


STUDIA ISLAMIKA

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ECLECTICISM OF MODERN ISLAM:
ISLAM HADHARI IN MALAYSIA

Muhamad Ali

THE PROBLEMS OF TRANSLATION IN *TURJUMĀN AL-MUSTAFAĪD*:
A STUDY OF THEOLOGICAL AND ESCHATOLOGICAL ASPECTS

Ervan Nurtawab

ISLAM, HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION AND MUSLIM
AUTOBIOGRAPHY IN THE INDONESIAN NEW ORDER

Mohamad Abdun Nasir

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Is Indonesian Islam Different? Islam in Indonesia
in a Comparative International Perspective

Mohamad Abdun Nasir

Islam, Historical Representation and Muslim Autobiography in the Indonesian New Order

Abstrak: *Artikel ini menjelaskan representasi Islam dalam buku sejarah resmi Indonesia yang disusun oleh Pemerintah Orde Baru (1967-1998). Buku tersebut berjudul Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (SNI), terdiri dari enam jilid dan terbit pada tahun 1977. Edisi revisi volume enam dan tambahan volume volume tujuh muncul pada tahun 1993. Keseluruhan volume mencakup periode awal sejarah pra-Indonesia sampai perkembangan terbaru negara di mana volume terakhir selesai ditulis.*

Meski ditunjukkan oleh rezim sebagai sejarah nasional, SNI tidak selalu berisi narasi yang mengakomodasi secara jujur aktor-aktor non-negara, suara rakyat, dan sejarah lokal. Banyak narasi sejarah yang disembunyikan, khususnya dalam narasi Islam dan umat Muslim. Memang, di satu sisi, rezim Orde Baru mengakomodasi Islam dalam sejarah resmi, mengakui kedatangan Islam di Nusantara pada abad ketiga belas dari Timur Tengah dan Asia Selatan. SNI juga menjelaskan secara rinci penyebaran Islam dan dinamikanya sebagai kekuatan sosial-keagamaan seperti yang diperlihatkan oleh kerajaan-kerajaan Islam di seluruh Nusantara sampai akhir abad kesembilan belas. Namun, di sisi lain, deskripsi perlawanan Islam dan Muslim terhadap pendudukan kolonial, khususnya selama revolusi kemerdekaan dan perjuangan nasional pada pertengahan abad kedua puluh, secara signifikan terbatas.

Dengan demikian, sejarah resmi Orde Baru melalui buku SNI merepresentasikan Islam ke dalam dua model yang berbeda: akomodatif dan selektif. Pendekatan akomodatif menerima integrasi Islam dalam sejarah negara karena Islam, khususnya dalam sejarah pra-Indonesia, dipahami sebagai bagian yang tidak terpisahkan dari bangsa yang memainkan peran penting dalam menghubungkan Nusantara dengan seluruh dunia dan dalam

mempertahankan Nusantara dari hegemoni politik dan ekonomi Eropa. Sedangkan pendekatan selektif bertujuan untuk membatasi visibilitas Islam selama masa perjuangan kemerdekaan dan seterusnya karena periode ini diklaim secara eksklusif sebagai narasi rezim. Historiografi, dengan demikian, dipergunakan sebagai alat untuk membungkam narasi-narasi tertentu dan merekonstruksi masa lalu dalam perspektif rezim. Jika pendekatan yang pertama terbuka bagi representasi Islam yang seimbang, yang terakhir cenderung untuk memilih secara sewenang-wenang sumber-sumber yang sesuai dengan ideologi negara.

Padahal, sejarah memperlihatkan kontribusi penting umat Islam dan komunitas pesantren selama masa revolusi. Oleh karena itu, mereka berusaha untuk merepresentasikan diri mereka dalam sejarah. Otobiografi muncul sebagian sebagai counter terhadap narasi negara, seperti yang ditunjukkan karya-karya Saifudin Zuhri (1919-1986). Zuhri, yang terlibat dalam perang kemerdekaan, jurnalis, dan mantan menteri agama dari latar belakang Muslim tradisional, menulis dua otobiografi, *Guruku Orang-Orang Pesantren* (1974) dan *Berangkat Dari Pesantren* (1987). Kedua otobiografi tersebut merupakan sumber-sumber sejarah alternatif untuk studi Islam Indonesia di zaman modern karena sumber-sumber ini mengandung narasi yang tak diceritakan dalam sejarah resmi. Lebih jauh, kedua otobiografi menawarkan narasi mengenai partisipasi Islam dalam perjuangan kemerdekaan dan berbagai momen historis penting yang coba didominasi oleh sejarah resmi.

Sebagai orang yang berasal dari pesantren, hidup melalui periode akhir kolonialisme, menyaksikan era perang, konflik, ketidakstabilan dan kesulitan ekonomi, Zuhri merasa bahwa sejarah nasional tidak mengatakan yang sebenarnya. Apa yang dia lihat dan alami sepanjang era ini berbeda dari narasi resmi. Lembaga pesantren di mana ia dibesarkan, belajar, dan memulai hidupnya tidak muncul dalam sejarah. Dengan demikian, menulis otobiografi bagi Zuhri tidak hanya berarti merepresentasikan dirinya, tetapi lebih penting, merepresentasikan orang-orang yang dia pikir berhak untuk dikenang. Otobiografinya bertujuan untuk mengingat mereka yang tak pernah dicatat dan mendengarkan mereka yang tak pernah terdengar dalam sejarah.

Mohamad Abdun Nasir

Islam, Historical Representation and Muslim Autobiography in the Indonesian New Order

الخلاصة: هذا البحث يبين عن مفهوم الإسلام في كتاب التاريخ الإندونيسي الرسمي الذي ألفته الحكومة في العهد الجديد (١٩٦٧-١٩٩٨). منها الكتاب - الذى نحن بصدد بحثه- المسمى بـ التاريخ الوطنية الإندونيسية (*Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*) ويحتوى على ست مجلدات وطبع في سنة ١٩٧٧. وطبع بطبعة جديدة مع تصحيح وزيادة حتى أصبح سبع مجلدات في سنة ١٩٩٣. وكل مجلد محتوى على البحوث عن عقود الأوائل من تطور تاريخ هذا البلد قبل تأسيس الدولة الجمهورية الإندونيسية إلى الأحوال الجارية الحادثة أثناء تأليف الكتاب المذكور. وإن كانت الحكومة تستهدف إلى إعلام التاريخ للمجتمع، لكن الكتاب المذكور لا يعبر عن زعماء الدولة وآراء الشعب والتاريخ المحلية بالصدق تماما. بل فيه أخبار تاريخي الذي لم يذكر، خاصة فيما يتعلق بالإسلام والمسلمين. من جانب، اعترفنا أن الحكومة في العهد الجديد قد أمنح للإسلام بوضعه في التاريخ الوطني الرسمي، ويرى ذلك من إثبات مجيء الإسلام إلى هذا البلد في القرن الثالث عشر الميلادي من الشرق الأوسط والآسيا الجنوبي. وكذلك هذا الكتاب يبين عن نشر الإسلام ودينا ميكيته في مكاتته كالقوة الاجتماعية والدينية حسب ما ظهر في عهد السلاطين والمملكات الإسلامية في كل أنحاء الجزائر من هذه المناطق إلى نهاية القرن التاسع عشر. لكن من جانب أخرى، لا يحكى هذا الكتاب عن دفاع المسلمين عن هذا البلد على احتلال المستعمرات، خاصة في عصر ثورة الاستقلال والجهود الوطنية فيها إلا تصورا محمدا.

بناء على هذا، التاريخ الرسمي في العهد الجديد إنما أظهر الإسلام في منهجين مختلفين وهما: متكيفي وانتقائي. الأول أن يقبل آثار الإسلام في تاريخ الدولة لأن الإسلام يفهم أنه جزء الذي لا يتجزأ عن الشعب الذي يدور دورا مهما في اتصال هذا البلد إلى جميع أنحاء العالم، وكذلك في دفاع عن البلد على تسيطر أوروبا في مجال السياسة والاقتصادية. أما الثاني متوجه إلى تفريق دور الإسلام في عصر الثورة الاستقلالية وما بعدها، لأن هذا العصر يعتبر تاريخ ظهور الدولة. علم التاريخ مستعمل في استتار التواريخ المعينة وتغيير التاريخ الماضي حسب ما يوافق بإيدولوجية الحكومية.

إذا كان النهج الأول مفتوحا بإظهار الإسلام، فالثاني يميل إلى انتقاء المصادر التي تناسب بإيدولوجية الدولة. وفي الواقع، التاريخ نفسه أظهر على إبدال المسلمين والمعاهد في عصر الثورة. من أجل ذلك، فما زال المسلمون مبذلين جهدهم في إظهار أنفسهم عبر التاريخ. فكتبوا عن سيرة حياتهم ردا على ما نقلته الدولة، مثل ما ألف به سيف الدين زهري (١٩١٩-١٩٨٦) المسمى *بأساتندي من المعاهد (١٩٧٤) (Guruku Orang-orang Pesantren) والإبتداء من المعهد (١٩٨٧) (Berangkat dari Pesantren)*. فأصبح كتابان مذكوران مصدرا بديلا لدراسة إسلامية بإندونيسيا في العصر الحديث، لأن المصادر مثله متضمنة على نقل تاريخ الذي لا يحكيه التاريخ الرسمي. بل فيهما تقديم على اشتراك الإسلام في جهود الاستقلال وفي مواقع تاريخية التي تلونها الحكومة بتاريخها الرسمي.

