


STUDIA ISLAMIKA

INDONESIAN JOURNAL FOR ISLAMIC STUDIES

Volume 29, Number 3, 2022



TOK TAKIA'S LEGACY IN AYUTTHAYA, THAILAND:
TRACING QADRIYYAH CIRCULATIONS
THROUGH THE BAY OF BENGAL

Christopher Mark Joll & Srawut Aree

POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF MUHAMMADIYAH:
HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES AND FUTURE

Ridho Al-Hamdi

FOSTERING A KNOWLEDGE CULTURE FOR PEACE,
DEVELOPMENT, AND INTEGRATION:
MUSLIM EDUCATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

Alizaman D. Gamon & Mariam Saidona Tagoranao

STUDIA ISLAMIKA

STUDIA ISLAMIKA

Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies

Vol. 29, no. 3, 2022

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Saiful Mujani

MANAGING EDITOR

Oman Fathurahman

EDITORS

Jambari

Didin Syafruddin

Jajat Burhanudin

Fuad Jabali

Ali Munbanif

Saiful Umam

Dadi Darmadi

Jajang Jahroni

Din Wabid

Euis Nurlaelawati

INTERNATIONAL EDITORIAL BOARD

M. Quraish Shihab (Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University of Jakarta, INDONESIA)

Martin van Bruinessen (Utrecht University, NETHERLANDS)

John R. Bowen (Washington University, USA)

Virginia M. Hooker (Australian National University, AUSTRALIA)

Edwin P. Wieringa (Universität zu Köln, GERMANY)

Robert W. Hefner (Boston University, USA)

Rémy Madinier (Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), FRANCE)

R. Michael Feener (National University of Singapore, SINGAPORE)

Michael F. Laffan (Princeton University, USA)

Minako Sakai (The University of New South Wales, AUSTRALIA)

Annabel Teh Gallop (The British Library, UK)

Syafaaturun Almirzanah (Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta, INDONESIA)

ASSISTANT TO THE EDITORS

Testriono

Muhammad Nida' Fadlan

Rangga Eka Saputra

Abdullah Maulani

ENGLISH LANGUAGE ADVISOR

Benjamin J. Freeman

Daniel Peterson

Batool Moussa

ARABIC LANGUAGE ADVISOR

Tb. Ade Asnawi

Yuli Yasin

COVER DESIGNER

S. Prinka

STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-0492; E-ISSN: 2355-6145) is an international journal published by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University of Jakarta, INDONESIA. It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular, and Southeast Asian Islamic studies in general, and is intended to communicate original researches and current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contributions from scholars of related disciplines. All submitted papers are subject to double-blind review process.

STUDIA ISLAMIKA has been accredited by The Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education, Republic of Indonesia as an academic journal (Decree No. 32a/E/KPT/2017).

STUDIA ISLAMIKA has become a CrossRef Member since year 2014. Therefore, all articles published by STUDIA ISLAMIKA will have unique Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number.

STUDIA ISLAMIKA is indexed in Scopus since 30 May 2015.

Editorial Office:

STUDIA ISLAMIKA, Gedung Pusat Pengkajian
Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) UIN Jakarta,
Jl. Kertamukti No. 5, Pisangan Barat, Cirendeu,
Ciputat 15419, Jakarta, Indonesia.
Phone: (62-21) 7423543, 7499272, Fax: (62-21) 7408633;
E-mail: studia.islamika@uinjkt.ac.id
Website: <http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/studia-islamika>

Annual subscription rates from outside Indonesia, institution:
US\$ 75,00 and the cost of a single copy is US\$ 25,00;
individual: US\$ 50,00 and the cost of a single copy is US\$
20,00. Rates do not include international postage and
handling.

Please make all payment through bank transfer to: **PPIM,
Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia,**
account No. **101-00-0514550-1 (USD),**
Swift Code: bmriddja

Harga berlangganan di Indonesia untuk satu tahun, lembaga:
Rp. 150.000,-, harga satu edisi Rp. 50.000,-; individu:
Rp. 100.000,-, harga satu edisi Rp. 40.000,-. Harga belum
termasuk ongkos kirim.



Pembayaran melalui **PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang
Graha Karnos, No. Rek: 128-00-0105080-3**

Table of Contents

Articles

- 425 *Christopher Mark Joll & Srawut Aree*
Tok Takia's Legacy in Ayutthaya, Thailand:
Tracing Qadriyyah Circulations
through the Bay of Bengal
- 451 *Ridho Al-Hamdi*
Political Consciousness of Muhammadiyah:
Historical Trajectories and Future
- 485 *Alizaman D. Gamon & Mariam Saidona Tagoranao*
Fostering a Knowledge Culture for Peace,
Development, and Integration:
Muslim Education in the Philippines
- 519 *Fariz Alnizar, Fadlil Munawwar Manshur, Amir Ma'ruf*
Following the Global Rejection:
The Motives of Majelis Ulama Indonesia's
Fatwas on Ahmadiyah
- 547 *Siti Syamsiyatun*
Redefining Manhood and Womanhood:
Insights from the Oldest Indonesian Muslim
Women Organization, 'Aisyiyah

575 *Dian Yasmina Fajri & Susanto Zubdi*
Lebaran Kranggan:
Al-Tārikh al-maḥallī li taqālīd
mujtama‘ Buhun fi Jāwah al-Gharbīyah

Book Review

619 *Idris Masudi*
Kosmopolitanisme Hukum Islam:
Peredaran Kitab *Minhāj al-ṭālibīn* di Nusantara

Document

635 *Oman Fathurahman*
Flagship of Scholarship on Indonesian Islam:
In Memoriam Azyumardi Azra (1955-2022)

Ridho Al-Hamdi

Political Consciousness of Muhammadiyah: Historical Trajectories and Future

Abstract: *Muhammadiyah, as Indonesia's largest Islamic reformist force, has survived for more than a century coping with political challenges. It is irresistible to further investigate its political identity through the inquiry of historical consciousness. This paper examines the formation, structure, and fate of the political consciousness of Muhammadiyah. Formation represents the past, structure indicates the present, and fate denotes the future. The findings demonstrate that the formation commenced from 1912 to 2020, splitting into two gradual phases: individual consciousness (1912-1971) and institutional consciousness (1971-2020). This trajectory has resulted in two structures of political reasoning in Muhammadiyah: scripturalist-rationalist as the dominant school and substantial-pragmatist as the marginalized one. Meanwhile, the politics of Muhammadiyah in the future will no longer involve instituting a political party. Instead, it is establishing centers of excellence to engineer political strategies and preserve actions operated by the "Muhammadiyah Caucus."*

Keywords: Muhammadiyah, Political Consciousness, Islamic Reformist, Formulation, Political Reasoning.

Abstrak: Muhammadiyah sebagai organisasi Islam pembaharu terbesar di Indonesia mampu bertahan lebih dari satu abad dalam menghadapi berbagai tantangan politik. Hal ini penting untuk melihat identitas politik Muhammadiyah melalui penelusuran kesadaran sejarah. Artikel ini menganalisa proses pembentukan, struktur, dan nasib kesadaran politik Muhammadiyah. Pembentukan mewakili masa lampau, struktur menunjukkan situasi masa kini, dan nasib mengindikasikan masa depan. Studi ini menemukan bahwa pembentukan kesadaran politik Muhammadiyah dimulai sejak 1912 hingga 2020 yang terbagi menjadi dua tahap: kesadaran individual (1912-1971) dan kesadaran institusional (1971-2020). Selama rentang waktu tersebut, struktur akal politik Muhammadiyah terbentuk menjadi dua: “Skripturalis-Rasionalis” sebagai madzhab paling dominan dan “Substansialis-Pragmatis” sebagai madzhab yang terpinggirkan. Situasi ini kemudian membentuk masa depan politik Muhammadiyah yang tidak lagi memerlukan pendirian partai politik. Sebagai jalan keluar, mendirikan pusat-pusat keunggulan adalah sebuah kebutuhan yang berfungsi untuk merekayasa strategi politik dan mengawal aksi-aksi yang diperankan oleh “Kaukus Muhammadiyah”.

Kata kunci: Muhammadiyah, Kesadaran Politik, Reformasi Islam, Pembentukan, Akal Politik.

ملخص: نجت جمعية المحمدية، باعتبارها أكبر قوة إصلاحية إسلامية في إندونيسيا لأكثر من قرن في مواجهة التحديات السياسية. شىء يثير الاهتمام إلى معرفة هويتها السياسية من خلال التحقيق في الوعي التاريخي. وهذه الرسالة تبحث عن تأسيسها وهيكلها ومصير الوعي السياسي للمحمدية. تمثل التشكيلة عن الماضي والهيكل عن الحاضر والقدر عن المستقبل. تظهر النتائج أنه تم تشكيلها منذ عام ١٩١٢ إلى عام ٢٠٢٠، الذي ينقسم إلى مرحلتين تدريجيتين: الوعي الفردي (١٩١٢-١٩٧١) والوعي المؤسسي (١٩٧١-٢٠٢٠). نتج عن هذا المسار هيكلين للتفكير السياسي في المحمدية: روحاني-عقلاني باعتباره المدرسة المهيمنة، والواقعي-البراغماتي باعتباره المدرسة المهمشة. في غضون ذلك، فإن جمعية المحمدية في المستقبل لن تنضم إلى تأسيس حزب سياسي. بدلاً من ذلك، تقوم بإنشاء مراكز امتياز لهندسة الاستراتيجيات السياسية والحفاظ على الأعمال التي يديرها «تجمع المحمدية».

الكلمات المفتاحية: جمعية المحمدية، الوعي السياسي، الإصلاح الإسلامي، تأسيس، التفكير السياسي.

Historically speaking, the dynamics of Muhammadiyah and politics has always been unpredictable due to distinctive circumstances and cases. On the one hand, Muhammadiyah never engaged with practical politics, even though it actively initiated political parties. On the other hand, Muhammadiyah positions itself as the interest group and the moral force toward the elected government, resulting in so-called “high politics” and “low politics.” The former indicates an ethics-based political movement because of its position as the moral force, while the latter denotes the practical political movement, which tends to be insulted due to the active engagement in the politics of power, party and election.

