


STUDIA ISLAMIKA

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HOMOGENIZING INDONESIAN ISLAM:
PERSECUTION OF THE SHIA GROUP IN YOGYAKARTA

Al Makin

RAFET BEY: THE LAST OTTOMAN CONSUL IN BATAVIA
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR 1911-1924

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ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
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Frial Ramadhan Supratman

Rafet Bey: The Last Ottoman Consul in Batavia during the First World War 1911-1924

Abstract: *This paper will investigate a brief intellectual history of Rafet Bey, an Ottoman statesman who was appointed as consul-general in Batavia in the early twentieth century. In this paper, intellectual and global history will be the main approach to analyze relations between the Ottomans and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) in the early twentieth century, especially during the First World War. The appointment of Rafet Bey as Ottoman consul in Batavia coincided with a moment of strength for the Dutch East Indies, after conquering Aceh and other Indonesian regions. On the other hand, the emergence of the Armenian question also caused some difficulties in Ottoman foreign policy at the time. In short, a brief intellectual biography of Rafet Bey is important because it allows deeper analysis on Ottoman- Indonesia relations in the early twentieth century.*

Keywords: Rafet Bey, Ottoman Consul, Batavia, First World War.

Abstrak: Artikel ini akan melacak sejarah singkat intelektual Rafet Bey, seorang negarawan Usmani yang diangkat sebagai Konsul Jenderal di Batavia pada awal abad ke-20. Dalam artikel ini, sejarah intelektual dan global akan menjadi pendekatan penting untuk menganalisa hubungan historis antara Usmani dan Hindia Belanda (Indonesia) pada awal abad ke-20, khususnya selama Perang Dunia Pertama. Pengangkatan Rafet Bey sebagai konsul Usmani di Batavia bertepatan dengan semakin kuatnya posisi Hindia Belanda, khususnya setelah menaklukkan Aceh dan wilayah Indonesia lainnya. Di lain pihak, kemunculan masalah Armenia juga menyebabkan kesulitan bagi kebijakan luar negeri Usmani saat itu. Singkatnya, biografi intelektual Rafet Bey menjadi penting karena ini akan memberikan analisa lebih dalam mengenai hubungan Usmani-Indonesia di awal abad ke-20.

Kata kunci: Rafet Bey, Konsul Usmani, Batavia, Perang Dunia Pertama.

ملخص: يبحث هذا المقال في تاريخ فكري موجز لرأفت بك، رجل الدولة العثمانية التي تم تعيينه قنصلا عاما في باتافيا في أوائل القرن العشرين، وسيكون التاريخ الفكري والعالمي فيه مدخلا هاما في تحليل العلاقات التاريخية بين الدولة العثمانية وجزر الهند الشرقية الهولندية (إندونيسيا)، وخصوصا خلال الحرب العالمية الأولى. وقد تزامن تعيين رأفت بك كقنصل عثمانى في باتافيا مع تزايد قوة جزر الهند الشرقية الهولندية، وخاصة بعد غزو أتشيه والمناطق الإندونيسية الأخرى. ومن ناحية أخرى، فقد أحدثت مشكلة الأرمنية صعوبات للسياسة الخارجية العثمانية حينذاك. وباختصار، فإن السيرة الفكرية لرأفت بك أصبحت هامة لأنها سوف تقدم تحليلا أكثر عمقا حول العلاقات العثمانية - الإندونيسية في أوائل القرن العشرين.

الكلمات المفتاحية: رأفت بك، القنصل العثماني، باتافيا، الحرب العالمية الأولى.

Rafet Bey (known also as Refet-Bey) was the last Ottoman Consul-General in Batavia in the early twentieth century. Since the middle of nineteenth century, the Ottoman state had opened consulates in Southeast Asia. In the first instance, the Ottoman government appointed Syed Abdullah al-Junayd, a local Arab trader of Hadhramaut origin, as Ottoman consul in Singapore in 1864 (Göksoy 2004, 94). From then on, the Ottomans intended to open another consulate in Batavia. However, Ottoman efforts to open a consulate in Batavia were always unsuccessful because the Dutch considered the consulate to be a symbol of the unity of Muslims. It could therefore be a catalyst in reviving the Muslim spirit to fight against Dutch colonial power. On 17 February 1882, the Ottoman government finally appointed Syed Aziz Efendi of Baghdad as an honorary consul in Batavia. In the following year, on 21 April 1883, Galip Bey from the division of the translation bureau of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was appointed as the first official consul-general in Batavia (Göksoy 2004, 96–97). The appointment of an Ottoman consul in Batavia played an important role in bridging the relationship between Ottoman and indigenous peoples, especially Muslims, in the Dutch East Indies, coinciding with the Pan-Islam policy of Sultan Abdulhamid II. The consuls, consequently, were watched with suspicion by the colonial authorities who initially wanted to recognize them only as “commercial agents” (*handelsagenten*) without diplomatic status (Schmidt 1992, 86).

Although Ottoman consuls in Batavia were seen by the Dutch as commercial agents, Ottoman consuls in Southeast Asia had the main function of protecting Muslims from colonial exploitation. According to the consuls, colonialism had created poverty. It was for this reason that the Ottomans gave donations to decrease destitution in so-called Far Eastern states.¹ Ottoman consuls were not merely as commercial agents, but rather they acted as agents bringing modernization from Istanbul to Batavia. According to the Ottoman archives, Ottoman consuls acted as a bridge between the Ottomans and Southeast Asia. Poverty and colonialism became important issues which were brought to the Sublime Porte, stimulating subsequent policies in several fields, such as education.

Since the establishment of the Ottoman consul in Batavia, Ottoman-Dutch East Indies relations became stronger. Indigenous Muslims and Arab communities benefitted from this effort because they hoped the

Ottomans would bring a positive influence on the Dutch East Indies. The opening of the Ottoman consulate could not be separated from the Dutch invasion of Aceh in the mid-nineteenth century.² The Dutch and British had changed the political arena on Sumatra and in the Malacca strait in the nineteenth century. Accordingly, the Dutch relinquished a pivotal city on the Malay Peninsula, namely Malacca, to Britain. In return, Britain surrendered its claims on Aceh to the Dutch. This political change had led to the Dutch invasion of Aceh and made Aceh into a global question. By that time, the opening of an Ottoman consulate (*Syahbandarhane*) in the region would also mean that the government would have the opportunity to have more information on Aceh and follow the developments there very closely (Göksoy 2015, 192–93).

Thanks to the opening of the Ottoman consulate, indigenous and Arab communities did indeed enjoy some benefit. Syed Abdullah al-Junayd (Göksoy 2004, 94), Ottoman consul to Singapore, was a descendant of the Hadrami people who lived in Singapore. In Singapore, Ottoman got easily access to establish consul-general because the British government gave more freedom to the Ottomans in Southeast Asia than the Dutch East Indies did under the Dutch government.³ Many migrants, especially from Hadhramaut region came to Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century, and they began to settle in Southeast Asian cities such as Singapore, Batavia and Surabaya to seek opportunities, commonly as traders.⁴ In the author's opinion, a Hadhrami was picked out as the first Ottoman consul because Hadhramis were considered to be appropriate agents for reinforcing Islamic solidarity among the indigenous population. The choice may also have been related to Berkes' argument that in the Hamidian era of the Ottoman state, those promoting Arab (i.e. Muslim) civilization gained more ground in removing European civilizational colour and influences. However, it must be said that this support had occurred prior to the Hamidian era and continued under Abdulhamid II period (Berkes 1998, 262).

After opening the Ottoman consulate in Batavia, several consuls, such as Kamil Bey, began to launch important programs to give scholarships for children of indigenous Muslims and Hadhramis families. Kamil Bey expected that Istanbul could supervise the education movement for Arabs and other Muslims in the Dutch East Indies. In 1898, initiated by Kamil Bey's program, students from Batavia came to Istanbul.⁵ The Ottoman state paid all the expenses for those students, sending them to

Ottoman schools in Istanbul. In short, Kamil Bey, as Ottoman consul, had opened a new era in the cultural and intellectual relationship between the Ottoman state and the Dutch East Indies, although he was viewed suspiciously by the Dutch colonial administrators as he had been spreading Pan-Islamism in the Dutch East Indies.

Nevertheless, the Ottoman state always supported its consul in Batavia because it had to protect Ottoman interests in the international arena. Consuls were representatives of the Ottoman government abroad. They therefore had to be loyal to the central government in Istanbul. Accordingly, the Ottoman consul had to carefully navigate the circumstances. Sometimes, the Dutch warned the Ottoman State regarding the position of Ottoman consuls in Batavia who created uncomfortable conditions for the Dutch colonial government. Several consuls were dismissed or refused by the colonial government because they sowed suspicion, fear and dislike. According to Schmidt, Kamil Bey was dismissed because he had spread suspicion of the Dutch, especially C. Snouck Hurgronje (Göksoy 2004, 103; Schmidt 1992, 88).

