


STUDIA ISLAMIKA

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Firman Noor

Leadership and Ideological Bond: PPP and Internal Fragmentation in Indonesia

Abstract: *During 2014-2016, the United Development Party (PPP) experienced the most severe and prolonged internal fragmentation in its history. Since the beginning of 2014, the emergence of the twin Board of the Central Committee cemented the fragmentation that had occurred. Some people relate this phenomenon to the interests of the elites. However, the interest of the elites itself is something inevitable and in many cases is not necessarily the cause for prolonged fragmentation. The aim of this article, therefore, is to explain the factors that lead to the internal fragmentation. This article regards three main root-causes of the problem, namely (1) weak leadership, in particular the absence of a strong patron, which facilitates cadres' unrestricted freedom of action and makes them unable to maintain the Party unity, (2) the lack of an ideological bond that leads to the growth of exclusive-pragmatism, and (3) external factors, namely the government and coalition partners that are eager to preserve each conflicting group's position.*

Keywords: Islamic Party, Fragmentation, Leadership, Ideology, PPP.

Abstrak: *Sepanjang tahun 2014-2016, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) mengalami perpecahan internal yang terparah dan berkepanjangan dalam sejarah mereka. Munculnya dua kepemimpinan sejak awal 2014 turut memperkuat perpecahan yang telah terjadi. Beberapa kalangan berpendapat bahwa masalah ini terjadi karena berkaitan dengan kepentingan para elitnya. Walaupun kepentingan-kepentingan elit merupakan sesuatu yang tidak dapat dihindari dari sebuah perpecahan internal, namun dalam banyak kasus belum tentu hal tersebut menyebabkan perpecahan yang berkepanjangan. Artikel ini berusaha menjelaskan faktor-faktor penyebab perpecahan yang berkepanjangan di internal PPP. Artikel ini mengemukakan tiga faktor utama yang dapat menjelaskan fenomena itu, yaitu (1) kepemimpinan yang lemah, terutama tidak adanya patron yang kuat menyebabkan para kader dapat bertindak bebas, dan tidak mampu menjaga persatuan partai, (2) melemahnya ikatan ideologi partai, yang membawa kepada menguatnya sikap yang eksklusif-pragmatis pada sebagian kader mereka, dan (3) faktor eksternal, yaitu pemerintah dan mitra koalisi yang berhasrat dan berkepentingan memelihara posisi masing-masing pihak yang berkonflik.*

Kata kunci: Partai Islam, Fragmentasi, Kepemimpinan, Ideologi, PPP.

ملخص: يعاني حزب الاتحاد التنموي خلال الفترة من عام ٢٠١٤ إلى عام ٢٠١٦ الانقسامات الداخلية التي تُعدّ الأسوأ والأطول في تاريخ الحزب. ويعزز هذه الانقسامات التي حدثت منذ بداية عام ٢٠١٤. ويرى بعض المراقبين أن السبب في ذلك مرتبط بمصالح نخبة الحزب. وعلى الرغم من أن مصالح النخبة في حد ذاتها من الأمور التي لا يمكن فصلها من انقسامات داخلية، إلا أنها، وفي كثير من الحالات، ليست بالضرورة أن تؤدي إلى ما كان عليه الحزب حالياً ولفترات طويلة. وحاول هذا المقال تسليط الضوء على العوامل المؤدية إلى هذه الانقسامات، حيث قدم ثلاثة عوامل رئيسية يمكن أن تفسر هذه الظاهرة، وهي (١) القيادة الضعيفة، لا سيما عدم وجود راع قوي مما يؤدي إلى حرية غير مقيدة بمارسها كوادرات الحزب، إضافة إلى عدم قدرتهم على الحفاظ على وحدة الحزب؛ (٢) فقدان القيود الإيديولوجية للحزب، الأمر الذي أدى إلى تعزيز النموذج الفكري الاستثنائي والبراغماتي لدى بعض كوادرات الحزب؛ (٣) العامل الخارجي وهو الحكومة وشريك الائتلاف، حيث لكل منهما رغبة ومصالح في الحفاظ على هذا الصراع.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الحزب الإسلامي، التجزئة، القيادة، الإيديولوجيا، حزب الاتحاد التنموي.

In the post 2014 Election, the PPP, one of the Indonesian oldest Islamic parties established in 1973, once again experienced fragmentation. Since the first quarter of 2014 up to the beginning of 2016 there have been two camps: 1) a camp led by the General Chairperson of PPP Suryadharma Ali (2007-2014) and replaced by Djan Faridz and 2) a group led by Muhammad Romahurmuziy the former General Secretary of PPP (2011-2014) claiming themselves as the legitimate leadership of the Party. In the history of PPP this situation appeared to be the longest internal conflict, which was marked by the continuation of double leadership for over two years. Such prolonged turmoil was indeed detrimental to the future of the Party and this study aims at explaining some factors that lead to the internal political turmoil within the PPP.

On April 9th 2016 all participants attending the 8th PPP's Congress (*Muktamar*) approved Muhammad Romahurmuziy to be the next leader of the PPP. The accomplishment of this Congress, popularly called the "Muktamar Islah" (Reconciliation Congress), indicated the eagerness among factions inside the Party, which had been involved in prolonged conflict, to restore their relationship. The conflicting groups seemed to realize that the continuation of Party fragmentation would only endanger their political prospect; hence the only choice they had was to establish reconciliation. Many prominent *ulamā's* and senior members supported this action.

However, not all factions were eager to comply. Up until today, one of the important factions, led by Djan Faridz, which was previously part of Suryadharma Ali Camp, still rejects the implementation of "Muktamar Islah". This situation implies that the internal conflict has not been entirely reconciled by the Party. In responding to the situation Asrul Sani, General Secretary of the PPP, said that the conflict was not totally resolved (Taufiqurrohman 2016).

This contradiction reveals some of the Party's important characteristics, which have continuously influenced PPP's performance, particularly during the Reform era. The crisis of leadership is the first obvious fact of the above phenomenon. Over the past ten years, the absence of a strong leader, who could handily unite all of the Party's elements, has been a main characteristic of the Party. This particular situation to some extent reflects the background of existing factions that hold diverse perspectives or interests. The differences sometimes make unity a difficult reality.

The lack of a strong leader generated the rise of exclusive-partial factions and provided the opportunity for those factions to perform their ideals and maneuvers, including rallying support, in the name of the Party, to establish their position. To some extent, the presence of the 8th PPP's Congress was a reflection of the Romahurmuziy Group's success in developing political support and conducting its agendas. The freedom of action which was sometimes conducted by circumventing other groups' aspirations, became a common occurrence in the PPP and over time tended to be more inexorable, due to the lack of strong and respected Party leadership.

Besides the leadership problem, the PPP also seriously suffers from the lack of an ideological bond. Over time the decline of ideological factors that create unity, deteriorates the collective commitment based on similar visions or ideals, and increases the sense of individual-pragmatism, which eventually shakes internal solidity. In the current situation, several members are very enthusiastic to have "Muktamar Islah". Faridz as the leader of his faction stated that the aforementioned Congress was *haram* (forbidden) (Hidayat and Arkhelaus 2016), and accordingly as a Muslim it was an obligation to avoid it. Not only that, his faction also planned to set up a Muktamar Luar Biasa (Special Congress) as an alternative to the Muktamar Islah (Azis 2016a).

The weaker ideology gives a way for the escalation of pragmatic actions in this Party. In this regards, an individual's or group's initial commitment could be easily switched if it provides more political or material advantages. Some members of Faridz Camp, who were later identified as Suryadharmas' men, decided to attend the 8th PPP's Congress and join the PPP led by Romahurmuziy, their actions reflected the switching situation. Later their actions ruined the commitment and relationship between those people and Faridz Camp. Pragmatism also encourage cadres to put forward the spirit of 'the end justifies the means' and that included using an exclusive, one-sided interpretation of the law. Even though such an interpretation is controversial and debatable, it is justifiable and secured the agendas and actions. In the current case, the Romahurmuziy Camp and his supporters believed that the 8th PPP's Congress was in line with the spirit of the Supreme Court verdict that endorsed the PPP holding a Congress and establishing a new committee. However, the Faridz Camp regarded the 8th PPP's Congress, held by Romahurmuziy's Camp

to be in violation of the Supreme Court's decision, and thus considered illegal (Faiz 2016). According to Faridz Camp's interpretation, before the PPP could legally conduct a Congress, all groups or factions in the Party should first acknowledge the Djan Faridz's PPP leadership as the only legitimate PPP. This camp also believed that the 8th PPP's Congress was illegal since the legal status of the Romahurmuziy's PPP leadership was not clear (Azis 2016b). However, before both groups could settle this dispute, the Romahurmuziy Camp took action and held the 8th PPP's Congress. The Romahurmuziy Camp believed that such action was something that all members of the PPP should agree on as needed.

Beyond the two main reasons previously stated as problems, the 8th PPP's Congress also indicated that significant contributions stemmed from the government's initiative and policy. The government took the initiative to be a mediator between the Romahurmuziy Camp and the Faridz Camp in order to terminate a conflict between them. The Indonesian government's gesture in this instance involved top ranking government officials such as Vice President M. Jusuf Kalla and the Minister of Law and Human Rights Yasonna H. Laoly. The government, as an external factor, fully supported the implementation of the 8th PPP's Congress and provided special treatment by instantly providing the rare *Surat Keputusan* (decree) that legalized the new PPP Committee led by Romahurmuziy. Such special treatment could be seen as compensation for the Romahurmuziy Group. The group had been closely allied with the government since the previous year's presidential election. The Romahurmuziy Group was known to accommodate the government's political interests.

