*) di tubuh mereka.* Pertama, *keberadaan warisan sejarah Kerajaan Islam di Patani yang diingat sebagai semacam negara adidaya Patani Raya atau kerajaan yang menguasai Semenanjung Malaya. Dalam ingatan mereka, kerajaan-kerajaan itu menjadi semacam simpul, antara budaya kolektif mereka, kejayaan kerajaan lokal,*

kejayaan agama Islam, serta kesatuan Nusantara di mana mereka menjadi bagian darinya. Terlebih ketika hal tersebut dipadu dengan eksistensi pengadilan agama yang mandiri dengan kedudukan dan pengaruh ulama atau imam yang juga kuat.

Kedua, *kesamaan Islam Muslim Melayu dengan misalnya Muslim Indonesia atau Malaysia yang tampak sangat dekat dengan praktik serta pemikiran keagamaan dan kebudayaan. Dengan ini, yang menjadi fokus mereka adalah bagaimana membentuk format Nusantara, lebih khusus, Islam Nusantara sebagai sebuah identitas di Thailand.* Ketiga, *Islam itu sendiri, di mana dengan memeluk agama Islam, mereka merasa menjadi bagian dari dunia Islam.* Keempat, *Negara Thailand sebagai realitas politik dengan segala bentuknya, terkhusus mayoritas Budha, yang* notabene *justru sangat konstitusional. Maka, lapisan-lapisan identitas itulah yang pada perkembangannya menjadikan mereka secara ideologis sangat solid hingga kini dan lebih jauh mampu menyatukan Muslim minoritas di Thailand Selatan dalam sebuah perjuangan bersama.*

Namun demikian, pergerakan mereka seringkali harus terhalang oleh reaksi pemerintah setempat yang dengan cerdik mendasarkan diri pada pengangkatan konsep nasionalisme nation-state. *Ketika konsep ini diusung, jelas kesatuan bangsa sebagai representasi dari keinginan bangsa itu sendiri akan sangat sulit ditolak oleh segenap lapisan masyarakat, tak terkecuali kelompok Muslim minoritas. Karena ketika muncul kelompok masyarakat dengan visi berbeda, terlebih bagi sebuah kelompok minoritas dengan kepentingan nasional, yang akan dilancarkan pemerintah terhadap mereka kemudian adalah asimilasi, kalau perlu secara paksa.*

Di sini, prinsip yang dipegang dan disetujui oleh kelompok mayoritas adalah bahwa keputusan nasional harus tetap dijaga. Sebab itulah, meskipun perbedaan itu merupakan ciri khas umum dari kelompok tersebut, namun tetap saja, kepentingan mayoritas akan selalu menang dan kepentingan kelompok minoritas niscaya akan tersingkir. Terlebih, kebijakan pemerintah tersebut pastilah ditopang oleh suatu aparat yang kuat yang mampu menghegemoni pelbagai wilayah kehidupan masyarakat mulai dari dimensi pendidikan, hukum, ekonomi, hingga bahasa.

Problemnya, konsep nasionalisme yang diusung pihak pemerintah tampaknya tidak memberi peluang bagi terbangunnya hubungan yang lebih setara dan adil, kecuali jika ada perubahan mendasar dari paham nasionalisme nation-state *itu sendiri. Prosedur demokrasi dan HAM yang mendasarkan pada nasionalisme itu faktanya belum memberikan hak di mana minoritas bisa memperoleh hak-hak khusus terkait sejarah, kultur serta agama yang mereka miliki. Namun demikian, setidaknya, ada beberapa pokok tuntutan yang diajukan oleh kelompok Muslim minoritas di Thailand Selatan.* Pertama, *kebebasan beragama dan beribadah.* Kedua, *diberinya peluang hukum agar umat Islam memiliki hukumnya sendiri yang khas.* Ketiga, *ekspresi kultural menyangkut warisan budaya lokal seperti pemberangusan dan penyitaan warisan budaya. Dan* keempat, *hak untuk memerintah (*self-goverment*) dan mengatur rumah tangga sendiri, mengelola tanah dan sumber alam, termasuk hak untuk memperoleh kekuasaan secara merdeka.*

Ahmad Suaedy

The Muslim Minority Movement in Southmost Thailand: From the Periphery to the Centre

خلاصة: ازدادت فكرة الأقلية أهمية وأثارت اهتماما واسعا وسط عملية التغير في هذا العصر من عهد العولمة، وقد بدأ هذا الاجراء من تجربة الأقلية المسلمة في الجزء الشرقي من أروبا في الدول الخاضعة للاتحاد السوفييتي سابقا، عندما جاهدت من أجل الحصول على الاستقلال والمساواة بالأغلبية؛ فمنذ ذلك الحين من اوائل التسعينات تتابعت الأقليات في الدول الديموقراطية في النهوض بالمطالبة بالمساواة، وما لبث أن انتشرت هذه الظاهرة في كثير من أجزاء العالم.

يعرض هذا المقال عن الأقلية المسلمة باتخاذ حركة الأقلية الاسلامية في جنوب تايلاند كمثال للقضية؛ والمقال يحاول أن يجد جوابا حول حركة الجماعة الأقلية المسلمة في سبيل تحقيق هويتها ضمن دائرة الهيمنة الحكومية؛ وإلى أبعد من ذلك يحاول هذا المقال أيضا ان يقتفي أثر الجهات الفاعلة سواء كانت جماعية أم فردية في استمرارية الحركة الاجتماعية في جنوب تايلاند، تلك الحركة التي كانت متسمة بالتمرد والانفصالية.

ومن الناحية النظرية يمكن البحث في أصول حركة الجماعة الاسلامية الأقلية بمنهج الذاكرة الجماعية الذي ينتهي به التحليل إلى إظهار أربعة طبقات من الهوية لديهم؛ أولها الارث التاريخي للمملكة الاسلامية بفطاني التي تبقى في ذاكرتهم كبيرة إذ كانت مسيطرة على شبه جزيرة ملايا، وهي خلاصة ثقافتهم الجماعية وهي تعبير عن ازدهار المملكة محليا وعن ازدهار الاسلام ووحدة الأرخبيل التي كانوا هم جزءا منها، خصوصا عندما يتوحد ذلك بوجود المحكمة الاسلامية مع مكانة رجال الدين ونفوذهم أو المكانة القوية للأئمة.

ثانيا التشابه الاسلامي الملايوي حيث هناك تشابه على سبيل المثال بين المسلمين الاندونيسيين والماليزيين يظهر جليا في الممارسات والتفكير الاسلامي وفي ثقافتهم، وعلى

هذا فإن موضع اهتمامهم هو كيف تكون صياغة الارخبيل وبالأخص الأرخبيل الاسلامي كهوية في تايلاند؛ وثالثا عامل الاسلام نفسه حيث كانوا على وعي بأنهم جزء من العالم الاسلامي؛ ورابعا واقع دولة تايلاند كحقيقة سياسية يسودها البوذيون؛ تلك هي الطبقات من الهوية التي جعلتهم في تطورها متآخين جدا من حيث الايديولوجية حتى استطاعت أن توحد الأقلية المسلمة بجنوب تايلاند في جهاد مشترك.

بيد أن حركتهم كثيرا ما واجهت عراقيل نتيجة رد فعل الحكومة المحلية التي استندت بذكاء لوضع فكرة القومية لدولة الشعب؛ فإن الالتزام بهذه الفكرة تكون وحدة الشعب مع تنوع المجتمع سواء كان في الجانب الاجتماعي السياسي أم الديني ضرورية الأولوية، وتلك هي الحالة التي تعيشها الأقلية المسلمة في تايلاند؛ ذلك لأنه عندما نشأت طائفة من المجتمع ولها رؤية مختلفة، وخاصة إذا كانت أقلية مع مصلحة مختلفة عن مصلحة دولة الشعب كان طبعيا أن تستن الدولة برامج لاستيعابهم.

وهنا فإن المبدأ الذي يتمسك به الأغلبية ويوافقون عليه هو أن القرار الوطني يجب الاحتفاظ به، وتكون مصلحة الأغلبية فوق الأقلية التي تتعرض بالتأكيد للقضاء عليهم؛ فضلا عن أن الحكومة مدعومة بسلطة تستطيع أن تفرض هيمنتها على مختلف جوانب الحياة الاجتماعية اعنى التعليم والقانون والاقتصاد وحتى اللغة.

والمشكلة أن فكرة القومية التي تروج لها الحكومة لا تفسح المجال في كثير من الأحيان لبناء علاقة أكثر مساواة وعدالة، إلا إذا كان هناك تغير جذري في مفهوم القومية لدولة الشعب؛ فالاجراء الديموقراطي وحقوق الانسان اللذان هما أساسيان في مفهوم القومية في الحقيقة لم يعطيا الضمان بأن الأقلية يستطيعون أن يحصلوا على حقوق تتعلق بتاريخهم وثقافتهم ودينهم؛ وفي هذا الصدد يتقدم الأقلية المسلمة في جنوب تايلاند ببعض المطالب الاساسية؛ أولها حرية ممارسة الدين وأداء العبادات؛ ثانيا إفساح المجال القانوني للمسلمين أن يطبقوا أحكامهم الخاصة؛ ثالثا التعبير الثقافي الخاص بالإرث الثقافي المحلي مثل الحملة والاستيلاء على الإرث الثقافي؛ ورابعا الحق في الحكم الذاتي وإدارة شئونهم الخاصة وإدارة الأراضي والمصادر الطبيعية بما في ذلك حق الحصول على سلطة بكل حرية.

The Muslim minority in South Thailand[1] seems to have missed out on the significant changes that accompanied the fall of Communism at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Muslim minorities in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, for instance, experienced quite drastic change, some becoming independent nation-states, and if not, at least gaining self-determination and self-governance, or equal rights as minorities under the United Nations (UN) declaration.[2] The Muslim minority in South Thailand, which has experienced similar repression though not under a Communist government, has yet to experience the kind of recognition that Paulton has described as the emergence of a global awareness of the fate of Muslim minorities accompanying the fall of Communism. Paulton writes:

> In the late 1980s with the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, minority rights once came on the human rights agenda. Since then the international community had moved towards standardization and codification of minority rights, leading to the U.N. Declaration in the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992, and the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: First legally binding international instrument devoted to the plight of minorities.[3]

Though this may be the case, it is not true that insurgency, separatism, and violence are the main choice for the majority of Malay-Muslim activists and residents in South Thailand when it comes to demanding justice and the eradication of discrimination. They have a long history of repression. Forbidden from speaking and studying their Malay-Muslim language, their culture and history in schools or at work, today, some 60,000 soldiers are posted at various check points and military posts – most of which are in the yards of Buddhist temples – throughout three provinces whose joint population fails to exceed three million people.

After the 2004 violence, the majority of Muslims have clearly shifted towards the centre from what was previously a rather peripheral attitude. They have indeed not lessened their demands for justice, the eradication of discrimination, the revival of Malay-Muslim traditional culture and language, and freedom of expression. They now pursue such demands by strengthening civil society, by increasing community awareness of cultural and human rights, engaging in political discourse and debate in the public realm and negotiating vis-à-vis the central government or social movements in general. In doing so, they utilize the momentum behind the demands for democracy within Thailand on the one hand, and the effects of globalization on the other, which have increased international pressure. The two elements of suppression and opportunity continue to shape the current situation, as they have done in other Muslim countries, such as the social movement in Egypt and the Iranian revolution, in which simultaneous but contradictory processes pushed Islamism toward its hegemonic position: *opportunity* and *suppression*.[4]

This article, which focuses on observing individual and group actors in the social movement in South Thailand in a way that does not neglect the important contributions made by political actors as well as by the insurgency and separatist movement,[5] contends that insurgency, separatism, and violence are no longer the typical choice for those who strive for fundamental human rights in the Thai nation-state. Unfortunately, however, the central government of the Thai Kingdom has not been very responsive nor has it taken these demands seriously. It has shown a lack of political will in granting these actors more extensive rights as demanded on a global scale by recent developments in human rights and the rethinking of the concept of nationalism and national identity.[6]

Rethinking the concept of nationalism has led Chaim Gans, for instance, to differentiate between statist nationalism and cultural nationalism. Statist nationalism places more emphasis on a unified national identity that tends to produce a forced cultural unity that ignores the cultural differences of socio-cultural groups on the national stage. It stresses the geographical boundaries of a nation-state, within which all must refer to one national identity. This concept was applied quite strongly during the Second World War.

Meanwhile, newer conceptions of nationalism include cultural nationalism, which is quite flexible towards cultural differences on the national stage. This concept enables the possibility of creating cultural diversity within a state, especially for those states that are home to very different social groups but that identify themselves as being part of one nation. The relationship between Canada and Quebec is an example of this kind of nationalism, as the existence and practice of Quebec's own language (French) and culture has been granted a certain amount of freedom and flexibility within the state of Canada.[7] Any state that is historically home to very large cultural differences will find it necessary to embrace this concept of cultural nationalism, as statist nationalism can no longer be maintained in the contemporary era of globalization.

Although the Thai government has been highly persuasive in running a number of programs as part of its national agenda, such as providing free schooling and constructing infrastructure, in the South these programs are generally seen as supporting assimilation and the eradication of the Malay-Muslim language, culture, and history from South Thailand. Such programs represent a continuation of the exclusive and static way nationalism and national identity were viewed in the past. The Thai government is incredibly slow in responding to change, and is too cautious simply because of the region's long-lasting resistance to and conflict against the Thai government. If there is no meaningful change in the strategy adopted by the central government in the near future, there is cause to fear a return of a stronger insurgency, separatist struggle, and more intense violence. For the sake of peace and to guarantee minority rights, the international community must monitor the process that is currently unfolding in South Thailand.

Social Movement as a Strategy: From the Periphery to the Centre

Social movement is one way to initiate change through procedures involving political parties and the bureaucracy, or even through demonstration and revolution. Asef Bayat compared and contrasted the changes brought about in the 1980s in Egypt by the Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) through a social movement without revolution, with the revolution in Iran in the 1970s, which may be described as a revolution without a social movement.[8] Different from radical strategies and demands for change voiced through political parties, the

bureaucracy, or even through revolution, social movements are more gradual and rely on the awareness of their supporters and on voluntary support due to such awareness, rather than formal membership ties and structured orders. Mario Diani, for instance, describes four primary characteristics of social movements. They first require the establishment of a strong network between the members of the movement through continual, informal, and unstructured interaction. Second, there must be a shared belief and solidarity amongst its members. Third, there is a need for the formation of collective action to resolve conflict, as is the continual pursuit of demands and actions that are not institutionalized and do not follow the procedures usually followed in religious organizations or structures in general.[9]

Social movements in general involve gradual change, yet tend to mask agendas for radical change and as a consequence are long-term and substantial, and often non-linear.[10] Currently in South Thailand, the freedom or autonomy from the central Thai government is perhaps the underlying but very far-off agenda of the social movement. As a result, it is radical in nature, and will remain so especially when gradual but more fundamental change, such as self-determination, self-governance or the acknowledgement of being a minority with equal rights as citizens, fails.

