

# STUDIA ISLAMIKA

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Jourdan Khalid Hussein

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## FAITH ON THE MOVE: INSIDE OF THE IJTIMĀ‘ OF JAMA’AH TABLIGH IN PEKAN BARU

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## YUSMAN ROY AND THE LANGUAGE OF DEVOTION— ‘INNOVATION’ IN INDONESIAN ISLAM ON TRIAL

Stewart Fenwick

# **STUDIA ISLAMIKA**



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*Jourdan Khalid Hussein*

## Not Secular Enough? Variation in Electoral Success of Post-Islamist Parties in Turkey and Indonesia

**Abstrak:** *Politik Islam menjadi topik yang banyak diperdebatkan dewasa ini. Di Barat, perdebatan mengenai kegunaan relatif inklusi atau isolasi politik, terutama terhadap partai atau gerakan Islam yang menggunakan kekerasan di bawah kekuasaan rezim otoriter, telah membayangi studi mengenai partai Islam yang bergerak di bawah demokrasi. Artikel ini beranjak dari debat tersebut dan mengkaji partai-partai Islam yang berkompetisi di pemilihan-pemilihan umum yang bebas dan kompetitif, terutama partai-partai post-Islamist—istilah baru yang digunakan dalam artikel ini untuk memaparkan argumen-argumen mengenai fenomena baru gerakan politik di dunia Muslim.*

*Partai yang menjadi pembahasan artikel ini adalah Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Partai Keadilan dan Pembangunan) di Turki dan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) di Indonesia. Partai-partai ini diklasifikasikan sebagai partai post-Islamist terutama karena partisipasi mereka dalam pemilihan umum telah membuat mereka meninggalkan agenda-agenda Islamisme mereka—seperti mendirikan negara atau menegakkan hukum berbasis syariah—menuju kepada agenda-agenda yang lebih populis dan mengedepankan kesejahteraan rakyat serta keadilan di masyarakat. Partai-partai ini telah mendemonstrasikan level kesuksesan yang bervariasi dibandingkan dengan partai-partai pendahulunya yang menyuarakan agenda hampir sama di negara masing-masing. Turki dan Indonesia mempunyai trayek sejarah di mana kesuksesan partai-partai Islam mengalami fluktuasi dalam setengah abad terakhir. Partai-partai Islam sebelum AKP dan PKS pun sangat rentan terhadap penindasan, fragmentasi intra-partai, atau tidak adanya daya tarik politik terhadap pemilih di negara-negara mereka.*



*Artikel ini berusaha menjelaskan akar dari kesuksesan elektoral AKP dan PKS dan mengapa mereka berbeda—yang satu menjadi partai sangat besar di Turki dan yang satu hanya berhasil menjadi partai medium yang menjadi anggota koalisi dari partai berkuasa (Partai Demokrat). Artikel ini menganalisis kedua partai post-Islamist tersebut sebagai aktor politik rasional yang menggunakan beberapa macam strategi untuk mendapatkan kesuksesan elektoral mereka. Sejumlah pertanyaan yang hendak dijawab dalam artikel ini adalah: apa yang menjelaskan variasi kesuksesan elektoral di antara dua partai post-Islamist yang beroperasi di dua negara demokrasi dengan populasi Muslim terbanyak, mengapa partai AKP lebih sukses dari partai PKS, dan dalam kondisi apa dan sampai sejauh mana partai-partai post-Islamist bisa bertahan dan menjadi partai yang sukses dalam pemilu-pemilu di negara demokrasi Muslim.*

*Argumen yang digunakan untuk menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan di atas berkisar pada fenomena sekularisme dan post-Islamisme di negara-negara berpenduduk Muslim. Sekularisme dan post-Islamisme adalah dua variabel yang terikat secara kausal di mana sekularisme menciptakan path-dependence framework—jalur politik yang mengikat karena alasan struktural dan historis—untuk partai-partai politik manapun yang mengedepankan Islam sebagai alat penarik suara pemilih. Ketika muncul kejutan-kejutan eksternal yang melemahkan jalur tersebut, maka jalur tersebut akan menciptakan krisis yang memunculkan sederetan kesempatan politik dan dorongan kejadian berbeda dari apa yang biasanya dialami partai-partai Islam dari jalur tersebut.*

*Di Turki, krisis ekonomi dan kesempatan bergabung dengan Uni Eropa menjadi faktor pendukung AKP menjadi partai penguasa. Artikel ini berargumen, jika bukan karena paham Kemalisme (sekularisme di Turki) dan beberapa faktor pendukung akibat adanya paham tersebut di negara Turki, seperti peran militer dan polarisasi sosial di masyarakat Turki, partai AKP tidak bisa sukses sekarang. Sebaliknya, jika tidak ada paham Pancasila (bentuk sekularisme pasif di Indonesia) dan faktor pendukung akibat Pancasila yang tersosialisasi sangat luas seperti sikap pemilih Indonesia dan peran militer yang lebih ramah terhadap Islam, PKS mungkin bisa sukses partai AKP.*

*Jourdan Khalid Hussein*

## Not Secular Enough? Variation in Electoral Success of Post-Islamist Parties in Turkey and Indonesia

**الخلاصة:** إن السياسة الإسلامية موضوع يكثر الجدل عنه في الوقت الراهن، وفي الغرب كان الجدل عن جذور الانعزال السياسي، خصوصا الأحزاب السياسية التي تلجأ إلى العنف تحت سلطة النظام الاستبدادي، يكمن وراء دراسة الأحزاب الإسلامية التي تتحرك تحت النظام الديمقراطي.

هذا المقال ينطلق من ذلك الجدل المشار إليه وتجري دراسة للأحزاب الإسلامية التي تتنافس في الانتخابات العامة الحرة التنافسية، خصوصا الأحزاب مابعد الإسلامية، وهذا مصطلح جديد يستخدمه هذا المقال لعرض الاستدلالات حول ظاهرة جديدة في الحركة السياسية بالعالم الإسلامي.

الأحزاب التي تكون محور هذا البحث هي حزب العدالة والتنمية في تركيا Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) وحزب العدالة في الرفاهية بإندونيسيا Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)؛ وقد صنفت الحزبان ضمن الأحزاب مابعد الإسلامية لمشاركتها بصفة خاصة في الانتخابات العامة، الأمر الذي يفرضي بهما إلى ترك برامجهما الإسلامية مثل إقامة دولة إسلامية وتطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية إلى اتخاذ برامج أكثر شعبية وإعطاء الأولوية لرفاهة الشعب وتحقيق العدالة في المجتمع؛ لقد استعرض هذان الحزبان مستويات للنجاح الانتخابي تختلف عن الأحزاب السابقة عليهما التي كانت تدعو إلى برامج تكاد تكون نفس البرامج في كل دولة منهما؛ ولتركيا وإندونيسيا مسار تاريخي بحيث يشهد نجاح الأحزاب الإسلامية فيهما تأرجحا خلال النصف قرن الأخير، وكانت الأحزاب الإسلامية قبل هذين الحزبين تتعرض للاستبداد أو التمزق داخليا أو تعاني من عدم جذبة سياسية إليها لدى الناخبين في الدولتين.

يحاول هذا المقال أن يشرح جذور النجاح الانتخابي الذي حققه كل من حزب العدالة والتنمية التركي وحزب العدالة في الرفاهية الإندونيسي، ولماذا كان أمرهما مختلفا في أن أحدهما وهو حزب العدالة والتنمية صار حزبا كبيرا في تركيا، في حين كان النجاح الذي حققه الآخر وهو حزب العدالة في الرفاهية أن يصير فقط حزبا متوسطا ينضم إلى عضوية التحالف مع الحزب الحاكم (الحزب الديمقراطي)؛ يقوم هذا المقال بتحليل حزبي مابعد الإسلاميين المشار إليهما كممثلين للسياسة العقلانية التي تلجأ إلى العديد من أنواع الاستراتيجيات لتحقيق نجاحهما الانتخابي؛ هناك أسئلة يرحى أن تجدها جوابا هذه الدراسة؛ وهي ما هو الأمر الذي يوضح اختلاف النجاح الانتخابي الذي حققه كل من حزبي مابعد الإسلاميين اللذين يعملان في دولتين ديمقراطيتين يقطنهما أكبر تجمع سكاني من المسلمين؟ ولماذا حقق حزب العدالة والتنمية التركي نجاحا أكثر من حزب العدالة في الرفاهية الإندونيسي؟ وما هي الظروف وإلى أي مدى يمكن للأحزاب مابعد الإسلامية أن تبقى أحزابا ناجحة في الانتخابات في الدول الديمقراطية الإسلامية؟

إن الاستدلالات التي قدمت للإجابة على تلك الأسئلة تدور حول ظاهري العلمانية ومابعد الإسلامية في الدول التي يقطنها مسلمون؛ فالعلمانية ومابعد الإسلامية نوعيتان مرتبطتان سببيا بحيث تتيح العلمانية الإطار المعتمد للمسار السياسي الملزم بناء على أسباب ثقافية وتاريخية لأي حزب سياسي يجعل الإسلام وسيلة لكسب أصوات الناخبين، وعندما تحدث مفاجآت خارجية تضعف ذلك المسار فإنه أي المسار يحدث أزمة أبرزت بدورها سلسلة من الفرص السياسية ودوافع الأحداث المخالفة لما حرت به العادة أن تعيشها الأحزاب من جراء ذلك المسار.

وفي تركيا كانت الأزمة الاقتصادية والفرص المتاحة للانضمام إلى دول الاتحاد الأوربي عاملا مساعدا لحزب العدالة والتنمية أن يكون حزبا حاكما، ويحتج هذا المقال بأنه لولا الإيديولوجية الكمالية أعني العلمانية في تركيا وبعض العوامل المساعدة نتيجة انتشار تلك الإيديولوجية في دولة تركيا، وذلك مثل دور الجيش والاستقطاب الاجتماعي لدى المجتمع التركي لما كان لحزب العدالة والتنمية ذلك النجاح الذي عليه الآن، وعلى الجانب المقابل لولا إيديولوجية البانشاسيلا Pancasila وهي شكل من أشكال العلمانية السلبية في إندونيسيا والعوامل المساعدة نتيجة انتشار البانشاسيلا الواسع مثل موقف الناخبين ودور الجيش الذي كان أكثر تسامحا تجاه الإسلام لما كان لحزب العدالة في الرفاهية ذلك النجاح مثل الذي عليه حزب العدالة والتنمية.

For the past couple of years, the international media has repeatedly described Turkey, a secular country with 99% Muslim population, as ruled by a “mildly Islamist” party.<sup>1</sup> The Turkish Justice and Development Party, also known as the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP), took over the Turkish government by winning 363 out of 550 seats in the parliament in 2002. The AKP was only formed a year before the election and championed a reformist political platform. Two years later in another secular country with the largest Muslim population in the world, the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party or known as the *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS), made a surprise by gaining from less than 2% in 1999 to 7.3% of the national vote in Indonesian 2004 legislative elections.<sup>2</sup> The PKS also anchored its electoral success to a reformist anti-corruption platform that attracted many Indonesian voters. Both of these parties are similar in many aspects, such as abandoning Islamism, organizational strength, grassroots strategies, operating under democracies, but different in their electoral success. Their similarities exhibit a new trend in political Islam, as both parties are post-Islamists.

Post-Islamist parties are political parties that have abandoned Islamism to seek broader support and enlarge social bases for politically pragmatic reasons. Islamism as an ideology generally seeks to impose *shari'a* law (Islamic jurisprudence), as the law of the land and possibly establish an Islamic state. In many Muslim-majority countries, Islamism has given rise to many Islamist political parties; however, they are not successful. On the contrary, post-Islamist parties emerged in those countries, particularly those who practice free and fair elections, indicates a shift from pursuing goals central to Islamism to popular vote.

The success of the AKP and the PKS, as post-Islamist parties under two Muslim-majority democracies with different kinds of secularism, is an understudied subject in political Islam and a puzzle worthy of further review. Unlike the AKP, which now forms the Turkish government and won the most votes in the past two Turkish national elections, the PKS can only be satisfied with being part of the winning coalition of the Indonesian government. Both parties gained their respective political positions based on the different degrees of electoral success they gained in elections. By investigating the electoral gains of both parties, this article seeks to address the important question: What

explains the variation in electoral success of two post-Islamist parties operating under two Muslim democracies? Why is the AKP more electorally successful than the PKS? Under what conditions and to what extent do post-Islamist parties thrive and become electorally successful?

The answers to these questions necessarily intersect with the literature on secularism in the Muslim world and political parties in emerging democracies, body of scholarships that are frequently neglected by scholars of comparative political Islam. How do types of secularism, military intervention, party membership, political platform, and cadre recruitment, explain varying degrees of electoral success? This article posits that the different types of secularism in Turkey and Indonesia basically set the electoral trajectory of the AKP and the PKS. The role of the military and external factors (or later addressed as *exogenous shocks*) such as the European Union and economic crisis are also the causal variables of the variation in electoral success between the two post-Islamist parties. This article also looks at important events in both countries' political histories to highlight the interaction amongst the causal variables that explain the variation. The analysis in this article covers the context before and after the election in 2002 and 2007 (Turkey) and 2004 and 2009 (Indonesia). The AKP was formed in 2001 and competed for the first time in 2002 winning 34.26% and later in 2007 winning 46.58%. The PKS competed in 2004 gaining 7.3% and in 2009 gaining 7.8%. These periods are important because they were the election years of both countries when both the AKP and the PKS were relatively new and exhibited their electoral successes.

### **Defining Electoral Success as the Dependent Variable**

While it might be obvious that the AKP has already successfully won the election and taken over the government, the PKS could only stand as part of the winning government coalition yet still gained the highest vote share among other parties that use Islam to capture votes.<sup>3</sup> It is therefore important to frame the definition of electoral success that is inclusive to a broader scope of post-Islamist parties. General literature on the electoral success of political party usually, if not solely, emphasizes electoral victory as the defining factor. Scholars also attempt to link electoral success with the election system and electoral law of the country where the political party operates.<sup>4</sup> However, it

can also be argued that one minimalist measure of electoral success would be winning some seats in the parliament or even being able to run some candidates during an election. This explains that there is a “hierarchy” of electoral success or also known as a *variation* and the former definition of electoral success is inaccurate to explain the phenomenon of two post-Islamist parties, the AKP and the PKS, both of which have significantly improved their shares of votes from an election.

Accordingly, the definition of electoral success does not require an electoral victory of a party. The tricky part in explaining and defining electoral success in this article is anchored to the situation of the Indonesian PKS. It consistently, if moderately, increased its vote shares and seats in the parliament, but the party did not win the election and only had a fair amount of electoral success compared to that of the AKP. Although the comparison might strike an imbalance as to the type of the parties (Islamist), the PKS itself was an Islamist party, which now has significantly reverted its agenda to impose Islamic law, and embraced Indonesia’s constitution as its main reference and as part of its commitment to a new vision of inclusivity and political reform.<sup>5</sup> This electoral success might seem only *relative* and insignificant, however, the fact remains that the PKS, as a post-Islamist party, managed to increase its vote share from the previous election and remains the party with most vote shares and seats than other parties (Islamist) that attempt to affect similar outcome in politics. What accounts for electoral success, therefore, are the significant vote shares the parties get from an election and the significant number of seats they gained in the representative bodies. This definition thus accommodates the research question of this article, as to what explains the *variation* in electoral success of post-Islamist parties.

### **Post-Islamism Discourse and Scholarship: A Snapshot**

The intriguing cases of the AKP and the PKS deserve deeper observation as they bring attention to the new trend of “post-Islamism.” In contrast to Islamism, post-Islamism indicates a shift from pursuing goals central to Islamism. Post-Islamism connotes a departure from Islamism possibly occurring after participation in competitive politics. It shows a disappointment in the failure of the idealism of Islamism and departs for a pragmatic approach that yields practical political gains.

The table (Table 1) below helps to illustrate the difference between post-Islamist and Islamist or Islamic parties.