During crucial moments, the presence of external elements or factors were unavoidable and they significantly impacted the PPP, whether positive (uniting factor) or negative (fragmenting factor). It did not mean, however, the impacts of intervening factors were minor. In some cases, the external factors, whether from non-governmental groups or the government itself, usually intensified or increased tensions among the conflicting groups. In general, the external role strengthened the group's political bargaining *vis a vis* its opponent. However, for those that had the government as an ally, having such a relationship would usually provide more advantages, such as material support and political networking. More importantly, by securing government support they believed themselves as legitimate or as the constitutional group when compared to a rival.

The three main factors, the lack of strong leadership, a weak ideological bond, and external roles were in many aspects the key contributors in determining PPP's performance. These factors sometimes provided advantages for the PPP, but could also generate deadlock and worsen the relationship between conflicting cadres or factions in the Party. This article, however, does not deeply explore the phenomenon surrounding the 8th PPP's Congress. Instead, this article will discuss the three factors and the prolonged internal conflict prior to the implementation of the 8th PPP's Congress results.

However, it is important to note that such conflict is not unprecedented. In the first decade of Reform era, PPP had been confronted by two internal conflicts. In 1998 some cadres, who were mostly un-influential figures and members, decided to resign from PPP and established a new party. This new party was named the United Party (PP) with the expectation it would gain increased political advantages. This effort did not result in a significant adverse impact to the Party. It suffered more serious trouble when some important members of the Board of the Central Committee (DPP), led by a charismatic figure K.H. Zainuddin M.Z., established PPP-Reformasi in January 2002. The party was then renamed the Reformed Star Party (PBR). The establishment of the PBR was a response to Hamzah Haz's policy to postpone the 6th Congress implementation. Haz was the General Chairperson of PPP. Such a postponement, stipulated in the October 2001 National Working Congress (Mukernas), was regarded by the PPP-Reformasi as a manipulative movement to maintain the dominant power of Haz and his associate.

In the New Order era, it was the internal conflict and not a fragmentation that became "a trend" in this Party. This internal conflict was mainly triggered by the political struggle among four main organizations (*unsur*) from which the PPP has been established. Those organizations were Ulama Awakening Party (PNU), Indonesia Muslim Party (Parmusi/MI), Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII), and the Indonesia Islamic Education Union Party (Perti). The ego and self-interest of the organizations were responsible for such internal conflicts. The exclusive leadership of Jailani Naro, the cadre of Jamiatul Al-Wasliyah, one of MI's *onderbows*, caused the deterioration of the conflict. His tendency to eliminate NU's role in the Party or national politics provoked counter-attacks from NU's cadres. The 1980's may

be regarded as the most divisive moment among the organizations, particularly between NU and MI in PPP.

Despite the important role of the four organizations in the beginning of the Reform Era, the schism based on the origins of the organizations, appeared to be less important. The fact that the leaders of both conflicting groups in the current conflict come from NU's background, Haz versus K.H. Zainuddin M.Z. (2001-2002) and Suryadharma versus Romahurmuziy (2014-2016) confirmed this view. It seems there is a shift of root causes of the fragmentation that may be an interesting subject of study. Against this backdrop, the focus of this article is to identify the root causes of fragmentation in PPP. It is assumed that PPP's fragmentation is related to the Party's failure to manage their differences. This article also discusses their roles in creating current internal fragmentation that began from 2014 and continued until the beginning of 2016.

Some argued that Suryadharma's maneuver to attend the Greater Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) Party campaign in Gelora Bung Karno (GBK) was the main reason behind PPP fragmentation. However this article regards Suryadharma's maneuver as merely a trigger rather than the source of the problem, because Suryadharma's maneuver would not normally result fragmentation if it happened in "normal conditions". In other words, there were other underlying causes which prevented the Party to properly navigate the maneuver, thus creating prolonged conflict and ending in internal fragmentation.

Fragmentation in the Theoretical Context

The PPP has been an object of research for many scholars with various aspects of studies (Amir 2003; Anas 1997; Anwar, 1984; Haris 2007; Jihan, 1984; Rizali 1993; Rodja 1994; Sulastrri 1993, 157–181). Though some of the scholars discussed internal conflicts (Hakim 1993; Haris and Saidi 1991; Mahdi 2003; Sutia 1996; Yusuf 1984), they did not really address the root causes of the internal fragmentation. A specific study on the PPP internal fragmentation, particularly after 2014 Election, is indeed quite rare. The study on the internal dynamics of PPP from 1999-2014 conducted by Fananie (2015) alluded to an internal fragmentation, but he did not really focus the discussion on the root causes.

As the roots causes of the fragmentation are the main focus of this discussion, the theoretical framework in this article is based on the

concepts related to internal fragmentation causes and other related thoughts. Fragmentation is indicated by the presence of more than one group inside the Party claiming to be the real or legal representation of the Party. Internal conflict sometimes leads to fragmentation, but it is not necessarily the cause. Hence, discussing internal fragmentation, as the main focus of this article, essentially would be slightly different than discussing internal conflict. In relation to the internal fragmentation, many scholars have discussed and provided many answers for this matter. Some believed that weak leadership was the main cause of internal fragmentation. Brass (1965, 232–238) emphasized that leadership is an important factor for the establishment of internal solidarity. With the capacity to resolve conflict and to nurture loyalty, a leader should be the most important factor for securing the future of Party cohesion. In other words, the Party's failure to generate credible leadership will lead to internal disruption within the Party.

Similarly, Weiner (1957) argued that the leaders' important roles, in maintaining party solidarity, are to achieve compromise among factions within the party, to provide a source of prestige for the members, and to define the values articulation. He also added that building tolerance among factions and establishing equal agreement on the party's ideals are important factors in strengthening party solidarity (Weiner 1957, 241–242). Furthermore, a charismatic leader may also increase the unity of the party and prevent it from fragmenting. The study on the Socialist Worker Party in Spain indicated that the role of a charismatic leader is one of important factors in strengthening party solidarity (Bell and Shaw 1994). According to the Panebianco Party, a charismatic leader should act as a unifying symbol and provide beneficial guidance (Panebianco 1988, 65–67). The absence of a charismatic leader or strong patron creates difficulty when a party seeks to establish and maintain internal solidarity.

Apart from the leadership factor, some scholars have pointed out that the failure to uphold ideological unity was the main cause behind the fragmentation. The study of Fickett (1976), related to the party's fragmentation, indicated that the difficulties in understanding the conflict between elites was the actual root of the internal fragmentation. In support of that opinion, Bell and Shaw (1974, 175) presented Western democratic political perspectives and indicated that comprehending and implementing ideology is a main cause for political party's turmoil

regarding internal solidarity. Singh (1975, 12–16) believed that political parties that put more emphasis on their ideologies rather than other pragmatist causes, as a unifying factor, would most likely be successful in maintaining their internal solidarity. According to Kumar (1990, 328), ideology can play a unifying role among factions and could be an important position for strengthening internal organizations. Having a strong ideological bond would increase the party's ability to maintain unity. Likewise, the failure to establish such a bond could potentially lead to internal fragmentation.

As for Indonesia's case, the Subekti's study (2014) on the internal fragmentation of PSII in 1970s revealed the role of government plays a part in determining the party's internal situation, which then tends to increase conflict and create fragmentation. Another factor that also played an important role is conflicts from the elites, a situation that weakens internal leadership. Her study stated that a prolonged elite dispute created a severe internal split and led to the New Order regime which intervened and supported the government's political interests. Such intervention is used to purge any factions that possess anti-government tendencies and eventually undermine the party's ability to play a significant role in national politics. In his study on the National Awakening Party (PKB), Kamarudin (2008, 257–258) identified factors behind internal fragmentation within a political party. According to him, personal leadership policies that lack compliance with internal political party systems or rules is one of the main factors that creates disappointment. The failure to reach compromise between factions also contributes to fragmentation. Therefore, the presence of external factors that influence the internal conflicts exacerbate the fragmentation rather than settle it. The practice of pragmatism (or self-interest orientation) among members tends to worsen the conflict-of-interest issues and obliterates the unity of the party (Kamarudin 2008, 261–262). Besides other possible factors, the studies of Subekti and Kamarudin inferred that the role of external factors could not be neglected when addressing the root causes of internal fragmentation within political parties.

Moreover, some scholars indicated a correlation between the institutionalized party and the factions that lead to party fragmentation. Noor (2015) pointed out that an un-institutionalized party, indicated by the existence of a weak system and the low level of value infusion, would be more vulnerable to party fragmentation rather than the institutionalized

one. Fananie (2015) also maintained a similar conclusion. He believed the party that had weak institutionalization, in which traditional leadership tendency still existed, tended to fail in solving the expansion of factionalism and internal contention. Randall and Svasand (2002, 13) highlighted that in a situation where the party's members and supporters could gain similar identity, preserve commitment, and institutionalize internal values that party cohesion would be easier to establish. The above-mentioned studies concluded that in the absence of common identity and commitment in a party, the opportunity would arise for members to pursue their own self-interest without any hesitation or constraint.