Another aspect of social movements is that they do not neglect the possibility of working with the government in power, and are even open to becoming part of the power structure that they help to shape, though they continue to maintain their independence and original objectives.[11] This then opens possibilities for negotiation within the new structure in order to obtain the ultimate goal of the movement. While insurgency and separatism would, according to Asef Bayat's categories above, be seen as revolutionary demands for change, this article does not differentiate between those involved in social movements and those involved in insurgency, separatism, or revolution, as all can have revolutionary demands. The activists interviewed for this research showed great respect for both those involved in party politics and the bureaucracy, as well as those involved in insurgency and separatism.[12] However, at the same time they are concerned about society's unwillingness to support revolutionary change given that its members have lived under repression in South Thailand for so long that it will take time before they will learn to participate in politics and speak out publically. Several informants are

involved in providing political and civic education to society through various means, including through the mass media, especially radio, print media, and the internet, as well as through organizing training, workshops, advocacy, and strengthening networks between different groups working on a number of different issues. It is thus hoped that such efforts will lead to long-term, radical and substantive change. By using the same channels as those in power, but choosing a different paradigm and a different target while at the same time encouraging enthusiasm and change, this movement is perhaps an example of what Antonio Gramsci called the "war of position"[13] by increasing awareness, strengthening networks, and gaining wider moral, cultural, institutional, and intellectual support within society.[14] For Gramsci, the "war of position" was a process of change undertaken in stages when outright revolution was impossible, but the change was still opposed to the hegemonic power. Robert Cox writes:[15]

> Accordingly, Gramsci argued that the war of movement could not be effective against the hegemonic state-societies of Western Europe. The alternative strategy is the war of position which slowly builds up the strength of the social foundations of a new state. In Western Europe, the struggle had to be won in civil society before an assault on the state could achieve success. Premature attack on the state by a war of movement would only reveal the weakness of the opposition and lead to a reimposition of bourgeois dominance as the institutions of civil society reasserted control.

Due to such severe and long (centuries old) repression, like it or not the Malay-Muslims of South Thailand lie on the periphery in national politics, to the extent that several scholars call them "second class citizens" compared to the Thai majority. Even today, the Thai government continues to view the three Malay-Muslim majority provinces in the South as occupied lands, and not equivalent to the other Thai provinces.[16] The tendency of the state to force a unified national identity on all citizens and ignoring cultural uniqueness and the differences of certain groups on the one hand, and the lack of upward mobilization in the workforce on the other,[17] has led to the advocacy of ethnic nationalism[18] and to create a Malay-Muslim identity in reaction to the strength and depth of state penetration and enforced uniformity. Ethnic nationalism is not static, but rather fluid, enabling flexibility in the strategies used by Muslims in the South in their struggle to be free from state

repression. It has made them more likely to take a middle path in order to take position in Gramsci's "war of position".

Yuan-Kang Wang has compared the Muslim minorities in Xinjiang and in Guangdong, noting that while the Muslim minority in Xinjiang tended to take a peripheral position and attitude, the Muslim minority in Guangdong was inclined towards integration and taking the middle path. Wang defined peripheral as a position a group takes when it differs in regards to its perception of national identity and its individual group identity, and tends towards resistance or rebellion. Meanwhile the middle path, or integration, is the path a group takes when it chooses to fully integrate itself with the national identity and to become part of the established social and political structure.[19] According to Wang, if the government gives equal opportunities in political and economic mobilization as it gives to the political elite, and when it treats everyone equally as citizens, minorities will tend to take the middle or integrative path. This is what occurred in the case of the Muslim minority in Guangdong. On the contrary, if the government restricts the mobility of the political elite of minorities and treats them discriminatively, they will tend to take a peripheral position, as with the Muslim minority in Xinjiang.[20]

However, the South Thailand case differs slightly from Wang's observations. The central government's granting of equal opportunities in political and economic mobilization and equal treatment for all citizens is not what has caused the Muslim minority to adopt a middle path, as this is precisely what the Muslim minority is fighting for. Rather, the middle path here refers to the fact that while struggling for these things, the Muslim minority uses democratic and legal procedures, whether through legal, political, cultural, and public communication channels. The middle path includes, for instance, calling for changes in legislation and amendments to the constitution. Reference to human rights as the foundation for the struggle and the objectives to be achieved is also an indicator of the middle path, rather than opposition to the central government based on ethnic or exclusive identities. Human rights can also become the basis to achieve guaranteed protection of ethnicity or cultural uniqueness, and to realize demands for political and economic justice and equal treatment as citizens.

This article demonstrates that the middle path or position is thus not solely determined by the central government, but rather can be seized

by society to achieve justice, economic and political mobilization, and equal treatment as citizens. The ultimate goal may well be to achieve, for instance, freedom or autonomy, yet the final achievement must be reached through negotiation. It seems that this is currently occurring in the social movement in South Thailand. In this context, this research is not intended to highlight the situation in South Thailand as a success story, but rather just the beginning of a phenomenon that may evolve into a trend.

The Thai Kingdom versus Malay-Muslim South Thailand

National Identity and the Fate of the Muslim Minority

Tension, conflict, and the ongoing war between the Patani Kingdom[21] and the Siamese (now Thai) Kingdom[22] has a long history, some would say it dates back centuries.[23] Others, however, note that when Islam first came to the region, sometime around the 14-17th centuries CE, there was virtually no conflict between the Muslims in Patani and the Buddhists living nearby. They each managed their own kingdoms peacefully. Conflict only emerged in the 18th century with the establishment of the Bangkok Kingdom (1767-1810) and its government, which aggressively replaced the Ayuthaya dynasty (1569-1767).[24] A Malay-Muslim, who wrote a history of Patani which was written in Arab-Malay script (known as *Jawi* in South Thailand), also argues against those who suggest that the Patani Kingdom was already under the rule of the Ayuthaya Kingdom before the Bangkok Kingdom came to power.[25] The tradition of giving a Golden Flower every year in tribute to the Kingdom of Siam is controversial, as some consider this a sign that the Patani Kingdom was a subject of the Kingdom of Siam, but others see it as nothing more than an indication of good relations and mutual respect as the same tribute was made to other kingdoms, such as the Vietnamese and Cambodian Kingdoms, which at the time were both Buddhist.[26] Lorna Dewaraja who has researched the histories of Muslim minorities in Theravada Buddhist-majority countries such as Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand, writes:

> ...During the last 500 years the Thai Muslim who are an assorted community and spread into the Thai Buddhist environment except for fact that they have remained Muslims. Thai Muslims have assimilated the

> host culture much more than the Sri Lanka Muslims, for the former speak Thai, wear Thai dress and have adopted Thai forms of greeting...[27]

At that time, conflict and war was centered around conquering territory, but with each controlling their own realms.[28] Later developments saw the conflict became more systematic and covert when the King of Siam, Raja Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), influenced by Western ideas of nationalism, introduced a nation-state model, and applied strict boarders to the Kingdom of Siam. The Malay Peninsula or Greater Patani, which had been under the rule of the Islamic Patani Kingdom, was incorporated into the Kingdom of Siam's new nation-state.[29] Chulalongkorn's successor, King Wachiravut (1910-1925), who was born and raised in Europe, mostly in the UK, increased the area incorporating the Patani region, and adopted a stricter version of the Western concept of the nation-state. King Wachiravut also introduced patriotism, a mark of western nationalism, by establishing a paramilitary group to protect the Kingdom of Siam's nation-state.

The former region of the Patani Kingdom annexed by the Kingdom of Siam later became a bargaining tool between the Kingdom of Siam and the English and French colonizers, who at the time occupied Malaya (now Malaysia) to the south, and Burma, Vietnam and Cambodia to the north. The contemporary Malaysian states bordering Thailand—Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis—were part of this region. At the demand of the English, Siam surrendered these states as a concession so as to avoid being attacked and occupied.[30] In doing so, the Kingdom of Siam avoided occupation and thus never in its history was this kingdom, based on Buddhist cosmology, to borrow Surin Pitsuwan's term,[31] subject to Western colonialism. However, in the collective memory of the Malay-Muslims, they have lived under eternal Siamese occupation.

Thai-Buddhism and Malay-Islam: Two Contradictory Cosmologies

Thai modernization and nationalism as introduced by King Chulalongkorn did not only plant the seeds of patriotism in the members of his newly formed paramilitary force, evoke pride in the pioneers of the kingdom, and establish strict geographical borders. It also affected religion. King Chulalongkorn, for instance, initiated the establishment

of a religious organization, the *Sanghai,* which consisted of *Bhikku*, or monks, at the end of the 19th century.[32] This organization was intended to hierarchically organize *Bhikku*, so that the king, kingdom, and the state could use the organization to legitimize its authority in the eyes of the people. The king then stipulated that a prince should act as protector of the *Sanghai* organization, with Prince Vajiranana first to hold the position (1910-1921).[33]

The influence of *Bhikku* or monks in Thai society is very strong, and the influence of Buddhism very deep. In the past, pre-modern era, one percent of the children in Thailand became *Bhikku*, and half a percent became *Bhikku* assistants. At that time, according to Charles Keyes, it was common for temples in the villages and also at higher levels to be managed and led by a *Bhikku* who came from the local middle or elite classes. It has only been in the modern era that *Bhikku* have more generally come from the villages and traditional societies, and here it tends to be a way to achieve social mobility. Those who are educated in Buddhism often choose between becoming respected *Bhikku,* or working in the public or private sectors, holding low or middle rank positions.[34]

The integration of the religious organization into the Thai state was so complete that the king was positioned as the protector of Buddhism and thus became an integral part of the religious structure (*satsana*) itself. The king had a special place in religion, as did the *Bhikku.* According to Thai Buddhist Cosmology, *Bhikku* are religious leaders while the King is the protector of the entire religion of Buddhism in the Thai state. This concept was later adopted into the 1932 constitution of the Thai Kingdom and has been maintained in subsequent amendments. However, the position of King as protector of religion, according to Thai Buddhism, does not refer to the person but rather the position. According to this cosmology, the King has a special relationship with the *Bhikku* at a spiritual level, but does not have power over the *Bhikku*. This is reflected, for instance, in Thai citizenship. *Bhikku* do not need to have national identity cards, do not need to elect others or be elected in general elections, and are not obliged to pay taxes thanks to their position as religious leaders. Similarly, the King needs no identity card, does not vote and is not elected through general elections, and is exempt from paying taxes because he owns the country and holds a special position in Buddhism. Both the *Bhikku* and the King are considered to

be beyond politics, though it cannot be denied that both have political influence, especially in everyday politics. Thus there emerges a kind of trinity comprised of the nation, the monarchy/king, and religion. King Vajiravudh formed these three united elements into the "Three Pillars" of the Thai nation and state at the beginning of the birth of Thai nationalism. The three pillars, the nation (*chat*), religion (*satsana*), and the monarchy (*phramahakasat*), functioned together as a single unit, with the monarchy acting to protect and bind the other two together.[35]

Government intervention in religion was not limited to this organization, but extended to religious education. The government, for instance, facilitated the establishment of two religious education centers for Buddhism in Bangkok especially for *Bhikku* to study religion and meditation, whose graduates could become "spokesmen", formally known as *Tammathut* (a kind of "ambassador" for the *dhamma*), promoting government programs. However, later developments primarily in the post constitutional monarchy era of the 1960s and 1970s saw a deviation from or opposition to the unified *Sanghai*. A number of *Bhikku* took the initiative to establish a kind of compound with programs that did not require government approval, or that even contradicted or criticized government programs. For instance, *Bhikku* of very high standing (like *wali* or saints in Islam) established a compound in the forest and turned it into a place of meditation where the community could come and go as they pleased, without government approval . In fact, in the 1960s quite a few had become involved in communism, influenced especially by Vietnam and other neighboring countries such as Laos and Burma.[36] Although the government took a firm stance and punished these *Bhikku* by expelling them from the *Sanghai* organization, the trend of "deviance" continued to grow. Today, according to Keyes, it is quite the norm that *Bhikku* form groups with specific aims and orientations as is typical of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that do not seek nor abide by approval from the government, and are often involved in advocacy which conflicts with those government programs that do not benefit the people. This is thanks to the emergence of several *Bhikku* groups who initiated and were involved in independent social programs, both progressive and fundamental.[37] Keyes writes:

> ...But Thai Society is no longer one in which what Buddhism means can be determined by the state. The events of the 1970s and the memory of these events, even in silence, fundamentally undermined the dominance of an established Buddhism which had been shaped by a series of crises involving religion and power since the end of the nineteenth century when the country was first to launch the process of the creation of a modern nation-state.[38]

Meanwhile, the 'ideal' history of Islam knows no formal religious institutions like the Church in Christianity or the *Sanghai* in Thai Buddhism. Islam has its own cosmology, not only an ideal cosmology in doctrine and history, but one that has also been influenced by the local realities of the areas in which it exists. Although there tends to be a general platform for Islamic cosmology, local dynamics and challenges have made significant contributions to Muslim cosmology in South Thailand.

However, before discussing this further, it is important to note that because of the length of time during which Malay-Muslims in South Thailand have lived under repression and occupation by the central government without freedom of expression, it seems insufficient to base this examination on the life and expressions of Malay-Muslims as recorded in academic historical accounts or equally academic theories on Islam.[39] Thus the main focus is on Malay-Muslim collective memory, though this is of course crosschecked in both academic literature and non-academic pieces written by Malay-Muslims themselves (which also tend to be an expression of their collective memory).

To this end, research was undertaken in South Thailand for one month, where more than 30 key actors were interviewed in depth, some more than once. Attempts were made to experience their daily lifestyle, by going to traditional markets, taking public busses between cities and smaller public transport vehicles within cities, taking motorbike taxis, speaking with students I met while living on campus, meeting the families of old and newly made friends, and visiting modern and traditional *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) to meet teachers and *ustadz* (religious leaders). These activities were undertaken in three provinces, Yala, Narathiwat, and Patani, as well as in Songkhla. Not being able to speak Thai was a limitation as the majority in Thailand, especially children, communicate in Thai, though almost all can speak Malay as it is used at home and when studying religion, especially at TADEKA

(religious education centers for pre-school and primary school children that are present at almost every mosque in South Thailand), religious *madrasah,* prayer houses, mosques or at home. Not having mastered the Thai version of Malay, which differs significantly from Indonesian or Malaysian, was another shortcoming.[40]

Collective Memory

Theory

Using collective memory to understand the dynamics of life in situations like those in South Thailand is crucial. Collective memory is one way to immerse oneself in the perspectives, thoughts, and ambitions of a community, especially when repression and occupation has meant that it has not been able to or does not have a public sphere in which to express such things. Academically speaking, collective memory differs from history. Examining the collective memory of the life of the Jews who suffered under Nazism, Yael Zerubavel defined the two:

> History, the product of a scholarly scrutiny of the records of the past, is essentially a 'superorganic' science detached from the pressures of the immediate sociopolitical reality. Collective memory, on the other hand, is an organic part of social life that is continuously transformed in response to society's changing need.[41]

Collective memory is also said to be a continuation of the historical record, as it is society's response to past events that have been stored because of repression. Their socio-political objectives or agendas of today and the future are also stored in collective memory. Zerubavel goes on to write:

> Collective memory continuously negotiates historical records and current social and political agendas. And in the process of referring back to these records, it shifts its interpretation, selectively emphasizing, suppressing, and elaborating different aspects of the record. History and memory, therefore, do not operate in totally detached, opposite directions. Their relationships are underlined by conflict as well as interdependence, and this ambiguity provides the commemoration with creative tension that makes it such a fascinating subject of study.[42]

According to Yael Zerubavel, in the entire historical Jewish experience of joy and suffering, only three moments constitute very strong and deep memories. The first is that of their unmatched glory and prosperity when they received the Torah and lived out its teachings. Second, their incredible suffering when they were tortured, expelled, and were scattered over the world with no state or place to live—a suffering that would only continue under the cruelty of Nazism. And the third moment is their hope for return to prosperity with the establishment of the state of Israel on Palestinian land, which promised them a sovereign state of their own, and glory and prosperity like that in the past.[43] Thus, unlike historical accounts that tend to follow objective scientific procedures, collective memory tends to involve emotion. Consequently, it results in the emergence of a group identity and collectivity that differentiates the group from others. Collective memory and the revisiting of various events and moments in that group's history then further strengthen the sense of collective identity.[44]

Malay-Muslim Collective Memory: the Patani Kingdom, Islam, Cultural and National Identities