إذا أمعنا النظر إلى سيرة ذاتية لسيف الدين الزهري، فنرى أنه قد شاهد نهاية الاستعمار والقتال والحرب والفتن والأزمة الاقتصادية الشديدة، من أجل ذلك وصل زهري إلى القول أن التاريخ الوطنية الرسمية لا تنقل عن الحق. وذلك لأنه قد تجرب وسللك في هذه العقود أشياء مختلفة عما حكاه التاريخ الرسمي. فلا تظهر في التاريخ هيئة المعاهد التي فيها يعيش ويتعلم ويبدأ حياته. بناء على هذا فتأليفه على الكتب المتنوعة عن حياته لا تنحصر غايته إلى إظهار نفسه قط، بل أهم منه وهو إظهار الرجال والأشخاص الذين يستحقون أن يذكروا. وكذلك تأليفه متوجه إلى ذكر من لم يذكر في التاريخ وسماع عمن لا يسمع فيه.

This essay examines the representation of Islam in the official history book of Indonesia composed by the New Order (1967-1998). The book called *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National History) consists of six volumes published in 1977. A revised edition of volume six and the last additional volume (volume seven) appeared in 1993. These volumes cover early period of the pre-history of Indonesia until the most recent development of the country during which the last volume was finished.¹ The book's structure is chronological and each volume emphasizes specific themes. In addition to the issues of economics, society, politics and culture, the volumes discuss the rise and the fall of various religious-based kingdoms in the Nusantara archipelago.² They narrate the struggle of the people in these islands against the European colonial, mainly Dutch, power and economic hegemony that occurred until the mid-twentieth century in which the independence and the birth of Indonesia was declared. Volume seven specifically pertains to the rise of the New Order and the progress in socio-religious life and economic development that this regime brought to the country. The significance of these volumes in producing discourses on Indonesian history is unquestionable during the New Order since it was widely used in national school curricula. Only recently after Reform era in 1998 did their domination cease. Although the volumes were projected by the regime to be a national history, they do not necessarily contain narratives that fairly accommodate non-state actors, people's voices and local histories. Many historical subjects and narratives are concealed. This holds true for Islam and Muslim's narratives, since this official chronicle represented them discriminately.

On the one hand, the regime accommodates Islam in its official history, acknowledging the arrival of Islam in the archipelago in the thirteenth century from the Middle East and South Asia. The history describes in detail the spread of Islam and its dynamics as a socio-religious power reflected in many Islamic kingdoms throughout the islands until the end of the nineteenth century. The description of Islam and Muslim resistance against colonial occupation, especially during the course of the revolution for independence and national struggle in the mid-twentieth century, are significantly limited. Why does the state's history during the New Order represent Islam differently? What are the ideology, principles and methods of historiography adopted by the state? And how do Muslims represent themselves in history?

I am thus interested in looking at the ways in which the history was composed and manipulated by the New Order to legitimate its own *status quo*. I will examine the politics of the New Order's historiography and historical (mis)representation as these are revealed in its official history book and analyze how such a chronicle is challenged by autobiography written by unrepresented people.

Scholars are interested in discussing autobiographies arising in modern Indonesia and seek to reveal a general pattern and feature of this literary genre that relates to, for example, the idea of self-representation³ and women's sexual fantasies and agency⁴. Recent scholars highlight autobiographies, especially written by "the leftists" and critical figures who became political victims of the state, which flourish after the collapse of the New Order. Their studies disclose features of autobiographical works in this period and signify flourishing autobiographical works as the sign of democratic era and freedom of the press.⁵ These two streams of study missed some important attributes of autobiography that rise during the New Order, as two autobiographies written by Saifudin Zuhri (1919-1986) palpably display.⁶ Zuhri, who was involved in independence war and a former journalist and Minister of Religion from a traditionalist Muslim background,⁷ wrote two autobiographies, *Guruku Orang-orang Pesantren* and *Berangkat dari Pesantren*, published in 1974 and 1987 respectively. They constitute alternative historical sources for the study of Indonesian Islam in the modern time because these sources contain narratives, which are untold in the official history, and offer a Muslim's narratives and perspectives about Islam and Muslim participation in the independence struggles, a contested historical juncture that the official history attempts to dominate. These autobiographies politically challenge the New Order's official history and introduce a new concept of the self, which implies a sense of communalism instead of individualism, in modern Indonesia.

Accommodative History

History can have many meanings and can be used for different purposes. It might become a source of pride and dignity of a people, society and nation and should therefore be preserved in written sources or visual materials. It might be used by rulers as a means of strengthening their legitimacy or silencing past events that might stir serious inquiry about their current rule. The past can also be reconstructed to conjure

up certain images to stimulate people's feelings and actions. It conveys particular messages to the public or intended audiences so that they supposedly respond to them accordingly. In short, history can serve different purposes for different people. History thus depends largely on for whom it is written and for which purposes it is composed.⁸ The Indonesian state official history composed by the New Order appears to follow this frame.

One salient problem of Indonesian historiography is concerned with defining a national history: how it is composed, from which period it begins, who and what should be narrated and so forth. This problem stems from the nature of Indonesia's pluralistic society. Indonesia, a nation born only in 1945, comprises of diverse religious, cultural, and ethnic societies residing in thousands of islands speaking different local languages. These issues constitute the main themes of a volume addressing Indonesian historiography.⁹ This volume offers several important thoughts, suggesting the use of both local and regional, while not disregarding foreign, sources. National history can also benefit from archeology and epigraphy. The volume contains several papers by experts in anthropology, sociology, comparative history and cultural and religious studies, encouraging social and humanities approaches, rather than merely a political perspective that often dominates an official history. The efforts to write a national history by Indonesians themselves began in the first national seminar of history in Yogyakarta in 1957, followed by the second seminar in 1970. In 1977, six volumes of national history appeared and become the state official history of the New Order. After the collapse of this regime, revisions have been made by the subsequent regime.¹⁰

According to Sartono Kartodirdjo, one of the main editors of the official history book, national history must become a symbol of national identity that should include the narrative of Indonesian communities as a coherent whole.¹¹ He proposes several principles that should feature in the national history; non-political history, descriptive-analytical rather than descriptive narrative, covering pre-history up to contemporary history, integration as a paradigm and free from nationalist biases.¹² The volumes employ consistently these criteria, except for the last point that still predominates the structure and content of the sixth volume, its revised edition and the seventh volume.¹³ The nationalist orthodox narratives of the New Order clearly dominate the history.

The official history attempts to reconstruct Indonesia's past as grandeur and as the cradle of the establishment for the nation. It considers the past as a modality for building up "Indonesia's unity in diversity", as the state's principle declares.¹⁴ It argues that the pre-Indonesian societies, be they Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim or Christian, had established cosmopolitan connections with people from different parts of the world. This experience created religious, socio-political, cultural and economical ties amongst them and subsequently affected their mutual relationships. Similar relations also internally prevailed amongst the people in the archipelago that linked one region to another and from one generation to the next. This contention suggests that the establishment of Indonesia as a nation-state in a later century has a firm historical basis. The narratives about the Indonesian past are given within this cohesive and continuous historical pattern that connects the previous and subsequent eras and links the people into vigorous reciprocal interactions.

This becomes a perspective upon which the history of pre-Indonesian Islam is reconstructed. More specifically, the establishment of Muslim communities and the rise of Islamic kingdoms are seen as a continuation from previous existing societies and empires. Islam is not regarded as a major threat leading to the decline of those kingdoms despite their tensions and conflicts.¹⁵ The history maintains that the coming of Islam into the islands was brought by traders from South Asia and the Middle East, but was not spread through military invasions. The emergence of Islamic kingdoms such as Pasai in Sumatra and Demak in Java are perceived as coincidental with the declining power of the Sriwijaya Buddhist Kingdom in Sumatra at the end of the twelfth century and with the internal conflicts in the Javanese Majapahit Hindu Kingdom at the end of fifteenth century.¹⁶ Another clear message from this history is that the Europeans, especially the Dutch and Portuguese, coming first to conduct commercial businesses and later to colonize, are regarded as common enemies and from here the Muslims along with other indigenous societies defended the islands. This spirit in turn gradually helped unite the archipelago into one nation after the end of the Dutch occupation in the mid-twentieth century.

