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Hasnan Bachtiar

Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah:
Muhammadiyah’s Position and Thoughts
on *Negara Pancasila*

Abstract: *This paper evaluates Muhammadiyah’s effort to revitalise the doctrine of Siyar since the publication of Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah (the state of Pancasila as the abode of covenant and the space of testimony). It finds that the ideas in the publication aim to provide guidance for Muhammadiyah members on the relationship between the state and Muhammadiyah. It ensures that its members will understand that Indonesia is Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah. It seeks to defend itself against Islamist criticism, while also affirming its responsibility for state development. This paper argues that the idea is a product of Muhammadiyah’s contemporary ijtihad, an effort in theologising democracy based on the idea of Islam Berkemajuan (Islam with progress), in order to strengthen the social bonds of its members who are facing the challenging reality of the massive spread of Islamism and the associated social, political and economic problems.*

Keywords: *Siyar, Negara Pancasila, Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah, Contemporary Ijtihad, Theologising Democracy, Islam Berkemajuan.*

Abstrak: *Artikel ini ingin mengevaluasi upaya Muhammadiyah dalam merevitalisasi doktrin Siyar, terutama ketika Muhammadiyah mengumumkan gagasan Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah (sebagai sebuah negara kesepakatan dan perjanjian). Artikel ini menemukan bahwa gagasan ini bertujuan agar menjadi pedoman bagi warga Muhammadiyah yang menegaskan mengenai hubungan antara negara dan Muhammadiyah. Hal itu meyakinkan warga Muhammadiyah agar memahami bahwa Indonesia bukanlah dār al-Islām maupun dār al-ḥarb, tetapi Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah. Hal itu juga merupakan upaya untuk membentengi diri dari kritik kelompok Islamis dan juga mengafirmasi mengenai pentingnya bertanggung jawab dalam hal mengimplementasikan Pancasila dan juga pembangunan bangsa dan negara. Artikel ini berargumentasi bahwa gagasan ini merupakan produk dari ijtihad kontemporer Muhammadiyah yang diformulasikan sebagai sebuah ikhtiar teologisasi demokrasi yang berlandaskan kepada gagasan Islam Berkemajuan, dalam rangka memperkuat ikatan sosial para anggotanya yang sedang berhadapan dengan pelbagai persoalan kekinian, seperti misalnya merebaknya Islamisme dan persoalan sosial, politik dan ekonomi yang ada di Indonesia.*

Kata kunci: *Siyar, Negara Pancasila, Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah, Ijtihad Kontemporer, Teologisasi Demokrasi, Islam Berkemajuan.*

ملخص: تقوم هذه المقالة بتقييم جهود المحمدية في إحياء تعاليم السيّر، وخاصة بعد أن أعلنت فكرة دولة البانتشاسيلا باعتبارها دار العهد والشهادة. كشفت هذه المقالة عن أن هذه الفكرة تهدف إلى أن تكون دليلاً لأهالي المحمدية التي تؤكد على العلاقة بين الدولة والمحمدية. وقد أفنح هذا أهالي المحمدية من أجل الفهم بأن إندونيسيا ليست دار الإسلام ولا دار الحرب، بل دار العهد والشهادة. كما يمثل محاولة لتحسين نفسها من انتقاد الجماعات الإسلامية وتأكيد أهمية تحمل المسؤولية فيما يتعلق بتنفيذ البانتشاسيلا وتنمية الوطن والدولة. وقد استندت هذه المقالة بحجة تفيد بأن هذه الفكرة هي نتاج الاجتهاد المعاصر للمحمدية الذي تمت صياغته كمحاولة لاهوتية ديمقراطية على أساس فكرة الإسلام التقدمي، من أجل تقوية الروابط الاجتماعية لأعضائها الذين يواجهون العديد من المشكلات المعاصرة، مثل انتشار الإسلاموية والقضايا الاجتماعية والسياسية والاقتصادية في إندونيسيا.

الكلمات المفتاحية: *السيّر، دولة البانتشاسيلا، دار العهد والشهادة، الاجتهاد المعاصر، اللاهوت الديمقراطي، الإسلام التقدمي.*

The central doctrine of the classical *Siyar* (Al-Shaybani 1966, 3; Ford 2008, 19–53; Khadduri 1965, 25, 2008, 3–17), which distinguishes the world into two – *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-ḥarb*, as well as its implication for the application of *jihād* (Bsoul 2010, 71–96; Khadduri 1966, 15)– has been relatively neglected while Muslims have lived within the modern nation-state system (Piscatori 1986, 143–77) that upholds Westphalian values such as autonomy, independence and sovereignty. Yet, at the same time, the *Siyar* has often been used to legitimise various Islamist activities. As scholars have noted, some Islamists have promoted the idea of Islamist expansionism through reference to *jihad* (Barton 2004) tracking down leading Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). When Islamists are thought to have wrongly instrumentalised the idea, it encourages many Muslims in both majority Muslim countries and elsewhere to attempt to neutralise it and head it toward a more moderate, tolerant and pluralist form (Kamali 2015; Maarif 2009; Madjid 2008; Masduqi 2011). One of the influential Muslim organisations struggling with this direction toward moderation is Muhammadiyah (Burhani 2013, 137; Saeed 2007, 397–98).

This paper specifically examines Muhammadiyah's effort to revitalise the notion of *Siyar* since proclaiming the idea of *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah* (the state of Pancasila as the state of consensus and witness). This is intended as an intellectual reconciliation between the state ideology of Pancasila and *Siyar*. In dealing with its effort at revitalisation, this paper argues that Muhammadiyah has undertaken contemporary *ijtihad* based on the fundamentals of *Islam Berkemajuan* (progressive Islam). Through this mechanism, it self-consciously seeks to theologise democracy in order to strengthen the social bonds of its members who are facing the challenging reality of the massive spread of Islamism and the social, political and economic problems within Indonesia. This paper will systematically cover the discussion on the discourse of Muhammadiyah's *Islam Berkemajuan for Indonesia Berkemajuan* (progressive Indonesia), and *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah* as Muhammadiyah's intellectual and political manifesto.

