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Raihani, Irfan Noor, & Supriansyah

Commodification of *Ḥajj* Rituals amongst Banjarese Pilgrims

Abstract: *This paper is drawn from a larger study of Banjarese experiences in performing* ḥajj *or pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. This phenomenological study employed in-depth interviews with about 50 informants in two different areas where Banjarese populations are concentrated, i.e. South Kalimantan and Indragiri Hilir. The theme of the commodification of rituals including* ojek ḥajar aswad *and* badal haji *emerged from the comprehensive data analysis. In theory, commodification refers to the practice to turn something into a commodity. In the experiences of some Banjarese pilgrims, commodified rituals have the importance of both spiritual enhancement and social pride, even though these practices sometimes involve cheating and manipulation from the side of the service providers. So, not only do* ḥajj *rituals provide sacred experiences for the pilgrims, but also an opportunity for some to make profits from them even through unethical or illegal conduct.*

Keywords: *Ḥajj, Umrah*, Ritual Commodification, Islam, Banjar.

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Abstrak: *Artikel ini diambil dari penelitian yang lebih luas tentang pengalaman orang Banjar dalam menjalankan ibadah haji ke Arab Saudi. Penelitian fenomenologis ini menggunakan wawancara mendalam dengan sekitar 50 informan di dua wilayah berbeda di mana populasi orang Banjar terkonsentrasi, yaitu Kalimantan Selatan dan Indragiri Hilir. Tema komodifikasi ritual, termasuk ojek hajar aswad dan badal haji, muncul dari analisis data yang komprehensif. Secara teori, komodifikasi mengacu pada praktik mengubah sesuatu menjadi barang dagangan. Dalam pengalaman beberapa jamaah haji Banjar, ritual yang dikomodifikasi memiliki nilai penting baik untuk peningkatan spiritual maupun kebanggaan sosial, meskipun terkadang melibatkan penipuan dan manipulasi dari pihak penyedia layanan. Jadi, tidak hanya ritual haji yang memberikan pengalaman sakral bagi para jamaah, tetapi juga peluang bagi beberapa orang untuk mengambil keuntungan dari mereka, bahkan melalui tindakan yang tidak etis atau ilegal.*

Kata kunci: Haji, Umrah, Komodifikasi Ritual, Islam, Banjar.

ملخص: هذه المقالة مأخوذة من بحث أوسع حول تجربة مجتمع بانجار في أداء فريضة الحج إلى المملكة العربية السعودية. يستخدم هذا البحث الظاهري مقابلات متعمقة مع حوالي ٥٠ من المخبرين في منطقتين مختلفتين حيث يتركز سكان بانجار، وهما جنوب كاليمانتان وإندراجيري السفلى. ظهرت موضوعات تسليع الطقوس بما في ذلك مساعدة الناس لتقبيل الحجر الأسود وبدل الحج، من تحليل بيانات شاملة. من الناحية النظرية، يشير التسليع إلى ممارسة تحويل شيء ما إلى سلعة. في تجربة بعض حجاج بانجار فإن للطقوس السلعية قيمة مهمة في كل من التحسين الروحي والفخر الاجتماعي، على الرغم من أنها تنطوي في بعض الأحيان على الخداع والتلاعب من جانب مقدمي الخدمة. لذلك، مناسك الحج لا توفر فقط تجربة مقدسة للحجاج ولكن أيضًا فرصة لبعض الناس للاستفادة منها حتى من خلال الأعمال غير الأخلاقية و غير القانونية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الحج ، العمرة ، تسليع الطقوس، الإسلام ، بانجار.

Hajj is one of the five pillars of Islam that every Muslim with capacity has to perform once in a lifetime, although additional performances are recommendable. Capacity refers to a complex set of required abilities including the economic ability to support the pilgrims and the family left behind, physiological and physical ability, and safe and secure returned passages from home to the Holy Land and home again (Al-Qurtubi 2004; Musa 1988). Many Islamic scholars put forward a very strong recommendation that once in a lifetime is enough for Muslims to observe *ḥajj* to open more opportunities for those who have not done to do so, and for the consideration of using the fund for more urgent social necessities of the Muslim community. Nevertheless, *ḥajj* is compulsory as mandated in the Quran and the Hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad.

Because of such compulsory status, Muslims strive to prepare themselves in order to be able to observe such a ritual. Banjarese Muslims, a Malay ethnic group who originally inhabited the lands of Borneo or Kalimantan, are no exception in this endeavor (Daud 1997). Anecdotal evidence suggests that *ḥajj* for these Muslims is one of the top life priorities to achieve, even in some instances more important than marriage. As insiders, we have witnessed people of this group sell lands and even homes to enable them to perform. Future Banjarese *ḥajj* put on the waiting list have now reached the number of 30,990 future pilgrims in 2019, and the waiting period in that year was from 18 to 20 years (data from Office of Religious Affairs in South Kalimantan). When the visa requirements were not as complex as the current time, many Banjarese Muslims went on tourist visas for *ḥajj*. Some of them overstayed and experienced being chased by the Saudi authority and deported.

Religion is inseparable from the economy. Religious practices often have economic consequences on the followers such as spending on operational costs for rituals, buying appropriate clothes, and other unavoidably associated costs such as fashion (Fealy 2008; Jones 2010; Rinallo et al. 2019). Although the spending on goods and services can be considered as a mirror of piety, the practices of religious-economy marriage create an ample opportunity for establishing strong business relations between suppliers and religious buyers. This does not necessarily say that the practices using religious symbols and rituals for profit gains sacrifice the sacredness of religion or rituals. In Islam,

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ḥajj as a religious ritual is one of the most marketed rituals in the world as in almost every aspect the consumption of money and good is large and unavoidable (Qurashi 2017). One can count this from *ḥajj* preparation to accomplishment; all require money and are indicative of commodification. This paper sheds light on how Banjarese pilgrims were involved in the commodification of some *ḥajj* rituals during the annual *ḥajj* season. It explores what activities of *ḥajj* they put into commodities, how such economic transactions happened, what factors interplaying in such commodification, and how both sacredness of the rituals and profane economic interests compete in the field. To achieve this, the paper first describes briefly Banjar as a Malay sub-ethnic and their relation with Mecca, the Islamic jurisprudence of *ḥajj* to provide a sufficient understanding of what it is concerned with. This will be followed by a review of the relevant literature on religious commodification to underpin the study. Following the methodology, it presents and discusses findings on the *ḥajj* ritual commodification amongst Banjarese pilgrims.