From the previous analysis it is evident that some dominant factors are regarded as the root causes of fragmentation. These factors could be categorized into three groups. The first group is related to the lack of strong leadership which is caused by the weak institutionalization of the party. In the case of PPP, the weak institutionalization was worsened by the absence of charismatic or strong leadership, which eventually opened opportunities for the elites to freely act based on their exclusive interests. The second group is the lack of an ideological bond or significant party role, an identifiable purpose. The lack of an ideological bond or values that bind and unite all members as one, solid body could be harmful to the party solidarity, as when internal differences regarding the party vision or strategy create divisive opinions and actions. In the case of the PPP, the reduced importance of ideology in its daily life has created egocentrism that exacerbates conflict and eventually diminishes the sense of unity and togetherness

The third group is the involvement of external factors that usually make the conflict more complicated and the compromise more difficult to reach. Such external factors may be government, non-governmental institutions, or political coalitions which have some political deals with factions within a party. The next discussion proves that the complexity of the roots causes of internal fragmentation within the PPP is not merely about individual political interests or individual maneuvers prior to the 2014 Election.

The Presence of Suryadharma in the Gerindra Campaign: A Trigger

In March 23rd 2014, the General Chairperson of PPP Suryadharma Ali attended the last day of the Gerindra Party campaign in GBK. His attendance at the occasion, together with Djan Faridz and K.H.

Nur Iskandar S.Q, drew public attention. Prabowo Subianto, the Chairperson of Advisory Board of Gerindra, was very surprised by the presence of Suryadharma. For some attendees, his surprise indicated that Prabowo had not invited Suryadharma and never expected him to be present at his Party's campaign. Some people, however, assumed that because Prabowo was not sure that Suryadharma would accept his invitation, one was not issued, thus, the presence of Suryadharma surprised him.¹

By wearing green, the PPP's formal attire, selected individuals were invited to come to the podium and join with Gerindra's elites to speak. At the podium, Suryadharma loudly shouted "long live Gerindra" several times. He also gave a political oration that clearly indicated his support for Prabowo to become the next Indonesian President. For many people his attendance and speech were quite unusual, but for Suryadharma it was appropriate and most importantly still in line with the Party's interest, namely establishing political networking and probing political opportunities particularly in the months prior to the presidential election. Moreover, for him it was also a normal response for Prabowo's sympathetic invitation.

For some cadres Suryadharma's maneuver not only exceeded his authority but also had clearly disrespected the Party's dignity, including their policies and the members of the committee. For the previous reasons and the fact that Suryadharma did not communicate his attendance to the other members of DPP, some cadres were quite angry (Hariansib.co 2014). They regarded Suryadharma's maneuver, including yelling "long live Gerindra" as having degraded the PPP and Gerindra (Susila 2014). His positive gesture to support Prabowo, a figure that was actually not on the PPP's Presidential Candidate nomination list, also upset the Party's internal agreement. For all these reasons, some cadres started to openly criticize him. Over time, this critical attitude gained massive support, mainly among the PPP's elites and members of the DPP, and eventually ended with the provisional dismissal of Suryadharma from his position within the Party on April 18th, 2014. The decision to dismiss him was stipulated in the meeting of the Executive Board.

Suryadharma's maneuver should not have been used as the main reason for his dismissal, let alone a reason engendering prolonged conflict. It soon became obvious that the dismissal of Suryadharma was indicative of a larger problem. The sources of the problem did not

rest solely on the presence of Suryadharma in the Gerindra's campaign. Suryadharma was suspected of corruption and on September 10th 2014 due to this legal status the Party once again dismissed him. This abrupt decision then triggered an escalation in conflict ended on April 23rd - 24th 2014. Reconsideration of the issues and events indicated that other fundamental problems within the Party could also be regarded as the reasons behind the PPP's internal fragmentation.

The Absence of a Central Figure and Uncontrollable Maneuvers

The absence of central figures could actually provide benefits for an institutionalized party. In fact that is one of the indicators of institutionalized party. However for an un-institutionalized party, the lack of a central figure could possibly lead to many disadvantages. The accumulated results of a weak system and the absence of a strong patron might cause some complexities for the party. The next section will discuss the effects of the absence of a strong figure, the emergence of unwieldy behaviors and maneuvers, and the failure to uphold the reconciliation between the two conflicting groups, which led to prolonged conflict that further impacted the Party's cohesion.

Strong Figure Deficiency in the PPP

For most parties in the Reform Era, the strong figures or patrons still played a salient role, due to their strong influence on almost all aspects (Noor 2012; Sugiarto 2006; Tan 2006). These figures, who were mainly founders of the Party, played a huge role in establishing, running, and eventually maintaining the existence of the Party. Their influence was the inevitable result since the development of the Party often depended on their networking, and financial or political resources. For some figures, their role was more than just being a Party symbol; they also served the determining factor for almost anything, including the Party's organizational structure and policies.

On one hand, the absence of a patron enabled the Party to evolve based on collective agreement and consent. It also enabled them to preserve the Party system and continuously develop toward higher levels. The values and existing system was the source of cadre loyalty rather than figures or individuals. Moreover, the decision making process was based on the spirit of objectivity, democracy and more systematic approaches.

On the other hand, the absence of central figures tended to deteriorate the Party's performance and solidarity. As mentioned by Kumar (1990) and Panebianco (1988), a strong and charismatic leader is sometimes needed. In the Indonesian case, a strong leader could be a mediator for modernizing the political parties (Tohari 2015). For political parties who lack institutionalization and tend to override and misuse rules, the presence of charismatic or strong figure is sometimes needed to act as an arbitrary power, particularly to impede illegal, exclusive or individual maneuvers conducted by some elites or factions. In short, the importance of strong figures serves to ensure the direction of the party and to preserve internal unity.

In relation to this, the PPP itself had been a Party without a strong patron inside. After some charismatic figures passed away, mostly during the New Order period, Party cadres could not rely on any strong figures to run their Party with strong leadership. In addition, the PPP is far from being a well institutionalized party. The P2P-LIPI's research showed that the quality of the Party's institutionalization is still low particularly with respect to ideology, internal conflict management and internal cohesion (Haris 2007, 23–49). Therefore, the situation of the PPP is very complex and needs particular effort to reconsolidate its internal balance and solidity the organization. In relation to the internal management, the situation has complicated the attempt to resolve the conflict. Romahurmuzyi even stressed that one of important lessons from the current conflict was that the Party needed a strong figure or patron to lead. He then concluded that a "Patron is a necessity for every single party in Indonesia, and its absence will only lead to conflict".²

Suryadharma's position, as the general chairperson of the PPP, did not necessarily make him a central figure or patron, let alone a charismatic leader. Even though Congress of the PPP chose him as the leader, for many cadres, particularly elites and senior figures, he was not considered to be a credible patron who had earned respect or obedience. Some of the members even stated that Suryadharma was not a promising figure that would be able to bring the PPP to a better situation, let alone lead a country (Interview, Jakarta, December 18th, 2015). Moreover, some elites and seniors held important positions in the DPP before Suryadharma, thus he was not really a *senior* figure in terms of serving the Party. The elites and seniors included Emron Pangkapi, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, and Irgan Chairul Mahfiz, all

of them then joined Romahurmuzyi Camp. In short, Suryadharma's influence in the PPP was basically not strong enough. The situation indicated that no one served as the patron for the Party. The next discussion will be about the situation and explain how such a situation negatively impacted the Party.

Uncontrollable Maneuvers

A Freedom to Act and Unreliable-Unilateral Policies

Prior to and during the 2014 turmoil, some uncontrolled maneuvers were obvious. The maneuvers were carried out in an effort to establish legitimacy for each camp's position on issues such as internal leadership, the president's candidacy, and how the Party should respond to the present Government. The absence of a patron provided each contentious camp opportunities to make decisions on many important matters and to adamantly claim their position as legitimate policy. The abrupt decisions and dismissal were some of the main results. However, the decision making process itself indicated an oligarchy tendency, which tended to neglect a collaborative process. They, for instance, did not build a systematic approach towards the seniors, let alone cadres, to have second opinions on a policy. Almost all political approaches in the decision making process were conducted to have nothing but personal approval or justification from some senior figures, such as K.H. Maimoen Zubair, to simply defend and justify their position, which strengthened the contention between both camps.

When the Party's priorities were clearly understood, Suryadharma's presence at Gerindra's last Campaign was "understandable" and was reported to the DPP. Suryadharma then accused Party members who disagreed with him of being traitors, accusing them of using that moment to overthrow him from his position. Based on this reasoning, Suryadharma then stipulated a tough approach for those accused cadres, who had persuaded other party's members to disobey him. He then decided to dismiss some cadres who also were the members of the DPP. Suryadharma's exclusive policy on those "dissident cadres" was actually a response to their rejection of his president candidacy proposal a year before and some of Suryadharma's policies afterward. For Suryadharma and his supporters, all PPP cadres should ideally be more than willing to support his proposals and demands, as he was the General Chairperson of PPP.³

Self-centered maneuvers by Suryadharma were also reflected in last minute decisions to support Prabowo Subianto in the 2014 Presidential Election. After Megawati Soekarnoputri rejected his invitation and did not approve his recommendation, as advised by PPP's elites, the discussion led to the possibility of the PPP supporting Joko Widodo in the next presidential election. Instead of warmly accepting the invitation, the daughter of Soekarno preferred to appoint her daughter Puan Maharani and Tjahjo Kumolo as her representatives for that occasion. Suryadharma considered the rejection as arrogance on Soekarno's daughter's part and a humiliation on him because it seemed that she valued him at the same level as her daughter. He was really upset and cancelled the occasion. This personal disappointment, along with other reasons, motivated him to give his support to Prabowo.⁴

Suryadharma held firmly to his decision and utterly struggled for it in the forum of the II Rapimnas (National Leadership Meeting) PPP (May 10th-12th 2014). On that occasion he promoted once again Prabowo and asked attendees to follow his will. During that event, Joko Widodo's supporters took defensive positions but finally succumbed their interest as Suryadharma's intransigence seemed unstoppable (Interview with Muhammad Romahurmuziy, Jakarta, December 25th, 2015). On May 12th 2014 the PPP then officially declared its support for Prabowo (Sembiring, 2014). However, for the Joko Widodo supporters, it did not mean relinquish their commitment to support Joko Widodo.