Several scientists have studied the dynamics of Muhammadiyah and politics. Noer (1973) explored the development of Islamic-modernist movements in Indonesia between 1900 and 1942, including Muhammadiyah, in response to Dutch colonization. More specifically, Alfian (1989) investigated the political behavior of Muhammadiyah under the Dutch colonization of 1900-1942. In the meantime, Shihab (2016) analyzed the response of Muhammadiyah to the sturdy penetration of Christianity into Indonesia. Under Indonesia’s Soekarno regime, Hamka (1956) and Syaifullah (2019b) explained the political engagement of Muhammadiyah inside the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations (Masyumi Party). Although Madinier (2013) focused on depicting the political dynamics inside Masyumi, he still included the significant role of Muhammadiyah activists in that party. Likewise, Noer (2000) also portrayed the involvement of Muhammadiyah activists in the Indonesian political landscape between 1945 and 1965.

Moreover, Nashir’s (2000) finding demonstrated the accommodative behavior of Muhammadiyah when dealing with the government during the New Order regime, mainly in the case of Pekalongan, Central Java. Meanwhile, Jurdi (2010) investigated the changeable dynamics of Muhammadiyah in coping with Indonesian political issues from 1966 to 2006. Syaifullah (2019c) found there was no quantitatively different achievement for Muhammadiyah in attaining parliamentary seats, irrespective of whether it employed the structural strategy (having a political party) or the cultural strategy (not having a political party).

In the post-New Order regime, many pieces of research on the dynamics of Muhammadiyah and politics can be presented here.

Asyari (2008) argued that the politics of Muhammadiyah in the decade following 1998 focused on implementing the political *ijtihad* of Amien Rais through the establishment of PAN and, as a result, relations between them were politically solid. Moreover, Al-Hamdi (2013) and Efendi (2014) demonstrated that the politics of Muhammadiyah elites have spawned in a continuum from a moderate-inclusive stance to a fundamentalist-exclusive one. Wardana and Hidayat (2019) argued that although Muhammadiyah declared a neutral position in response to any political events, their findings demonstrated the multiplicity of Muhammadiyah's political engagement in the 2019 Regional Representative Council (DPD) election. Moreover, Nashir, Qodir, Nurmandi, Jubba, and Hidayati (2019, 1-24) highlighted Muhammadiyah's success in taking a moderate approach with any political forces in the 2019 presidential election, preventing it from being trapped by partisan politics.

Previous works have shown that examining the dynamics of Muhammadiyah and politics in a scholarly debate is a fascinating inquiry for anyone. Although Muhammadiyah has declared that it has not changed as a political party since its establishment, it has always related itself with low politics. Even though it commits to be a socio-religious movement, politics is one of the critical strategies to enlarge its *da'wa* (Islamic proselytizing) to society.

Political Consciousness and Phenomenological Inquiry

In the Islamic tradition, a recognized statement is related to self-consciousness: "*man 'arafa nafsahu faqad arafa rabbahu*" (Whosoever recognizes himself knows his Lord). It suggests that it is impossible to recognize our God if we do not really know and understand ourselves as a human wholly. In other words, self-consciousness is the right path to understanding the nature of God. We realize that we live not only in the ideal situation but also in the worst condition with various impediments. Thus, consciousness will be developed when we cope with the various clashes between self-consciousness (subject) and external stimuli outside the human (object).

It is undeniable that humans live with their worldview, and it becomes the foundation of the ideology adopted by humans, individually or collectively, to define self-consciousness, self-identity, and its group (Muthahhari 2001). Indeed, the worldview is influenced by a particular

school of thought adopted by humans. Therefore, the worldview is how humans conclude, interpret, and summarize issues related to God, the universe, and its history. This argument is supported by Kuntowijoyo (2001), who contended that human consciousness is influenced and shaped by ideology.

In this context, self-consciousness is a long-term process from the trajectory of the past, creating a way of thinking in the present and future. Likewise, political consciousness is constructed from the long-term history of its formulation, which affects the structure of the way of thinking and behaving and its fate in the future. By applying Hanafi's (1991) concept of self-consciousness, political consciousness is constructed through three main phases: *takwīn* (formulation phase), *al-bunyān* (structure phase), and *mashīr* (fate phase). These three phases represent the time dimension, respectively: the formulation represents the past trajectory, structure denotes the present trajectory, and fate indicates the future trajectory.

Phenomenological inquiry is a relevant approach, utilized in this study, to investigate more comprehensively how the political consciousness of Muhammadiyah is constructed and how it affects ways of thinking and behaving among its devotees when dealing with unpredictable political situations. The formulation and structure inspire how Muhammadiyah engineers its fate in the future. The phenomenological approach was introduced by Husserl (1999). It studies anything in the physical reality, which human senses can interact with. According to Titus, Marilyn, and Nolan (1994), phenomenology is a means to analyze consciousness because it investigates and uncovers a pure history of the past. Pure history will invent a pure consciousness as a remarkable modal to chase a bright future. Thus, phenomenology can also be classified as an interpretative activity. Similarly, Hanafi (1991) recognized phenomenology as part of conceptualizing a personal consciousness and a civilizational consciousness.

Muhammadiyah as an Islamic Reformist Movement

Muhammadiyah is the largest Islamic modernist-reformist organization in Indonesia, established on 18 November 1912 in Yogyakarta. According to Nashir (2010, 144-6), the embedded feature of Muhammadiyah is the *tajdid* movement's two inseparable key elements: purification and dynamization. On the one hand, it always

refers to the authenticity of Islam. On the other hand, it behaves as the reformer for human advancement, particularly Muslims. In founding Muhammadiyah, one of the great legacies of Ahmad Dahlan is his expertise in integrating *tanzīf* (purification) and *islāh* (dynamization or reformation). The alignment of Qibla, conducted by Ahmad Dahlan, was one of the tangible manifestations of purification-reformation, which was the embryo of Muhammadiyah's reformation. Alfian (1989, 5) considered Muhammadiyah as (1) a religious reformist movement, (2) an agent of social change, and (3) a political force. The first two were derived from its overt aims as a socio-religious organization. Meanwhile, the third was the upshot of both the philosophical effect of Islamic modernism adopted by Muhammadiyah and the development of the movement as one of the foremost interest groups.

More specifically, Jainuri (1999) proposed the six-dimensional characteristics of the Islamic reformist movement. First, it argues that Islam covers all aspects of life, whether religious rites or social affairs. Second, religious beliefs and practices should be manifested into daily life based on Al-Qur'an and As-Sunnah values and their contextualization in modern life. Third, sharia-based laws should be adaptable in all aspects of life, not rigid. Fourth, it interprets Islamic teachings by utilizing various scholarly approaches, including Western approaches. Fifth, it recognizes the glory of Islam in the past as an ardor, not a romanticism, to cope with present and future challenges. Sixth, it acknowledges change as an inevitability, as long as the present life does not represent pure Islamic doctrines. These six characteristics can be observed in Muhammadiyah.

Based on the arguments presented by Nashir (2010), Alfian (1989), and Jainuri (1999), Muhammadiyah is acknowledged as the most powerful Islamic reformist movement in Indonesia. Historical facts support the arguments where Muhammadiyah, from 1912 until the present, is consistent with practicing purification and reformation simultaneously and gradually by its elites, cadres, activists, members, and devotees. The result is that Muhammadiyah has large networks and tremendous resources not merely in Indonesia but also around the world.

Three Trajectories of the Political Consciousness of Muhammadiyah

Adopting Hanafi's (1991) concept, this study analyzed the political consciousness of Muhammadiyah across three gradual trajectories:

formulation, structure, and fate. The source of Muhammadiyah's political consciousness can be traced back using archives and official documents such as the verdicts of *Muktamar* (the primarily national meeting), the verdicts of *Tanwir* (the second largest national meeting after *Muktamar*), plenary session verdicts of the central board of Muhammadiyah, other official decrees published in Muhammadiyah media, and relevant references related to the thoughts and political behaviors of Muhammadiyah elites.

Formulation of the Political Consciousness of Muhammadiyah

In the formulation phase, this study partitions the political consciousness of Muhammadiyah into two gradual trajectories. The first was the period of searching for a political identity, as part of the construction of "individual consciousness" that occurred from 1912 to 1971. The second was the period of consolidation of its institutional position as part of the formulation of "institutional consciousness," active from 1971 until 2020.

1. Individual Consciousness: 1912-1971

During the early establishment of Muhammadiyah in the 1910s, Muhammadiyah elites preferred to join *Sarekat Islam* rather than other political organizations because *Sarekat Islam*, at the time, was the most influential Islamic political movement, playing a significant role in strengthening Muhammadiyah's growth. According to Mu'arif (2010, 213), if Muhammadiyah desired to launch a new branch, it usually began at a *Sarekat Islam* meeting (*vergadering*). At that time, Muhammadiyah always received an invitation from various branches of *Sarekat Islam* to deliver *pengajian* (Islamic teachings).

Ahmad Dahlan, Fachroddin, and Mas Mansur were some foremost elites in Muhammadiyah, who had essential roles in *Sarekat Islam*, primarily between the 1910s and 1920s. *Sarekat Islam* is growing because of the role of Muhammadiyah elites, while Muhammadiyah is flourishing due to the religious *da'wa* through *Sarekat Islam*. In brief, *Sarekat Islam* needs Muhammadiyah to approach Muslim society via *da'wa*, while Muhammadiyah uses *Sarekat Islam* as the political channel to increase Islamic understanding of Muhammadiyah among the public. It is reciprocal cooperation.

The honeymoon of Muhammadiyah-*Sarekat Islam* was decayed by the so-called "party discipline" policy, mainly from 1926 until

the formation of a new party by Muhammadiyah elites in 1938. The conflict was started with an accusation by Muhammad Soedja', who said that HOS Cokroaminoto was useless during his stay in Mecca as the delegate of Indonesia's Al-Islam Congress because of the weakness of his Arabic and English language ability. Cokro was considered to have a luxury lifestyle in Mecca. *Sarekat Islam* rejected the accusation (Alfian 1989, 222-3; Nasihin 2012, 166-7). They blamed each other and claimed the other was wrong.