Jewish collective memory is similar to Malay-Muslim collective memory in South Thailand. Malay-Muslims also remember three important moments, namely their prosperity under the strong Patani Kingdom and the kingdoms before it; their long-suffering under Thai occupation; and their hope for freedom and equality in the future. In their collective memory, the prosperity of the Patani Kingdom also includes the Islam of the expansive and powerful kingdoms before it, such as the Langkasuka Kingdom, which then became Patani Darussalam.[45] The Langkasuka Kingdom was not only a source of pride because their kings converted to Islam before any other kingdom in the archipelago, such as Malacca, Sri Wijaya in Palembang, or smaller kingdoms in what is today Malaysia. Rather, it was during the Langkasuka Kingdom that the prosperous Patani Kingdom was established, which then not only became a symbol of Islamic prosperity in the Malay Archipelago but also became a global trading centre known as the Malay Empire, Greater Patani, or the Malay Peninsula. So important was its position, that Michael J. Montesano and Patrick Jory, as if to confirm the col-

lective memory of the Malay-Muslims in the region, describe it in the following way:

> If Southeast Asia is a meeting place of the world's civilizations, cultures, and religions, then one of the points of most intense contact must surely be the Peninsula that bounds the eastern side of the Straits of Malacca. It is here that maritime Southeast Asia meets the region's mainland; that "the Malay world" converges with that of the Thai; that Islam encounters Theravada Buddhism; and that since ancient times the economically dynamic part of the region has been.[46]

This deep collective memory, in religion, economics, politics, and culture, that clearly saw Malay-Muslims to hold an important position not only in the archipelago but also in the world, was shattered all of a sudden when they lost all their power and identity under the rule of the Thai Kingdom, a state based on Buddhist cosmology that they neither knew, nor understood. One historian, who focuses more on representing the collective memory of the Patani Kingdom[47] as written in Jawi script, quotes a heroic sentence written on the exit of a museum in Mexico City. The historian, Haji Abdurrahman Daud,[48] apparently wishes to remind all that the legacy of history and of a land can never be lost as it always lives on. The original English quote reads:

> ...we leave the museum behind, but not history, because history continues with our life. The Motherland is a continuity, and we all are laborers toiling for its greatness. Out of the past we received the strength required for the present. Out of the past we received the purpose and encouragement for the future. Let us then realize the responsibilities for freedom in order to deserve more and more the honor of being Mexicans.[49]

Perhaps the quote is intended to be satirical as it refers to a passage taken from Mexico, as the political situation in South Thailand is, as a result of government repression, less than conducive to freedom of expression in matters pertaining to the existence and the history of Patani. The quote contains the word "freedom" and suggests that the past must be a reference for the present. In his 100-page pocketbook, Abdurrahman also writes that the Malay Empire lost power completely in 1902. The years between 1902-1916 marked the complete annexation of the Malay area by the Kingdom of Siam. The area was divided

into seven regions, in order to further fragment Malay power. Then in the 1940s, after uprisings during the previous years, all government heads of the seven provinces and those at the lower levels were appointed by the central government and all were Buddhist.[50] Abdurrahman writes on the end of the kingdom:

> The Patani Muslim Malay Empire was absolutely defeated. The sovereignty of Malay kings was lost, along with its citizen's rights, like an alligator swallowing powerless prey in one gulp. The right to independence, the right to freedom, and the right to live, to have a nation, a language, culture, and religion.[51]

Abdurraham refers to the concept of human rights born in the American people's struggle to free themselves from English occupation by advocating three main rights, the right to life, the right to independence and the right to freedom. According to Abdurrahman, the Siamese occupation of Patani was the result of a series of discussions and agreements between the Kingdom of Siam and the English Kingdom. Siam was determined to maintain control over South Thailand, which it had already split into seven provinces, but the English were also determined to control the area. As an occupying force, the Kingdom of Siam tried not only to conquer the nation and the land, but also tried to destroy ethnic groups, language, religion, and culture. Thus, both the Siamese and the English were colonial forces. For Abdurrahman, the three or four provinces that are currently home to the Malay-Muslims from the former Patani Kingdom and that are now part of the Thai Kingdom, are the only Muslim provinces in the archipelago that are still under occupation, as all others have gained independence from the English. On the discussions and agreements reached between the Siamese and English, Abdurrahman writes:

> Bangkok [capital city of the Kingdom of Siam] considered this agreement to represent great magnificence that they could be proud of because it raised their state to equal standing with the occupying powers in Asia and Europe. As a result of the agreement, Bangkok introduced its new policy, known as the Siam Assimilation Policy, which marginalized the Malays by eradicating Malay existence right down to its roots, through:
> 1. Eliminating and replacing Malay citizenship with Siam citizenship;
> 2. Cutting off ethnic Malay identity (passed down through generations) and replacing it with a Siamese identity;

3. Wiping out Malay culture, replacing it with the Siamese lifestyle.[52]

In addition to memories of culture, language, and the claim to the land of the former Patani Kingdom, the position of *ulama* and the application of *shari'ah* are two elements intrinsic to the memories of the existence of the Patani Kingdom and its Islamic nature. In the past, the Patani Kingdom was remembered for its adherence to the *shari'ah*, with *ulama* responsible for its implementation. Thus for Malay-Muslims the *ulama* and the kingdom/king are two sides of the same coin. When Prime Minister Phibul revoked government implementation of *shari'ah,* the reaction was quite strong. However, in one way demands for the central government to implement Islamic law were an acknowledgment of the existence and authority of the Thai state itself.

The implementation of Islamic law, in the Islamic cosmology of South Thailand, cannot be separated from the existence of the state, either the Islamic Kingdom in South Thailand or the Buddhist Thai Kingdom. In place of the state, an Islamic Council was established in all regions as a facility for registering marriages, divorces, reconciliations after separations, and inheritance. The institution actually works within the boundaries of national law but is managed privately, more like an NGO. Its registries are recognized as legitimate state documents, and any dispute can be brought before the Islamic section of the State Court. According to one employee of the Islamic Council in Yala, from the standard annual budget of 5 million baht, the government only contributes 200,000 baht, and provides the council with a very simple building at the provincial level. He sees this as yet further evidence of the Thai government's discrimination and injustice towards the Malay-Muslims in the South.[53] The remaining budget, he explained, comes from administration fees and *zakat* (alms) or donations from Muslims. Thus employees at the centre do not receive wages equal to those received by other public and private employees. All, except the administrative officers who are paid from the official budget, must hold second jobs.

Memories of the glory of Islam and the prosperity of Muslims continue to be part of Malay-Muslim collective memory. At this time, several prominent *ulama* and famous writers emerged, one of whom was Sheikh Dāwūd al-Faṭṭānī.[54] His books (published as the *kitab kuning*, loose-leaved books printed on yellow paper) are well known

in many higher education institutes in Egypt, including Al-Azhar, and in the Middle East in general, and are still taught in *pondok* in South Thailand. Such *ulama* and writers were believed to have created a deep culture, language, and tradition, as well as a social structure that still exists today. *Jawi* (Arab Malay) script was a symbol of their existence, and the Malay language is still used today within the family and in teaching Islamic education, even though it has been officially banned.[55] Although there are many Thai-language religious education books and even Thai translations of the Qur'an, there is strong resistance to using Thai in Islamic education, which is understandable given that Thai is seen as part of Buddhism and the Thai State.[56] One interviewee stated that Islamic education in Thai was seen as part of the effort to eradicate Malay-Muslim culture and tradition, because the government provides enormous funding for all subjects instructed in Thai, but not a cent for those instructed in Malay.[57]

Based on the above examination, we may conclude that Malay-Muslims in South Thailand have multiple identities. First, they identify with the Patani Kingdom, remembered as the Greater Patani superpower, or the kingdom that reigned over the Malaya Peninsula. Although it is difficult to find evidence of its former glory in historical records, both primary/secondary sources, or through artifacts, nearly the entire population of Malay-Muslims in South Thailand shares the same memory of its existence. There, there was unity, between the glory of Islam, the glory of the Patani Kingdom, and the united archipelago, of which they were part, as well as an independent religious court and a special position for *ulama* and *imam*.

Second, they identify with the "archipelago", or more particularly the "Islamic archipelago". Being Muslims, they share similacities with Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia, especially Java and Aceh. These two area are often mentioned by interviewees, who said that culturally, Islam in these other areas of the archipelago was most similar to that in South Thailand. This belief is held by the entire community in South Thailand. Abdurrahman notes, yet, as Malay-Muslims of South Thailand are, as a result of the Siamese occupation, 100 years behind Muslims in other areas of Malaysia and Indonesia, not to mention Singapore, in terms of *tamaddun* (their culture and civilization).

Third, Islam itself constitutes one part of their identity. Their adherence to Islam makes them feel a part of the Muslim world. They

identify with all Muslims, but especially with those from the Middle East.

Fourth, they identify with the Thai State as a political reality in all its forms, as a Buddhist kingdom with a Buddhist majority. Interviewees often uttered sentences of the kind, "I am a Thai citizen, but why am I discriminated against, unable to speak about what we have, our language, traditions and history?". All of these identities are prominent in Malay-Muslim collective memory.

While Islam has no institute of religious leaders in Malay-Muslim cosmology, it is apparent that the King and the Islamic/Patani Kingdom or government in general, on the one hand, and *shari'ah,* the Malay language, and the *ulama* as the leaders of Islam on the other, cannot be separated in Malay-Muslim cosmology. An independent religious court and the enforcement of Islamic moral standards according to *shari'ah* are an important part of this cosmology. Thus, from almost all perspectives, there is no harmony between the Buddhist cosmology of the Thai State and the Malay-Muslim cosmology of the three provinces.

Even today, Malay-Muslims feel that they are struggling under the occupying force of a foreign power. They still dream of cultural freedom, freedom of expression, and of justice, either through autonomy or through self-governance, with a government of their own based on their own religious and cultural identity.[58] Their current situation is much like the Muslim minority in the Balkans and East Europe before the mid 20th century, before the changes that took place there, which Paulton describes as follows:

> ...(t)he League of Nations (established after the First World War) [now the UN] had a number of provisions regarding the rights of minorities in east or south-eastern Europe, these were largely ignored by the state concerned, with little or no sanction from outside. The explosion of German nationalism under Hitler which led to appalling destruction of the Second World War produced a revulsion towards all forms of nationalism, which extended even to provisions for minorities. In the post-war period minority rights were generally ignored in favour of individual human rights. The dynamics of the Cold War issued in the ideological struggle, with the Soviet camp stressing economic and social rights while the West stressed civil and political ones.[59]

Nevertheless, despite harsh repression and imposed uniformity, there are quite a lot of different expressions of Islam in Thailand. As well as having diverse origins, from Cambodia (Champa), Persia or Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Middle Eastern countries, within Thailand itself Muslims are spread throughout several regions. They are also not immune to outside influence, including from the Malay-Muslim majority in the four provinces of South Thailand (Yala, Patani, Narathiwat, and Satun).[60] Besides this group, there are also Thai-Muslims who have naturally assimilated to the local culture. Muslims in Thailand are thus very plural in terms of their origin, culture, and customs.[61]

Omar Farouk, an expert on Islam in Southeast Asia and Thailand, emphasizes the heterogeneity of Muslims in Thailand. He argues that they can generally be categorized into two groups, the "assimilated Muslims", who have assimilated to the local Thai culture, and those who have not (the "unassimilated Muslims"). The 'assimilated Muslims' are generally spread throughout Thailand and have, through a long process, completely assimilated to the local culture except in that they remain Muslim. Meanwhile, 'unassimilated Muslims' refers to those, often called Malay-Muslims, that reside in the three provinces of Yala, Patani and Narathiwat and still resist the existence of the Thai Kingdom.[62] Similar to Farouk, Imtiyaz Yusuf divides Muslims in Thailand into those that are "integrated" and those that are "unintegrated". Yusuf focuses more on the resistance movement caused by the lack of integration of the Malay-Muslims in South Thailand.[63]

Although it seems impossible that Buddhism could replace Islamic traditions in South Thailand, there is no doubt that globalization and secularization (part of the government program that Malay-Muslims suspect of being a front for Siamization or Thainization), as well as fundamentalism, affect the development of Islam in South Thailand. Today, many Malay-Muslims are concerned about the influence of secularism on the one hand, as it potentially threatens the diversity of Malay-Muslims, but also fundamentalism on the other as it gives them a negative image in the eyes of others and on the international stage.[64]

Marshal Phibul Songkhram and Thaksin Shinawatra:

Ultra Nationalism,[65] the Assimilation Project, and the Marginalization of the Malay-Muslim Minority

The formative era of nationalism, which led to the Thai constitutional monarchy of 1932, was marked by latent tension between members of the old elite who were incorporated into the new monarchy, and the emergence of a new and educated elite, especially in the bureaucracy, military, and political parties. However, this new elite only became new oppressors, more cruel than those before them.[66] Thus the western-influenced nationalism initially introduced by the King, did at certain times and at certain levels come back to bite him. Keyes writes:

> The reform instituted under King Chulalongkorn at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries replaced local political institutions in the semiautonomous polities of the traditional Siamese order with new institutions that were uniform throughout the state and centered on Bangkok. These reforms brought into existence a bureaucracy that became and still remains for most people the embodiment of the Thai state. The creation of a national army was closely linked with the establishment of a bureaucracy in extending uniform control throughout the state.[67]

Another problem was that the concepts accompanying Western-influenced modernization that were adopted both by the King's reformation and also by the new middle class, could not be applied as they were in the West, particularly with regards to the strict separation between civil society, the state, and religion. Thus, modernity was modern only in appearance, and actually adopted and further ingrained the traditional values that contradicted the values of modernity itself. The change to a constitutional monarchy should have made the relationship between the rulers/elite and their people more egalitarian and just, but this was not to be. Keyes once again writes:

> Although in English the Thai civil bureaucracy is often spoken of as a "civil service," the Thai call officials "servants of the crown" (*kharatchakan*). The difference in terminology leads the Thai to see bureaucrats, not as serving the people in whom sovereignty resides, but as representing the crown, or its government.[68]

The height of the assimilation policy, which saw the Siam/Thai identity forced on all Thai citizens and the denial of religious and cultural pluralism and diversity was consolidated with the reappointment of Marshal Phibul Songkhram as Prime Minister for the second time in 1948.[69] In a Prime Minister's Decree, Phibul banned the wearing of sarongs, Muslim hats (*peci*), and the daily dress of Malay-Muslims; the use of Malay as the language of instruction in schools, in names, as school subjects, or as the language used in religious education. Phibul also annulled the previously enforced *shari'ah* law, including Islamic family law (*al-aḥwāl al-shakhshīyah*).[70] It is no surprise that such extreme state intervention made Malay-Muslims feel like "second class citizens", given the continuous threats, the social, political and economic alienation, and the discriminative treatment they were subjected to by their own country.[71] The Religious Court was only restored after significant protest, yet even then restoration was only a partial, and the court was no longer an independent body as it was previously but was positioned under the state court.

During the interim government between Phibul's two terms, the Malay-Muslims led by Haji Sulong[72] made seven demands to the central government.[73] Negotiations over these demands were underway when Phibul started his second term and built a government described by Surin Pitsuwan as chauvinistic and fascist. Haji Sulong and a number of other Muslim leaders were imprisoned for eight years without trial. After having been released in 1954, four years later they were kidnapped and killed and to this day nobody knows where their bodies or graves are. Pitsuwan writes of the Phibul government: "... he turned to a leadership theory already practiced by the fascist regimes under Hitler and Mussolini: absolute obedience to the leader."[74]

Phibul's most chauvinistic policy was applied during his first term in government, when he changed the name of the state from the Kingdom of Siam to the Thai Kingdom in 1939.[75] In doing so, he completely wiped out any possibility of acknowledging ethnic and cultural diversity in the country. One interviewee mentioned that the name change marked the end of the existence of the Malay-Muslims in the eyes of the Thai state. Subjects of the Kingdom of Siam who had been ethnic Siamese, Malay-Muslim, and Siam-Muslim, and as such quite plural, were now unified under one ethnicity – Thai. For the Thai

state, there was no longer any such thing as ethnic Siamese, or ethnic Malays.[76]

Then, in the 1950s and 1960s, protesters and separatists were stigmatized as communists and "bandits".[77] Under Phibul's government Martial Law was also introduced, which allowed the government to detain people for seven days without needing to produce evidence. It is still in effect today. The same "threat" posed by "bandits" and "communists" had previously been used in justifying the military's extermination of Haji Sulong's supporters during a religious ritual in April of 1948.[78] Later during the Thaksin Shinawatra era the labels "bandit" and "terrorism" were used to contain the 2003-2004 violence, which reached its peak with the April 2004 tragedy.[79]

Student movements demanded democratization and demilitarization in the 1980s and 1990s and this gave some flexibility to Thai politics, which then influenced policies pertaining to South Thailand. Although there was no meaningful progress with regard to essential demands such as the right to use the Malay language in the workplace or at school, and the demand for recognition of Malay-Muslim cultural uniqueness in general. Such demands led to the 1997 constitutional amendment, which, amongst other things, allowed civil leaders to step up as national leaders. The inclusion of decentralization was one of the most fundamental changes to the Thai constitution since 1932. However, these changes had no essential implications for the status and position of Malay-Muslims in South Thailand, except in that it raised hopes for possibilities of amending the constitution on a consistent basis.