Phenomenological Approach to *Ḥajj* Practices

The study about the commodification of *ḥajj* rituals as this paper is reporting is part of a larger study about "Urang Banjar Naik Haji" or Banjarese People Performing *Ḥajj* funded by the Ministry of Religion through Antasari State Islamic University in 2018. The larger study used a phenomenological approach to understand the experiences of Banjarese people in performing *ḥajj* and how they make meanings of such experiences. Studies of pilgrimage, not necessarily *ḥajj*, using phenomenological approaches have been done in various contexts. For example, Toguslu (2017) studied Belgian Muslims' experiences in performing *ḥajj* through which they made meanings of the ritual as a religious obligation, spiritual enhancement, and a process of home return. Kapusta (2016) looked into the Maya community's experiences of pilgrimage and sacrifice by which he uncovered issues of Mayan cosmology through pilgrim's experiences. From the studies, this particular methodology has enabled researchers to uncover distinctive and comprehensive experiences of people in passing through the rituals and learn a great deal from these experiences to have more meaningful everyday life afterward.

In the "Urang Banjar Naik Haji" study, we in-depth interviewed no less than 50 people in two main areas where Banjarese people are

concentrated, i.e. districts in the South Kalimantan province and Tembilahan in the Riau. The participants performed *ḥajj* in different years from 1975 to 2018, and, therefore, the experiences they shared with us were very rich and varied. With regard to the commodification of rituals that this paper is concerned with, it seems that those who went for *ḥajj* before the years 1990s were not exposed to massive commodification practices. Besides the interviews, we also collected documents from the pilgrims including photos of themselves.

After collecting data, we analyzed the data through the following steps, i.e. data reduction, data display, and data interpretation (Miles and Huberman 1994; Patton 2002; Strauss et al. 1998). For data reduction, we did data cleaning by clarification and verification of information before we transcribed all the recorded interviews. We used N-Vivo software to code and categorize the transcripts. In our note, there are hundreds of codes emerging during this analysis phase. We merged, collapsed, and sometimes had to delete codes where the information looks overlapped with others. We then structured and organized the verified codes into meaningful categories, and displayed them for interpretation. From this process of analysis, we found one interesting theme to pay particular attention to, namely: the commodification of *ḥajj*. Our careful reading into the data, the commodification indicated in the coded data is not limited to *ḥajj* as an expensive macro journey in terms of transport, accommodation, and living costs. More than this, we found that the commodification was expanded to micro rituals of *ḥajj* which this paper is particularly concerned with.

Banjar and Mecca

Banjar is a Malay sub-ethnic who occupies the island of Kalimantan and shares it with other indigenous people of Dayak. Banjarese usually resides in coastal areas of the islands, while Dayak lives in its mountains and inner side. While Banjarese are considered devout Muslims and Dayak are Kaharingan, Hindus, or Christians, the relationship between these two has been quite harmonious. Islam started to spread in the southern part of the island in the 16th century when Demak Sultanate came to help the Banjar Kingdom to rage war against another kingdom in the area with the condition that Banjar had to accept Islam. Demak sent thousands of armies and a preacher called Khatib Dayan to propagate Islam to the people (Noor 2012; Reid 1992). After winning

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the war, Bandar Masih, now known as Banjarmasin, became the capital city of the Banjar Sultanate, and people living in this city identified themselves as Banjarese to distinguish them from Dayak non-Muslims. Since then, as Daud (1997) and Hawkins (2000) argued, Banjar has referred to both ethnic and Islamic identity markers portraying the closest relationship between ethnicity and religion, although recent development suggests that this is not always true.

It is hard to find literature that provides a comprehensive account of when and why many Banjarese migrated to Mecca and formed a specific community in the area, but Daud (1997) believed that the relationship between Banjar and Mecca was very strong after the kingdom accepted Islam. The tradition of learning Islamic knowledge in Mecca seemed to pave the way for Banjarese people to stay longer than what is required for doing *ḥajj* or residing in the Holy City. Sheikh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari was sent by the Sultan of Banjar in the 18th century to study Islamic knowledge and reside there for about 35 years (Azra 1998). Before this, much is unknown. With the help of the Sultan, al-Banjari established a house for himself and his family and accommodate Banjarese who needed shelter. Anecdotal account explains that the influx of Banjarese to Saudi Arabia occurred after the Banjar war against the Dutch colonialist (Raihani 2018). Another overseas destination for this ethnic group was Malaysia. To date, it is not clear how many Banjarese populations are in Saudi Arabia. But this ethnic group has established a good image through which many of the members became distinguished Islamic scholars such as the mentioned al-Banjari, Sheikh Muhammad Nafis al-Banjari, Sheikh ʻAli bin Abdullah al-Banjari, Sheikh Abdul Karim al-Banjari, Sheikh Muhammad Hassan Said Banjar and so forth.

The existence of the Banjarese community in Saudi Arabia continues up until now. Its community members played a significant role in various fields. Several years ago, one of the authors of this article was informed by a colleague, an Indonesian envoy doctor for serving pilgrims in a *ḥajj* season that the head of Meccan hospital at that time originated from Banjar. In Saudi Arabia, Banjarese usually puts "Banjar" following their names. Another example of how strong the community is in continuing the traditions of learning the Islamic religion is a young Quranic reciter, Sheikh Asal Shu'bah Banjar, who regularly leads prayers in a mosque in Mecca (Ramdhani, 2018). So,

the Banjarese network remains strongly existent and contributes to the provision of assistance for incoming pilgrims from the same origin. This reflects a diaspora attitude to bind themselves together as one single community (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011). While they contribute to the receiving country to which they belong now, they never forget their country or at least their ethnic origins.

The Islamic Jurisprudence of *Ḥajj*

There is a dispute among Islamic scholars on when *ḥajj* as an Islamic ritual was made compulsory. Some believe it was made compulsory four years, six years, nine years, and even ten years after the Prophet Muhammad and his companions migrated from Mecca to Medina (Al-Muayyidi 2008). All have textual references and reasons, but, as history tells, the Prophet Saw himself did not make the compulsory pilgrimage until the tenth year of his migration to Medina, i.e. in the year 632. This is the first and last *ḥajj* the Prophet Saw made in Islam. It is pertinent to mention here that *ḥajj* rituals before Islam dated back to the Prophet Abraham (Al-Muayyidi 2008; Musa 1988).