<b>Islamic Entity</b>	<b>Islamist Movement</b>	<b>Islamic Party</b>	<b>Islamist Party</b>	<b>Post-Islamist Party</b>
<b>Organization Structure</b>	Grassroots	Cadre-based, not necessarily grassroots	Grassroots, cadre-based	Grassroots, cadre-based
<b>Platform or Agenda</b>	Shari'a or Islamization of society or values	Non-Shari'a, tolerance of secularism	Shari'a or Islamization of society/ values, intolerance of secularism	Non-Shari'a, Pro-Secularism, Reform, and possibly Islamization of Values
<b>Operational Area</b>	Non-political sphere	Competitive electoral or authoritarian politics	Competitive or authoritarian politics	Competitive electoral politics
<b>Methods of Subsuming Islam</b>	Campaign, Public Piety, Social Services	Symbols / Logos, Public Piety, Muslim Candidates	Political Platform, Symbols/ Logo, Public Piety	Public Piety, Muslim Candidates, Islamic rhetoric
<b>Islamism Trajectory</b>	Non-political	None	Yes, Political	Abandoning Islamism
<b>Examples</b>	Indonesian Muhammadiyah	Indonesian PAN and PKB	Turkish Welfare and Virtue Party	Indonesian PKS, Turkish AKP

The table above may introduce some new entities in context of Indonesian and Turkish political Islam. It will help to explicate the distinction between various entities of political Islam. Knowing the different manifestations will generally enhance our understanding of the phenomenon, but more particularly this table will strengthen the basis of the case selection of this article. Each entity demonstrates different features that show any inaccurate comparison amongst the entities could lead to a theoretical misunderstanding.

Post-Islamist parties believe that democracy is essential and Islam is compatible with democracy. They seek to ascertain that Muslims can be democrats.<sup>6</sup> Muslim democrats reject or discount the historical Islamist goal of an Islamic state, settling instead for “crafting viable electoral platforms and stable governing coalitions” in pursuit of Islamic and other interests, and respecting the rules of the democratic political game. These shifts come about not because of revision to “theory and ideology,” but from “pragmatism and politics.”<sup>7</sup> According to Olivier Roy, post-Islamism reflects the conceptual and practical failure of Islamism’s effort to Islamize the state and to unify religion and politics.<sup>8</sup> In a post-Islamist society, politics and religion remain autonomous in a way that politics takes precedence over religion (i.e., political motivations or interests trump religious ones), while Islamization is “privatized” in a way that the state is no longer seen as important in the Islamization of society. The discussion above behooves the question whether a post-Islamist party has to come from Islamist party or not. Thus far, most scholarship indicates that such transition is definitely only possible within the context of departure from Islamism as no other instigator, aside from Islamism itself, can stimulate and push a party to become a post-Islamist.<sup>9</sup>

Both the AKP and the PKS are post-Islamists as they also share the same features discussed above. The AKP was founded by Turkish former Islamist politicians who were involved in and disappointed with the progress of Islamist Virtue party and Welfare party made in Turkish politics. The PKS started as an Islamist party in 1998 with the name PK (*Partai Keadilan* or Justice Party) and became post-Islamist in the following 2004 and 2009 Indonesian elections with the new PKS name. One may ask if comparison with other post-Islamist parties in different regimes, such as those of Egypt or Iran. However, this may not be possible because the Egyptian regime led by Hosni Mubarak was authoritarian and the Iranian regime is also an authoritarian theocratic state.<sup>10</sup> These different types of regime make any comparative analysis of electoral successes with the AKP and the PKS very unlikely as the Egyptian and the Iranian regimes are not Muslim-majority democracies. Based on this definition, the case of the AKP and the PKS stand out as the only post-Islamist parties operating under liberal democratic regimes, which guarantee free and fair elections; hence, Turkey and Indonesia are legitimate Muslim-majority democracies. The AKP and



the PKS certainly display the features of post-Islamism described above. The absence of state maneuver in rigging or manipulating electoral results means that the electoral successes, and the variation, of both parties deserve more attention.

Nonetheless, there barely exists a literature on the comparison of electoral success of both parties. What abundantly exists is the scholarship on each individual party's electoral success. Despite a very few comparative scholarship on both parties, they only deal with the Turkish and Indonesian regime incentives and their effects in the performances and in the internal movement-party dynamics of both parties.<sup>11</sup> Most scholarship on each individual party's electoral success explains the voter typical profiles and their motivation for the votes. Some scholars argue that the AKP's electoral success in government is critically contingent on success in the economic sphere.<sup>12</sup> The AKP constituencies are not most economically disadvantaged segments of Turkish society but rather the middle-income earners. Some scholars have attempted to draw a link of some kind of economic patronage between the AKP and a prominent association of emerging pious businessmen who are committed to international trade and the EU accession.<sup>13</sup> Others also argue that the AKP's electoral success is due to the emergence of cross-class coalition encompassing a large part of the rural population, artisans, and small traders in the cities, urban slum-dwellers and the rapidly rising Islamic bourgeoisie mostly coming from the Anatolia region of Turkey.<sup>14</sup> On the same note, the PKS appeared as a great option to many of the swing voters in Indonesia because it presented many promising policy changes such as good governance and anti-corruption with less Islamist tone. The PKS has successfully expanded its electoral bases by being more pragmatic, yet most of the voters in the last two elections were basically the swing voters who were undecided about which party to vote for.<sup>15</sup> The dearth of comparison of the electoral success of both parties and the reason behind their variations are what primarily push the writing of this article. The contributions I hope to make to the current scholarship of political Islam is how electoral successes of post-Islamist parties are determined or affected under free and fair elections with different types of secularism. This central question will unpack different correlations and potential causations of different variables in bringing about different degrees of electoral success of the AKP and the PKS.

## **Why Comparing Turkey and Indonesia**

The cases of Turkey and Indonesia are very interesting to compare. Both operate in Muslim-majority democracies where different traditions of Islam are prevalent, sectarian tension barely exists, and monarchic authority is out of the picture. Both are also culturally and religiously diverse countries where other religions and ethnicities also play significant role in public life as well as politics. Both parties heavily rely on the similar electorate of young, urban, lower-middle class and petty bourgeoisie who prospered under the rapid economic development of previous nationalist parties.

More importantly, there are differences that significantly highlight the importance of the comparison. Turkey has a distinct secularism system from that of Indonesia. In Turkey, the secularism is restrictive and somewhat resembles laicism in France in which religion (Islam) is strictly separated from politics and public life; in other words Islam to some extent is controlled by the government. In Indonesia, the secularism is passive and allows for greater freedom of religious expression in politics and public life. There are also factors such as the existence of elite struggle within the political and military circles in Turkey and the push for the European Union accession, all of which are absent in Indonesian politics. These factors definitely have affected the electoral success of both parties markedly different. The interesting similarities and differences in social, economic, and political circumstances between Turkey and Indonesia thus serve as the reasons for the case comparisons.<sup>16</sup>

This article emphasizes on finding the causal mechanism that explicates under what conditions post-Islamist parties successfully win an election and forms a government and what variables inhibit such a political state. This article will also (1) unravel the causal path of why each post-Islamist party has its own trajectory of electoral success and (2) identify the causal variables that explain why there is such a different of trajectory of a similarly type of political party. The latter will basically answer the research question of this article. Unlike the most common research design on Islamism, which most likely offers the typical conclusion of moderation of Islamist party, this research attempts to offer something new in investigating the advancement of political Islam that is dynamic and unpredictable.

This article posits that the variation in electoral success between the AKP and the PKS can be explained by two reasons:

1. The different types of secularism adopted by Turkey and Indonesia, which dictate the roles of the military in both countries and the electoral behavior of Turkish and Indonesian voters. The electoral behavior is heavily driven by the polarization that is present in Turkey but absent in Indonesia.
2. The absence of exogenous shocks in the case of the PKS, that vitally affects the different party platform and electoral strategies the party adopts from those of the AKP. Both parties emerged with promising reforms and Islamic values, but the AKP succeeded by offering additional packages that deal with the exogenous shocks, ending in more electorally successful performance of the AKP.

These two reasons can be understood better when they are broken down into five independent variables that are embedded in the analyses and explanation of each cases of this article. These independent variables may interact with each other and create critical junctures that crucially determine the different outcomes of the dependent variable (electoral success). These independent variables are (1) types of secularism, passive or aggressive; (2) military roles; (3) electoral behavior, particularly with respect towards Islam; (4) exogenous shocks, such as economic crisis or EU membership; (5) party strategies, such as organizational strength, party platform, and campaign strategies.

### **A Post-Islamist Clean Sweep in Turkey**

When the AKP unprecedentedly won the elections in 2002, the political history of Turkey was in the making. It was the first time Turkey was about to be governed by a non-coalitional government that had a strong roots in the country's long problematized source of tension: Islamism. Yet, the AKP being the newborn "post-Islamism star" set a different course by charting a populist plan of economic growth, human rights, the EU membership, and consolidation of democracy. The epochal event, however, was a major dealt blow to the secularist in Turkey. Such a slap in the face of the secularists triggered a long wave of contention between the two camps (the secularist and the anti-secularist) in an acutely polarized Turkish society, leading

to bigger a “post-Islamist tsunami” in 2007 – the AKP government strengthened its mandate by increasing its electoral strongholds in the 2007 election. This section seeks to unpack these two important events as the context of the dependent variable of this thesis: electoral success. This section briefly surveys Turkish history vis-à-vis Islam and the rise and transformation of what became the AKP. Second, it analyzes the characteristics and the party strategies of the AKP. Third, it examines the electoral successes of the AKP in 2002 and 2007 by linking all the independent variables.

*Brief History:*

*Constructing a Secularist Path*

As the post-imperial successor state of the Ottoman Empire – the last Caliphate in the Muslim world – Turkey has never had an easy relationship with Islam. Since the country’s founding in 1923, Islam was deliberately abolished from public spaces in Turkey, intending to orient the country towards the West. Such an orientation was aimed to emulate and achieve “European” modernity, under the pretext that Islam served as a hindrance towards reaching such a “noble” goal to which every post-colonial state aspired. The main architect of this top-down secularization is Mustafa Kemal, also known as Atatürk (translation: “father of the Turks”). His radical reforms and modernization project evoked both admiration and deep-seated resentment within and outside Turkey. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was a practical statesman rather than an ideologue, but his vision of secularism generated the famous titular ideology of “Kemalism”. This ideology gave birth to the oldest Turkish political party, named People’s Republican Party or *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP), and “authorized” the Turkish military as the guardian of Kemalism, a staunchly aggressive secularism. Yet most importantly, what has inspired fierce debate and deep political tension in Turkey is the backlash this ideology has caused in Turkey’s society: the incessant appearance of Islam in Turkish political and social life. The “father of the Turks” did not foresee that what he benevolently thought good for his “children” would generate a strong countermovement in a country of almost 80 million Muslims: political Islam.

Atatürk’s radical reform was indeed controversial and imposing. In implementing his reform, the Kemalist elites did not consult with the broader population of the largely conservative Muslim Turkish peasants

or at least make any concessions with the opposition to the reform. The reforms are only a small part of the whole Kemalist early modern agenda that were institutionalized into a constitution. The Turkish Constitution was first drafted in 1921 and finally promulgated in 1924. Throughout Turkish political history, the constitution has been replaced as many times as the army has staged coups to protect the Kemalist ideology of Turkey, such as the ones in 1961 and 1980. However, the most interesting facet of the constitution is the paradoxical ruling on the role of Islam in Turkish society. While the constitution formally adopted laicism and put barriers on expression of political Islam and religious associations (Sufi orders or *tarekat*), it also decreed the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) as an institution to regulate and control Islam.<sup>17</sup> This paradox projects the Kemalist strategy in “containing” Islam that stems from its insecurity and fear of Islam becoming a challenging political force that had been seen as the cause of the regression of the Ottoman Empire.

However, most of these reforms took place in the urban centers, while the countryside remained largely untouched.<sup>18</sup> Until the 1950s, the bulk of the Turkish population remained isolated and “traditional” (according to Kemalism standard, “Islamic” or conservative and rural), while the urban centers were modern and secular. Islam was not completely out of the picture; it was simply extinguished from the public space and strictly subordinated to and supervised by the Turkish state, through its *Diyanet*.<sup>19</sup> In the countryside, Islam continued to have strong social roots and remained largely beyond state control.<sup>20</sup> Similar to many Arab regimes, the *Diyanet* seeks to restrain political activities emanating from religious spaces by administering Turkey’s 77,000 mosques and the production of religious knowledge. It supervises and employs the muftis, religious scholars who give legal opinions, and imams.

Repression can only last for so long. The Kemalist state’s modernization project, which seeks to mold a monolithic Turkish identity (a secular ethnic Turk), has generated deep-seated resentment from various groups such as Islamists and ethnic minorities. Kemalism was generally couched in six principles: republicanism, populism, secularism, reformism, nationalism, and statism.<sup>21</sup> Secularism and nationalism are the main controversial principles that trigger the

current opposition towards the ideology: Kemalism carries an ethnic element of “Turkishness” that alienates the Kurds, who make up half of the population in the Eastern or Central Anatolia, Christian minorities such as the Greeks and the Armenians, and non-Muslim minorities. The Kemalist state tightly controlled the development of non-state groups because autonomous activities, particularly those of religion, were perceived by the state as a potential threat to its ability to carry out its secularism project. It is also important to note that the Kemalist regime quickly suppressed any opposition to the regime’s nationalist ideology, exemplified through the government’s violent crackdown on the Kurdish movement.<sup>22</sup> The suppression and the stifling of religious, social and political activities by the Kemalist state did not really follow its goal to secularize the entire Turkish society. Islam and ethnic minorities have long been part of and flourishing under the Ottoman Empire. The Kemalists’ objectives to stifle religious activities and ethnic minorities only drove Islam and these minorities more adamant and persistent. The Kemalist self-fulfilling prophecy of the fear of non-secular forces finally came true when the political liberalization through an election of multiparty democracy in early 1950 transformed the dynamic of opposition voices and the fate of political Islam in Turkey. The center right gained a monumental voice and rallied all the Turkish electorates in the right (mainly conservatives Muslims) to resist the authoritarian tendencies of the Kemalist state. It was not a surprise, then, when Islamism in Turkey eventually resurfaced.

The Turkish election and the victory of the Democratic Party in 1950 led by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, who was later executed in violation of the 1924 Constitution, opened a political space for various groups in Turkey. Such a “political liberalization” was welcomed by all kinds of Turks, from left to right, after a long authoritarian rule by the CHP for almost three decades. The triumph of the Democratic Party served as the break from many nationalist policies pursued by the CHP, and as a result gave more political opportunities and economic freedoms for many Turks. The economy was heavily liberalized and the Kemalists no longer monopolized politics. The Turkish economy grew stronger and Turkey joined NATO within a decade of the Democratic Party ruling. Most importantly, this more liberal political climate gave the green light to more civil society organizations and political groups. It is from this environment that political Islam

started to develop, but its emergence was not apparent until the 1970s.

In the 1970s, Turkey was on the verge of civil war after an increase of left wing and right wing violence erupted in the country, urging the military to intervene in 1980 to “restore order”. What made Turkey interesting during the aftermath was the institutionalization of “Turkish Islam” by the military to forestall the rise of communism and leftist ideologies. The military suddenly meddled in religious affairs, designing ways to combat Islam with its spectrum of counter-ideologies. The military made religious education a compulsory subject in all and “state-controlled moral and religious education was promoted.”<sup>23</sup> This involvement of the Turkish military in Islamic affairs prompted the famous doctrine set by the military “Turkish Islamic Synthesis.” It employed the tripodal rhetoric of “the family, the mosque, and the barracks,” and was designed to reduce the appeal of radical leftist ideologies and to prevent non-Turkish sources of Islamic thought from influencing the development of the Turkish “Islamic model” of state building.<sup>24</sup> The synthesis was devised to support the Kemalist state building project by amplifying the Turkish conservative value placed on family and depoliticizing the role of Islam.

*The Evolvement of Turkish Political Islam:  
From National Order to Welfare Party*

The DP’s victory in 1950 basically “relegitimized Islam and traditional rural values,” but such political move prompted the Turkish military to intervene in 1960 as the Kemalist regime perceived Menderes’ policies as heretically dangerous.<sup>25</sup> Although the military turned power back over to the politicians in 1961 and returned to the barracks, it instituted a number of reforms that strengthened its political role and served its Kemalist objectives through the creation of the new constitution in 1961. Nevertheless, the most important revision in the 1961 constitution was the expansion of the scope for associational freedom, which led to the proliferation of autonomous groups, including religious groups. The revival of Islam came about through the mushrooming of religious organizations in the 1970s and reappearance of different Sufi *tarikatarlar* and religious networks that helped the poor vis-à-vis the problems they faced coming from Kemalist modernization. Out of these less stringent circumstances, a

notable religious manifesto called *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook) was put forward by its founder Necmettin Erbakan. It was able to galvanize masses and mobilize resources to create a strong base for political forces. Erbakan used the code words “national” and “culture” to refer to Islam and the manifesto itself actually refers implicitly to “political Islam”. These code words were adopted because it was constitutionally illegal in Turkey to use overt religious symbols or reference for political purposes.