Suryadharma's loyalty to Prabowo was followed by his strong support of the Koalisi Merah Putih (Red-White Coalition, KMP), a coalition consisting of Prabowo's supporting Parties, after the 2014 Presidential Election. Even though for many the PPP's members continued support of the KMP was pointless, at least according to Romahurmuziy's Camp, it had clearly betrayed the PPP. It was essential for Suryadharma to continue supporting the KMP. Hence he rejected any attempts to separate the PPP from the KMP. Thus Suryadharma's inflexibilities eventually triggered antipathy and uncertainty in the PPP. Suryadharma's troubling attitudes were not easy to cope with, especially since there was an absence of a strong person (or institution) that could warn and stop him. Over time, Suryadharma eventually faced a strong and solid opposition toward his stubbornness.

On the other hand, to some extent, Suryadharma's opponent also took a similar attitude. They also tended to act without restraint, including the controversial ways, to reach their goals. The absence of an arbitrator or a strong patron provided them a good chance to constantly criticize Suryadharma's policies and destabilized his position. This camp for instance declared a motion of no confidence (*mosi tidak percaya*) not long after the Gerindra Campaign affair. For some, such a motion was unnecessary and even counterproductive for Party solidity. However, such maneuvers still continue because no element in the Party was able to prevent it.

This Camp also unilaterally fired Suryadharma twice. They dismissed Suryadharma from his position on April 18th 2014 through an Executive Leadership of the Central Board (PH DPP) meeting, without Suryadharma's attendance. They charged Suryadharma with committing political maneuvers without the consent of the Party's members and to some extent Suryadharma had downgraded the Party's image by openly supporting Prabowo. Secondly, they dismissed Suryadharma on September 10th 2014, using similar medium. Romahurmuziy Camp charged him for his status as the suspect of corruption. On this occasion they offered two options for Suryadharma namely, (1) that he agree to resign or (2) if he did not agree, then the PH DPP would purge him from his position. Since Suryadharma left the forum to show his disagreement towards those options, the Romahurmuziy Camp decided to dismiss Suryadharma from his position.

Besides continuously undermining Suryadharma's position, the Romahurmuziy Camp was also decisive about changing Party policies. For instance they switched the Party's coalition policy from initially being a part of the KMP to becoming a member of the KIH. This decision was exclusively made without a proper consultation with other elements inside the Party. Not long after the PPP was totally unsuccessful in holding any significant positions in parliament, Romahurmuziy and his fellows immediately decided to leave the KMP. This abrupt and stunning decision was not only confusing other members of the KMP but also their KIH rival.

Eventually the continual discrediting of Suryadharma was not always found to be favorable with other PPP's cadres. Many cadres started to defend their Party's General Chairperson and to maintain

his policies or positions.⁵ For instance, they regarded Suryadharma's attendance in Gerindra Campaign to be in line with the spirit of Party's policy to open up political communication with other parties. Dimiyati Natakusumah said that:

SDA (Suryadharma Ali) as a general chairperson was given a mandate by the Rapimnas to evaluate all president candidates. (For this reason) it is actually possible for Pak SDA to join any relevant occasions (including Gerindra Campaign). However, since SDA had been heavily challenged by other long before, his attendance in Gerindra Campaign becomes a trigger for conflict.⁶

They also did not accept an accusation, spread by Romahurmuziy group, that Suryadharma was a source of the PPP's failure in the 2014 Election, they denied his attendance at the Gerindra Campaign severely damaged the Party's image before the mainly Muslim voters. For them, in fact, the PPP's achievement in the 2014 Election was better than the previous election, because the Party secure more votes. Over time, the number of Suryadharma supporters increased and defending Ali became one of their main goals.

The absence of a respected patron drove each group to persistently dwell on their respective stances and interests. The dispute largely was about the status of the Chairperson. Both the Suryadharma and Romahurmuziy camps continuously claimed that their leadership of the PPP was the legitimate one. Each camp's policy on the Party's stance towards the new government was consistently contradictory. While the PPP-Suryadharma/Faridz decided to keep a distance from the government and stayed in the KMP, the PPP-Romahurmuziy joined the government and preferred to be part of the KIH. In the recent developments, however, the PPP's Faridz modified its political preference by providing an opportunity to join and support the Joko Widodo Government. However, this decision did not automatically become a catalyst for reconciliation due to some unsolved agreements on principles and matters between this camp and the PPP-Romahurmuziy group, including acknowledging the other camp's position and on the issue of Party leadership.

Ignoring Each Other and Party's Rule Manipulation

Not having a respected leader or patron, to some extent, caused the lack of aptitude in the PPP to preserve Party unity, including a low

tolerance of the diversity and differences. This eventually led to the tendency of ignoring or avoiding each other. Each camp then developed exclusive perspectives in almost all important issues with zero tolerance to the other. Unfortunately, such attitudes and interests meant the stepping aside of the rules of the game, including acts of manipulation and twisting the Statue of the Party (AD/ART). It is evident when they tried to pursue dismissal processes.

The tendency to disregard the Party's rule was evident in April 2014. The abrupt decision to dismiss some Party's cadres including the Vice I Chairperson of the PPP, Suharso Monoarfa, and some Board of Regional Committees (DPW) PPP chairpersons, actions on April 16th 2014 proved this tendency. Suryadharma considered that his decision for Suharso and others was lawful. He also believed that this action was still in accordance with his authority as the Party's leader to save the PPP from disloyal members' maneuvers. Suryadharma eventually also purged Romahurmuziy from his position, two days later for disobedience, even though the allegation had not been clearly and officially proven. Not only that, Suryadharma also unilaterally dismissed 15 Party officials, including the Secretary General and some Vice Chairpersons, on September 12th 2014. The results due to some allegations including the attempt to oust his position as the Party's Chairperson through an improper forum and to support Joko Widodo Government (Setiawan, Yulika, Rahman, 2014).

Based on the Party's constitution, particularly *Anggaran Rumah Tangga* (ART), the process of cadre dismissal could not be unilaterally conducted and would take some time before the Party could finally decide its verdict. The 2011 ART of PPP Article 10 (2), (7) and (8) stated that the dismissal of a member of DPP must be conducted during PH DPP meeting, and at such time, his or her fault should be clearly proven. Moreover, the letter of notification should be given to the accused member three times before the dismissal process could proceed (The 2011 ART of PPP Article 4 [3]). This complex and long process of dismissal indicated that Suryadharma's abrupt decision to purge some Party elites was not in concordance with the spirit of Party's constitution.

On the other hand, the Romahurmuziy Camp had also held an exclusive perspective on the matters of dismissal, which for some was quite deceptive. This group fired Suryadharma from his position as

General Chairperson twice during the six month period. They accused Suryadharma of taking adverse actions and for that reason the DPP implemented the 2011 ART of PPP Article 10 (1.d), (2), (7) and (8) which stated that the Party was entitled to dismiss a member of central executive board meeting who was proven to have committed detrimental actions for the Party. The similar accusation was also implemented for the second dismissal by using the same forum held on September 9th-12th 2014. This time the main reason was related to the status of Suryadharma for suspected misconduct relating to the ministerial operational fund, particularly for the implementation of pilgrim, fraud and corruption. This camp believed that with such a status Suryadharma was entitled to be fired (Suryana 2014).

However, according to Ali's supporters, the constitution allowed the dismissal of the Party's General Chairperson only through Congress as the highest meeting level in the PPP or at least in the forum of Special Congress. The main reason for this opinion was that the General Chairperson was directly elected by thousands of Congress attendances. Hence, the exclusive and limited forum like PH DPP or Rapimnas could not replace Congress. In this logic, as the PPP General Chairperson elected in Bandung Congress (2009), Suryadharma could be only dismissed in the Congress or similar forum and not in the other forums, including Rapimnas (Setyadi 2014a). Syaifullah Tamliha stated that the dismissal of Suryadharma through Rapimnas clearly went against the real spirit of Party's constitution (Interview with Syaifullah Tamliha, Jakarta, December 18th, 2015). For Faridz, such a dismissal indicated that the Romahurmuziy Camp did not comprehend the rules of the game (Munir 2014).

Controversies regarding the process of dismissal were time consuming as both sides persistently maintained the legality of their respective actions. Instead of trying to find a middle way or a comprehensive solution, each camp believed that it was reasonable to treat the dismissed members as outsiders, having no right as Party members. Both camps also paid little attention to any recommendations, including those from the elder cadres like K.H. Maimoen Zubair (Jazuli, 2014), to find a mutually agreeable solution through a reconciliation as soon as possible.

