STUDIA ISLAMIKA

INDONESIAN JOURNAL FOR ISLAMIC STUDIES

Volume 30, Number 1, 2023



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Islamism and Muslim Support for Islamist Movement Organizations: Evidence from Indonesia

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Mujiburrahman

ISSN: 0215-0492 E-ISSN: 2355-6145

STUDIA ISLAMIKA

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Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies

Vol. 30, no. 1, 2023

STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-0492; E-ISSN: 2355-6145) is an international journal published by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University of Jakarta, INDONESIA. It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular, and Southeast Asian Islamic studies in general, and is intended to communicate original researches and current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contributions from scholars of related disciplines. All submitted papers are subject to double-blind review process.

STUDIA ISLAMIKA has been accredited by The Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education, Republic of Indonesia as an academic journal (Decree No. 32a/E/KPT/2017).

STUDIA ISLAMIKA has become a CrossRef Member since year 2014. Therefore, all articles published by STUDIA ISLAMIKA will have unique Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number.

STUDIA ISLAMIKA is indexed in Scopus since 30 May 2015.

Editorial Office:
STUDIA ISLAMIKA, Gedung Pusat Pengkajian
Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) UIN Jakarta,
Jl. Kertamukti No. 5, Pisangan Barat, Cirendeu,
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Website: http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/studia-islamika

Annual subscription rates from outside Indonesia, institution: US$ 75,00 and the cost of a single copy is US$ 25,00; individual: US$ 50,00 and the cost of a single copy is US$ 20,00. Rates do not include international postage and handling.

Please make all payment through bank transfer to: **PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia,** account No. **101-00-0514550-1 (USD), Swift Code: bmriidja**

Harga berlangganan di Indonesia untuk satu tahun, lembaga: Rp. 150.000,-, harga satu edisi Rp. 50.000,-; individu: Rp. 100.000,-, harga satu edisi Rp. 40.000,-. Harga belum termasuk ongkos kirim.

Pembayaran melalui **PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, No. Rek: 128-00-0105080-3**

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Saiful Mujani, R. William Liddle, & Deni Irvani

Islamism and Muslim Support for Islamist Movement Organizations: Evidence from Indonesia

Abstract: *Does ideology predict public support for Islamist movement organizations (IMOs)? This article is to reassess the extent to which ideology matters to support social movement organizations among Muslims. A previous quantitative study in Indonesia found that Islamic ideology did not explain support for IMO such as Darul Islam. We reject the finding based on new Indonesian data. We examined Muslim support for three contemporary IMOs: FPI, HTI, and ISIS, through a nationwide opinion survey. The survey explores whether Islamism as an ideology significantly contributes to support for IMOs among Muslims. We find that a majority of Indonesian Muslims do not support IMOs, and that belief in Islamism as an ideology significantly explains the support of those who do. Preference for Islamism over the 1945 Constitution and its religiously inclusive preamble, the Five Principles, predicts mass support for Islamist organizations. Islamist ideology increases support for IMOs, while a pluralist socio-religious tradition and deradicalization and moderation policies weaken it.*

Keywords: Islamist Movement, Ideology, Islamism, Opinion Survey, Indonesia.

 DOI: 10.36712/sdi.v30i1.33369

Abstrak: *Apakah ideologi memprediksi dukungan publik terhadap organisasi gerakan Islamis (Islamist Movement Organizations, IMO)? Artikel ini mengkaji kembali sejauh mana ideologi penting untuk mendukung organisasi gerakan sosial di kalangan umat Islam. Kajian kuantitatif sebelumnya di Indonesia menemukan bahwa ideologi Islam tidak menjelaskan dukungan terhadap IMO seperti Darul Islam. Kami menolak temuan tersebut berdasarkan data baru. Kami mengkaji dukungan Muslim untuk tiga IMO kontemporer: FPI, HTI, dan ISIS, melalui survei opini nasional. Survei tersebut mengeksplorasi apakah Islamisme sebagai sebuah ideologi secara signifikan memberikan kontribusi terhadap dukungan IMO di kalangan umat Islam. Kami menemukan bahwa mayoritas Muslim Indonesia tidak mendukung IMO, dan kepercayaan pada Islamisme sebagai sebuah ideologi secara signifikan menjelaskan dukungan dari mereka yang mendukung IMO. Preferensi terhadap Islamisme atas UUD 1945 dan Pembukaannya yang inklusif secara religius, Pancasila, memprediksi dukungan massa untuk organisasi Islam. Ideologi Islam meningkatkan dukungan untuk IMO, sementara tradisi sosial-keagamaan pluralis dan kebijakan deradikalisasi dan moderasi melemahkannya.*

Kata kunci: Gerakan Islamis, Ideologi, Islamisme, Survei Opini, Indonesia.