As explained in the Islamic textbooks (Al-Muayyidi 2008; Al-Qurtubi 2004; Musa 1988), *ḥajj* must be observed in the month of *Dhulḥijjah* (the 11th month of the Islamic calendar). *Ḥajj* requires the doers to start the rituals with sincere intention, i.e. doing purely for God in one of the specifically determined places depending on which direction they enter Mecca. Once they arrive in Mecca, they have to do *ṭawāf*, a seven-time circle around the Kaaba followed by *sa'i* which is a small run between Ṣafa and Marwa. All of these are compulsory rituals of *ḥajj* before they continue to stay in Arafat on the 9th of the month. As the sunset approached, they went to Mina by stopping over in Muzdalifah for a short night stay. In Mina, they may stay until three days and do the throwing *(jamarāt)* every day. While doing all these rituals, they have to wear white unsewed garments for males and normal white Islamic clothes for females. They return to Mecca and do a farewell *ṭawāf* before returning to their home country. This is a general sense of how *ḥajj* is practiced in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence.

While the above rituals are mainly compulsory for the pilgrims, there are recommended rituals such as kissing *ḥajar aswad* (the black stone) attached to one of the Kaaba corners. Rite passages during the above rituals and visit to the Prophet's graveyard are also recommended. To

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our (the authors') knowledge and experiences, none of the Muslims are willing to skip this and considers as the second most important ritual after *ḥajj* or umrah in Mecca. Visits to public historic graveyards such as that in Mecca and Medina are optional. Other rituals during ḥajj are considered optional that require more spaces to explain.

As also outlined in the above-referenced literature, another topic of the *ḥajj* jurisprudence relevant to this paper is *badal haji* or doing *ḥajj* for another person. A Muslim may travel for *ḥajj* for someone else because s/he is unable to do so for reasons of either incurable sickness or death. *Badal haji*, as popularly termed in the Banjarese community and elsewhere, has many conditions, among others: 1. The *badal* performer must have performed *ḥajj* for him or herself before; 2. One *badal* is for one person, multiple *badal* wishers by one performer are not allowed; and 3. The better or most preferred performer is the child of the disabled parents or one that has kinship, although paying someone to do so is permitted. Many other rulings about this *badal haji* practice can be referred to the relevant Islamic references.

Religious Commodification

By definition, commodification is turning something into a commodity to take the profit out of it (Fealy 2008; Fealy and White 2008). This is an economic transaction between seller and buyer over a commodity in which the endpoint is either loss or profit. In economic practices, many things can be transformed into commodities including religion, religious rituals, and practices. However, this is not to imply that such religious commodification must always be considered economic practice. Kitiarsa (2007) argues that religious commodification does not necessarily desacralize religious practices or produce new religious forms that contradict institutionalized religious beliefs and practices. Religious commodification looks more like an appropriation of religious practices in the context of modernization and rationalization. In this context, instead of becoming neglected or extinct, religion and people's religiosity continue to flourish in a way appropriate to economic development. Therefore, religious commodification cannot be divorced from the flourishing trend of middle-class Muslims. The increasing religious piety and sentiments following the rise of middle-class Muslims have seduced markets to produce products that help fulfill their religious actualization as well

as economic and social status. In Indonesia, as Hasan (2016) observes, middle-class Muslims have developed to form a network through which Islamic revivalism is preached, which influences social and political landscapes. In the economic context, the network creates opportunities for business and commercialization of religious products among its members and beyond.

Kitiarsa (2007) and Jafari & Sandikci (2016) argue that following the rise of urban global Muslims, new forms of Islamic consumerism have emerged. To Jafari & Sandikci (2016), such Islamic consumerism reflects a synergy between Islam and capitalism in which ideas of Islamic economy, market, and values are reproduced and reconstructed. In other words, consumption culture cannot be easily separated from religious narratives as many religious teachings require Muslims to make consumption. Therefore, Muslim consumerism is not merely because of globalization, but it is rooted as a culture within daily Islamic practices. Jafari & Suerdem (2012) further see that the sacredness of religion does not necessarily make an exclusion of worldly consumption. Consequently, religious commodification is not limited to the discussion of 'sacred' and 'profane', but also include issues of '*halal*', '*haram*', '*mustahab*', '*makruh*', and of 'Islamic' and 'un-Islamic'. All are equally competing to form and decide upon the status of Muslim consumption of worldly products. However, different from Hasan's (2016) observation above, Jafari and Suerdem (2012) consider such consumerism culture is in no way exclusively limited to a particular social class, but manifests in all classes in different forms.

Pertinent to this article's focus, *ḥajj* or Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina is an example to discuss the contestation between economic and religious or spiritual interests in this ritual commodification. *Ḥajj*, as mentioned previously, is one of the most commodified religious rituals in the world. Millions of Muslims conduct this pilgrimage by visiting Mecca and Medina annually for performing various rituals of *ḥajj*. From year to year, the number of pilgrims increases very significantly to the point that the capacity of both cities and other compulsory visited places like Mina and Arafat can no longer accommodate the visitors. Consequently, despite the efforts to improve both capacity and facilities of the *ḥajj* services, the government of Saudi Arabia has imposed a policy of quota and waiting list. Only ten percent of Muslim populations in each country in the world are allowed to perform *ḥajj*

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in one year, leaving millions of people to stay on the waiting list for several years, particularly in a country where Muslim populations are the majority like Indonesia (interviews with Office of Religious Affairs in South Kalimantan).

The above picture indicates that there has been a high demand by Muslims for doing *ḥajj*, while the opportunity has been increasingly limited. From the economic perspective, this gap between demand and opportunity or supply results in consequences such as the rise in price and the opening up of businesses in *ḥajj*. In the context of Indonesia, the government officially organizes *ḥajj* services for Muslims (popularly termed as *"Haji Reguler"*), but also leaves ample room for private sectors to play in providing the services (*"Haji Plus"*). In our review of various travel agents' brochures in the last couple of years, compared to the government's cost for *ḥajj*, the private travel agents set up a very high cost around 5 to 7 times the former's price in 2018 and 2019. This means a Muslim has to pay at least 150 million rupiahs or even more depending on the travel agents' reputation and facilities offered for doing *ḥajj* through the private sector. Meanwhile, he or she would only pay around 35 million rupiahs for the *ḥajj* services provided by the government. Besides the prestige and reputation, the distinctive difference between the governments and the private's *ḥajj* is the distance between *ḥajj* accommodation and the centers of rituals, i.e. haram mosques in Mecca and Medina. Also, the private Muslim *ḥajj* has a shorter stay from the government one, namely 25 compared to 40 days.