This research will investigate the role of the Ottoman consul in the early twentieth century, as many studies concerning the Ottoman state in the early twentieth century have been devoted to the relationship between the Ottoman state and Europe. Undoubtedly, relations between the Ottoman state and Europe were very important. The First World War became a favorite topics of historians to view the Ottoman state in the early twentieth century (Aksakal 2008; Çiçek 2014; Erickson 2001; Köroğlu 2007; Rogan 2015). Historians excessively underscore the role of military and political intrigue in the capital city, Istanbul. On the other hand, Indonesian historiography in the early twentieth century has very much focused on the emergence of a modern elite and the birth of the nationalist movement (Adam 1995; Anderson 2006; Formichi 2012; Laffan 2003; Nagazumi 1989; Niel 1970; Noer 1994). Furthermore, very few historians have explored Indonesia in the First World War in a global context (Dijk 2007). However, this research will give a new and different view about relations between the Ottoman state and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) in the early twentieth century. It will investigate the role of the Ottoman consul abroad in Batavia, especially during the First World War.

In this research, firstly, this article will explore Rafet Bey's ideas, views, and vision as an Ottoman statesman, especially regarding foreign

and domestic politics. This article will examine how intellectual and ideological transformation in Istanbul influenced Ottoman statesmen in remote area such as Batavia. Rafet Bey jotted down notes providing a unique perspective regarding the Western invasion of Muslim lands and provocation to the Ottomans. Secondly, this article will investigate the role of the Ottoman consul in Batavia during the First World War and how the Ottoman consulate strategized to attract sympathy and reactions from indigenous peoples in the Dutch East Indies during the First World War. Thirdly, this article investigates the impact of the First World War in Indonesia, especially in Batavia.

In short, this research argues that intellectual and ideological movements in Istanbul also influenced Ottoman statesmen abroad. Rafet Bey, as Ottoman Consul in Batavia, had a similar outlook and view to the statesmen and intellectuals living in Istanbul. Thus, the appointment of Rafet Bey in Batavia had a significant effect as the Ottoman voice abroad. The influence of nationalism, Turanism, and Islamism was understood by Rafet Bey. However, he had to use these ideologies to defend the Ottoman state's reputation abroad. The role of Rafet Bey in Batavia was important to defend the Ottoman position and reputation in the international arena, especially during the First World War. On the other hand, Rafet Bey tried to explain to Muslims and the Dutch colonial government about the Ottoman position on several issues such as the Armenian question. To gain support from Muslims in the Dutch East Indies during the First World War, Rafet Bey had to explain to the public in the Dutch East Indies regarding conflicts and problems in Ottoman domains. The article also argues that during the First World War Batavia felt the impact of the war in several ways, like a propaganda war between foreign consulates. Foreign consulates the Ottomans, Germans, and British tried to support their cause and denigrate the image of their enemies. Therefore, the Ottomans, Germans, and British spread propaganda in Indonesian-Malay newspapers to gain local support during the First World War.

Rafet Bey's Outlook about the West and Non-Muslims

According to the archives in Istanbul, Rafet Bey was appointed by the Sublime Porte on April 4, 1911, as consul-general in Batavia (*Batavya Başşehbender*). Before going to Batavia, he was an Ottoman consul in New York. He had previously been appointed in Tiflis (in

the Russian Caucasus).⁶ He was the last Ottoman consul in Batavia, as he left for Ankara on March 16, 1924, shortly after Mustafa Kemal (known as Atatürk) and his nationalist group organized the newly-founded modern state, the Republic of Turkey.⁷ Thus, Rafet Bey was an Ottoman statesman and an early Turkish (Republican) statesman at the same time, witnessing the political transformation from the Ottoman state to the Republic of Turkey.

Rafet Bey was a product of political events in the early twentieth century. He was appointed as consul in Batavia in 1911, three years before the Ottoman state declared war on the Allies. We do not know whether or not Rafet Bey was a member of the Young Turks. However his position as Ottoman consul in Batavia cannot be separated from a policy that the Young Turks pushed. The Young Turks ideology was originally “scientific”, materialist, Social Darwinist, and vehemently antireligious; it additionally did not favor representative government. However, in a short period, members of the intelligentsia came to understand how difficult it was to achieve the changes needed to establish their ideal “scientific” administration (Hanioglu 1995, 32, 2011, 48–67).⁸ Accordingly, we can say that Young Turks members were westernized men who desired to imitate the West’s modernization.

By 1908, the Young Turks, as a political movement in Istanbul, had taken over authority, witnessing political constraint in the Ottoman regions. The Allied states, like Britain, had invaded various Ottoman regions, declaring war on the Ottoman state. Young Turks emerged as a political power to oppose cooperative minded statesmen, the Young Turks desired radical changes in the Ottoman state. One of their aspiration was to install a constitution and open parliament meeting.

Having marched and instigated protest in Istanbul 1908, the Young Turks declared a Constitution, allowing exiles to come back to Istanbul after leaving the country to avoid prosecution as they formed the opposition during the Abdulhamid II period.⁹ Thanks to the support of military power, the Young Turks could run the government and create state stability for a while. Accordingly, they sensed how important Turanism was in building a strong nation, and began to be suspicious of non-Turkish elements as undermining stability.

Although Young Turks’ members were westernized people, they criticized the West in the early twentieth century. This was largely due to what Western states did in Ottoman lands, such as provoking Arab

or Armenian leaders to raise turmoil against the Ottoman state. Rafet Bey's views cannot be separated from the intellectual circumstances at the time. He viewed Western states as rogue nations that had to be blamed for the crisis of state and civilization in the Ottoman state, saying that European states had to pay for what they did because they had caused the destruction of land and property.¹⁰ According to Rafet Bey, he even felt upset and disappointed with many Muslims who became advisors for European states. Rafet wrote:

To be sure, Europeans have experience to play in politic, involving the power of wealth and money. Many people give them information that can split Muslims, providing them all of the information concerning spiritual power, such as customs, religion and morality. On the other hand, they would like to ruin our faith and creed. Then, they use 'society' or groups who work day and night to divide and threaten Easterners. With this purpose, they hire and install people as advisors, informants and scoffers to crush Islam. These people speak on behalf of *sayyid* group. They are Arab who are hiding inside their own interest selling religion, people and nation with for money.¹¹

Rafet Bey viewed Western states, especially Britain, as trying to control the political system of the Ottoman state, dictating to the Ottomans how to be a civilized state, but they never applied these modernizations in their own political system. In a Malay newspaper, Rafet Bey wrote:

The British legal system (*Grondwet* in Dutch) is the oldest constitution in the world, however, in the past 45 years, Britain have only just permitted Jews to send their representatives to Parliament. Meanwhile in the Turkish constitutional periods (1875 and 1908), Christians and Jews were permitted to send their representatives to Parliament based on their quantity. So, who treats them [minority religious communities] justly?¹²

Not only did he criticize Western states, Rafet Bey also blamed Russia for always treating the Armenian people ruthlessly. He revealed that Russia never provided good education for Armenians. In the *Pantjaran Warta* newspaper, Rafet Bey wrote:

When I was in charge as Consul in Tiflis [in the Russian Caucasus] and arrested in 1903/1906-, I saw and checked closely how the Russian government tortured and treated their (Armenians) right and assets. The Russian government forbids them to study in their own language, closes their schools, plunders their school and church properties, which are being protected by *Catholic d'Etchiamiazianhaus* of Armenia. The government of Russia also compels Armenians to study in Russian schools. They therefore cannot learn their own language and love their own people.¹³

Like other Ottoman statesmen in the early twentieth century, Rafet Bey seemed to be upset about the rebellion of non-Turks, such as Arabs and Armenians against the Ottoman state. Western states and Russia had instigated local tribes in Anatolia and Arabia to rise in rebellion against Istanbul. In the early twentieth century, Britain and France had invaded Arab lands, triggering rebellions against the Ottomans. For the Ottoman state, Arab regions were important because of their roles geographically and historically, helping the Ottoman state to communicate with Muslims from various regions such as South and Southeast Asia. In the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman governor in the Hijaz played a significant role in shaping global solidarity among Muslims, acting as the mediator between Muslims and the sultan in Istanbul. The role of the Ottoman governor in the Hijaz was significant, as he could popularize the sultan's role as Caliph to Muslims.¹⁴ Laffan assesses that it was only in the Hijaz that the Jawah (Southeast Asian Muslims) directly encountered the machinery of the Ottoman government, where it was either well-maintained nor efficient (Laffan 2003, 125).