The impact of this conflict was that *Sarekat Islam* decided to apply the policy of "party discipline" for Muhammadiyah members who were still active in *Sarekat Islam*, requiring them to select one of two difficult options: remaining with the party but leaving Muhammadiyah or staying at Muhammadiyah but leaving the party (Noer 1985, 152). Some influential Muhammadiyah cadres active in *Sarekat Islam* left the party. Although most Muhammadiyah cadres in local branches left the party, some were still active inside the party and left Muhammadiyah. Because of this situation, Fachrodin and other Muhammadiyah cadres eventually strived to re-activate Muhammadiyah branches, which were broken due to this conflict (PB Moehammadijah 1929; Mu'arif 2010, 239). The conflict was reinforced by the fact that Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) rejected Cokroaminoto's translation work of Al-Qur'an. Another fact is that where Muhammadiyah survives, *Sarekat Islam* perished. In addition, Muhammadiyah schools are alleged to receive a financial subsidy from the Dutch Government (Nasihin 2012, 173-80).

While *Sarekat Islam* applied "politics of *hijrah*" (politics of non-cooperation) toward the Dutch Government in the 1930s, most Muhammadiyah elites denied this concept and argued that this position harmed the Muslim community (Noer 1985, 176). The upshot was that Muslim elites were pioneering a new political party, the Indonesian Islamic Party (PII), which was established in Surakarta on 4 December 1938. Most functionaries were dominated by Muhammadiyah cadres such as Mas Mansur, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, Ahmad Kasmat, Mohammad Rasjid, Faried Ma'ruf, and others (Alfian 1989, 355; Hadikusumo 2014, 134; Hadikusumo 2017, 86).

Muhammadiyah cadres and members reacted to the engagement of Mas Mansur in PII because he was the general chairperson of

Muhammadiyah at the same time. Some argued that Mansur should leave the party and remain at Muhammadiyah to maintain its neutrality, while others said that everything depended on Mansur (Pedoman Masyarakat 1938; Pantjara Amal 1939; Noer 1985, 177). However, the role of Muhammadiyah cadres in the political stage was not merely within PII but also in other political forces. When the Indonesian Political Federation (GAPI) was established on 21 May 1939, Mansur joined it. By 1941, although having been elected by the national conference, organized by GAPI to lead the Indonesian People Assembly (MRI), Mansur still rejected it due to his vital position in Muhammadiyah (Alfian 1989, 336-7; Syaifullah 2019a, 74-5). In addition to being active in PII, GAPI, and MRI, Muhammadiyah cadres also involved themselves in the High Islamic Council of Indonesia (MIAI), the liberative institution of Muslim organizations across Indonesia (Hadikusumo 2017, 82; Syaifullah 2019a, 65-6; Hadikusumo 2014, 138). When the Japanese colonizing regime replaced MIAI with Masyumi in 1941, Muhammadiyah cadres still engaged as Masyumi functionaries (Syaifullah 2019a, 68, 90-91).

It is notable that Muhammadiyah under Mansur's leadership succeeded in establishing the political foundation of Muhammadiyah, later legalized by the annual congress of Muhammadiyah in 1939. There are seven statements: (1) politics is fundamental, but (2) it is not a concern of Muhammadiyah. If Muhammadiyah members want to join it, (3) they should make a new channel (4) outside of Muhammadiyah (5) which has no organizational relation with Muhammadiyah, but (6) but with which it can cooperate and (7) develop the opportunity to cooperate with other forces. Thohari (2005, 248) argued that this concept was an outstanding contribution by Mansur in political affairs because almost all decisions related to political issues in Muhammadiyah refer to this concept.

When it was approaching Indonesian independence in 1945, Muhammadiyah cadres were involved in preparing Indonesia as an independent state, including Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Abdul Kahar Muzakir, and Kasman Singodimedjo. Such cadres joined the Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) and the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI), and contributed to establishing the state constitution. Post-1945, the dynamics of Muhammadiyah and its politics could be traced back to

the Masyumi Party because Muhammadiyah was one of its founders in 1945. Syaifullah (2019b, 207) classified the relationship between Muhammadiyah and Masyumi into three different phases: the intimate (1945-1955), the tenuous (1955-1959), and the end of a relationship (1959). Although the intimate relationship had a long duration, the internal critique of Muhammadiyah still occurred during this decade.

Most functionaries of Masyumi were Muhammadiyah cadres, some of them even held top positions, such as Soekiman Wirjosandjojo and Prawoto Mangkusasmito. In the administration cabinet between 1945 and 1966, some cadres became ministers, such as Mohammad Rasjidi, Mohamad Roem, M. Jusuf Wibisono, Kasman Singodimedjo, Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Faqih Usman, and Muljadi Djojomartono. In the House of Representative of 1955-1959, 14 of 57 seats of Masyumi were held by Muhammadiyah cadres. In the meantime, 21 of Masyumi's 112 seats in the *Majelis Konstituante* (Constitutional Assembly) of 1955-1959 were Muhammadiyah cadres. This indicates that although Muhammadiyah never transformed itself into a political party, it was adaptable to the political struggle between 1945 and 1959.

After the end of the organizational relationship between Muhammadiyah and Masyumi in 1958, Muhammadiyah was frequently intimidated by the state apparatus and political parties outside Masyumi. The apparatus arrested many cadres and *muballigh* (preachers) from Muhammadiyah. Its members were accused of being ex-members of the banned party, and their activities were regarded suspiciously and controlled by the government and society. The impact of the situation was that Muhammadiyah's activities were sluggish. Various branches were perishing, and numerous Muhammadiyah schools were closed permanently (Badawi 2001, 4).

Although Muhammadiyah activities were sluggish, its elites attempted to keep the organization alive and active. By the 1960s, Muhammadiyah approached Soekarno, the sole power of the Old Order regime. This strategy had a positive impact, particularly following the Soekarno speech at the Muhammadiyah Congress in 1962. Soekarno (2013, 9) conveyed his respect to Ahmad Dahlan and his pride in being part of the organization when he inhabited Bengkulu as the chair of the education division of Muhammadiyah. Soekarno requested the delegates of Muhammadiyah Congress not remove his name from

Muhammadiyah and when he died he asked to be buried on behalf of Muhammadiyah. Badawi (2001) uttered that “the green light is on”, indicating the re-revival of Muhammadiyah.

After the 1962 Congress, Muhammadiyah’s position was considered by Soekarno and all political forces to counterbalance the three predominant national forces: nationalism (the nationalist party, PNI), communism (the communist party, PKI), and religion (the NU party), referred to as “NASAKOM”. Meanwhile, the political aspirations of Muhammadiyah members and supporters were spreading to other political parties, including the communist party (Usman 1971, 17).

Muhammadiyah’s role as a real political force increased when the “GESTAPU” (the 30 September Movement) Tragedy took place in 1965. The communist group was alleged to be the chief puppeteer behind the tragedy. Muhammadiyah positioned itself as the frontline responder to cope with and even exterminate the communist force from Indonesia. The role of Muhammadiyah transformed not merely as *Ormas* (the social force) but also as *Ormaspol* (the social and political forces). It was legalized by an official letter issued by Indonesia’s Deputy Prime Minister of Social and Political Affairs Adam Malik on 27 April 1966, No. 19/MPM/SP/1966. The letter stated that Muhammadiyah was considered a political party and had the right to participate in government institutions (PP Muhammadiyah 1968, 4; Suara Muhammadiyah 1966b, 26).

The role of *Ormaspol* was applied merely for a few years as an initiation for Muhammadiyah to create a new political party (PP Muhammadiyah 1968, 4; Suara Muhammadiyah, 1966a, 15; Suara Muhammadiyah 1966b, 26). The creation of a new party was affected by the fact that Muhammadiyah activists eventually preferred to fight for political goals rather than *da’wa* activities, which could harm Muhammadiyah’s position. By creating the party, Muhammadiyah could focus on social and religious affairs. After a long and challenging process, the new party, the Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi), was established on 20 February 1968. Two Muhammadiyah cadres, Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun, acted as the general chairperson and general secretary.

Although Muhammadiyah cadres dominated Parmusi, an internal conflict occurred when the government intervened in the party. While the first congress of Parmusi appointed Mohamad Roem as the general

chairperson in 1968, President Soeharto rejected the decision because Roem was an ex-activist of the banned Masyumi party. Soeharto eventually approved Djarnawi as the general chairperson of the party. The internal conflict in Parmusi took place when Parmusi's cadres, Jailani Naro and Imran Kadir (Naroka), attempted to stage a coup on the Djarnawi leadership on 17 October 1970, declaring that they were the new leaders of Parmusi. This caused Muhammadiyah to again take the political stage up until 1971, the year of the party fusion instructed by the New Order regime.

The political journey of Muhammadiyah from 1912 to 1971 reflected a search for an institutional identity because Muhammadiyah never issued an official letter either banning its cadres from joining or engaging with a political party. This period depended on individual consciousness to either engage or disengage with the party. In other words, the political position was flexible and adaptable during this time.

2. Institutional Consciousness: 1971-2020

This period began with the emergence of the so-called “*Khittah Ujung Pandang*”. The *khittah* denoted the organizational decree responding to national political situations decided by the Muhammadiyah Congress in 1971 in Ujung Pandang, the other name of Makassar City, the capital of South Sulawesi. There are at least four features of the *Khittah Ujung Pandang*: Muhammadiyah has no organizational relationship with and is not affiliated with any political forces; each Muhammadiyah member can join other organizations as long as it does not contradict the Muhammadiyah statute; Muhammadiyah behaves *amar mʿruf nahi munkar* (doing good deeds and abandoning bad ones) productively toward Parmusi and other parties; and Muhammadiyah should take part in development agendas.

The *Khittah Ujung Pandang*, in turn, was revised by the *Khittah Surabaya* in 1978, removing two points (number 3 and 4), making it more assertive that Muhammadiyah “has no organizational relation with and not affiliated with any political parties and organizations” (PP Muhammadiyah 1978, 33). Nashir (2008, 34-5) argued that Muhammadiyah’s neutral position toward politics does not mean that it is anti-politics but rather that it does not take part in practical political activities in the way that parties do. It also does not denote to “keep the same distance” or “maintain the same closeness” because still having a political orientation is not part of the *khittah* values, namely liberating

Muhammadiyah from political interests and power-oriented goals that parties chase.