It were these very amendments that allowed Thaksin Shinawatra, a civilian, ex-policeman, and the richest man in Thailand with his telecommunications business, to establish the political party *Thai Rak Thai* (Thai People Love Thailand, TRT). The party won the 2001 elections and he became the first Prime Minister from the civil sphere. Thaksin immediately sought to renew the populist economy and to push the civil sphere to play a greater role in national leadership. For the economy, Thaksin created three main programs, national competitiveness, industrial linkage, and small-scale entrepreneurship. Besides his success in raising Thailand's technological capabilities to compete on the world stage, Thaksin also channeled capital to develop small and medium enterprises down to the village level.[80] His success in this matter was

proven by his party's re-election in 2005, although he lost all his seats in South Thailand, especially in the three troubled provinces. Before the end of his term, there was a military coup and the TRT was banned from politics by the Thai Supreme Court. The ban is still in effect today. In strengthening his polities and civil society, Thaksin also recruited former university leaders, and was not hesitant about working with those from the left. Charles Keyes describes Thaksin's government:

> The new government [PM Thaksin] that took power in January was widely praised for including several leftist-oriented student leaders from the 1970s, for its apparent openness, and for its concern for social justice, Chamlong was very positive in his support for a new government.[81]

For the South, besides channeling capital for small and medium enterprises, Thaksin also developed infrastructure that had never been built before such as inter-provincial highways between the three provinces. He also appointed Wan Muhamad Noor Matha as minister, then vice prime minister and also as spokesperson for the prime minister's office.[82] He was a leader of the Wahdah Islamic group,[83] which had formed a coalition with Thaksin's party in the 2001 election and won a sufficient number of seats. Thaksin was also quick to shift responsibility for security in South Thailand from the military to the police.[84]

However, this honeymoon did not last long, as Thaksin had built a centralistic government, or as some described it, a civil dictatorship. Thaksin was also felt to have established a highly chauvinistic nationalism, as seen for instance in the name he gave to his party, and his management of conflict, particularly in the South, along the lines of George W. Bush's global counterterrorism strategy.[85]

Thaksin's management of government was little different from how he might, as CEO, handle a private company. Lauridsen aptly writes: "... the politics of Thaksin was one of the centralization of power in the hands of a CEO Premier transforming the Thai state into his own machine."[86] Thaksin, Lauridsen continues, became a "soft authoritarian figure", who saw democracy not as an objective but purely as a tool in itself.[87] Thaksin's centralization of power did not just encompass parliament, the cabinet, and the bureaucracy, but extended to the military, police and independent observers such as the National Counter Corruption Commission/NCC, the election Committee,

the Constitutional Court/ECC, media, local actors, civil society and NGOs. Lauridsen writes:

> He looked on the country as a company and worked to centralise of power (sic) in the hands of a single authority, namely CEO Thaksin himself. Moreover, his 'war on corruption' was in contradiction with the way in which he undermined the NCC and with his constant political manoeuvrings to save the TRT from public scrutiny.[88]

Some observers are of the opinion that the move to have the police replace the military in South Thailand was not motivated by civil forces, but was part of Thaksin's business strategy, and his positioning of loyal people at all levels. Many people close to Thaksin, a former policeman, had backgrounds in the police force, and thus he was able to control the police well before he could control the military. In addition, the people in the South disliked the police more than they did to the military.[89]

Perhaps the worst part of the Thaksin government's policy on the South was the release of the Emergency Decree, which allowed authorities to detain a person for 30 days without sufficient evidence. Thus, South Thailand has, until today, been oppressed by three frightening laws, namely the criminal law (KL), the Martial Law (ML), and the Emergency Decree (ED), in addition to the Internal Security Act (ISA) which has yet to be put into effect. Under the ML and ED, the authorities could and still can arrest anyone suspicious in South Thailand for 37 days without producing evidence. Tragically, after the coup d'état ousting Thaksin in 2006, all his policies, including these two laws, fell back into the hands of the military.[90]

According to Professor Chaiwat Satha-Anand, an expert on conflict and peace in South Thailand who currently heads an information centre on peace and conflict at Thammassat University, Bangkok, halfway through Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont's period in government and after the 2006 coup, Surayud Chulanont proposed an ISA but was then caught up in internal problems within his government and it was soon forgotten.[91] For three years now, it has not been put into effect due to disagreement between factions within the government. One benefit of the ISA is that although it does not annul the ML, it does annul the ED. "At least citizens can't be arrested arbitrarily for 37 days, but only for 7," said Srisombop Jitpiromsri.[92] According to Srisombop, the ISA requires that there be the institutions or infrastructure necessary to im-

plement the ISA and annul the ED. However, the ED can be extended every three months before the ISA is made effective. In the evaluation of the ED in July of 2009, of which Srisombop was coordinator, he suggested it be extended once again but that the government must build the infrastructure for the ISA and annul the ED in the following three months (before September 2009). From then on, Srisombop said, the ISA could slowly be introduced.

From the examination above, perhaps Mahakanyana's depiction is fitting:

> When looking back to the root causes of the conflict, it is clear that the impact of the centralized state itself explains the emergence of the separatist movement in southern Thailand. ...(t)he movement started with the state penetration into the peripheral areas of southern Thailand and the disruption of the local power structures.[93]

McCargo recommends:

> The only way forward is to try some form of participatory legitimacy: to give Malay Muslims substantial control over their own affairs, while retaining the border region as part of Thailand. In other words, substantive autonomy – probably called something else – is probably the only long-term solution that might satisfy most parties to the conflict. To broker this settlement, ensure the peace, and marginalize the extremists who would seek to subvert it, new political and security arrangements will be needed.[94]

Sulak Sivaraksa, an eminent social critic and spiritual Buddhist in Bangkok believes that as Malay-Muslims in the South are not Thai or Siamese, they have their own history and culture and thus need to be treated separately if the Thai government does not wish to be considered discriminative.[95] Similar suggestions have been made by the NRC (National Reconciliation Commission), formed by Thaksin after the April 2004 tragedy specifically to address the Tak Bae and Kru-Ze Mosque incidents. The commission employed intellectuals, NGO activists, and religious scholars, to produce highly comprehensive recommendations. However, no serious follow up action was ever taken on the commission's recommendations, and thus it was seen as only having been established to appease international pressure

coming largely from the UN, with no real intention to implement its recommendations.

On the other hand, Professor Chantana Banpasirichote-Wungaeo, lecturer in politics at Chulalongkron University, believes that there is no formal discrimination towards the Malay-Muslims in the South. Rather it is a matter of incompatibility in terms of language and culture. The central government, he says, has made Thai or Siam the standard language for education and work, while Malay-Muslims use Malay. Because no specific action has been taken to address this, they will always be left behind and be marginalized in the workforce, in education, and in fact in almost any field. Consequently, while the government might seem discriminative this is not really the case.[96]

Response from the South: Shift Towards the Centre

The Events of 2003-2004

For the majority of people in South Thailand, 2003-2004 was full of unrest and uncertainty. Oppression, discrimination, and violence have always been part of life in the region, but these two years saw an unprecedented escalation in violence. According to McCargo[97] and data given by the NRC,[98] throughout 2003 there were several violent outbursts, including the attack on a border police patrol on April 26, and an attack on a security checkpoint on 3 July that killed five police officers and one civilian. Violence reached new heights in 2004, with three major attacks. On 4 January there was a large scale attack by insurgents against the Joh-Ai-Rong military base and weapons were stolen, and on April 28 simultaneous attacks were mounted against several security check points, eventually provoking police to fire on insurgents in the Kru-Ze mosque (historically associated with the coming of Islam to the Patani Kingdom), killing 105, as well as five police officers, and one civilian. These two attacks were followed by a demonstration on October 25 in the Tak Bae district of Narathiwat. Demonstrators demanded that imprisoned friends be released, but police responded by blindly firing into the crowd, killing seven. 78 more died a terrible death in trucks on the way to jail.

These violent outbreaks only made the central government increase monitoring of and tighten control over society in the South by

introducing the Emergency Decree to complement Martial Law, and shifting control of all new legislation to the military, and no longer the police, as had been the case during Thaksin Shinawatra's government.

Almost all interviewees said that these incidences were more beneficial than harming. That is, they succeeded in forcing the central government of Thailand and the world, especially Southeast Asia, to open their eyes to the oppression and discrimination occurring in South Thailand.[99] Although some did not agree with the use of arbitrary violence, they respected the insurgents and separatists who determinedly pursued their aspirations in their own way. In reality, since 2004 the central government seems to have paid more attention to the budget and cultural rights, granting, for instance, flexibility to study Malay and Jawi script in schools, particularly in *pondok*. Although officially there is no legal basis for such measures, except maybe that found in the passages of the constitution on which the nation-wide process of decentralization is based, these recent developments are encouraging enough to prompt further initiatives.

There has also been sufficient change in the struggle for human rights. In the past, there were only two choices, to be involved in political parties and the bureaucracy which meant collaborating with the government, or to turn to separatism or insurgency. However, since 2004, a new phenomenon has emerged, namely the growth of civil society organizations and NGOs addressing a variety of issues. Initiatives to support the Malay language and cultural rights have also emerged in formal government institutions and schools, which indicates an acceptance of a key Malay-Muslim aspiration (cultural rights) as expressed in mass media and by NGOs, although the reality is still far from the ideal.

South Thailand Aspirations: From Haji Sulong, the Constitutional Amendments, to the NRC

The struggle for special rights for the people of the three Muslim-majority provinces of South Thailand from the Thai Kingdom has been ongoing, at least since the beginning of the 20th century, but was only systematically formulated with Haji Sulong's 1947 petition. Several key aspirations of the petition were as follows. South Thailand, or the three provinces, should be governed by a leader elected directly by local

residents; taxes should be used entirely for improving the wellbeing of the residents of the three provinces; local governments should be given authority to implement the *shari'ah* as they see fit; independent rights should be given to a Religious Court and Islamic Council; and 80% of civil servants should be local residents.[100] The petition was brought to an end with the imprisonment of Haji Sulong and a number of other South Thailand Muslim leaders in 1948, and their later kidnapping and murder in 1958. This did, however, unwittingly create an everlasting hero for the people of South Thailand.

In conjunction with democratization at the end of the 1980s, several changes were made to the management of the Thai state, the most important amongst them being the 1997 constitutional amendment. It had implications for demilitarization (although the military has regained power since the 2006 coup) and decentralization, with direct elections for the position of governor in areas deemed ready. Unfortunately, only two central provinces, Bangkok and Pattaya, have been deemed ready. The constitutional amendment underwent several changes in 2002 and later in 2007. The latter, which further consolidated the 1997 amendment with regard to social participation and decentralization, stated that the Chief Executive of the Provincial Administration Organization, a provincial position below the Governor, would be elected directly by the people and would be responsible for development and the provincial budget, but the security and political sectors remained under the Governor who was, and still is, appointed by the central government.[101]

The recommendations of many observers, researchers, and politicians associated with the NRC are seen as highly comprehensive, but, as mentioned previously, they have certainly not been implemented effectively to date. Recommendations made included the political and cultural rehabilitation of the Malay-Muslim Southern provinces, which would involve the reestablishment of the cultural and community education institutes that were damaged or destroyed under the repressive political system. Cooperative reconciliation was also proposed, as well as strengthening the economy, politics, and job opportunities, and increasing fairness and equality in recruiting employees to work for the government, private companies, or in education. Basically, they constituted some form of affirmative action for the people of South Thailand, who have been left far behind in comparison to ethnic Thais.[102] Chaiwat

Satha-Anand notes that the NRC's recommendations were given some attention under Surayud Chulanont during his short tenure as lived Prime Minister after the 2006 coup. However, after this he was busied with internal politics. Nevertheless, the situation made it possible for the civil society-led social movement to develop and to become more resilient. A number of important actors in the movement are discussed below.

MAC: Human Rights and Law Enforcement

Twelve March 2004 was a dark day for Malay-Muslims in South Thailand, amongst the sporadic outbreaks of violence present ever since early in 2003. It marked the kidnapping and murder of Somchai Neelapaijit. He had been a lawyer, working *pro bono* to defend victims of kidnappings or imprisonment, and those accused of terrorism in South Thailand. Although residing in and coming from Bangkok, and being a Thai-Muslim not a Malay-Muslim, his perseverance in defending accused terrorists and political activists from unjust criminalization in South Thailand is well known and recognized. Somchai Neelapaijit is only one of many Muslim activists or defenders of activists in South Thailand who were kidnapped and killed, with no one knowing the whereabouts of their bodies or their graves. The five police accused of kidnapping and killing him were tried, but only one mayor was given three years in jail and not for kidnapping or murder, but on common criminal charges. The rest was released on the grounds of insufficient evidence.[103] From Haji Sulong's death in 1958, to Somchai Neelapaijit in 2004, the Thai kingdom has continued to resort to kidnapping and murder of those fighting for, supporting, or defending the rights and freedom of expression of the people of South Thailand.

Somchai was also the president of the Muslim Lawyers Club (MLC) in Bangkok and vice president of the Thai Human Rights Committee. At the time, not many were brave enough to follow his steps in defense of political victims, especially in South Thailand as there was a significant political risk. However, Somchai Neelapaijit went about his work diligently and also supervised a number of junior lawyers from South Thailand who were studying in Bangkok. They became the founders of the Muslim Attorney Center (MAC), which worked *pro bono* to help political victims and their families with advocacy and legal matters. While the Muslim Lawyers Club (MLC) was based in Bangkok and

only worked secretly in the South, the death of Somchai Neelaphaijit stimulated MAC to maintain a presence in each of the capital cities of the three provinces of Patani, Yala and Narathiwat, as well as in Songkhla, the largest city in the vicinity.[104] The centre not only accompanies victims in court, but is also involved in political advocacy, direct advocacy, investigation, and providing legal education for the public to increase understanding of legal procedures and people to contact if something should happen. Education is particularly concerned with Martial Law, the Emergency Decree, kidnapping, shootings, and arrests.[105]

Each MAC branch has between 7-10 full-time lawyers and 20-30 volunteers who provide their services free of charge. Even today, these offices are filled on a daily basis with all manner of cases, from those who have lost family members, to victims of fatal shootings, arrest, imprisonment, and kidnapping. "In fact, we're overwhelmed because we don't have enough people, but because of restricted funding and a limited number of volunteers, we just do our best," said Anukul Arweaputeh, director of the Patani branch of MAC.[106] The institute is committed to enforcing human rights such as the right to life, freedom from torture, freedom from death, freedom from fear, and freedom of expression.[107] The institute has maintained its headquarters in Bangkok since its establishment in 2005, but is operationally centered in the four regions mentioned above.