The rise of private travel agents for *ḥajj* in Indonesia has been quite phenomenal as well as problematic. As described above, since the Saudi Arabia Kingdom has imposed a quota of Muslims to perform *ḥajj* for each country, the number of waiting lists has been increasing from time to time. This means that the number of aspiring Muslims is greater than the number of performing ones. This triggers the mushrooming of travel agents that facilitate Muslims to perform *ḥajj*. Since *ḥajj* is limited by quota, travel agents compete to attract people to perform *'umrah* (popularly termed as "small *ḥajj*") (Makin 2017; Sucipto 2013). So, the inability to perform *ḥajj* in an immediate time encourages Muslims to go to Saudi Arabia for *'umrah*. Additionally, the increase of the *ḥajj* aspiring Muslims has been doubled by the increase of middle-class Muslims whose consuming behaviors are restricted by religious

teachings. Therefore, religious consumerism among middle-class Muslims in Indonesia is increasingly high (Fealy 2008; Jones 2010); some are manifested in the forms of performing both *ḥajj* and *'umrah*.

What is offered by private travel agents is targeting directly the economic levels of Muslim people. In the case of *'umrah*, for instance, there are various offers of *'umrah* packages catering to different levels of Muslims' needs from simple ones to the most luxurious ones. Likewise is the *ḥajj* packages offered by private travel agents. This approach – travel agents offering different packages – manifests both different motivations of people in performing *ḥajj* and *'umrah* and economic aspects of religious practices. Blackwell (2010) explains that pilgrims' motives to perform pilgrimage can be various. Using Maslow's (1970) theory of needs, she argues that pilgrims' motivation can be various from fulfilling social and esteem needs to self-actualization. Her observation was influenced by the socio-psychological framework, even though from an Islamic perspective the motive for any worship must be for the sake of Allah alone. However, there seems to be an undisputed reality that the intention of people in performing both *ḥajj* and *'umrah* can be spiritually, socially, economically, and/or psychologically driven. Social prestige is often referred to as one of the common motives among Muslims (Blackwell 2010; Sucipto 2013). This analysis of pilgrimage's motives resembles a debatable image of a consumer society whose capacity to purchase commodities is used to display people's constructed egos and identities (Debord 1995). Of course, there should be room for people whose intention to perform pilgrimage is purely sincere (Hilmy 2019).

On the other hand, consumerism in Mecca and Medina driven by the rising wealth of the region following the success of oil revenue and foreign investment has gone frenzy. This has been symbolized in various forms of commodities from simple to luxurious ones (Makin 2017). Different types of accommodation are provided to cater to different classes of Muslims to stay during their *ḥajj* or *'umrah* time. For wealthy Muslims, Western chain hotels such as Sheraton, Pullman, Raffles, Fairmont, and Mövenpick are surrounding the *ḥarams* (another term to refer to both Mecca and Medina) within a very short walking distance. Less luxurious hotels and so forth are provided for Muslims who cannot afford the formers. A thousand shops selling different types of products – again for different classes of people – exist to cater to the needs of

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pilgrims. Bin Dawood is one of the famous shopping complexes that stand nearby the *ḥarams* so that pilgrims can go shopping immediately after the regular prayers. Mecca has been described by some observers as the new Las Vegas for its shopping and luxurious attractions.

The description of the *ḥajj* commodification above leads to an important question of the sacredness of the rituals in the ocean of consumerism. In Islam, a motive for doing worship is pivotal in determining the quality of service one presents before God. As explained before, the correct motive or intention in every worship including *ḥajj* and *'umrah* is only for the sake of God. As has been indicated by how particularly private agents offer packages corresponding to social classes of people, the motives can be mixed between the sacredness of intention and social privilege and status. In other observations, political motives are quite common for doing either *ḥajj* or *'umrah* among Indonesian politicians (Sucipto 2013). The consumerism overwhelming the rituals may also distract people from being focused on spiritual improvement. Peace and tranquility during worship may be lost due to the disturbances of consumerism attractions (Hilmy 2019).

In relation to the above, it is interesting to understand Belk's (1989) classification of consumerism, namely: sacred consumerism and profane consumerism. Sacred consumerism refers to activities to spend or consume goods driven by ecstatic, self-transcending, and extraordinary, but not necessarily religious, experiences. This consumerism behavior can be applied even to those who do not believe in religion. Spiritual and special experiences in consumption are an important component of this sacred consumerism. The sacred consumers may feel spiritually or religiously justified in their consuming practices. Meanwhile, profane consumerism is the daily consumption activities that do not relate to any sacred motives. This profane consumerism does not have any specialties and does not lead to special experiences. It does not reflect any commitment to ritual nor is justified by spirituality.

However, apart from the above classification, religious practices, and rituals are inseparable from the capitalist influences which have penetrated almost all segments of society. When making meaning of his own *ḥajj* journey, Hilmy (2019) uses religious capitalism to describe how luxurious facilities, expensive commodities, and classy services are juxtaposed with spiritually sacred times and places. Observers like Hilmy (2019), Makin (2017), and Qurashi (2017) reveal the fact that

pilgrims' spiritual endeavors may be distracted by such capitalist earthly symbols. In a more interesting account, Hilmy (2019) portrays pilgrims' behaviors to become religiously selfish to the extent of sacrificing others for individual benefits. He points to, among others, pilgrims struggling to kiss *ḥajar aswad* while hurting others. These pilgrims, as he describes, are actually practicing capitalism in the form of religious rituals.

Commodifying *Ḥajj* Rituals among Banjarese Pilgrims

Our findings suggest that the commodification of *ḥajj* as a whole process occurred since the very beginning of its activities. In particular, those who went for *ḥajj* using private agents were offered several types of packages meeting the needs of individual pilgrims. Those with busy life and wealth opted for a shorter "*haji* plus" usually completed in 20 to 25 days. Yet, the package prices were various depending on facilities, accommodation distance to the Grand Mosques in both Mecca and Medina, and travel guides offered by the agencies. For example, the most expensive "*haji* plus" offered pilgrims a more individualized *ḥajj* guide (leading much smaller numbers of pilgrims compared to government-regular pilgrims), accommodation in the Zamzam tower hotels adjacent to the Mecca Mosque, more luxurious tents in Mina, and luxurious local transports. Pilgrims of this type of *ḥajj* constituted a small exclusive number of *ḥajj* representing their class in society. They can afford "the *ḥajj* commodities" offered by business agencies that promise to facilitate the attainment of spiritual goals without leaving their earthly class and status.