Consequently, Muhammadiyah positions itself as the interest group or, according to Nashir's (2008, 39) conception, the moral force. As the interest group, it pursues strategies like lobbying and influencing key persons involved in policymaking, using tactical communications, and adapting itself to the existing situation without deviating from the core values of Islam. It can be seen in some cases, such as the ban on civil servants becoming active in Muhammadiyah, and the intervention of Pancasila toward Muhammadiyah principles. Regarding the first case, according to Adhy (2010, 20-1), as the chairperson of Muhammadiyah at the time, AR Fakhruddin communicated with the Minister of Home Affairs, Amir Mahmud, the key individual who issued the ban regulation. The upshot is that it is not a big deal if Muhammadiyah members that are civil servants do not become active in Muhammadiyah, but they can create and maintain *pengajian* in government institutions. As a result, *pengajian* in such institutions is widespread across the country.

In the case of "asas tunggal" (the sole foundation), the New Order regime intervened in all aspects of life, including the realization of the "asas tunggal" of Pancasila in all kinds of organizations since the mid-1980s. This regulation became controversial among Muhammadiyah members and supporters. Some agreed to the realization of "asas tunggal," while others rejected it. Even Malik Ahmad, one of the chairpersons of the central board of Muhammadiyah, said he intended to leave Muhammadiyah if it approved of Pancasila as its official foundation. To neutralize the conflict, AR Fakhruddin applied the strategy of "helmet politics." With reference to Adhy (2010, 22) and Syukriyanto (2017, 116), this concept is illustrated when a Muslim goes to the mosque for prayer using a motorcycle and a helmet; using the helmet does not change his or her faith as a Muslim. Therefore, Muhammadiyah accommodated Pancasila in its statute, formalized by the 1985 Muhammadiyah Congress (PP Muhammadiyah 1985).

By the 1990s, Muhammadiyah appeared to criticize the New Order regime because of its consistency as a moral force. It was evident through the role of Amien Rais, who proposed a challenging notion called "suksesi kepemimpinan nasional" (national leadership succession) in 1993. This notion was an effort to stage a coup against Soeharto due to his dictatorial leadership style. Majelis Diktilitbang

and LPI PP Muhammadiyah (2010, 299-300) highlighted five primary considerations as to why Amien Rais had to expel Soeharto from his position: 1) poverty and unemployment could not be reduced; 2) corruption and nepotism were rampant, predominantly committed by Soeharto's family and cronies; 3) the democratization process was far removed from the people; 4) Indonesia's debt to international institutions had increased; 5) law and human rights enforcement efforts were humiliated. Although Rais's effort took a long time and was frequently exhausting, Soeharto eventually stepped down as president in May 1998. Muhammadiyah issued an official statement on 19 April 1998 that emphasized that the reformation effort should be constitutional and peaceful.

After the decline of Soeharto, some parties supported Amien Rais to create a new political party. Rais proposed this notion at Muhammadiyah's *Tanwir* meeting in Semarang City in July 1998, to toughen his choice. The *Tanwir* eventually decided that Muhammadiyah instructed to Amien Rais to behave what so called "*ijtihad politik*" (making a political decision) whether to establish a political party or not. Following broad support to establish a party, Amien Rais and other prominent figures and leaders launched the National Mandate Party (PAN) on 23 August 1998. In this regard, Muhammadiyah was consistent as the interest group and the moral force. It took no intervention and no deep involvement in the PAN's establishment. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that PAN has a historical and emotional relationship with Muhammadiyah.

Amid an increasingly democratic climate, Indonesia held presidential elections for the first time in 2004. Amien Rais was one of the five presidential candidates, alongside Megawati, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Wiranto, and Agum Gumelar. Muhammadiyah released an official statement in strong support of Amien Rais as Muhammadiyah's best cadre to fight for the sustainability of the reformation agenda and the nation throughout the 2004 presidential election. Although some Muhammadiyah members refuted this decision due to it contradicting with the spirit of the *Khittah Ujung Pandang*, most agreed and supported it during the 2004 political campaign.

Due to Rais's failed bid to become president, some Muhammadiyah activists, primarily the younger generations, suffered disappointment and dissatisfaction with PAN. They argued that Muhammadiyah needed

to establish its own political party, which would be the real channel of Muhammadiyah's aspirations. The need to establish a political party was discussed at Muhammadiyah's *Tanwir* meeting in Mataram City, West Nusa Tenggara, in 2004. It eventually stimulated Muhammadiyah's young activists to set up the new party in 2006, named the National Sun Party (PMB). Sadly, PMB's fate in the 2009 election was worse than PAN's because it could not surpass the minimal parliamentary threshold of 2.5 percent.

In its subsequent development, and although Muhammadiyah has been consistent in not affiliating with any political parties and executive candidates, devotees have expressed their political aspirations through the *Tim Sukses* (success team). The support of Muhammadiyah followers in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections was split into two contradicting blocs: those for Prabowo and those for Jokowi. Presently, the political engagement of Muhammadiyah members has spread into almost all political parties. The data demonstrates that the elected Muhammadiyah cadres for the House of Representatives from 1999 until 2019 were dominated by cadres active in PAN, followed by cadres nominated by PPP, Golkar, PKS, PBB, Gerindra, PDIP, and Hanura. In brief, the evolution of political consciousness in Muhammadiyah can be seen in Figure 1.




Figure 1. The formulation process of the political consciousness of Muhammadiyah

Structure of the Political Reasoning of Muhammadiyah: Present Trajectory

According to Hanafi (1991), the structure studies phenomena is based on the amount of time together, also referred to as synchrony. This method is relevant to the phenomenon of Muhammadiyah's political consciousness. The structure phase has formulated the "political reasoning of Muhammadiyah". This presents the question: what is the political reasoning of Muhammadiyah? According to

Cambridge Dictionary (2020), the term “reasoning” can be understood as the way someone thinks and understands something and how they behave and make judgements based upon what they believe, based on their experience and the practical information collected. It indicates the correlation and consistency between mind and action. Therefore, if someone has no consistency in their mind and actions, they do not use their own “pure reason”.

With reference to this concept, the political reasoning of Muhammadiyah can be understood as the consistency in the way of thinking and behaving by its followers in relation to political issues like power, the government, political parties, and elections. Therefore, each political behavior by Muhammadiyah followers should be based on organizational decrees, to ensure that their minds and actions are not contradictory. That is why Muhammadiyah believers should be conscious of all regulations and guidelines.

1. Influential Factors in the Formulation of Muhammadiyah’s Political Reasoning

The formulation of Muhammadiyah’s political reasoning can be traced from 1912 until the present, as previously explained. A century is more than adequate as a robust model to understand the reasoning in the present and deal with future challenges. This paper proposes four influential factors on the formulation of Muhammadiyah’s political reasoning.

The first is Muhammadiyah as the Islamic movement, which mainly concerns social affairs. Since its foundation, Muhammadiyah has been consistent as the Islamic *da’wa* movement for society. It can be seen in the robust rejection of Ahmad Dahlan, at the request of some prominent leaders such as Agus Salim, Misbach, and Cokroaminoto, to make Muhammadiyah a political party. Similarly, when Muhammadiyah, under the leadership of Ahmad Badawi after the GESTAPU Tragedy of 1965, denied President Soeharto’s request to change Muhammadiyah into a political party, leading to Parmusi being established in 1968 as the political channel for Muhammadiyah devotees. The withdrawal of Muhammadiyah activists from *Sarekat Islam* demonstrated their commitment as real activists of Muhammadiyah. Furthermore, when NU and the PSII (Indonesia Islamic Union Party) left Masyumi, each as an independent party, Muhammadiyah remained consistent

as the special member. This evidence indicates that the nature of Muhammadiyah's struggle is not in political affairs but *da'wa* for society.

The second factor is Muhammadiyah as the modernist Islamic movement. This has been hypothesized by Geertz (1960, 149-61) as having these features: fate is decided by humanity and hard work, not by God. This maintains the purity of Islam and tends to insist all sorts of rituals outside Islam, justifying its pragmatic values in contemporary life with a general reference to Al-Qur'an and As-Sunnah. As a result, Muhammadiyah can grow in urban areas rather than rural areas because urban society is more educated and works in industrial sectors. Islamic teachings, in the view of Muhammadiyah, can be internalised more swiftly by such a society. Meanwhile, rural society has difficulty receiving Muhammadiyah doctrines because it prohibits the rituals of *slametan*, *tahlilan*, *yasinan* and the like, which have a long history, particularly in Javanese society.

The third factor is the influential values of Muhammadiyah. Since its foundation, Muhammadiyah's values have been widespread, like "a library of ideology". They can be found in *Al-Mā'ūn* theology, *Al-'Asr* theology, Mas Mansur's Twelve Steps, the introduction of the Muhammadiyah statute (MADM), the Muhammadiyah personality (*Kepribadian Muhammadiyah*), the Muhammadiyah belief and life goals (MKCH), the Muhammadiyah *Tarjih* religious verdicts (HPT), the strategy of "helmet politics", the Islamic life guidelines for Muhammadiyah devotees (PHIWM), the idea of Pancasila as *dār al-'ahd wa al-shahādah* (a consensus and witness state), and others. These values are delivered at various Muhammadiyah meetings and training sessions as channels to indoctrinate its devotees on what Muhammadiyah is and how it operates. Through these forums, Muhammadiyah has built both a material civilization and also a non-material one. More obviously, happiness can be reached not only in tangible ways, such as with the accumulation of property or wealth, but also in intuitive ways like sincerity and politeness.

The fourth factor is the *Khittah Ujung Pandang*. In this context, the term "khittah" can be understood as Muhammadiyah's organizational policy for responding to a particular issue. For coping with the politics of power and the party, the recognized policy is the *Khittah Ujung Pandang*, revised for the first time by the Muhammadiyah Congress in Surabaya in 1978. The main message of the *khittah* is that

Muhammadiyah has no organizational relation and is not affiliated with any political parties. Thus, this *khittah* is always the fundamental postulate denying the desire to embroil Muhammadiyah in practical politics. The decision of Muhammadiyah not to become involved organizationally in the institution of PAN in 1998 and PMB in 2006 and election events is tangible evidence of the fulfillment of *Khittah Ujung Pandang*.

2. Features of the Political Reasoning of Muhammadiyah

This paper has focused on four features of the political reasoning of Muhammadiyah, based on a consideration of the formulation process and influential factors. The four features have been employed by Muhammadiyah devotees as the way of thinking and behaving when addressing political issues, such as the politics of power, the politics of the party, and the politics of elections. They are scripturalists, rationalists, substantialist, and pragmatists. Two features, scripturalist and substantialist, were adopted by Liddle (1996, 323-50) to depict two models of Muslim responses toward the impact of globalization on religion and religious identity.