After its headquarters were established, MAC branches were set up in Yala, Narathiwat and Patani. "People were working in each city as soon as MAC was established in Bangkok, but the centers in each city were officially established one per year," Anukul Arweaputeh said.[108] Almost all MAC lawyers are, directly or indirectly, Somchai Neelapaijit's students. And, although fighting for Muslims, they also work with Buddhist and other non-Muslim lawyers. Phongarat, for instance, is a Buddhist lawyer who is not a member of MAC, but who travels two to three times a week between Bangkok, where he lives, and the three provinces, in order to accompany victims in court. He took me to visit the families of people in South Thailand who had been murdered, kidnapped, had their *pondok* shut down because it was thought they were harboring separatists, and those accused of shooting or killing citizens. According to Anukul, initially it was difficult for MAC's people to reach victims because they had been so used to having to pay lawyers every

time they went to court, but gradually they have begun to feel the trust society, religious leaders included, has in them. "Now we feel that we have the full support of religious leaders," Anukul said.

In addition, there is a flexible coalition between MAC and a number of legal experts from universities and NGO activists in general, including women's NGOs, not only in the South but also in Bangkok. Yet it is no easy thing to get lawyers involved. According to Anukul Arweaputeh, not many lawyers in the South are prepared to display the kind of attitude that MAC does because of the high risk involved. However, gradually the police, military, government, and even the justice system have started to take note of the situation. MAC also publishes an annual report on the political situation in South Thailand and selects cases on their website www.macmuslim.com.

Women's Movement: Initially for Victims

The women's movement currently plays perhaps the most important role in South Thailand's social movement. According to Soraiya Jamjuree, lecturer at the Education Faculty of The Prince of Songkhla University and an activist, before the violence of 2003/2004 women in South Thailand were well established, in that they worked, as was customary, in the home, in the rice paddies, or did sewing. Some worked in offices. However, the current situation has forced women to seek work outside the house as many have lost their husbands or sons, either because they died in violence, or were shot or arrested for suspected involvement in the insurgency.[109]

Some of these women built up a network of victims, assisted by NGO activists and academic researchers, to help one another. They currently seek to help schoolchildren, secure scholarships, find work for widows although opportunities are limited and rather uncertain, and defend victims in court, most of whom are poor, by working with lawyers prepared to work *pro bono*.[110] Many women now have to run their households on their own, while previously they usually did not work as anything other than as house wives. To date, government compensation for victims and families affected by the violence in this way is very limited.

Zaenab, known more commonly as Yena, and Zubaidah are two such activists whose families are victims of the violence. Yena lost 48 family

members, including her children, in the Tak Bae incident. Initially, she worked as a tailor, and her husband as an *ojek* (motorbike taxi) driver. They had eight children. Now Yena, a junior high school graduate, is coordinator for the three provinces. At 48 years of age, she is rather old for an activist, but enjoys her work serving the families of victims by finding lawyers, finding schools for orphans, helping victims make their way to government offices as needed, and accompanying them to court if family members have been accused of involvement in the separatist movement. "I only befriend them and find them a lawyer. If they need letters, I accompany them to the relevant government office," she said while accompanying two neighbors to the Narathiwat Court, who had been accused of murdering a Buddhist who was shot in front of their house two years ago.[111] The two neighbors had initially been arrested and detained for one month, then released and allowed to work in Songkhla. However, three months later they were summoned to court in a case that has dragged on for nearly two years. "He hasn't worked for over half a year and has had no income because of the court case," Yena said. Many people share the same fate.

This is what Yena and the 6-10 other colleagues working in each province face on a daily basis. It is no easy thing, and because of her work, she lost her husband two years after her children and relatives died in the Tak Bae incident. He was shot dead while riding his motorbike, which Yena believes was due to her activism. Now Yena, a simple woman who looks older than her age, seems to know no fear and never tires. She travels around the three provinces on a daily basis to coordinate emerging issues and new cases, and to accompany victims. Her thick notebook and official correspondence with various authorities indicates just how much she deals with the authorities in the three provinces. Many cases involve people accused by police of being involved in separatism. On average, they may only be detained for a month, or a month and seven days in accordance with the Martial Law and the Emergency Decree, but their subsequent dealings with the police and the court can take from between two to four years, not including time in jail if proven guilty. In practice, according to Phongarat, many people are imprisoned for two years in Bangkok, released, their cases are then submitted to the court in a process that may take another two years, and then the court sentences them to imprisonment again. Constant dealings with the police and the court makes life miserable.

Yena and her colleagues receive support from NGO activists and lecturers and researchers at universities, such as activists Soriaya and Alisah Hasamoah, both of whom are lecturers in the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Prince of Songkhla University. The current priority for women, according to Soriaya, is to ensure that government compensation or aid, when given, does not discriminate against certain victims, such as those accused of being insurgents or separatists. "We are currently fighting so that victims aren't discriminated against when being considered for aid, especially those whose husbands or family members have been accused of involvement in the insurgency. At the moment it's good news, although it's still a long process," Soriaya said. Currently, victims involved in the insurgency or separatist movement do not receive any aid whatsoever because they are deemed to be fighting the government and the state.

The movement also works with Buddhist women. One such senior NGO activist is 54-year-old Chomron Poo Doolae Daek, better known as Kunj.[112] Initially involved in the movement advocating peace and human rights through interfaith dialogue in North Thailand, after the violence in April of 2004, Kunj quickly moved to help victims in the South. She established a network with Yena and others, as well as with Soriaya and her network. First, she started with trauma healing for the parents, wives and children of victims. She then started looking for scholarships for their children to attend school, and then moved on to finding work for the wives and the children of victims. She also established a network with social workers, including with Yena and Soriaya's group. Initially Kunj had difficulty obtaining the support of religious leaders in the South because in addition to being a female, she was also Buddhist. However, after becoming aware that her programs were helping Muslim victims, they were quick to give their support. Kunj's appointment as member of the NRC enabled her to gain support from the religious leaders, *imam*, and academics also involved with the commission. "I have a lot of support from religious leaders, some of whom I met at the NRC," she said.

Speaking on the role of women, Soriaya explained that the current issue was the increasing need for women to work outside the house because of their circumstances, for instance due to the deaths or arrests of their husbands and sons, or even because of their often lengthy involvement with the police and the court. This became a problem

because job opportunities for women were limited, both in the government and private sectors, let alone with the military or the police. The ratio of women working in offices in the South is incredibly low, as are job opportunities. Soriaya remarked that in terms of education and skills, women in the South did not lag behind men, but rather there were no government policies or political will in general, nor any push in the private sector, to give more positions to women. Soriaya and her network have been involved in negotiations with several departments of the central government, urging them to open up more jobs for women. They feel that the suggestion has actually been well received, but the process will take years.

All such activities, whether by NGOs, grassroots movements, or university groups, produce comprehensive data that are compiled and analysed by a research institute under the Faculty of Technology of The Prince of Songkhla University, known as the Deep South Coordinator Center (DSCC). According to DSCC coordinator, Dr. Metta Kuning, this institute is not only with other groups involved in the empowerment of society, but is specifically involved in compiling data on victims, widows, and children with regard to their current status, and in monitoring victims who pass through hospitals and NGOs. To date, the institute boasts a network of 47 hospitals that routinely pass on data regarding victims, widows, and children. Currently, there are 1063 children and 400 widows as registered patients. Facts about the victims' lives are then added to the initial data, which is then distributed to NGOs and the government in order to facilitate empowerment.[113]

Malay Language and Culture

Malay language, *Jawi* (Malay Arabic) script, and religious education are the three most important features of Malay-Muslim identity, and have thus been the focus of much concern. There is therefore a larger focus within the movement on these aspects. Of course the three will never be lost because they are continually maintained by the community, especially through TADEKA, *pondok* (Islamic boarding schools), and religious education in mosques, as well as within Malay-Muslim families. Despite the ban during Phibul's term, *pondok* and mosques have never neglected these three features, regardless of the risks. The ban against using any language other than Thai in the

workplace, public, schools, and in names was only introduced in the 1960s. However, very recently, government schools have begun to teach Malay for one hour a week, and it is also used in informal religious studies. The long struggle for Malay to be used for communication in the workplace and at schools still continues as the government has yet to change its stance on the issue. In addition, government schools are not allowed to teach the history of Patani. Leaders of both traditional and modern (combined curriculum of religious and general education) *pondok* constantly spend their own time and money to teach Malay, Jawi script, and religious education. Up to year 9, these schools have always provided these subjects to supplement what children learn at home. *Pondok* that collaborate with the government, politically and in regards to the curriculum they offer, do not officially provide this education. When in the 1980 things became more flexible, Malay and religious education were once again taught in schools, especially in religious schools, until year 4. More senior students learn Arabic for religious studies. This, however, was not part of the formal curriculum, all of which, including religious studies, had to be taught in Thai.

However, a number of *pondok* have set aside funds specifically to employ teachers of Malay and to provide extra classes for students. The Darut Sat *pondok* in Sae Buri, about 90 minutes drive from Patani, has 4,500 students, and has taught a modern curriculum since the 1960s. This *pondok* has always allocated funds and time to teach Malay and religious education using Jawi script. For the last two years, students have had to pay nothing, as the government has covered the cost of their tuition with a yearly subsidy of 10,000 baht per student. However, the government has refused to allocate money to study Malay, religion (taught in Malay), or local history, which forced the *pondok* to set aside funds for these studies. "All official subjects, including religious education, must be taught in Thai," said the director of the *pondok.* He revealed that it was now possible to teach Malay and Jawi script unofficially, though the history of the Patani Kingdom was still disallowed.

One diligent student of the *pondok* said he lacked the courage to own or possess any books on the history of Patani as he was arrested and detained for a month in 2004, accused of being involved in the violence. Before he was arrested, he had buried all his history and reference books. Now rotten, he is too scared to buy more books on the

history of Patani. The plan, according to the directors of Daru Sat, was to teach religious education in the Malay language (both in Latin and Jawi scripts), as well as in Thai, using funds provided by the government. Sekolah Sasnupatan (Ma'had At-ytarbiyah), a three generation old *pondok* located 10 km from Patani, is already implementing a similar model for its 2,500 students.

Recently, especially since the violence in 2004, a more collective awareness of the importance of Malay has become apparent in public discourse. Its emergence has coincided with the spread of community radio. Now, many foundations, *pondok*, and individuals concerned about the Malay language and Jawi script run independent broadcasts. Once such organization is the Foundation for South Thai Islamic Culture (YAKIST), established by former Police Mayor, Tengku Arifin Bin Tengku Chik. The 55 year old man worked for 20 years as a policeman stationed on the Thai-Malaysian border, but began to feel that the Thai government was discriminative in providing job opportunities for South Thais compared to other Thais. He thus resigned and used his pension to establish YAKIST. The foundation runs free courses in Malay for the community, especially for children, in the three provinces. It also runs courses in English and Arabic for a small fee. In addition, YAKIST has set up a community radio network in the three provinces, which uses Malay to converse about various topics. "The aim is to make Malay the language of communication for a variety of subjects, not only Islam," Arifin explained. There is Malay tuition comparing Malay with Malaysian and Indonesian, so that the Thai Malay language is able to keep up with developments in the archipelago. YAKIST regularly makes interactive Malay language programs with commercial radio stations that enable listeners to communicate directly with presenters. "The program is in the air for one hour a week, but broadcasts over several commercial stations in the three provinces," Arifin said. YAKIST also holds periodic exhibitions of Malay culture in the provinces.

Mansor Salleh is involved in a similar endeavor in Yala, the largest city of the three provinces in the South. When this businessman and former director of the Young Moslim Association of Thailand (YMAT) of Anwar Ibrahim's generation was running the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), he shifted from organizing charitable social activities to more transformative ones. After finishing his studies, and thus stepping down as director of YMAT in Bangkok, he returned

to Yala and developed charitable social programs, such as education in entrepreneurship, language, and micro-economics. Over the last four years, he has established a community radio network to help develop Malay. The station broadcasts five hours a day on various subjects. In addition to this Salleh also helps increase political awareness within the community, especially amongst children. "The objective is to make young children aware of the importance of Malay and the history of Patani, because they don't learn enough in government schools, especially when it comes to the history of Patani," he said.

Ismail Yakub, a traditional *pondok da'i* (preacher) works with the Islamic College of the Prince of Songkla University through his institute, The Southern Border Provinces of Thailand (PUSTA), to hold various exhibitions of traditional South Thai Malay art as part of the cultural movement. Most exhibitions are held in villages, open fields, *pondok*, and *madrasah*. The institute also promotes local Muslim leaders and *ulama* through seminars to help build awareness of local and Malay culture. Known officially as Hj Ismail Ishad Benjamith Al-Fatani, this 50-year-old man might dresses traditionally in the Islamic *ḥajj* hat, sarong, and Muslim shirt, but associates widely with all manner of people to the extent that he has been a consultant for a number of foreign institutes, including the Thailand Office of the Frederich Ebert Stiftung (FES). He was also coordinator of the People's Network for Southern Socio-Political and Economic Affairs, was appointed to the Committee of Tourism and Sports for the Patani Province, and was chairman of the Center for the Conservation of Local Cultures and the Environment. He believes that the reinvention of Malay culture must incorporate local intellectual roots and must be developed with a wider, more regional perspective.[114]

Mass Media and Data Collection

The media is important in providing information and voicing aspirations. Yet precisely because it is so effective at doing so, undemocratic governments are often scared of the media. This has certainly been the case with the Thai government and the local media in the three Southern provinces. To date, there has been no local media in Malay, either in the Latin script or Jawi script.[115] Similarly with television. Only recently have radio broadcasts in the Malay language

begun to increase, but even these are generally only broadcasted by community radio stations, and not by commercial or government stations.

2004 seems to have changed everything for those in South Thailand. Since the violence, a South Thailand journalist network has been formed, known as Voice Peace and comprised of journalists born and residing in the three provinces and aimed at improving reporting on South Thailand, which has been severely restricted due to central government repression. Voice Peace publishes media online at www.voicepeace.org. It is, in a way, a kind of informal news office, which provides more open and detailed news. The majority of journalists involved used to work in the public or commercial media, but decided to form their own network able to publish news online that otherwise cannot be published in papers or broadcast over the radio or on television. The website does not only contain news, but also features and human interest articles. Most are published in Malay, but select articles are translated into English and Thai. According to chief editor Tuan Daniya Hj Mansor,[116] the network advocates complete freedom of information in South Thailand, or at least as an alternative to the media that has to date been monopolized by investors and the government. "Investors are usually too scared of the government to risk publishing news about taboo matters. Although legally there is virtually no censorship on reporting, investors usually engage in self-censorship," Daniya explained.

Professional media organizations, local and foreign often use articles found at voicepeace.org. Even the Thai government will quote them. "We actually urge others to publish our news in their media," Daniya confirmed. The news often features reports on the lives of families who have suffered from the violence, who have had relatives shot or arrested. It also publishes news that is hardly ever found in public and professional media, describing how victims are shot and arrested. "Their [public media] reports do not answer the what, when, where, who, why, and how of things because they just publish what the government and military say," Daniya continued. According to Daniya, Voice Peace is actually radio based, and coordinates a network of community radio stations, but obviously also includes other media forms.

Voice peace is not alone in providing an alternative, more in-depth media, but is supported by a think-tank, also comprised of journalists, called the Deep South Watch (DSW). DSW is centered in the Faculty

of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Prince of Songkhla University Patani Campus, but is comprised of journalists and social/political researchers from the three regions, and even several from Songkhla. If voicepeace.org puts emphasis on news, feature articles, and human interest pieces, DSW is more focused on publishing research data on its website (www.deepsouthwatch.org), especially quantitative data on the media and what is published in the media, as well as academic research data, in an attempt to provide supporting data for the media. Thus, DSW is a place where journalists can gain more data, and can further analyse data they cannot publish in their own media. The institute was established and is led by two senior members, one a senior journalist by the name of Ayub Pathan[117] and the other, Dr. Srisombop Jitpiromsri,[118] a former Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Prince of Songkhla University and current director of the Center for South Conflict and Diversity (DSCD) at the same faculty. Junior journalists collect data from the field to produce the final product which is published on voicepeace.org. These reports and the reports at deepsouthwatch.org are then used to increase social awareness amongst the lower classes, especially among the families of the victims, through workshops, training, and other forums. Thus, the information journalists obtain is not only attained from investigation, but from society and the victims' families themselves. According to Daniya, family members of victims often write for Voice Peace.