Pan-Islamic solidarity spread from the Hijaz to various Muslims communities. Muslims commonly came to the Hijaz for pilgrimage, however, they did not go directly back home after pilgrimage, but rather studied in the Hijaz (Azra 2004, 1; Tagliocozzo 2013, 94). For instance, a *shaykh* of Lampung, Sumatra, Indonesia, became an important figure among Southeast Asian Muslims (*jawi*) in the Hijaz. His activity was recorded by C. Snouck Hurgronje, the famous colonial advisor for the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). The *shaykh* was born in Indonesia and studied in a religious school (*medrese/pesantren*), embracing the Qadiri (*Kadiri*) brotherhood of Sufi tradition. After graduating from his religious school, he went to Mecca to perform pilgrimage. After that, he lived in Mecca, teaching Islamic sciences there. According to C. Snouck Hurgronje, the *shaykh* of Lampung had been influenced by the ideology of Pan-Islamism. At the time of the Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878), the *shaykh* held a meeting at his home, together with his followers, performing prayers for the Ottomans. According to the *shaykh* "If we don't oppose the Dutch, we are nothing". Therefore, he believed Indonesians must unite after the Dutch had conquered Banten, Palembang and Aceh (Hurgronje 2007, 279).

However, after conquering the lands of the Mamluk kingdom in the sixteenth century, Ottoman sultans united the institutions

of sultanate and caliphate in one person and enjoyed great privilege as Caliph (İnalçik 2003, 63). The status of Caliph depended on Ottoman control of the Hijaz, especially Mecca and Medina. The relationship between Istanbul and the Sharif of Mecca became the key to managing the Caliphate as an institution. However, British and French influence on Sharif Husayn of Mecca and the Arab tribes of the region became the main concern of Ottoman statesmen in the early twentieth century.

Having taken political power in the early twentieth century, under the Young Turks, the Committee of Union Progress (CUP) played a significant role. Centralization was the most pivotal agenda item of the CUP. Accordingly, many local leaders in more remote regions disliked this policy. Sharif Husayn as the Sharif of Mecca disliked the centralization policy that was declared by the triumvirate of Ismail Enver, Ahmed Cemal and Mehmet Talat in 1913. He tried to resist centralization because it would threaten his autonomy. As a result, Sharif Husayn opened negotiations with the British and sent his son, Sharif Abdullah, to Cairo to open discrete negotiations with British officials there (Rogan 2015, 276).

Moving forward, the relationship between the CUP government in Istanbul and Arab leaders deteriorated more and more, especially in the First World War. Rafet Bey was a product of this political background because he could be considered the representation of the Ottoman state during the CUP period. Ottoman statesmen under the CUP commonly believed that Arab leaders were not loyal to the Ottoman state because they preferred to cooperate with Britain and France. In the First World War, the Ottoman government urged many Arab leaders to fight on behalf of the Ottoman state, but many of them refused to fight. Under the supervision of Sharif Husayn, Arab leaders preferred to gain independence from the Ottoman state. Thus, many Arab leaders opened negotiation with the British because they hoped that the British could help them to become independence states. In order to gain support from Arabs, Ottoman statesmen tried to arrest instigators and political activists who agitated for Arabs to rebel against the Ottoman state. In June 1915, Cemal Pasha ordered the arrest of Arab political activists. He instructed the judges to impose the death penalty on any suspect found guilty of membership in a secret Arabist society or of conspiring with the French against the Ottoman state.¹⁵

In line with the political background of the early twentieth century, Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals gradually underwent major changes. Until the Hamidian period, Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals were still committed to Ottomanism, the ideology which bounded all Ottoman citizens in one nation regardless of their religion.¹⁶ However, in the early twentieth century, Ottoman statesmen, like Rafet Bey, realized that Ottomanism was not enough to create a strong nation because many non-Muslims showed disloyalty to the Ottoman state, although they had enjoyed special privileges in the past. Writing to the Foreign Ministry in Istanbul from Batavia in 1921, he noted:

The way of administration which we have adopted since time immemorial provides our non-Muslim subjects with all the blessings of learning while condemning the ruling people (Muslims) to darkness and ignorance and even preventing them practically and materially from establishing trade and industry associations and companies among the ruling people, supposedly because these were considered to be aimed at dethroning our Sultans. Unfortunately, the trade and industry schools of our Christian subjects are older and better when compared to trade and industry schools opened by our government.¹⁷

In this context, we have to know exactly who constituted *biz* (we) in Rafet Bey's opinion. According to the text, Rafet Bey tried to define people who were loyal to Ottoman state. He indirectly wanted to show that it was not proper to bind all citizens together in Ottomanism because there were people who, although they were Ottoman subjects, tried to betray state. Therefore, government had to form a new ideology to make the Ottoman state great again. In this context, Rafet Bey wrote that non-Muslims had demoralized the Ottoman state because they were not loyal to the sultan. Therefore, they should not be included as members of Ottoman society. In the First World War, the Ottoman state abolished the Capitulations given to European traders, which protected basically the commercial rights of non-Muslims traders in Ottoman lands. This action caused a deteriorating situation for non-Muslim Ottoman subject in Ottoman regions because of their close commercial relations with the European traders in exports and imports. Ottoman statesmen like Rafet Bey asked the Ottoman government in Istanbul to control the flow of ideology from the West through several agents, especially traders and educators like missionaries. He thought that, through economic and educational activities, the Ottoman state had been betrayed by non-Muslims appealed to Britain, France and Russia for independence.¹⁸

Rafet Bey blamed the field of education, as many European states had begun to influence society through their schools.¹⁹ Although the Ottoman state had undertaken policy to reform education starting in the middle of the nineteenth century, education had still not influenced the Ottoman subjects in remote areas such as Arabia. Therefore, missionary schools in Arab regions had influenced Arabs with ideologies like modernization and nationalism to fight against the Ottomans. In addition, according to Rafet's statement, he blamed missionary schools during the nineteenth century, because many missionary schools in Ottoman regions fostered nationalism that prompted society to seek independence from the Ottoman state (Somel 2005, 257–76). For instance, during the early years of the nineteenth century, Protestant missionaries from Great Britain and the United States also converted many Armenians, resulting in the establishment of a Protestant *millet*, which aside from undermining the patriarch authority, also stimulated linguistic and historical studies, is contributing to the new feeling of Armenian nationalism (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 126).

Ottoman statesmen, like Rafet Bey, represented the changing intellectual movement from the early twentieth century until the fall of the Ottoman state. In this case, Ottomanism as declared from the very early Tanzimat period in the mid-nineteenth century was no longer relevant to the needs of the Ottoman state. The Ottoman government in Istanbul could not trust the ideology of Ottomanism as it had in the Tanzimat period. Equality between Muslims and non-Muslims had harmed the Ottoman state in the early twentieth century because it just gave non-Muslims opportunities to instigate nationalist movements to gain independence from Istanbul. The access of Non-Muslims to trade and education had eaten away the unity of Ottomans. Therefore, Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals began to propose a new ideology to shape a new Ottoman society. In addition, the influx of Muslims migration from beyond Anatolia had caused changes in intellectual movements. Many Muslim intellectuals who migrated to Istanbul and Anatolia encouraged national consciousness among Turks. Therefore, intellectuals like Ahmet Ağaoğlu could call themselves *Rus Musliman-* and *Türk Musliman*. Some other intellectuals with nationalist tendencies such as Yusuf Akçura, Ali Bey Hüseinzade and Mehmed Emin Resülzade also moved to Istanbul (Shissler 2002, 212). At the time, there was negotiation over ideology in the Ottoman domains, but

‘Muslims; and ‘Turkish’ were important element used to forge national consciousness (Aksakal 2008, 16). It came into vogue to fuse Turanism, nationalism and Islamism in one ideology to strengthen the Ottoman state. Intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp played significant roles in the movement to promote Turanism and Islamism (Gökalp 1968, 15; Köroğlu 2007, 37). Epitomized by Ziya Gökalp’s motto, “to become Turkish, Mulism and modern”, Turanism advocated reconciliation with both Islam and secularism (Hanioglu 2008a, 187).²⁰ Accordingly, many Ottoman intellectuals and statesmen shaped this new ideology in the early twentieth century based on social and political upheavals in the Ottoman regions. The perceived disloyalty of non-Muslims and non-Turkish became the main reason for promoting nationalism, Turanism and Islamism as new ideology.

Statesmen like Rafet Bey also adopted the same view regarding nation-consciousness. He believed that non-Muslims and Arabs (as non-Turkish) were no longer loyal to the Ottoman state. Many of them had been pushed by Western states and Russia to raise turmoil. However, in the several articles written by Rafet Bey, one can see how Rafet Bey had compromised with ‘nationalism’. For example, in the aforementioned article, Rafet Bey criticized Russia for not yet giving Armenians a good education. As a consequence, many Armenians could not learn their language and ‘love their people’.²¹ In this line of argument, Rafet Bey had admitted that nationalism was an important ideology in the early twentieth century. However, he was not forgiving if some people used nationalism to raise turmoil agaisnt the state. According to Rafet Bey’s thought and view, nationalism was an ideology to strengthening the existing state, not to making a new state.

Rafet Bey in Batavia during the First World War

Rafet Bey was appointed as Ottoman consul in Batavia during a difficult time, specifically during the First World War. In the First World War, Ottoman consuls-general abroad played an important role. They were involved in supporting Ottoman state, as one of the states at war. However, they also had to face hostility against the Ottoman in the war. In Batavia, the Dutch government was suspicious of the Ottoman consul-general because the Ottoman state had declared a *jihad* in order to instigate Muslims abroad to support the Ottoman state to fight against their non-Muslim rulers in colonies across Asia and Africa.