ملخص: هل تتنبأ الأيديولوجيا بالدعم العام لمنظمات الحركة الإسلامية؟ تهدف هذه المقالة إلى إعادة تقييم مدى أهمية الأيديولوجيا لدعم تنظيمات الحركات الاجتماعية بين المسلمين. وجد بحث كمي سابق في إندونيسيا أن الأيديولوجية الإسلامية لم تفسر الدعم لمنظمة الحركة الإسلامية مثل دار الإسلام. نحن نرفض النتيجة بناءً على البيانات الجديدة. قمنا بفحص دعم المسلمين لثلاث منظمات الحركة الإسلامية المعاصرة: FPI, HTI, ISIS من خلال استطلاع رأي وطني. يستكشف الاستطلاع ما إذا كانت الإسلاموية كأيديولوجية تساهم بشكل كبير في دعم منظمات الحركة الإسلامية بين المسلمين. نجد أن غالبية المسلمين الإندونيسيين لا يدعمون منظمات الحركة الإسلامية، وهذا الإيمان بالإسلاموية كأيديولوجية يفسر بشكل كبير دعم أولئك الذين يؤيدون ذلك. تفضيل الإسلاموية على دستور عام ١٩٤٥ وديباجته الشاملة دينياً، المبادئ الخمسة، تتنبأ بالدعم الجماهيري للمنظمات الإسلامية. تزيد الأيديولوجية الإسلامية من دعمها لمنظمات الحركة الإسلامية، بينما تضعفها التقاليد الاجتماعية والدينية التعددية وسياسات نزع التطرف والاعتدال.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الحركة الإسلامية، الأيديولوجية، الإسلامية، مسح الرأي، إندونيسيا.

In December 2020, the Indonesian government banned the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front), an Islamist Movement Organization (IMO) established when Indonesia democratized in 1998 (Nytimes.com 2020; Kumparan.com 2020). In 2017, the government had banned another IMO, the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, Indonesian Liberation Party) (Kompas.com 2017).

The creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also affected Indonesian Muslims. After learning about ISIS on social media, according to a report, up to 2017, 671 Indonesians traveled to Iraq and Syria to join (Kompas.com 2016; Tribunnews.com 2017). ISIS-related organizations and networks were also created in Indonesia (Tempo.co 2014). Some of them detonated terrorist bombs (Liputan6.com 2017). ISIS is believed to still be active in the country.

In the past decade, FPI, HTI, and ISIS have been the most mass media-covered IMOs because of their open activities, including public rallies and protests, and their terror attacks, mainly ISIS-inspired suicide bombings. FPI and HTI are not radical in their choice of means; HTI in particular is known as a peaceful organization. Both were nonetheless banned because the government concluded that they threaten Indonesia's identity as a religiously plural political community.

Seen from their vision and mission statements, FPI, HTI, and ISIS are IMOs. They are social movements characterized by "interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity" (Diani 1992, 13). These interactions are both informal and formal, but they commonly use extra-parliamentary means, which are sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent, sometimes both.

The defining characteristics of IMOs are Islam and Islamism as their collective identity. FPI, HTI, and ISIS share this identity (Assalmaniyah.Blogspot.com 2022; Idntimes.com 2019; Tirto.id 2017). Mozaffari (2007) acknowledges their claim that Islam is a total or comprehensive system of life, even though in practice across the Muslim world this claim has been far from monolithic and static (Snow and Byrd 2007).

In Indonesia, Islamism has deep roots in the pre-twentieth century Dutch colonial period and the early struggle for national independence at the beginning of the twentieth century (Effendy 2004; Noer

 DOI: 10.36712/sdi.v30i1.33369

1973). Throughout the nationalist period, Islamists argued that since Indonesia was an almost entirely Muslim nation (87.2% today: BPS 2010), it should be governed by syari'ah (Islamic law). Islam was seen as a powerful symbol uniting people against colonial occupation (Kahin 1952).

Early 20th century Muslim organizations included Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), founded in 1912, Muhammadiyah (the Way of Muhammad) also in 1912, and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, Rise of the Religious Scholars) in 1926. Sarekat Islam was formed initially as a cooperative to represent Muslim Javanese batik traders against Sino-Indonesian dominance of their industry. Its focus quickly shifted to a popular nationalist struggle against the Dutch; by 1919 it claimed 2 million members, though the real number was probably less than half a million (Ricklefs 2008, 200).

Muhammadiyah was created by modernist Muslims influenced by an Egyptian movement that sought to reestablish the authority of the Qur'an and Hadith (Sayings of the Prophet) as against that of traditional clerics, including the four classical schools of interpretation (*mazhab*). NU rose in defense of those schools, and also of traditional beliefs that had become a part of Islam as practiced in the archipelago.

NU from the beginning was particularly strong in Java, among the ethnic Javanese (who comprise 42% of the national population), Muhammadiyah stronger outside of Java. The Javanese have a long-held reputation as more open and tolerant than Middle Eastern Muslims (Geertz 1971). NU is also well known for its commitment to a religiously pluralist Indonesia (Barton and Greg Fealy 1996).

Both organizations grew rapidly and have tens of millions of members today, NU a claimed 90 million and Muhammadiyah a claimed 50 million. Muhammadiyah retains its strict interpretation, and NU its more open or pluralist one. Indeed, NU's leaders have proclaimed for decades a unique form of Islam in Indonesia, Islam Nusantara (Islam of the Archipelago), distinct from Middle Eastern Islam. Our study attempts to observe the extent to which Indonesian Muslims do in fact believe in Islam Nusantara.

During World War II, Muhammadiyah and NU, originally non-political, were forced with many smaller groups by the Japanese occupation government to combine into an umbrella political association called Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi,

Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations). With independence in 1949, Masjumi aspired to build a shari'ah-based Indonesia. Its leaders and those of NU joined parliament and began planning for democratic national elections, held in 1955.