The *Milli Görüş* leaders aimed to revive Turkish traditional values and institutions. Their goal was to build a “national (Islamic) order” and put an end to the process of Westernization. With these deep multiple resentments and their available resources as well as the power of the masses, these leaders formed their own separate political party in January 1970, the National Order Party (MNP), the first in a series of religious parties established under the shadow of the *Milli Görüş*.<sup>26</sup> The National Order Party (MNP) only lasted for a year until it was closed in May 1971. As the first Islamist party formed by Necmettin Erbakan, it advocated a new economic and social order based on “national” (read: Islamic) principles. With a violation of secularism, the party was shut down after a military intervention in 1971.<sup>27</sup> The cycle of military intervention in closing down Islamist parties only reinforced the will of Erbakan and his followers to keep challenging the Kemalist regime. They founded the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi* [MSP]) in 1972. The party resembled the average Islamist party that promoted “Islam is the solution” to solve Turkey’s various problems. The MSP established itself as an important actor in Turkish political life by winning the third place in the 1973 election. Yet, again, the military staged a coup in 1980 and the MSP was shut down.<sup>28</sup>

The MSP party reemerged in 1983 under a new name—the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi* [RP]). RP’s ideology might have differed little from that of the MSP, but it expressed the same hostility to Westernization and the same anti-Western bias. The party was perceived as using democracy in rather instrumental terms to push the Turkish state and Turkish society in a more Islamist direction.<sup>29</sup> In the 1995 national elections, Erbakan became the prime minister after the RP formed a coalition with the center-right True Path Party and came in first in the election with 21.6 percent of the total vote. The RP’s stunning victory sent shock waves throughout the secular establishment, especially the military, as for the first time since the founding of the Turkish Republic



in 1923, Turkey was governed by an Islamist party and prime minister.<sup>30</sup> Without this specific political strategy of merging with the center-right, the party would have been less successful in broadening its appeal. Aside from other political strategy such as providing a network of social-welfare, help to the poor (by helping residents to find jobs, providing hospital and health care, and providing other social amenities), the RP also capitalized on its organizational strength, the extremely effective grassroots network that reached out to the marginalized groups in the shantytown and other poor urban areas.<sup>31</sup>

Nonetheless, Erbakan's hostility towards the West alarmed the Kemalist establishment. The most concerned Kemalist institution was the military, but instead of intervening directly, as it had in 1960, 1971, and 1980, the military employed more subtle and indirect methods to force Erbakan out. On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council (MGK) presented Erbakan with a list of recommendations with an aim to protect secularism, which Erbakan resisted. The military, however, mobilized the secular establishment, including the pro-Kemalist media, against him and staged a "silent" or "post-modern" coup, eventually forcing him to resign in June 1997. With such a post-modern coup – one that defies the traditional military coup, the Refah Party was closed down in January 1998. The soft coup underscored the abandonment of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. It also consequently sparked an internal debate within the Islamist movement about the movement's future political strategy and agenda. Two groups emerged from the ashes of the RP: (1) the "traditionalists" (*Gelenekciler*), centered on Erbakan and his chief lieutenant, Recai Kutan, which opposed any serious change in policy and (2) the younger group of "modernists," or "reformists" (*Yenilikciler*), led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the mayor of Istanbul, and his close associate Abdullah Gül, which argued that the party needed to reconsider its approach to fundamental issues such as democracy, human rights, and relations with the West.<sup>32</sup>

Despite the closure of the RP through the post-modern military intervention or "soft coup" in 1997, the cycle of Islamist parties continued. The Fazilet Party (FP) emerged immediately in 1998 that began to embrace Western political values. In short, anti-Westernism and suspicion of the West were no longer a hallmark of Islamist discourse. Yet again, in June 2001, the Constitutional Court outlawed the FP for its violation against principles of secularism of the Constitution. After the

shut down of the FP in June 2001, the *Milli Görüş* movement formally split and the traditionalists established the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi* [SP]) – which regarded Islam as incompatible with Western values, while the modernists founded a new party, the AKP with Erdoğan as the party chairman. This split represented a fundamental ideological rift in the *Milli Görüş* movement.

*Farewell to Islamism:*

*the Emergence of Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)*

In 2001, the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP) or “Justice and Development Party” was formed. The AKP changed the character of its Islamist predecessor and transformed the party into what can be seen as a post-Islamist party with a larger scope of regions in Turkey. It abandoned Islamism and embraced the West while still maintaining conservative values. The AKP emerged as both a continuation and change of Erbakan’s party. It is an incarnation of Islamist party in that it focuses on conservatism instead of religious values. However, it also tries to appeal to more constituents, aspiring to become a larger party that is less exclusive like the previous Islamists. Within the AKP there is, of course, the Islamist heritage of the RP, but it is no longer that of the mid 1990s. It is not an Islamist party, but it maneuvers to be a mass party that appeals to both Islamists and the broader spectrum conservatives, with an element of a free-market entrepreneurial spirit that was not part of Erbakan’s approach. Unlike *Milli Görüş* movement that did not have a sufficiently wide social base to overtake the government through the ballot box, the AKP capitalized on new ideas and initiatives to bolster its electoral bases. The AKP defines itself not as an Islamic party but as a conservative democratic party similar to Christian democratic parties in Western Europe.<sup>33</sup> The AKP internalizes the Islamic values as its moral compass and its members are proud of their Islamic practices. Every successful movement in Turkey has some of the characteristics of the AKP; the only difference is that the AKP gives voice to the Muslims or the conservatives. According to Joshua Walker the AKP makes it fashionable for average devout Turks to have headscarf-wearing wives and regularly go to Friday prayers.<sup>34</sup>

Since its founding in 2001, the AKP has increasingly emphasized “Western” political values such as democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law in its public discourse. The AKP views the West,

particularly the EU, as an important ally in its struggle against the “tyranny” of the Kemalist state. Instead of emulating previous Islamists by calling democratic reform a Western agenda, the AKP sees greater democratic reform as essential in achieving an agenda that represents almost half of Turkey’s population. They see the Western agenda as overlapping with their own. The party views membership in the EU as a tool to reduce “the influence of the military and establish a political framework that will expand religious freedom and ensure its own political survival.”<sup>35</sup>

The AKP champions democratization and economic liberalization rhetoric, not nationalism and religion. However, they have sensitivities towards important issues in the Middle East and might appear Islamic or, according to many media labels, “mildly Islamist” or “with Islamist roots,” because they tried to pursue many democratic goals on behalf of their constituents who many are conservative and religious Turkish Muslims. The AKP takes on their religious sensitivities and puts forward pragmatic policies towards Turkey’s many problems, such as the Kurdish and Armenian issues. The AKP offers something new to its constituency. It is a conservative party and hence, in the Turkish context, religion plays an important role in its worldview. Nevertheless, the party has gone beyond what some Turks expected the party to be: it stirred numerous controversies with plans to ban some alcohol in restaurants, proposals for adultery law, and the classic headscarf debate.<sup>36</sup> The AKP also appears to be a promoter of the reconciliation between secular and Islamic values, the latter of which is often interpreted as conservative values. The AKP has become so sophisticated in explaining to their voters that Islam can go hand in hand with secularism. Arguably, the AKP has an agenda and answers to most questions that have not been answered by other previous incumbent parties. The AKP is focused and effective in supporting NGOs, business and civil societies. Hugh Pope from International Crisis Group in Istanbul also said that the AKP is more open to new ideas than other parties; they have created their own intellectuals and established journals and think tanks.<sup>37</sup> Ahmet Evin also confirms that the AKP “publish journal articles more regularly than their competitors.”<sup>38</sup> Investigating further, the said think-tank could be the “Siyaset Ekonomi Ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (SETA Foundation)” which is based in Ankara and has a branch in Washington D.C. and the journal might be the “Insight Turkey”. The founding Director of SETA

is Dr. Ibrahim Kalın who is the Chief Foreign Policy advisor to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

### *The Electoral Successes*

In November 2001, Turkey held its parliamentary election and the AKP gained 34 percent of the vote, well ahead of the secularist CHP, which placed second with 19 percent of the vote. As only these two parties obtained sufficient votes to cross the 10 percent threshold (according to Turkey's electoral law) needed for representation in parliament, the AKP disproportionately gained nearly two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly, enabling it to sweep the parliament and form its own government. This again sent shockwaves to the Kemalist establishment and prompted them to put more cautionary eyes on the AKP. The AKP reform package was very attractive to many electorates. Among the issues are expansion of freedom of expression and abolition of the death penalty and establishment of retrial rights for citizens.<sup>39</sup>

The AKP's electoral success in 2002 was buttressed by its performance in managing the Turkish economy from a crisis in 2000. The Turkish currency was devalued several times, the banking sector was devastated, and the economy shrank by a historic 9.5 percent in 2001. Since the AKP took power, the Turkish economy has been growing in impressive rates and the party has taken credit for it. In contrast, other conventional parties in Turkey, like those in the left and right spectrum, were discredited, because of the huge economic crisis. Other parties collapsed because they were blamed for the economic crises, the three major parties that made up the coalition government following the April 1999 elections: Democratic Left Party (the DSP) led by Bulent Ecevit, the Nationalist Action Party (the MHP) and the Motherland Party (the ANAP). They could not even pass the 10 percent threshold in the November 2002 elections. Turkish electorates "punished" both the right and the left of the political spectrum, including the center-left that were penalized for failing to protect the poor and the underprivileged, giving space for center right parties.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, the party's acronym of the "AK" party means "white or clean" and it fits with its icon of a white light bulb. Because of rampant corruption problem in Turkey, the AKP with this symbol and its rhetoric was able to exploit public discontent with revelations of corruption in the mainstream secular parties and to portray itself as the party of "clean government."<sup>41</sup>

The AKP's embracement of the West (or the EU) is accompanied with the abandonment of the anti-globalization discourse that characterized the Islamist movement in the past. The AKP has many capable technocrats within its body. The party's handling of 2001 economic crisis by strictly adhering to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and attracting more foreign investment to overcome the crisis and revive the economy demonstrated this new capacity existing within a post-Islamist party. Thus, the AKP has adopted liberal market policies to attract foreign investment and integrate Turkey more closely into the global economy.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, the AKP was able to incorporate both winners and losers from the neoliberal globalization process. Business support, from social and medium enterprise units falling under the umbrella of a major nation-wide business association, constitutes a crucial element of the AKP's electoral support. The AKP was able to sustain equitable growth, avoid costly financial crises and tackle the problem of pervasive corruption.<sup>43</sup> The large segment of popular support of the AKP also comes from the party's ability to provide urban services delivery. Economic issues and party delivery become the central concerns of the voters. The AKP succeeded in bringing together different social bases under the economic performances, therefore its success hinged on a secular performance.<sup>44</sup> Although there is a conservative base, the AKP's success is not because of ideological base, but the success is based on mustering electoral support, not ideology.

European Union membership was also central to the AKP's political platform. The magnitude of the major economic crises that Turkey experienced in November 2000 and in February 2001 created a massive wave of unemployment and bankruptcies and hit all sections of society, rendered the potential material benefits of joining the EU all the more attractive.<sup>45</sup> Not only economic crisis, the AKP also came after democratic crisis in Turkey. The soft-coup against the Refah Party in 1997 became the symbolic entrenchment of military hegemony that many Turks, particularly those out of the Kemalist elites, resented. The AKP supported the EU process mainly because the EU could be an umbrella that would protect them from authoritarian maneuver of the military. The EU process also helps the AKP in pushing its agenda for more democratic reforms in Turkey. The reform package the party put forward not only includes the EU membership, but also economic stabilization, and reform of the legal system.

### *The Continuous Success in the 2007 Election*

The AKP obtained 46.6 percent of the vote in the July 22, 2007, election, increasing 12 percent of its previous electoral gain in the 2002 election. The most important increases occurred in the predominantly Kurdish areas of southeastern Anatolia. The AKP also increased its support in the five largest cities in Turkey. In Istanbul, it received almost as many votes as all its opponents combined. This suggests that the AKP is gradually extending its hold from the rural toward the city centers. The electoral support of the AKP gives the party an attribute of a center-right party. It has managed to design a party platform that is anchored in cultural preferences (typical right wing) with social-economic policies (typical left wing) and is favored by the electorate as a whole. Economic performance and social services delivery were voters' main concerns and key factors in the AKP's electoral success.

The AKP realized that it needed to stand out as much as possible and hence, devised a strategy to capture more votes. The party leadership's decided to replace about 200 candidates identified with the more-religious wing of the party on its July 2007 electoral list (some of the new candidates come from the liberal and center-left sectors of Turkish politics). It has been portrayed as intended to distance the party from old-line Islamist elements. Of those replaced, 165 were removed outright and 40 were placed in non-electable positions on the AKP list.<sup>46</sup> Here, the AKP's strategic move in toning down its Islamist past deserved greater attention in abandoning Islamism. Its post-Islamist trajectory led to a stable electoral and executive-cum-legislative hegemony in the Turkish politics that inevitably upset the formerly glorious Kemalist regime.

Another factor that led to a "landslide" of the AKP in the Turkish National Assembly was the Kemalist (particularly the military) comeback in intervening Turkish civilian politics. In May 2007, the Constitutional Court blocked Abdullah Gül's first bid for presidency, on a basis that his political views expressed during his Refah Party years was against the Turkish secularism, and the fact that his wife, Mrs. Hayrünnisa Gül, wears a headscarf.<sup>47</sup> For this reason, his election to the presidency by the AKP is likely to remain a source of tension between the AKP government and the secularists. Before the July 2007 election, the AKP posture on the headscarf was prudent; its wearing by the wives of AKP leaders signaled to the leadership's commitment to Islamic values,

but the party did not directly challenge the ban.<sup>48</sup> Gül's nomination provoked mass demonstrations by the secularists in major Turkish cities. It also elicited a warning by General Mehmet Yaşar Büyükanıt in April, yet brought attention to the so-called e-coup or "midnight memorandum," a statement posted on the Turkish General Staff web site declaring that the military is "the definite defender of secularity" and "will manifest its attitude and behavior in an explicit and clear fashion when necessary."<sup>49</sup> This prompted the Turkish population that the military might have staged another soft coup to close down the AKP.

Abdullah Gül had previously served as the Turkish Foreign Minister under the AKP government. The Constitutional Court decision that blocked the first attempt to elect Abdullah Gül as president is also considered by many Turkish and outside observers as having been politically motivated. However, he was eventually elected as the President on August 28, 2007 and was sworn in the same day, becoming the first ex-Islamist Muslim President in the modern history of Turkey. The failed presidential selection in May 2007 led to the decision to hold parliamentary elections, originally scheduled for November, on July 22, 2007. The AKP was embittered by the military's role in derailing Gül's candidacy for the presidency, although AKP critics contend that the party pushed the envelope too far by nominating him after Erdoğan decided not to stand for the presidency. Nevertheless, the military maneuver actually was a benefit for the AKP. The Turkish pro-democracy electorate became more discontent with the semi-autocratic institution of the military. They translated their disappointment with more votes for the AKP in the "premature" parliamentary election in July 2007. According to an estimate by Joshua Walker, there could have been about 15 to 20 percent of the AKP votes was motivated against military intervention in politics.

### *Electoral Strategies and Organizational Strength of the AKP*

The AKP is very careful and more mindful than previous Islamist parties when they decide which Islamic policies to pursue. The previous Islamist parties have rather crude and almost unrelenting blatant overt Islamic agenda. Secularists and the Kemalist elites were so much stronger, politically and institutionally, than other Islamist parties in Turkey. Other parties in the past were risk at being crackdown. Thus,

the AKP is tactical and tactful in packaging itself to the public. It strives to be the most organized programmatic political party in the country and attempts to incorporate as many supporters as possible. It is pragmatic yet still retains its conservative streak to maintain its core supporters.