The first feature is scripturalist. According to Liddle (1996, 239), the scripturalists generally do not engage in the intellectual activity of adapting the message of Muhammad PBUH and the meaning of Islam in the social context. They believe that the message and meaning are, for the most part, expressed clearly in Al-Qur'an and As-Sunnah, and need only be realized conscientiously. This group is strongly *shariah*-minded. Thus, the scripturalists maintain the purity of Muhammadiyah on the path of Islamic *da'wa* for society, avoiding activities like elections and party politics.

The second feature is rationalist. Referring to Oxford Learner's Dictionaries (2020), the term "rational" indicates behavior or ideas based on reasoning rather than emotions, and the ability to think logically and make decisions based on reasoning rather than emotions. In this context, thinking logically prioritizes logical arguments rather than depending on *taqlid* (uncritical and unqualified acceptance of a traditional orthodoxy). The rationalist feature is central to Muhammadiyah as the reformist-modernist Islamic movement. According to Geertz (1960), rationality is one of the embedded features of Muhammadiyah.

The third feature is substantialist. Liddle (1996, 325-7) proposed a four-part substantialist idea: 1) the substance of belief and practice

is more important than the form; 2) each succeeding generation of Muslims must interpret the message of Quran and Sunnah in light of the prevailing social conditions of their time; 3) Muslims should be tolerant toward each other and toward non-Muslims; 4) Muslims must accept the existing structure of government as the final form of the Indonesian state, as summarized in Pancasila. Likewise, Anwar (1995, 155-6) argued that the substantialists prefer to underline the realization of the substance of Islamic values in political activities rather than religious symbols and texts.

The fourth feature is pragmatist. In Oxford Learner's Dictionaries (2020), "pragmatic" involves solving problems practically and sensibly rather than by having fixed ideas or theories". In other words, pragmatism is part of the outcome of rationality because someone who has made a rational choice will usually take a pragmatic approach. Alfian (1989: 150) labeled Ahmad Dahlan a true pragmatist, evidenced in his behavior. He took something if he thought it was a better option than the others. He behaved based on what he thought was right and favorable for Muslims. He copied, without shame or regret, institutions established by Christians, including those for educational and health affairs. As a pragmatist, he liberalized Islam, as he had liberalized Muhammadiyah, to accept everything, which he thought was advantageous and not in contradiction to the true faith.

3. Two Types of Political Reasoning in Muhammadiyah

Considering the four features of Muhammadiyah's political reasoning elaborated above, this paper proposes two *types* of political reasoning in Muhammadiyah. The first is scripturalist-rationalist, dominating most of Muhammadiyah's reasonings. The second is substantialist-pragmatist, the minority reasoning because it is marginalized by most Muhammadiyah followers and is not supported by organizational decrees. If the former can be cataloged as the mass reasoning, the latter is the elite reasoning. The mass reasoning indicates that most Muhammadiyah devotees at the grassroots level support this position, while the elite reasoning is supported primarily by Muhammadiyah elites.

a. Scripturalist-Rationalist Reasoning

Conceptually speaking, the scripturalist-rationalist has some propositions. First, Muhammadiyah did not involve itself in practical

politics, such as the politics of the party and elections. Second, Muhammadiyah followers looked for other livelihoods to sustain themselves, such as in education, health, social issues, and the like. Third, they assumed that political activities tended to be harmful and cause suspicion, hatred, hostility, and the tendency to humiliate others. Fourth, they preferred to take a contradictory position toward the regime or anyone in power. However, they desired to hold power without a bloody struggle. They only accepted power if they were offered the top position. In other words, although they abhorred and were in opposition to the regime, they still needed the government's financial subsidy. The image which emerged was that Muhammadiyah was anti-politics. To illustrate this absurd position, the "politics of *hijrah*", operated by *Sarekat Islam* toward the Dutch government, represents the current, subconscious situation of most of Muhammadiyah's reasonings.

Historically, the way of thinking and behaving on the side of the opposition can be traced back to Muhammadiyah elites' behavior. Although Hamka, as the general chairperson of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), firmly issued a *fatwa* (an interpretation on a point of Islamic law given by a qualified legal scholar, known as a *mufti*) saying "Merry Christmas" to Christians was *haram* (forbidden in Islam), a lot of Muslim scholars rejected it. Moreover, Muhammadiyah's opposition to the Soekarno regime can be reflected in the conflict between Masyumi and Soekarno. The Permesta/PRRI rebellion of 1958, committed by some Masyumi elites (M. Natsir, Syafruddin Prawiranegara, and Burhanuddin Harahap), saw the peak of the conflict among them. The robust rejection of Malik Ahmad and the application of Pancasila into Muhammadiyah principles, the powerful will of Amien Rais to overthrow Soeharto as the president, and the critical-oppositional position of Din Syamsuddin toward SBY's administration, have reinforced the hypothesis that Muhammadiyah abhorred power. The support of Muhammadiyah devotees for Jusuf Kalla and not SBY in the 2009 presidential election, and Prabowo Subianto over Joko Widodo in the 2019 presidential election, is evidence that the political reasoning of Muhammadiyah is oppositional. Thus, the political opposition conducted by most Muhammadiyah followers at the grassroots level toward the SBY and Jokowi regimes reflects *Sarekat Islam*'s non-cooperative politics toward the Dutch Government.

The scripturalist-rationalist prefers to situate Muhammadiyah as an interest group and moral force rather than a real political force. For them, political activities tend to cause negative impacts on Muhammadiyah rather than positive ones. To struggle for their interest, this school utilizes a strategy of lobbying the elite, influencing policymakers and establishing partnership programs. This school positions the government as the patron supporting Muhammadiyah's activities. The positive outcome is that the work ethos of the scripturalist-rationalist is excellent because they work hard to convince the government that their programs are eligible to be supported, subsidized, and act as the best pilot for others. It is the pattern of cultural struggle, differentiated from the structural struggle, which is close to the other type of reasoning.

Some specific factors have influenced the way Muhammadiyah devotees adopted this reasoning: Muhammadiyah being an Islamic movement mainly concerned with social affairs; the *Khittah Ujung Pandang*; and the indoctrination of Muhammadiyah values in various meetings and training sessions. Even some Muhammadiyah cadres and members have argued that Muhammadiyah does not need to undertake activities related to practical politics.

b. Substantialist-Pragmatist Reasoning

Differentiated from the scripturalist-rationalist, the substantialist-pragmatist has some basic principles. First, Muhammadiyah's ideas and goals must be implemented into practical politics through party and election politics. Second, they are interested in engaging in political activities, whether as the party activist or by being nominated in the electoral stage as the legislative member candidate, the executive candidate, or the *Tim Sukses*. Third, Muhammadiyah's education, health, and social affairs activities should navigate through the practical politics to accomplish the targeted program. The effort applied in legislating and budgeting is the best way to facilitate the fulfillment of the goal "*Masyarakat Islam yang sebenar-benarnya*" (the ideal Islamic society).

Although the political struggle is more complicated than the *da'wa* struggle, Muhammadiyah should take a strategic role by distributing its numerous cadres to various political parties. If needed, Muhammadiyah can create a political party. For this school, the political struggle is like providing "heaven for a while", because everything can be obtained if power can be attained. Although this school protects the purity

of Muhammadiyah from any political activities, they argue that Muhammadiyah needs to play a significant role in practical politics, whether through establishing a political party or designing to distribute its cadres to various political parties. It can be considered a “structural struggle” as opposed to a cultural struggle.

In this context, Ahmad Dahlan was the substantialist-pragmatist. It can be traced back to when Dahlan needed *Boedi Oetomo*'s assistance in the process of Muhammadiyah's establishment. Dahlan and his disciples willingly enrolled as members of *Boedi Oetomo* to learn how to organize an association. According to Shihab (2016), Dahlan created the Muhammadiyah statute soon after establishing Muhammadiyah in alignment with the Dutch Government's direction. Dahlan never resisted Dutch policies because rigorous attitudes would harm the sustainability of Muhammadiyah at the time. He preferred to adopt the defeatist tactics first until Muhammadiyah reached a stable position and then take decisive steps at the right time.

It explains why Shihab (2016, 214-6) argued that Dahlan was flexible, accommodative and cooperative with the Dutch Government, on a basis of favorable cooperation with each other. Dahlan's tolerant attitude toward the activities of Christians and missionaries indicated that he was a realist. With such a strategy in the 1920s, the Dutch Government allowed the establishment of Muhammadiyah branches across Indonesia. Ahmad Badawi also adopted a flexible style for coping with the Soekarno regime, as did AR Fakhruddin when he responded to Soeharto's policy banning civil servants from participating in Muhammadiyah and the adoption of Pancasila into the Muhammadiyah statute. It aimed to maintain Muhammadiyah's existence by surpassing the obstacles. Fachrodin and Mas Mansur's refutation of *Sarekat Islam*'s “politics of *hijrah*” is evidence that Muhammadiyah elites tend to have substantialist-pragmatist features. The willingness of Ki Bagus Hadikusumo in accepting the failure of the Jakarta Charter of 1945 by removing seven words was also robust proof that Ki Bagus was the substantialist-pragmatist.

Several factors influenced the way Muhammadiyah believers applied this reasoning. The first is the political engagement of Muhammadiyah cadres in Masyumi from 1945 to 1959. It is supported by the fact that Muhammadiyah cadres like Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun held the top position in Parmusi, and Amien Rais was the central

figure of PAN. The second is the inability of Muhammadiyah to strive for its goals, whether through government or parliament. Therefore, Muhammadiyah should design itself not merely as a cheerleader but also as an influential actor in the political arena. The third is the understanding of how Muhammadiyah values itself. This school argues that Muhammadiyah activities in education, health, and social affairs should be supported throughout the policymaking.




Figure 2. Structure of the political reasoning of Muhammadiyah

The Fate of the Politics of Muhammadiyah: Future Trajectory

The future of Muhammadiyah politics rests upon two main cornerstones: past and present experiences. Muhammadiyah has a belief that fate is decided by humans themselves, not by God, so the political future of Muhammadiyah should improve. Past and present trajectories are a rigorous model for Muhammadiyah to address unpredictable impediments in the future. The fate phase simulates the advantage and disadvantages of Muhammadiyah having a political party. Later, this paper proposes establishing a center of excellence and the need for the purification of Indonesia’s political system.