Some Muslims, however, rejected peaceful struggle. An extra-parliamentary revolutionary struggle was launched, also in 1949, by the Dar'ul Islam (DI, Islamic State) and its armed wing, the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII, Indonesian Islamic Army) (Fogg 2019). All this despite the reality on the ground that not all Indonesians are Muslim and not all Muslims are Islamists.

Most "secular" or "nationalist" leaders, including founding fathers President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammad Hatta, are Muslims. They nevertheless were and are committed to an Indonesian nation with an inclusive social and religious identity. DI was banned by President Sukarno in 1962. During four authoritarian decades under Sukarno and his successor, army general President Suharto (1959-1998), it continued its struggle underground. It has also inspired other violent and non-violent Islamist movements. Democratization in 1998 gave these organizations an opportunity to surface. According to Jones (2010), many Islamist movements today are continuations of DI.

HTI began as a branch of an international Islamist organization, Hizbut Tahrir, founded in Palestine in 1953 (Orofino 2021; Pankhurst 2016). Hizbut Tahrir's ideology is similar to both the Islamic parties of the 1950s, Masjumi and NU, as well as DI. Like DI, HTI is an extra-parliamentary organization, but it is peaceful and unarmed (Tirto.id 2019). Despite its peacefulness, HTI was banned by the government of President Joko Widodo (called Jokowi) in 2017 after new laws were passed requiring mass organizations to accept the Constitution of 1945, including its preamble, the doctrine of Pancasila (Five Principles)[1] (EmbassyofIndonesia.org).

Pancasila's first principle, Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa (belief in the one and only God), stipulates that Indonesian nationality is inclusive of several socio-religious identities, including Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. Indonesians must also be loyal to the Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Detik.com 2017b). HTI does not accept these constraints because its version of

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Islamism does not recognize the modern nation-state. HT branches have been banned in many countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, United Kingdom, Germany, and Russia on the ground that they are a threat to the state (Detik.com 2017a; Fealy 2020; Mujani and Liddle 2021).

FPI has been banned for the same reason (Nytimes.com 2020). Its main goal is to Islamize Indonesia through the implementation of shari'ah (Mujani and Liddle 2021; Tagar.id 2019). Interestingly, this framing is an unintended consequence of the organization's founding. FPI was created with the support of the armed forces leadership when Indonesia democratized in 1998. The military's ostensible intention was to use FPI to maintain order at a time of much disorder after the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime.

The military chose to back FPI because it possesses religious capital in addition to its ability to mobilize armed thugs. Its leader, Rizieq Shihab, is believed by some Muslims to be an Islamic scholar (ulama) and a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. This religious capital has since become the core of the organization's legitimacy. As FPI has grown more independent, Islamist framing has become increasingly prominent. It is now known as an Islamist organization that directly enforces Islamic norms in society, even though it does not have the authority to do so. Not suprisingly, there are often clashes between the police and FPI over whose conception of law and order will prevail.

Politically, FPI has become increasingly strategic in its choice of tactics. It mobilized a successful pressure campaign among Jakarta Muslims against the Sino-Christian governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok), demanding his imprisonment for blasphemy (Al Qurtubi 2020). Ahok did in fact go to prison and subsequently lost reelection for governor in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election (BBC.com 2017).

That success further increased FPI's political capital, to the point that it soon made an impact on national politics. It supported the candidacy of opposition leader Prabowo Subianto against Jokowi in the 2019 presidential election and arguably increased voter turnout for Prabowo. FPI leader Shihab was subsequently charged with pornographic behavior and fled to Mecca. He did not return to Indonesia until November 2020, when he was welcomed by thousands of followers who ignored COVID-19 health protocols. Shihab further challenged the government

by inviting thousands of his followers to attend his daughter's wedding. He also organized several gatherings that attracted thousands more and was believed to have increased the spread of the pandemic.

On December 7, 2020, six FPI armed guards were killed by the police, who had been monitoring Shihab's activities. Shihab was arrested on December 13 and the FPI was banned on December 30. The new laws restricting mass organizations were applied again, this time to FPI, which does not accept the 1945 Constitution, Pancasila, or the Unitary State of Indonesia as its sole foundation.

ISIS is a more recent phenomenon in the Muslim world (Westphal 2018). Its influence on Indonesian Muslims is believed to have spread through social media (Tempo.co 2019). Many Indonesian Muslims sympathize with ISIS's struggles against "infidels" in Iraq and Syria; they viewed their Muslim brothers and sisters as threatened. Some Indonesian Muslims did not immediately return from the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, but instead traveled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS. Others returned to Indonesia to establish an ISIS branch and recruit more Muslims.

To what extent are these three organizations supported by Muslims in Indonesia? Who supports them, and why? These questions are crucial for estimating their sociopolitical significance in Indonesia's relatively more open and contested current polity when compared to almost all Muslim nation-states. Indonesia is the largest democracy in the Muslim world, despite current challenges to its democratic status (Mujani and Liddle 2021).

For this case and comparatively, exploring mass support is crucial to determining whether IMOs can grow and shape political life. One study has found that mass support is an indicator of social movement outcomes (Banaszak, Lee Ann, and Heather L. Ondercin 2016). IMOs, however, have not yet been integrated into mainstream social movement studies (Sutton, Phillip, and Stephen Vertigans 2022). Our study hopes to make a step in that direction.