The AKP puts many candidates in local offices and with many of these candidates and more organizational strength, they run a clean campaign government and prove themselves better at governing than the secularist or other candidates. They have local officials throughout Turkey who are perceived positively. They do this for quite long, and despite the attempts of smearing from the opposition, they get to keep their clean credential intact. Scholars have argued that the AKP's leadership is much more diffused. They have much more local contact with local authorities – previously built throughout the incarnation of the Islamist parties – than any other major parties that are more of elitist. The AKP is also known for their usage of grassroots campaigning. They send their representatives all throughout Turkey during campaigning season.

The AKP and Erbakan's parties were good in providing social services. Strong network of this kind of services help people adjust to the cities. AKP local politicians go around and help poor people in the neighborhood, from which they get political loyalty. They are very grassroots and very systematic. They pick and choose candidates and well-known intellectuals throughout the country to be part of their party or campaign. They are close to the people, to shanty-town folks and they at least appear to be talking to the people. They offer free medicine, free food, and small income for people to send their children to schools – though the party is not clientelistic and does not build patronage. People who are fans of AKP, according to Joshua Walker, are die-hard supporters.

### *The Polarization Divide as Electoral Benefit*

Turkish society, according to prominent Ottoman historian Serif Mardin, has long been divided between the “center” and the “periphery”. These divides have existed since the Ottoman times and continues to determine the politics of Turkey. The center is generally the Kemalist establishment. The Kemalist acts as the cult of the state and promotes a certain type of regime. The secularism system was imposed with force



and resembles French laicism. They are urban, secular, and modern. In fact, they are the minority, probably 20 percent of the population, but they wield significant amount of power; whereas, the periphery is usually comprised of the conservatives and the Islamist from central Turkey eastwards, they are mostly a society of peasants. They are rural, traditional, and religious. They were marginalized politically, but were numerically stronger by far. What happened is that as Turkey modernized and democratized, political space open up for different groups, including the periphery. Atatürk did not try to eliminate Islam, but eliminate it from the state sector. Islam flourished rather strongly outside the major city. In a way, the periphery was a sort of counter culture, with the main culture being the secular urban modern society.

Now with globalization and more access to international trade, the new social sector is the conservative elites and the so-called “Anatolian bourgeoisie”. In one view of Turkish political dynamics, the religious-secularist divide in Turkish society reflects the redistribution of power from the Kemalist elites (who usually are the traditional business establishment), the bureaucrats, and the military – to this rising social sector, which finds political expression in the AKP.<sup>50</sup> This new landscape of polarization between two opposite camps within Turkish society provided the AKP with significant leverage to increase its electoral appeal and retain the electoral success by rallying many disillusioned Turks under the cause of challenging the notoriously paternalistic Kemalist establishments. Thus, it can be seen from the electoral bases of the AKP and the factors contributing to the sustainable success of the AKP in the 2007 election, that the AKP basically appeals to those who have long been marginalized by the Kemalist regime, or the periphery voters in Turkey.<sup>51</sup>

Overall, the post-Islamist clean sweep in Turkey led by the AKP reflects a somewhat complicated picture that basically breaks down to three big pieces of puzzles: the aggressive Kemalist policies of secularism, the secular performances of a religious party, and the center-periphery divide. None of the puzzle is labeled “Islam is the solution” or “Islamism”. In contrast to this, we will see a different trajectory in Indonesia, a path that is walked by the Prosperous Justice Party.

## Miscalculating Islamist Ballots in Indonesia

In the Indonesian 2004 elections, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) sent shockwaves throughout the country and abroad. Observers worried that an imminent *stealth Islamization* – borrowing Pepinsky’s and Liddle’s terms – was going to take over the world’s biggest Muslim population.<sup>52</sup> The party fared pretty well relatively, finishing fifth in the election, yet made a major breakthrough by significantly increasing its votes from less than even two percent in the previous 1999 election. However, such fear of Islamization was confounded when the party only increased less than one percent of its votes in the 2009 election. Behind these ambiguous political trends – ones that evokes both astonishment and relief – is the party’s long transformation. The PKS phenomenon, of its rise and stagnancy, is understood as a product of the dynamic socio-political interaction in a diverse Muslim democracy.

### *Brief History:*

#### *From Dictatorship to Democracy, from Student Activist to Politicians*

The *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) has strong roots in university campuses and other educational institutions. The party evolved from an organized *da’wah* (Islamic propagation) movement popular among younger university students and educated Muslims in Indonesia in the 1970s, called *Jamā’ah Tarbīyah* (Education Movement), to an outright Islamist party named *Partai Keadilan* or PK (Justice Party) in 1999, and finally to a post-Islamist party in late 2008. Many of the active facilitators and educators of the *Tarbīyah* movement were graduates of universities in the Middle East that had intimate contacts with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>53</sup> In the mid-1990s, the *Tarbīyah* network gained momentum, expanding significantly to various prestigious university campuses in Indonesia, notably in secular universities such as the University of Indonesia (UI), Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), and Gajah Mada University (UGM), as opposed to Islamic universities that also abounded in Indonesia. Because of their solid network and well-organized leadership, the *Tarbīyah* student activists were able to spread their influences to formal structures of the universities “by systematically taking over student-parliaments in universities at faculty and departmental levels.”<sup>54</sup> According to Machmudi in his seminal work on the history of the *Jamā’ah Tarbīyah*, many of the *Tarbīyah* activists “won control of student executive

bodies and placed their best cadres in the position of head of student senates.”<sup>55</sup>

The *Tarbīyah* activists used university mosques and prayer rooms (*muṣallā*) as their “base camps” to conduct their activities such as religious education (*halaqah*) and meeting. They founded intra-campus organizations under the umbrella body called the Forum for Islamic Study.<sup>56</sup> Their organizing capacity was incomparable to other student movements in university campuses back in the mid 1990s as their movements gather many like-minded activists who are religious and dedicated to the Islamist causes. Their goal was to disseminate *shari’ah* values among the grassroots through education and services. The *Tarbīyah* movement was an apolitical organization, presumably because it did not want to appear as a threat to President Suharto’s dictatorship that ruled Indonesia from 1966 to 1998.

However, when the Asian financial crisis severely hit Indonesia in the beginning of 1997, it sparked into a political crisis, something that the other Asian countries did not experience. Students across the country saw an opportunity for political reform; they mobilized and rallied university students demanding political change. During this time, the *Tarbīyah* network founded the Action Union for Indonesian Muslim Students (KAMMI, *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*) in March 1998.<sup>57</sup> In April 1998, KAMMI, under the leadership of Fahri Hamzah, organized a huge demonstration calling for the resignation of President Suharto. The *Tarbīyah* movement was a significant part of the student movement that toppled the dictatorship of Suharto in 1998. The movement then decided to take up the opportunity to bring its reform mission to a larger scale by participating in politics. The *Partai Keadlian* or PK then was created in Jakarta in July 1998, with Nurmahmudi Ismail, a PhD graduate from the American Texas A&M University, elected as the party’s first president.<sup>58</sup> The PK then participated along with 48 other political parties in the first democratic elections since 1955 – the first Indonesian election since independence in 1945.

The “Islamic moral reform” slogan championed by the PK did not work well with the diverse Indonesian electorates who were deeply concerned with the severe economic crisis of 1997 that preceded the election. The party could only be satisfied with 1.7 percent of the national votes, which failed even to pass the minimum electoral

threshold of 2 percent votes, and was thus unable to compete in the next elections.<sup>59</sup> The PK realized that their Islamist platform was not attractive enough to Indonesian voters. In the spirit of transforming society through reform, the party decided to be pragmatic and embrace politics as the means to achieve its goal of “Islamic reform”. The PK decided to change its name to the *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) in 2002. The first major step that the party took was to revise its platform and program, including rebranding its name to be more appealing by articulating its image as a ‘clean and caring’ (*bersih dan peduli*) party. The ‘clean image’ refers to the PKS’s commitment to fight corruption, which in fact has become the main characteristic of the party’s political career. The ‘caring image’ of the PKS was portrayed in its social services programs, particularly during the natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes that occur often in Indonesia such as the ones in Aceh after the tsunami in 2005 and in Yogyakarta after the earthquake in 2006. The social programs also extend to major urban cities such as Jakarta and Bandung targeting the low-middle class.

The party’s attempt to downplay Islam in electoral politics gained much scholarly attention that the party had “moderated” as a result of its inclusion in the democracy (the inclusion-moderation hypothesis).<sup>60</sup> However, some skeptics and secularists in Indonesia still suspected that the party hid its true agenda to establish an Islamic state, slowly but surely.<sup>61</sup> The view that the rebranding of the party image was only complete window dressing to achieve a greater goal of *shari’ah* as the rule of law was prevalent among many observers and politicians. Notwithstanding the skepticism, many of the Indonesian voters put their trust in the party in the 2004 election by giving the party significantly more votes than its previous share in 1999.

### *Electoral Success through Pragmatism*

With a new image of “clean and caring,” the PKS boosted its political significance by receiving 7.3 percent in the 2004 election and its leader Hidayat Nur Wahid became the speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly. During the 2004 general election, the party changed its rhetoric from promoting moral and religious or *Islamic* reforms to agendas of clean government, social welfare, and anti-corruption. Scholars have argued that the shift of image from an Islamist into a

democratic party “enabled the PKS to attract support from the wider Muslim community” and arguably non-Muslims who shared the vision and mission of the new party, so that it managed to quintuple its votes from the previous elections.<sup>62</sup> The change in name and rebranding also indicates a shift in the party’s orientation towards electoral politics: the PKS had become more pragmatic. It did whatever it could to gain a larger share of power. The party also supported the candidacy of the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Muhammad Jusuf Kalla in September 2005, who both as a pair subsequently won the second round of presidential election in 2004 with 60.62%, which automatically made the PKS one of the governing parties under the coalition of the president party, *Partai Demokrat* (PD) or the Democratic Party.

The party’s quick shift to pragmatism and its electoral success surprised many people, and the reasons for both phenomena seem to be intertwined. The party’s electoral success in significantly improving its electoral share seemed to be anchored solely in its successful rhetorical campaign promoting anti-corruption and good governance. Within one year of changing its name and rebranding its image, the party was able to surprise many analysts and competing politicians. The ultimate reason behind the pragmatism was the diversity of the Indonesian electorates. In order to succeed and become a major political party in Indonesian politics, a political party has to be pluralist. The PKS attempted to appeal to an enormous diversity in Indonesian electorates – from religion to ideology to ethnicity to socio-economic status – and fared quite well in 2004. However, the PKS still maintained its ideology and basis in Islam in 2004. It projected its image as religious-nationalist, but its cadre and internal leadership was still reportedly loyal to Islamism. Rather than depicting fundamentalist views, the PKS chose to downplay its Islamism and to be “accommodative” by including non-Muslims and Muslims from various backgrounds. Its coalition with the Prosperity and Peace Party, *Partai Damai Sejahtera* (PDS), a Christian Party, to run for the election of governor of the Province of Papua in 2006, indicates the PKS’s pragmatic and “accommodative” effort. Such a pragmatic attitude carried over into the regional elections that took place after the 2004 elections, and even until now. It is no less interesting that 60 percent of the PKS coalitions in the regional elections are with Islamic parties and 40 percent are

with secular parties, including those Christian parties such as the PDS.<sup>63</sup>

From the example above, democracy made the Islamist movement evolve fairly quickly with substantial transformation. Although the party had not abandoned Islamism when it formed the PKS in 2002, nor when it gained significant votes in 2004, the *Tarbīyah* movement adjusted very quickly to the behavior of Indonesian voters. The party acted like a typical political party in that it seeks to appeal to as many voters as possible – by changing name, cooperating with non-like-minded actors, toning down ideological rhetoric, appealing to the lower middle class – but does not necessarily seek a mass membership. The transformation of the PKS from an exclusively cadre party into a more inclusive party is different from a catch-all political party theory, coined by German political scientist Otto Kirchheimer, or a mass-based party.<sup>64</sup> Both catch-all and mass-based party emphasizes on vote-seeking behavior of the party, but the PKS came off as more complex: it has become a vote-seeking party that also attempts to maintain its stronghold of cadres. While mass-based party has an open membership, the PKS still requires the new members to go through extensive training in accordance with its ideology – which has changed from Islamism to one that embraces *Pancasila* (explained below).<sup>65</sup> After reaping the harvest of pragmatism, the PKS seemed not to be content with 7.4 percent while maintaining its Islamism tinge. Despite some internal disagreement, it went further down the road by officially embracing the Indonesia's state basis of *Pancasila* that emphasizes pluralism and diversity.

### *Pancasila and Belated Post-Islamism*

*Pancasila* is the foundational philosophy of the Indonesian unitary state that was invented in 1945 by the President Sukarno, which maintains unity amid the diversity in the archipelagic Indonesia. The philosophy means “five principles” in Sanskrit and includes the “belief and unity in one God” as one of the five principles. It basically is a mesh of nationalism, socialism, and monotheism – three ideologies Sukarno embraced as his guiding principles of national leadership to solve any potential conflict among the Muslims, nationalists, and the Christians. This philosophy has had an impact on the Indonesian political scene, in which parties that espouse it tend to be more acceptable among

voters and fare better in elections compared to counterparts that espouse other ideologies. A veteran Indonesianist Douglas Ramage, for instance, argues that the wide acceptance of Indonesia's national ideology of *Pancasila* has shaped the ways in which Indonesian Muslim political leaders articulate democratic ideals.<sup>66</sup> It was also used under Suharto to justify his rule and protect him from any ideology-driven movement that could have threatened him. Nevertheless, in the Indonesian context, *Pancasila* can be used to measure whether a party is staunchly Islamist or has completely abandoned Islamism as its ideology.

When the PKS gained momentum in the 2004 election, it was confident in its Islamist rhetoric and packaged it into moral and salient issues like good governance, anti-corruption, and public welfare. The party was sure that the transformation from the PK did not need to be accompanied by a change in basis or constitution of the party. The party's constitution, therefore, was still anchored in Islam. Al-Qur'an and Hadith were still the guiding forces of the party. Yet, during the party's national conference in Bali in February 2008 the PKS, however belatedly, was eventually certain that it wanted to discard its Islamist image. It was not clear what really drove the party leadership to abandon Islamism and become a post-Islamist party by committing to *Pancasila* and embracing it as the party's basis. Furthermore, the party's reference to the Indonesian Constitution was final and non-negotiable; there were no more references to *shari'ah* as the source of law. Influential party figures began to publicly reject the label Islamism, claiming that the PKS was now 'religious-nationalist' in outlook.<sup>67</sup>

In an interview with Metro TV in July 2010, the new Secretary General of the PKS, Anis Matta, made a statement that the party recently steered public attention to its "openness." He argued that until recently the party had made the public aware of long existing "open" principles embedded in its party constitution.<sup>68</sup> In the same video, Matta argued that the implementation of *shari'ah* is justified under two principles: 1) if democracy or the public will allow for it and 2) the fact that Indonesian Constitution itself has already adopted many religious laws to begin with (Indonesia also has religious courts that arbitrate from *shari'ah* perspective). He basically tried to assert that *shari'ah* has historically been part of the spirit of Indonesian laws. He also implied that *shari'ah* does not need a state to be fully practiced,

pointing out that Muslims can practice their daily Islamic practices without an institutionalization of *shari'ah*.