1. Advantage and Disadvantage of Muhammadiyah Having or Not Having a Political Party

According to Lasswell (1936), politics is about discussing who gets what, when, and how. Power and resource allocation is the “what”, or the primary goal. “When” concerns whose turn it is to control the power and resources. Finally, “how” deals with how to obtain such power and resources. An election is one of the constitutional ways to achieve this objective. It is also similar in the context of the dynamics of Muhammadiyah and the political party. It raises the question: does

Muhammadiyah needs to establish a political party to embark on the path of its followers' aspirations? Or, could Muhammadiyah believers' aspirations be represented in all political parties? This paper offers two possible simulations.

a. First Simulation: If It Has a Party

What is the advantage of Muhammadiyah having a party? Some arguments can be provided here. First, the aspirations of Muhammadiyah believers can be channeled into the party easily and swiftly. Second, Muhammadiyah's proposal and suggestion will be taken seriously by the party through its delegates in the parliament, either through the legislating or budgeting process. If Muhammadiyah cadres hold executive positions, they will receive various advantages, like partnership programs, policy support, and financial subsidies. Third, the desire of Muhammadiyah devotees to be politicians can be readily channeled into the party.

What is the disadvantage of Muhammadiyah having a party? There are several points to consider. First, Muhammadiyah needs immense energy to govern the party. If the party is extremely fundamental, Muhammadiyah should allocate human and financial resources and prepare its cadres to command the party from national to local levels across the country. Indeed, Muhammadiyah's human and financial resources will be consumed by political matters and *da'wa* activities marginalized, as it did when Muhammadiyah had a role as *Ormaspol* after the GESTAPU Tragedy of 1965. Second, political and *da'wa* activities are mixed. It will stimulate internal conflicts among Muhammadiyah followers due to differing interests. It could be that cadres active in the party will use Muhammadiyah facilities and networks to further their political ambitions. Third, it is difficult for Muhammadiyah to be a significant influence on all parties due to having its own. Other parties have no desire to connect themselves to Muhammadiyah because it has its own party.

b. Second Simulation: If It Has No Party

What is the advantage of Muhammadiyah not having a party? First, it is easy for Muhammadiyah to be a prominent force because all political parties can communicate without interests conflicting. Second, the political aspirations of Muhammadiyah can be channeled into all parties and forces, and Muhammadiyah can spread different expectations into different parties and forces. Third, the desire of

Muhammadiyah followers to be politicians can be extend into all parties, rather than just in one. Fourth, Muhammadiyah can focus on organizing itself as the *da'wa* movement for society, including on issues of economics, community development, charitable activities, philanthropy, humanitarian missions, and others.

What is the disadvantage of Muhammadiyah not having a party? First, it is not necessarily easy to channel the political aspirations of Muhammadiyah believers into a party because Muhammadiyah needs a personal rapport with certain elites in the party. Second, Muhammadiyah cannot fight for its interests easily and rapidly because it must approach various parties through both organizational and personal lobbying. Therefore, when the government policy does not favor Muhammadiyah, it is as if Muhammadiyah strives for its interests single-handedly. Third, it is not easy for Muhammadiyah followers to become politicians who hold key positions in a party. If they can join the party, they cannot directly hold the key and special positions. They need to exert significant effort to attain such a position. It could be that they are marginalized from the party. The impact is that it is not easy for Muhammadiyah to nominate its cadres to run for executive elections because it needs to approach various parties, which are not necessarily successful. This assumption is accepted if we agree that the party is an effective way to recruit political leaders.

Considering both simulations, it is difficult to determine whether Muhammadiyah should establish a political party. Nevertheless, this paper proposes an option for upcoming situations that suggests Muhammadiyah does not need to establish a party. Some subsequent arguments support this proposal: Most Muhammadiyah elites suggested not creating the party; there is no quantitatively superior achievement between the structural (having parties) and cultural (having no parties) strategies for obtaining parliamentary seats. This is reflected in the struggle between Masyumi and PAN. Additionally, the state of contemporary democracy is incompatible with Muhammadiyah forming such a party. As a possible option for Muhammadiyah to address political issues, this paper proposes the need to form a “center of excellence”, which has a primary duty as a research institute engineering political strategies and distributing potential cadres to be politicians across various political parties.

2. The Establishment of a Center of Excellence

This paper proposes instituting a center of excellence under the name “Pusat Pengembangan Kader Politik” (Center for the Development of Political Activists, PUSKAPI). The philosophical foundation of the establishment of PUSKAPI is the “bridge of controversy” between the dominant reasoning (scripturalist-rationalist) and the marginalized reasoning (substantialist-pragmatist) for dealing with political issues. In the unpredictable political arena, the debate between them never ends. While the marginalized reasoning argues that Muhammadiyah needs a political party as a vehicle to attain power, the dominant reasoning denies this entirely. In other words, PUSKAPI is a moderate path to solve the fragmentary debate.

PUSKAPI has at least a twofold duty: being a center of excellence (1) for improving the personal capacities of Muhammadiyah cadres who desire to become active in the political arena, and (2) formulating the strategies for Muhammadiyah cadres when they address political situations, such as elections, legislating, budgeting, and the distribution of Muhammadiyah cadres into political parties. More technically, PUSKAPI could organize a scheduled activity like a “school of politics”, to develop the cadres’ capacity and supply ideological nutrition for designing the strategy to achieve success in both legislative and executive elections. Hence, the creation of a “Muhammadiyah Caucus” or “Muhammadiyah Diaspora” in the parliament is an inevitability, so that Muhammadiyah is the major force in the political arena. Therefore, PUSKAPI should be equipped with updated technological facilities, including the use of big data. Because it is ad hoc, PUSKAPI should be supervised by the Institute of *Hikmah* and Public Policies (LHKP), one of the supporting units in Muhammadiyah, with its primary function to deliver considerations and suggestions relating to political issues to the official board of Muhammadiyah.

3. The Need for Purifying the Political System in Indonesia

If Indonesian democracy is measured by Schumpeter’s (2008) “free competition for a free vote” and Dahl’s (1972) criteria regarding contestation and inclusiveness, Indonesia has succeeded in surpassing them. If Indonesian democracy is examined according to Huntington’s (1991) three stages of democracy (the end of an authoritarian regime, the installation of a democratic regime, and the consolidated democracy),

Indonesia has succeeded to move beyond the first and second stages but has not met the third step. Hadiwinata and Schuck (2007, 18-9) postulate that Indonesia oscillates between a defective and a consolidated democracy.

Most scholars have concurred that, despite many developments in Indonesian democratization, weaknesses exist in five areas: civil society, political society, the rule of law, state bureaucratic performance and the economic society (Bünthe and Ufen 2009, 22-3; Ufen 2009, 153; Aspinall 2010, 103-23; Hilmy 2010, 65; Liddle and Mujani 2013, 25-50). Moreover, Magnis-Suseno (2013, 30-5) argues that democracy in Indonesia still contends with five main challenges: anti-pluralism, ongoing impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations, extreme regionalism or regional separatism, social injustice and rampant corruption that embraces bribery. Meanwhile, Mietzner (2009, 124-46) labeled Indonesia as a “low-quality democracy,” and Tan (2012, 175-6) classified it as “the reign of the parties” between 1998 and 2008. Moreover, due to the increase of oligarchic power and the feeble legal officials in various political posts, mainly in democratic institutions, Winters (2013, 11-33) predicted that the prospects for democratic consolidation in Indonesia are equally grim. Additionally, Hadiz (2017) and Power (2018) similarly believe that the current state of democracy in Indonesia is in the setback phase.

Still, other scholars like Hefner (2000, xviii, 221; 2009a, 27-8; 2009b, 281-98) and Mujani (2003, 334-50) are seemingly optimistic that Muslim society in Indonesia can encourage a democratic and pluralistic culture. Diamond (2010, 46) also supports Hefner, contending that Indonesia between 1998 and 2009 was a free country and a more vigorous, stable and legitimate democracy. Since then, Mietzner (2013, 240) has been more optimistic that the one and a half decades of Indonesia’s democratic journey since 1998 have been a surprising success, although there is no guarantee for the next 15 years.

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) reported that Indonesia from 2007 to 2020 was classified as “a flawed democracy”. It indicates that the state still has free and fair elections, despite the many infringements on media freedom. Although Freedom House reported that Indonesia between 2006 and 2013 could be classified as “a democratic state” and the “most consolidated democracy” in Southeast Asia, developments between 2014 and 2021 saw it relegated to the status of “a semi-democratic state”.

In light of these facts, it is necessary to purify and reform the political system in Indonesia. Purification requires reforming the existing constitutional system, including other fundamental acts and more capitalistic and liberal regulations. The government's desire to issue some omnibus laws demonstrates capitalist interests, which are more beneficial for investors than regular citizens. Electoral and political party systems are also more liberal, so such systems should be purified based on Indonesia's genuine culture.

Conclusion

This paper examined the formation, structure, and fate of the political consciousness of Muhammadiyah. These three phases represent a temporal dimension: past, present, and future trajectories. The formation occurred from 1912 to 2020 and divided into two gradual phases of consciousness: individual consciousness (1912-1971) and institutional consciousness (1971-2020). The former denotes the identity struggle and the energetic involvement in party politics, causing Muhammadiyah activists to address many political conflicts. Meanwhile, the latter indicates Muhammadiyah's role as the interest group and the moral force by employing strategies of lobbying and influencing the policymakers. In other words, if the former signifies engagement consciousness, the latter symbolizes disengagement consciousness.

For more than a century, the past trajectory has constructed a four-part political reasoning for Muhammadiyah: scripturalist, rationalist, substantialist, and pragmatist. Four driving factors influenced the development of the four reasons: Muhammadiyah as the Islamic movement focusing on social affairs, Muhammadiyah as the Islamic modernist-reformist movement, acknowledging Muhammadiyah values, and the *Khittah Ujung Pandang*. Therefore, it can be summarised that Muhammadiyah has two types of political reasoning: scripturalist-rationalist, as the dominant school, and substantialist-pragmatist as the marginalized school. If the former represents the reasoning of the masses, the latter symbolizes the elite reasoning.