The description of pre-Indonesian Islam is comprehensive and detail. The book applies various perspectives such as social history, anthropology, and economic history to depict Islam. It is therefore not

merely a political history, as what commonly official history would be, but also a wide-ranging history addressing the issues of the methods and channels of Islamization, Muslim cities and their inhabitants, centers of worship and economic activities, and sailing and sea trade with the outer world. The editor of volume three is Uka Tjandrasmita, an archeologist and historian who graduated from the University of Indonesia. In addition to archeological sources, he bases his data largely on local narratives, tales, court manuscripts and archives and on foreign sources written by Chinese and European scholars. These sources, especially from western scholars, use data from the Muslim and western traveler reports such as Ibn Batuta, Marco Polo and Tomé Pires, who visited the archipelago at the end of thirteenth, the fifteenth and at the beginning of the sixteenth century respectively.¹⁷

A special feature of this historiography concerns the topographical approach, which relatively only began to be introduced to the study of the history of Islam in Indonesia in the 1970s. The major works in this field and Islamic history in general remain concerned with political history.¹⁸ Topographical approaches in history are often adopted by archeologists who attempt to reconstruct history based on material evidence such as remnants of court buildings, stones, gravesites, coins or other materials. It is said that the growth and development of Islamic cities in pre-Indonesian Islam had to do with various factors such as geography, economics, politics, and even magic-cosmology. Most Muslim cities that emerged in these periods such as Pasai, Palembang, Banten, Demak, Ternate, and Gowa were located in coastal areas or on riverbanks so that their geographical position could establish easy sea commerce and connect worldwide trading activities to create lucrative markets and boost economic growth.¹⁹ In classical Javanese literature such as in *Babad Tanah Jawi*, the selection of places and the establishment of cities were often made on the ground of spiritual instructions given by saints.²⁰ The discussion of the developments of Muslim coastal cities in this volume proves the thesis that Islam came to Indonesia through the sea routes, connecting the islands to South Asia and the Middle East, from which Muslim preachers and traders came. This argument strengthens the idea that the pre-Indonesian societies established close and strong socio-religious and economical ties worldwide and that Islam was one of the religions that contributed to this process.²¹

The representation of Islam in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which featured the struggle against the Europeans, is also emphasized in this volume portraying Islam as indigenous and native powers that responded critically and resisted vigorously the political and economic intervention of the Europeans. The Dutch encountered resistance from Islamic Kingdoms such as Malaka, Aceh, Moluccas, Banten, Mataram, Banjar and Gowa. Meanwhile, the Portuguese and, to a lesser degree, the Spaniards, faced resistance from Islamic kingdoms in Malaka, Banten, Aceh, and Moluccas.²² Volume four especially focuses on such regional struggles and regards them as preliminaries to the establishment of a nation-state of Indonesia.²³ The regional resistance against western economic and political domination in the previous centuries is regarded as the seed of nationalism and the rise of the revolution for independence in the twentieth century. Therefore, the state official history represents the Indonesians engaging in those struggles as national heroes that later generations of citizens must remember. This is chiefly because colonial narratives in many ways described the Indonesian people who resisted the colonials as insurgent groups jeopardizing colonial interests.²⁴ In such narratives, the colonials represented themselves as the actors and the indigenous people as their objects.²⁵ Now, in the official chronicle, the logic is reversed; the indigenous people are the heroes, while the colonials are seen as the enemy. Thus, one history is written against another history.

However, this approach of looking at regional narratives within the frame of nationalism leads to certain dilemmas. The history regarding the diversity of religious, socio-cultural, and ethno-regional backgrounds as the fundamental structure of pre-Indonesian societies seems to be steadily deemphasized. What is now crucial for the state is a national dimension of the unified form of resistance against foreign powers. The state gradually co-opted these regional narratives and manipulated them as a national movement rather than as local phenomena. At the same time, the state is less attentive to local historical actors in its narratives and draws little attention to regional voices in wider socio-political contexts.²⁶ The beginning of the twentieth century is interpreted as the initial movement of national (and nationalist) struggle, in which ethnic, religious and local movements were diminished and unified under the banner of nationalism.²⁷ This shifting historical paradigm applies to the official narratives in describing the independence revolution and

beyond, in which the state becomes the dominant actor in Indonesian history.

Selecting Narratives, Silencing History

Unlike the state's perception of thirteenth to nineteenth century pre-Indonesian history that accommodates Islam into the state history as the glorious past of the nation, the history of Islam in the course of the independence movement in the middle of the twentieth century is hardly visible. The state changes its approach in representing Islam and Muslim participation in independence struggle and comes forward as the only central actor in the history and dominates the narrative. The New Order presents itself as the sole, unchallenged and valid authority that requires undivided appreciation from the entire society and the people. It seeks to produce a grand narrative to create a positive impression of itself and to strengthen its current dominative ruling over the country, displacing all rivals of autonomous and local narratives.²⁸ Instead of acknowledging Islam as a dynamic power that played a decisive role and made outstanding contributions toward the establishment of the nation, the New Order significantly silences this picture of Islam. This new approach was taken by the state to unify and nationalize, and thus simplify, its history. The New Order regarded Islam more as a potential threat and rival to state ideology and state power rather than as an ideal partner from the second half of the 1960s until the mid 1980s,²⁹ during which the major works on national history were composed.

Nevertheless, the real enemy in the New Order's grand narrative is not Islam, but rather colonialism, separatism, and communism.³⁰ For this reason, volume six of this official history, which especially focuses on the period of the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), draws special attention to the nation's situation at the time of independence and beyond and frames these stories within the paradigm of the state as the main actor in the national history. This time span exclusively belongs to the New Order's narratives and the history is exclusively devoted to heroic narratives of the regime and the national army. The army constitutes the core element of the regime in the first half of its governance and represents itself as the defender of the country. The state and the army exemplify themselves as the carrier of rapid economic development and guarantor of political stability.

Although Indonesia declared its independence on 17 August 1945,

the diplomatic efforts and physical battles against the Dutch, who insisted on re-occupying Indonesia, and the remains of the defeated Japanese armies continued. The newly born country also faced an unabated series of internal conflicts and regional revolts instigated by separatist groups and local fighters dissatisfied with the central government's policies.³¹ This chaotic national political constellation, high economic inflation and instability during the Old Order period (a term used by the New Order to name the Sukarno's era from 1945-1965) continued and led to the bloody national tragedy that occurred on 30 September 1965. In this disastrous event, the Communist Party was accused of being the mastermind behind the abortive *coup d'état* that brought about this catastrophe. The period of disorder, the history tells, ends with the rise of the New Order in 1967.³²

In most such situations, the history portrays nationalist figures holding pivotal roles in diplomatic struggles, and the Indonesian national army is credited for their part in restoring peace and order. Volume six and its revised edition as well as volume seven are replete with such heroic records and offer a privileged place for the army and Suharto to fully articulate their narratives. The New Order is interested in building up its image and carving it into the history. These volumes give space to highlight military operations throughout the country and selectively underscore Suharto's engagement in such endeavors. Two specific narratives are chosen to underline this point. The first story is concerned with the extraordinary victory gained by the Indonesian National Army (TNI) led by Suharto in recapturing the capital of the state in Yogyakarta from the second Dutch aggression and occupation.

After more than a month of preparation, TNI began attacking the Dutch's positions. They destroyed the communication systems used by the Dutch, railroads were demolished and even Dutch military convoys were suddenly ambushed in daylight. The Dutch thus dispatched a great number of its troops to keep its strategic places and left their main position in Yogyakarta open to attack. The general attack on Yogyakarta on March 1, 1949, which was led by Colonel (now President) Suharto successfully seized the city and occupied it for six hours. It was an obvious proof showing to the world that TNI was strong enough to stage military operations.³³

What is interesting is that this narrative places a special emphasis on the role of TNI, particularly on the figure of Suharto. The parenthesis in the quotation purports to connect the present (Suharto's presidency) with the past (Suharto's military role). It points out Suharto's central

importance and his great achievement in such a successful military service for the sake of the nation's independence. Another example in the same narrative deals with the Indonesian military operation of 1950 in combating a revolt in eastern Indonesia led by the former Dutch militias known as KNIL (*Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger*) or the Royal Netherlands Indies Army. Again, the figure of Suharto is particularly exposed and marked within a parenthesis.

On April 26, the army's expedition under the command of Colonel Kawilarang whose core military element was the Mataram Brigade led by Lieutenant Colonel Suharto (now president) arrived in South Sulawesi. Therefore, the situation there was brought under control and order was restored. But this would not last for long, because there were Dutch armies and Indies armies that often created disturbances and provoked violence against the national army. On May 15, battle broke out between the national army and the Dutch and its local loyal militias. A ceasefire was signed between the two conflicting parties and this signaled the end of the battles.³⁴

It is true that Suharto engaged in large military operations in the course of the independence movement,³⁵ and a semi-biographical book displaying many pictures of him along with his army colleagues during military duties clearly reveals his eagerness and active participation in various battles.³⁶ However, choosing his personal narrative and inserting it into the official history at the expense of other narratives appears to be an unfair representation. The two quoted narratives obviously disclose a tendency for personal exposure. They and other similar narratives are selectively chosen and emphasized to demonstrate that the military and Suharto played the most pivotal roles in obtaining independence. Both stories also explicitly convey a message that the president used to be a prominent hero of the military who engaged in various battles and always won. The stories from the battlefield inform the readers about these palpable achievements. The figure of Suharto and the army are central, if not sacred, in these last two volumes of official history. The history especially provides the narrative of the rise of the New Order along with its all achievements and the domination of the army as a guarantor of stability.³⁷ The Indonesian national history since independence is thus identical to a military history. Other narratives are deemphasized. Other stories of prominent figures are silenced. Not only does the regime insert its military ideology in the reconstruction of the official history, but it also attempts to disseminate their heroic

stories into public remembrance through visual means such as films, museums and monuments.³⁸

Because of such dominant themes, other voices and narratives are rarely presented. Indeed these last volumes also narrate struggles by non-military actors in regional contexts, but the descriptions are superficial and limited. Volume six, for example, does not include some major battles that broke out in Java and other islands such as in Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Bali. This volume does not even cover the Surabaya battle on November 10, 1945, in spite of the fact that this date is marked as National Hero's Day due to the abundance of victims in that conflict. Only in the revised volume six published in 1993 are these regional battles and other missing narratives included. Yet the overall perspective of historiography in this revised edition remains unchanged. The army persistently comes forth as the real hero in all narratives. The history thus tends to simplify the narratives, neglecting the complexity of wars and non-military elements of popular participation in these deadly revolutionary struggles.