Confirming this statement in an interview, a former Member of Parliament (MP) from the PKS stated that what the party seeks is *islāh* (social reform), and it does not have any problem with the Indonesian Constitution, nor does it have any ambition to establish an Islamic state. What the party seeks to implement is *shari'ah* values within society and politics, allowing the politics to be ethical. The MP emphasized that the NKRI or *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (the concept of a Unitarian State of Indonesia) is final and non-negotiable, thus the PKS does not seek to establish an Islamic state, particularly with the uncertainty over whether *shari'ah* would bring more benefits and diversity to the Indonesian people.<sup>69</sup> It tries to differentiate itself from a radical and violent Islamist movement such as *Dār al-Islām* that seeks to establish *shari'ah* as the formal law of the land.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, at the party's second national congress in Jakarta in June 2010, the PKS went another step further when it moved to adjust its organizational statutes to allow for the inclusion of non-Muslims into executive positions within the party, not only as members and voters, but as cadres, so long they qualify for the high moral standards the party sets up.<sup>71</sup>

Notwithstanding the assuring statement of the PKS's post-Islamism by the Secretary General and its subsequent actions, there seems to be an intensive internal debate occurring within the party. The chief of the *Shūrā* council, on the other hand, in the same interview video with Anis Matta argues that the PKS has not changed and it still remains a *partai dakwah* (propagation party), *partai kader* (cadre party), and *partai nasional* (mass-based party). This confirms the complexity of what kind of political party the PKS is. It is not a mass-based party, but also not a catch-all party. The statement of the party being "propagation party" and "cadre party" depicts that the party still seems to be exclusive, but that contradicts its statement as a "mass-based party" that connotes the party should be inclusive and has an open national membership. It is interesting to analyze further and link it to the two different camps within the party. The two camps are the "Justice" camp (*Kubu Keadilan*) and the "Prosperous" camp (*Kubu Kesejahteraan*): same ideology, different approach in politics, and the latter now dominate the elite leadership.<sup>72</sup> The first camp seems to be the core founder of the party and the dedicated former *Tarbiyah* activists while the latter



seems to be either the new members or progressive *Tarbiyah* activists. An Indonesian analyst said that the pragmatism might actually be risky in terms of their internal process and maintenance of party cadres.

If pragmatism through image rebranding and rhetorical changes is the prime factor for why the PKS managed to make a very significant gain of electoral shares, then their organizational strength and electoral strategies are equally strong determinants. As for the organizational aspect, the PKS reformulated its leadership structure by giving more power and control over the organization to the *Shūrā* Council or *Majelis Syuro* (Deliberation Assembly). This enabled the party to work more efficiently, to make decisions in a simpler manner, and to implement programs more effectively.<sup>73</sup> However, scholars have argued that the council is non-democratic and non-transparent. According to Greg Fealy, who went to the party's national summit last summer in 2010, the identity of most of its 99 members is confidential, nor usually is the timing and locations of its meetings. Fealy, an expert on Indonesian political Islam, revealed through his comment that despite all the reforms and rebranding the party made for the sake of its image, internally, the party's leadership is still not transparent and democratic.<sup>74</sup>

Another organizational change was the creation of auxiliary institutions, with the most important being 1) the Electoral Victory Body (*Badan Pemenangan Pemilu* or *Bapilu*), whose task was to manage the party campaigns and mobilize support for elections, and 2) the Board of Experts (*Dewan Pakar*), comprised of professionals with various expertise who are to advise the party according to their special vocation.<sup>75</sup> These institutions were designed to ensure that the party would maximize its votes from the electorates in all elections.

One last important element to note within the party's organizational strength is its ability to consolidate capacity building of a political party, particularly in galvanizing and representing many public aspirations and training cadres with a purpose to serve the country. The training reportedly also emphasizes capacity building of each cadre, thus collectively contributing to the overall neat administration and organizational strength of the party. These cadres understand the vision and mission of the PKS really well, knowing their rights and duties vis-à-vis the party. The cadres also hold regular weekly meetings to instill the basic and foundational values of the party, thus they have high integrity.<sup>76</sup>

The party has a solid foundation composed of strongly committed individuals with a rigid requirement of membership. However, along with the more open policy of the party, the membership is operating more on an ideology that emphasizes brotherhood or sisterhood based on voluntary participation. The latter refers to the exhaustive strategy of rallying and recruiting as many people as possible.

This cadre process has extended into university campuses, emulating what the *Tarbīyah* has done in the past and is good at. The profiles of these young cadres are usually of neither the modernist nor the traditionalist background of Muslims in Indonesia—they are a somewhat new generation of Islam: cleaner of corruption, intellectually appealing and at the same time reliant on a fairly strict interpretation of religion.<sup>77</sup> They mainly have been raised in the typical urban Muslim upbringing, where a distinction between traditionalist (follower of one of the Sunni *madhhab* or school of thoughts) and modernist (follower of the tradition of the famous Egyptian reformer, Muhammad Abduh, who relied on the Al-Qur'an and Hadith as opposed to the accumulated knowledge from one of the school of thoughts) Muslim no longer exists. The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) embraces the former and Muhammadiyah embraced the latter, both of which are the largest Muslim social-welfare organizations in Indonesia. They are the middle class who have emerged from Suharto's New Order economic achievements, which have enabled them to pursue their studies in universities both in Indonesia and abroad (the West or the Middle East). It was during their studies that the slogan of "universal Islam" or "global Islam" that seeks to practice the "true Islam," was introduced and strengthened. This slogan has been encapsulated by the *Tarbīyah* movement and later by the PKS. Thus, it is not surprising that the party's cadres come out of this type of background.<sup>78</sup>

### *Electoral Strategies of the PKS*

Aside from the good governance and anti-corruption slogan the PKS brings up as part of their electoral strategies, the party also touches on bread and butter issues to attract wider constituents. The party also delivers social services that will definitely buy the votes of the lower middle class in urban areas. Through comprehensive electoral strategies, the party not only seeks to attract the pious intellectuals and reformist Indonesians but also young people, women, and the poor in urban

cities. According to Thomas Pepinsky et al., who did many analyses on Indonesian voting behavior, campaigning for votes based on single-issue messages rooted in political Islam was not an electorally viable strategy in Indonesian elections. The Islamists in Indonesia acknowledge that although Indonesian Muslims are pious, they also care about other political and basic issues common in many developing countries such as food, employment, health, security, development and territorial integrity.<sup>79</sup> The electoral appeal of the PKS itself has been strong mainly in the Java region and some provinces in Sumatra, in which both regions have been the historical strongholds of the spread of Islam in Indonesia since centuries ago. This pushed many Islamists to diversify their electoral strategies if they wanted to become a bigger party with more electoral gains. What the PKS did was to adapt to the Indonesian electorates who demanded many things from the government and adopt broad and inclusive political messages in order to be electorally viable. Pepinsky et al. also argues that the “most successful Islamist parties in 2004 and 2009 are those that have abandoned single-issue Islamist politics in order to seek broader political support by offering broader and more inclusive political messages.” The PKS messages then “are becoming ever more indistinguishable from those of *Pancasila* based parties such as Golkar and PD (Democratic Party).”<sup>80</sup> The PKS’s strength then only lies on the fact that it is a new party that has strong anti-corruption agenda.

The PKS also attempted to appeal to women by introducing a women’s program called *Pos Wanita Keadilan* (Justice Women Post) in 2007. The program provides social services for women and uses the slogan “*Ibu Sehat, Keluarga Sehat, Bangsa Kuat*” (Healthy Mothers, Healthy Family, Strong Nation) to raise awareness about Islam and social politics. Eunsook Jung who did extensive analyses on the PKS and other Muslim organizations in Indonesia, describes the program aims to provide education and training for women. It has about 970 posts in Indonesia and continues to expand.<sup>81</sup> Jung argues that this women’s section of the PKS tries to dispel the stereotype that it is the PKS’s internal culture that prevents women from attaining equal standing. While there is no statistical evidence about women voters of the PKS, it is obvious that this type of strategy is part of the party’s tactic to be electorally successful. Social services like this attempt to shape the party’s image as “caring”. The beneficiaries of this service who tend to

be coming from the lower middle class might have more tendencies to vote for the party in election, both regionally and nationally.

The evidence of the party's success in rebranding its image as part of its electoral strategies is reflected in a survey done by AKSES – a political consulting firm that did polls on the potential and previous voters of the PKS.<sup>82</sup> It shows that out of 738 respondents in 12 Indonesian provinces, 85 percent said that they perceived the PKS as “active in the public activities” and 92 percent said they were “close to the society.” More importantly however, 97 percent said the party's image focused on “prayer and religious studies in the Mosque.” The latter confirms that the public still strongly perceives the image of the party as the party of pious Muslims. The party's success of electoral strategies is reflected from the findings of this survey. The PKS has been successful at shaping the public perception of its party, but the survey does not do justice to the whole picture as it was not done to voters who did not vote or did not want to vote for the party, because the survey was done only to potential voters and previous voters of the PKS. It is somewhat surprising, however, that in the 2009 elections the PKS's path to greater electoral success did not bear substantial fruits.

The PKS stagnated in the 2009 election. It only obtained 7.88 percent of the total share and added 12 legislative seats. It stagnated and it miscalculated what it would gain in the 2009 election.<sup>83</sup> The party had predicted that it would double the amount of its electoral share and become one of the three biggest parties, as opposed to being the fourth largest and increasing less than one percent of its electoral gain from that of 2004. There are various reasons why the party stagnated, the two main ones being 1) the absence of charismatic leaders from the party as a result of a strong commitment to the institutionalized cadre process and to no charismatic politics and 2) the multitude of swing voters who no longer voted for the party in the election. The two reasons why the party stagnated are intertwined: voters “switched out” of the PKS and swung to vote for the charismatic Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's party, the PD (Democratic Party). Other reasons range from a corruption scandal involving one of the party's members that tarnished the party's image (explained below), to the party's decision to become pragmatic, which lost some very conservative voters who felt strongly about Islamism and shifted their alliance to Islamist parties, as opposed to the post-Islamist PKS. This appeal to

the “middle” shows the limit of the “median voter theorem” in the case of the PKS. The “curse” of pragmatism may also relate to the contest between the Muhammadiyah and the PKS. The Muhammadiyah, which is one of the Indonesia’s two biggest Muslim organizations, traditionally supports the nationalist *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN) or National Mandate Party and felt threatened by the aggressiveness of the PKS – this will be explained in detail later.

The votes that shifted from the PKS to other parties mostly went to the Democratic Party (DP) of the President Yudhoyono and possibly to other nationalist parties that also tapped into religion as their electoral strategies (some of them claim to be Nationalist-Religious parties). According to the AKSES Survey that took place three months before the election in 2009, 23 percent of the votes gained for PKS in 2004 shifted to the Democratic Party of the Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), although 71.7 percent during the survey identified as loyal voters to the PKS. The survey also shows that 51 percent of the respondents “switched out” of the PKS because they liked the presidential candidates from other parties. Obviously, these people were swing voters and most likely switched to the Indonesian President’s Democratic Party in the 2009 election. Only less than 6 percent did not vote for the party because the party had become less Islamic, giving rise to speculation that the PKS was still able to maintain its “loyal” voters who voted because of Islamic causes championed by the party. Moreover, the AKSES surveyed the respondents who had not voted for the PKS up until the 2009 election and presented these statistics: 13.2 percent said they voted because of the Indonesian President SBY and 27.2 percent said they thought the PKS did not have any credible candidates for national leaders. All of the findings above show that charismatic leaders in political parties in Indonesia really mattered. The PKS was losing votes because it did not have a charismatic leader like SBY of the PD (Democratic Party).

Two other factors that caused the swing to other parties aside from the lack of charismatic figures in the PKS are 1) the ability of the other parties, mostly nationalists, to tap into religious issues and 2) the performance of the PKS MPs and ministers in the government. In an interview with Nabil al-Mutawwa, one of the current PKS MP, he explained that the PKS is disadvantaged by the amount of uneducated Indonesians who voted because of money politics and cannot vote

based on the performance and platform of political parties, but on charismatic figures and money politics. This situation favors the more established parties, such as *Golkar* (Functional Group), which under the Suharto regime operated as a clientelistic party and has become the symbol of the New Order's cronyism. He argues that the PKS is more concerned and committed to public morality and prosperity. Thus, they are targeting ministerial portfolio that deals with public welfare such as information and technology, agriculture, and social affairs (based on a Memorandum of Understanding with the President SBY).<sup>84</sup> This commitment not to do money politics and the ability of other nationalist or secularist parties to appeal to religious aspiration of Indonesian voters, took over the constituents of Islamist voters within the PKS. These parties know that there is a considerable demand for Islamism in Indonesia and capitalizing on this issue will surely benefit any political parties, including the nationalist parties. The manifestation can be seen from the support from these nationalist and secularist parties for the religiously charged bill in the legislation. Of the 74 districts that applied *shari'ah* by-laws, more than 75 percent of them are dominated by nationalist parties, not the PKS.<sup>85</sup>

The statistics about the performance of the PKS MPs and ministers in the government is examined in another aspect of the AKSES survey that asked the respondents for suggestions to improve the PKS electoral gains. Their suggestions reflect voting preferences and behavior in Indonesian electorates. 33.3 percent said that the party should increase its communication and sensitivities to the people's concerns and demands. 26.7 percent said the party should increase their socio-economic programs such as scholarships, health insurances, and subsidies for daily goods. These suggestions reflect that socio-economic issues are still the greatest concerns for Indonesian voters. The economy and how the government delivers its services significantly affected the voting preferences of Indonesian electorates. Unlike Turkey's AKP, which prides itself as successful in saving the Turkish economy from collapse, managing the economy and achieving increased sustainable growth, the PKS did not have the capacity and opportunity to do the same. It was not the leading governing party; hence, without such an opportunity, electoral gains sided to other parties that were able to do this. The PKS seemed to invest more in establishing its image as the "clean" and the "corrupt-free" and the party that cares for the people,

but not as the party that delivers economic growth or is capable in governance. Religion is an important factor in Indonesian politics, but basic socio-economic issues definitely matter more to Indonesian voters. The party's inability to perform well in this context and to deliver socio-economic promises to the voters definitely affected its electoral gains in the 2009 election. Those who voted not for religious reasons, but because of the PKS's reformist image, were disappointed after PKS-supported governors and district heads failed to bring about substantial change in their provinces and districts after being elected. It is this dissatisfaction at the grassroots level that explains why, in 2009, the PKS yielded its most disappointing results in exactly those places where the party had actually done very well either in 2004 or in subsequent local elections.<sup>86</sup>

### *The Curse of Pragmatism*

Another reason why the PKS was not as electorally successful as it had predicted in the 2009 election was that it tried to make so many coalitions and moderate itself.<sup>87</sup> With the party's decision to include non-Muslims into the leadership structure and cadres, the PKS attempted to salvage its reputation as a party with strict organizational rules that give the image of its organizational strength and capacity. In fact, when the PKS was initially formed, its strict internal rules helped the party gain a significant institutional advantage over many of its electoral rivals. However, with the opening up of the party to broader constituencies, particularly to non-Muslims, these strict rules were repeatedly tweaked to accommodate the pragmatic turn within the PKS. This was disillusioning not only to the conservative Islamists in the top party ranks but also to the rank and file that constitute the party's human capital, and most importantly to the voters.<sup>88</sup>

In pursuing the "moderation" policy, the PKS went a little bit overboard. The party often offered controversial fast-track appointments to positions as party candidates in legislative or direct elections for governor, mayor or district head. During direct local elections, which have been held in hundreds of provinces and districts since 2005, the PKS also supported various candidates with dubious Islamic credentials. Often these candidates came from a business and bureaucratic background and they became candidates only after paying huge amounts of money to the party. In adopting this kind

of nomination procedure, the PKS basically “emulated the practices of other parties which are widely known for effectively auctioning off nominations for these executive elections to the highest bidder.”<sup>89</sup> The consequences for this at least can be seen from the stagnation in its 2009 election results, which the PKS miscalculated to double from that of 2004. In order to be “moderate” and please both sides of the voters – the non-Islamists and the Islamists– the PKS, according to Robert Pringle, was acting like a *Janus*. It was facing forward and backward, trying to appeal to the intellectual elites with new technology and modern approach, and simultaneously adhering back to the Islamist politics. The PKS attempted to appeal to as many constituents as possible by being “moderate,” but it ended up siphoning off its supporters.

The pragmatism it adopted also caused tension within similar Muslim organizations in the country, mainly the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU). Idris Thaha from the State Islamic University in Jakarta argues that the PKS appeals as a new party to the young generation, despite many attempts to link it to the *Masyumi* Party – the Islamist party that participated in the 1955 election and gained more than 20 percent of the total votes. The PKS distinguished itself from the Islamist parties such as the PAN or *Partai Amanat Nasional* (National Mandate Party), which is closely linked to the Muhammadiyah and the PKB or *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (National Awakening Party) to the NU – both claim as the nationalist-religious party.<sup>90</sup> The tension lies on the accusation of the Muhammadiyah to the PKS for “proselytizing” its members from the Muhammadiyah to the PKS’s social movement. Despite the fact that both the Muhammadiyah and the PKS belong to the Islamic modernist movement with slightly different traditions, Muhammadiyah members became an easy target for proselytizing. The PKS’s aggressive proselytizing upset the Muhammadiyah’s leadership. The Muhammadiyah issued a decree in 2006 and warned that the Muhammadiyah members should be wary of PKS. Although Muhammadiyah members have the right to vote for any political party, they were advised to be cautious of political parties like the PKS. Responding to the decree, the PKS and the Muhammadiyah leaders met and decided to respect each other’s territory, thus solving the conflict.<sup>91</sup> However, this definitely caused a major blow in the PKS electoral support. There are about 40 to 50 million members of the



Muhammadiyah in Indonesia and getting an official decree to basically not vote for the PKS significantly shifted many potential voters away from the PKS. Similarly, the NU took the same stand that the PKS should respect its boundary. The NU is also concerned about the PKS's aggressive proselytizing.<sup>92</sup> However, it is uncertain how many voters from the NU background used to vote for the PKS before the NU's decision to officially tell the PKS to "respect its boundary."