Religion and Pondok

McCargo divides Islam in South Thailand, as in other places, into two categories, namely traditional, which still accepts syncretic elements, and modern, which has been cleansed of such elements.[119] McCargo goes further to explain that the modern are more willing to accept government programs, and are thus more progressive than the traditional who tend to reject government programs. This causes the traditionalists to be rather backwards in terms of curriculum and development.

The findings of this research propose a slightly different way of categorizing Muslims in South Thailand. It seems that traditional Muslims are those who practice local Islamic traditions and who adhere to local wisdoms. These traditional Muslims can then be further divided

into two categories, namely those who accept government programs and those who are selective or reject such programs outrightly. Those who choose the latter are indeed left behind in terms of curriculum and development. The very large majority of Malay-Muslims in the South are traditional. There is a very clear division within this category between those who are willing to accept government programs and its academic curriculum, and those who are selective or completely uncooperative. Those who accept the government curriculum must teach all subjects in Thai, including religious education, which may only take up two hours a week. Yet they often add their own curriculum to teach religious education in Malay using Jawi script in the afternoons. This kind of model means classes run from 8 in the morning to 3.30 in the afternoon. While academic studies are held in the morning, the afternoon is set aside for religious education. According to a number of interviewees from various *pondok*, about 30% of *pondok* maintain purely traditional systems teaching only religious education, while the remaining 70% are also traditional but apply a modern system with a combined curriculum. In addition, there are those that tend to be puritanical—McCargo's modern Muslims—by purifying religious practices from both local and Middle Eastern traditions that are considered to have no basis in the Qur'an and the hadith. Such beliefs are often referred to as Wahhabism by the traditionalists. They are currently led by the very charismatic *ulama,* Tuan Guru Dr. Ismail Lutfi, who studied in Saudi Arabia for nearly 15 years. The group he leads will be discussed in more detail below.

Three of the largest traditional *pondok* include Darus Sat in Saeburi, Patani (4,500 students),[120] Sekolah Sasnupatam or Maa'hat At-Tabiyah in Muang, Patani (2,500 students),[121] and Darussalam School in Narathiwat (5,500 students).[122] All implement the entire government curriculum for general education in the morning and evening, and in between provide special lessons for religious education or for the study of the Qur'an and religious texts using Malay language, written in Latin or Jawi script. By implementing the government curriculum, as private schools they receive an annual subsidy of 10,000 baht per student. This is in line with the central government program for free schooling, though government schools receive much larger subsidies. Thus, *pondok* are able to provide free schooling for students, and some

like Darus Sat, even transport students to and from home for a small fee. The *pondok* has at least 35 large busses for this purpose.

The government subsidy is only for Thai language subjects, including religious education. But these *pondok* set aside part of the government subsidy to employ teachers to teach Arabic and Malay in Latin and Jawi script. Although there clearly seems to be some flexibility in teaching Malay and Jawi script, the central government has still not allocated a special budget or formed a curriculum for these subjects, and thus *pondok* must compile the curriculum themselves.[123]

According to Djusmalinar,[124] the Malay teacher at Darus Sat and also a lecturer in Malay at the Prince of Songkhla University, it is not easy to teach Malay because the language is primarily used for every day communication and thus there are no formal standards, which must be set first. Djusmalinar, originally from Indonesia, explained that the formal Malay used in South Thai schools is adopted mainly from Indonesian and Malaysian, though it has not developed in South Thailand as has Malaysian and Indonesian. Nevertheless, government universities in the South always offer studies in Malay. On the other hand, interviewees related how subjects on local culture, such as the history of the Patani Kingdom, are still forbidden, especially since 2004, but that *pondok* are able to indirectly introduce aspects of the history of the kingdom to students. These *pondok* are serious in setting aside funds and time to prepare and teach Islamic studies and Malay, including Jawi script. Students interviewed told how they were planning to prepare a subject on the history of the Patani Kingdom or of the three provinces of South Thailand.

Those *pondok* classed as separatist or rebellious are still traditional, whether they accept the government program or not. These monitoring *pondok* are naturally monitored much tighter. Sapan *pondok* in Tak Bai, located about 8 km from Narathiwat city with 600 students, was shut down by local authorities and all subsidies and permits were cancelled after it was deemed to have been involved in the insurgency in July 2007. The 600 students were forced to find new *pondok* and schools, and the 63 teachers were unemployed until they found new jobs. "There was no transitional process, for instance, for staff or teachers. It was shut down, and for the last two years the government has made no kind of approach whatsoever," Zubaedah, one of the three directors, said.

As with other *pondok,* this *pondok* maintained traditional religious understandings and had accepted the government program in order to receive free education for its students. However, because one teacher was suspected of being involved in the insurgency and separatist movement, the entire *pondok* was shut down and the three primary directors were detained for 37 days (based on Martial Law and the Emergency Decree) after which there was no proof of their involvement. However, they still had to report to their parole officers for the last two years. They continually appear before court, even today.[125]

Dr. Ismail Lutfi Patani's Religious Study Group

Dr. Ismail Lutfi Chapakia is the full name for the man who has published several books, including his dissertation, under the name Dr. Ismail Lutfi Patani. The 60-year-old man is self-taught and a gifted writer. He is a member of the third generation of the family that established the Madrasah Ar-Rahmaniyah in Beraul, about 10 km from Patani, and at the age of 16 had already written a book. By year 9, he no longer wanted to be a student, but demanded of the directors that he be able to teach. He had, at this stage, already written several short books on the history of Muhammad and the four rightly guided caliphs, which are still in print today. He read books from his parents, teachers, and postgraduate students who had returned from studying abroad. "Every time someone returned home from studying abroad I would visit them and borrow their books," he said. Of course, the directors of his parent's *pondok* could not refuse his demands to teach. Then, when he was in year 12, a man from Saudi Arabia visited the *pondok* with forms to apply for undergraduate scholarships. He applied, and was the only student from the *pondok* to be accepted. He encountered difficulties because he did not have the required graduation certificates for year 9 and 12, but was eventually allowed to go. He spent nearly 15 years studying in Saudi Arabia until he obtained his PhD, and, apparently, this was to change his life.[126]

His religious beliefs are perhaps most evident in his dissertation entitled "*Ikhtilaf Ad-Daaroen wa Atsaruhu fi al-Hukm al-Munakahat wa al-Mu'amalaat*." Generally speaking, his 544 page thesis, published in Saudi Arabia but available in a number of stores in Yala, argues that there are only two kinds of states in Islam, "*Dār al-Islām*/ the Land

of Islam" and "*Dār al-Ḥarb*/the Land of War." Arguing against other writers, he contends that there is no "*Dār al-Ṣulḥ*/Land of Truce". He discusses the implications of this on marriage laws and social interaction in Islam. In doing so, he Islamicizes political issues in his puritanical way, following Wahhabist trends in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia.[127] When questioned about the status of the Thai state, he says it is definitely *Dār al-Ḥarb*, but that there are two kinds of *Dār al-Ḥarb*, those that exist under a peace agreement, and those that do not. Thailand, he says, is currently one of the former.[128]

After returning home to Patani in about 1986, he first set about cleaning up what is categorized as *bid'ah* (heresy). However, unlike the Wahhabi's in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere who tend to use curses and violence, Ismail Lutfi used persuasion and friendship. According to one close student, H. Basyir Dullah Adam,[129] Ismail Lutfi and his students, Basyir included, were excommunicated from the community because of their heretical and anti-traditional sermons and teachings. However, because of their soft and persuasive approach they were eventually accepted, despite maintaining different principles. "If someone attacked him, he would usually approach them in a sign of friendship and brotherhood," Basyir said. Working together with a number of traditional *ulama,* Ismail Lutfi's group runs a rather large Islamic financial institution known as Takaful Islam, its success signified by its luxurious offices in each of the three provinces.

Traditional Muslims, both those who accept the modern curriculum and those who maintain a traditional curriculum, often call Ismail Lutfi's group Wahhabi because of its puritanical tendencies that are seen as anti-traditional and heretic. The group not only has a *pondok* with a combined curriculum, but has also established a rather large university, the Yala Islamic University. It is currently the only private Islamic university in Thailand, with Dr. Ismail Lutfi Pathani as rector.[130] Ismail Lutfi, called Sheikh by his students, also leads thousands of congregants of mosques and various other religious groups. He himself teaches interpretation of the Qur'an every Saturday in his *pondok* in Patani and previously on Sundays in an old building of the Yala Islamic University. He has now moved the Sunday classes to a new building. These sermons are attended by thousands, not including those who listen to radio broadcasts of the sermons in the five provinces of Satun, Narathiwat, Yala, Patani, and Songkhla. He has written no fewer than

50 books, most of which are short, less than 100 pages, which he has circulated to thousands of congregants. Most concern worship and society, some are transcripts from sermons and study groups, others he has written specifically. Ismail Lutfi also holds an annual mass event of *i'tikaf* (meditating at the mosque) for the last ten days of Ramadan. Thousands of congregants spread throughout mosques cook, eat, and drink outside their mosques. His own *pondok* mosque might hold up to 500 people, while the *imam* of other participating mosques, known as *murobbi,* hold their own *i'tikaf* in their respective mosques.

Ismail Lutfi claims that he was once listed as a Jemaah Islamiyah leader, higher even than Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. However, thanks to his close relationship with Thai Prince Somdet Phra Boromma-orasathirat Chao Fa Maha Vajiralongkorn, he was pardoned. Once, when the Malaysian government stopped him from speaking at a university in Kuala Lumpur, relations between Malaysia and Thailand soured after the Prince jumped to his defense and telephoned the Malaysian government. "Although I was eventually allowed to speak and was there ready to go, I decided to cancel rather than cause conflict between the two nations," he said. He is now very close with the Kingdom and the central government, which appointed him *Amīr al-Ḥaj* (Haj leader) for 2007 and 2009.

When asked for confirmation in regards to accusations that he was a Wahhabi, Ismail Lutfi, who always dresses in long flowing white robes and Muslim headdress, replied that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb was just an ordinary human, who could at times be correct, but who could also be wrong. "We follow what is true, and we avoid what is false," he said. He also did not reject adhering to a school of thought, but, citing Imam Syafi'i famous words, "*Idhā saḥḥa al-ḥadīth, fa-huwa madhhabī* (any *hadith* considered to be true belongs to my school of thought)," acknowledged that it had to be based on the Qur'ān and genuine hadīth. Almost all his books contain arguments from the Qur'ān and hadīth on the perspectives and forms of worship considered true. In response to queries about rumors among his students suggesting that he refused to be appointed Governor of Patani and to become *Syech al-Islam* (the Sheikh of Islam) in Bangkok, he replied that nothing was ever clear. His unclear response parallels the government's equally unclear actions and propositions to end the violence and discrimination in South Thailand.

"Nothing is ever clear, and the central government has never offered any form of resolution," he said with annoyance.[131]

He continued to talk about the three options for the resolution of the Malay-Muslim issue in the South: freedom, autonomy, or to become a part of Thailand but with guaranteed freedom and equal rights. He aspires for the latter of the three. "I have always wanted peace, but it needs to be with guaranteed freedom and equal rights. We have our own traditions and culture. I have often been approached by people from the central government, but not one has ever directly discussed resolution of the South Thailand problem," he said.

Peace Movement: Ahmad Somboon Bualuang

Almost all figures and groups mentioned above pursue peace efforts in their own ways. However, Ahmad Somboon Bualuang specifically emphasizes that his struggle is for the creation of peace and for mediation between groups, especially between the separatists/insurgents and the government (local and central). It is no easy thing to occupy such a position in the tense situation, some would say war, that is pervasive throughout South Thailand. Yet he does, for the sake of communication and understanding amongst the different parties. "They [the insurgents/separatists and the government] are unable to communicate directly at the moment, because they are both scared of each another, because of representation and so on," he said. In doing so, he has "lost" two chauffeurs, each doubling as informal bodyguards, to unknown shooters. He now chooses not to have a chauffeur, driving himself around instead.

The unique aspect to this 58-year-old man is that he has close relationships with a number of actors in the insurgency and separatist movements even though he himself does not agree with their violent methods that have recently become more random and arbitrary, with the bombing of streets and markets, and other public places. A former lecturer in the Faculty of Education of the Prince Songkhla University, he has been involved in NGOs working towards strengthening civil society through peaceful means since well before the reformation, which led to the 1997 constitutional amendment—a significant step towards democratization and decentralization. His perseverance saw him appointed member of the NRC, formed under PM Thaksin Shinawatra's

government to resolve the violent incidents of 2004. He was a representative for NGOs, religious leaders, academics, and politicians. This unique role also meant that he was often involved in meetings with insurgents and separatists, especially overseas, most often in Europe. He is considered to represent an independent voice that can communicate with, and is trusted by, the central government. Similarly, the government sees him as understanding the aspirations of insurgents and separatists because of his proximity with them, his ability to communicate with them, and the trust they place in him in inviting him to their meetings. He is currently the only expert that the Thailand Research Council (TRC) has accepted as a consultant to comment on and to evaluate all research proposals of Thai universities related to South Thailand.

However, Ahmad Somboon Bualuang continues to be critical of the government. He feels the government has not done enough to bring the Malay-Muslims out of their backwardness caused by past repression and current government indifference and neglect of cultural and linguistic differences. The central government made Thai or Siamese the standard language when Malay-Muslims did not use or understand it. In the 1950s, at the height of Thai chauvinism the government even banned the display, practice, and use of Malay-Muslim culture and language. Although this has not been the case since the 1960s, there has been no policy to reverse it. There should, Ahmad said, be some sort of affirmative action to raise Malay-Muslims up to a level equal with the wider Thai community. "For as long as there is inequality, poverty, and injustice, it will be difficult to put a halt to the violence," he continued. If there are no special policies, recruitment of civil servants or private employees will surely favor those who meet the standard. This is not to say that Malay-Muslims have to be given special treatment, but they do have to be empowered until they have abilities equal to the Thai majority.

Conclusion

Although repressive policies have only become more frequent since the violence in 2004 with the introduction of Martial Law, the Emergency Decree and military domination since the 2006 coup d'état, the struggle for justice and equal rights for the Malay-Muslims

in South Thailand has only shifted closer to the centre, through the strengthening of civil society via legal processes, empowerment of the media, human rights, and of society's political awareness. Increasingly brutal violence has no place, and when public places, such as at bus terminals and markets, are targeted insurgents and separatists tend to lose society's sympathy. It is necessary to understand that the increase in violence in public places is partly caused by the location of military posts and checkpoints in Buddhist temples. Whenever separatists attack military personnel or posts the media reports the incident as an attack against Buddhism. There certainly are several cases in which Buddhist leaders were targeted, but this should not be overgeneralized. The placement of military posts and checkpoints in Buddhist temples is not only dangerous and unwise, it further complicates the conflict, increasing inter-religious tensions and inviting increasingly brutal and uncontrollable violence in public places.

The central government has increased the budget for South Thailand, however funding is more often than not allocated to maintaining security, as the assignment of 60,000 military personnel to secure less than 3 million civilians would indicate. Also, the budget for education, for the majority in the South, is only allocated for studies taught in the Thai language, and this includes Islamic education. The government has neglected to strengthen or promote Malay language and culture, which is a large part of the Malay-Muslim identity. The local government under the Chief Executive of the Pattani Provincial Administration Organization, at least according to a Patani official, has already designed several programs for cultural empowerment, such as preparing teachers to teach at TADEKA, and to teach the Malay language and religious education (in Malay). However, he has yet to secure a legal basis for the program, which is thus still considered a trial.