Theoretical Background

We examine Muslim mass support for rather than direct participation in Islamic movement organizations. Our study is about Muslim mass agreement with the goals of and willingness to help IMOs. That support is a mirror of direct participation at the mass level. Perspectives

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on social movement participation are therefore relevant to our research.

Islamic movements are still marginal in social movement studies (Sutton, Phillip, and Stephen Vertigans 2022). Most research in this field is materialist (Oberschall 2004). Students of mainstream social movements have not yet taken seriously the notion that a movement might be shaped by religious values, by a belief that society should be governed by divine command.

Fortunately, a few scholars have started to bring social movement theories to Islamic movement studies (Clark 2004; Kurzman 2004; Lubeck 2000; Oberschall 2004; Sutton, Phillip, and Stephen Vertigans 2022; Wickham 2002; Wiktorowicz 2001, 2004). The emergence of the New Social Movements perspective, which emphasizes the importance of non-material values in explaining social movements in Europe, is relevant to Islamic movement studies (Sutton, Phillip, and Stephen Vertigans 2022).

Current research on the re-emergence of conservative movements in the West, such as "Why the U.S. Conservative Movements are Winning" (Amenta 2022), indicates that institutions and values or ideology are still crucial to explain or to frame social and political movements (King 2008; Orofino 2021; Simpson, Avery Walter, and Kim Ebert 2021; Wesbury 2002; Westphal 2018; Zald 2000). One study even suggests that ideology is a more appropriate concept than frame (Oliver, Pamela E., and Hank Johnston 2000). Traditionally, ideology has been a political concept that "points to coherent systems of ideas which provide theories of society coupled with value commitments and normative implications for promoting or resisting social change" (Oliver, Pamela E., and Hank Johnston 2000, 37).

Students of Indonesian politics have long paid attention to Islamic movements. Deliar Noer's *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (1973) is the earliest scholarly work on the subject. Noer's work was historical and descriptive. A more analytical approach, very relevant to our research, is Karl Jackson's *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: a Study of Indonesian Political Behavior* (1980). This work, highly original and imaginative public opinion research, explored how citizens in a West Javanese community perceived Darul Islam (DI), an Islamist group in rebellion against the newly independent Indonesian state as described above.

Jackson found that support for DI was more strongly associated with politics (i.e., traditional authority) than with religion or Islamic

ideology. This finding was surprising because Islamist movements were at the time and are still often more associated with Islamic ideology; that is, the belief that Muslims should be governed by shari'ah or Islamic law. This ideology, according to Jackson, turned out to be irrelevant in the case of Muslim support for the DI in West Java.

Jackson's study was conducted in the 1960s, when explanations of social movements in the US first argued that the emergence, process, and outcome of social movements were more associated with political processes, opportunities, or opportunity structures than with grievances (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Charles Perrow 1977; Lipsky 1970; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978).

However, a more current perspective from social movement studies re-emphasizes the significance of ideology in framing a movement (Amenta 2022; Becker 2020; Simpson, Avery Walter, and Kim Ebert 2021; Sutton, Phillip, and Stephen Vertigans 2022; Westphal 2018) as emphasized earlier (Gamson and David S. Mayer 1999; Klandermans 1997; Oliver, Pamela E., and Hank Johnston 2000; Wesbury 2002; Zald 2000). Individuals participate in or support a protest or organization because they share a particular ideology. This ideology frames their attitude or behavior and encourages participation in or support for social movements. For example, Robert Rohrschneider (1990) found that left–right oriented ideology is crucial to explain mass support for new social movements in Western Europe. In the case of IMOs, the Muslim public is likely to share their idea that the world should be governed according to shari'ah (Cammet and Pauline Jones Luong 2014; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008; Snow and Byrd 2007).

This essay is to reasses to the extent in which ideology matters to support for social movement organizations among Muslim.

Measures

Our exploration of Muslim mass support for three IMOs (FPI, HTI, and ISIS) includes a set of measures regarding the awareness and attitudes of individual Muslims about the three Indonesian IMOs. These comprise awareness of each organization, attitude toward their respective goals, and willingness to help them (see Appendix 1).

Ideology in this study is defined as a preference for a shari'ah-based polity over the existing state doctrine of Five Principles (Pancasila) and the 1945 Constitution. The Indonesian conception of a shariah-based

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polity is far from the monolithic conception of Islamism that is often found in Islamist movement research (Snow and Byrd 2007). It is instead a variant, and should be understood in the context of specifically Indonesian history and discourse among Islamist movement actors, leader, and constituents, as previously described.

The belief that a polity should be governed by shari'ah in the context of Indonesian politics and history is part of a discourse in which the shari'ah-based polity has been for decades and is today contrasted among elite players with a more religiously-inclusive idea of the state in the Five Principles and 1945 Constitution. Our survey assesses the extent to which this discourse is found within today's Muslim public. See appendix 1 for wordings of Islamist ideology.

Method and Data

We constructed a public opinion survey to explore Muslim mass support for FPI, HTI, and ISIS. This is a realistic method for observing Muslim mass support for any social or political organization, including the three IMOs examined here. Nationwide probability sampling is necessary to make realistic inferences. The survey was carried out under our supervision by the Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI, Indonesian Survey Institute) from April-May 2021.

The national sample size was set at 1200. The population, adults aged 17 or older, was stratified according to sex and province, then clustered according to village or urban ward (*desa* or *kelurahan*) as the primary sampling unit. The sample size for each village/ward was set at 10 respondents. The survey therefore selected 120 villages/wards.