Muhammadiyah's Islam Berkemajuan for Indonesia Berkemajuan

Muhammadiyah is the largest modernist Muslim organisation (Fealy 2004, 168; Kurzman 2002, 344; Ricklefs 2012, xxiv), with a large number of social enterprises (Fauzia 2013; Latief 2012). It has

been considered puritanical and reformist (Peacock 1978b, 1978). It is puritanical in the sense of a theological framework (*‘aqidah*) that locates authority in religious matters in the Qur’an and Sunnah (*al-rujū’ ila al-Qur’ān wa al-Sunnah*) (Boy 2018, 232). Meanwhile, it is reformist because it has rejected any Islamic teaching it considers to be fatalistic, superstitious or heretical (Nashir 2010, 292), and also because it has followed Muhammad Abduh’s acceptance of those parts of modernisation deemed beneficial, such as a modern-style education (Alfian 2010, 168–69; Darban 2010).

Historically, Muhammadiyah puritanism was not resistant to local culture and tradition (Burhani 2005, 2016b; Nakamura 2012). In fact, when KH. Ahmad Dahlan (1882-1962) established Muhammadiyah in 1912 in Yogyakarta, the organisation took on a Javanese (*Kejawanan*) rather than Arab or Middle Eastern character. Dahlan was a Javanese bourgeois (*priyayi*) and one of the bureaucrats of the Yogyakarta palace (*keraton*). Muhammadiyah is often categorised as a proponent of fundamentalism, though this does not conform to the values of the locality. In the 1930s, Muhammadiyah religious thought had shifted significantly towards fundamentalist-puritanism (Barton 2010, 138–39; Beck 2014; Burhani 2006, 1–22, 2016b; Kuntowijoyo 2001, 158–70). Burhani and Pradana Boy diagnose this shifting character of Muhammadiyah as being influenced by its internal leadership, mainly during the period of KH. Mas Mansur, the establishment of Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah and the flourishing of transnational Islamist thought (Boy 2018, 244; Burhani 2006, 19, 2016b, 115–36).

However, these changes within Muhammadiyah suggest that it can be dynamic. It implies that there is no single identity attached to it. It is also supported by the plurality within its elites and members (Boy 2007; Burhani 2013, 105–44). For instance, Abdul Munir Mulkhan observes a specific sociological variant of Muhammadiyah in a particular place that tends to be Marxist (*Marhaenis*) (Mulkhan 2010). Also, referring to the Muhammadiyah methodology of *ijtihad* (*Manhaj Tarjih Muhammadiyah*), Muhammadiyah states that in conducting *ijtihad*, its fundamental principle is ‘dynamisation.’ This means attempting to persistently transform prevailing interpretations of Islam, in line with what it believes are its core values, in order to face current challenges and solve the problems of the *ummah* (A. Abdurrahman 2002, 286; Boy 2018, 253–54).

Muhammadiyah and Islam Berkemajuan

Muhammadiyah declares that it stands on the foundation of 'Islam Berkemajuan' (progressive Islam) (Mu'ti et al. 2015). In Din Syamsuddin's view, it is its worldview (*wijbah*) (Syamsuddin 2015a, 11). Referring to Burhani's analytical argument, this worldview is characteristically cosmopolitan. It tends to be inclusive and open-minded (Burhani 2016b, 43; Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 2010). However, scholars have not explained a more precise definition of the concept of *Islam Berkemajuan*. Even Muhammadiyah never explains this concept in a distinct proposition, although Muhammadiyah has used it in almost all its events. Nonetheless, it can be reformulated from various sources, including the Muhammadiyah organisational program, historical data, specific academic works and their elites' views.

First, in the 47th Muktamar Muhammadiyah (the National Congress of Muhammadiyah) in Makassar in 2015, *Islam Berkemajuan* was the headline promoted. In this event, Muhammadiyah strove to contextualise it in the current situation. This event resulted in several recommendations committing Muhammadiyah to challenge various strategic issues such as national democratisation, the development of a community of knowledge, the enhancement of religious pluralism and multiculturalism, the empowerment of individuals and groups with different abilities and disabilities, disaster management, the eradication of corruption and poverty, the protection of migrant workers and many others (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 2010, 13). For Muhammadiyah, *Islam Berkemajuan* accentuates the progressive idea of religion as providing solutions to current problems.

Second, the idea of *Berkemajuan* was mentioned by KH. Ahmad Dahlan at the inception of Muhammadiyah. Their first Statute of Organisation (1912) mentioned the term 'progress' (*majoe*) and 'to progress' (*memajoekan*). In this statute, "Muhammadiyah aims ... to progress the Islamic teachings among its members" (Fachrudin 2015, 170). In their Charter (1914), Article 2a states that "Muhammadiyah aims to progress and gladden religious preaching and teachings in the Dutch East Indies." (Maarif 2015, 428). One of Dahlan's pupils, Syuja', wrote his teacher's memoir, recording Dahlan's idea of activism. It was published in 2009 with the title, *Progressive Islam: The story of early time of KH Ahmad Dahlan's Struggle (Islam Berkemajuan: Kisah*

Perjuangan KH Ahmad Dahlan pada Masa Awal) (Syuja 2009). These documents illustrate that the idea of “*Islam Berkemajuan*” is rooted in their history.