The description of the Surabaya battle illustrates such imbalanced representations. The history does not mention the participation of major fighters coming from Muslims and the *pesantren* (traditional Islamic boarding school) communities that were a fundamental element of the civilian forces called *Hizbullah* and *Sabilillah* and led by *kyai*, or *pesantren* religious leaders. After the promulgation of Independence in 1945, the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) returned to Indonesia as part of an international coalition under British leadership to disarm the defeated Japanese armies. This international body, especially the division of Dutch troops, attempted to re-occupy Indonesia because the Netherlands still claimed it to be a part of their East Indies colony. This dispute forced the Indonesians and the Dutch to resolve their issues through serial negotiations that unfortunately were to no avail. Due to the failure of diplomatic efforts, armed confrontations occurred between the allied forces and Indonesian fighters in Surabaya and other cities in Java.

The Surabaya battle is the first battle after the return of the Dutch with the international allied force to Indonesia. It was a fierce battle that claimed the greatest number of fighters and killed a British General, Mallaby, who led the coalition.³⁹ Unfortunately, the official history does not elaborate enough on this historic battle. Neither does it clearly

mention the participation of the *Hizbullah* Muslim paramilitary and civilian forces. Among the core elements of these forces were *kyai* and *santri*. One leading *kyai*, Hasyim Asy'ari (1871-1946), the founder of the Muslim organization *Nahdlatul Ulama* and was recognized as a national hero in 1964, is not mentioned at all despite his pivotal role. In addition to directly involving the *pesantren* force during the war for independence and acting as a spiritual leader for many Indonesians including the central figures such as Sukarno, Hatta and Sutomo, he also issued a jihad fatwa regarding the battle.⁴⁰ Similarly, this history poorly describes Sutomo (Bung Tomo) as one of the youth leaders who provoked the fighters through his inflammatory speeches and *takbir* broadcasted by radio transmission.⁴¹ The New Order regime never acknowledges him as a national hero. Only recently he has received such an admission.⁴²

Writing history is not only purely an academic, but is also a political task. In this respect, the most important question is not "what is history?", but rather "who is history written for?".⁴³ This question is relevant here with regard to New Order historiography, which tended to manipulate history in its own interest. Although historical objectivity remains a major issue amongst historians and philosophers who wonder if such objectivity in history can ever be reached, the state history's representation of Islam is obviously imbalanced. The New Order regime's political interest clearly affected the official history in many ways. Colonialism, separatism and communism are the main enemies that must be combated and imaginatively defeated through official narratives. However, Islam is not an exception either. Although the regime did not politically consider Islam as a perpetual rival and enemy, the relation between the state and Islam in the early period of the first two decades of the New Order government was uneasy and fraught with tensions and ambiguities.⁴⁴ Conflicts between the army and Muslim groups occurred in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta, in 1984 and in Lampung in 1989. In these clashes, many Islamists, Muslim activists and protestors were detained and murdered.⁴⁵

Another reason for the aversion of the state to accommodating Islam fully in the official history is because many Islamists making Islam into an ideology still envision the establishment of an Islamic state, which is what the protagonist of the *Darul Islam* rebellion demanded.⁴⁶ Although this group was formally dissolved, its sympathizers still exist

in strongholds in West Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi. It might be argued that by reducing the representation of Islam as an ideology in the state's history helps minimize the future possibility of the rise of Islam politics in Indonesia. The fact that the official history appeared only one year before the very critical election in 1978, in which Suharto was challenged by Muslim political parties and faced opposition from Muslim political figures,⁴⁷ might explain the strong ideological tendency of the state's historiography. This Islamist ideology and the state-Islam political relationship often in conflict reveal the factors causing the misrepresentation of Islam in the national history. This ideological stance and political constellation in turn shapes the method of the state's historiography and representations. If the state eager to represent pre-Indonesian Islam in a positive view, it now hardly acknowledges the role of Islam in the times of independence and beyond. Three main approaches in the state's historiography regarding Islam can be discerned.

First, the state is very selective in singling out references and historical data concerning Islam. Selectivity often constitutes a means of representation or misrepresentation in historical narrations. By including and excluding certain sources, the author invariably picks up particular narratives that meet his or her particular interest and simultaneously omit unwanted specific stories. Hardly any Indonesian sources dealing with Islam are cited in the sixth volume, despite many available sources, and the only English source used concerning Islam is Harry J. Benda's book.⁴⁸ This implies that the volume avoids discussing Islam beyond Benda's view. This volume also does not refer to the Indonesian scholar Deliar Noer's book about the Muslim movements in Indonesia, despite its concern with the independence period.⁴⁹ In contrast, the volume cites many sources that credit nationalism as the ideology of the independence revolution.⁵⁰ All of this strongly indicates that the state selectively chose certain sources to benefit its own interests, while disadvantaging others.

Information on Islam and its role in the course of the independence revolution can be easily found in many sources, including in works by scholars who are concerned with the independence revolution, such as Bernhard Dahm and Benedict Anderson.⁵¹ Although Islam does not constitute their main research focus, both scholars concede the decisive role that Islam assumed in this period. Dahm, for example,

suggests three main ideologies that were importantly influential in the course of independence revolution, namely Islam, Nationalism and Marxism.⁵² He even states that in nationalist figures such as Sukarno, who embraced Marxism, the influence of Islam on his views was obvious. He divides the intellectual development of Sukarno into three phases: nationalist (1926-1931), Marxist (1932-1933) and Islamic (1934-1941).⁵³ He shows that Sukarno, who proclaimed Indonesian independence and then became the first president, intensively studied Islam when he was in exile in Ende Island in eastern Indonesia and in Benkulen on the southwest coast of Sumatra from 1934 to 1941.⁵⁴ Sukarno, who had previously joined *Sarekat Islam*, discussed Islam with Muslim figures such as Ahmad Hasan⁵⁵ during his time in exile and later became a member of the *Muhammadiyah* Muslim modernist organization while he was in Benkulen.⁵⁶ Although these relations were uneasy, these experiences demonstrate that Sukarno learnt enough about Islam. Likewise, Anderson clearly indicates the important role that the Muslims, especially from the *pesantren* communities, played in gaining the nation's independence. Anderson's main point in the first chapter of his book is that the Indonesian youth (*pemuda*) constituted the core backbone of the independence revolution.⁵⁷ Many Muslim youths in Java, in which he undertook his fieldwork, studied in traditional Islamic boarding school or *pesantren*. Equipped with religious doctrines, disciplines, and self-defense techniques and martial art called *pentjak silat*, the youths of the *pesantren* were well-prepared to face crises, including revolution.⁵⁸ Anderson also mentions in his book the Muslim paramilitary force, *Hizbullah*, as one of the important components of the youth movement in the struggles for independence.

Second, Islam is only represented in a normative, superficial narrative, as either a pure religion or a non-political entity, but not as a power and an ideology, in spite of the fact that it was both religion and ideology that inspired Muslims to wage battles against the colonials.⁵⁹ Hardly any prominent Muslim figures are visible in most narratives in volume six, its revised edition and volume seven. The seventh volume for instance only mentions *Nabdlatul Ulama*, *Muhammadiyah* and *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*/MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council) as representatives of Islam and includes other religions such as Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism as well. It discusses them all under the chapter "Demography and the Development of Society". The perspective in this representation

remains unchanged; all are presented as an example of the successful development program of the secular state in the field of religious life.⁶⁰ The state adopts this approach to follow the Dutch policy regarding Islam, in which this colonial administration only recognized Islam in its purely religious and ritualistic activities but restricted it in terms of ideological and political expressions.⁶¹

Third, Nugroho Notokusanto (1931-1985) is one of three general editors of the New Order's official history book and is often regarded as the master architect of the state's historiography, who framed the past of Indonesia from the perspective of military ideology.⁶² Notokusanto, whose close association with the army began when he joined the Student Army in 1945, was appointed a member of the Army History Center in 1964,⁶³ an experience that considerably influenced his perspective as a historian. He has left three remarkable legacies in the New Order's historiography. The first was the reconstruction of the history of the September 30, 1965 tragedy, in which the Communist Party was suspected of plotting the coup. The second pertains to the de-Sukarnoization of the official history and the last legacy is concerned with his endeavor to promote the army as the main actor in Indonesian history.⁶⁴ This New Order historiography has been seriously challenged since the Reformation era in 1998 because it hardly recognizes local histories and fails to accommodate regional and religious, non-state figures. How, then, do Muslims, especially those who witnessed and experienced the independence revolution, represent themselves in Indonesian history, and how do they offer their personal narratives about Indonesia's past? To answer this question, we surely cannot depend on the official history. Rather, we should now find alternative sources, one of which stems from personal accounts written by authors who experienced and witnessed history.