One last factor that might have affected the electoral stagnation was the corruption scandal involving several prominent PKS figures. Voters were disappointed with the commitment of the PKS that championed the anti-corruption slogan. Some of its non-cadre nominees for governorships and regencies, particularly those of doubtful probity, are known to have paid vast sums to secure the party's backing.<sup>93</sup> Some of the PKS figures have also been going investigation with the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission. It was not certain whether several members can affect the whole reputation of the party. At the same time, it also signifies the vulnerability of the PKS lies with its recent policy of openness. The policy seeks to include more people who are not necessarily part of the cadres (those who do not go through systematic training) and they do not have the same quality and integrity of the cadres. The PKS is the only political party that features cadres outside the election periods, and also conducts education and training sessions for its cadres regularly. The cadres have to commit not to engage in corruption and do anything treacherous to the party's moral politics and piety.<sup>94</sup> The corruptive behaviors of these non-cadres members have therefore risked the party a chunk of electoral gains.

Overall, the electoral success that stagnated in the case of the PKS reflects a linkage of the independent variables. When the party strategies, as a variable, interacted with the electoral behavior of Indonesian voters, the PKS made a major breakthrough in the 2004 election. However, the stagnation occurred when the party strategies created backlashes that basically are the manifestations of conjoint outcomes of the interaction between type of secularism and electoral behavior. What is not elaborately discussed yet, is how the type of secularism as the root causal variable maintained the determinacy of the PKS's path. Such a path, in contrast to that of the AKP, was immune to the many critical junctures in Indonesian political history. The next section will

unpack how the two paths differ, answering the research question of this article.

### **Not Secular Enough: Explaining the Variation**

Comparing the cases of the AKP in Turkey and the PKS in Indonesia brings post-Islamism into the limelight. Although both parties are post-Islamist and have similar variables determining their respective electoral success, the contexts of these variables are different in Turkey and Indonesia; both adopt different approaches towards secularism and there are instrumental variables in the case of Turkey but absent in the case of Indonesia.

In answering the research question, this article discusses the causal factors that have led to the variation in electoral success between the two post-Islamist parties. The causal factors are analyzed within the framework of path dependency in which certain historical events or decisions set the foundations of how histories in both cases unfolded and significantly molded the chain of contingent smaller events leading to each party's electoral trajectory and success. These causally linked smaller events are also determinant and they lock-in both post-Islamist parties in two different binding political circumstances. Such political circumstances include social norms engendered by state's secularism, military roles, electoral behavior, and political attitudes towards the state, that determine the path of how each post-Islamist party evolved, interacted, and attained what it accomplished relative to each other. Moreover, such a path is not absolutely deterministic as external factors also play adequate roles in affecting the direction of the path, causing a conjuncture where a new path can be taken. External factors such as crisis or foreign entities can indeed serve as exogenous shocks that disrupt these paths.

Therefore, this article identifies secularism, being Turkish Kemalism and Indonesian *Pancasila*, as causal historical events that shaped the determinacy of both the AKP's and the PKS's paths. Kemalism and *Pancasila* act in both countries beyond as types of secularism, but much like as ideologies that vitally dictate many outcomes of political events in each country. They also significantly affect Turkey's and Indonesia's political circumstances such as the different roles of Islam in each country's public space. Closely linked to secularism are the

militaries in both countries, which both help maintain and disrupt the determinacy of both paths. The latter is because the military is in fact the one who “accidentally” took part in creating the conjuncture of the paths by triggering counter-reactions from parts of the society, which precisely describes what happened in Turkey; whereas in Indonesia the military maintained the determinacy by going back to the barracks. Such involuntary consequences caused by the militaries or other players embedded in the secularism reversed the contingency of the deterministic pattern that governs the path dependency, which in the context of Turkey is also influenced by the exogenous shocks. The exogenous shocks in this article are the Turkish 2000 economic crisis and the European Union accession, which contributed to the conjuncture in the Turkish history and benefited the path of the AKP’s electoral trajectory. Accordingly, the absence of exogenous shocks in the Indonesian case reinforced the contingency of the PKS’s path. Thus, this article argues that the variation in electoral success between the two post-Islamist parties is essentially anchored in the path that has already been constructed by causal historical events, mainly the establishment of each country’s secularism. The variation is also rooted in the conjunctures – facilitated by the exogenous shocks – which happened in the Turkish case, yet absent in the Indonesian case.

After individually analyzing each case of the two post-Islamist parties, secularism appears to be most crucial causal factor of why the AKP is more electorally successful than the PKS. This variable leads to another one that also shapes the electoral trajectory of the parties, which is the role of the military; yet, the role of the military is more heavily present in Turkey than in Indonesia, as in the latter the military has no direct impact on the electoral success of the PKS. Secularism in both countries sanctions the role of the militaries to protect it and acts as the causal historical event that set the path for the AKP and the PKS. Structurally speaking, secularism and the militaries are two independent variables that are causally linked and affect the dependent variable: variation in electoral success. Below, it will be shown how these two factors or independent variables interplay and converge in determining the different electoral trajectory of the AKP and the PKS.

*Turkish Polarization:**The Battle Between the Secularists and the Pious*

The central element of secularism in Turkey is the polarization it creates in the Turkish social and political scenes. Secularism divides the population into two different camps: the secularists and the pious Muslim Turks. Although most literature splits the polarization into the secularists and the Islamists, the term Islamist only applies to those who want to establish an Islamic state or prefer *shari'ah* as the law of the land, whereas the reality in Turkey shows that those who oppose secularism are not necessarily Islamists; they are essentially pious Muslims who want to freely practice their religion.<sup>95</sup> Thus, the term “pious” fits more appropriately with the reality of Turks who want to practice their religion publicly (such as wearing the veil, for instance) without state intervention in their religious rights, while still upholding the principle of separation between religion and the state. Known as *laiklik* in Turkish (a derivation from the word “laicism”), secularism in Turkey, according to Hakan Yavuz, is single-handedly defined as “the identity of ‘progressive’ people, the state project of modernization, a model of creating an enlightened Islam, and also a strategy of criminalizing religious opposition.”<sup>96</sup> The secularists in Turkey are equated with the term “Kemalists,” or those who strongly subscribe to the doctrine of Kemalism, which is basically an aggressive secularism that seeks to keep Turkey free from religion. The pious Muslim Turks on the other hand, stoutly oppose the Kemalist secularism – which emphasizes the role of the state in protecting the political sphere and public life from religion – and challenge it politically by establishing and voting for political parties that intend to reshape secularism in Turkey into a system that is more religion-friendly and seeks freedom from state control.<sup>97</sup> This polarization between two camps in the Turkish political sphere basically explains why the AKP was able to mobilize many Turks to vote for it in the 2002 election and increase its votes in the 2007 election.

The Kemalist ruling elites established the *Diyanet*, or Directory of Religious Affairs, to supervise and control Islam in Turkish public life. An expert on Turkish Islamism, Hakan Yavuz, argues that the Turkish state seeks to control religious symbols, language, leadership and networks through its institutions. He argues that the secularism in Turkey is not freedom *from* or *of*, but *control* of religion.<sup>98</sup> This objective to control religion in Turkey stems from the exclusive understanding

of secularism that is rationalist in orientation, uncompromising, and focuses on a scientific understanding of the world without any reference to God or a theistic norm. The downside of this “exclusive secularism” is that it tends to trigger an opposition from the religion it antagonizes that will strengthen its assertiveness and actually produce a “secular fundamentalism” which is intolerant of anything theistic or religious. The state control of religion was also accompanied by the Kemalist modernization project that demarcates the boundary between Islam and modernity. It defines modernity as an alternative lifestyle free from religion and a contrast to Islamic activism, which is divisive, anti-national, and anti-modern.<sup>99</sup> It discourages any Turk from looking at Islam as a strong, positive element of their identity. The illiberal nature of Turkish secularism definitely creates a backlash that is detrimental to the formation of Turkish identity.<sup>100</sup> This backlash makes the formation of Turkish Islamic identity seem irreconcilable with the separation of political power and religious authority. Rather than the desired of modernization and societal development, secularization in Turkey became part of the process of social engineering emanating from an elite decision to “modernize” and free the country from Islam by controlling it.<sup>101</sup> Thus, in the Turkish context, secularism is paradoxically both progressive and authoritarian.

The aggressive secularism and economic growth has made the formation of elites in Turkish society inevitable. Borrowing the definition from Nilüfer Göle, elites of a certain group are referred to by their acquisition of a “cultural capital,” specifically, a universal scientific language and professional skills. The formation of elites in this context is constructed through various means of values that shape political, cultural, social, and religious views of certain groups. The formation of counter-elites, accordingly, is constructed through various means of counter-values. In the Turkish context, the elites are the secular Kemalist and the counter-elites are mainly the pious Muslim Turks who rose to the top of socio-economic classes. These counter-elites can actually extend to anyone from the central and eastern part of Turkey who became middle and upper classes and moved to urban areas in the western part of Turkey. It is thus not a coincidence that these formations are in accordance with the analysis of a prominent Ottoman historian, Serif Mardin, who coined the term “center” and “periphery.” It is clear that the elites in Turkey basically emerge from the “center” of

Turkey and the counter-elites emerge from the “periphery” of Turkey. In his seminal essay of the center-periphery relation of Turkish politics, Serif Mardin argues that every society has a center and periphery. The former is associated with strong institutions and urbanism while the latter is associated with feudal nobility and nomadism.<sup>102</sup> The center tends to be occupied by the ruling elites who were often perceived as hostile by the periphery. They effectively “owned” the state institutions and its political apparatus, including security circles, various layers of state-dependent business, and various branches of the intellectual community and academia.<sup>103</sup> Mardin argues that the confrontation of center and peripheral forces has occurred since the Ottoman Empire and carries over into the modern day of the Turkish Republic. The implication of these dual, opposing forces in modern day Turkey, thus, is the construction of elites and counter elites.

The center elites in Turkey is also known as the new Republican elites. They identified themselves as *ilerici Atatürkçü aydınlar* (progressive Kemalist intellectuals), thus implying their allegiance as intellectuals to Atatürk’s reforms. These intellectuals also included academicians, novelist, and journalists.<sup>104</sup> Their political manifestation is the Republican People’s Party (CHP) that ruled autocratically until 1950 when the political liberalization took place and the Democratic Party took over the government. This is basically the root cause of why the center is perceived as a patronizing actor in modern Turkish politics who thought the Atatürk reform was the best thing for all Ottoman citizens. The CHP emerged as the ultimate symbol of the center and stood fast for the preservation of Kemalist ideals. The bureaucrats, who were one of the center elites during the Ottoman era, selected the CHP as the one party with which they could best cooperate.<sup>105</sup>

On the other hand, peripheral forces molded the counter-elites in Turkey. Economic liberalization gave them a leg up to become more visible in Turkish public life and urban areas. What is interesting about the periphery is that there is no homogenous identity but a predominant denominator: resistance to the authoritarian Kemalist secularist project, which is in most cases usually wrapped in the cloth imbued with Islam. The periphery belongs to an often-described “uncontrollable mass of heterogeneous character” that is the source of defiant opposition to the new regime and its top-down modernization reforms in the early decades of the Republic. There is an irrepressible

variety of cultural differences within the periphery, including a rich variety of sectarian groups of Sunni or Shi'ah origin (like the Alevi), as well as non-Muslim and non-Turkic ethnic groups.<sup>106</sup> The resistance towards this top-down approach is more prevalent than the acceptance, by embracing the eternal nemesis of Atatürk: Islamism, and later post-Islamism. The counter-elites formation is heavily constructed around Islamic identity, though not all those who opposed the top-down approach were Islamists, but Islam indeed emerged in the Turkish public life along with the rise of the peripheral groups.

With rapid economic liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s, Islamism appeared to be an attempt to provide Muslims from the periphery with a new guide of daily life conduct and new forms of political expression. Contemporary Islamist movements in Turkey emerged after the 1950s and grew during the post-1980 period. During that same period, peripheral groups were moving to urban centers and gaining access to secular education and opportunities of upward social mobility. Islamist movements attempted to respond to the aspirations of these new groups and help them come to terms with modernity in general and with the secular elites in particular. Those accesses to the center's "cultural capital" led to the rise of the periphery in Turkey, economically, socially and politically. If the center elites have the economic, media, and political power to maintain the status quo of top-down and illiberal secularism, the periphery counter-elites have also acquired those various facets of power thanks to the economic liberalization project. The picture that has unfolded during the past three decades is that counter-elites have joined Turkey's traditional middle and upper classes. They assert that Islam fit perfectly well with modernity. This is the formula with which they have moved from Anatolia to the metropolis of Istanbul and other urban cities.<sup>107</sup> They want to be seen in Turkish public spaces, which consequently pose a threat to the center elites.

Young, urban, educated groups of pious Turks are also politically active and publicly visible. Furthermore, veiled women became visible on modern university campuses in big cities and Islamist periodicals, newspapers and books shifted the intellectual debate in Turkey away from the dominance of leftist intellectuals to that of the Islamists. The pious women suddenly became the central issue of debate in Turkish public life. They became the symbol of periphery's activism and of

Turkish Islamism as well. They now can be seen in urban spaces such as cafes and restaurants in big cities. These are the visible and educated periphery women, who remind the secular elites and self-assertive modern women of their presence as the counter-elites.<sup>108</sup> The battle between the elites and the counter elites basically lies in the struggle of owning and defining what the “cultural capitals” should be in modern day Turkey. The young counter-elites began to obtain the same cultural capitals as the center elites. They share the same university classes, occupy the ranks of parliament, and participate in public debates on television. The secular elites, in turn, reacted primarily in political terms, and began to wage a battle against Islamic fundamentalism (by falsely linking this to the counter-elites) and in defense of secularism by siding with the Kemalist institutions to “save” the country from the periphery. The insecurity of the center and the resilience of the periphery are mostly represented in the 2002 and 2007 election. Yet, the latter testifies more to the statement of why this long confrontation between the elites and the counter elites, actually gave rise to the alternative to Atatürkism: post-Islamism in Turkey.

### *The Battle and the AKP's Electoral Success*

Along with economic liberalization, the former occupants of the periphery become part of the center. This coexistence in urban areas engenders tension between the two camps. The elites feel increasingly insecure with the myth of “takeover” by the Islamists while the counter-elites continue to strengthen their visibility in Turkish public spaces. Interestingly, the elites who for so long had been strong advocates for modernization and secularization in the early decades of the Republic suddenly reversed their support for reforms, mainly on the nationalist ground against the EU membership that intensified since 1999. The membership entails the acceleration of democratization reforms of which the center elites feel particularly threatened by the democratic demands from the periphery. Consequently, the elites employ rhetoric that places the Turkish military as the natural protector of the Kemalist Republic and overlooks the non-democratic tone of the military's rhetoric and actions, only for the sake of their security against the rising counter-elites. Their political power, which is basically couched in the existence of the CHP, was threatened by the dramatic rise of the AKP in the 2002 election and the 2007 election.