The controversy also appeared on issues related to the role of Party Court (*Mahkamah Partai*) and the implementation of the 8th PPP's

Congress. The Romahurmuziy Camp held the 8th PPP's Congress on October 15th-18th 2014 in Surabaya, although *Mahkamah Partai* had actually not yet decided the date and place of the Congress. On the other hand, according to the Party's constitution, *Mahkamah Partai* was the only body that was entitled to provide any necessary policies or decrees for conflict resolution as provided in the 2011 ART of PPP Article 19 (1.a). The *Mahkamah Partai*, led by Chozin Chumaidy one of senior figures in the PPP, finally made eight points in relation to the conflict resolution, they were noted in the decree number 49/PIP/MP-DPP.PPP/2014. One of the points affirmed that in the situation where both camps did not reach reconciliation, and the DPP was not able to decide the date of Congress, the *Majelis Syariah* (the Board of Islamic Law) was the entitled body for making a decision on the date of Congress.

The appointment of *Majelis Syariah* to be a decider for the date of implementation of the 8th PPP's Congress was most likely related to the existence of K.H. Maimoen Zubair, the chairman of this body. The decree also noted that the DPP that was led by Suryadharma (the General Chairperson) and Romahurmuziy (the General Secretary), and that the Bandung DPP, should be considered the only legitimate leadership of the Party until the implementation of the 8th PPP's Congress. In relation to this, the Party then rehabilitated Suryadharma and restored his position as the legitimate leader of the PPP. The *Mahkamah Partai's* decision to rehabilitate Suryadharma was in accordance with its function according to the 2011 ART of PPP Article 19 (1.c), that explained one of its functions as the institution meant it could review the DPP's decision of dismissal. The Suryadharma Camp agreed with the argument on the right of *Mahkamah Partai* and regarded it as the legitimate one in accordance with the Party's constitution and the Law on Political Parties (UU No.2/2011 Article 32 [1]-[5]).⁷

However, the Romahurmuziy Camp disagreed with the logic and then rejected *Majelis Syariah's* authority regarding the implementation of Congress, including it being in deciding the date and place of the Congress. This rejection was also a refusal towards the *Mahkamah Partai* decree. This camp reckoned that such an authority was not mentioned in the Party's constitution. The *Mahkamah Partai* had authority only to decide which camp was actually legal to represent the PPP; and to recommend for each conflicting group to establish a reconciliation.⁸

Moreover, this camp also believed that Article 16 of the Party's constitution did not mention any single rights of *Majelis Syariah* that could be used as a legal foundation to decide the date and place of Congress implementation. Furthermore Romahurmuziy said:

Mahkamah Partai announced a decree on the implementation of Congress, a thing that we actually did not ask at all. In our perspective, *Mahkamah Partai* had made decision beyond its jurisdiction and exceeded its domain of authority...In the organizational context, *Majelis Syariah* did not have authority to hold Congress. That is why we then said that *Mahkamah Partai* acted like as its wish.⁹

In addition, this camp, was actually the DPP who had the authority to determine the date and place of Congress. Since the only legitimate DPP was the one that was led by the duo of Emron-Romahurmuziy, no other institution could replace the PPP Emron-Romahurmuziy's authority to decide the 8th PPP's Congress. For this reason, the Surabaya Congress that was arranged by them was the only legitimate Congress for the PPP. This Congress then elected and inaugurated Romahurmuziy as the new General Chairperson of the PPP.

The Suryadharma Camp, on the other hand, disagreed with such a standpoint. Instead, this camp totally supported *Majelis Syariah's* stance on the illegality of Surabaya Congress (Taufiqurrohman 2014; Wijaya 2014; Huda 2014). For that reason, similar to the *Majelis Syariah*, the Suryadharma Camp rejected the legality of the PPP Romahurmuziy and other decisions or policies of the Surabaya Congress. Another reason for Suryadharma's Camp to refuse the PPP-Surabaya existence was the fact that it was declared before the new government was formed. It means, unlike the PPP-Jakarta, the Romahurmuziy PPP had broken the Party's constitution (the 2011 ART of PPP Article 19 [1.a]) which stated that the DPP should hold the implementation of Congress at least one year after the establishment of new government. The dispute on the previous matters continued and could not effectively be coped with by any individuals or institutions within the Party.

Their standpoint on the role of the *Majelis Syariah* remains controversial until today. The irreconcilable viewpoints make any attempts to explore compromise difficult. In fact, they keep establishing more local board committees to show that their existence was really supported by the people at the grass-roots level. In many regions, the presence of the organization's dual structure has become another

problem. The absence of an internal push factor also made *islrah*, that provisionally took place in April 2014, become artificial. Consequently, the conflict should be referred to a national court. Unfortunately, the judgment of the Court could not bring the two factions to accept reconciliation. The verdict of Supreme Court which was in favor of the Faridz camp did not make Romahurmuziy concede and acknowledge the legitimacy of the Faridz Camp.

The Lack of an Ideological Bond: Factionalism Escalation

A strong ideological bond that united the Party's cadres based on idealism or value consciousness is a necessary factor for maintaining the integrity of the Party. It will also help settle any disputes which may arise. The lack of such an ideological bond gives rise to exclusive-pragmatism and weakens the sense of togetherness which over time leads to antagonism. The next discussion will show that the lack of an ideological bond within the PPP was an instrumental factor for the prolonged internal conflict.

Pragmatism as a Basis

The failure to ensure the sanctity of an ideology as the ultimate guidance of individual conduct and the policy making process has been an impediment within the PPP from time to time. Haris' study on the Party clearly suggested that during New Order period (1991) or Reform Era (2007), ideology was far from being influential in the Party and took a peripheral role or was merely empty jargon. Not only that, member's understanding of the Party's ideology was generally weak (Interview with Syaifullah Tamliha, Jakarta, December 18th, 2015). Some cadres believed that the lack of proper human resource development was the main factor behind this weakness.¹⁰

Such a shortcoming eventually engenders the rise of exclusive-pragmatic orientation, fulfilled by mainly practical, reactionary and even opportunistic considerations.¹¹ On the other hand, these pragmatic orientations generated "relativity" or the absence of an exact and clear guidance for cadres to follow. It then also creates inability to move cadres toward the same position or one direction based on similar opinions and interests. In this circumstance, pragmatism ruled, and created a situation where an exclusive-pragmatic policy was sometimes responded to or even fought with another exclusive-pragmatic attitude. As a consequence,

it was clear that pragmatic awareness rather than ideological interests dictated the Party's policies and maneuvers, which in the long run side stepped idealism, collective interests and eventually internal unity.

The Lost of the Sense of Unity

Divided Loyalty

Currently the conflict shows that some important policies were not based on ideological considerations. Important decisions, including the Party's candidate in the 2014 presidential election, was not something "sacred" to the cadres and many were mainly driven by individual-pragmatism, as they did not have a strong sense of connection or belonging related to the policies.

The lack of ideologically founded policies or decisions made the process unstable and easily challenged. Thus, it was conceivable that the PPP supported Subianto even though his name was not on the list of the PPP presidential candidates. On the other hand, it was possible to cancel the PPP's commitment and policy to be loyal supporters of Subianto and to stay in the KMP through a quick and exclusive decision.

In its development, the pragmatic policies, with more emphasis on pragmatic political issues rather than ideological based attitudes, served as a "big hope" for both camps. Each camp believed such hope should be a salvation for the Party. For them, if the Party could not hold this hope, disasters would come to the Party as a result. Not only that, the presence of the big hope over time created a sense of "identity" or "collectivity" among their respective supporters. It then triggered the spirit of togetherness and established virtual loyalty. Hence, joining the KMP, for instance, provided a hope and "identity" for the Suryadharma Camp. On the other hand, to be part of the government and the KIH had been a *raison de etre* for the Romahurmuziy Camp. This spirit or identity would not last very long as the sense of pragmatism was the driving force behind it. However since the hope remains prospective for both camps, it could maintain the sense of togetherness.

However, loyalty eventually was not dedicated to the Party; rather it was submitted to the factions. Indeed, in this situation, factionalism has been more relevant to the life of the Party as opposed to the collective interest of all members of the Party. Such sentiment spurred inappropriate competition between the two camps. The Romahurmuziy Camp's attitude to purge Suryadharma, for instance, was mainly to

gain political and financial advantages and hold a significant “progress” that would be impossible to reach if Suryadharma was still in charge. Romahurmuzyi said that Suryadharma must be removed first, otherwise the plan to be part of the government, that would provide noteworthy resources and benefits, would always face a huge obstacle. He stated that “...if Pak Surya had not been ousted yet, the PPP could not be turned to be a government supporter. Hence, he must go...”.¹² On the other hand, for Suryadharma’s supporters it was important to be part of his camp because they would be provided with benefits such as having a strong chance to dominate and hold significant positions in the Party, by filling the positions that were left by the Romahurmuzyi loyalists. Thus, it was clear that the lack of ideology affection and consciousness divided the cadres’ loyalty and enhanced the ever widening chasm of factionalism between them.

The High Level of Camp’s Egoism

In the situation where pragmatism became superior, egoism was another inevitable consequence along with factionalism. In this case, those who held different viewpoints would be easily regarded by other cadres as a major competitor or even as the greatest foe with the potential to obstruct their big hope. Interestingly, such egoism had occurred in the Party before the Reform Era. Around thirty years ago, Saifuddin Zuhri, former Minister of Religion and a PPP senior figure, had discussed the problem of egoism in the Party. For him egoism became obvious and had negative impact on the PPP and the country. Zuhri (1984, 7–8) stated that:

The thing that created crisis in PPP was the lack of values equilibrium. It was clear that the egoism, which then generated egocentrism, fostered subconscious shock. The image (for having it) could contaminate the culture of leadership...It was due to simply sick subconscious, moral gradation and the crisis of egoism, the politics then become automatically a filthy thing, a pollution that devastate the lung or even the heart of a nation.

