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

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Music, Contentious Politics, and Identity: A Cultural Analysis of "Aksi Bela Islam" March in Jakarta (2016)

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Rahmat Hidayatullah

Music, Contentious Politics, and Identity: A Cultural Analysis of "Aksi Bela Islam" March in Jakarta (2016)

Abstract: *This article examines the role of music as a repertoire of contention and as a framing device used to challenge the political legitimacy of the rulers and strengthen the collective identity of the participants in "Aksi Bela Islam" (ABI), a demonstration held in Jakarta at the end of 2016. Rizieq Shihab, one of the key actors of ABI, wrote two songs known as "Si Ahok Durjana" and "Mars Aksi Bela Islam". This paper argues that the success of mass mobilization during ABI cannot be separated from the creative use of media and popular culture—including music. The key actors of ABI used music and popular media as framing devices to communicate cognitive meanings, mobilize potential adherents, delegitimize authorities, instill emotional feelings and awaken the collective identity of Muslims. This paper applies new social movement theory that emphasizes the significance and role of cultural factors in the dynamics of social movements.*

Keywords: Music, Social Movement, Contentious Politics, Framing, Collective Identity.

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Abstrak: *Artikel ini mengkaji peran musik sebagai repertoar perseteruan dan perangkat pembingkaian yang digunakan untuk menentang legitimasi politik penguasa dan memperkuat identitas kolektif para partisipan dalam rangkaian demonstrasi kolosal Aksi Bela Islam (ABI) di jantung Ibu Kota Jakarta pada penghujung 2016. Dalam peristiwa tersebut, Rizieq Shihab, salah satu aktor utama ABI, menciptakan dua karya musik, yakni "Mars Aksi Bela Islam" dan "Si Ahok Durjana". Kajian ini menunjukkan bahwa keberhasilan mobilisasi massa dalam rangkaian ABI tidak dapat dilepaskan dari penggunaan kreatif media dan budaya populer—termasuk musik—oleh aktor-aktor utama gerakan sebagai strategi pembingkaian untuk mengkomunikasikan makna kognitif, memobilisasi pengikut potensial, mendelegitimasi otoritas penguasa, menanamkan perasaan emosional, dan membangkitkan identitas kolektif umat Islam. Artikel ini menggunakan teori gerakan sosial baru yang lebih menekankan faktor kultural dalam dinamika gerakan sosial.*

Kata kunci: Musik, Gerakan Sosial, Politik Perseteruan, Pembingkaian, Identitas Kolektif.

ملخص: تتناول هذه الدراسة دور الموسيقى بصفتها ذخيرة النزاع وأداة التأطير التي تستخدم لمعارضة الشرعية السياسية للحكام، وتعزيز الهوية الجماعية للمشاركين في سلسلة من المظاهرات الضخمة التي يطلق عليها اسم «العمل من أجل الدفاع عن الإسلام» في قلب العاصمة جاكرتا في نهاية عام ٢٠١٦. وقد ألف رزيق شهاب، أحد الممثلين الرئيسيين في هذه الحادثة، أغنيتين، هما «سي أهوك دورجانا» و»مارس أكسي بيلا إسلام». وتظهر الدراسة أن نجاح التعبئة الجماهيرية في هذه المظاهرات لا يمكن فصله عن الاستخدام الإبداعي للإعلام والثقافة الشعبية--بما في ذلك الموسيقى--من قبل الجهات الفاعلة الرئيسية للحركة كاستراتيجية تأطير لتوصيل المعانى المعرفية، وتعبئة الأتباع لمحتملين، ونزع الشرعية عن الحكام، وغرس المشاعر العاطفية، واستحضار الهوية الجماعية للمسلمين. وتستخدم هذه الدراسة نظرية الحركة الاجتماعية الجديدة التي تركز أكثر على العوامل الثقافية في ديناميات الحركات الاجتماعية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الموسيقى، الحركات الاجتماعية، سياسة النزاع، التأطير، الهوية الجماعية.