In each province, several villages/wards were proportionally selected at random. In West Java, the number of selected villages/wards was larger than that of, for example, Papua because the West Java population is much larger than that of Papua. In each selected village/ward, all neighborhoods (*rukun tetangga*) were listed, and five were selected at random. In each selected neighborhood, two houses (kartu keluarga) were randomly selected, in which the family members (aged 17 or older, males or females) were listed; one was randomly selected to participate.

If the selected respondent was a male in the first house, the chosen respondent in the next house was a female to make the respondents proportional in terms of sex according to the national census (50:50).

One numerator was responsible for completing face-to-face interviews in one village/ward. The numerators were university students trained for field work. The response rate was 86%.[2] For the demographic characteristics of the respondents according to the Indonesian national census and our sample, see Appendix 2.

Results

As discussed, in the last five years, the Indonesian government has banned two high-profile IMOs: FPI and HTI. In addition, ISIS has attracted attention not only from the government, but from the public as well because of its open terrorism. Are Indonesian Muslims aware of these organizations? Do they agree with their goals? How willing are they to help them if given the opportunity?

Our survey found that most Muslims are aware of FPI (76%) and ISIS (73%), but only 35% know of HTI. HTI was officially banned before FPI; open activity is now illegal and it has disappeared from the public's view. FPI continues to be covered by the mass media since its leaders are being prosecuted in court (Sindonews.com 2021); moreover, there has not yet been a verdict in the case of the six murdered FPI activists (Tempo.co 2022). ISIS is illegal, but the public is generally aware of it as it has committed several violent actions in Indonesia over the last few years. It is believed to remain in the country.

The extent to which Indonesian Muslims support these organizations was observed through attitudes toward their goals. A significant number of Muslims who are aware of FPI (35%) state that they agree or strongly agree with its goals (Table 1), or 25% of the total Indonesian Muslim population. A shockingly high number, in our view, for an extreme and illegal group. Moreover, 19.6% of Muslims who are aware of FPI are willing or strongly willing to help it in various ways, such as joining an activity, donating, or spreading positive news or ideas about it. This proportion constituted 15% of the total Indonesian Muslim population. Again, while not a majority, a worrisome number for an illegal group.

Among the 35% of Muslims who are aware of HTI, only 12.8% state they agree or strongly agree with its goals, 4.5% of the total Indonesian Muslim population. In addition, only 9.9% of Muslims aware of HTI (3.4% of the total Muslim population) are willing or strongly willing to help it (Table 1).

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Table 1. Awareness of and support for the three IMOs (%).

		FPI	HTI	ISIS
Awareness	Yes	76 (*N*=687)	35 (*N*=325)	73 (*N*=677)
	No	24 (242)	65 (603)	27 (251)
Attitude toward the organizations' goals (only those who are aware)	Agree/strongly agree	35 (240)	12.8 (42)	2.3 (15)
	Disagree/strongly disagree	49.3 (338)	64.1 (208)	87.1 (590)
	Don't know	15.7 (108)	23.1 (75)	10.7 (72)
Willingness to help (only those who are aware)	Willing/strongly willing	19.6 (134)	9.9 (32)	1.6 (11)
	Unwilling/strongly unwilling	63.9 (439)	73.1 (237)	90.3 (612)
	Don't know	16.5 (113)	17.1 (55)	8.1 (54)

While ISIS is better known than HTI, attitudes toward it are more negative. Only 2.3% of Muslims aware of ISIS (1.6% of the total Muslim population) agree or strongly agree with its goals. In addition, only 1.6% of Muslims who are aware of the movement (1.1% of the total Muslim population) are willing or strongly willing to help. This proportion was not statistically significant (error margin +/- 4%) (Table 1).

The three IMOs are similar in ideology or main goals. Mass support, however, varies greatly. A significant number of Indonesian Muslims support FPI, while their level of support for HTI is low, and support for ISIS is below the level of significance. In an open society, support for extreme organizations such as FPI and HTI is normal, as these organizations are generally moderate or peaceful in their choice of means. It is also normal in an open society for mass support for ISIS to be insignificant, as this organization has demonstrated its capacity and willingness to use violence on several occasions. This finding is consistent with a study by Muñoz and Anduiza (2019), who found that support from mass publics decreases for violent movements.

Several studies claim that the emergence, processes, and outcomes of a movement are framed by its particular values, culture, or ideology. In the case of IMOs, mass support may be framed by a

particular belief: that the polity should be governed according to shari'ah.

In Indonesia, we have argued, political demands for the implementation of shari'ah are often contrasted with support for the religiously-inclusive Five Principles and 1945 Constitution. We found that most Indonesian Muslims preferred the latter to the former as the foundation of the polity (pro-constitution index=0.86 on a 0–1 point scale; Table 2).

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables.