The *jihad* declaration was announced in 1914 at Fatih Mosque, Istanbul, to support the Ottoman state morally.²² However, many orientalist such as C. Snouck Hurgronje thought that declaring *jihad* was dangerous. In fact, it was not the first time that the Ottoman state had declared *jihad*. Colonial advisors such as C. Snouck Hurgronje seemed to be suspicious of the *jihad* declaration because it could threaten their colonial domination over Muslims, especially in the Dutch East Indies. On the contrary, Aksakal argues that *jihad* could be a key component in forging an alliance with a non-Muslim European power at the same time. It could also be an ideology hostile to non-Muslims in the Ottoman fold. It could even be used to fight against Muslims as well as Christians (Aksakal 2016, 1965). Therefore, the *jihad* declaration must be placed in the context of Ottoman interests. At the time, during the First World War, the Ottoman state tried to build alliances with non-Muslim powers like Germany. Therefore, it would be a contradiction if we consider *jihad* in this context solely as a Holy War against Christians. Furthermore, C. Snouck Hurgronje as a colonial advisor as well as academic in Leiden University, criticized his companion in Germany, Carl Heinrich Becker, for instigating the Ottoman state to declare *jihad* in order to support the political interests of Germany in the First World War. The clash between C. Snouck Hurgronje and Becker was not about their actual involvement in society and politics as such, but about bad scholarship wrong decisions, dangerous policy and scholarly ethics (Buskes 2016, 47).

The crucial role of Ottoman consulates abroad during the First World War was to propagate 'jihad news' to all Muslims. This caused many non-Muslim rulers to place Ottoman consulates under strict control because they thought that *jihad* was dangerous for their rule. According to the archive, the Ottomans sent *jihad* instructions on February 6, 1915, to its representatives abroad for propagation. Sent to several regions such as Singapore, Penang and the Swahili coast [East Africa], this declaration urged Muslims to join their *jihad* "to fight against Britain and France". This message was declared and circulated by German consulate of Batavia, as well.²³ According to this archive, we know that the German consulate was involved in order to drive Muslims in the Dutch East Indies to fight against Britain and France. During the First World War, the Germans always helped Ottoman consuls to spread news about the war because the British consulate in Batavia prohibited Ottomans from using British telegraph lines to get news about the First World War.²⁴

Accordingly, during the First World War there was polarization among consulates in Batavia. The War not only happened in Europe and the Middle East, but also in Batavia between consulates. Undoubtedly, the British consulate in Batavia was suspicious of the German and Ottoman consulates because they were pro-active in declaring *jihad* in the Dutch East Indies. In this context, although the Dutch maintained a neutral position in Europe, they supported the British because they considered the Ottoman and German consulates in Batavia to be spreading anti-colonialism through the *jihad* declaration. Even non-official Arabic *jihad* declarations published in Istanbul and intended to be spread all over the Muslim world included the “Muslim of Java” (i.e. Southeast Asia), as well. However, when this appeared in Istanbul press in late December 1914, the inclusion of “Muslim of Java” in the *jihad* declaration caused the Dutch government to take prompt action against its spread in their colony. The Dutch government wanted the Ottoman government to issue an official correction to the effect that the *jihad* declaration did not include the Muslims of the Dutch East Indies, since the Netherlands was a neutral country in the First World War. Accordingly, the Ottoman government had to make this correction in June 1915, six months after the appearance of the Arabic *jihad* declaration in newspaper (Göksoy 2004, 127–28; Schmidt 1992, 136–37).

The Dutch colonial government always tried to control Ottoman consular activities because many Muslims in the Dutch East Indies showed sympathy to the Ottoman state. Rafet Bey as Ottoman consul in Batavia once received a letter from a Javanese prince of Yogyakarta named Raden Mas Adhihardjo Ningrat IV of Sri Paduka Sultan Yogya III, several months before the Ottoman’s declaration of war constituting their entrance into the First World War. The prince lived in the Blandongan neighborhood of Batavia. Through a letter, Raden Mas Adhihardjo told a Rafet Bey that he wanted to join the military school in ‘Constantinople’. This letter was written in the Indonesian language and submitted to Istanbul through the consulate.

Presented to His Majesty Sri Paduka Sultan Kaiser enthroned in the state of Turkey. With all my respect, I am Raden Mas Adhihardjo Ningrat IV from Sri Paduka Sultan Yogya III living in Blandongan neighborhood, Batavia. I present this letter to You Majesty *Sri Paduka* (the Ottoman sultan). I hoped you will allow me to study in your military school in Constantinople under your instruction...²⁵

In addition to the letter of Raden Mas Adhihardjo, Rafet Bey also received a complaint letter from Enthong Maliki who lived in Batavia, on March 25, 1916. Enthong Maliki, together with Enthong Gendut and Enthong Modin, was chief leader from Batu Ampar (Kartodirdjo 1978, 39). He asked Rafet Bey as Ottoman consul to help Muslims in Condet, because the landlord of Condet burned their houses down.²⁶ In the letter, Enthong Maliki wrote:

If you cannot help us Muslims, it would be better for us to die. It is hard for Muslims to live. Many Muslim's houses were burned down. The ones who come to burn down house were some 100 people under the direction of the landlord of East Condet. And there were people who after working under landlord were then punished by the landlord. After they were punished, the landlord also asked them to pay money. If they could not pay, the landlord would auction everything they have at home. What a pity to be Muslims in this country!. I hope you can give us help. If you cannot help, it would be better for Muslims to die. Several people who came to shoot at and burn the house were *Wedana, Mantri, Polisi, Juragan, Mandor* [various colonial officers, from district chief to police functionaries] and other people who work for the colonial government. That is the conditions that are happening in Condet village.²⁷

Those letters indicate that Rafet Bey as Ottoman consul in Batavia had a heavy duty to protect the Ottoman reputation in Batavia, because many Muslims in the Dutch East Indies had trusted Ottoman state to supervise education and modernization. Accordingly, Rafet Bey was in charge of propagating the good image of the Ottoman state during the First World War. He knew that a lot of Muslims in the Dutch East Indies would support the Ottoman position if they knew that the Ottoman state was in the right during the First World War. Rafet Bey therefore tried to spread news about the Ottoman state through newspapers in the Dutch East Indies, urging Muslims in the Indies to pray for the Ottoman sultan, calling sultan by his *Gazi*²⁸ title. In *Pantjaraan Warta* newspaper, Rafet forwarded an instruction from *Sadrazam* (title of Ottoman Prime Minister) Said Halim Pasha. Thus this message from Istanbul was translated from Ottoman Turkish into Malay.²⁹ From Istanbul Sadrazam Said Halim Pasha instructed:

As the progress and victory of army and naval power on behalf of God's will in the Dardanelle, the ministries therefore wished that Sri Paduka Sultan added his name with *Gazi*- title by means of fatwa.³⁰

This instruction was important for Ottoman position in the Dutch East Indies because it shows that Ottoman, through Rafet Bey, clearly instructed Muslims in the Dutch East Indies to support Ottoman state with calling Him in pray with *Gazi* title. The usage of *Gazi* title indicated that Ottoman state was ready to spread “Holy War” spirit against unbeliever, in particular Britain and France. Meanwhile, in *Sin Po* newspaper, Rafet Bey asked Muslims to pray for the sultan in order to support Ottoman state in the Battle of Gallipoli³¹, informing the ministry that “the news and defeat of our enemis at the Gallipoli Peninsula has provoked much pleasure and enjoyment among the Muslims here” in the Dutch East Indies. He also secured the mentioning of the *Gazi* title of the Ottoman Caliph in the Friday sermons in the mosques in the region. For that, he wrote to the Foreign Ministry on 11 June 1915, that “in a very lucid sermon during the Friday prayer yesterday at the Great Mosque of Batavia, the preacher mentioned the name of our exalted Caliph with the title of *Gazi*”, besides making intercessory prayers for the victory of Muslim soldiers and the prolongation of the healthy life of Caliph.³² Accordingly, though he did not join the war directly in the Ottoman territories, Rafet Bey, as Ottoman consul in Batavia, played an important role to support the Ottoman state from Southeast Asia. He was in charge of propagating news about Ottoman participation in the First World War. In concrete term, this task put him in charge of publishing good news regarding the Ottoman position in the First World War. At the time, rumor and propaganda had become important tools to provoke popular sentiment. In line with this, Rafet published the following telegram from Istanbul in Malay newspaper.