History and Self-Representation: the Rise of Autobiography

Historians make use of various written sources to support their historical inquiries. In addition to archives and official documents, they also base and enrich their data on personal notes and narratives such as memoirs, biographies and autobiographies. The importance of these literary genres lie in their capacities as personal accounts to offer alternative views about specific events that authors, or main actors in the narratives, directly experience about specific historical events and

provide specific information that is either unavailable or limited in other sources. They thus give distinctive information about occurrences or issues that might be lost, unless otherwise written in such accounts.⁶⁵ With respect to the Indonesian context, autobiography is increasingly becoming a popular source for historical research since it often reveals a past uncovered in the official history or offers a specific concept of culture, self and religious tradition.

There are at least two main features of modern autobiography written by Indonesians. Initially, autobiography arose during the periods of the state's formation and echoed the spirit of independence and anti-colonialism. The authors in this generation commonly portrayed themselves heroically and attempted to define what the nation would be. Self-representation and the search for the nation's identity become the main themes of this initial phase.⁶⁶ The second wave of autobiography emerged after the downfall of the New Order and marked the beginning of democratization and openness in the new era called *Reformasi* in 1998. Unlike the previous phase, in which the authors' self-awareness was closely tied with the idealism of national formation, autobiography in the post-Suharto and reformation era signals the rise of self-representation and freedom of expression against state repression. Political and public figures wrote their lives as a means of self-promotion of practical political purposes, for example, when they ran for an election, a phenomenon that was unlikely to occur under the strict control of the state in the previous era. Dissident and opposition groups shared their narratives through autobiography too and expressed their voices delineating their bitter political experiences under the New Order. Many of them who are critical of this regime stem from leftist or ex-communist groups and opposing Muslims who lived under state oppression.⁶⁷

Among the autobiographies that emerged during the New Order are *Guruku Orang-orang Pesantren* (My Teachers are the People of the Traditional Islamic School) in 1974 and *Berangkat dari Pesantren* (Start from the Traditional Islamic School) in 1987, both of which were written by Saifuddin Zuhri. These autobiographies belong to the first category of Indonesian autobiography.⁶⁸ The significance of Zuhri's works for the study of modern Islam in Indonesia is first because they include a wide span of time and cover several pivotal historical periods, from late colonialism, the independence revolution, and Sukarno's era up to the

transition to the rise of Suharto's New Order. His works offer different narratives about the struggle for Indonesian independence from those of the official history. They inform readers about Muslims and the *pesantren* community involvements during revolutionary movements in the mid-twentieth century which are silenced by the New Order history. In this respect, Zuhri is concerned with the construction of the national history and the representation of Islam in it during the debates on the writing of the state history in the 1970s.

His first book appeared only three years prior to the rise of the state official history in 1977. Zuhri's works constitute pioneering autobiography of traditionalist Muslims offering rich accounts, life stories, religious discourses, and the political views and practices of the *pesantren* community and providing insider perspectives about Islam, especially from this traditional institution and their contribution for independence, which suffers from the state historical misrepresentation. His works also clearly demonstrate that within even traditionalist Muslim societies, the concept of the self has been widely articulated. These autobiographies disclose a model of self-representation in which the concept of self does not necessarily refer to the author himself as an individual, but also as a body representing a collective sense of community. It is because Zuhri integrates his sense of self into the self of *pesantren* throughout his autobiographies. His childhood, adulthood and most of his career are germane to this educational institution.

Zuhri's autobiographies also answer to one of the important questions posed by Rodgers, who was curious whether people from other than North and West Sumatera write their memoirs and autobiographies that emphasize their childhood.⁶⁹ Zuhri's works obviously answer Rodger's questions. However, although Zuhri includes the narratives of his childhood in his autobiographies, he does not mean to focus merely on this early period of his life. In other words, his childhood does not seem to be the most important narrative but constitutes an inseparable part of the whole story whose most element stem from his experience in *pesantren*. This is a distinctive character distinguishing his work from other autobiographies written by Pospos and Radjab, as Rodger's study reveals. To these two Indonesian autobiographers, childhood is central to their autobiographies because, I think, they wrote their work while they were in Diaspora, living in Jakarta which is culturally different, and geographically far away, from their villages in Sumatra. Reminiscence

of the childhood might be remembered more often than other aspects of life for those experiencing diasporic life. Besides, the tradition of ethnographic writing about the village life during the childhood is particularly strong among people from such specific regions.⁷⁰

Saifuddin Zuhri was born in Banyumas, Central Java in 1919 and died in Jakarta in 1986. He grew up in a Muslim traditionalist family and received his basic education in the *madrasah* and *pesantren* mostly affiliated with the Muslim organization *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU). His career started as a teacher at various NU-affiliated educational institutions. He joined the NU's youth organization *Ansor* and became a local commander of the *Hizbullah* paramilitary force that along with other elements of the army and civilian forces worked hand in hand in the struggles for independence. This participation helped him get in touch with national figures and linked him to the central board of the NU. He entered government office as a civil servant and served as the head of the religious office in Central Java province in 1950, while was still active as an NU's central board member. In 1962, Sukarno assigned him to the position of Minister of Religion and he remained in this position until 1967 when the New Order suddenly dismissed him. Upon his retirement, he decided to join the Development Unity Party (PPP) as a representative of the NU faction until this organization withdrew from the coalition. He spent his last years writing articles in national newspapers and magazines and finished his second autobiography in 1985, a year before he died.⁷¹

He said that he was reluctant to write about himself. In a short foreword to his first autobiography, he tells readers his reasons for writing it, stating that a friend requested him to write about the world of the *pesantren* and the people who dedicated their lives to this institution and the nation as well. If his friend had not made such a request, he would not have written the book. In his first autobiography, *Guruku*, for example, he does not really mean to talk about himself because the main actor of the book is not himself, but rather his teachers and the people from the traditional Islamic school with which he used to study. He writes the book to honor those that he thinks deserve remembering. He says:

Frankly, I do not like to write about myself. I would rather like to write about and narrate the stories of those who have brought my life to what I am now and who have taught me...if there is a story about my life [in this writing], it is only meant to easily understand the stories about the people

I am discussing. They are my friends, teachers, and leaders, who all come from and learn in the *pesantren*...they are part of our society who like others have given their contributions to their country.⁷²

This work is devoted to the people whom Zuhri interacted with when he was in the *pesantren*. Narratives about himself and his family are present only in a limited chapter and in scattered passages throughout the book. He starts his narrations about his childhood and first education in a traditional Islamic school in 1929. The first two chapters are concerned with his early life. In four subsequent chapters, he talks about his teachers and the *pesantren* life until he finishes studying there and begins his career as a teacher and his involvements in youth organizations affiliated with the NU. This experience brings him into a broader network with the central board of this organization and helps him connect to nationally prominent figures who are struggling for independence from both the Dutch and Japanese occupations. In the last three chapters, Zuhri focuses his narratives on the independence struggle, telling about the negotiations, conflicts and battles in which *Hizbullah* forces and the *pesantren* people engaged until the mid 1950's. In short, two thirds of this book pertains to the traditional Muslim religious school and its role in the establishment and formation of the nation.

There appears to be a shift in writing style and focus in Zuhri's second autobiography by narrating his life in considerable detail and providing longer and more elaborate narratives of the struggle for independence. This work has many pictures depicting his family members and his various organizational activities in *Ansor*, *Hizbullah*, and the NU up to his official appointment as a minister of religion. Some narratives describing his close relationship with Sukarno appear in the last chapter, giving a strong impression of his proximity to the first president, which was the likely reason for his unexpected dismissal as a minister upon the emergence of the New Order. However, this second work still remains focused on the *pesantren* as a place from which he begins his life, as the title suggests. Several narratives contained in the first autobiography, especially about the involvement of the people of the *pesantren* in the cause of national independence are reproduced and extended.

What Zuhri seems to stress in his two autobiographies is the institution of the *pesantren* and its pivotal role in the formation of the nation. In his view, this point does not receive the attention it

deserved.⁷³ He needed to represent the *pesantren* people in his narratives since they are rarely visible in other histories about the independence and revolution. He appeals to his readers not to forget their roles, but to remember them through his autobiographies. He seeks to reveal that the Muslims and the *pesantren* community in particular were not only involved themselves in debates about the strategies and techniques of the struggle, but also critically responded to the colonial discourse, contributed for the state's formation, and participated in battles against the nation's enemies. These are the prevalent themes of his autobiographies.

The *pesantren* people engaged in discursive battle on colonialism, independence and state identity. There was a heated debate within the *pesantren* and the NU circle about imitating the colonial lifestyle, their dress and accessories. The debate arose when the NU's youth wing *Ansor* adopted bugles and drums in their paramilitary parades and wore ties in ceremonials and meetings.⁷⁴ A senior NU figure and several other leading figures forbade adopting colonial dress or other ornaments, because they were colonizing a Muslim nation. These people were afraid that imitating the colonial style was equivalent to agreeing with them. In contrast, Hasyim Asy'ari, the founder of the NU, approved of such practices, arguing that using bugles and drums aimed to demonstrate Muslim power in paramilitary shows, so that they would not be overlooked. Likewise, adopting Western dress was permissible as long as it did not indicate support for colonial policy. Zuhri expresses his opinion on this debate, while criticizing and explaining the reasons for the repudiation of Western practices and finally praising them.