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Support for FPI	543	1.00	4.00	2.2242	.60703
Support for HTI	246	1.00	4.00	2.0229	.58365
Support for ISIS	600	1.00	4.00	1.7192	.45952
Support for FPI and HTI	233	1.00	4.00	2.0856	.56346
Support for FPI, HTI, and ISIS	226	1.00	3.33	1.9465	.44893
Islamism: Prefer shari'ah over Pancasila	870	.00	1.00	.1235	.32921
Sex (male)	928	0.00	1.00	0.4947	0.50024
Rural-urban (rural)	928	0.00	1.00	0.4795	0.49985
Age	928	17.00	89.00	38.1949	14.73046
Education plus income	922	0.00	1.00	0.4746	0.20254
Ethnicity (Javanese)	928	0.00	1.00	0.4476	0.49751

How significantly does ideology (Islamism) explain support for IMOs when controlling for socioeconomic and demographic factors? In our study, 49.5% of the sample is male. Their mean age is 38, 48% live in rural areas, and 45% have Javanese ethnic background. They are mostly employed (0.57 on a 0–1 point scale) and blue-collar workers (0.80 on a 0–1 point scale). Their educational plus income level is, on average, lower middle class (0.47 on a 0–1 point scale) (Table 2).

The bivariate statistics indicate that ideology is significantly associated with Indonesian Muslim support for IMOs. Islamism as an ideology in which the polity should be based on shari'ah in preference to the inclusiveness of the 1945 Constitution associated

 DOI: 10.36712/sdi.v30i1.33369

significantly and positively with IMO support ($p \leq 0.001$) (Table 3). A Muslim who agrees that Indonesia should be governed according to shari'ah significantly supports Islamist organizations, including ISIS.

Table 3. Linear regression of Muslim support for the IMOs (unstandardized regression coefficients, B).

Parameters	FPI+HTI		FPI+HTI+ISIS	
	B	Std. error	B	Std. error
(Constant)	2.683***	.022	1.892***	.030
Islamism: Prefer shari'ah or Islamic law over Pancasila	.385***	.062	.493***	.092
N	870		225	
R2	0.043		0.114	

Dependent variables: Support for the FPI and HTI, and support for the FPI, HTI, and ISIS.

***, **, and * are significant at ≤0.001, ≤0.01, and ≤0.05, respectively.

Does Islamism consistently predict Muslim support for IMOs, controlled for socioeconomic and demographic factors? A multivariate analysis demonstrates how consistetly significant the relationship between Islamism and support for the IMOs is. (Table 4).

Islamism is consistently significant to explain for the suuport controlling for social-economic factors. ($p \leq .001$), The impact was also consistent across IMOs. The belief that Indonesia should be governed according to shari'ah rather than the 1945 Constitution predicted support for FPI, HTI, and ISIS, regardless of sociodemographic factors.

This finding holds for Muslims who live in rural or urban areas, are more or less educated, male or female, Javanese or otherwise, and younger or older. We thus reject the previous finding (Jackson 1980) that Islamic ideology does not matter but confirm that ideology as framing does matter in support for social movement organizations (Snow and Byrd 2007).

Socioeconomic and demographic factors were significant in predicting support. Lower education and income increased support

for the IMOs ($p \leq .001$). While elites are probably more educated and have better incomes, a better socioeconomy at the mass level weakened support. If socioeconomic conditions worsened among ordinary Muslims, then support for IMOs strengthened. Consistent with this pattern was the impact of rural background: those who live in rural areas are more likely to support IMOs. This pattern indicates that the Islamist groups are more strongly rooted in rural communities, even though their actions occur more often in urban areas. This finding is consistent with a previous study (Mujani and Liddle 2004).

Support for the IMOs is more strongly associated with non-Javanese Muslims.[3] At the mass level, Javanese Muslims, relative to non-Javanese Muslims, are less likely to support them, even though some famous IMO figures are Javanese, such as S. M. Kartosoewirjo of Dar'ul Islam, the Bali bombers, and Ismail Yusanto of HTI. Instead, Arab Indonesians, less than 1% of the population, are among the most prominent leaders, including Rizieq Shihab of FPI, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir of Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Congregation), and Umar Jafar Thalib of Laskar Jihad (Jihad Warriors).

At the mass level, Javanese Muslims are generally unlikely to support IMOs. As discussed, the Javanese, the largest ethnic group (42%), have a long-held reputation as more open and tolerant than Middle Eastern Muslims. Moreover, Javanese Muslims are the backbone, at the grass roots, of NU, the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia and the protagonist of Islam of the Archipelago, an explicitly pluralist ideology. It is thus unsurprising that the Javanese are less likely to support IMOs.

Sex does not matter to support for the IMOs. Females and females make no difference in supporting for the IMOs among Muslims. Our initial expectation was that females were more likely to be hostile toward Islamist groups, as females are often claimed to be suppressed or even subjugated by Islamist males. There is also resistance worldwide from female Muslim activists against Islamist organizations. Interestingly, Jeffry Halverson and Amy Way's (2011) observation of two female IMO leaders in the Middle East suggests there may be an "Islamist feminism" different from secular-oriented feminism among Muslim women as a type of anticolonial discourse. Does anticolonial discourse exist among Muslim women at the mass level? More research is needed.

 DOI: 10.36712/sdi.v30i1.33369

Table 4. Multilinear regression of Muslim support for the IMOs (unstandardized regression coefficients, B).

Parameters	FPI+HTI		FPI+HTI+ISIS	
	B	Std. error	B	Std. error
(Constant)	2.942***	.067	1.902***	.112
Islamism: Prefer shari'ah or Islamic law over Pancasila	.306***	.061	.446***	.096
Sex (male)	-.062	.039	-.056	.058
Rural-urban (rural)	.151***	.041	.065	.062
Education plus income	-.389***	.104	.128	.165
Ethnicity (Javanese)	-.222***	.040	-.127*	.058
N	864		225	
R2	0.121		0.145	

Dependent variables: Support for the FPI and HTI, and support for the FPI, HTI, and ISIS.