Considering the formation and structure phases as the representation of past and present trajectories, the politics of Muhammadiyah in the future suggests that the establishment of a political party is no longer a major agenda for Muhammadiyah. Instead, this paper proposes

that Muhammadiyah institute a center of excellence as a channel to improve the personal capacities of Muhammadiyah cadres who desire to become active in the political arena and engineer the strategies to address dynamic political situations. Thus, creating the so-called “Muhammadiyah Caucus” as the major force is inevitable. Additionally, the purification-reformation of the Indonesian political system should be the radical agenda for the state through legitimate means, scientific research, and discussions among academics and broader society.

The investigation of the political consciousness of Muhammadiyah through the past, present, and future trajectories contributes to consolidating an institutional identity for coping with any political issues, whether they be the politics of power, the politics of the party, or the politics of elections. The public is no longer muddling with the debate of the need of Muhammadiyah to institute a political party or not because this discussion keeps recurring. The dominant reasoning consistently denies it, while the marginalized reasoning supports such a notion. In this context, the savvy of Muhammadiyah leaders is, indeed, examined by the public. Moreover, the duty of LHKP should be revitalized, not merely for operating technical activities but also conceptualizing and engineering the center of excellence for addressing unpredictable political issues and maintaining the actions of “Muhammadiyah Caucus”.

Endnotes

- The author expresses honest gratitude to the Council of Higher Education, Research, and Development (Diktilitbang) Central Board of Muhammadiyah in providing the generous grant for this research under the contract number of 0984.012/I.3/D/2019.

Bibliography

- Adhy, Soeparno S. 2010. *Bersama Empat Tokoh Muhammadiyah*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
- Alfian. 1989. *Muhammadiyah the Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism*. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press.
- Al-Hamdi, Ridho. 2013. "Islam and Politics: Political Attitudes of the Elites in Muhammadiyah 1998-2010." *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 3(2): 267-90. doi: [10.18326/ijims.v3i2.267-290](https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v3i2.267-290).
- Anwar, M. Syafii. 1995. *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru*. Jakarta: Paramadina.
- Aspinall, Edward. 2010. Indonesia in 2009: Democratic Triumphs and Trials. *Southeast Asian Affairs*: 103-25.
- Asyari, Suaidi. 2008. *Ijtihād-Based Politics: The Muhammadiyah Political Participation in Post-Soeharto*. *Studia Islamika* 15(1): 25-83. doi: <https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v15i1.537>.
- Badawi, M. Djaldan. 2001. *Buku Putih Muhammadiyah*. Unpublished Document. Yogyakarta: Sekretariat PP Muhammadiyah.
- Bünthe, Marco, and Andreas Ufen. 2009. *The New Order and its Legacy Reflections on Democratization in Indonesia*. In: Bünthe M and Ufen A (eds) *Democratization in post-Suharto Indonesia*. London: Routledge.
- Cambridge Dictionary. 2020. "Reason". [dictionary.cambridge.org](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/reason). <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/reason>
- Dahl, Robert A. 1972. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Diamond, Larry. 2010. *Indonesia's Place in Global Democracy*. In: Aspinall E and Mietzner M (eds.) *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Efendi, David. 2014. *Politik Elite Muhammadiyah: Studi tentang Fragmentasi Elite Muhammadiyah*. Yogyakarta: Reviva Cendikia.
- Freedom House. Multi-years. "Freedom in the World." [freedomhouse.org](https://freedomhouse.org/reports). <https://freedomhouse.org/reports>

- Geertz, Clifford. 1960. *The Religion of Java*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Hadikusumo, Djarnawi. 2014. *Aliran Pembaruan Islam: Dari Jamaluddin Al-Afghani hingga KH Ahmad Dahlan*. Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah.
- _____. 2017. *Matahari-matahari Muhammadiyah*. Second Edition. Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah.
- Hadiwinata, Bob S., and Christoph Schuck. 2007. *Mapping Indonesia's Way Towards Democracy: In Search of a Theoretical Frame*. In: Hadiwinata BS and Schuck C (eds.) *Democracy in Indonesia: The Challenge of Consolidation*. Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag.
- Hadiz, Vedi R. 2017. Indonesia's Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a New Phase of Deepening Illiberalism. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 53(3): 261-78. doi: [10.1080/00074918.2017.1410311](https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2017.1410311).
- Hamka. 1956. *Muhammadiyah-Masyumi*. Jakarta: Masyarakat Islam.
- Hanafi, Hassan. 1991. *Muqaddimah fi 'Ilmi al-Istighrâb*. Cairo: Al-Dar al-Faniah.
- Hefner, Robert W. 2000. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- _____. 2009a. *Introduction: Modernity and the Remaking of Muslim politics*. In: Hefner RW (eds.) *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- _____. 2009b. *Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence in post-Soeharto Indonesia*. In: Hefner RW (eds.) *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Hilmy, Masdar. 2010. *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1999. *The Idea of Phenomenology*. Netherlands: Springer.
- Jainuri, Achmad. 1999. *The Formation of the Muhammadiyah's Ideology, 1912-1942*. PhD Dissertation. Quebec: McGill University.
- Jurdi, Syarifuddin. 2010. *Muhammadiyah dalam Dinamika Politik Indonesia 1966-2006*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
- Kuntowijoyo. 2001. *Muslim Tanpa Masjid*. Bandung: Mizan.
- Lasswell, Harold. 1936. *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*. New York: Whittlesey House.
- Liddle, R. William. 1996. *Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia*. In: Woodward MR (eds.) *Toward*

- a New Paradigm: Recent Development in Indonesian Islamic Thought. Arizona: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies.
- Liddle, R. William, and Saiful Mujani. 2013. *Indonesian Democracy: From Transition to Consolidation*. In: Künkler M and Stepan A (eds.) *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Madinier, Remy. 2013. *Partai Masjumi: Antara Godaan Demokrasi dan Islam Integral*. Jakarta: Mizan.
- Magnis-Suseno, Frans. 2013. *Indonesia's Challenge: Making Democracy Succeeded*. In: Heise M and Rucktäschel K (eds) *Indonesia's Search for Democracy: Political, Economic, and Social Developments*. Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag.
- Majelis Diktilitbang and LPI PP Muhammadiyah. 2010. *1 Abad Muhammadiyah: Gagasan Pembaruan Sosial Keagamaan*. Jakarta: Kompas.
- Mietzner, Marcus. 2009. *Indonesia and the Pitfalls of Low-quality Democracy: A Case Study of the Gubernatorial Elections in North Sulawesi*. In: Bünthe M and Ufen A (eds) *Democratization in post-Suharto Indonesia*. London: Routledge.
- _____. 2013. *Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in post-Authoritarian Indonesia*. Copenhagen: NUS Press and NIAS Press.
- Mujani, Saiful. 2003. *Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in post-Suharto Indonesia*. PhD Dissertation. Columbus: Ohio State University.
- Muthahhari, Murthadha. 2001. *Mengenal Epistemologi: Sebuah Pembuktian terhadap Rapuhnya Pemikiran Asing dan Kokohnya Pemikiran Islam*. Translated by Muhammad Jawad Bafaqih. Jakarta: Lentera.
- Mu'arif. 2010. *Benteng Muhammadiyah: Sepenggal Riwayat dan Pemikiran Haji Fachroddin (1890-1929)*. Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah.
- Nashir, Haedar. 2000. *Perilaku Politik Elit Muhammadiyah*. Yogyakarta: Tarawang.
- _____. 2008. *Khittah Muhammadiyah tentang Politik*. Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah.
- _____. 2010. *Muhammadiyah Gerakan Pembaruan*. Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah.
- Nashir, Haedar, Zuly Qodir, Achmad Nurmandi, Hasse Jubba, and Mega Hidayati. (2019). Muhammadiyah's Moderation Stance in the 2019 General Election: Critical Views from Within. *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 57(1): 1-24. doi: 10.14421/ajis.2019.571.1-24.
- Nasihin. 2012. *Sarekat Islam Mencari Ideologi 1924-1945*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
- Noer, Deliar. 1973. *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942: East Asian Historical Monographs*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- _____. 1985. *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942*. Jakarta: LP3ES.
- _____. 2000. *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional: Kisah dan Analisis Perkembangan Politik Indonesia 1945-1965*. Second Edition. Jakarta: LP3ES.
- Oxford Learner's Dictionaries. 2020. *oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com*. www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com
- Pantjaran Amal. 1939. Kijai H. M. Mansoer Masoek politiek. *Pantjaran Amal* 4(1). 10 Januari 1939: 5.
- Pedoman Masyarakat. Edition of 16 November 1938.
- Power, Thomas P. 2018. Jokowi's Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia's Democratic Decline. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 54(3): 307-38. doi: [10.1080/00074918.2018.1549918](https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2018.1549918).
- PB Moehammadijah. 1929. *Berita Taboenan Moehammadijah Hindia Timoer Taboen 1927*. Djogjakarta: Pengoeroes Besar Moehammadijah.
- PP Muhammadiyah. 1968. *Laporan PP Muhammadiyah Periode 1965-1968 kepada Mukhtar Muhammadiyah ke-37 pada tanggal 21-26 September 1968 di Yogyakarta*. Unpublished Document.
- _____. 1978. "Keputusan Mu'tamar Muhammadiyah ke-40 di Surabaya tanggal 24-30 Juni 1978." In *Berita Resmi Muhammadiyah* Special Number.
- _____. 1985. *Laporan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah dalam Mu'tamar Muhammadiyah ke-41 di Surakarta tanggal 07-11 Desember 1985*. Unpublished Document.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A. 2008. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. Third Edition. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Shihab, Alwi. 2016. *Membendung Arus: Respon Gerakan Muhammadiyah terhadap Penetrasi Misi Kristen di Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah.
- Soekarno. 2013. *Makin Lama Makin Cinta*. In: Mu'arif (eds.) *Makin Lama Makin Cinta: Setengah Abad Muhammadiyah 1912-1962*. Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah.
- Suara Muhammadiyah. 1966a. "Situasi Tanah Air: Pilih Presiden Baru." In *Suara Muhammadiyah* 10(May): 15.
- _____. 1966b. Laporan PP Muhammadiyah: Dari Mu'tamar ke Tanwir Masalah Organisasi dan Politik (Bagian II Habis). *Suara Muhammadiyah* 13-14 (July): 25-7.
- Syaifulloh. 2019a. *KH Mas Mansur Sapukawat Jawa Timur*. Surabaya: Hikmah Press.
- _____. 2019b. *Gerak Politik Muhammadiyah dalam Masyumi*. Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah.