A specific problem for the center elites is the fact that their adversaries (the periphery) seem to be perfectly organized while they are impeded by divisions and discord. The periphery elites control modern non-governmental organizations, entrepreneurial organizations, effective pressure groups, expanding think tanks, a powerful net of small-and-medium size companies, nation-wide media, and a splendidly organized governing party.<sup>109</sup> The political weakness of division also adds to the woes of the center elites. They see themselves as the avant-garde of modernity but have been pushed to the fringes by globalization and the opening of their country advocated by the AKP. They are divided into nationalist isolationists in the CHP and open-minded supporters of globalization. They claim to be the beacon of Turkey's "modernization", yet reject the European Union reforms that seek to change many undemocratic Turkish laws. The elites see that the Turkish government has betrayed Kemalist idealism, but hope to rest easy as long as the Kemalist institutions are in their hands.<sup>110</sup> However, everything changed when the nomination of Abdullah Gül as the President of Turkey in 2007, turning out to be the peak of the battle between the center and the periphery, which solidified the AKP mandate, political power, and electoral success.

Abdullah Gül's nomination set a record in the history of the Turkish republic, because his Islamist past and his veiled wife presented a symbolic contradiction to the Presidency as the Turkish symbol of a unified, secular, and modern republic. Feeling extremely challenged and insecure, the Kemalist upper-middle classes mobilized the army, the jurisdiction, the media, and themselves to foil the nomination. The army issued April 27 e-memorandum which they criticized the Islamist tendencies within the government and, most importantly, warning that they stood ready to act to "protect" secularist Republican principles – by possibly staging another coup.<sup>111</sup> Furthermore, the center elites displayed their unease by taking to the streets in a series of massive demonstrations in April and May of 2007, armed with symbols such as Turkish flags and photographs of Mustafa Kemal.

The country then found itself in a major legal and political crisis. The AKP camp focused on the military and spoke as if anyone who opposed Gül's candidacy hoped to see a coup.<sup>112</sup> The center elites, through the CHP as their political representation, politicized the

condition set by the Constitutional Court and succeeded in foiling the nomination. However, growing agitated by the Kemalist ploy and in the polarized setting of Turkish politics, the AKP moved to make necessary arrangements for direct popular election of the president and then called new parliamentary elections. The opposition, surprisingly, also called for early elections, on the grounds that a new parliament should elect the president after renewing the electoral confidence. Elections were set for 22 July 2007 and the AKP strongly took over the ballot boxes with almost 50 percent of the electorates, dealing the center elites a major blow.<sup>113</sup> The AKP thus became the dominant party with an average of more than 50 per cent of the votes in two clusters of provinces comprising a total of 44 out of 81 provinces.<sup>114</sup> Indeed, the polarization that has been entrenched in Turkish politics from the confrontation between the elites and counter-elites reached its peak in the 2007 election. The AKP, as a post-Islamist party that has successfully attracted a wide spectrum of voters, clearly benefited from this apex of clash between secularism and post-Islamism.

*Indonesian Soft Secularism:  
The Accommodative Space for Islamism*

Contrary to Turkish secularism, Indonesian secularism has adopted an inclusive approach. It does not try to eliminate religious symbols and norms from the public sphere, it seeks to accommodate a diversity of religious perspective – including political Islam - and use religious values embedded in the national ideology called *Pancasila* to support the existing social and political order as well as nation-building projects. Islam came to Indonesia through peaceful means and adopted to the local culture, hence is more syncretic. Although there exist numerous struggles for political Islam or secessionist movements using Islam as legitimacy, most Indonesians disagree on how Islam should play a role in public life. Even during the early days of the republic, most Muslims who fought in the independence from the Dutch agreed not to establish an Islamic state. There was no place for an Islamic state, but Indonesian leaders decided to make space for Islamism to compete in politics. It was only under the 32 years of authoritarian rule of Suharto that Islamism was somewhat suppressed and not as politically free to contest. After 32 years of a grim past, Islamism is now a force that can compete with other political forces for a shared space in public, thus,

ironically providing a rather less electorally successful path for the PKS to thrive in Indonesian politics.

Foreign traders first introduced Islam into various city-ports of the archipelago from the Middle East and South Asia. The culture developing along the coast under the influence of the traders included traits like egalitarianism, dynamism, and independence, which affected the ideology and practice of Islam in the country significantly.<sup>115</sup> As a result, the Indonesian people are now relatively more moderate in their outlook towards Islam, a helpful ingredient for a pluralistic democracy. Islam in Indonesia was believed to help foster the spirit of moral politics and good governance, but not of an establishment of a theocratic state. In Indonesia, religion serves more as moral support than as state ideology. Islam in Indonesia has always competed with outside powers or against tyrants ruling the country (Suharto), becoming the people's driving force vis-à-vis oppressive authority. Indonesia's rulers conceived of the people as an object—the oppressed—forcing them thereby to struggle for their rights and finally resort to Islam as a source of legitimacy for the control of authority and democracy.<sup>116</sup> Although the secularism in Indonesia might be modeled on that of the United States of America, it is not true that there is an absolute separation between religion and the Indonesian state. The Indonesian government still “flirts” with religion by financing religious schools, administering Hajj, and it even has a Ministry of Religious Affairs that predominantly endorses Islam as the “mainstream religion” and handles mostly Islamic affairs. The relationship between Islam and the Indonesian state is in a gray area but still holds the principle of inclusive secularism. Islam can thrive in public life, including in politics whereby political parties can try to mobilize voters under Islamic rhetoric.

The basic political philosophy of Indonesia is embedded in the form of five precepts – *Pancasila* in Sanskrit – intended to provide a basic political philosophy for the new nation Sukarno had introduced as a preliminary draft on June 1, 1945. Sukarno and his coauthors intended *Pancasila* to provide Indonesians with a nonsectarian affirmation of religious values in a secular framework.<sup>117</sup> The final form of *Pancasila* was developed by a committee of nine nationalist leaders and presented in the preamble to the Indonesian 1945 constitution in a text known as the *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter). The first *sila*, or principle, talks about belief in monotheism, which is basis for theistic secularism.<sup>118</sup>

However, in the face of strong criticism from largely modernist Islamist leaders, it was agreed that the *sila* would read “belief in God with the obligation of adherents of Islam to live according to Islamic law.”<sup>119</sup> This statement, which became known as the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter, was deliberately ambiguous. According to Greg Barton, the principle was unclear as to what authority it would endow the state with to intervene in private religious practice.<sup>120</sup> Even so, a senior nationalist, Nahdlatul Ulama’s Wahid Hasyim, who was one of the nine co-drafters, felt that the phrasing of the principle would suggest a direction to become an Islamic state. On August 18 1945, the wording of the first *sila* was changed to “belief in the one true God” only and the reference to *shari’ah* dropped. *Pancasila* then acted as the final compromise between Islam and secularism in Indonesia. It was embedded in all Indonesian social and political institutions, making it part of the national consciousness of many Indonesians – a strong element in Indonesian nationalism. It then continued to serve paradoxical roles in Indonesian politics vis-à-vis Islam: as the guarantor for Islam to be politically expressed and as the protector of the Indonesian state from being converted into an Islamic state.

It is because of *Pancasila* that the PKS finally publicly affirmed its commitment to it as the end of its ambiguous relationship with the concept of an Islamic state. *Pancasila* forces any political actors on the Indonesian political scene to moderate their ideology and appropriate their platform with the spirit of five principles the *sila* embodies. This national ideology is widely entrenched in the Indonesian education system and in some schools it is required to be recited weekly or even daily. *Pancasila* has acted as the tool of both nationalism and inclusive secularism. Despite various Islamist movements and the desire to legislate *shari’ah* by laws in many Indonesian provinces after the decentralization in 1999, Indonesian Muslims in general already internalize the spirit of *Pancasila* that essentially represents the reality of diversity in Indonesian culture, religion, and ethnicity.<sup>121</sup> It is also because of *Pancasila* that such polarization and tension between the center and periphery elites does not exist in Indonesian society. *Pancasila* was a product of convention of many Indonesian leaders in the early period of the republic based on the reality of diversity in the archipelago. It is Indonesia’s type of secularism (inclusive) that shapes the electoral trajectory of the PKS to be less successful than that of the

AKP. The former only capitalizes on its loyalist voters and some other hopeful, reform-minded, pious Muslims while the latter benefits from a large pool of “anti-center” crowds of the periphery.

Indonesia’s warm relationship with Islam gave legitimacy for the public to embrace Islam for various means: education, politics, human rights, and even entertainment. Islam became part of the culture of all Indonesians, regardless of religious affiliation, unlike in Turkey, where it was only a “consumption” of the counter-elites or the periphery. In Indonesia, Islam can be a commodity and a cultural capital for many. The government also encourages the institutionalization of Islam through establishing State Islamic Universities (UIN) that provide secular and Islamic knowledge at the same institution, funding the Indonesian *Ulama* Council (MUI) that issues *fatwá* (religious ordinances) and acts as the moral authority for Indonesian Muslims, and many others. Islam also gave birth to the two of world’s biggest social and welfare Islamic organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Ultimately, the accommodative space for Islam forces all the political players in Indonesia to espouse Islamic rhetoric or appeal to the conscience of Indonesian Muslims using religious piety to mobilize voters in the elections; thus, regardless of the political party ideologies, even the nationalist parties in elections attempt to appeal to these sensitivities without necessarily espousing Islamism.

### *Links to Electoral Stagnation*

All of the factors above inhibit the chances for a successful electoral strategy by a post-Islamist party such as the PKS. Because of Indonesian accommodative space for Islam, the PKS rivals other competitors who are not necessarily its archetypes: non-Islamist or non-post-Islamist actors. First, the PKS now has to compete with political parties who are basically capitalizing on Islam for political gains because strategic political calculations compelled these parties to appeal to Muslims whose Islamic proclivities determine their voting decision.<sup>122</sup> The PKS essentially has to “share” the space with others “given for free” by Indonesian secularism. Competition for this space is so fierce that, interestingly, the PKS has to even sell different fruits: they launch their campaign on non-Islamic issues such as good governance, anti-corruption, and social justice, yet packaged in Islamic public piety represented by their politicians, and cadres.

Secondly, the PKS can only target “confused” pious Muslim urbanites whose view of the role of Islam in public life is generally at odds with those of whom the PKS attempt to buy their loyalties: Indonesian Muslim students who study Islam extensively in colleges and universities. Their knowledge of Islam is definitely different from that of the PKS’s staunch urban voters, whose knowledge of Islam (usually those who are students go to secular universities) is more inclined to a version of new, globalized Islam as a universal force that comprehensively guides a Muslim’s life.<sup>123</sup> The knowledgeable and pious Indonesian Muslims who supposedly are the strongest potential voters turn out to be skeptical of the PKS and not vote for the party; this space for such an Islamic educational institution supported by the government and Indonesian secularism apparently appeared as a “curse” for the PKS.

Lastly, the presence of the NU and Muhammadiyah as the strongest indicators of how spacious the room for Islam to flourish in Indonesian public life basically pose the greatest “threat” to PKS ambition to emulate the AKP’s vast bases of voters. The NU and Muhammadiyah have adopted a more progressive understanding of Islam that is in sharp contrast to the Islamism of both the Arab Middle East and of South Asia. This civil society manifests itself in dozens of nongovernmental organizations concerned with development, social justice, respect for human rights, and modern progressive understandings of Islam. These young Muslim intellectuals from both camps of the NU and Muhammadiyah contribute to the development of a well-articulated alternative to Islamism.<sup>124</sup> The followers of NU and Muhammadiyah (the approximate number is around 40 millions each) and their political support traditionally goes to the PKB (Crescent and Star Party) or PAN (National Mandate Party), which lately however, might have shifted to political parties that can both deliver economic performance and represent moderate Islam.<sup>125</sup> The PKS clearly faces big competitors in the market of Muslim votes. This opposition from a staunchly influential movement in Indonesian Muslim politics definitely dealt a blow to the PKS’ less successful electoral trajectory.<sup>126</sup>

### *The Military Factor*

The Turkish military has a decisive role in determining the course of post-Islamism in Turkey. Its self-ascribed claim as the guardian of

Turkish secularism has affected the way any Islamist or post-Islamist actor in Turkey views and strategizes to advance their political agenda. The military has acted as one of the causes of the AKP's electoral success. Its authoritarian attitude has evoked deep-seated anger and frustration among the periphery elites, while simultaneously soothing the anxiety of the central elites vis-à-vis the rise of the periphery. On the contrary, the Indonesian military is less influential in directly shaping post-Islamism in Indonesia. Although it was strongly against political Islam, which it views as a threat to national security, the Indonesian military is more Islam-friendly and even allows space for generals who are practicing Muslims to take up important positions. Both militaries, however, have long histories of involvement in politics, especially the Indonesian military that had a one third representation in the parliament under Suharto's military dictatorship.

The Turkish military, or popularly known as the TSK (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*), is the Ottoman institution that has been professional for centuries and survived the dismantlement of the Empire. Atatürk adapted the existing institution into the guardian of Kemalist secularism in the wake of the republic's establishment and made its commitment to defend the Turkey's unity and secularism principle against perceived threats such as the Kurdish secessionist, armed aggression, and political Islam. The TSK is a respected institution in Turkey and is a symbol of nationalism, but is resented by the periphery and praised by the center.<sup>127</sup> Its numerous intervention in politics by staging coups has been controversial and although it restored the government back to civilian rule, it succeeded with a less democratic, redrafted constitution. This has become the causal factor for the AKP's success in politicizing resentment against the military and mobilizing those who support more democratization in the military to vote for the party.

In Turkey, it is known that the secular elites are "militarized" and that they are offered a protection of their secularist ideology by the TSK. The latest manifestation of this secular militarization has been the military's mobilization of forces in the country to foil the AKP's presidential nomination of Abdullah Gül, and the most recent case in 2008 of the Constitutional Court to close down the AKP on the similar ground of previous party closure: anti-secularism. The latter has triggered more controversy as the AKP survived by one vote, but the former has more direct relevance to the analysis of the party's electoral

success. It has been emphasized that the outcome of the 2007 election was a “punishment” from the Turkish center-right voters (particularly the periphery) for the center elites (mainly represented by the CHP) because of the CHP’s implicit alliance with the Constitutional Court and the TSK to conspire against the AKP nomination of Gül.

In an in-depth survey about religion, society, and politics in Turkey, TESEV conducted a poll in 2007 that asked various respondents all over Turkey questions about the role of the military. Almost 54 percent of respondents agreed with the statement “Turkish people can safeguard secularism without the support of the military.”<sup>128</sup> The statistic indicates that the majority of the Turkish public has enough self-confidence to assert that the military should not intervene in enforcing secularism that is basically under a civilian sphere. With the consolidation of democracy, the Turkish public has been more politically conscious, and the more the TSK behaves with undue pro-Kemalism attitude, the more agitation will come from the periphery, resulting in retaliation. Another event that explicitly involved the military’s complicit intention of another “post-modern coup” was the “Information Support Activity Plan.” The plan’s document aimed at bringing the judiciary, the media and public opinion over to the military’s side, because of the rumor that suggested that the AKP government was preparing the spread of the Islamic life style.<sup>129</sup> The military planned to carry out smear campaigns against “anti -military” artists and authors, create tensions in the Kurdish Southeast and get artists to produce work promoting the opinions advanced by the military.<sup>130</sup> As part of this grand design, the military has classified the dailies, journalists and intellectuals in pro and anti military terms. Consequently, this has sparked controversy and added to the frustration of the AKP after the military’s unabashed support for the pro-secular, nationalist “Republic Rallies” in the spring of 2007 to thwart Gül’s nomination. The immediate conclusion drawn by AKP supporters after the military’s April e-memorandum statement was that this “coup plan” had backfired, provoking the people to stand with the “democratic” voices against the “coup plotters.”<sup>131</sup> Thus, it could be concluded that because of the military’s persistently “illicit affairs” with politics – particularly by backing the center elites – amid the mood of EU democratization reform launched by the AKP, the Turkish military has actually helped its nemesis to accumulate more popular support.



Unlike the TSK's staunch hostility towards Islam, the Indonesian military, also known as TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*), strictly adheres to *Pancasila* as its guiding principle. Although their loyalty to *Pancasila* during the Suharto regime (called the "New Order" era) could have been as strong as the TSK's to Kemalism, the TNI's interpretation of *Pancasila* vis-à-vis Islam only extends to the Islamist secessionist movement, and not to Islamist or even post-Islamist political parties. During Suharto's rule, the Islamic parties were merged under one party called PPP (Unity Development Party or *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*) on the basis of *Pancasila* as the sole foundation of the national politics and in fear of a political Islam that would challenge Suharto's iron fist. What distinguishes the TNI from the TSK is the three decades of experience the former had under Suharto in national politics, ranging from legislative positions to provincial governor and even cabinet positions. *Pancasila* was strictly enforced during the New Order and has suppressed any Islamist movement into the underground – evidence that *Tarbīyah* only operated clandestinely in universities until the 1990s. Overall, as *Pancasila* is inherently neutral towards Islam, the military cannot but allow for it to flourish in the public sphere, including in the barracks. This was the case even when it had the power to completely suppress *Pancasila*, similar to what the Turkish military did before the AKP took power. The Indonesian military is indeed the guardian of *Pancasila*, but after the fall of Suharto in 1998, *Pancasila* proved to be resilient without the military's protection when the Indonesian voters themselves "protected" it and compelled the PKS to embrace it as a final principle of its politics.