Enemies (Britain and France) tried to land and conquer Kumkale, but all of them have been driven back to the sea. Meanwhile, there are no enemies (Britain and France) on Asia side. Enemies who landed in Gaba Tepeh tried to conquer the place with the assistance of their war ships, however, they were ousted to other places. People still in boats (*praoe atawa sekotji*) surrounding the war ship were drowned. Britain’s war ships, the *Majestic* and *Triumph*, were broken and retreated from the field of battle. Readers must know that those ships have sunk in the Dardanelles.³³

In short, although Batavia was far away from the battle fields, the city became the center of a propaganda war in the Dutch East Indies between the British, German, and Ottoman consulates. Although the Dutch declared themselves a neutral state during the First World War, they sided with Britain to counter Ottoman and German propaganda.

One of the reasons prompting them to engage in counter-propaganda was that majority of the Dutch East Indies' population was Muslim. In addition, there was an Arab community living in the Dutch East Indies who could jeopardize the Dutch position by provoking Muslims to raise turmoil against the colonial government. This argument can be corroborated in van Dijk's argument that "the Arab community in Southeast Asia was a highly international one, interknit by many business and family links between Arab who had settled in the region" (Dijk 2007, 307).

Undoubtedly, the Hadhrami-Arab community had vigorous relations with the Ottoman state (Berg 2010, 181; Wells 2015, 89–115). In the early twentieth century, they had strong interest and tie with newly-established the first modern Islamic organization named Sarekat Dagang Islam.³⁴ Encouraged by Tirtoadisuryo (a graduate of government school, OSVIA)³⁵, a *batik* trader named Haji Samanhudi founded Sarekat Dagang Islam in 1911 as a Javanese *batik* traders' cooperative (Kuntowijoyo 1994, 23; Ricklefs 2001, 210). In the First World War, Sarekat Islam (successor of Sarekat Dagang Islam), launched propaganda to support the Ottoman state. With its newspaper named *Oetoesan Hindia*, it frequently published news concerning the Ottoman state. Cokroaminoto was appointed as editor of *Oetoesan Hindia*. This newspaper spread negative news about Britain, as it had colonized many Muslim states. Even *Oetoesan Hindia* clearly revealed its hope for the First World War.

Although Turkey took a neutral position, the Ottoman government and Caliphate called for a defeat of the alliance between Britain and Russia because, if they were victorious, they would get vast authority over Asia and Europe. In this matter, people are sure that Russia will not wait much longer to invade Constantinople and declare a separate Armenian state; Egypt will be made into an Arab Kingdom by Britain (of course, under British protection). And the Caliph will be moved to Mecca, and France will stay forever in Syria, and that country will become a second Tunisia.³⁶

In addition to *Oetoesan Hindia*, the newspaper *Pantjaran Warta* was an important media outlet for Sarekat Islam. This newspaper was bought by Sarekat Islam from Seng Hoat on June 21, 1913. Under the leadership of Goenawan, this newspaper eventually became the mouthpiece of Sarekat Islam. Like Mas Marco Kartodikromo and Sosro Koornio of *Sarotomo* newspaper, and Djojosoediro of *Tjabaja Timoer*, Goenawan was among the most radical editor at the time (Adam 1995, 289). In the rebellion at Muara Tembesi in Jambi, Sumatra, Goenawan

was called a representative of the Turkish Caliph.³⁷ We will see that *Pantjaran Warta* newspaper would help Rafet Bey to share his view and thoughts concerning the Ottoman state in the First World War and on the Armenian question.³⁸ In publishing news concerning the First World War, *Pantjaran Warta* always supported the Ottoman state. It told Malay readers about the Ottoman army in the battlefield. The newspaper wrote: “As we wrote in the past few weeks concerning the kind of treatment Turkish Muslim’s to their enemy, we therefore wish Mr. Law (the British Finance Minister) not to worry, as they (Turkish Muslims) must face their enemies, and they always treat their enemies very well.”³⁹

In the *Pantjaran Warta* edition published on the major Islamic holy day celebrating the end of the fasting month (*bayram* in Turkish, *lebaran* in Indonesian), the newspaper clearly supported the Ottoman state in the First World War. Goenawan, as the editor of *Pantjaran Warta*, wrote that Muslims in the Dutch East Indies always loved Turkey (i.e. Ottoman state). He wrote: “We all as a Muslims love Turkey from our mouth until our heart and bone. It will be useless if Britain published news to try and make us to hate the Ottoman state. Our readers, believe!”⁴⁰

Thanks to his wide connection in the Dutch East Indies, Rafet Bey could collect support and donations from Muslims across the Dutch East Indies. In this effort, he organized the Hilal-i Ahmed Cemiyeti (Red Crescent Society), an Ottoman charity organization established in 1912 during the Balkan wars to help the widows and orphans of the Ottoman soldiers, to collect donations from Muslims. On March 16, 1916, the Batavia branch of Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti managed to collect money in the amount of 2.120 Netherlands Indies guilders. This money was sent back to the center of the Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti in Istanbul.⁴¹ In this context, Rafet Bey succeeded in playing an important role diplomatically because he could manage the relationship with the Arab-Hadhrami community in Batavia. Since the opening of the Ottoman consulate in Batavia, the Arab-Hadhrami community played an important role in helping the Ottomans in Southeast Asia, working and cooperating diplomatically and economically. Thanks to good relations between Ottoman consulate and Hadhrami communities, the Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti could operate in the Dutch East Indies. The chief of Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti of the Dutch East Indies was Mr. Sayyid Hasan bin Semit, a Hadhrami.⁴²

Just as he gained support from the Hadhrami community, Rafet Bey also supported them in their social life. One can contrast this with his relationship with the Chinese community in the Dutch East Indies. Rafet criticized the economic conditions of the Dutch East Indies during the First World War. According to him, the Chinese played nefarious role by hoarding several products. Therefore, the prices of many products became too expensive.⁴³ In this context, Rafet Bey tried to support the Hadhrami community in the competition Hadhrami and Chinese merchants on Java at the time. The Hadhrami community helped Javanese to establish a modern organization named *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (the Islamic Trade Association) (Korver 1985, 13–21). Therefore, there was alliance between the Ottomans, Hadhramis and Javanese people to face competition with Chinese merchants. In its newspaper, *Neraca*, Sarekat Islam criticized capitalism of Chinese merchants, opposing Chinese merchants' activity (Kartodirdjo 1978, 151).⁴⁴ In this context, Rafet Bey criticized the Chinese because he wanted to support Hadrami and Javanese interests in the economic field.

Though Rafet Bey was far away from battlefield, he still had to work to gain the support of Muslims in the Dutch East Indies. Hanioglu has argued that the Ottoman's *jihad* declaration made to Muslims of South and Southeast Asia was not the main priority, because the most important *jihad* was not for Sunni Muslims, but rather to attract Shi'i Muslims in order to defend Islamic lands in Ottoman territory (Hanioglu 2008b, 121–22). However, the reaction of (majority Sunni) Muslims in the Dutch East Indies during the First World War was positive. They supported the Ottoman state with their money and media, in particular their newspapers. Therefore, seeding supportive news and spreading the instruction of *jihad* were the main agenda items of the Ottoman consulate in Batavia during the First World War so as to gain support from Muslim in the Dutch East Indies. This support was important to defend the Ottoman position in the war. The Ottoman and German consulates in Batavia always tried to cooperate in their activities, especially during the First World War. With their efforts in spreading propaganda far from battlefield, many Muslims in the Dutch East Indies gave sympathy to the Ottomans. In this context, the Batavia branch of Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti played very important role to collect donations from Muslims despite the Dutch restrictions on the collection of charity money during the First World War.

Rafet Bey and the Armenian Question

The roles of the Rafet Bey as consul in Batavia included not only propagating the *jihad* declaration and collecting donations from Muslims in Dutch East Indies, but also defending the Ottoman reputation in the international arena. In the early twentieth century, the Ottoman state had to face against harsh and poorly-informed opinions from Europeans over the Armenian question. Undoubtedly, Rafet Bey also had to face this problem in Batavia.

From the nineteenth until early twentieth century, the Ottoman state underwent several upheavals from the Balkans to Anatolia. Nationalism from Europe had spread to Ottoman regions, causing unstable conditions in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. The Balkans, which were majority Christian, deeply impacted by the ideology of nationalism (Jelavich 1995, 121). Supported by the Ottomans' archenemies, such as Russia and Britain in the late nineteenth century, many Christians rejected Ottoman authority. Several regions such as Greece, Serbia, Crete, Egypt, Bulgaria and some Arab regions gradually displayed hostility to the Ottoman government in their provinces. They refused to be subject to centralized control because they thought that the centralization process would weaken their authority among the people. On the other hand, Europe and Russia also played a significant role in destabilizing European regions. For instance, Britain tried to maintain conflict between Ottoman state and Russia because it was worried that Russia would expand its military ambitions, which could threaten the British position in the Middle East. Russia also tried to expand her ambitions to protect Orthodox Christianity in regions under Ottoman control. Therefore, Russia and Britain became important players in the Ottoman regions. In addition, the Ottoman state gradually lost its power because it suffered decreasing economic power on foreign debt which consequently caused heavy burdens upon the central budget.