In such an atmosphere a different opinion, which was not extraordinary and normally solved judiciously, could be easily justified as a serious violation, and for that reason deserve to be given heavy punishment. This phenomenon became obvious during the post 2014 II Mukernas (National Organization Meeting). Suryadharma’s policy to

dismiss some DPP members and DPW chairpersons who disagreed with his policy and maneuvers was one of the main examples. Suryadharma sacked some people who had been identified as the main actors that consistently criticized him for his wrongdoings, such as his support for Subianto and for spreading a sense of disloyalty. Suryadharma's presence in the Gerindra Campaign was judged by the Romahurmuziy Camp as a serious violation, and for this reason Suryadharma deserved to be purged from his position. This situation indicated that a critical attitude or different opinions were equal to serious violations.

Moreover, egoism also appeared in the way they regarded their positions. Suryadharma sometimes regarded himself as "the president" who deserved to dismiss any disloyal or disobedient minister or his assistances.¹³ According to Suryadharma, his position as the chair of *formateur*, and a part of the VII Congress mandate, was the basis for his action. For Suryadharma his role, as the leading figure in the structure and membership of the 2011-2014 DPP, provided him the political and legal rights to dismiss any members of the DPP who were not in line with his vision and the general Party's policy. Thus, the second dismissal of some members of the DPP, including the general secretary of the PPP and later the all cadres who attended Surabaya Congress, confirmed his reasoning.

On the other hand, the Romahurmuziy Camp did not see Suryadharma's position in the same way. They simply regarded him as nothing more than a member of the DPP who possessed equal rights and obligations with other members. Thus, they believed that treating Suryadharma like other members of the DPP, including firing him before the PH DPP forum, was fair and legal (Anggriawan 2014). For this reason it can be understood why they pushed Suryadharma to resign in the PH DPP meeting. Around five months later this group dismissed Suryadharma for second time. They regarded his status, as a suspect of religious ministerial corruption case that had a bad impact on the PPP, in particular deteriorating Party's image, was equal to a heavy violation act and for this reason it was more than enough for the Party to sack Suryadharma from his position.

The persistent attitude was also reflected by each group's adamant stance on how to respond the new government. On the one hand, Suryadharma insisted on support for Prabowo and maintained his preference, until the moment of the III Mukernas 2014, which finally

stated the PPP political position of supporting Prabowo in the 2014 Presidential Election. The close relation with Prabowo and other of his supporting parties, built mainly during the campaign of the presidential election period motivated Suryadharma to prefer joining the KMP and being in government opposition. Suryadharma consistently held this policy, even though many cadres started to question and even criticized the political advantages for the PPP to be part of the KMP. This question arose and found its relevance after the PPP's failure to secure any important positions in parliament. Over time, the stubborn attitude triggered obstinate resistance from other cadres, which then proved to be harmful for Party solidarity.

On the other hand, the Romahurmuziy Camp also gave a similar gesture. This group also took a stubborn attitude in defending its interest. The concern to be part of the Widodo's followers resulted in Ali's dismissal in April 18th 2014. Even though the PPP provisionally agreed to support Prabowo during the campaign time, the main obsession never totally evaporated. When there was a chance to reemerge, this group would properly use that moment to undergo a change of ideals. The opportunity occurred when the Joko Widodo Government signaled the opportunity to establish mutual relation with this group. As a response, this camp not only unilaterally announced the cancelation of PPP's commitment to KMP but more importantly, for a second time, dismissed Suryadharma from his position. He was a figure that was regarded as the main obstacle. Until 2016, the previous policies were obstinately embraced by this group.

Moreover, the rejection of the *Mahkamah Partai* policy was also a reflection of egoism. Romahurmuziy Camp ideally should have acknowledged and paid serious attention to the institutions who had the legal right to be in charge of the conflict resolution. However, this camp insisted that those institutions, the *Mahkamah Partai* and *Majelis Syariah*, had nothing to do with the Congress. The Surabaya Congress, in other words, had abandoned the *Majelis Syariah's* policy, which for some also indicated the desertion Zubair's existence. According to Syaifullah Tamliha, the rejection on K.H. Maimoen Zubair's recommendation showed clear evidence of the absence of an ideological bond behind the cadres' behavior.¹⁴ This situation portrayed how the rise of pragmatism not only had endorsed uncontrollable situations but it also generated the abandonment of party institutions and respect for the Party's figures.

Eventually egoism was also reflected by the reluctance to build intensive communication between the conflicting groups. Communication was not properly measured and the substance tended to be monologues instead of dialogues. They sometimes attacked each other using the mass media, including social media, by using words such as childish, stubborn, even *oknum* (unscrupulous) (Ali 2014) to describe their opponents. In this situation, they did not have a strong eagerness to carry out a reconciliation process. The fact was that the word of *islah* was something easy to say rather than to do. Both groups, on many occasions, said that they wanted to do *islah* as it was neither something forbidden nor impossible. However, this statement usually was followed by some requirements before doing *islah* that were really difficult to meet by the opponent, including acknowledging the opponent's legal status and to be willing to dismiss its own existence.

The continuous maneuvers, that demonstrated their reluctance to establish reconciliation, occurred until each group carried out Congress, and both sides claimed their legitimacy.¹⁵ As matter of fact, most Congress attendees came from the divided committees. The attendees of Surabaya Congress, held on October 15th-18th 2014, were mostly general chairpersons and secretaries of DPW and DPC. The members of the Jakarta Congress, held on October 30th – November 2nd 2014, were mainly new chairpersons and secretaries who were inaugurated prior to the implementation of the Jakarta Congress. The former general chairperson and secretaries were dismissed for their presence in Surabaya Congress.

On the other hand, those who attended the Jakarta Congress were discharged from their positions for being unsupportive and disloyal to the DPP led by Romahurmuziy. Hundreds of PPP cadres were victimized by the two conflicting groups in the name of group supremacy. This situation indicated a phenomenon of sacrificing party cohesion for exclusiveness. In this atmosphere, it is fair to say that Congress was actually a means for the self-legalization of each group's existence and the crystallization of differences. Moreover, reconciliation was not a main objective of the Congress since each group had no intention of accommodating its competitor's interests. In other words, substantially the Congress was also a reflection of egoism among conflicting groups.

In this circumstance, enforcing unity and solidarity was not a main priority. The two Congress held by each group reflected this attitude. In

this case, the PPP was not an institution that was described by Selznick (1957, 22) as a receptacle of group idealism, in which the party was an ideology manifested for cadres, one that could maintain their behavior or code of conduct based on the party's values (McGuire 1997, 8) and the sense of unity. After the Congress, each group had more difficulties in finding a way toward reconciliation. Both parties considered themselves as legal and supported by cadres across the country as they claimed themselves to be strong enough to run the Party. Hence any attempts to find reconciliation was not necessary. On the other hand, any opinions that suggested the Party's weakness or provided disadvantages for the Party's existence would be rejected, and this included rejecting a court verdict. Romahurmuziy camp, for instance, clearly rejected the verdict of State Administrative Court (PTUN) that winning the Faridz Camps by conducting cassation at the level of High State Administrative Court (PTTUN) (Rahardjo, 2014).¹⁶ As the PTTUN verdict declared the illegality of its camp, it was the Faridz Camp that appealed the verdict.¹⁷

Up until October 2014 when MA stated its verdict, both groups were still confident of winning the court's approval and continued pursuing their political agendas. Some aspects of their agendas were contradicted each other. In October 2015, the MA decided that the Faridz camp was a legal one, so anything that related to the PPP should be addressed to this camp. MA stated that its decision, decree No.504 K/TUN/2015, was final and binding for all. After the MA finally announced the verdict, both groups were still reluctant to accept the verdict, let alone implement it as a basis for reconciliation. In fact the Romahurmuziy Camp interpreted the MA verdict as a foundation to revive the PPP 2011 Bandung Congress version, in which Suryadharma was the general chairperson and Romahurmuziy was the general secretary. However, since Suryadharma was not able to run his function due to his status as a corruption suspect, the PPP would be led by Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, the person elected by the pro-Romahurmuziy camp elites, as Suryadharma's replacement. This standpoint ignored the existence of the MA and the Faridz camp. On the other hand, the Suryadharma/Faridz Camp believed that the Party should respect and recognize the MA verdict since it was stated by the highest court and binding for all and rejected Suryadharma's proposal (Firdaus 2016).

The Romahurmuziy Camp questioned the capability of Faridz to lead the PPP. For this group, Faridz represented an opportunist

politician, non-Islamic minded person and more importantly a new comer in the PPP. These characteristics meant he did not fit as a proper leader for the PPP (Interview with Muhammad Romahurmuziy, Jakarta, December 25th, 2015). The opinion was rejected by the Faridz Camp, who reckoned it as nonsense and based on invalid information. They refused the idea that Faridz was a new comer, since he had been a member of the PPP Committee since 2011, and they also believed that a fresh figure in the Party like Faridz was needed by the Party.¹⁸ More importantly, Romahurmuziy needed to do something immediately, before the Faridz Camp implemented the MA verdict. With such attitudes, reconciliation was impossible.¹⁹

All the phenomena that happened, from the mid-April dismissals until the MA verdict in October 2015, indicated the lack of an ideological bond among the PPP members, thus the established factionalism and prolonged conflict were the unavoidable results. The situation would have been different if cadres had felt a sense of togetherness, united by ideological values, and they had maintained their unity from the beginning.