Third, there are intellectual works appreciating the discourse of *Islam Berkemajuan*. These include, “*Muhammadiyah Berkemajuan: Pergeseran dari Puritanisme ke Kosmopolitanisme*” (2016), “*Kosmopolitanisme Islam Berkemajuan*” (2015), and “*Islam Berkemajuan untuk Peradaban Dunia: Refleksi dan Agenda Muhammadiyah ke Depan*” (2015) (Burhani 2016a, 329–33; Hakim 2015, 50–67). In general, they discuss this discourse intensively and promote the view that this idea is inspirational, dynamic and futuristic in dealing with challenging realities. The first book, written by Burhani, draws on the twin concepts of Muhammadiyah theology, ‘Al-Ma‘ūn Theology’ and ‘Al-‘Aṣr Theology’ (Burhani 2016a, 45–48). In his view, the former shows that Muhammadiyah emphasises religious orthopraxis, while the latter builds on this and respects the spirit of hard work for the sake of the future. In the second book, Hajriyanto Thohari evaluates the slogan, “talk less, much work,” which relates to the central Muhammadiyah orientation of faith in action (Thohari 2015, 329–34). He also takes into account the essentials of the dynamisation of Muhammadiyah action (Thohari, 2015). In the third book, Sudarnoto Abdul Hakim argues that the spirit of *tajdid* (reformation) within Muhammadiyah should be constantly inspiring as science, technology and philosophy are always dynamic (Hakim 2015, 50–67).

Fourth, according to the Chairman of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah, Haedar Nashir, *Islam Berkemajuan* is conceptually the religious idea emphasising the praxis of universal humanism (Nashir 2015, 9). For him, religion aims to solve any problem of humanity and encourages social change and transformation from decadence and crises into better conditions. Meanwhile, the Former Chairman of Muhammadiyah, Din Syamsuddin, urges the persistent revitalisation and contextualisation of the idea to maintain its contemporary relevance (Syamsuddin 2015a, 12). To his mind, the idea is essential to solve any new problem in society. He adds that when there is no dynamisation, the idea will be stripped of its ability to solve new problems. In short, it is clear from both individuals that ‘progressive Islam’ is meant to be dynamic and transformative. Although others, such as Omid Safi, have spoken of a similar concept and emphasised that it holds Muslim

societies accountable for justice and pluralism (Safi 2003, 2), the Muhammadiyah notion of progressiveness includes the use of *ijtihad* to deal with issues of human development, such as poverty, education and empowerment.

Islam Berkemajuan for Indonesia Berkemajuan

For Muhammadiyah, given that *Islam Berkemajuan* is not only a religious idea but also inspiration for a social movement, it should be materialised in concrete realities. According to Syamsuddin (2015a), Muhammadiyah, as an agency of civilisation, wants to make Indonesia a progressive nation (*Indonesia Berkemajuan*). This is not surprising when one considers that Muhammadiyah presents itself as a religious organisation combining orthodoxy and orthopraxy, with the latter involving social activism (M. Abdurrahman 2003, 123; Beck 2001, 286).

Zakiyuddin Baidhaway argues the combination of orthodoxy and orthopraxy has been motivated by the theology of puritanism and 'Al-Ma'ūn Theology' (*Teologi al-Ma'ūn*) (Baidhaway 2015, 69–91). While the former focuses on the importance of referring to the main sources of Islam, the latter means that Islam should be valuable to society and humanity (Baidhaway 2015). Baidhaway explains that religious thought should be integrated with social activities to ensure that they will be beneficial for humanity, particularly for weak and marginalised people (*mustad'afin*) (Baidhaway 2015, 84). From 2015, there has been also a new theological trend within Muhammadiyah called 'Al-'Aṣr Theology'. According to Azaki Khoiruddin, it highlights an ethos of activism in the circle of Muhammadiyah emphasising the spirit of hard work, respect for time, and concern to develop the nation for the future generations (Khoirudin 2015). Therefore, Muhammadiyah's orthopraxy means more than just behaviour validated by religion; it also includes social activism consistent with a religious ethos.

The idea of *Islam Berkemajuan* compels Muhammadiyah to be involved in solving current national issues. In its official document, Muhammadiyah recognises that Indonesia is facing multi-dimensional crises (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 2015c, 17–28). These challenges include neoliberalism, corruption, injustice, inequality, social disparity, poverty and the sensitive religious issues of Islamist conservatism, radicalism and terrorism. The state should be central in

addressing these issues, but various Muhammadiyah higher education institutions actively reinforce the notion that Muhammadiyah has a civic as well as an Islamic duty. The slogan of the University of Muhammadiyah Malang, for example, is “From Muhammadiyah for the nation” (*Dari Muhammadiyah untuk Bangsa*).

***Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah:* Muhammadiyah’s Intellectual and Political Manifesto**

Muhammadiyah offered the notion of *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah* as a way of reformulating the reconciliation between the state principles of Pancasila and *Siyar*. It also offered a way to revitalise *Siyar* in order to face current challenges, such as the spread of Islamist conservatism, radicalism, terrorism and others. In revitalising it, Muhammadiyah contextualised the classical idea of *Siyar* (*dār al-‘ahd* or the state of consensus) and deployed contemporary *ijtihad* through an elaboration of the concept of *dār al-shahādah* (the state of witness) to complement *dār al-‘ahd*.

The Process of Conceptualisation and Legalisation

The idea of *Negara Pancasila* as *Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah* is a result of Tanwir Muhammadiyah, the special forum for discussion before the organisation’s national congress in Bandung in 2012 and Samarinda in 2014. Afterwards, this idea was presented and decided upon in the 47th Mukhtar Muhammadiyah, 3-7 August 2015, in Makassar (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 2015b, iii). In all forums of discussion (*musyawarah*) in both Tanwirs and Mukhtar Muhammadiyah, there were proponents and opponents. One of the movement’s official journalists, writing for *Suara Muhammadiyah*, reported that some figures believed in the idea of unity between state and religion (*al-dīn wa al-dawlah*) (Mu’arif 2018). He added that their thought is based on the classical doctrine of political Islam (*al-siyāsah al-shar‘iyah*) and *Siyar* (Mu’arif 2018). As a consequence, they think that Indonesia should be viewed as *dār al-Islām* (the Islamic state) because the majority of Indonesians are Muslims and adhere to their religious obligations (Mu’arif 2018). In addition, the memory of the *Piagam Jakarta* (the Charter of Jakarta) still strongly influences an utopian belief that the founding fathers of Indonesia intended to create an Islamic state (Mu’arif 2018).