In this context, the Armenian question firstly emerged as a political and social problem. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 prompting the independence of Bulgaria and Serbia had stimulated the Armenians to seek independence from the Ottoman state. A Russian invasion of three Ottoman provinces in Eastern Anatolia also triggered nationalist Armenians to support Russia in order to gain their own political goals. They hoped Russia and the Europeans could help them to gain independence. From then on, Armenian revolutionary societies sprang

up within the sultan's dominions, particularly at Istanbul, Trabzon, Erzurum and Van region (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 202). They started to attack Ottoman tax collectors, postmen, and judges, massacring entire villages, and forcing Armenian peasants and merchants to hide them and feed them, on pain of death (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 203). However, Abdulhamid II as Ottoman sultan successfully repressed any Armenian revolution. In light of this, many Westerners condemned Abdulhamid II over the Armenian question. After revolutionary activity, many Armenian political activists had been arrested. Even in the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman state had to face counter-attacks from Armenian revolutionaries (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 205).

Within this atmosphere, relations between Ottoman state and Armenians were getting worse. Armenian nationalists had been considered insurgents because they had disturbed the security of Ottoman regions. In the First World War, relations between the Ottoman state and Armenia were even more severe. After the declaration of war, the Ottoman state had to face off against Russia, Britain and France who all supported Armenian claims. Especially as regards Russia, many of its forces fostered Armenian revolutionary groups in Eastern Anatolia during the war against the Ottoman army. In addition, the Ottoman state had to manage the local population to convince them to help the Ottoman side in the First World War. The CUP under its triumvirate of Cemal, Enver and Talat Pasha forced the local population to join Ottoman state at war. The Ottoman state had to face the question of loyalty from the local Armenian population. In this contexts, Armenia was always accused of disloyalty because they had collaborated with Russia to undermined Ottoman authority, especially after Armenian insurrection at Van in 1915. Accordingly, the Ottoman state felt that Armenians threat for state security in wartime, and they had to be relocated to more suitable areas within Ottoman borders. In late spring 1915, the Ottoman turned to a Western-style policy of regional population relocation designed to separate insurgents from their base of popular support (Erickson 2013, 221).

The Armenian question became a global phenomenon in the First World War that allowed enemies to attack the Ottoman state abroad. As mentioned above, the Dutch tried to tarnish the Ottomans' image in the Dutch East Indies, especially through newspaper propaganda. In 1917 the *Bataviasch Nieuwsblaad* published a news about Enver

Pasha, calling him as ‘The Great Murderer of Armenians’. Accordingly, Malay newspaper tried to respond this news, calling the Commander-in-Chief in Europe, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig did the same work. Then, the Malay newspaper called Enver Pasha as a ‘Turkish hero’ to Muslims in the Dutch East Indies (Dijk 2007, 310). Concerning this accusation against Enver Pasha, *Pantjaran Warta* newspaper defended Enver like this:

If *Batavia Nieuwsblad* calls Enver the murderer of Armenia when he was in charge as commander-in-chief, the *Batavia Nieuwsblad* also must call the British commander-in-chief on the Western frontier, General (Field Marshal Sir Douglas) Haig, a murderer because he did his job just as Enver did. It is common for European Christians to insult other faiths, accusing other people of being fanatics etc. However, they [Europeans] always view their actions as good thing, even though it the furthest thing from the dignity. That is the world. There is no rogue and no kind. It depends on who is speaking.⁴⁵

Debates concerning the Armenian question in Malay newspapers continued. On July 20, 1917, defending the Ottoman state on Armenian question, *Pantjaran Warta* published an English article translated in Malay regarding the Armenian question. *Pantjaran Warta* published information from Mr. Dikran Kouyoumdjian, an Armenian. This information was copied from *African Times* and *Orient Review*. According to the newspaper, Armenia was not they enemy of Turkish because the Turkish Kingdom (the Ottoman state) had given good positions to Armenians.⁴⁶ The newspaper continued that the Armenian question emerged in Turkey because the West had such political heft. The newspaper opined:

Now we want to ask for our part a big question for our Armenian friends, to tell us the reason why their powerful protectors, England, America, etc. have not granted Armenians independence in the occupied territories of the Caucasus, while those powers hasten to recognize the independence of the treacherous Sharif Husayn of Mecca as King of Arabia, who did not the Entente powers...as much as Armenians did? According to our conviction as long as Russia exists, especially with its present power, it is absolutely impossible that the Armenians will get any form of independence, for the reason that there are some Armenian populations living in the Russian Caucasus, Tiflis and Baku districts.⁴⁷

Regarding the Armenian question in Batavia, Rafet Bey, as Ottoman consul, tried to clarify for local audiences. Rafet Bey rejected negative

analyses about the Armenian question. He claimed that there was no massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman state.⁴⁸ He wrote:

Since the emergence of the Ottoman state seven centuries ago, until now, the Turkish government has never disturbed the freedom of Christian and Jews in religious matters, customs or behavior. Although almost all Turkish crafts and traders are in Christian hands (Armenian and Greek), the Turkish people (Muslims) have protected the status, belongings and souls of Christian. Until the year 1910, Turkish Christians were exempted from heavy and dangerous military duty, gaining high rank in military offices in Turkey such as Sava Pasha, Cora Heodory Pasha, Mavro Jani Pasha and Naoum Pasha (Armenians in particular). Others have gained important positions in the Foreign Ministry, Finance Ministry, Justice Ministry, etc. In 1879, the Turkish *gezant* in London was Moussouros Pasha (a Christian Greek), in 1893, it was Rustem Pasha (a Syrian Catholic), and in 1906 Moussouros Pasha's son has been appointed to substitute for Rustem Pasha. This has not only happened in London, but also in other places Turkey has appointed Christians as person in charge.⁴⁹

Rafet Bey gave a high honor to Christian subjects of the state, even mentioning those Christian Armenian who hold or had held very high positions in the Ottoman government, like ministers and ambassadors. Rafet Bey inquired about a British telegraph that had slandered Turkey. He also said that Armenians had ben instigated by "our enemy". Therefore, Armenians "had been bribed by Russia, Britain in order to expel the Ottomans from Egypt". Britain and Russia also instigated the Armenians to revolt against the Ottomans.⁵⁰ According to his explanation above, Rafet Bey's opinion reflected the same opinion about the West and non-Muslim (like Armenians). Rafet Bey blamed the West over the Armenian question. Rafet's opinion can be seen as reflection of Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals during the early twentieth century. They wanted to bond Ottoman society using two element: Islamism and Turanism.

Having explained about the Armenian question in Malay newspaper, Rafet Bey received a threat from "Incognito", an anonymous writer. In the letter, the unknown author wrote:

If you don't stop writing those bloody of yours in the local papers about Armenians, I will put a bullet through your damned head. I don't care even it costs me my life. The whole world knows what a bloody bastards you Turks are, so you need not advertise yourselves innocent lambs. The time will come when the Armenians will be revenged, and woe to your heathen and fanatic nation, because they will be blown into the air by the anger

of all the brave Armenians, now I as a gentleman (not a bloody coward like you) warn you, that if I see again such rubbish articles of yours in the paper concerning Armenians, you must be sure that it will cost you your life. So be AWARE stop your swinish lies, and don't you write any more trash in the papers.⁵¹

In the end of letter, "Incognito" just put signature with the symbol of gun. The symbol in this letter epitomized the threat for Rafet Bey. Receiving this the threatening letter, Rafet Bey was not afraid. In the next issue, Rafet Bey reported and published this letter in *Pantjaran Warta*, the Malay language newspaper. He also answered this the threatening letter in *Pantjaran Warta*, writing:

Concerning the threatening letter, Turkish man can never be subdued by such an arrogant attitude. Moreover, he continues to execute the honorable duty for his people and motherland which is higher and holier than his own self. I forward the information mentioned above, The Koran, religion and our faith never permit to murder an ant forever, if it does not put us at risk. How could a person who has been taught this faith murder a human being, who has the highest and honorable position of all of God's creatures?⁵²

In *Pantjaran Warta* newspaper, Rafet Bey continued to defend the Armenians in Turkey, explaining that Turkish treated Armenians and other non-Muslims very well.

In Turkey, Armenian and other non-Muslim are granted to have education and courses in their own style. The entire school system is regulated and owned by their own society. The schools provide enough courses to be admitted at the university level. This university is only regulated by the government by providing several departments in the university, such as medicine, law, etc. Furthermore, the Turkish government has granted permission to Greeks to own the Trade School as a branch of university...⁵³

Having explained regarding Armenian and non-Muslim questions in the *Pantjaran Warta* newspaper, the editor of the newspaper expressed his gratitude for the information and explanation received from Rafet Bey.