With democratization, the Indonesian military had to return to the barracks and be deprived of their special three-decades-privilege of involvement in politics. In theory, the PKS could prosper without any fear of suppression from the military to express its political aspiration, but the reality told a different story when most Indonesian Muslims, though pious, do not necessarily vote for Islamist or post-Islamist party. The absence of polarization that endows one camp with the backing and support of the military clearly draws the line between the case of the electoral trajectory of the PKS and the AKP. The Indonesian military was pushed completely out of politics when the PKS competed in elections, but the AKP had to endlessly face its military nemesis ever since it embarked on a popular mandate to rule Turkey in 2002,

causing antagonism that benefited the AKP. These different roles of the military in Indonesia and Turkey shed another light on how to see the variation in electoral success between two post-Islamist parties in two Muslim-majority democracies. If anything, the secularism in both countries is the strongest factor that explains the variation, which also drives the behavior of the military in each respected country. These two entities within Turkey and Indonesia have proven to be the causal institutions behind the variation in electoral success between the PKS and the AKP.

### *The Exogenous Shocks in Turkey and Their Absence in Indonesia*

Although both Indonesia and Turkey experienced economic crises at the dawn of their democratic springs, only the AKP had an advantage to pull its name on taking the credit of the ensuing economic recovery in 2002, while the PKS did not even manage to break through the electoral threshold in 1999 (it was still staunchly Islamist under the name *Partai Keadlian* – PK). The economic crisis in Indonesia in 1998 was followed up by elections a year later, which were not won by any Islamist or even post-Islamist party. Moreover, because the analysis of variation in electoral success between the PKS and the AKP focuses on the period when each party took off as a significant political force in the national politics, the 1998 Indonesian economic crisis is irrelevant – the PKS only emerged as an important political actor in 2004. Whereas in Turkey, exogenous factors such as the economic crisis and the AKP's smart handling of the economy afterwards became the cornerstone of its electoral success in the 2007 election. The crisis also gave the AKP a ticket to the national mandate as voters were already disappointed by the poor economic performance before 2002 of the coalitional government. The other variable that affected the variation in electoral success was the EU reform initiated by the AKP, which benefited the AKP by getting rid of undemocratic practices particularly those of the military. The EU reform challenged the illiberal Turkish secularism and sanctifies the democratic commitment of the AKP as a post-Islamist party. In the context of path dependency, these two main exogenous shocks that created a critical blow to the determinacy of the Turkish path, were absent in Indonesia and thus the PKS did not have the same chance to be as electorally successful as the AKP.

A year after a major earthquake in Istanbul and Kocaeli in 1999,

an economic crisis in 2001 hit Turkey and resulted in unprecedented high unemployment amongst the urban white-collar communities.<sup>132</sup> The economic crisis was severe enough that the government before the AKP was blamed of not doing enough to alleviate the crisis. However, prominent Turkish World Bank economist Kemal Dervis – who later became part of the CHP – was called back to Turkey to become the Minister of Economy to handle the crisis. Unfortunately, Dervis did not really get the credit he deserved when the AKP took power in 2002 and the recovery delivered great economic performances and strong economic growth in the upcoming years.

The Turkish public praised the AKP for the economic recovery and performance – though it is fair to say that the AKP's minister maintained the economic growth – and overlooked Dervis' tribute in laying the foundation of the economic recovery. Moreover, in 2004, inflation fell to single digits for the first time since 1976. Average growth during the AKP's first five years in office was 7.4 percent.<sup>133</sup> Public opinion then began to side with the AKP because of its outstanding governance in the economy by successfully implementing the recovery program and its strong commitment to economic liberalization. The AKP significantly reduced the inflation rate and convinced investors of Turkey's prospect, despite the continual current account deficits due to the over-valued Turkish lira and high interest rates. Thus, the economy seems to have helped the AKP, which was rewarded by voters who perceived its economic performance favorably.<sup>134</sup>

Based on this analysis, it is clear that the economic factor played a significant role in the electoral success of the AKP. The Turkish voters are not only concerned with the rigid secularism imposed and guarded by the center elites as well as the military, but also with their welfare and the economy of the country. Clearly, the three parties that experienced a dramatic collapse in their electoral support were the parties that made up the coalition government that came into office following the April 1999 elections and failed to address the economic crisis in 2001.<sup>135</sup> The AKP benefited from this collapse in its 2002 victory and with the luck it inherited from Dervis' recovery plan, the AKP managed to turn its political victory into a claim of recovering the Turkish economy, helping to garner more votes in the 2007 election. Whereas in Indonesia this political opportunity was never available for the PKS, the party championed good governance, anti-corruption, and

social justice platform, but an economically sound platform was never on their table. Moreover, by 2004 the Indonesian economic crisis was not one of the main concerns of Indonesian voters; economic justice and income distribution were more pressing than the mere piety of politicians. Even for those two issues, the PKS did not have specific answers to offer the voters. Its significant breakthrough in the 2004 election with less than 10 percent was not indicative of the people's faith in the party's ability to run the economy.

The AKP's success in delivering economic growth is also tied up with its commitment to the EU membership. The decision of the EU Council in December 1999 to announce Turkey as a candidate country for full membership exerted a dramatic impact on the incentive structure facing the economic and political actors; it provides a powerful force for a mix of economic and democratization reforms in the process packaged in the term of "EU reform," becoming a political commodity for the AKP to sell.<sup>136</sup> The opening of EU-accession talks also made Turkey attractive to foreign investment, and overall global market trends helped as well, but the AKP government also showed unprecedented openness to privatization. With such a commitment, it was not surprising that many business communities, particularly those in Central Anatolia, strongly supported the AKP, especially when the opposition seemed to be hostile to global capital and privatization.<sup>137</sup> The opposition of the CHP to the EU accession definitely gave a great advantage to the AKP in the international stage; the party gained international legitimacy for its national mandate to govern Turkey. Dramatic and controversial reforms passed by the AKP government in July 2003 further moved Turkey into accordance with EU statutes by offering a conditional amnesty to a portion of those affiliated with the long-standing conflict over Kurdish autonomy – something which drew the Kurds to also overwhelmingly vote for the party in the 2007 election.<sup>138</sup> The AKP also took a number of steps to improve civil and political freedoms and amended the constitution under the "EU reform" claim, particularly tackling issues its electorate felt strongly about such as the headscarf controversy. The AKP also thought it would be able to address the religious rights of its core constituency by moving closer to the EU and implementing EU demands. Indeed, the EU has become the AKP's leverage to advance politically and increase its popular support.

This EU factor is absent in Indonesia; not even a different form of international incentive was available as an opportunity for the PKS to tap into. If anything, the PKS was actually looking up to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and increased its hostility towards the West by regularly staging emotional pro-Palestinian rallies in Jakarta. The PKS was at a disadvantage when it came to the exogenous shocks that could have rocked the Indonesian path and created a critical conjuncture that could revert its determinacy vis-à-vis Islamism. Neither did it have the ability to prove itself with economic policy, nor was it able to muster international support for its legitimacy. Thus, its variation from the AKP was inevitable.

**Conclusion:**  
**Deciphering Comparative Post-Islamism**

Ultimately, this article boils down to the basic relationship between post-Islamism and secularism. Secularism in both contexts is a state ideology implemented and enforced from above. It is not merely a diffused political philosophy that circulates in society. Both are inherently compatible; secularism caused the emergence of post-Islamism, while democracy or the failure of Islamism helps secularism in pulling the trigger. This article contextualize post-Islamism vis-à-vis the differing roles of Islam in the public spaces of the two Muslim-majority countries that have deep historical roots. These historical roots have produced different institutions, such as militaries, that are integral to the different outcomes of post-Islamism. The Turkish military came as a by-product of a strong empire state with deep Islamic features that transformed into a secularist modernizer, while the Indonesian military emerged as the corollary of anti-colonial insurgency-based state. From a historical institutionalist view, the article posits that different types of secularism dictate different circumstances in which Islam can flourish. Islam then assumes different roles in Turkish politics and social norms and in Indonesian institutions and imaginations. The Turkish experience left space for the emergence of an Islamist counter-elite while the Indonesian experience produced a different dynamic in which a somewhat weakened Islam became part of the new national identity and embedded itself in strong civil society institutions, something that had been unable to grow in Turkey until the 1970s and 80s. Therefore, post-Islamism is not a rigid by-product of

secularism in Muslim-majority countries. Rather, it is a fluid entity that can adapt flexibly in any Muslim-majority democracy and can manifest itself in various forms with varying degrees of performance in politics.

Furthermore, the discourse on post-Islamism is fairly nascent. Much of the scholarly attention has been focused on the ever-increasing salience of Islamism – the so-called notorious specter in the Western imagination. Although scholars such as Olivier Roy, Asef Bayat and Greg Fealy – to name a few – have been addressing the salience of the post-Islamism phenomenon, there is a lack of scholarship in explaining the comparative trend of post-Islamism. With the recent zest of welcoming the Arab revolutions come the great news of the Muslim Brotherhood and its counterparts in various Middle Eastern countries embracing a pluralistic democracy and their enthusiasms to follow in the footsteps of the Turkish AKP. Who knew the Muslim Brotherhood and its counterparts in Tunisia, such as Al Nahda, would finally have the chance to prove themselves as the much-anticipated democratic forces in Egypt's and Tunisia's upcoming democracy?

If this article were to be rewritten, it would probably wait until after Egypt's and Tunisia's elections occur and see whether Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood or Tunisia's Al-Nahda would qualify for an additional case comparison in this article. If indeed these Islamist actors are now turning their face towards the post-Islamist trend in Turkish politics and display a strong commitment to embark on a post-Islamist path, then there is a possibility that the scholarship on post-Islamism in democratic countries will grow significantly. The scholarship on Islamism will, hopefully, shift to that of post-Islamism, analyzing and constructing theories that address the most salient topic in the Muslim world: the question of the role of Islam in changing politics, rooted in different histories and unique circumstances. The article, thus, aims to humbly contribute to the nascent scholarship of post-Islamism.

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  80. Ibid.
  81. Eunsook Jung, “Taking Care of the Faithful: Muslim Organizations and Partisan Engagement”, PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 2009: Chapter 8.
  82. The research survey was done to mainly investigate the “switch in” and “switch out” among PKS voters in 12 provinces. There were 738 respondents interviewed using the face-to-face method, using multistage random sampling, with margin of error 4% and 95% confidence interval.
  83. Interview with one of the PKS cadres, Jakarta, August 2010.
  84. Interview with Nabil al-Mutawwa, Jakarta, August 2010.
  85. Interview with Sunny Tanuwidijaja, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, August 2010.

86. Information gathered from Dirk Tomsa (La Trobe University, Australia) through email correspondence.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Interview with Idris Thaha, Jakarta, August 2010.
91. Eunsook Jung, "The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization in Indonesia," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Philadelphia, March 25-29, 2010.
92. Ibid.
93. Bubalo et. al, "Zealous Democrats," p. 48.
94. Jung, "The Political Behavior," p. 8.
95. It is also undeniable that there are Turks who are Islamists, but their support is very insignificant (mostly politically represented by the *Saadet* Party – the spinoff of the *Refah* Party which disagrees with the AKP). The Islamists in this chapter are therefore put within the same category of "the pious" which represents the majority of the Turks who disagree with the current type of secularism in Turkey.
96. M. Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, Cambridge Middle East Studies, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 144.
97. Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, p. 146.
98. Ibid.
99. Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, p. 149.
100. Illiberal is used to describe the intolerance of Turkish secularism towards religion, in contrast to the liberal one such as in the United States.
101. Nilüfer Göle, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites," *Middle East Journal* 51, no. 1 (1997), p. 48.
102. Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus* 102, no. 1 (1973): 169-90.
103. Ibid.
104. Göle, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey," p. 50.
105. Ali Çarkoğlu, "A New Electoral Victory for the 'Pro-Islamists' or the 'New Centre-Right'? The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey," *South European Society & Politics* 12, no. 4 (2007), p. 503.
106. Ibid, p. 504.
107. Michael Thumann, "A Very Secular Affair: The Power Struggle of Turkey's Elites," Washington, DC Transatlantic Academy, 2010.
108. Göle, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey," p. 57.
109. Thumann, "A Very Secular Affair."
110. The state bureaucracy, the military and the jurisdiction were supposed to be the opposition to the prime minister's cabinet.
111. Thumann, "A Very Secular Affair."
112. Zeyno Baran, "Turkey Divided," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 1 (2008), p. 63.
113. Çarkoğlu, "A New Electoral Victory," p. 511.
114. Ibid, p. 515.
115. Abdurrahman Wahid, "Indonesia's Mild Secularism," *SAIS Review* 21, no. 2 (2001), p. 26.
116. Ibid, p. 28.
117. Greg Barton, "Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam," *Politics & Policy* 38, no. 3 (2010), p. 480.
118. The remaining principles are "just and civilized humanity," "the unity of Indonesia," "consultative democracy," and "social justice for the entirety of Indonesian society" and seen to assuage the concerns of both religious and secular nationalists in a common language.

119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. The decentralization has made many local politicians appeal to more Islamist aspirations to become elected. These aspirations exist within Indonesian provinces that have more Islamist strongholds, such as those in Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi islands.
122. Please refer back to the table in chapter 1 in which there is even a type of Islamic party because of this phenomenon.
123. Interview with Thaha, who teaches in one of the IAINs and whose research has largely been on the rise of the PKS.
124. Ibid, p. 486.
125. The Indonesian President's secular-nationalist party "Democratic Party" is namely the one that most Indonesian public associate with this category.
126. The decree can be found (Indonesian) in LibforAll Foundation, *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional Di Indonesia*, Edited by Abdurrahman Wahid. Jakarta: LibforAll Foundation, 2009, p. 239.
127. Karakebir Akkoyunlu, *Military Reform and Democratisation : Turkish and Indonesian Experiences at the Turn of the Millennium*, New York: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007.
128. Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak. "Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey," edited by Jenny Sanders. Ankara: TESEV, 2007, p. 83.
129. Menderes Cinar, "The Militarization of Secular Opposition in Turkey," *Insight Turkey* 12, no. 2 (2010), p. 112.
130. Ibid.
131. Baran, "Turkey Divided," p. 66.
132. Çarkoğlu, "A New Electoral Victory," p. 505.
133. Baran, "Turkey Divided," p. 65.
134. Ibid, p. 516.
135. Önis, "The Political Economy of Islam," p. 3.
136. Önis, "The Political Economy of Islam," p. 14.
137. Baran, "Turkey Divided," p. 66.
138. R. Quinn Meacham, "From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (2004), p. 354.

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المتفقيين والباحثين التي تتعلق بمنهج المجلة. والمقالات المنشورة على صفحات هذه المجلة لا تعبر عن هيئة التحرير أو أي جمعية التي تتعلق بها. لكنها مرتبطة ومنسوبة إلى آراء الكاتبين. والمقالات المحتوية في هذه المجلة قد استعرضتها هيئة التحرير. وهذه المجلة قد أقرها وزارة التعليم القومي أنها مجلة علمية (SK Dirjen Dikti No. 23a/DIKTI/Kep/2004).



ستوديا اسلاميا

# سثوديا اسراميا

مجة إنءونسية للءراساء الإسلامية

السنة الثامنة عشر، العءء ٣، ٢٠١١



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ءقالء «ءرب» ءوباء: رمز العلاءة السلمية  
بين الجماعات المءلفة عرقيا وءينيا  
في ءزيرة لومبوك

سوبراءءو

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اللونءرا (النصوء) المءءمة لءاربخ واءو Wajo:  
نظرة ءءءة في أول ءءول الاسلام إلى واءو  
ءسنول فهمة إلباس

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