The crucial moment that revealed serious division between proponents and opponents was in one of the commissions during the Mukhtamar Muhammadiyah in 2015. The chairperson of the commission was Saad Ibrahim. He is the Chairman of the Provincial Branch of Muhammadiyah in East Java and also one of the prominent 'ulama' within Muhammadiyah. As the chairperson, he does not deny that debates on the notion of *Negara Pancasila* during the forum were fierce (Ibrahim 2018). The puritanism within Muhammadiyah, always emphasising the credo of "return to the Qur'an and Sunnah" (*al-ruju' 'ila al-Qur'an wa al-Sunnah*), dominated, although the conservative participants were a minority at that time. Accordingly, the doctrine of classical *Siyar* significantly conditioned their perspective. The central argument consistently defended by conservatives was that Indonesia is *dār al-Islām*. This argument referred to the seven controversial words of the *Piagam Jakarta* stating that the first principle of Pancasila is "Belief in God with the obligation to carry out Islamic *Shari'ah* for Muslim adherents" (*Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi para pemeluk-pemeluknya*) (Hosen 2007, 62,59-107).

As Ibrahim narrates, all participants in the forum respected the spirit of democracy (*musyawarah*) and the noble virtues of Islam (Ibrahim 2018). On that occasion, together with other members of the organisation's elite and the majority of participants, he insisted that the *Piagam Jakarta* should be understood properly. He and the majority argued that, in interpreting *Piagam Jakarta*, it must not contradict *Piagam Madinah* (the Charter of Madinah). They meant that, while *Piagam Jakarta* underlines the obligation of implementation of *Shari'ah* by Muslims, *Piagam Madinah* emphasises the importance of implementation of "each religion" by each believer. Arguably, as a consequence of following the Qur'an and Sunnah, Indonesian Muslims should be following the *Piagam Madinah* rather than *Piagam Jakarta* (Ibrahim 2018; Salim 2009, 105–10). This argument convinced all Muhammadiyah activists in the forum that it was important that the notion of the state of Pancasila as *Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah* was accepted. It became an official policy of Muhammadiyah and was formalised in the Tanfidz Muhammadiyah (the legalisation of organisational documents) on the 18th of August 2015 in Yogyakarta (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 2015c, 1–2).

Main Idea

According to their official document, Muhammadiyah views that the Republic of Indonesia, based on the five principles of Pancasila (*Negara Pancasila*), is the *Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah*. It is called *dār al-'ahd* (the state of consensus) (İnalçık 2018) because the establishment of the state in 1945 and the formulation of its principles resulted from the national consensus (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2015: 12). Adding *dār al-shahādah* (the witness) after *dār al-'ahd* means the implementation of Pancasila needs Muhammadiyah participation. Accordingly, Muhammadiyah will witness itself as a part of Indonesia and becoming Indonesian (Syamsuddin 2017, 161–62).

While Pancasila was historically reformulated through a national consensus, central figures of the nation, mainly some Muhammadiyah elites who represented Muslims' aspirations, understood that Pancasila conforms with the teachings of Islam (Hakim 2013; Nashir 2018, 23; Syamsuddin 2015b). While Indonesia ideally aims to create a state that is safe, secure and peaceful (*dār al-salām*), as well as more progressive, just, prosperous, dignified and sovereign, this aim is in accordance with the ideals of Islam, as understood by Muhammadiyah, which is to realise "*baladatun tayyibatun wa rabbun ghafūr*" (the great state that is blessed by God's grace) (Nashir 2018, 20–21).

Through the formulation of *dār al-'ahd*, in reconsidering the discourse of the classical *Siyar*, Syamsuddin argues that the dichotomist thought of distinguishing the world into *dār al-Islām* (the state of Islam) and *dār al-ḥarb* (the state of war) is not relevant in the modern context of globalisation (Syamsuddin 2017, 161). This is because Indonesia is also a part of the international system of nation-states, which morally and politically respects global diversity. Consequently, he emphasises that Indonesia is bound to international agreements on a broader level. It is analogous to the position of Muhammadiyah, which is bound to the national consensus as well as to a higher authority (Syamsuddin 2017). Furthermore, Syamsuddin follows a Hegelian approach when explaining the national consensus. He elaborates that Muhammadiyah has to deal with a consensus that reflects the rendezvous of two kinds of freedom, namely subjective and objective freedom (Syamsuddin 2017). While the former is the freedom aspired to by an individual or a certain group in society – in this context, a Muslim organisation such as Muhammadiyah – the latter results from the participation of all in

the nation, including Muslims. In another formulation, Syamsuddin argues that the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia is based on Pancasila, the crystallised collective ideals of a nation that is culturally diverse. Accordingly, Indonesia exists at the intersection between the subjective and objective liberty of all elements of the nation. In other words, it is a meeting of minds over these elements (Syamsuddin 2015b, 279). Thus, Pancasila is a common platform and common denominator for Indonesia that can accommodate the shared values of various religions to guarantee the life of the people in national unity (Syamsuddin 2015b).