***, **, and * are significant at ≤0.001, ≤0.01, and ≤0.05, respectively.

Discussion

Jackson's (1980) study of mass support for an Indonesian Islamist organization found that politics, that is, traditional authority or clientelism, is more significant than Islamic ideology in explaining support for IMOs. His finding is consistent with the political process and political opportunity structure perspective on the emergence of social movements in general. It is also a critique of the sociopsychological explanation in which grievances or social breakdowns are the cause of a social movement's emergence. On the contrary, the sociopsychological perspective, which includes political alienation and relative deprivation, all predict participation in or support for a social movement. Moreover, many studies have suggested that culture or ideology is crucial for framing social movements.

Our study has analyzed the relationship between ideology, i.e. Islamism, and Muslim mass support for Indonesian IMOs. Islamism as an ideology offers a strong and consistent explanation. The IMOs may vary in terms of ideological nuances, goals, and strategies, yet

they share the core idea that the polity should be governed by shari'ah. This ideological core matters to any IMO. It can explain why Muslims support Islamist groups such as FPI, HTI, or ISIS. We expect that Islamism as ideology can also explain support for IMOs elsewhere.

The substantial effect of Islamist ideology on radical and violent IMOs means that deradicalization or religious moderation policies are necessary to reduce or contain the Islamist threat. In the Indonesian case, both Muslim society and government have been concerned with radicalism since the 2002 Bali bombing. At that time, the government adopted a policy to deradicalize the IMOs. This policy was strengthened in 2010, when the government established a special body to counter terrorism, the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT, National Body of Counter-Terrorism) (Tempo.co 2021).

The task of this body is to "Overcome terrorism and radicalism via a synergistic effort of governmental and societal organizations, including prevention, protection, prosecution, and deradicalization plus increasing national vigilance and international cooperation to maintain national security" https://www.bnpt.go.id/visi-dan-misi. (Authors' translation). The government acts directly and through civil society, particularly Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, to counter the propagation of radical ideology. These policies seem to be on the right track, but need stronger support from society (Akmaliah, Sulistiyanto, and Sukendar 2022; Ihsan and Fatah 2021; Karwadi 2014; Mohammed 2020).

Conclusions

Islamist movement organizations (IMOs) are frequently believed to be driven by Islamism, according to which a polity should be governed by shari'ah or Islamic law. A previous quantitative study in Indonesia (Jackson 1980) found that Islamic ideology did not explain support for Dar'ul Islam, an IMO. We reject this finding based on new Indonesian data, Muslim support for three contemporary IMOs: FPI, HTI, and ISIS, examined through a nation-wide opinion survey. Preference for Islamism over the 1945 Constitution and its religiously inclusive preamble, the Five Principles, predict mass support for Islamist organizations. Policy of de-radicalization or de-ideologization of Islam will weaken Muslim support for Islamist movement organizations.

 DOI: 10.36712/sdi.v30i1.33369

Endnotes

1. The five principles are: 1) belief in the one and only God; 2) a just and civilized humanity; 3) unity of Indonesia; 4) democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; and 5) social justice for the whole Indonesian people.
2. This sampling method followed previous works including Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani (2018) and Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi (2018).
3. According to the last national census in 2010, Muslims were 87%, Javanese 40%, Sundanese 15.5%, with hundreds of other ethnic groups (BPS 2010).

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 DOI: 10.36712/sdi.v30i1.33369

Appendix 1

Measures

Variables	Questions	Coding, scaling, and indexing
Support for the Islamist movement organizations (IMOs)	Do you know of the following groups or organizations? (Yes or no) (1) FPI, (2) HTI, (3) ISIS	Know FPI=1, otherwise=0 Know HTI=1, otherwise=0 Know ISIS=1, otherwise=0
	If you know of them, do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the goals of these organizations?	Strongly agree=4 Agree=3 Disagree=2 Strongly disagree=1
	If you know of them and had the chance, how willing would you be to help them through voluntary work, donations, and so on?	Strongly willing=4 Willing=3 Unwilling=2 Strongly unwilling=1
Index of support for IMOs	FPI+HTI+ISIS	1–4 point scale (1=very weak support or no support, 4=very strong or full support)
Islamic law preference	Which of the following statements do you prefer? (1) Our nation state should be based on a system inclusive to all religions as stated in the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, or (2) our nation state should be based solely on shari'ah or Islamic law	1=based on Islamic law 0=based on the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution

Appendix 2

Demographic characteristics of respondents according to census and sample (%)

Demographic	Population (census)	Sample
Sex		
Female	50	50
Male	50	50
Rural-urban background		
Rural	50.2	50.6
Urban	49.8	49.4
Religion		
Islam	87.3	87.1
Other	12.7	12.9
Ethnicity		
Javanese	40.2	40.2
Other	59.8	59.8
Province		
West Java	17.4	17.4
East Java	16.2	16.2
Central Java	14.6	14.7
Other	51.8	51.7

 DOI: 10.36712/sdi.v30i1.33369

Guidelines

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Studia Islamika, published three times a year since 1994, is a bilingual (English and Arabic), peer-reviewed journal, and specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular and Southeast Asian Islamic studies in general. The aim is to provide readers with a better understanding of Indonesia and Southeast Asia's Muslim history and present developments through the publication of articles, research reports, and book reviews.