The government is not serious in applying the NRC's recommendations, which have been inspired by Malay-Muslim aspirations. The enormous inequality in recruitment of civil servants, especially to the military and police forces, is much cause for concern. If not resolved immediately, it raises questions about renewed tension and more violence. Besides the need for special attention in the form of affirmative action to increase the prosperity of Malay-Muslims in the South and to provide them with equal opportunities in the workforce and in the

economy, the central government also needs to help prevent such inequalities amongst Malay-Muslims themselves.

More opportunities need to be given to the educated, especially those educated overseas, to work safely in the three provinces, as neglecting them will lead to their unemployment, which runs the risk of pushing them to join the insurgents and the separatists.

Finally, nations and states in the region need to constructively contribute ideas and help facilitate communication between Malay-Muslims in the South and the central Thai government as the sheer length of the conflict has meant that both parties are now unable to communicate smoothly in negotiating substantial issues. Some Malay-Muslims have close relations with the central government but are reluctant to talk about substantial issues because they feel that they have been betrayed and their aspirations neglected. A number of those interviewed were hopeful that both the civil societies and governments of Indonesia and Malaysia will play a role in bridging this communication gap. These neighboring states need to understand the latest developments in the movement and its aspirations, and not rely purely on the traditionalists, both those in political parties and the bureaucracy or those who are insurgents or separatists (the newest actors in the social movement). Continual research into and assessment of the issue is vital for any kind of comprehensive and up-to-date facilitation.

Endnotes

1. South Thailand – also known as Southmost Thailand, Deep South Thailand, Far Southern Thailand or the Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand – here refers to the three provinces which have been unstable since before Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 1932. These provinces are Yala, Patani and Narathiwat. South Thailand consists of 14 provinces, but only four, Yala, Patani, Narathiwat dan Satun, have Muslim majorities, three of which have experienced long periods of instability and violence. The Muslim population in Thailand is about 6% on a national scale, but 90% of them live in the three Muslim majority provinces. See figures 1 and 2, taken from Michel Gilquin, 2005, *The Muslims of Thailand*, Bangkok: IRASEC and Silkworm, pp. 32 and 50.
2. Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki (eds), 1997, *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State,* London: Hurst and Company in Association with the Islamic Council. See also Eli Eminov, 1997, *Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria,* London: Hurst and Company in Association with the Islamic Council.
3. Hugh Paulton, 2000, "The Muslim Experience in the Balkan State, 1919-1991," *Association for the Study of Nationalities*, Nationalist Papers, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000, p. 60.
4. Asep Bayat, 2007, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movement and the Post-Islamist Turn*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 7. Emphasis added.
5. These two topics, particularly after the series of violent events in South Thailand in 2003-2004, have been the focus of much literature, including books, published and unpublished research findings, as well as publications with a limited distribution such as leaflets and so on. For a comprehensive discussion of the insurgency and separatist movements see, for instance, Danile J. Pajor Jr, 2005, "Lessons Not Learned: The Rekindling of Thailand's Pattani Problem," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, unpublished thesis. For an examination of the latest political, social, and religious movements see Duncan McCargo, 2009, *Tearing Apart The Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand*, Singapore: NUS Press.
6. See for instance, Chaim Gans, 2003, *The Limits of Nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, particularly pp. 7-66. Gans discusses the inadequacies of nationalism that is only based on geographical boundaries and does not consider the collective rights of cultural groups within those boundaries. This issue will be discussed further below.
7. Michael Macmillah, "Quebec," in Michael Watson (ed.), *Contemporary Minority Nationalism,* London, Routledge, 1990, pp. 117-145. Also Ilan Peleg, *Democratizing the Hegemonic State: Political Transformation in the Age of Identity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 114-122.
8. Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic*, pp. 18-19.
9. Mario Diani, 2000, "The Concept of Social Movement," in Kate Nash, *Reading in Contemporary Political Sociology*, Blackwell: Oxford, pp. 154-176.
10. Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic,* pp. 19-20.
11. J. A. Goldstone, 2003, Bridging Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Politics" in J.A. Goldstone (ed.), *States, Parties and Social Movements*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-24.
12. Insurgency and separatism here must be differentiated from violence. Insurgency and separatism can be non-violent, and may, for instance, involve negotiation and political struggle. Almost all people condemn blind and arbitrary violence, except that with a

cause, such as fighting against government-created paramilitary or armed guerrilla forces.

13. Antonio Gramsci, 2006, "State and Civil Society," in Arachana Shama and Akhil Gupta (eds), *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader,* Victoria, Australia: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 75-76. See also Robert W. Cox, 2002, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay on Method," in James Martin (ed.) *Antonio Gramsci: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers,* Routledge: New York, pp. 360-361.
14. Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic*, p. 21.
15. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations", p. 361.
16. Nearly all informants shared these sentiments , from ordinary citizens to religious leaders and politicians, including senators, and even a vocal Buddhist spiritual leader, Sulak Sivaraksa. Interview, 28 September 2009.
17. Patani senator, Dr. Warawit Baru, mentioned that the latest data obtained by research undertaken by the Prince of Songkhla University shows that 87% of the population of the three provinces is Muslim, but 94% of civil servants are Buddhist and do not originate from the three provinces. This does not include the military forces present in the South, who are composed of a Buddhist majority and in general cannot speak Malay. Interview, 16 September 2009, Bangkok parliament building. However, there has been a change in recruitment between the provincial and district levels. While at the provincial level the Governor is still appointed by the central government and there is still much more accommodation for candidates from outside of the three provinces, key positions at the district level are often filled by locals, which then leads to greater recruitment of locals for other positions. See figures 3 and 4, taken from Wattana Sugunnasil, 2007, "Culture, Politics and Violence in Southern Thailand," in Surichai Wun'Gaeo, *Rural Livelihoods Insecurities in Globalizing Asian Economies*, Bangkok: CSDS and SRI Chulalongkorn University, p. 129.
18. For a definition of ethnic nationalism, see David Brown, 1988, "From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Spring, pp. 51-77.
19. Yuan-Kang Wang, 2001, "Toward a Synthesis of the Theories of Peripheral Nationalism: A Comparative Study of Chinas's Xinjiang and Guangdong," *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 2, No. 2, September, p. 178.
20. Wang, "Toward a Synthesis", p. 181.
21. The Patani Kingdom was the final kingdom to control the area that at the time was known as "*Patani Raya*/Greater Patani" or "*Semenanjung Malaya*/the Malay Peninsula". The kingdom spanned over what is today seven Thai provinces, four of which were Muslim majority provinces in the southern most part of Thailand, namely Narathiwat, Patani, Yala, and Satun. The kingdom also encompassed several Malaysian states, currently known as Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis. See Ibrahim Syukri, 2005, *History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani*, translation by Conner Baily and John N. Miksic, Athens: Ohio University Press, especially Chapter II, pp. 17-49. In the Siam/Thai language, "Patani" is written and pronounced with a double "t", "Pattani", to the extent that this difference is yet another element in each party's claim to the area.
22. The name of the kingdom was 'Siam' before it was changed to the Royal Thai Kingdom (in 1939), which controlled the same area it does today minus the area currently known as Southmost Thailand, until its later incorporation in 1901. Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, 2005, *A History of Thailand*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 26-104.

23. Ibrahim Syukri, 2005, *History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani*, translated by Conner Baily and John N Miksic, Athens: Ohio University Press, especially Chapter I, pp. 17-49.
24. Pajor, "Lessons Not Learned", pp. 8-16. See also Lorna Dewaraja, 1988, "Muslim Minorities in Theravada Buddhist Societies: A Historical Study of Sri Lanka, Thailand and Burma," *12th IADA Conference, International Association of Historians of Asia*, Colombo 1-5 August, unpublished, especially pp. 13-15.
25. Nik Anur Nik Mahmud, 2000, *Sejarah Perjuangan Malayu Patani, 1785-1954 [History of the Patani Malay Struggle, 1785-1954]*, Jawi script, Bangi: Penerbit Universitas Kebangsaan Malaysia, p. 18.
26. *Ibid*.
27. Dewaraja, "Muslim Minorities in Theravada Buddhist Societies", pp. 14-15.
28. Syukri, *History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani*, pp. 17-49.
29. Surin Pitsuan, 1982, *Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of The Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand*, dissertation in Political Science at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, US (microfilm version, unpublished), pp. 28-9.
30. Generally speaking, in the collective memory of the Malay-Muslim elite in South Thailand, the English colonizers initially promised independence for the areas of the former Patani Kingdom that had been annexed by the Kingdom of Siam because they had sided with the English against the Kingdom of Siam and the Japanese, an ally of the Kingdom of Siam during WWII. However, the English failed to fulfil its promise, or consciously betrayed it after having been given a massive concession in the form of a railway project from Bangkok to South Thailand, thousands of tonnes of rice when Siam had plentiful crops to be given to English-occupied peoples who were experiencing economic depression, and four new regions which are now part of Malaysia, forming the border with South Thailand. For these Malay-Muslims, the English colonizers are most responsible for their suffering because they betrayed their promise, to the extent that the Malay-Muslims feel they were just a bargaining tool used by the English in negotiations with the Kingdom of Siam. A senior Malay-Muslim figure showed me the original treaty between the UK and the Kingdom of Siam that made the English betray their promise to help South Thailand gain independence from the Kingdom of Siam's occupation.
31. Surin Pitsuwan, 1985, "The Lotus and The Crescent: Clashes of Religious Symbolisms in Southern Thailand," paper prepared for the *Asian Regional Meeting Workshop an Ethnic Minorities in Buddhist Polities Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand*, 25-28 June, Bangkok, Chulalongkorn University, unpublished, pp. 1-9.
32. For a discussion of the *Sanghai*'s profile, history, its relationship with the government and its position in Thai society, see Yoneo Ishii, 1993, "*Sejarah Sanghai Thai: Hubungan Budhisme dengan Negara dan Masyarakat* [The History of Thai Sanghai: Buddhism's Relationship with the State and Society]," Malay translation from Japanese by Mohamed Yusoff Ismail, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
33. Charles F/ Keyes, 1989, *Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom as Modern Nation-State*, Colorado: Westview Press, pp. 137-138.
34. *Ibid.,* pp. 138-139.
35. According to analysts, King Vajiravudh's three pillars were copied from the British slogan "God, King, and Country" popular during the time of European nationalism. Erik Cohen noted in regard to this "three pillar" concept, that King Vajiravudh was the first educated king who had also studied in England. Although the concept seems to be little more than an imitation from the West, more precisely from the UK, it has its own in-depth understanding of Thai (Siam) society. It is also not rigid, unlike the

relationship between the people, state or government, and religion in Europe. See Erik Cohen, 1990, "Sovereignty, Nationality and Religion: A Study of Politics and Religion in Thailand ", *The Research Final Report,* Jerusalem, The National Research Council of Thailand, Bangkok, unpublished, pp. 5-7. Keyes, *Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom ,* pp. 140-141.

36. *Ibid*. See also Jerroold Schecter, 1967, *The New Face of Buddha: Buddhism and Political Power in Southeast Asia*, especially Chapter II "Buddhism, Nationalism and Communism," New York: Coward-McCann Inc., especially pp. 28-32.
37. Charles F. Keyes, 1999, "Buddhism Fragmented: Thai Buddhism and Political Order Since the 1970s," keynote paper for the *7th International Conference on Thai Studies*, Amsterdam, 4-8 July, unpublished. See also Sakurasi Yoshihide, 1999, "The Role of Monks in Rural Development and Their Social Function in Civil Society," paper for the *7th International Conference on Thai Studies*, Amsterdam, 4-8 July, unpublished.
38. Keyes, "Buddhism Fragmented: Thai Buddhism," pp. 36-37.
39. Surin Pitsuwan has comprehensively examined the Islamic cosmology that applies to Muslims in South Thailand and which is diametrically opposed to the cosmology of Thai Buddhism, and how it is one major obstacle to complete and real integration of the Thai state. See Pitsuan, *Islam and Malay Nationalism*, pp. 8-12. See also Pitsuan, "The Lotus and The Crescent".
40. A total of three months were spent in Thailand for research, from July to September 2009. The first month was spent exploring available literature, taking advantage of the rich academic resources at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, and meeting a number of researchers and professors on campus. The third month was also spent in Bangkok rechecking the literature and confirming facts with researcher and professors, as well as Buddhist and Muslim religious figures. During these two months, I lived in an apartment on campus at Chulalongkorn University. In general, people interviewed from traditional and modern *pesantren,* religious officials, and ordinary citizens in South Thailand were unwilling to be recorded and wished to remain anonymous.
41. Yael Zerubavel, 1998, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition,* Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, p. 4.
42. *Ibid.,* p. 5.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.,* p. 7.
45. Haji Abdurrahman Daud, nd, *Sejarah Negara Patani Darussalam* [*The History of Patani, Land of Peace*], Yala: Deers Eye, p. 10.
46. Michael J. Montesano and Patrick Jory (ed.), 2008, *Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula*, Singapore: NUS Press, p. 1.
47. Patani here refers not to one of the four Muslim majority provinces of South Thailand (Narathiwat, Yala, Patani, and Satun) or to one of the three provinces that still resist a unified Thai state (Narathiwat, Yala or Patani). Rather, Patani here refers to the Patani Kingdom of the past, that encompassed Greater Patani/The Malay Peninsula, which in addition to the four Muslim majority provinces of South Thailand also included several other provinces with large, but not majority Malay-Muslim populations, such as Songkhla, Satun, Jalu, Jambu, etc, and also the Malaysian border provinces of Trengganu, Kelantan, Kedah and Perlis. Interview with Abdurrahman Daud, 8 and 16 August 2009.
48. Haji Abdurrahman Daud (61), a pensioner and voluntary teacher at a *pesantren*, is a diligent reader and writer who has mastered Arabic and French, and a little English after studying languages for 10 years at Aljazair. Even today he claims to keep up with the latest world news by watching television. He reads many books on revolution,

from those that happened in South America, Europe, the Soviet Union, China, to those in Asia.

49. Abdurrahman Daud, *Sejarah Negara Patani Darussalam,* p. iv.
50. For a further discussion on this see Mahmoud, *Sejarah Perjuangan Melayu Patani,* pp. 23-30. This policy is still largely in effect today. Only during the last two years has the governor of Yala been a Muslim, but he was still appointed by the central government and thus most of the elite in Yala regard him as a pro-center Muslim governor.
51. *Ibid.,* p. 76. Emphasis added, author's translation from the Malay.
52. *Ibid*, pp. 80-81. Author's translation from the Malay.
53. Interview with a key employee of the Islamic Council of Yala, 20 August 2009. Only this year has the government given the council a new building on a larger piece of land for a new and largely representative office. However this was only for Yala and Patani, and the other provinces have not, or not yet, been given new ones too. See also Mahamasake Cheha, 1998, "The Administration of Islamic Family Law and Inheritance in Southern Thailand (Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun)", International Islamic University, Malaysia, unpublished dissertation.
54. The compilers of the *kitab kuning* in Arabic and in Malay in Jawi script are discussed quite comprehensively in Virginia Matheson and M.B. Hooker, 1988, "Jawi Literature in Patani: The Maintenance of an Islamic Tradition," *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Kuala Lumpur.
55. TADEKA are centres for pre-school and primary school religious education. Almost every mosque in South Thailand has a TADEKA, which are very traditional. Students study religious education in Malay. Thus there are at least three main centres in which Malay is preserved: TADEKA, *pesantren*, and the family. It should be no surprise that both Malay language and Islam are an integral part of the Malay-Muslim world, and as such, inseparable from it.
56. Pitsuwan, "The Lotus and the Crescent".
57. An Indonesian lecturer in Malay Language at the Patani Campus of the Prince of Songkhla University mentioned that the Malay of South Thailand was still spoken quite well, especially within the family and when studying religion. Parents and children below the age of 13 still use Malay, except in government schools. Meanwhile, teenagers are less likely to use Malay because there is a lot of vocabulary, especially modern terms, not available in Malay. Interview with Djusmalinar, 21 August 2009. See also Djusmalinar, 2009, "*Generasi Penutur Bahasa Melayu di Thai Selatan* [The Generation of Malay Speakers in South Thailand]," *Dewan Bahasa,* July, pp. 32-34.
58. According to Jeff Upward, quoting from Erikson, the Malay-Muslims have four different kinds of demands of the central government. Namely, (1) to be recognised and accepted as a respected minority, that has always been culturally different from the Thai mainstream, and as a result needs autonomy within the Thai state; (2) to have their own completely independent state, based on the historical domain of the Sultanate present before colonialism; (3) unification with the Malaysian Federal States; (4) incorporation of the South Thai states into a Pan-Islamic State, an ideology inspired by the terrorist group Jama'ah Islamiyah. Jeff Upward, 2006, "Insurgency in Southern Thailand: The Cause of Conflict and the Perception of Threat," November, http://www.ballarat.edu.au/ard/bssh/school/capstone/Jeff/%20upward.pdf, p. 8. Accessed in hardcopy from the Chulalongkorn University library, number 72072.
59. Paulton, "The Muslim Experience in the Balkan State" p. 60.
60. Raymond Scupin, 1980, "The Politics of Islamic Reformism in Thailand," *Asian Survey,* Vol. 20, No. 12, December, pp. 1223-1235.
61. Gilquin, *The Muslims of Thailand,* pp. 7-22.