As mentioned previously, the *Negara Pancasila* means not only *dār al-'ahd*, but also *dār al-shahādah*. As Haedar Nashir contends, the implication of this concept is that Muslims need to involve themselves in the realisation of state ideals as the main actors of witness (*shuhadā'*). Inspiration comes from the Quranic phrase, "*shuhadā' alā al-nās*" (the witnesses among the people) (Nashir 2018, 20–21). It encourages Muslims to maintain their commitment to contribute to the development of Indonesia in any field and dimension of life, in any way that is fair and noble (*fastabiq al-khayrāt*), so that Indonesia becomes one of the great civilisations in the midst of global competition (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 2015a, 13–14). The implementation of this concept is based on the principle of meritocracy and proportionality because of the defined and differing roles of citizens. In dealing with this aspect, Syamsuddin argues that Indonesian citizens have to serve their state as the manifestation of their commitment to common national ideals such as becoming good citizens, obeying the law and the constitution (Syamsuddin 2015b, 284–85).

Motives and Objectives

There are several reasons that account for why Muhammadiyah proclaimed the notion of *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah*. First, as guidance, as this notion "aims to be a reference and orientation of thought and action for all Muhammadiyah members in dealing with the development of the state and nation based on 'Islam Berkemajuan' as Muhammadiyah's Islamic perspective" (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 2015b, iii). According to Thohari (2018), the formalisation of this notion "is to make Muhammadiyah become more proactive and progressive in a developing nation, as exemplified

by its past generations”. In addition, although *Negara Pancasila* was finalised after the independence of Indonesia, the institutionalisation of *Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah* was important to prevent ambivalence by Muhammadiyah towards the state (Syamsuddin 2017, 160). Furthermore, Syamsuddin asserts that this notion is about the state and nation, and is therefore political. Yet, at the same time, because it involves Muslims, it is religious (Syamsuddin, 2015b: 281). In Thohari’s words, it is an authentic *ijtihad* of Muhammadiyah (Thohari 2018).

Second, this notion is intended to be an ideological fortress for Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah views it as an ideological protection against the massive spread of Islamism (Bayat 2013, 5–7). As Abdul Mu’ti contends, Islamists – including those within Muhammadiyah – can be potentially subversive, since they tend to refuse the state principles of Pancasila and its system of governance, and they have exerted strong efforts to establish an Islamic state (Amar and Apip 2017, 13). With regard to the Muktamar Muhammadiyah, Saad Ibrahim explains that *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah* is important because Muhammadiyah has to face the context of religious-based challenges (Ibrahim 2018). In alignment with Mu’ti’s consideration, he worries that Muhammadiyah will be perceived as similar to modern Wahhabism in the sense of religious conservatism and, to some extent, of radicalism (Ibrahim 2018).

There are several cases that are important to be noted here. In 1953, the notion of Indonesia as *dār al-Islām* (not *dār al-‘ahd*) was offered firstly at the 32nd Muktamar Muhammadiyah in Purwokerto. Participants (*muktamirin*) urged Muhammadiyah to conceptualise the Islamic state. To follow up this demand, the concept was given one formulation by Abdul Kahar Muzakir in ‘Tanwir Muhammadiyah’ in Pekalongan in 1955. In his view, the Islamic state is the state that is governed by a Muslim ruler and implements Islamic law (I. M. Rais 2016, 8–9). However, as Amin Abdullah observes, there have been other interpretations that are “exclusive, close-minded, sectarian, primordial, parochial” (Abdullah 2017, 85). Zakiyuddin Baidawy points to groups that have proposed such alternative ideas, such as Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) and Jamaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD). Ambitiously, each has wanted to

establish an Islamic state given that Indonesia is perceived as un-Islamic and Pancasila as the ideology of evil (*tāghūt*) (Baidhawiy 2016, 42). Moreover, about 500–700 Indonesian jihadists have joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

In dealing with the cases above, Syamsuddin states that “in the democratic era, any idea or aspiration of anyone or group is permissible (free to be expressed) as long as it is articulated through procedures and mechanisms that are constitutional, non-coercive and non-violent” (Syamsuddin, 2015b: 282). Regarding the accusation that Pancasila is an evil, un-Islamic, infidel ideology, he asserts that “this idea is a threat and can even be categorised as a subversion to the state ... This approach is indeed a betrayal of the national consensus” (Syamsuddin 2015b, 282).

Third, this notion also aims to enhance political relationships between the state and Muhammadiyah as a civil society organisation. This political enhancement can be articulated in three different ways, namely *realpolitik*, philosophy (moral) and nationhood. From the perspective of *realpolitik*, relations between the two political agencies have weakened over time. In previous political periods from the 1980s onwards, the best Muhammadiyah cadres occupied various strategic political positions in either executive, legislative or judiciary institutions (Jurdi 2010, 461–83). In their positions, they contributed to state policies and activities. Yet, in the period 2014–2019, there has been only one Muhammadiyah representative in the cabinet of President Joko Widodo (Burhani 2014). In 2016, Muhadjir Effendy, a Muhammadiyah activist, was appointed as the Minister of Education and Culture, replacing Anies Baswedan.

Philosophically, as Haedar Nashir asserts, *Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah* was proposed to integrate Islamic and Indonesian values (*keislaman dan keindonesiaan*) (Nashir 2018, 25). He claims that Islam itself is a progressive religion and potentially can encourage the advancement of civilisation (*dīn al-ḥadārah*). Accordingly, Muhammadiyah can engage usefully with the nation by implementing the values of progressivity (Nashir, 2018: 29). He adds that while Islam is understood as the progressive religion, capable of adjusting to any dynamic life context, the classical doctrine of *Siyar* (separating *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-ḥarb*) should be reformed or at least revitalised in accordance with the character and personality of Indonesia (Nashir 2018, 29).

In addition, according to Azaki Khairuddin, a young Muhammadiyah activist, this notion provides a valuable bridge of nationhood (*silaturahmi*) between the ruler and young activists (Azaki Khairuddin 2018). They think that they do not have a good relationship with the government because according to them, in Khairuddin's word, it is not Islamic. In the view of those he represents, the government has not practised Islamic and Indonesian values in proper ways. In short, young activists have a distrust of the government because of corruption, the lack of law enforcement, and a state policy that they believe does not prioritise the people's welfare. Based on all these factors, young activists want to give something to the nation that is more meaningful and to be involved in the process of state development more significantly.