The information of the aforementioned article has intentionally been published in *Pantjaran Warta* gladly, because this article has given this information for Muslims who live under Dutch authority as neutral government [in the First World War]. The Dutch newspapers, especially *Het Nieuwsvanden Dag*, has published news and claimed that Turkish have murdered Armenians living in Turkey ruthlessly. Everyone who has the blood of Islam, of course, feels curious when they hear the news,

because Islam forbids its believers to such murder. (Muslims would not be curious) of one or two people died, but it is thousands of people who died. Who would not be curious? According to the Turkish consul, there are Armenians who have been sentenced to death because they raised turmoil, just as Indians who raised turmoil in Singapore in the past few days. Regarding the article written by His Excellency the Turkish Consul (Rafet Bey) which has been published above, it has relieved our curious attitude. As for Muslims, they will be more convinced that Islam is the most beautiful religion. *Amin amin ja Robboelalamin*.⁵⁴

As mentioned above, concerning the Armenian question, Indonesians and Muslims who lived in Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) always trusted to information provided by the Ottoman consul, Rafet Bey. The Islamist newspaper, like *Pantjaran Warta* and *Oetoesan Hindia* played an important role in the First World War. Those newspapers had the tendency to defend the Ottoman state during this difficult time.

In short, events in Anatolia such as the Armenian question had emerged as global phenomena to tarnish the Ottoman reputation in the international arena. Therefore, Ottoman consuls such as Rafet Bey had the heavy duty to defend the Ottoman reputation abroad. Ottoman enemies such as Britain and France always propagated negative news about the Ottoman state in the First World War. The relocation of Armenian citizens (known also as *tahcir*) within the state boundaries became a propaganda tool of European powers to tarnish the Ottoman reputation. However, Rafet Bey could counter negative news about the Ottoman state in Batavia.

After the First World War, the Ottoman state had to face several disadvantageous agreements imposed upon Turkey. The country lost many regions, especially Arab regions, to Britain and France (Rogan 2015, 380). The Bosphorus Strait and Istanbul were occupied by the Allies. At the same time, the Ottoman sultan did not try to fight against them, but hoped to find a peaceful solution through negotiations. At this juncture, the nationalist group (known also as *Kuvayı-Milliyé*) led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) opposed the sultan and his allies in Anatolia. They were not willing to surrender the Ottoman fate to the Allies. The nationalist group eventually began to lead a counter-attack in occupied regions such as Izmir in 1919 (Hanioglu 2011, 97). Having succeeded conquering Anatolia, the nationalist group declared the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and abolished the Caliphate as an institution one year later on March 3, 1924 (Finkel 2005, 545;

Hanioglu 2008a, 197, 2011, 97). Ottoman consulates abroad were closed and consuls were called back to home in Turkey, including Rafet Bey. He left for Ankara on March 16, 1924.⁵⁵ It is likely he joined the nationalist group to build the Republic of Turkey.

Conclusion

Rafet Bey is an example of an Ottoman statesmen in the early twentieth century. He lived through a difficult period, especially in the First World War. His life and service in Batavia give important data to analyze global history in the early twentieth century. As an Ottoman statesmen, Rafet Bey was influenced by the changes in the Ottoman capital city, Istanbul. At the time, many migrants came from the Balkans to Anatolia to secure their position, because many Muslims in the Balkans were prosecuted after several Ottoman defeats in the late nineteenth century. Therefore, Ottoman statesmen blamed Western European countries and Russia over unstable conditions in Ottoman regions. Most of them did not trust Western civilization, creating alternative ideologies such as Pan-Islamism as seen in the Hamidian period (1876-1909). However, Pan-Islamism was not enough to bind Ottoman society together. Several rebellions, such as those in Arab lands evidenced that the Ottoman state had to face nationalism in Muslim lands, not only in Christian lands such as in the early twentieth century.

Ottoman statesmen like Rafet Bey would be the embryo of a new ideological movement supporting nationalists movements. In this context, the fusion of Islamism and Turanism was the most important development to create a strong nation. However, the ideological movement was not only adopted by statesmen in Istanbul, but also in remote areas such as Batavia. Rafet Bey as Ottoman consul in Batavia was sure that the invasion or incursions of Western states, especially through non-transparent method including missionary activities, had undermined the Ottoman state. They influenced Ottoman in Arab regions to start insurrections against the Ottoman state. Ottoman statesmen like Rafet Bey tried to define loyalty anew. Rebellions of Armenians and Arabs showed that Ottoman identity posed a serious problem, and leaders had to try a new formula to transform the Ottoman state into a strong nation.

Rafet Bey lived in Batavia for several years during the First World War. His duty was not easy because the Ottomans were key players

in the First World War. Therefore, one of the important duties of the Ottoman consul in Batavia during the First World War was to spread the *jihad* declaration among the Muslims. Yet, this seemed to be ineffective because the Dutch strictly controlled the activities of the Ottoman consul. Together with the German consulate, Rafet Bey had to face negative propaganda created by British consulates in the region. To counter Britain propaganda, Rafet Bey published several writings in Malay newspapers, urging Muslims to pray for the Ottoman sultan and for the victory of the Muslim soldiers. Thanks to his good relations with the Hadhrami community, Rafet Bey succeeded in collecting donations through the Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti of Batavia. In addition, the Hadhrami community also helped Rafet Bey to propagate news about the Ottoman struggle using German telegraph lines.

In addition, Rafet Bey had to defend the Ottoman reputation because the Ottomans had been accused of massacring Armenians in 1915 during the relocation of the Armenian population. Consequently, the Armenian question became a serious problem for the Ottoman in the international political arena. Therefore, Rafet Bey as Ottoman consul in Batavia had to counter negative news about Armenia, although he was threatened by an anonymous letter not to write anymore about the Armenian question. In this context, although he did not go to battle, Rafet Bey also had to defend the Ottoman reputation abroad over several events in Anatolia such as the Armenian question. It can be concluded that the Dutch East Indies played an important role in the First World War. The First World War was not only about gunfire and battlefields, but also about propaganda. In this article, Batavia witnessed a propaganda war between Ottoman state, Germany and Britain.

Endnotes

- The inspiration to write this article is derived from my M.A. Thesis in Istanbul University (2016) entitled 'İstanbul'dan Samarang'a Panislamizm: Endonezya'daki Anti-Kolonyal Harekete Osmanlı Etkisi (1876-1918)'. I want to thank to my supervisor Yrd. Doç. Dr. Metin Ünver. In addition, I would like to thank to anonymous reviewers, copyeditor and my colleague, Zacky Khairul Umam, who have contributed and helped to comment my article.
- 1. BOA, YA.HUS 286/40 (June 1898). BOA (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) is the abbreviation of Ottoman archives in Istanbul.
- 2. The first correspondence between Ottoman state and Aceh in the nineteenth century was signed by the submission of a letter in Jawi-script Malay from Acehese sultan, Mansyur Syah, to the Ottoman sultan, Abdülmecid (dated 15 Rabi' al-Awwal 1265 H/ 8 February 1849 CE). See Kadı, Peacock, and Gallop (2011, 163–81) and Reid (1969, 84).
- 3. The early press in Singapore was mainly in the hands of Muslims of mixed Indian-Malay origins (so-called *Jawi Peranakan*), whereas book printing seems to have been a privileged domain of Javanese Muslims. See Freitag (2003, 227).
- 4. To the Hadhrami, the world was divided into two parts: the *Balad* or homeland and the *Mahjar* or sphere emigration (Boxberger 2002, 41). See also Ho (2006, 98), Alpers (2014, 122), and Berg (2010, 95–110)
- 5. BOA, YA. HUS 385/13 (May 1898).
- 6. BOA, HR. SYS 2881/47 (September 1915).
- 7. BOA, HR. IM 239/61 (March 1924). Since then, there existed no Turkish diplomatic representation in Jakarta until 1957.
- 8. Zürcher divides the characteristic of Young Turk into subgroups such as 1) the founders of Young Turk movement; 2) the leaders of 1908 constitutional revolution; 3) the politically active officers in Ottoman Army; 4) the members of Central Committee of CUP; 5) the leadership of the nationalist resistance after World War I; and 6) early Republican elites. See Zürcher (2010, 96).
- 9. See Zürcher (2010, 75).
- 10. BOA, HR. SYS 2465/72 (March 1921).
- 11. BOA, HR. SYS 2465/72 (March 1921).
- 12. BOA, HR. SYS 2879/16 (February 1915).
- 13. BOA, HR. SYS 2879/16 (February 1915).
- 14. The Hijaz was not merely a place of pilgrimage and religion for the Southeast Asian Muslims or *Jawi* like Acehese. It was also a place to establish direct contact with the Ottoman authorities. There was thirteen Acehese *hajjis* delivered a petition to the Ottoman governor of Hijaz to be forwarded to Istanbul, requesting help to save their country from the invasion of Dutch in 1885. See Göksoy (2015, 178).
- 15. The revolt of Sharif Husayn signed the chaos in Arabia. During the revolt, Cemal Pasha arrested several revolutionary leaders, especially those who had relation with Sharif Husayn and Faisal such as all the relatives of the Bakri family, Shukri Pasha al-Ayyubi and other Syrian notables and Umar Rafii (a lawyer), his brother Abd al-Ghani Rafii and Abd- al-Qadir Kiwan (the preacher of the Umayyad Mosque). See Rogan (2015, 292) and Çiçek (2014, 60).
- 16. Regarding Ottomanism, see Davison (1963, 94) and Engelhardt (1999, 43).
- 17. BOA, HR. SYS 2465/72 (March 1921).
- 18. Regarding intervention of Western Europe and Russia in Ottoman regions, see İnalçik (1992, 69).
- 19. BOA, HR. SYS 2465/72 (March 1921).