62. Omar Farouk, 1988, "The Muslims of Thailand: A Survey," in Andrew D.W. Forbes (ed.), *The Muslims of Thailand: Historical and Cultural Studies*, Vol. I, Rachi, India: South East Asian Review Studies, pp. 8-17.
63. Imtiyaz Yusuf, 2007, "Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand," Working Paper, *East-West Center Washington*, No. 7, March.
64. Scupin, "The Politics of Islamic Reformism in Thailand," pp. 1223-1235. Compare with Andrew D.W. Forbes, 1982, "Thailand's Muslim Minorities: Assimilation, Secession, or Coexistence?," *Asian Survey* ,Vol. 12, No. 11, pp. 1058-1073. It is necessary to note that almost all analysts conclude that there is no relationship between the insurgency/separatist movement in South Thailand and Islamic fundamentalism or global terrorism.
65. The term "ultra nationalist" is used by Surin Pitsuwan to describe Prime Minister Marshal Phibul Songkhram's policies on nationalism and the Thai national assimilation policy applied since 1938, which led to the establishment of the military dictatorship. Elsewhere, Surin also uses the term "Thai chauvinism". See Pitsuwan, *Islam and Malay Nationalism,* p. 86.
66. Sulak Sivaraksa, 1991, "The Crisis of Siamese Identity," in Craig J. Reynolds, *National Identity and Thailand, 1939 – 1989, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 25*, Victoria, Australia, Monash University, pp. 52-56.
67. Keyes, "Buddhism Fragmented: Thai Buddhism," p. 41.
68. Keyes, *Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom,* pp. 141-142.
69. Acknowledged in a NRC report, the NRC having been formed to investigate and make recommendations for resolving the 2004 violence.
70. Nipon Shoheng, 2008, *Muslim Elite Response to Governments' Policies of Modernisation in Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand*, dissertation at the International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, unpublished, pp. 77-102.
71. Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana, "Decentralization, Local Government", p. 7. See also Pitsuwan, *Islam and Malay Nationalism*, pp. 89-92.
72. Haji Sulong was at the time Governor of Patani and director of the Ulama Council for the three provinces. He led the petition for the seven demands of self-determination. Initially, the petition did not demand independence for the three provinces. Today, Haji Sulong is considered a hero and inspires almost all movements in South Thailand, whether they work within political parties and the bureaucracy, whether they are insurgents or separatists, or whether they are active in social movements or civil society organizations.
73. The seven objectives are:
    1. The appointment of a high commissioner to govern the Greater Patani Region with full authority to dismiss, suspend, or replace all government officials working in the area, the individual must be elected by the people in a general election held for that specific purpose;
    2. Eighty percent of civil servants in the four provinces to be Muslims;
    3. Malay and Siamese to be official languages;
    4. Malay to be taught in primary schools;
    5. Muslim law to be applied in the region with separate Islamic courts independent from the government's judicial system;
    6. All revenues collected in the region to only be expended for the welfare of the people in the region;
    7. The Provincial Islamic Council to be given full authority over Islamic legislation on all Muslim affairs and Malay culture under the supreme authority of the high commissioner referred to in objective 1.

See Pitsuwan, *Islam and Malay Nationalism*, p. 152.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 86-88.
75. According to Chia-anan Samudavanija, political expert from Chulalongkorn University, Phibul only had the cabinet meet for 10 minutes to change the state's name from the Kingdom of Siam to the Thai kingdom, in a move that would cause much suffering. In the final three minutes of those 10 minutes, he had yet to obtain unanimous support, but no matter, the decision had been made. See Chia-anan Samudavanija, 1991, "State-Identity Creation, State-Building and Civil Society," in Craig J Reynolds, "National Identity and Its Defenders Thailand, 1939-1989", Victoria, *Monash Paper on Southeast Asia* No. 25, Monash University, p. 62.
76. Interview with Ahmad Somboon Bualuang, 6 August 2009. Somboon is a senior activist living in Patani, who was a member of the NRC (National Reconciliation Commission) after the April 2004 tragedy, and now works as a government advisor on South Thailand, at the Thailand Research Council (TRC).
77. The term "bandit" was used as early as during the English occupation to insult Muslims in the former area of the Patani Kingdom. During the occupation, the term referred to drug dealers, drunks, and Chinese gamblers in the area. Then in the 1950s-1970s it was associated with communism and was also aimed at Malay-Muslims, especially the separatists who were killed by the government of the Thai Kingdom. See Upward, "Insurgency in Southern Thailand".
78. According to analysts, only two provinces, namely Bangkok and nearby Pattaya, have already implemented the decentralization law. The rest yet have to do so, despite the 10 years that have elapsed since it was introduced in 1997, and despite the finer adjustments made, especially in the 2002 and 2007 constitutional amendments. See Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana, 2006, "Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand," Washington, *East-West Center*, unpublished, p. 14. See also "Dialogue on Implementing the Local Government Provisions for the New Constitution in Thailand" organised by the *King Prajadhipok Institute (KPI)*, 11-13 December 2007, Chaophya Park Hotel, Bangkok, pp. 58-101.
79. See Ukrist Pathmanand, 2007, "Thaksin's Achilles' Heal: The Failure of Hawkish Approaches in the Thai South," in Duncan McCargo, *Rethingking Thailand's Southern Violence*, Singapore: NUS, pp. 69-88. See also Willard A Hanna, 1965, "Peninsular Thailand: The Thai Muslim Centers of Pattani and Yala" Part V, Thailand, *Reports Service*, American Universities Filed Staff, October, pp. 1-2.
80. Laurids S. Lauridsen, 2008, "The Policies and Politics of Industrial Upgrading in Thailand during the Thaksin Era", Bangkok, *10th International Conference On Thai Studies*, Thammasat University, unpublished, p. 5.
81. Charles Keyes, 2006, "The Destruction of a Shrine to Brahma in Bangkok and the Fall of Thaksin Shinawatra: The Occult and the Thai Coup in Thailand of September 2006," *Asia Research Institute*, Singapore, unpublished, p. 18.
82. Wan Muhamad Noor Matha was on the political black list for five years, along with more than 100 other TRT leaders, as a part of the Thai Supreme Court's suppression of Thaksin's party. For a brief history of his life and time in politics, see Duncan McCargo, 2009, *Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand*, Singapore: NUS Press, pp. 75-80.
83. For an account of the success of the Wahdah group in the Islamic and Malay-Muslim struggle, see Doromae Paseloh's (Director of Islamic and Asian Studies at the Center for Humanities, Malaysian Science University) "Kumpulan Wahdah dan Pembangunan Islam di Selatan Thailand [Wahdah Association and the Development of Islam in South Thailand]", paper presented at *Seminar Pembentangan Kajian Ilmiah Pengajian Islam*

dan Pengajian Muslim [Academic Workshop on Islamic and Muslim Studies], Islamic College, Prince Songkhla University, Pattani Campus, 18 August 2009, unpublished.

84. Several observers suggest that the restructuring of the security handling apparatus in the three provinces, which had been under two well-established institutes – the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) and Civilian-Police-Military Command 43 (CPM 43) – in which the military was all powerful, was one cause of the tension and violence that continued throughout 2003-2004 in the South because the military felt marginalized. Thus, the violence of this period was a combination between opportunities taken by insurgents and separatists on the one hand, and by the security apparatus, especially the military, on the other. For more on this, see Marc Askew, 2007, "Conspiracy, Politics, and a Disorderly Border: The Struggle to Comprehend Insurgency in Thailand's Deep South," Washington, *East-West Center*, Policy Studies 29 (Southeast Asia), especially pp. 38-41.
85. Ukrist Pathmanand, 2005, "Thaksin's Policies Go South," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 168, No. 7, July, pp. 8-13.
86. Lauridsen, "The Policies and Politics of Industrial Upgrading", p. 24.
87. *Ibid*.
88. *Ibid.,* p. 20.
89. Askew, "Conspiracy, Politics, and a Disorderly Border", pp. 1-25.
90. Interview with Dr Srisombop Jitpiromsri, 14 August 2009. Srisombop is founder and prominent figure of Deep South Watch (DSW) and director of the Center for South Conflict and Diversity (CSCD). He teaches now that he is no longer Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus.
91. Interview with Chaiwat Satha-Anand, 28 September 2009. See also Chaiwat Satha-Anand, 2009, "Untying the Gordian Knot: The Difficulties in Solving Southern Violence," in John Funston (ed.), *Divided Over Thaksin*, Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 96-109.
92. Interview with Dr Srisombop Jitpiromsri, 14 August 2009.
93. Mahakanjana, "Decentralization, Local Government," p. 14.
94. McCargo, *Tearing Apart The Land,* p. 188.
95. Interview, 28 September 2009.
96. Interview, 28 September 2009.
97. McCargo, *Tearing Apart the Land,* pp. viii-1. Several analysts, including McCargo, point out that military involvement in the violence was a result of the transferral of responsibility for security from the military to the police. Nevertheless, the insurgents and separatists did indeed have their own plans and agendas.
98. Report of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), "Overcoming Violence through the Power of Reconciliation", 16 May 2006, (Unofficial Translation to English), pp. 9-10. See also Chaiwat Satha-Anand (ed.), 2009, *Imagined Land? The State and the Southern Violence in Thailand*, Research for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA), Japan.
99. According to most, before the events of 2003-2004 there had been almost no development in the government's treatment of Malay-Muslims in the South, and no international attention, either from international institutions, ASEAN countries or other Muslims in the archipelago. See figures 5 and 6 for more on the escalation of violence in 2004. Figures taken from Wattana, "Culture, Politics and Violence", p. 127.
100. For the original text translated into English see footnote 73.

101. The King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI), 2007, "Dialogue on Implementing the Local Government Provisions of the New Constitution in Thailand," Bangkok, December, pp. 22-28.
102. Report of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), 2006, "Overcoming Violence Through the Power of Reconciliation", Bangkok, 16 May, unofficial translation into English.
103. See Human Rights First, "Somchai Neelaphaijit" available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrd_thailand/hrd_thailand_neelaphaijit.asp, accessed 25/08/09.
104. It is necessary to note that Yala, the largest province in South Thailand, only has a population of 500,000-600,000. The historical division of Patani into seven provinces was intended to weaken the Muslim struggle in the region.
105. See the MAC profile at http:/www.macmuslim.com, accessed 26/08/2009.
106. Volunteers in the three cities include women from the Islamic Law or Syariah Faculty of the Islamic College, Prince of Songkhla University. "I want to study 'Siamese *shari'ah*' too," said Muallimah, a final year student studying *shari'ah* who volunteers at MAC. She explained that she was not afraid of being involved with MAC, although it would make it hard for her to find work in the government. Most students, she continued, were reluctant to work in the government because of its discriminative nature.
107. See the official MAC website at http://www.macmuslim.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11&Itemid=10&lang=en.
108. Interview with Anukul Arweaputeh, director of the Patani branch of MAC, 18 August 2009.
109. Interview with Soraiya Jamjuree, 26 August 2009.
110. Interview with Zaenab aka Yena, 24 August 2009.
111. *Ibid.*
112. Interview with Kunj, 13 August 2009.
113. Interview with Dr. Metta Kuning, 3 September 2009.
114. Interview with Hj Ismail Ishad Benjamith Al-Fatani, 11 August 2009.
115. One director of a relatively large *pesantren* related how a Malaysian investor tried to establish a print media organization in the Malay language. He printed 10,000 copies of the first run but because he had not sought permission from the government they were never circulated. Interview, 27 August 2009.
116. Interview with Tuan Daniya Hj Mansor, 6 September 2009.
117. Interview, 17 August 2009.
118. Interview, 14 August 2009.
119. McCargo, *Tearing Apart The Land*, pp. 20-28.
120. Interview with three key figures, Mahmud Saleh, Abdussama Duhai, and Nimuhammad Waba, 9 and 16 August 2009.
121. Interview with the director Drs Hj Ahmadkamae Waemusor, 27 August 2009.
122. Interview with one of the *pesantren*'s directors and also Senator Muhammadrusdi Boto, in the Bangkok Senate, 26 August 2009.
123. According to the Chief Executive of the Pattani Provincial Administration Organization, Syed Abdulnasir Al-Jufree, there is now some flexibility for local governments to compile budgets that meet local needs, especially for religious development, which includes increasing religious education and Malay studies in schools. He is currently preparing a Malay language course for schools by designing curriculum and training prospective teachers who will later be placed in public and private schools. Interviewed in his office, 2 September 2009.

124. Interview with Djusmalinar, 20 August 2009.
125. Interview with the three primary directors of the now derelict Sapan *pesantren,* Tuan Guru Husein Nuh, Tuan Guru Abdus Somad, and Zubaedah, each of whom are on parole, 24 August 2009. Nevertheless, Zubaidah (36) is now a provincial coordinator of a victim's network which also networks with the women's movement, the human rights movement, and the media. On the day he was interviewed, Pangarat, a human rights activist in Bangkok who had taken the case, had just received permission from the government to reopen the *pesantren*. However, he said, it would take time for the *pesantren* to regain operations and to receive government subsidies again. In any case, the three main directors of the *pesantren* are still on parole. Interview with Pangarat, 24 August 2009.
126. Interview with Dr. Ismail Lutfi Pathani, 1 and 3 September 2009.
127. Dr. Ismail Lutfi said that after completing his exams, his examiners immediately suggested that his dissertation be published as it contained important findings. It was, however, only published in 1990 by Darus as-Salam in Mecca.
128. Interview with Dr. Ismail Lutfi Pathani, 3 September 2009.
129. Interview with H. Basyir Dullah Adam, 29 August 2009.
130. Ismail Lutfi related how he had dreamed about setting up a university since studying in Saudi Arabia in the 1970s. As such he works very diligently, managing it alone. The university, he declared, did not receive much funding from the Thai government, rather most came from governments in the Middle East thanks to his wide lobbying.
131. One assistant who is very close to Ismail Lutfi, and is also a political expert, said that Ismail Lutfi was once formally approached by a team from the Prime Minister's office to speak about how to resolve the violence and other issues in South Thailand. However, as the meeting concluded and the team started to leave, one turned back and whispered to him, "Don't be serious *ustadz*, 80% of military personnel don't agree with that solution," the assistant said, imitating the team member's whisper. Interview 29 August 2009.

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Ahmad Suaedy *is the Executive Director of Wahid Institute, Jakarta*