Fourth, this notion is, in effect, Muhammadiyah's intellectual and political manifesto. In terms of the intellectual manifesto, Muhammadiyah insists that Islam has an important role to play in national development and should play it. As Amin Abdullah says, the dynamisation of Islamic thought (*Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah*) aims to maintain its relevance to any space and time (*al-zamān wa al-makān*), its adaptability through developments of science and technology (*nazāriyah al-mar'ifah*), and its orientation to solving current problems including mainly 'dehumanisation' (Abdullah 2017, 80). To realise this intellectual manifesto, Syamsuddin emphasises that Muhammadiyah has taken part in the contestation over the religious interpretation (*musābaqah al-tafsīr*) of Pancasila and what form the state should take (*Negara Pancasila*) (Syamsuddin 2015b, 162).

However, Hajriyanto Thohari's critical reflection needs to be examined here. He states that the future challenges are to face Islamism and guarantee the process of 'substantial democratisation'. As a politician, he believes that the day-to-day political situation in Indonesia has moved forward on formal democracy, which emphasises majoritarianism and domination of party elites ('partitocracy'), but not substantial democracy (Thohari 2018). In particular, partitocracy tends to sell out the idealism of substantial democracy to the hand of oligarchism. Indeed, both partitocracy and oligarchism contradict the State Constitution of 1945 and the Law of Political Parties, which emphasise principles of transparency and democracy. Thohari (2018) enthusiastically asserts that:

In solving those problems of democracy, the parties themselves should firstly initiate the reform of the corrupted political tradition they practise. In addition, Muhammadiyah's cadres should also be encouraged to be involved in the process of reform. But there is a requirement: Muhammadiyah have to produce substantially more cadres – those who will be able to colour three strategic dimensions: organisation, ummah (pluralist societies) and national leadership.

Certainly, Abdullah's and Syamsuddin's opinions are in tune with Thohari's reflection, while he adds other complex realities that have to be handled by Muhammadiyah. In dealing with these realities, Haedar Nashir optimistically states that Muhammadiyah has undertaken and will continually contribute to the realisation of the ideals of the nation in many fields of life (Nashir 2018, 29–30). Syamsuddin likely agrees with Nashir's statement in terms of the meaning of *dār al-shahādah* (the state of witness) as the encouragement to undertake participatory actions within the spirit of progressive Islam (*Islam Berkemajuan*) in order to build a progressive Indonesia (*Indonesia Berkemajuan*) (Syamsuddin 2017, 162). As a matter of reflection on Muhammadiyah's intellectual and political manifesto, Syamsuddin elaborates that *Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah* has two kinds of affirmation for Muhammadiyah activists: the first is to affirm themselves as Muslims, the second as Indonesians. Both affirmations relate to the Islamic caliphal (viceregency) mission that should be realised in the Indonesian world (*khalīfatullāh fi arḍinā, Indonesia*) (Syamsuddin 2015b, 283).

Therefore, there are four Muhammadiyah motives and objectives in reformulating and proclaiming the notion of *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah*: (1) guidance for Muhammadiyah activists on the relationship between the state and the organisation; (2) an ideological defence against Islamism and other 'dehumanising' ideologies; (3) an instrument of political harmonisation between the state and Muhammadiyah, and; (4) an intellectual and political manifesto affirming Muhammadiyah as a part of Indonesia and Indonesia itself.

Strategies and Implementations

Muhammadiyah has certain strategies in disseminating and implementing *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah*. This notion has been disseminated and implemented through its

various institutions, mainly its charitable enterprises and political activities.

First, the dissemination of the notion via its institutions to several organisational channels. Their main channel is its provincial and regional branches throughout the country. After a process of legalisation, the official document of the notion has spread to its provincial and regional branches. From these branches, they will forward the copies to their local branches and sub-branches. In order to accelerate this dissemination, this document can also be accessed online via the Muhammadiyah website (www.muhammadiyah.or.id). Although the internet is widely available today, not all Muhammadiyah members can access it, particularly those who are living in the remote and outermost areas such as the interstate borders (Yamien 2010). However, their elites are skilled in spreading the notion via social media and television. Some intellectuals in Muhammadiyah's circle have produced editorials in local and national newspapers and online media. The intellectual organisation, the Ma'arif Institute, has published a journal covering a specific theme on the notion, and others have published books.

However, what Muhammadiyah has done is challenging. While development of information technology has had an effect, it has been not followed by critical literacy. Many people, as well as some Muhammadiyah members, have been not able to think critically when they are confronted with fake news. False information has sharpened the appeal of Islamism, even with its subversive tone, complicating the task of disseminating ideas like *Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah*. One of many ways that Muhammadiyah can address this problem, as its Division of Library and Information (*Majelis Pustaka dan Informasi Muhammadiyah*) has attempted to do, is to advance a program of literacy *jihad*. The primary aim of this *jihad* is to enhance the awareness of people to be wiser and more critical in reading, thinking about and evaluating information.

In addition, as a strategy of dissemination, Muhammadiyah has been using its charitable enterprises, such as its educational institutions (schools and universities), health institutions (hospitals and clinics) and philanthropic institutions (open houses for the homeless, orphanages and nursing homes). Since 1912, starting with the modernisation of Islamic schools initiated by KH. Ahmad Dahlan (Alfian 2010, 168–69; Kim 2007, 53–55; Nakamura 2012, 93–102), Muhammadiyah

has played a significant educational role in particular, producing many prominent national figures. Now, its contributions have increased due to the rise in the number of its educational institutions. As its database shows, Muhammadiyah has 4786 schools and 171 universities (www.muhammadiyah.or.id). Moreover, its other institutions have also contributed to the development of Indonesia (Latief 2012). Its elites claim that their contributions can be considered as the implementation of *dār al-shahādah* (Nashir 2018, 32).