Zuhri argues that the *pesantren's* rigid perceptions about modernism brought by the colonials disadvantaged themselves, because they could not benefit from the modernity that the colonials introduced. As a result, many considered the traditional Islamic school conservative and zealous. However, Zuhri interprets this stance on repudiating to emulate the colonialist style as a means of defending the country from economic and cultural domination. By declining to adopt colonial cultural artifacts, he argues, *santri* (students of traditional Islamic boarding school) help preserve traditional culture, because following colonial models would not only strengthen their power, but also benefit their political, cultural and economical interests. By inserting the discourse about the dress debate into his autobiography, he wanted to demonstrate how deeply

involved the *pesantren* people were in articulating their views regarding colonialism, culture and the socio-economic issues that Indonesians faced at that time. He insists on showing how the *pesantren* through their religious and ideological discourses are very concerned about nation building amid foreign political and cultural domination, even though such views often became a boomerang against themselves. He poetically illustrates this *pesantren* standpoint and situation as a candle that gives light to others while it burns and damages itself.⁷⁵

Zuhri goes on to discuss the traditional Islamic boarding school's engagement in struggles against the colonials. The last three chapters of his first autobiography are replete with the narratives about the acts of resistance that *pesantren* carried out. The second autobiography reproduces and extends these narratives. Regarding the *Hizbullah* paramilitary force, his description in the second autobiography is more detail and longer than in the first. As a local commander of *Hizbullah* in Central Java, he was able to illustrate meticulously the development and role of this force and the debates over its establishment.⁷⁶ This is especially because he was kept informed by the NU central leaders, such as Wahid Hasyim, concerning the most recent development of the country at that time. Hasyim was a vice-president of Masyumi, the united Muslim organization whose idea of its establishment came from the Japanese. Masyumi was an umbrella organization of *Hizbullah*. The Japanese waged attacks to the U.S.-led coalition in World War Two and persuaded Indonesians to support their military by creating indigenous semi-military forces such as *Pembela Tanah Air*/PETA (land defenders) and *Hizbullah*. One of the political advisors of this Muslim paramilitary force was Wahid Hasyim. Since Zuhri was Hasyim's personal assistant, he often received up-to-date information about this new force from him directly. Zuhri's narrative about *Hizbullah* is intended to reveal the intense engagement of the *pesantren* community and NU figures in the initial process of the creation of this new force. He challenges any description or discussion about this paramilitary force that disassociates it from the *pesantren*, even though the *pesantren* people did not dominate the composition of this force since its membership consisted of several Muslim organizations. For example, in scattered narratives about *Hizbullah*, Kahin, whose book becomes one of the primary sources of the official history of the independence revolution, never connects this force to the NU or the *pesantren* community.⁷⁷

Zuhri not only explains the creation of *Hizbullah*, but also reveals its real contributions and involvements in the wars of independence and discloses the fact that most *pesantren* become bases for this force. The last three chapters of his first autobiography and five chapters of his second autobiography provide lengthy and detail depictions about the struggles and the battles in which the *pesantren* people took important parts. He also mentions other military forces such as *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat/TKR* (Civilian Force) as a prototype for the national army, *Barisan Pemberontak Republik Indonesia/BPRI* (Republic of Indonesia Fighting Forces), and *Barisan Banteng/BB* (Nationalist Force) that became ideal partners of the *pesantren* in defense of the country. Military collaboration between these people's forces often formed a united front that successfully defeated the second Dutch military aggression in major towns of Java.

The narratives and information that Zuhri provides in his autobiographies do not necessarily contradict other sources, but complement them. Although there is no evidence from his autobiographies that prior to writing them he read academic literature about the *pesantren* and Islam in Java during the period of revolution,⁷⁸ his descriptions in many respects are not significantly different from those of some scholars, such as Harry J Benda and Benedict Anderson. Benda's focus on the short Japanese occupation inevitably led him to give much room to discuss the *pesantren*, the NU, and their prominent figures such as Hasyim Asy'ari and Wahid Hasyim and their major roles in the creation of *Hizbullah* (The state official history refers to this book but remains silent in regard to the *pesantren*).⁷⁹ Anderson for example suggests that the training in martial art technique known as *pentjak silat* was prevalent in the traditional Muslim schools and that *santri* commonly mastered it in addition to regular studies of Islamic doctrines.⁸⁰ Zuhri says the same things about this technique of self-defense in chapter two of his first autobiography. Anderson links his discussion of martial art to the revolutionary period, in which the *pesantren* communities prepared themselves mentally and physically. Moreover, his general overview of life in this traditional Muslim institution in Java during the revolution agrees in large parts with Zuhri's description. Nevertheless, his notion about the *pesantren's* anti-colonialism toward the Dutch in the late colonial times discloses a tendency to disguise the *pesantren's* partial accommodative approaches to the colonials.⁸¹ The political

stance regarding colonialism that the NU and the *pesantren* adopted is not entirely idealistic, but sometimes is realistic. For example, in 1930 the NU issued a statement that the Netherlands East Indies was an Islamic abode (*Dār al-Islām*) because there was a religious office called *penghulu* (*qāḍī* appointed by the colonial administration) that handled Muslim affairs.⁸² This religious statement is an implicit support of the colonial presence, since by claiming their colony as an Islamic abode, jihad and resistance to the colonial government is forbidden.

Zuhri seems to be fully aware of what history is and how to deal with it. He is conscious that history must be created and if the history about the *pesantren* in the course of independence revolution has not been written, people will easily forget it. They might not realize the *pesantren's* contributions to the establishment of the nation. In a dialogue with Wahid Hasyim, the son of the NU founder and the father of the fourth Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, Zuhri makes use of history as a means of self-representation. The dialogue took place when they visited a small town in Central Java, Parakan, which became a regional base camp of the *pesantren*, *Hizbullah* and military forces. They discussed a famous *kyai* who offered his blessing to fighters who only handled a traditional weapon known as *bambu runcing* (sharpened bamboo) to wage battle against the Dutch.⁸³

Wahid Hasyim (WH): "Everywhere people are discussing *bambu runcing* Parakan. General Sudirman as the highest commander of the army also pays a great deal of attention to it and realizes its tremendous positive impact to the army and paramilitary fighters' struggles".

Saifuddin (S): "Does this influence Muslim's position in political struggles?"

WH: "Yes, of course. It is not only for political struggles, but also for a long struggle for the nation and its culture in the future. The struggle against the Dutch will not last for long, God willing. The longer is political, economical, and cultural struggles in the formation the nation's character. It takes long times and needs virtue and patience".

S: "Don't people know the Muslim contribution to the nation?"

WH: "Yes, for now! However, the next generation might not be aware of it. There might be even efforts to conceal the contribution of Muslims. Future struggles will be carried out by future generations. Our generations might no longer witness this in the future. If we do not make ourselves visible, there might be no people speaking on our behalf and recognizing our shares and deeds."⁸⁵

In this dialogue, Zuhri is concerned with how people in the future would respond to the contributions that Muslims and *pesantren* folks made and expects that people acknowledge these roles. His interlocutor suggests that Muslims and the people of the *pesantren* must be aware of and care about their own legacy for other people might not. By including this dialogue and the narratives about the bamboo weapon in his autobiographies, he reminds readers about the origin of the sharpened bamboo. He wants to attract the reader's attention to this important heroic story of the discovery of the bamboo weapon because he knows this story in the popular imagination of Indonesians is rarely associated with the *pesantren*. He claims that the sharpened bamboo that has become a symbol of the national revolutionary struggle originates from the *pesantren* community. He recalls readers to read this story carefully, so that they will be well informed and know what really happened in the past. His conversation with Wahid Hasyim, who seemingly appears to become a central figure in this narrative, inspires him to produce a self-representation through which the stories of the peoples who are non-state actors and from small regional towns are well represented. Zuhri fears that if he does not write about the life of the *pesantren*, no one will do so. There might be scholars in the future who will write about the *pesantren*, but they are not historical witnesses who have direct experiences of this institution during the revolution.

The *pesantren* people conceived of their contributions to the nation as part of their religious identity. Zuhri realizes that many figures coming from this traditional religious institution do not ask for recognition for what they have done, because to them the struggle for the independence was part of a religious duty and the implementation of God's command. He calls them "people who only seek for God's pleasure (*pengabdian tanpa pamrih*)".⁸⁵ This concept deeply influences the teacher-pupil relations in *pesantren* and creates mutual emotional ties. Observing this model of relation, Anderson says, "the teacher was regarded as the student's spiritual father, and their relationship was often closer and deeper than that previously existing between the youth and his biological father".⁸⁶ By the same token, Zuhri expresses his close feeling to his teacher, stating that "the book (*Guruku*) is also meant to pay respect to teachers who loved their pupils like their own children, even though they have no blood relationship".⁸⁷ Zuhri knows that the concept of *ikhlas* (sincerity and pursuing God's pleasure) in life is a very important doctrine for

the *pesantren* people. This is a principle that often deflects them from making self-exposure and self-representation. They probably do not want to represent themselves because self-representation might imply seeking human recognition rather than divine blessing. This might explain why the *pesantren* people rarely produces an autobiographical genre, and Zuhri's autobiographies presumably appear to be among the first to emerge in this community.⁸⁸ With the concept of *ikhhlās* and humility, they can hardly be expected to represent themselves in history.⁸⁹ However, in Zuhri's view, this inward-looking orientation should not become a pretext for unfairly representing the people of the *pesantren* in the Indonesian history. It is in this context that Zuhri writes his autobiographies: to challenge historical misrepresentation of the *pesantren* world.