The journal invites scholars and experts working in all disciplines in the humanities and social sciences pertaining to Islam or Muslim societies. Articles should be original, research-based, unpublished and not under review for possible publication in other journals. All submitted papers are subject to review of the editors, editorial board, and blind reviewers. Submissions that violate our guidelines on formatting or length will be rejected without review.

Articles should be written in American English between approximately 10.000-15.000 words including text, all tables and figures, notes, references, and appendices intended for publication. All submission must include 150 words abstract and 5 keywords. Quotations, passages, and words in local or foreign languages should

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All notes must appear in the text as citations. A citation usually requires only the last name of the author(s), year of publication, and (sometimes) page numbers. For example: (Hefner 2009a, 45; Geertz 1966, 114). Explanatory footnotes may be included but should not be used for simple citations. All works cited must appear in the reference list at the end of the article. In matter of bibliographical style, *Studia Islamika* follows the American Political Science Association (APSA) manual style, such as below:

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2. Booth, Anne. 1988. "Living Standards and the Distribution of Income in Colonial Indonesia: A Review of the Evidence." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 19(2): 310–34.
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4. Wahid, Din. 2014. *Nurturing Salafi Manhaj: A Study of Salafi Pesantrens in Contemporary Indonesia*. PhD dissertation. Utrecht University.
5. Utriza, Ayang. 2008. "Mencari Model Kerukunan Antaragama." *Kompas*. March 19: 59.
6. Ms. *Undhang-Undhang Banten*, L.Or.5598, Leiden University.
7. Interview with K.H. Sahal Mahfudz, Kajen, Pati, June 11th, 2007.

Arabic romanization should be written as follows:

Letters: *', b, t, th, j, ḥ, kh, d, dh, r, z, s, sh, ṣ, ḍ, ṭ, ẓ, ', gh, f, q, l, m, n, h, w, y*. Short vowels: *a, i, u*. long vowels: *ā*, ī, ū. Diphthongs: *aw, ay. Ïā marbūṭā*: *t*. Article: *al-*. For detail information on Arabic Romanization, please refer the transliteration system of the Library of Congress (LC) Guidelines.

ستوديا إسلاميكا (ISSN 0215-0492; E-ISSN: 2355-6145) مجلة علمية دولية محكمة تصدر عن مركز دراسات الإسلام والمجتمع (PPIM) بجامعة شريف هداية الله الإسلامية الحكومية بجاكرتا، تعنى بدراسة الإسلام في إندونيسيا خاصة وفي جنوب شرقي آسيا عامة. وتستهدف المجلة نشر البحوث العلمية الأصيلة والقضايا المعاصرة حول الموضوع، كما ترحب بإسهامات الباحثين أصحاب التخصصات ذات الصلة. وتخضع جميع الأبحاث المقدمة للمجلة للتحكيم من قبل لجنة مختصة.

تم اعتماد ستوديا إسلاميكا من قبل وزارة البحوث والتكنولوجيا والتعليم العالي بجمهورية إندونيسيا باعتبارها دورية علمية (رقم القرار: 32a/E/KPT/2017).

ستوديا إسلاميكا عضو في CrossRef (الإحالات الثابتة في الأدبيات الأكاديمية) منذ ٢٠١٤، وبالتالي فإن جميع المقالات التي نشرتها مرقمة حسب معرّف الوثيقة الرقمية (DOI).

ستوديا إسلاميكا مجلة مفهرسة في سكوبس (Scopus) منذ ٣٠ مايو ٢٠١٥.

عنوان المراسلة:

Editorial Office:
STUDIA ISLAMIKA, Gedung Pusat Pengkajian
Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) UIN Jakarta,
Jl. Kertamukti No. 5, Pisangan Barat, Cirendeu,
Ciputat 15419, Jakarta, Indonesia.
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Website: http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/studia-islamika

قيمة الاشتراك السنوي خارج إندونيسيا:
للمؤسسات: ٧٥ دولار أمريكي، ونسخة واحدة قيمتها ٢٥ دولار أمريكي.
للأفراد: ٥٠ دولار أمريكي، ونسخة واحدة قيمتها ٢٠ دولار أمريكي.
والقيمة لا تشمل نفقة الإرسال بالبريد الجوي.

رقم الحساب:
خارج إندونيسيا (دولار أمريكي):
PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia
account No. 101-00-0514550-1 (USD).

داخل إندونيسيا (روبية):
PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia
No Rek: 128-00-0105080-3 (Rp).

قيمة الاشتراك السنوي داخل إندونيسيا:
لسنة واحدة ١٥٠,٠٠٠ روبية (للمؤسسة) ونسخة واحدة قيمتها ٥٠,٠٠٠ روبية، ١٠٠,٠٠٠ روبية (للفرد) ونسخة واحدة قيمتها ٤٠,٠٠٠ روبية.
والقيمة لا تشتمل على النفقة للإرسال بالبريد الجوى.

ستوديا إسلاميكا
مجلة إندونيسيا للدراسات الإسلامية
السنة الثالثون، العدد ١، ٢٠٢٣

ستوديا اسلاميا

ستودي اسلاميكا

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

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يولي ياسين