Ideally, these institutions would have significant influence in enhancing awareness of the notion. However, not all teachers and lecturers have agreed with the concept (Azaki Khairuddin 2018). In fact, it is a huge problem for Muhammadiyah. There is no doubt that some Muslims still believe in the idea of *dār al-Islām* rather than *Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah*. Moreover, some Muhammadiyah activists are, at the same time, also supporting the ideas and activities of HTI, JAT, JAD, and others (Boy 2012, 379–416; Qodir 2010, 39–72, 2018).

Muhammadiyah persists in hoping to disseminate the idea via its 'high politics'. For example, when Muhammadiyah insists that it is not a political party and will not play at the level of practical politics (*realpolitik*), Muhammadiyah claims that it has instead participated in the process of substantial democratisation (Jurdi 2010, 305; A. Rais 1995, 43–44; Thohari 1999, 103–6). In other words, Muhammadiyah maintains that what Muhammadiyah is doing is different from the practices of *realpolitik*, which is intended for gaining political power *per se* (Nashir 1999, 197). Muhammadiyah proclaims that, as a civil society organisation, its function is to be a balance of power between the ruler and the people or between state policies and people's aspirations (Ghazali, 2018). As Amin Abdullah says, Muhammadiyah has the double function of controller and transformer in terms of the implementation of the nation's noble virtues (Abdullah 2001, 43–56).

In describing its strategy, motives and objectives at length in its official document, Muhammadiyah states that:

In transforming *Negara Pancasila* towards *Indonesia Berkemajuan* (progressive Indonesia), Muhammadiyah has invited all elites of this nation to maintain their good morality consistently, fulfilling the people's mandate, struggling for the people's ideals rather than serving their [own] interests, or their groups and parties. Muhammadiyah has strongly encouraged the government to develop the state and nation with total respect for the values of justice, honesty and nationhood, as well as not

to involve an abuse of power. In dealing with this, Muhammadiyah has stressed that Indonesia will be built based on the values of progress, enlightenment, and Prophetic virtues as inspired by the noble and Islamic principles of Pancasila (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 2015c, 20–21).

The reality, however, is somewhat different. Some activists are at the same time politicians, spread across several political parties, thus having vital roles in the contestation of *realpolitik*. During the moment of democratic transition in 1998, Amien Rais, as the Chairman of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah, led activists and students to overthrow President Soeharto (Najib and Himmaty 1999). His extraordinary contribution has been praised by scholars and others, and he has even been granted the honourable title of ‘the Father of Reformation’ (*Bapak Reformasi*) (Denny J. A. 2006, 283; Nadjib 2016, 62). In the post-authoritarian era, he established the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat National/PAN*) and gained a position as the Chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR*). With this position, he initiated the process of amending the Constitution of 1945 (*Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*) that led to the ratification of whole sections of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) within the Constitution (Horowitz 2013, 89–123; Indrayana 2008, 316).

There are other figures of note. Imam Addaruqutni, for instance, established the National Sun Party (*Partai Matahari Bangsa*) in 2006, though this party has failed to survive. Ahmad Rofiq established the National Democrat Party (Nasdem) in 2011, which was then taken over by a corporatist, Surya Paloh. In 2015, Rofiq founded the United Indonesia Party (Perindo). The younger Muhammadiyah activist *cum* politician, Raja Juli Antoni, initiated the Indonesian Solidarity Party (Partai Solidaritas Indonesia) in 2014, which is preparing to fight the 2019 national election.

The phenomenon of practical politics among Muhammadiyah activists shows that the position of Muhammadiyah is ambivalent: they affirm a moral position that presumes to be above politics, but also become involved in the give-and-take of *realpolitik*. Yet, according to Hajriyanto Thohari, a Muhammadiyah activist and the Deputy of the Chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) from 2009 to 2014, this ambivalence can produce meaningful benefits for society (Thohari 2018). He claims that Muhammadiyah should encourage

its cadres who have participated in political parties to bring religious and moral values to the process of formulating political policies so as to ensure that they are pro-justice and humanity (Thohari 2018). Although this idea of moral engagement is not always followed, due to the rational calculations that politics demands, it should still become the essential basis of their political behaviour (Abd. Rochim Ghazali 2018). One way this might be done is in the prioritising of the process of substantive democracy, rather than simply formal or 'façade' democracy. Muhammadiyah has pursued this "moderate" path in initiating the program of constitutional *jihād* (*jihad konstitusi*) that reviews laws and policies to determine whether they contradict the public interest and principles of justice and humanity (Hendrianto 2018, 206, 221).

Challenges

For Muhammadiyah, there are various challenges in implementing *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah*. These include the growth of Islamist ideology within the movement, the emergence of Islamist populism – the political populism that involves Islamists as agencies of mobilisation (Hadiz 2016; Islam 2015; White 2002) – and the complex problems facing the nation such as corruption, injustice, the undue influence of neoliberal corporations, social disparities, poverty and the trends of partitocracy and political oligarchism.

Their first challenge is the rise of Islamism within. As mentioned before, the ideology of religious negation (*takfirīyah*) has grown massively and infiltrated Muhammadiyah as well. On the one hand, this organisation is puritanical because, in matters of religion, it refers to the primary sources of Islam, such as the Qur'ān and Sunnah (Prophetic tradition). On the other hand, Muhammadiyah also agrees to some extent with the ideology of Wahhabism. Neither is the main factor conditioning the spread of Islamism in the circle of Muhammadiyah. More important are the cultural and political connections of transnational Islamic movements that tend to be resistant to modernisation. Others, such as complex social, economic, political and cultural problems in Indonesia, have been understood to be factors that significantly influence the rise of distrust, as well as an alternative discourse claiming that the political system and practices of Indonesia have not been Islamic. The accumulation of these many

factors has affected the ideological construction of some Muslims as well as some Muhammadiyah activists, and also shaped their interest in joining conservative and even radical groups (a Muhammadiyah activist 2018; Syamsuddin 2017, 160). Unsurprisingly, some Muhammadiyah activists have joined HTI or Salafist jihadist organisations (Qodir 2018).