Reading these autobiographies, one will realize to whom Zuhri is speaking. He conveys a clear message that the Muslims and the *pesantren* have great contribution for the establishment of the country and the history of modern Indonesian must admit and include this. He intends to respond to the state national history that does not give space to the Muslims and the *pesantren* narratives. Volume six of the official history that never mentions the *pesantren* roles and their contributions to the revolutionary struggles become a target of critique of Zuhri's autobiographies. His works also challenge any other historical representations that give imbalanced accounts about the Muslims and the *pesantren's* pivotal contribution to this country.

Conclusion

The New Order's official history as can be seen from the book of *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* represents Islam into two different models: accommodative and selective. The accommodative approach accepts the integration of Islam in the state's history since Islam especially in the pre-Indonesian history is conceived of as an inseparable part of the nation that played a decisive role in connecting the Nusantara archipelago worldwide and in defending the regions from the European political and economic hegemonies. The selective approach is aimed to limit the visibility of Islam during the courses of the independence struggle and beyond since these periods are claimed to belong exclusively to the regime's narratives. Historiography is thus projected as a means of

silencing narratives and re-constructing the past within the regime's perspective.

If the former approach is open to various perspectives of interpreting Islam and makes representation of Islam balanced, the latter tends to choose arbitrarily sources that are in line with the state's ideology. The state only permits the representation of Islam in the history as a purely religious phenomenon regardless of its ideological and political dimensions that encouraged its followers to engage actively in the defense of the nation and to struggle for the independence revolution. The fact that a strong penetration of military ideology controls the state historiography has led to the dominant narratives of the regime and the army. The history overlooks the contributions that the Muslims and the *pesantren* community made during the revolutionary eras. As a result, they attempt to represent themselves in the history. Autobiography thus emerges partly as a counter balance to the state narrative, as what Zuhri's works demonstrated.

Zuhri wrote two autobiographies that are specifically concerned with the world of the *pesantren* and their considerable endeavors in the establishment and formulation of the nation which are unfortunately invisible in the official history. As a person who came from the *pesantren*, lived through the late phase of colonialism, witnessed the eras of wars, conflicts, instability and economic hardship, he feels that the national history did not really tell the truth. What he saw and experienced throughout these eras significantly differ from the official narratives. The institution of the *pesantren* where he grew up, studied and began his life does not appear in the history. Although the *pesantren* people are humble and emphasize the importance of gaining God's pleasure rather than human recognition, this does not mean that misrepresenting them in the history is tenable. Writing autobiographies for Zuhri does not merely mean making his self-representation, but more importantly representing those he thinks deserve remembering. His autobiographies aim to remember those who are unspoken and listen to those who are unheard in the history.

Endnotes

1. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto (general eds.) *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia I-VI* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka 1977). Each volume has a different title and a special editor. A revised edition of volume six and a new volume (volume seven) appeared in 1993. See R.Z. Leirissa and Saleh As'ad Djamhari (eds.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia Jilid VI: Republik Indonesia: dari Proklamasi sampai Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Jakarta: Department of Education and Culture, 1993); and *ibid.*, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia VII: Labir dan Berkembangnya Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Department of Education and Culture, 1993).
2. The term Nusantara refers to the archipelago islands in Southeast Asia that later in the middle of the twentieth century formed a new nation called Indonesia.
3. See for example Susan Rodgers, *Telling Lives, Telling History: Autobiography and Historical Imagination in Modern Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), C.W. Watson, *Of Self and Nation: Autobiography and the Representation of Modern Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000).
4. Soe Tjen Marching, *The Discrepancy between the Public and the Private Selves of Indonesian Women: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Autobiographies and Diaries* (New York and Ontario: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2007).
5. See Gerry van Klinken, "The Battle for History after Suharto: Beyond Sacred Dates, Great Men and Legal Milestones", *Critical Asian Studies*, 33:3, (2001), Henk Schulte Nordholt, "De-colonizing Indonesian Historiography", *Working Paper No 6*, Center for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University, Sweden, (2004), and C.W. Watson, *Of Self and Injustice: Autobiography and Repression in Modern Indonesia* (Leiden: KITLV, 2006).
6. The only exception to this is the one written by Watson (2000). Watson discusses one of Saifuddin's autobiographies, focusing his analysis on the notion of the self and nation. Here, I expand his study by using both Saifuddin's autobiographical works and argue that both are in many ways responses to the New Order's state official history.
7. Saifuddin Zuhri, *Guruku Orang-orang dari Pesantren* (Bandung: Al-Ma'arif, 1974); and *Berangkat dari Pesantren* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1987). *Pesantren* is a religious boarding school found widely throughout Indonesia. This term is in the initial use closely associated with the Islamic boarding school of the traditionalist Muslim background of *Nabdhatul Ulama*/NU (literary means the awakening of *'ulamā'*) founded in Surabaya in 1926 partly as a reaction to the strong influence of the Modernist Muslim. In contemporary uses, however it refers to any Islamic boarding school run personally either by non-affiliated Muslim individuals or in affiliation with any Islamic organizations. In this paper, I mean *pesantren* as the institution affiliated with the NU.
8. Keith Jenkins, *Re-Thinking History* (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 17-8.
9. Soedjatmoko, Mohammad Ali, G.J. Resink and George McT. Kahin (eds.), *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965). A new book encouraging a comprehensive approach to Indonesian historiography appeared in 2001. See Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds.), *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 2001).
10. In 1999, the new Indonesian government made revisions to certain parts of the official history that is especially concerned with the narratives of the New Order.
11. Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Indonesian Historiography* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2001). Part one of this book mainly addresses this issue, p. 11-100.
12. *Ibid.*, 33-4.
13. Sartono himself withdrew from the editorial board in the last two editions (the revised sixth volume and the seventh volume) composed in 1993 because of such a strong tendency.
14. The motto is *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, literally meaning "unity in diversity". This motto

- and the state's philosophy or *Pancasila* (five principles) are integrated into the figure of the Garuda bird as the state's emblem.
15. Bambang Sumadio (ed.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia II: Jaman Kuno* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1977), p. 273-274. This volume also claims that on the basis of Javanese literary sources, such as *Babad Jawa* and *Serat Kanda*, the first emperor of Demak is the descendant of the last king of Majapahit. *Ibid.*, p. 274.
 16. Uka Tjandrasasmita (ed.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia III: Jaman Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Kenajaan-kerajaan Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1977), p. 84-100.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 100-10.
 18. Humphreys maintains that political history dominated Islamic historiography until before World War I. R. Stephen Humphreys, *Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry, revised edition* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), p. 228.
 19. Tjandrasasmita (ed.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia III*, p. 148.
 20. *Ibid.*, 153.
 21. This is also one of the general considerations about the Islamic history in Indonesia made by Federspiel. See Howard M. Federspiel, *Indonesia in Transition: Muslim Intellectuals and National Development* (New York: Nova Science Publisher, 1998), p. 132-3.
 22. Tjandrasasmita (ed.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia III*, p. 311-67.
 23. See E.A. Sutjipto (ed.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia IV: Indonesia dalam Abad 18 dan 19* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1977).
 24. This claim was made by Sartono (1921-2007) in his foreword to a volume that specifically explores the history of regional resistance against the Dutch. The book was published two years before the official history book. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Sejarah Perlawanan-perlawanan terhadap Kolonialisme* (Jakarta: Department of National Defense and the Center of History Studies of the Indonesian National Army, 1973). Sartono is considered to be the first Indonesian scholar to reject the colonial narratives. His view is reflected in his famous work about peasant regional resurgence in Banten in 1888, published in 1966. This work was awarded with the Benda Prize as the best work in Southeast Asian studies in 1977. He studied with Harry J Benda at Yale and with Wartheim, a Dutch scholar, at Amsterdam. For his career see *Inside Indonesia*, 90, October-December, 2007 or at <http://insideindonesia.org/content/view/1019/47/>.
 25. Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Indonesian Historiography* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2001), p. 29-31.
 26. The separatist movements in Aceh, Moluccas and Papua in contemporary Indonesia might suggest that not all regional struggles in pre-independence times could be interpreted as nationalist movements. See Richard Chauvel, "The Changing Dynamics of Regional Resistance in Indonesia" in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds.), *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History* (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 2001), p. 146-160.
 27. See Yusmar Basri (ed.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia V: Jaman Kebangkitan Nasional dan Masa Akhir Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1977).
 28. Henk Schulte Nordholt, "De-colonizing Indonesian Historiography", *Working Paper No 6*, Center for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University, Sweden, (2004), p. 1.
 29. Bahtiar Effendi, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p 13-64.
 30. Gerry van Klinken, "The Battle for History after Suharto: Beyond Sacred Dates, Great Men and Legal Milestones", *Critical Asian Studies*, 33:3, (2001), p. 324.
 31. Compare volume six and its revised edition. Nugroho Notosusanto (ed.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia VI: Jaman Jepang dan Jaman Republik Indonesia* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1977); and R.Z. Leirissa and Saleh As'ad Djamhari (eds.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia Jilid VI: Republik Indonesia: dari Proklamasi sampai Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Jakarta: Department of Education and Culture, 1993).
 32. This is the logic of the official history ending with the narratives of the rise of the