External Factors' Roles

Besides those significant internal factors, the PPP conflict included changeable external factors. The external factors became more influential when the Party failed to properly handle its internal problems. In relation to the role of external factor, Natakusumah said that it indeed had also played a role in determining the internal conflict, even though the internal factor was still the main problem.²⁰ At times and for some people, the external factors had an impact similar to the New Order era. Syaifullah Tamliha said that:

I reckon that PPP conflict whether happened in the New Order era or Reform era was depended by government's political will...If we see the background (in the era Reform context) it is related to the fact that government did not have sufficient power in parliament to secure its policies plan. Hence, (the main aim is) to add the number of group/faction in the parliament (that willing to support the government), in other words basically to seize PPP as the member of (government) coalition.²¹

Throughout the Indonesian political parties' history, there was government intervention in party internal conflicts. Such intervention occurred with the PPP (Haris and Saidi 1991) and other Islamic parties

(Subekti 2014), causing more damage related to internal commonality during the New Order era. The main aim of the government's intervention was to eliminate anti-government factions or those who were regarded as much too critical of the government's policies. It usually commenced with a type of invitation from a pro-government faction endorsing a conflict resolution process. The regime then used the opportunity to clean up anti-government elements in the party, in the name of terminating conflict and maintaining national stability, and ensuring the loyalty of party's elite and members to the New Order Government (Noor 2015; Subekti 2014).

Today, the situation is slightly different but has a similar purpose. The spirit to have more companions in the parliament to support and maintain the government existence is still there. However, currently the democratic government could not make any interventions towards a party's problems directly, let alone using violent ways. Moreover, today, external factors also encompass opposition elements who hope to strengthen their positions before the government. In the case of the PPP's conflict, the presence of the KMP provided a certain influence that also prolonged its internal conflict.

Mutualism Symbiosis, Confidence Building and Position Strengthening

As an intervening variable, an external factor played a role in providing motive and rationale that justified each group's maneuvers. In some aspects, it legitimated pragmatism in the PPP for gaining some advantages if the Party could positively build, what Romahurmuziy called "mutualism symbiosis" with the external factors. In short both groups and external factors, whether people, government or party coalitions, could provide advantages for each other. In this situation, some people, including Suryadharma, believed that the present external influence first appeared in the Bandung Mukernas that facilitated Joko Widodo and M. Jusuf Kalla to be on the Party's presidential candidate list. There was also another accusation, from Suryadharma's supporters, stating that the Golkar Party senior cadres maneuvered to conquer the PPP during the 7th Congress occasion. These accusations were rejected by Romahurmuziy, who stated that such accusations were rubbish and naïve.²²

Meanwhile, other people joined Romahurmuziy Camp by consistently refusing Ali's nomination as a presidential candidate and they expressed a half-hearted attitude in supporting Subianto as the next president.

There was to be an external intervention that promised to provide the Romahurmuziy Camp with some benefits (as compensation). They believed that Joko Widodo supporters, who had successfully convinced Romahurmuziy Camp, that they were the real actors behind such political attitudes. On the other hand, for Romahurmuziy and his companions the basis for refusing other candidates, beside Joko Widodo, was nothing but the survey results produced by some reliable survey institutions. The results predicted Joko Widodo as the most prominent candidate in the 2014 Presidential Election. Hence, any particular support to other candidates would be useless for the Party's prospects.

The role of the external factor took place in the rushed implementation of the Surabaya Congress that legalized the Romahurmuziy Camp and which had principally violated the Mahkamah Party policy. This Congress was implemented to ensure the "legalized PPP" could exist and support the new government as soon as possible. Also the opportunity to be part of the government was still quite open at that time. Even though the Romahurmuziy Camp ignored such an opinion, the effect of the Congress, in particularly on the government reaction to legalize quickly the Romahurmuziy Camp, triggered curiosity. In relation to this, Dimiyati Natakusumah regarded such a rushed action as peculiar and believed it to be part of a maneuver to gain some important positions in the government.²³ Syaifullah Tamliha, on the other hand, reckoned that the Surabaya Congress implementation was a real verification of the external factor role in this conflict.²⁴

Moreover, the abrupt decision, to quit the KMP and quickly followed with the determination to join the KIH, to some extent indicated a deal with the external factor's appeal. The new deal was quickly completed since an intense communication between pro-Joko Widodo elites in the PPP and the president's supporters had been developed by both parties, particularly after Prabowo's defeat. The warm relationship between the Minister of Religious Affairs Lukman Hakim Saifuddin and President Joko Widodo, for instance, provided a special access that made the maneuver to leave the KMP possible. This was followed by the decision to permanently purge Suryadharma, which then generated speculation on the connection between this decision and the interest to join the Joko Widodo Government (Setyadi 2014b).

The two actions were indications on how an external factor and the Romahurmuziy Camp properly supported each other to build more

political advantages for all. For the Romahurmuziy Camp this maneuver was identified what the Party should be concerned with how it was in fact a necessity. Moreover, the maneuver itself was not in vain, since some PPP elites who were also Romahurmuziy's closest friends were rewarded by President Widodo with significant positions including as the Minister of Religious Affairs (Lukman Hakim Saifuddin), as a member of the President's Advisory Board (Suharso Monoarfa) and as the Commissioner of PT Timah (Irgan Chairul Mahfiz), one of important state-owned enterprises. The situations over time enhanced close relations between Joko Widodo and the Romahurmuziy Camp, which on the other hand underscored the different stances and complicated reconciliation with the Suryadharma Camp that insisted on continuing opposition to the government.

An external factor also played a part in enhancing the political position that could not be reached by offering negotiations to the contender inside the Party. As a compensation of its political attitude, the Widodo government represented by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Menkumham) made a significant maneuver by supporting the defense of Romahurmuziy's existence. Menkumham insisted not going to provide any possibilities to legalize Faridz Camp, even though this camp had officially offered legalization for its existence. Menkumham also still did not stipulate a decree for Faridz Camp, although this camp has won its case in the PTUN. This attitude was very contradictory with its attitude towards the Romahurmuziy Camp. The previous camp was granted the decree by Menkumham (number M.HH-07.AH.11.01 Year 2014) soon after it asked for it, in fact only couple of hours, not the days or even weeks it used to take, after Yasonna H. Laoly was appointed by Joko Widodo to be Minister of Law and Human Rights, something that really was uncommon in the history of Indonesia's political party life.

Over time, Menkumham not only refused to give a decree but also appealed the case in PTTUN, not long after PTUN gave victory to the Suryadharma Camp. This attitude again showed a dedication to defend the Romahurmuziy Camp and raised speculation that the Menkumham did not have good intentions to help the PPP in terminating the internal conflict as soon as possible. On the other hand, the Menkumham stated that the decision to give the decree for Romahurmuziy's Camp was based on proper reasons (Movarita 2015).

Hence this institution appealed the case to show that the PTUN's verdict was against the law. This argument did not see the fact that the implementation of Surabaya Congress was not in line with the policy made by the *Mahkamah Partai*, being the only institution that had the right to decide the date of Congress implementation as part of a conflict resolution based on the Party's constitution and the law regarding a political party. The Menkumham decision was also inconsistent with the General Directorate of General Law Administration (Ditjen AHU) Harkristuti Harkrisnowo's attitude, which stated that the decree would soon be given after the *Mahkamah Partai* decreed the verdict (Detiknews 2014).

Up until January 2016 the government still did not intend to give the decree for the Faridz Camp, although MA, as the highest and supreme court, had won Faridz's case. This attitude raised confusion. According to Dimiyati, the Menkumham attitude was absolutely wrong, because the MA verdict was essentially final and binding for all elements, including Menkumham. Such attitudes created complexity and extended the internal conflict in which reconciliation become more difficult to reach. From this case it can be said, that generally speaking, the external factor had given hope for the Romahurmuzyi Camp, mainly to win court and gain a legal status that in the long run could be an effective way to maintain its existence.

On the other hand, Ali's commitment to the KMP had a strong connection to the realization of "collective hope" and the intention to bring some political benefits for the PPP. After Prabowo was defeated, his political supporters in the KMP set up a political strategy to grab all the important positions in parliament (MPR, DPR and DPD). This attempt was commenced by legalizing regulation on the MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD (MD3) and *Alat Kelengkapan Dewan* according to KMP version. This attempt was successful, since the KMP was still the majority force in the parliament. The KMP also had intentions to secure top leadership positions in the local government, such as governor, head of district, and mayor, by proposing a draft on indirect local election regulation, in which local parliament would be the only institution to elect local government leaders (Noor 2015a).

Such a proposal would provide an opportunity for parties inside the KMP to share those positions among themselves. It was possible since the KMP was the majority in almost all local parliaments in Indonesia.

In other words, the opportunity for the PPP to gain the position of governor, head of district and mayor was quite open. The presence of such a strategic opportunity was one of the important rationales for Suryadharma, at the time, to secure PPP position in KMP. However, this hope did not last long. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) disagreed with KMP's idea on the implementation for an indirect election and for this reason he then decreed the Government Regulation for Law Replacement (Perppu) that rejected KMP's law proposal and supported the implementation of direct elections to elect local government leaders. This regulation automatically ruined KMP's plan.