- _____. 2019c. *Pergeseran Politik Muhammadiyah*. Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah.
- Syukriyanto. 2017. *Biografi Pak AR*. Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah.
- Tan, Paige Johnson. 2012. Reining in the Reign of the Parties: Political parties in contemporary Indonesia. *Asian Journal of Political Science* 20(2): 154-79. doi: [10.1080/02185377.2012.714132](https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2012.714132).
- The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Multi-years. "Democracy Index". *eiui.com*. <https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index>
- Thohari, Hajriyanto Y. 2005. *Muhammadiyah dan Pergulatan Politik Islam Modernis*. Jakarta: PSAP.
- Titus, Harold H., Marilyn S. Smith, and Richard T. Nolan. 1994. *Living Issues in Philosophy*. Ninth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ufen, Andreas. 2009. *Political Parties and Democratization in Indonesia*. In: Bünte M and Ufen A (eds.) *Democratization in post-Suharto Indonesia*. London: Routledge.
- Usman, S. 1971. Sebuah Tanggapan: Muhammadiyah dan Politik. *Suara Muhammadiyah* 10: 17-8.
- Wardana, Amika, and Syahrul Hidayat. 2019. The Multiplicity of Muhammadiyah's Political Engagement in Indonesia's DPD Election. *Studia Islamika* 26(1): 75-111. doi: [10.15408/sdi.v26i1.6422](https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v26i1.6422).
- Winters, Jeffrey A. 2013. "Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia." *Indonesia* 96 (October): 11-33. doi: [10.5728/indonesia.96.0099](https://doi.org/10.5728/indonesia.96.0099).

Ridho Al-Hamdi, *Department of Government Affairs and Administration, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia*.
Email: ridhoalhamdi@umy.ac.id.

Guidelines

Submission of Articles

S*tudia Islamika*, published three times a year since 1994, is a bilingual (English and Arabic), peer-reviewed journal, and specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular and Southeast Asian Islamic studies in general. The aim is to provide readers with a better understanding of Indonesia and Southeast Asia's Muslim history and present developments through the publication of articles, research reports, and book reviews.

The journal invites scholars and experts working in all disciplines in the humanities and social sciences pertaining to Islam or Muslim societies. Articles should be original, research-based, unpublished and not under review for possible publication in other journals. All submitted papers are subject to review of the editors, editorial board, and blind reviewers. Submissions that violate our guidelines on formatting or length will be rejected without review.

Articles should be written in American English between approximately 10.000-15.000 words including text, all tables and figures, notes, references, and appendices intended for publication. All submission must include 150 words abstract and 5 keywords. Quotations, passages, and words in local or foreign languages should

be translated into English. *Studia Islamika* accepts only electronic submissions. All manuscripts should be sent in Ms. Word to: <http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/studia-islamika>.

All notes must appear in the text as citations. A citation usually requires only the last name of the author(s), year of publication, and (sometimes) page numbers. For example: (Hefner 2009a, 45; Geertz 1966, 114). Explanatory footnotes may be included but should not be used for simple citations. All works cited must appear in the reference list at the end of the article. In matter of bibliographical style, *Studia Islamika* follows the American Political Science Association (APSA) manual style, such as below:

1. Hefner, Robert. 2009a. "Introduction: The Political Cultures of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia," in *Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia*, ed. Robert Hefner, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
2. Booth, Anne. 1988. "Living Standards and the Distribution of Income in Colonial Indonesia: A Review of the Evidence." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 19(2): 310–34.
3. Feener, Michael R., and Mark E. Cammack, eds. 2007. *Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions*. Cambridge: Islamic Legal Studies Program.
4. Wahid, Din. 2014. *Nurturing Salafi Manhaj: A Study of Salafi Pesantrens in Contemporary Indonesia*. PhD dissertation. Utrecht University.
5. Utriza, Ayang. 2008. "Mencari Model Kerukunan Antaragama." *Kompas*. March 19: 59.
6. Ms. *Undhang-Undhang Banten*, L.Or.5598, Leiden University.
7. Interview with K.H. Sahal Mahfudz, Kajen, Pati, June 11th, 2007.

Arabic romanization should be written as follows:

Letters: ' , *b*, *t*, *th*, *j*, *h*, *kh*, *d*, *dh*, *r*, *z*, *s*, *sh*, *ṣ*, *ḍ*, *ṭ*, *z*, ' , *gh*, *f*, *q*, *l*, *m*, *n*, *h*, *w*, *y*. Short vowels: *a*, *i*, *u*. long vowels: *ā*, *ī*, *ū*. Diphthongs: *aw*, *ay*. *Tā marbūṭā*: *t*. Article: *al-*. For detail information on Arabic Romanization, please refer the transliteration system of the Library of Congress (LC) Guidelines.

ستوديا إسلاميكا (ISSN 0215-0492; E-ISSN: 2355-6145) مجلة علمية دولية محكمة تصدر عن مركز دراسات الإسلام والمجتمع (PPIM) بجامعة شريف هداية الله الإسلامية الحكومية بجاكرتا، تعنى بدراسة الإسلام في إندونيسيا خاصة وفي جنوب شرقي آسيا عامة. وتستهدف المجلة نشر البحوث العلمية الأصيلة والقضايا المعاصرة حول الموضوع، كما ترحب بإسهامات الباحثين أصحاب التخصصات ذات الصلة. وتخضع جميع الأبحاث المقدمة للمجلة للتحكيم من قبل لجنة مختصة.

تم اعتماد ستوديا إسلاميكا من قبل وزارة البحوث والتكنولوجيا والتعليم العالي بجمهورية إندونيسيا باعتبارها دورية علمية (رقم القرار: 32a/E/KPT/2017).

ستوديا إسلاميكا عضو في CrossRef (الإحالات الثابتة في الأدبيات الأكاديمية) منذ ٢٠١٤، وبالتالي فإن جميع المقالات التي نشرتها مرقمة حسب معرف الوثيقة الرقمية (DOI).

ستوديا إسلاميكا مجلة مفهرسة في سكوبس (Scopus) منذ ٣٠ مايو ٢٠١٥.

عنوان المراسلة:

Editorial Office:
STUDIA ISLAMIKA, Gedung Pusat Pengkajian
Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) UIN Jakarta,
Jl. Kertamukti No. 5, Pisangan Barat, Cirendeu,
Ciputat 15419, Jakarta, Indonesia.
Phone: (62-21) 7423543, 7499272, Fax: (62-21) 7408633;
E-mail: studia.islamika@uinjkt.ac.id
Website: <http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/studia-islamika>

قيمة الاشتراك السنوي خارج إندونيسيا:
للمؤسسات: ٧٥ دولار أمريكي، ونسخة واحدة قيمتها ٢٥ دولار أمريكي.
للأفراد: ٥٠ دولار أمريكي، ونسخة واحدة قيمتها ٢٠ دولار أمريكي.
والقيمة لا تشمل نفقة الإرسال بالبريد الجوي.

رقم الحساب:

خارج إندونيسيا (دولار أمريكي):
PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia
account No. 101-00-0514550-1 (USD).

داخل إندونيسيا (روبية):

PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia
No Rek: 128-00-0105080-3 (Rp).

قيمة الاشتراك السنوي داخل إندونيسيا:
لسنة واحدة ١٥٠,٠٠٠ روبية (للمؤسسة) ونسخة واحدة قيمتها ٥٠,٠٠٠ روبية،
روبية ١٠٠,٠٠٠ (للفرد) ونسخة واحدة قيمتها ٤٠,٠٠٠ روبية.
والقيمة لا تشمل على النفقة للإرسال بالبريد الجوي.



ستوديا إسلاميكا

مجلة إندونيسيا للدراسات الإسلامية
السنة التاسعة والعشرون، العدد ٣، ٢٠٢٢

رئيس التحرير:

سيف المزاني

مدير التحرير:

أومان فتح الرحمن

هيئة التحرير:

جمهاري

ديدين شفرالدين

جاجات برهان الدين

فؤاد جبلي

علي منحرف

سيف الأمم

دادي دارمادي

جاجانج جهراي

دين واحد

ايويس نورليلاواتي

مجلس التحرير الدولي:

محمد قریش شهاب (جامعة شريف هداية الله الإسلامية الحكومية بجاكرتا)

مارتين فان برونيسين (جامعة أرتيخة)

جوهن ر. بويوين (جامعة واشنطن، سانتو لويس)

فركنيا م. هوكير (جامعة أستراليا الحكومية كانبرا)

إيدوين ف. ويرنجا (جامعة كولونيا، ألمانيا)

روبيرت و. هيفنير (جامعة بوستون)

ريمي مادنيير (المركز القومي للبحث العلمي بفرنسا)

ر. ميكائيل فينير (جامعة سينغافورا الحكومية)

ميكائيل ف. لفان (جامعة فرينشتون)

ميناکو ساكاي (جامعة نيو ساوث ويلز)

انابيل تيه جالوب (المكتبة البريطانية)

شفاة المرانة (جامعة سونان كاليجاغا الإسلامية الحكومية)

مساعد هيئة التحرير:

تيسرتيونو

محمد نداء فضلان

رنغكا إيكسا سافوترا

عبد الله مولاني

مراجعة اللغة الإنجليزية:

بنيمين ج. فريمان

دانيل فتريون

موسى بتول

مراجعة اللغة العربية:

توباغوس أدي أسناوي

يولي ياسين

تصميم الغلاف:


س. برنكا

ستوديا اسراميا

سثوديا اسراميا

السنة التاسعة والعشرون، العدد ٣، ٢٠٢٢

مجلة إنءونيسية للءراساء الإسلامية



FOLLOWING THE GLOBAL REJECTION: THE MOTIVES OF MAJELIS ULAMA INDONESIA'S FATWAS ON AHMADIYAH

Fariz Alnizar, Fadlil Munawwar Manshur, Amir Ma'ruf

REDEFINING MANHOOD AND WOMANHOOD: INSIGHTS FROM THE OLDEST INDONESIAN MUSLIM WOMEN ORGANIZATION, 'AISYIYAH

Siti Syamsiyatun

لباران كرانجان: التاريخ المحلي لتقاليد
مجتمع بوهون في جاوة الغربية
ءيان ياسمينة فءري وسوزانتو زهءي