- New Order. See the last volume on R.Z. Leirissa and Zulfikar Ghazali (eds.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia VII: Lahir dan Berkembangnya Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Department of Education and Culture, 1993).
33. Notosusanto (ed.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia VI*, p. 62-3. This translation is mine.
 34. *Ibid.*, p. 77-8.
 35. However, the central role of Suharto in the General attack on Yogyakarta was challenged after he resigned in 1998. It is now said that the idea of the attack came from several people including the Yogyakarta Sultan, General Sudirman and Suharto. See Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order*, third edition (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 12-3.
 36. See on O.G. Roeder, *The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1969).
 37. See R.Z. Leirissa and Zulfikar Ghazali (eds.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia VII: Lahir dan Berkembangnya Orde Baru* [Indonesian National History VII: the Rise and the Development of the New Order] (Jakarta: Department of Education and Culture, 1993).
 38. Katherine E. McGregor, *History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007).
 39. Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950* (Victoria, Australia: Longman, 1974), p. 49-57; and J. Springhall, "Disaster of Surabaya: the Death of Brigadier Mallaby during the British Occupation in Java 1945-1946", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1996), p. 423-41.
 40. See Latiful Khuluq, *Hasyim Asy'ari: Religious Thoughts and Political Activities 1871-1947* (Jakarta: Logos, 2000), p. 69-120; and Nico Kaptein, "Acceptance, Approval and Aggression: Some Fatwas Concerning the Colonial Administration in the Dutch East Indies", *Al-Jâmi'a Journal of Islamic Studies*, Yogyakarta: IAIN, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2000), pp. 297-309.
 41. Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, p. 49-57.
 42. Bung Tomo was awarded the title of national hero in November 2008, along with Mohammad Natsir. See *Kompas*, November 7, 2008.
 43. Jenkins, *Re-Thinking History*, p. 18.
 44. Effendi, *Islam and the State*, especially chapter two, p. 13-64.
 45. *Ibid.*, p. 51-52. See also Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics*, p. 127-9.
 46. Volume four lists *Darul Islam* amongst the state's enemies and classifies it as insurgent movement. See R.Z. Leirissa and Saleh As'ad Djmahri (eds.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia Jilid VI*, p. 161-5. For an excellent analysis of this movement, see Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Kees van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martyn Nijhoff, 1984).
 47. Leo Suryadinata, *Interpreting Indonesian Politics* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), p. 139-141.
 48. Harry J Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945* (The Hague, W. van Hoeve, 1958).
 49. Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973).
 50. George M. T. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); Gandasubrata, *An Account of the Japanese Occupation of Banjumas Residence, Java, March 1942 to August 1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964); and two works by Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), and *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).
 51. Their works were published by Cornell University Press in 1969 and 1972 respectively. Since the sixth volume also used many Cornell publications, I presume the editor knew Dahm and Anderson's works.

52. Bernhard Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 57-175. Another argument about these three ideologies (Nationalism, Marxism and Islamism) was proposed by Woodman. See Dorothy Woodman, *The Republic of Indonesia* (London: Cresset Press, 1956), especially chapter three, p. 147-72.
53. Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle*, p. 57-208.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 174-97.
55. Ahmad Hasan was the founder of *Persatuan Islam* (*Persis*) that promotes puritan-modernist views of Islam in Indonesia.
56. Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle*, p. 179.
57. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in the Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 1.
58. The descriptions about the *pesantren* youths are given in his first chapter "Youth and Crisis in Java". See *ibid.*, p. 1-15.
59. The jihad fatwa and *Hizbullah* (God's army) are the real examples of the Islamic element within the Independence struggles.
60. R.Z. Leirissa and Zulfikar Ghazali (eds.), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia VII*, p. 257-312.
61. See Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, p. 23-4. On the general Dutch colonial policy on Islam, read chapter one of this book.
62. Katherine McGregor, "Nugroho Notosusanto: The Legacy of a Historian in the Service of an Authoritarian Regime", in Mary S. Zurbuchen (ed.), *Beginning to Remember, The Past in the Indonesian Present* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), p. 209-33.
63. *Ibid.*, 210-3.
64. *Ibid.*, 215-24.
65. Jeremy D. Popkin, *History, Historians, and Autobiography* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 4.
66. C.W. Watson, *Of Self and Nation: Autobiography and the Representation of Modern Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000).
67. C.W. Watson, *Of Self and Injustice: Autobiography and Repression in Modern Indonesia* (Leiden: KITLV, 2006).
68. Watson only discusses Zuhri's first autobiography. In his discussion, he does not specifically address the representation of Islam and the Muslim *pesantren* community in the national history. Nor does he focus on the national history book *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*. See Watson, *Of the Self and Nation*, chapter five "Islam in Java-Refractions through an Autobiographical Prism: Saifuddin Zuhri *Guruku Orang-Orang dari Pesantren*", p. 130-50.
69. Susan Rodgers, *Telling Lives, Telling History: Autobiography and Historical Imagination in Modern Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 73.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
71. I summarized this short biography from scattered information about him from his autobiographies. Another short version of his biography is displayed in the back cover of his second autobiography.
72. Zuhri, *Guruku*, p. iv-x.
73. He also wrote another book that stresses this notion. See Saifuddin Zuhri, *Ulama's Contribution to the State* (Jakarta: The Office of Minister of Religious Affairs, 1965).
74. On these stories see on Zuhri, *Guruku*, p. 108-9 and 120, and *Berangkat*, p. 159 and 403.
75. Zuhri, *Guruku*, p. 109.
76. Zuhri, *Guruku*, p. 258-79 and *Berangkat*, p. 222-4.
77. In scattered narratives about *Hizbullah*, Kahin, whose book become the primary source of the official history about the independence revolution, never connects it with the NU or *pesantren*. See George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952).
78. His indicates that he read various national newspapers and magazines and a few

- international periodicals both in English and Arabic, but not scholarly works. This is because he was concerned more with the global geo-political issues regarding World War II rather than scholarly reports.
79. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, p. 103-94.
 80. See Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 5-10.
 81. Zuhri, *Guruku*, p. 107-8.
 82. Andree Feillard, "Traditionalist Islam and the State in Indonesia: The Road to Legitimacy and Renewal" in Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich, *Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 131.
 83. *Bambu runcing* becomes a national symbol of resistance against the colonials.
 84. Zuhri, *Berangkat*, p. 299. Translation is mine.
 85. Zuhri, *Guruku*, chapter 3, p. 35-54.
 86. Anderson, *Java in the Time of Revolution*, p. 6.
 87. Zuhri, *Berangkat*, p. 579
 88. The only exception to this is a diary written by a *pesantren* leader in the mid-nineteenth century. See Ann Kumar, *The Diary of A Javanese Muslim: Religion, Politics and Pesantren 1883-1886* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1985).
 89. The biographies of the NU and *pesantren* leaders mostly appeared after their deaths and were written by others, not by themselves. Some of these figures also served as ministers of religion. See Azyumardi Azra dan Saiful Umam (eds.), *Menteri-menteri Agama RI: Biografi Sosial-Politik* (Jakarta: INIS, 1998). On a special volume of the biography of the NU and *pesantren* leaders, see Saifullah Ma'shum (eds.), *Menapak Jejak Mengenal Watak: Sekilas Biography 26 Tokoh Nahdhatul Ulama* (Jakarta: Yayasan Saifuddin Zuhri, 1994).

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ستوديا إسلاميكا

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السنة الثامنة عشر، العدد ١، ٢٠١١

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م. فركتيا (جامعة أستراليا الحكومية كانبيرا)

رئيس التحرير:

أزيوماردي أزا

المحررون:

- سيف المجاني
جمهاري
جاجات برهان الدين
عمان فتح الرحمن
علي منحنف
إسماتو رافي
دينا أفرينطي

مساعد هيئة التحرير:

- تسطينيونو
محمد نداء فضلان

مراجعة اللغة الإنجليزية:

ميليسا كروش

مراجعة اللغة العربية:

الرازي هاشم

تصميم الغلاف:

س. برنكا

ستوديا إسلاميكا (ISSN: 0215-0492) هي مجلة دورية يصدرها مركز البحوث الإسلامية

والإجتماعية (PPIM) جامعة شريف هداية الله الإسلامية الحكومية جاكرتا (STT/DEPPEN NO 129/DITJEN/PPG/STT/1976)، وترتكز للدراسات الإسلامية في إندونيسيا خاصة وآسيا جانوبي شرقي إجمالاً. تقبل هذه المجلة على إرسال مقالات


المتفقين والباحثين التي تتعلق بمنهج المجلة. والمقالات المنشورة على صفحات هذه المجلة لا تعبر عن هيئة التحرير أو أي جمعية التي تتعلق بها. لكنها مرتبطة ومنسوبة إلى آراء الكاتبين. والمقالات الختوية في هذه المجلة قد استعرضتها هيئة التحرير. وهذه المجلة قد أقرتها وزارة التعليم القومي أما مجلة علمية (SK Dirjen Dikti No. 23a/DIKTI/ Kep/2004).

ستوديا اسراميا

ستوديا اسراميا

مجلة إندونيسية للدراسات الإسلامية

السنة الثامنة عشر، العدد ١، ٢٠١١



الطريقة النقشبندية في مينانجاو:
ترجمة كتاب السعادة الأبدية للشيخ عبد القديم
إ. محمد بن فظن

حكاية الشعبية المينانجاوية "بنداكاندوانج"
بين الأسطورة والخرافة: المنظورات الدينية
إبغ. غ