Besides giving rationales for each camp, particularly in their expectation to get political positions, having a strategic relationship with the external factor also helped those groups to establish political confidence, in which the confident feeling was greatly supported by a strong companion from outside. The alliance with the external power, which a party could really rely on, motivated each group to fight for its existence. Such an alliance had strengthened commitment and was not easily surrender or subdued. Over time it hardened the sense of being different and separated. In terms of establishing confidence, some people believed that the relationship with the external factor had increased the Romahurmuziy Camp's confidence to believe that they were the one and only legal camp that deserved to lead the Party.

By having the full support of Joko Widodo's Government, this camp then acted as the real, legitimate leader for all PPP's members.²⁵ The Romahurmuziy Camp, for instance, insisted that having the Congress for the second time or a repeated Congress was important, and that the 2011 Bandung Congress DPP should become the steering committee for the occasion. If the two groups could not make it, Romahurmuziy regarded that challenging the MA decision through a judicial review (PK) was logical and should be done. This opinion clearly indicated not only a negative response on the MA verdict, but also avoided recognizing the existence of the Faridz Camp. The assurance of the governmental back up, including support for the maneuver challenging the MA's verdict, revealed the main foundation of this option.

On the other hand, the KMP with two important pillars inside namely the Golkar Party and the Gerindra Party brought a sense of confidence to Suryadharma's Camp. The support from those parties and the rest of the KMP Party members would be effective for protecting

its interest. The support from those parties was more or less felt as a serious warning for the Romahurmuziy Camp. For Romahurmuziy, the existence of the Faridz Camp was actually not a big deal, since the leader was a new comer in the PPP who had only limited support at the grass-root level. However, the existence of the KMP with two gigantic parties on the inside, made any efforts to eliminate the Faridz Camp more difficult.²⁶ Hence it was due to external elements or something behind the camp that made the Faridz Camp look strong and able to maintain its presence.

From the previous discussion, it can be seen that there were at least three main impacts regarding the presence of an external factor. The first is the legitimating reason or simply rationales for a political maneuver built by each group; the second is generating a sense of confidence in which some gigantic power out there would always provide back up for any actions that each group would do, with those all backgrounds each group had sufficient rationales in defending their position and kept pursuing their political agendas. Moreover, albeit each group, to some extent shared analogous outlooks on the importance of terminating internal conflict as soon as possible in order to accelerate recovery process and consequently generate all the Party's programs, they possessed different strategies to reach those goals. This, unfortunately included securing their own exclusive agendas.

Conclusion

This article considered three important elements in relation to the PPP's prolonged internal fragmentation. The first element was the lack of internal system, which over time created the lack of authority inside the party, and included the absence of an arbitrary institution or the absence of strong figures/patron. The second is the lack of a shared ideological bond that in turn promoted individual-pragmatism which became the most important foundation of political attitudes, objectives and relationship in the PPP. The third is external interests, as an intervening variable which actually could have been avoided if the Party had put aside the two previous factors in the early stages. The failure to overcome internal differences or interests, in particular those related to the presidential candidacy and the attitudes toward the new government, is the main result of the presence of those three elements that eventually led to the severe fragmentation.

However, the presence of such factors does not mean the closure of any possibilities to hold reconciliation or to terminate the conflict in the future. The role of these factors once again primarily is prolonging the internal fragmentation. In other words, the presence of strong leadership, having an ideological bond that leads to the ability to effectively avoid external factor's negative impacts would end the possibility of fragmentation from the early stage or at least would make the process of reconciliation become much easier to conduct.

The reliable solutions for easing these elements are varied. Based on the current conflict experience, it is important to make rigorous attempts to consistently implement a party's constitution and to enhance the role of ideology in the daily activities, such efforts should be considered by the PPP. For the elements to exist, all members should try to be innovative and create a breakthrough within the Party. Such actions should include creating a fair conflict resolution mechanism and a fair trial process within the Party, so that all Party members could not easily manipulate the Party's rules of the game, but rather have authoritative guidance for seeking justice within the Party. The cadres also need a sense of being protected by a fair system inside the party and for this reason they would be motivated to do more for the Party.

Moreover, a party should also implement a standardized cadre indoctrination process, in order to ensure that every member would understand the party ideology at the same level and could properly develop the internal values that would be utilized as their code of conduct for the party. This cadre indoctrination, would be a tool to create a similar vision of the party's objectives and what an ideal type of the party should be, so that the sense of belonging and solidarity would eventually be the result. Furthermore, the presence of a standardized cadre indoctrination process could also lead to a merit system of development, in which only cadres that passed several training sessions and provided evidence of sufficient comprehension regarding party ideology and vision would deserve to lead the party. In addition, the party should also maintain its independence by developing a strong financial mechanism and sources that the party could rely on without tapping into the interest of the donor or oligarchs, including external benefactors. Also by having a proper mechanism to finance a party's activities, cadres would be more motivated to be involved and the party could establish a sense of belonging among the cadres.

In the meantime, there is an interesting development in the beginning of 2016, the Faridz Camp was willing to open a discussion with some of the government's important elites, including Vice President M. Jusuf Kalla and Luhut B. Pandjaitan. It indicates a change of position toward the government, in which some people believed that it would also open a new chapter on the relationship between this camp and the Romahurmuzyi Camp. In fact, the Faridz Camp not only declared its commitment to be part of the government, but it is also willing to meet with the Romahurmuzyi Camp (Retaduari, 2016). Vice President M. Jusuf Kalla was the mediator for the meeting with the two rival groups. This situation is likely to happen for a pragmatic party like the PPP. In fact on March 10th 2016 all factions eventually agreed to set up a task force to formulate an action plan for reconciliation.

This article does not address the current developments within the PPP, since the main aim was to discuss the background of the prolonged fragmentation within the PPP during the period of 2014-2016. However, unless the party dares to face a repeated situation, in the future, the spirit of pragmatism should not be tolerated any longer. If the Party could make a great leap in terms of building an ideological bond and procedural leadership, the PPP could potentially maintain its strength and would most likely be able to properly solve internal turbulence. On the other hand, if the Party does not correctly solve issues and allows similar behavioral patterns to continue, the Party's future would continue to have significant fragmentation problems. The history of severe conflicts should be an important lesson to learn for PPP in order to develop many significant and fundamental changes right now and in the future.

Endnotes

1. Interview with A. Dimiyati Natakusumah, Jakarta, December 28th, 2015.
2. Interview with Muhammad Romahurmuziy, Jakarta, December 25th, 2015.
3. Interview with A. Dimiyati Natakusumah, Jakarta, December 28th, 2015.
4. Interview with Muhammad Romahurmuziy, Jakarta, December 25th, 2015.
5. Interview with A. Dimiyati Natakusumah, Jakarta, December 28th, 2015.
6. Interview with A. Dimiyati Natakusumah, Jakarta, December 28th, 2015.
7. Interview with A. Dimiyati Natakusumah, Jakarta, December 28th, 2015.
8. Interview with Muhammad Romahurmuziy, Jakarta, December 25th, 2015.
9. Interview with Muhammad Romahurmuziy, Jakarta, December 25th, 2015
10. Interview with Syaifullah Tamliha, Jakarta, December 18th, 2015; with Okky Asokawati, Jakarta, December 18th, 2015; with Muhammad Romahurmuziy, Jakarta, December 25th, 2015
11. Interview with Syaifullah Tamliha, Jakarta, December 18th, 2015; with Okky Asokawati, Jakarta, December 18th, 2015
12. Interview with Muhammad Romahurmuziy, Jakarta, December 25th, 2015.
13. Interview with A. Dimiyati Natakusumah, Jakarta, December 28th, 2015.
14. Interview with Syaifullah Tamliha, Jakarta, December 18th, 2015.
15. Interview with A. Dimiyati Natakusumah, Jakarta, December 28th, 2015; with Muhammad Romahurmuziy, Jakarta, December 25th, 2015.
16. Decree No. 217/G/2014/PTUN-JKT.
17. Decree No. 120/B/2015/ PT.TUN.JKT.
18. Interview with A. Dimiyati Natakusumah, Jakarta, December 28th, 2015.
19. Interview with A. Dimiyati Natakusumah, Jakarta, December 28th, 2015.
20. Interview with A. Dimiyati Natakusumah, Jakarta, December 28th, 2015.
21. Interview with Syaifullah Tamliha Jakarta, December 18th, 2015.
22. Interview with Muhammad Romahurmuziy, Jakarta, December 25th, 2015.
23. Interview with A. Dimiyati Natakusumah, Jakarta, December 28th, 2015.
24. Interview with Syaifullah Tamliha, Jakarta, December 18th, 2015.
25. Interview with a respondent, Jakarta, 18th December 2015.
26. Interview with Muhammad Romahurmuziy, Jakarta, December 25th, 2015.

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Interview with Syaifullah Tamliha, Jakarta, December 18th, 2015.

Interview with Muhammad Romahurmuziy, Jakarta, December 25th, 2015.

Interview with A. Dimiyati Natakusumah, Jakarta, December 28th, 2015.

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2. Booth, Anne. 1988. "Living Standards and the Distribution of Income in Colonial Indonesia: A Review of the Evidence." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 19(2): 310–34.
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
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ايكا فوئرا ويرمان

ءولة والءعوة الإسلامية في عهد النظام الجءيء:

ءراسء في فكر سوهارئو من ءلال الخطاباء الرئاسية

في المناسباء الإسلامية بإنءونيسيا

محمد عيسى عبء السلام