Quite differently, as this paper is concerned, the following findings may not reflect the complex social class interaction with religion like above, but more on the motivation and meanings to attain the perceived spiritual importance among the pilgrims through labor transactions. We found two interesting sub-themes from this research presented in the following sub-sections.

Ojek Ḥajar Aswad

Ojek ḥajar aswad is the term Banjarese pilgrims referred to as a person or group of people who offer service to pilgrims to kiss *ḥajar aswad*. *Ojek* is a term originally used in Indonesia to represent someone who works as a motorcycle driver in transporting people. The term use is expanded, particularly in Jakarta, to include those who offer services

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to protect people from rain by providing umbrellas in their way usually from public transport to offices. This is called "ojek payung". The term *ojek* used by Banjarese pilgrims means that there is a transaction of services offered by *ojek* in return for money.

As explained previously, kissing *ḥajar aswad* is one of the most aspired rituals every pilgrim wants to do after compulsory acts of worship during *ḥajj*. The black stone itself is believed to be sent down by God from heaven and placed in one of the corners of the Kaaba. According to one narration, the stone was originally white, but it becomes increasingly black because of absorbing human sins through their kisses. Not because he was sinful, however, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) kissed it and was followed by his companions as a recommended tradition. He recommended the believers kiss the stone as in the following narration:

> By Allah! On the Day of Qiyāmah, Allah will present the *ḥajar aswad* in such a manner that it will have two eyes and a tongue to testify to the *īmān* (faith) of all those who kissed it (Jami` at-Tirmidhi 961).

All of these laid the foundations for the significance of kissing the black stone. Muslims who are doing *hajj* or *umrah* often strive to do so at every cost. Since many pilgrims were strongly inspired to do so, the crowd around that corner was never light. People pushed each other to make way for them to approach the stone. Yet, the closer to the stone, the harder and the riskier the effort.

When the temptation meets the difficulty, people were usually quite smart to find a solution. The most possible and easy solution for the problem of kissing the black stone is to find *ojek* to make way for them to do the ritual. Huzri,[1] one of our informants, told us that he was approached by a woman who offered help to kiss the stone. The woman did not seem to work alone but had some fellows to assist. As other informants explained, the number one group comprised usually 6 to 7 people. Huzri felt that the way to the stone was opened, and he reached it easily and kissed it. Once it was done, the woman asked him to pay. He was surprised but managed to ask nicely about the price. He had to pay 300 Saudi Arabian Real (SAR) or more than one million rupiahs.

Not many of our informants admitted that they used the service as this was considered embarrassing and unethical, to say the least, if not unlawful. However, the story about it spread among Banjarese pilgrims year after year. From our informants, we understand that the price for

using the service of *ojek* ranged from Rp.300,000 to 400,000. As they told us, the Banjarese network provided information about the service. In the field around the Kaaba, usually *ojek ḥajar aswad* could recognize pilgrims who can be approached for accepting the offer. Alternatively, they had a contact person who was actively engaged with pilgrims at their accommodation and advertised secretly the service. If someone agreed to use their service, as some informants described, there would be some members of this group working around the Kaaba corner to make way for him leading to the stone. They protected him from other people moving and pushing to the same point till he reached and successfully kissed it. After that, like Huzri experienced as he told above, the group pulled him to come out from the crowd and asked for money.

Halim who went for *hajj* several years ago recalled a moment when he paid a visit to his relative who is now a permanent resident in Mecca. As he told, this relative gave advice to him:

> There is one person called Haji Humri who resided in Mecca for more than 30 years already. One day [during our time in Mecca] he invited us to come to his house. He warned us: "My brother if someone approaches you to offer help for you to kiss *Hajar Aswad*, do not accept". I asked him, why? "That person is also Banjarese who belongs to a brokering group to help those who desperately want to kiss the stone, and they have to pay".

It is interesting to learn that the *ojeks* for *ḥajar aswad* ethnically originate from Banjar, and so do the customers. This does not mean that this is exclusive to Banjarese pilgrims and network only as we heard the same story about Madurese groups who also provided this service, However, Banjarese pilgrims seemed to use only the service from Banjarese groups. So, this transaction did not go beyond ethnic boundaries or beyond nationalities. The reason for this may relate to communication practicalities when doing the transaction and oral advertisement among the Banjarese circle of pilgrims. Yurni confirmed that the Banjarese language serves as a pivotal medium for this transaction to happen.

> A Hajar Aswad Ojek will recognize our spoken language and decide whether to approach it or not when he is convinced that the hajj is Banjarese. In the crowd near the Kaaba, people are usually very noisy and your language can be easily identified. So, if you speak your Banjarese, the *ojek* will approach and offer you help to kiss the stone.

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As explained above, the Banjarese network that has existed in Mecca for centuries made the practices of *ojek ḥajar aswad* easier for the coming Banjarese pilgrims to access. This is not to say, of course, that the network works for such unethical practices, but part of it plays an important role in at least spreading the information among the pilgrims.

Badal Haji

Badal haji is an important solution for Muslims who are incapable to do *ḥajj*. There are several narrations from the Prophet regarding this ritual significance. One of them is mentioned as follows:

> Abdullah Ibn 'Abbas (may God be pleased with them both) narrated, "Al-Fadl Ibn 'Abbas was riding behind the Messenger of God and a woman from the tribe of Khath'am approached the Messenger with a question. Al-Fadl and the woman kept looking at each other so the Messenger of God turned al-Fadl's face to the other side. The woman said, 'O Messenger of God! My father is an old man. He cannot sit firmly on his mount and therefore cannot perform his obligatory hajj. May I perform hajj on his behalf?' The Prophet replied, 'Yes, you may.' This was during the Farewell Pilgrimage (Sahih al-Bukhari).

In the above hadith, performing hajj for someone else is permissible by the Prophet. In another hadith, the Prophet set a guideline for doing hajj for another person who is handicapped from doing so.

> Abdullah Ibn 'Abbas (may God be pleased with them both) narrated, "The Messenger of God heard a man say, 'O God! Here I am in response to your call on behalf of Shubrumah.' The Prophet asked, 'Who is Shubrumah?' The man replied, 'A brother or close relative. The Prophet asked, 'Have you made your own hajj?' 'No,' he replied. The Prophet said, 'Perform your own hajj first and then perform it on behalf of Shubrumah (Sahih al-Bukhari and Muslim).