20. See also Baltacıoğlu (1966).
21. BOA, HR.SYS 2881/47 (December 1915).
22. Ottoman entered the First World War on August 3, 1914. See Hanioglu (2008a, 177).
23. BOA, DH. EUM 6§ (March 1915).
24. BOA HR. SYS 2419/58 (April 1916).
25. *Dengan segala hormat. Hamba Prins Raden Mas Adhihardho (Ning)rat dari Srie Padoeka Sulthan Djocja ajang III tinggal di kampung Blandongan Batavia. Maka adalah hamba ada memersebahken sapoetjoek soerat ini dihadapan Srie Padoeka ajang Melia Toean Sulthan ia Itoe jika sekiranya di perolehken oleh Srie Padoeka Jang Moelia Toean Sulthan hamba moeboen --- beladjar karena perteloenganja Srie Padoeka Toean Sulthan boeat sekolah Militair di negeri Constantinopel boeat di bawah prentahnja Srie Padoeka Jang Moelia Toean Sulthan jang di sini. Lain dari itoe hamba mohonken dengan sangat moedah2 an di kaboelken dari permoeohenan hamba ajang terseboet di atas adanja. Hamba jang amat rendah.* BOA HR. ID 1373/67 (May 1914).
26. BOA, HR. SYS 2422/19 (June 1916).
27. *Djikaoe toean besar tiada toeloeng sama orang Moeslim, lebi baik sekalian orang Muslim, minta mati saja. Soesah sekali orang Moeslim poenja penghidoepan. Sekalian roemahnja orang Moeslim habis di bakar. Jang datang beka dan bakar itoe roma kira kira lebi dari 100 orang Toean Tanah Tjondet Oost peonja. Dan ada lagi orang Kampung toeloeng pekerdjaan sama toean tanah soedah di hoekoem, sesoedahnja di hoekoem toean Tanah minta bayaran. Djikaloe tida di bayar sama orang Kampung toean tanah lelang apa jang ada Dale roemahnja dan di ambil roemahnja orangnja di pesisir. Kessian sekali orang Moeslim di ini Negeri. Hamba harep padoeka toean besar poenja perteloengan. Djikaloe toean besar tiada toeloeng lebi baik orang Moeslim minta mati saja. Sebab jang datang merembak (menembak) dan bakar itoe remah ada Wedana, Mantri Politik, Opas Djoeragan, Mandor dan laen laen orang Kompanian. Begitoe padoeka toean besar Konsol jang hamba mengadoe hal di Kampung Tjondet adanja.*, BOA, HR. SYS 2422/19 (June 1916).
28. Gazi is a title to render Muslims in Anatolia in the context of the Holy War against Christians around the late Medieval period. The term gazi is defined as one who undertakes *gaza* or 'war for faith', 'war against infidel' or 'holy war'. For further reading about *Gazi*, see Wittek (2000, 30), İnalçik (2003, 26), Kafadar (1996, 58–59), Lowry (2003, 3), and Finkel (2005, 10).
29. BOA, HR. SYS 2323/16 (June 1915).
30. BOA, HR. SYS 2323/15 (June 1915).
31. BOA, HR. SYS 2323/15 (June 1915).
32. BOA, HR. SYS 2323/16 (June 1915).
33. BOA, HR. SYS 2323/15 (June 1915).
34. Several Arab wealth figures participated to establish a Sarekat Dagang Islam such as Haji Mohamad Arsar, Said bin Abdulrahman Badjenet, Shaykh Gallib bin Tebe, Shaykh Ali Rais and Shaykh Abdul Gani. See Adam (1995, 199).
35. Regarding biography of Tirtoadisuryo, see Toer (1985).
36. *“Walaupun Turki netral namun kaum pemerintah Ottoman dan Khalifat mengucapkan agar aliansi Inggris dan Rusia kalah sebab jika mendapat kemenangan maka akan besar sekali kekuasaannya di Asia dan Eropa, di dalam hal itu tahulah orang dengan yakin bahwa Rusia tidak akan tunggu lama lagi untuk menduduki Konstantinopel dan menjadikan Armenia berdiri sendiri; negeri Mesir akan dijadikan Kerajaan Arab oleh Inggris (sudah tentu berada di bawah perlindungan Inggris). Dan khalifah pun dipindahkannya ke Mekkah sedang Prancis akan tinggal buat selama-lamanya di Syria dan negeri ini akan dilakukannya sebagai Tunisia yang kedua”*, *Oetoesan Hindia*, November 19, 1915.
37. In 1916 in the Dutch East Indies province of Jambi, there was a rebellion at Muara

- Tembesi. Rebels considered this rebellion as sympathy with Turkey; There was also a rumour concerned a movement launched by the Sultan of Turkey and Susuhunan of Surakarta aiming at the promotion of Islam (Kartodirdjo 1978, 180; Korver 1985, 86).
38. Since Sarekat Islam supported Ottoman, the activities of Sarekat Islam got attention from Ottoman consul. There is an archive from Foreign Ministry reporting the meeting of Sarekat Islam of Sukabumi branch. See HR. SYS 2465/19 (December 1920); Regarding Sarekat Islam of Sukabumi branch, see Iskandar (2001, 134).
 39. *Pantjaran Warta* on August 18, 1917.
 40. *Pantjaran Warta* on July 20, 1917.
 41. BOA, HR. SYS 2172/12 (February 1916); BOA, HR.2172/13 (March 1916). In fact, sending donations to Turkey was not limited only to this instance this during the First World War. On several occasions, sums of charity money in various quantities were sent from Batavia to Istanbul by Rafet Bey, for instance, from a social activity of an operetta performance organized jointly by the Ottoman and German consulates in Batavia, a total 2.-759 Netherlands Indies guilders collected. Half of this money, namely 1.-374,56 Netherlands Indies guilders after the reduction of transfer charges, was sent to Istanbul by Rafet Bey on 22 April, 1915, to be deposited with the Ottoman Red Crescent Society, while the other half was transferred to the German Red Cross (see for instance, BOA, HR. SYS 2171/16).
 42. *Oetoesan Hindia*, October 7, 1915.
 43. BOA, HR. SYS 2403/36 (October 1914).
 44. See also *Neraca* November 10, 1917.
 45. *Pantjaran Warta*, on July 10, 1917.
 46. *Pantjaran Warta*, on July 19, 1917.
 47. *Pantjaran Warta*, on July 19, 1917.
 48. Armenian Question is still debatable discourse in the Western scholarship. For comparative reading see, Erickson (2013), McCarthy (2006), Akçam (2004, 2012), and Halaçoğlu (2005).
 49. BOA, HR. SYS 2879/16 (February 1915).
 50. BOA, HR. SYS 2879/16 (February 1915).
 51. BOA, HR. SYS 2879/16 (February 1915).
 52. BOA, HR. SYS 2881/47 (December 1915).
 53. BOA, HR. SYS 2881/47 (December 1915).
 54. BOA, HR. SYS 2881/47 (December 1915).
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Guidelines

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The journal invites scholars and experts working in all disciplines in the humanities and social sciences pertaining to Islam or Muslim societies. Articles should be original, research-based, unpublished and not under review for possible publication in other journals. All submitted papers are subject to review of the editors, editorial board, and blind reviewers. Submissions that violate our guidelines on formatting or length will be rejected without review.

Articles should be written in American English between approximately 10,000-15,000 words including text, all tables and figures, notes, references, and appendices intended for publication. All submission must include 150 words abstract and 5 keywords. Quotations, passages, and words in local or foreign languages should

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All notes must appear in the text as citations. A citation usually requires only the last name of the author(s), year of publication, and (sometimes) page numbers. For example: (Hefner 2009a, 45; Geertz 1966, 114). Explanatory footnotes may be included but should not be used for simple citations. All works cited must appear in the reference list at the end of the article. In matter of bibliographical style, *Studia Islamika* follows the American Political Science Association (APSA) manual style, such as below:

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Arabic romanization should be written as follows:

Letters: ' b, t, th, j, ḥ, kh, d, dh, r, z, s, sh, ṣ, ḍ, ṭ, ḏ, ḡ, f, q, l, m, n, h, w, y. Short vowels: a, i, u. long vowels: ā, ī, ū. Diphthongs: aw, ay. *Tā marbūṭā*: t. Article: al-. For detail information on Arabic Romanization, please refer the transliteration system of the Library of Congress (LC) Guidelines.

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
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فوزي

شخصية سونان كالي جانغا
في تقاليد ماتارام الإسلامية
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