In addition, the emergence of Islamist populism is also a challenge for Muhammadiyah. A year after the publication of the *Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah* (2017), Muhammadiyah has had to face the significant growth in populist anger, and even demonstrations such as the mass rally entitled the ‘Action of Defending Islam’ (*Aksi Bela Islam 212 and 411*) (Fealy 2016). This resentment, especially in conservative Muslim circles, at the perceived lack of justice and prosperity has been abetted by political leaders who have sought to manipulate it for their own self-interest (Assyaukanie 2017; Mietzner 2016; Mietzner and Muhtadi 2018; Robison and Hadiz 2017, 895–909). For Muhammadiyah, there has consequently been a double difficulty. First, its idea of strengthening its political relations with the ruler (*Muhammadiyah Berkemajuan untuk Indonesia Berkemajuan*) has become more difficult. Second, some Muhammadiyah activists have argued for joining forces with Islamist populism, since its criticisms of the government’s failings would seem to align with Muhammadiyah’s own version of progressive Islam (*Islam Berkemajuan*).

Conclusion

Muhammadiyah has multiple identities as it has become a dynamic organisation that transforms itself in response to changing realities. That is why some scholars identify it variously as a puritanical, reformist, modernist or other organisation. Nevertheless, Muhammadiyah claims to be a progressive organisation, primarily due to its perception that Islam is a religion providing the spirit and inspiration to solve current societal problems. This is a form of Islam it has designated *Islam Berkemajuan*. For Muhammadiyah, it is the most fundamental basis of thought and movement. With the perspective of *Islam Berkemajuan*, Muhammadiyah wants to solve any problem, mainly in Indonesia. Its dream is to make Indonesia a progressive state (*Indonesia Berkemajuan*), one attempt at which is the conceptualisation of *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah* (the state of consensus and witness).

As a progressive Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah has conducted *ijtihad* to find a solution to the issue of Islamist conservatism and even radicalism. Muhammadiyah views this problem as a threat that could possibly lead to national disintegration, since it has questioned the status of the state and its political system. Accordingly, Muhammadiyah has attempted to revitalise the doctrine of *Siyar* to confront this challenge. For instance, Muhammadiyah contextualises the concept of *dār al-'ahd* and adopts this concept in order to justify that Indonesia, as the state of Pancasila, is the state of consensus (*dār al-'ahd*), due to the fact it resulted from a national consensus of the Indonesian founding fathers. This justification emphasises that Indonesia is actually 'Islamic', although it has not directly dealt with Islamic identity or invoked the term *dār al-Islām*, as Islamists' criticise. In this context, Muhammadiyah offers a reconciliation of *Siyar* and Pancasila. Yet, despite the fact that Muhammadiyah produced such a moderate Islamic concept, as its activists attest, it was not deemed sufficient. Accordingly, Muhammadiyah has added the concept of the state of witness (*dār al-shahādah*) to strengthen the implementation of the values of Pancasila in the day-to-day life of Indonesian Muslims. With its concept of *dār al-shahādah*, Muhammadiyah encourages Muslims, and especially its members, to become involved in the process of state development in order to bring the ideal of *Indonesia Berkemajuan* into reality.

This concept, furthermore, aims to provide guidance for Muhammadiyah members regarding the relationship between the state and Muhammadiyah. It ensures that its members will understand Indonesia is neither *dār al-Islām* nor *dār al-ḥarb*, but *Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah*. In addition, it seeks to defend itself against Islamist criticism while also affirming its responsibility for both the implementation of Pancasila and the development of the state. On a practical level, this concept has been disseminated and implemented through its various institutions, mainly its charitable enterprises and political activities, but this has not been easy or uncontested. Of particular concern is that not all Muhammadiyah activists agree with this concept, due to their Islamist tendency. In addition, some Muhammadiyah members have been influenced by and participated in the trend of Islamist populism and its activities.

In conclusion, this article states that the concept of *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah*, as a reconciliation between Pancasila and *Siyar*, is a product of Muhammadiyah's contemporary *ijtihad*.

Muhammadiyah formulates it as an effort of theologising democracy, which is based on the idea of *Islam Berkemajuan*. Practically, however, in dealing with uneasy and challenging realities, Muhammadiyah must fight against problems of religious conservatism within itself (Burhani, 2018: 433-470) and ideological infiltration by Islamists. As a consequence, how Muhammadiyah deals with these realities – which depends on its progressive activists – will highly likely determine its success in implementing the concept. It remains to be seen whether Muhammadiyah could be considered a model of Indonesian Islam with progress (*Berkemajuan*) that is moderate and democratic.

Endnotes

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Abdul Munir Mulkhan, September 22, 2018.

Azaki Khairuddin, August 28, 2018.

Hajriyanto Thohari, August 21, 2018.

Mu'arif, August 20, 2018.

Saad Ibrahim, August 23, 2018.

Zuly Qodir, August 30, 2018.

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2. Booth, Anne. 1988. "Living Standards and the Distribution of Income in Colonial Indonesia: A Review of the Evidence." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 19(2): 310–34.
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5. Utriza, Ayang. 2008. "Mencari Model Kerukunan Antaragama." *Kompas*. March 19: 59.
6. Ms. *Undhang-Undhang Banten*, L.Or.5598, Leiden University.
7. Interview with K.H. Sahal Mahfudz, Kajen, Pati, June 11th, 2007.

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
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