While *badal haji* is permissible in the *shari'a*, in practice it goes beyond the benevolent relationship between relatives to cover the use of brokers, and in this way, it is subject to commodification. The brokering practice is possibly not exclusively, among Banjarese because in our findings this *badal haji* practice formed a big business during the *ḥajj* season. As explained earlier, *badal haji* has a strong basis in Islamic teaching, particularly in the conditions that people cannot travel and perform the *ḥajj* because they have passed away or were severely incurably sick. These people may ask others to perform *ḥajj* on their behalf of themselves. Asking others to do so opens up business opportunities for

those who are involved, even though the *badal* performers often use the reasons of helping each other in doing a good deed.

In our findings, the information about *badal haji* has always been circulated among prospective Banjarese pilgrims. In this case, most pilgrims from both South Kalimantan and Tembilahan shared the information and used the service from the same group. When we traced our informants in both areas, they pointed to a name, Darwis, who helped organize the brokering process between the *badal* wishers and performers, even though we also understand that some other Banjarese groups or individuals provided the same service. The wishers booked earlier before departure through this man, and, later, when they arrived in Mecca, they met the performers and proceeded to bind themselves in a contract. The economic side of this practice is explained by one of our informants, a Muslim, as follows:

> I know that the price of one *badal* is four million rupiahs. The agent in Indonesia will receive one million for each *badal*. You can imagine for one *ḥajj* season, he got 70 to 80 customers.

In our notes, hundreds of *badal haji* were done each year among Banjarese networks, and the price was various, but a maximum of Rp.15 million was recorded. The price varies according to the level of trust the *badal* wisher has for the performer. The trust usually goes higher when the performer is an Islamic cleric. Harsani explains:

> The *badal* practice very much depends on the figure of the *badal* performer whether people trust him or not. If the performer is '*tuan guru*' (Islamic cleric), people dare to pay higher because they believe that this performer will perform hajj for their loved one seriously. Also, they are convinced that the hajj is more possibly accepted by God because of the performer's piety.

The *badal* performers were usually Banjarese students and non-student residents who have lived in both Mecca and Medina for some time. They had a good liaison with other Banjarese who maintained relationships with *ḥajj* travel agencies. Someone like Darwis was included in this type of person, but he mainly managed customers in Indonesia. Darwis, as almost all informants admitted, established a strong connection with other Banjarese in Mecca who outsourced people who would be able to perform the *badal*. So, brokering was common in this business practice, and every party seemed to gain profit from it. Therefore, the price set for this service was quite high, and even higher when the service was deemed reputably trustworthy.

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Jurkani told a story about how he used *badal hajj* brokers for his late parent as follows:

> When I made *hajj* last year, I planned to make *badal* for my late parent. My friends warned me not to easily trust people who want to do so. When I was in Madinah, some people came to our hotel and asked if they could help with performing *badal haji*. I forcibly lied that we did not have *badal*. This is to avoid business with such unknown persons. When in Mecca, I met Haji Asrul and asked him for help. Haji Asrul happened to be my cousin whom I just knew when I met him. So, he helped me to find people who can be trusted to perform *badal hajj* for my parent. I wrote the names of my parent on a piece of paper and gave it to Haji Asrul.

As Jurkani indicated above and according to other informants, the major problem in the *badal haji* practice was that one *badal* performer was suspected to perform *ḥajj* for more than one *badal* wisher. This breached the Islamic rules of *badal haji* and made the *ḥajj* invalid for each of the customers he was working for. Nevertheless, although it would be hard to prove, this practice seemed to happen every year. Rumadi argued:

> We have to be very careful in selecting the *badal* performer because not all of them are trustworthy. Often, we are offered a cheaper price, but we don't know if the performer does it properly".

Siti said that she heard: "rumors that there are *badal* performers who do the *badal* one for ten customers. We avoid this, although we know that the sin is on them".

Another side of this *badal* practice is the role of a broker who gains a remarkable profit in every hajj season. Our informant, Bakri, told us that he has a friend who works to mediate between the *badal* wishers and performers. He said:

> I have a friend who helps to mediate between the wishers and the performers. Every year, he gets 70 to 80 people. You can imagine how much profit he gains every year because one badal is priced up to four million rupiahs and he gets one million for his service. He operates in Indonesia and does not need to go to Mecca.

So, we see that the profit resulting from this *badal* service is in no way small and opens up an opportunity for those who are involved to get benefit. There is no control by the government in any way so the practice in some cases can go beyond the ethics of such worship.

Making Meaning of the Rituals: Discussing and Concluding Remarks

As previously argued, doing a pilgrimage is not for nothing, but there are motives that drive people for performing such spiritually-physically-financially demanding rituals. Although Blackwell (2010) found that the motives for doing pilgrimage would be no more than self-esteem or lower in the hierarchy of Maslow's theory of needs, Islam prescribes that Muslims must commit all the worship and rituals only for the sake of Allah. It is considered sinful if someone has purposes other than Allah in his actions. Ali Shariati (n.d.) eloquently explains the essence of hajj as a spiritual journey where a Muslim leaves his worldly attachment to move forward to reach God. He said:

> Hajj represents your return to Allah, the absolute, who has no limitations and none is like Him. To return to Him signifies a definite movement toward perfection, goodness, beauty, power knowledge, value, and facts. On your way toward the eternal, you will NEVER approach Allah. He is to guide you in the right direction and not to be your destination! (p.7).

The above quote signifies Allah's will and power in guiding someone to reach Him, not because of the person's will and power. It suggests that such a spiritual journey will not achieve any success if someone cannot annihilate his ego. Further, Shariati explains:

> Hajj is also a movement. The man decides to return to Allah. All of his egos and selfish tendencies are buried at Miqat (Zu-halifa). He witnesses his own dead body and visits his own grave. Man is reminded of the final goal of his life. He experiences death at Miqat and resurrection after which he must continue his mission in the desert between Miqat and Mi'ad (p.9).

On kissing the black stone, Shariati sees it as shaking Allah's 'right hand' to proclaim the cancellation of any allegiance made before, and only allegiance to Allah is now valid and binding. While Shariati's explanation is more deeply philosophical, the informants explicated more religious but practical reasons why they kissed the stone. In the case of kissing *ḥajar aswad*, as our findings suggest, not every informant had the chance, or eagerness, to do so as they prefer to avoid the risks associated with it such as pushing or being pushed or being injured. To these pilgrims, avoiding harm should be preferred to doing *Sunnah*. Those who were determined to do the ritual even if they had to find and use *ojek ḥajar aswad* understood that it is a recommended action or *Sunnah*. It would be religiously meaningful for them to practice

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the *Sunnah* to the best they could. The perfection of following the Prophet's tradition was an ideal achievement for them during the *ḥajj* performance, and, therefore, every single recommended deed was important to do for a complete observation of the *ḥajj* worship. This kind of attitude of following the *Sunnah* is described in Hilmy's (2019) portrayal of pilgrims who are committed to performing the forty consecutive compulsory prayers in congregation *(ṣalāt arba'īn)* in the Medina mosque. To understand more about the meaning, there is spiritual satisfaction for the pilgrims in doing one of the most challenging rituals. An Islamic principle suggests that hardship would result in more rewards and spiritual satisfaction.

While the above teaching on hajj as Shariati explains should not open any room for hajj performers to seek worldly objectives, there was another reason for some pilgrims to kiss the black stone at any cost, and this reveals, to some extent, a social meaning or pride of the accomplishment of the ritual. Jamri, one of the informants, told us: "I was even asked by my son back home that I had to successfully kiss the stone". As he continued, the story of successfully kissing the black stone established a proud image of himself before his son, family, and neighbors. In the Banjarese tradition, and perhaps in the Indonesian context as well, once a pilgrim returns home, he or she will receive guests every day for one or more weeks. Besides serving food and *zam-zam* drinking water and giving out souvenirs from Saudi Arabia, the pilgrim told stories about the *ḥajj* experiences to the guests. One of the common stories told by many pilgrims would be kissing the stone. The story would be made a heroic one as the struggle to do so was so intense and risked life. That is why this often results in social pride, like Jamri's son who would tell that story to his friends about his father's success in kissing the stone. So, in this meaning, it would be appropriate to agree with Blackwell's (2010) argument above that pilgrims are often trapped in the fulfillment of their self-esteem needs in making a pilgrimage rather than making the *ḥajj* for the sake of God, one and only.

Many pilgrims believe in the sacredness of the black stone and strove as hard as possible to kiss it during their *hajj* time in Mecca but using the *ojek*'s service may undermine such sacredness. It is pertinent here to recall a story about Umar ibn al-Khattab when he kissed the stone by saying: "I know that you are just a stone and that you can neither do any harm nor give a benefit. Had I not seen Messenger of Allah kissing you,

I would not have kissed you". Hamka (1983) explains this narration that kissing the black stone is a mere kind of worship, not because the stone is sacred, but because of following the Prophet's footsteps. The stone itself has a significant dynamic in Islamic history. Believed to be a stone from paradise as indicated before, it was a stroke and broken into pieces during the Umayyad's siege in 683CE, and in 930CE was stolen by the Qarmatians (a sect of Shi'a) who asked for ransom from the Abbasid. After twenty-three years, they returned the stone, and the Abbasid placed it back in the Kaaba where it originally belongs.

The *badal haji* phenomenon suggests an important meaning of kinship in Islam and the Banjarese families. The most common practice of *badal haji* was dedicated to parents who passed away and, during their life, did not have the opportunity to perform the *ḥajj*. Feeling obliged to become dutiful and express love and affection to parents make Muslim children serve them even when they already departed. In one hadith narrated by al-Nasa-i, the Prophet asserted that the relationship between parent and children continues to exist after the passing of the parent through children's prayers. It is on children to treat their parents in Islamically acceptable ways during their life and after death. To provide good treatment to parents is not only when the parents are Muslims, but even when they are non-Muslims. 'Abd al-'Āṭī (1995) explains that it is the right of parents to receive *'ihsan'* (right, good, and beautiful dealings) from children even though they differ in religion. However, Muslim children are not allowed to pray for their late non-Muslim parents. All this teaching suggests how strong the relationship between children and parents is in Islam. In Banjarese society, and most possibly in any Islamic society, the kinship practice is a resemblance of such an Islamic teaching, and even more, is that it goes beyond blood relationships to include ethnic connection or popularly called *'bubuhan'* (Daud 1997). *Bubuhan* connotes that all Banjarese people are relative, and, therefore, they have to help each other. The concept *bubuhan* explains well how the Banjarese network facilitates the commodification process that this study is concerned with, although it does not always mean positive as some of this community consciously used this concept to gain 'unacceptable' profits such as the person that brokered the *badal haji* to get one million rupiahs for one person and that he could get seventy to eighty persons every year.

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For the reason of loving the late beloved persons, the pilgrims try to connect with their late parents or siblings through the *badal haji* practice. It is like a parcel sent by them to those who are no longer able to accumulate good deeds and rewards. Many pilgrims, therefore, wanted to send the best parcel they could afford. As Abdul Karim, one of our informants, explained, he would select a "*badal* performer" who is pious and knowledgeable in Islam to ensure that he was really devoted to performing the *ḥajj* and the high possibility that his *ḥajj* was accepted by God. Abdul Karim said: "It would be very unfortunate if we spent quite a lot of money for someone we love, but the outcome was not valid". What he meant is that the *badal* performer did the pilgrimage for multiple people which made the *ḥajj* performance invalid. Therefore, as Abdul Karim argued, paying a high price for good quality *badal haji* service would mean little, if not nothing, for his beloved parents.

To conclude, doing *hajj* in this age of capitalism reveals two sides of the same coin i.e., one becomes a symbol of piety and the other resembles worldly interests. Pilgrims nowadays are attracted to choose hajj packages that manifest their economic and social status, not necessarily because of religious reasons. Seeing the payment of the hajj costs as a hereafter investment *(investasi akhirat)*, some pilgrims are willing to spend hundreds of millions of rupiahs to stay in luxury hotels nearby the mosque in Mecca and Medina. They enjoy the privileged facilities and the proximity to the center of the *ḥajj* process. Beyond this, they can access big shopping centers adjacent to their accommodation and spend hot days in such air-conditioned buildings. When they return from *ḥajj*, they will be addressed as 'Haji' which also reflects a new social status that attracts respect from the community.

This study suggests more than the above dual reflections of *hajj*, which is the commodification of pilgrimage among the Banjarese community that goes beyond what has been found in other studies. It is not limited to the issues of various *ḥajj* packages, luxury accommodation, and good selling, but is related to sub-rituals of the *ḥajj* that are converted into commodities. In this study, the sub-rituals being commodified comprise kissing *ḥajar aswad* and *badal haji*. The demand for both rituals among the Banjarese pilgrims was quite high providing ample space for profit takers to turn them into attractive commodities. In nature, religious commodification always wraps the sold commodities with religious

reasoning such as, in this case, reciprocal assistance which is arguably mandated in the Islamic teachings. This means that the suppliers of goods provide the services to help the customers in performing the rituals while also receiving worldly rewards in the form of money. Although this reciprocal assistance is claimed to be religiously valid, the profit taken in such transactions is overt.

The above practice of commodification suggests an interesting interplay between sacred and profane interests within ritual practices (Belk, Wallendorf, and Sherry 1989; Fealy 2008; Hilmy 2019). The ritual itself – either kissing *ḥajar aswad* or *badal haji* – facilitates in people in the development of pure values of spiritualism and sincere religious commitment. Like the meanings that the informants have made of both rituals, the perfection of following the *Sunnah* leads to the spiritual enhancement of being close to the sacred being of the Prophet, and the expression of love to the late parents whose souls remain connected with the living children. This inherently sacred dimension of the rituals remains intact and never changes over time, and provides pearls of wisdom that pilgrims should learn from. However, the profane interest of the sacred rituals which comes as incoming external attributes give another color to the sacred. Although religious commodification does not necessarily mean negative practices, transactions that entail money-making from the side of service providers may interfere with the pure intention of the pilgrims and stifle such intended spiritual improvement. From the jurisprudential perspective, however, the unavoidable profane aspects of the ritual practices have a legal basis in Islamic rulings, and the transactions may be considered part of the sacred sacrifice from the side of the pilgrims. Yet, as previously stated, cheating practices such as doing *badal haji* for multiple customers are prohibited according to Islamic law.

The findings above also reveal an important aspect of Banjar as an ethnic group, namely the Banjarese network that has existed in Saudi Arabia, particularly in Mecca and Medina, and formed a *bubuhan* network, which makes this study more interesting. In Azra's (1998) note, Banjarese migration to Mecca can be traced to the 18th century when scholars like Sheikh Muhammad Arshad al-Banjari went to make *ḥajj* and seek Islamic knowledge. This *bubuhan* network gets bigger and it is well known that the Banjarese community in Saudi Arabia constitutes a significant number of Indonesians living in the country.

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Another fact is that South Kalimantan where most Banjarese live supplies one of the largest numbers of pilgrims every year. In 2017, the waiting list reached twenty-five years from the time of applying, let alone after the COVID-19 pandemic when hajj had been canceled for two consecutive years. In 2022, the Saudi Arabian government only allowed one million pilgrims to perform hajj from all over the world. The waiting list might become more than thirty years.

The *bubuhan* network as explained above is not at all homogenous, but part of it, as the data shows, plays an important role to help Banjarese pilgrims during their time in Saudi Arabia. During this *hajj* season, reconnection among family members, relatives, and larger *bubuhan* occur which forms an added value of the pilgrimage. It is not rare that a pilgrim who has never met his or her relative has the chance to meet during the season. In the network, it makes it easy for them to find and share information and locate where a person lives. Some of them, however, are engaged in such commodification that this study is concerned. Some have a pure intention to help with the rituals, but others only want to make a profit out of the services they provided. Worse, they take profit very highly and even without providing expected services such as a person doing *badal haji* for multiple persons. Within the *bubuhan* network in Saudi Arabia, they have some people in Indonesia to channel with the pilgrims and offer help in their *ḥajj* process. This is often in tandem with or complementing official services provided by the government. However, how and who is actually from the network involved in the commodification activities needs another study.

In short, *ḥajj* as a whole is subject to commodification, and some of its rituals are also turned into profitable commodities. Most pilgrims may be able to maintain pure intentions of, and willing to sacrifice wealth for, doing the rituals, and the service providers can acceptably gain profit and appropriately provide the services. In this transaction, we cannot categorize it into commodification in a negative meaning. However, it turns out to be a negative commodification when the service providers seek the opportunity to gain unacceptable profit and breach the Islamic ethical and legal codes of conduct to perform the agreed rituals. Overall, one thing for sure is that whether the commodification is negative or not, *hajj* can be said as a playing field of contesting sacred and profane dimensions of religion.

We put forward recommendations for further research and better applications of ritual practices to avoid such negative commodification. First, it would be interesting to investigate further the *bubuhan* network in Saudi Arabia, especially in Mecca where the original network was established centuries ago. Information on how Banjarese generations maintain the network and interact with other Malay networks or even the local Saudi community and the government would reveal interesting findings on how this network survived for ages as a distinctive Indonesian diaspora. Equally important is an investigation of the intellectual network of the Banjarese diaspora in Saudi Arabia. To date, knowledge has been scarce on this topic particularly whether and how the Islamic intellectualism founded since Sheikh Arshad's time has continued up until now, and if so, who are the figures and how they interact with the local intellectualism which is dominated by the Wahhabism. Second, to improve the ritual practices, particularly of *badal haji*, it is advisable for the Indonesian government to make standardization of the service tariff and to control the practices in order to avoid false or manipulated *badal haji*. Although this would be challenging for the government to implement, the standardization of tariffs would give pilgrims a clue when dealing with the service providers.

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Endnotes

1. All names of the informants and within the quotes mentioned in this article are pseudonym to maintain their confidentiality.

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2. Booth, Anne. 1988. "Living Standards and the Distribution of Income in Colonial Indonesia: A Review of the Evidence." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 19(2): 310–34.
3. Feener, Michael R., and Mark E. Cammack, eds. 2007. *Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions*. Cambridge: Islamic Legal Studies Program.
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5. Utriza, Ayang. 2008. "Mencari Model Kerukunan Antaragama." *Kompas*. March 19: 59.
6. Ms. *Undhang-Undhang Banten*, L.Or.5598, Leiden University.
7. Interview with K.H. Sahal Mahfudz, Kajen, Pati, June 11th, 2007.

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

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Suprapto & Miftahul Huda

Commodification of Ḥajj Rituals amongst Banjarese Pilgrims

Raihani, Irfan Noor, & Supriansyah

دور الصكوك المرتبطة بالوقف النقدي في تطوير مؤسسة الرعاية الصحية ببانتين

يولي ياسين