One of the most interesting aspects of the "*Aksi Bela Islam*" (ABI), also known as Islam Defense Action, was the use of music as a repertoire of contention to frame conflict issues and generate the collective identity of the demonstrators. During the event, Rizieq Shihab, head of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), wrote two songs: "*Si Ahok Durjana*" and "*Mars Aksi Bela Islam*". The first work, "*Si Ahok Durjana*", was launched by Rizieq on 14th October 2016 (1410 Action or ABI I) and sung along during the march, which started at Istiqlal Mosque, Bareskrim Polri (Criminal Investigation Agency of Indonesian National Police) and culminated in City Hall of DKI Jakarta (JPNN 2016; Panjimas TV 2016a). The second work, "*Mars Aksi Bela Islam*", was launched by Rizieq on 4th November 2016 (411 Action or ABI II) at Istiqlal Mosque and sung before the participants moved to the State Palace (Discover Jakarta TV 2016; FSRMM TV 2016). This song also played a big part of the demonstrations on December 2, 2016 (212 Action or ABI III), which were held at National Monument and led by a famous *nashīd* band that was affiliated with the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Izzatul Islam (5M Production 2016).

Research on the relationship between music and social or political movements is not new, but is still limited. As noted by Street, Hague and Savigny (2007), a considerable amount of literature draws attention to the role of music in public action and political protest. Many scholars argue that music and musicians were instrumental in giving expression to resistance movements and organizing opposition to regimes. Although they differ in many respects, they tend to share a common feature; music provided a means by which political resistance could be expressed and for opposition to be organized. According to Street, Hague and Savigny (2007), perspectives on the role of music in social and political movements generally lead to one of two approaches: first, using music as a way of 'seeing' the inner life of political participation; and second, presenting music as the cause of political participation (5).

The first approach can be seen in Ward's (1998) study of the role that music played in the civil rights movement in the United States. Ward explained that music "offers a glimpse into the state of black consciousness and the struggle for freedom and equality" at a given moment (1998, 6). The second approach can be seen in Ramet's (1994) study of the role of music in political movements in the Soviet bloc countries. Ramet claims that music is "an unexpectedly powerful force

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for social and political change" and "brings people together and evokes for them collective emotional experience to which common meanings are assigned" (1994, 1).

Within social movement research, the study of music is an emerging and promising topic of study. In this context, the work of Eyerman and Jamison (1998) provided a springboard for conceptualizing the relationship between music, emotion, and collective action (Corte 2012, 35). Eyerman and Jamison (1998) discuss music as part of a 'cognitive praxis', defined as "the knowledge-producing activities that are carried out within social movements" (7). As cognitive praxis, music and other forms of cultural activity contribute to the idea that movements are offered and created in opposition to the existing social and cultural order. In Eyerman and Jamison's (1998) perspective, art and music—culture—are forms of both knowledge and action, part of the frameworks of interpretation and representation produced within social movements and through which they influence broader societal culture. As such, they are much more than functional devices for recruitment or as resources to be mobilized (Eyerman and Jamison 1998, 23-24). Music, in particular, can empower people, help create a collective identity and a sense of movement in an emotional and metaphysical sense (Eyerman and Jamison 1998, 35).

Although the above literature demonstrated the role of music in social movements, prevailing research on social movements has, more often than not, relegated cultural products like music, art and film to a secondary analytic status compared to more tangible social and political movements such as protests, political turnout or media coverage (Corte and Edwards 2008, 5). Some of the studies that have been conducted by the academic community regarding the ABI phenomenon also show a similar trend. Although popular music and culture generally play an important role in the ABI movement, few researchers are concerned about that dimension. Even Journal Maarif's "Setelah Bela Islam: Gerakan Sosial Islam, Demokratisasi, dan Keadilan Sosial" (December 2016), which specifically raised the ABI phenomenon, tends to miss the role of media and popular culture such as music, audiovisual material, the internet, posters, flyers, and social media. Although this Journal Maarif's edition presents an identity/cultural analysis in addition to a class/structural analysis (Rais and Bagir 2016, 7), the identity/cultural analysis has little regard for the role of media and popular culture in the ABI movement.

One of the fundamental questions that researchers face in examining the ABI phenomenon is explaining the success of 'radical-conservative' Islamic groups—which have so far lacked supporters when compared to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. How did this movement mobilize hundreds of thousands of Muslims? How can we explain why so many people were involved in the movement, given the constraints of socio-economic class and religious identity within the Muslim community? Does the movement suggest an increased intolerance of religious extremism? Or is it just a product of a 'conspiracy' among Jakarta's political elite, who mobilized the masses as part of the fight to win the Jakarta Election in February 2017?[1]

Without denying these assumptions at all, this paper argues that the success of the ABI movement's mass mobilization cannot be separated from the creative use of media and popular culture by movement actors and intellectuals, who used such tools to delegitimize Ahok's leadership, recruit potential constituencies, instill emotional feelings and define collective action as a '*jihad*' against 'religious blasphemy'. This paper applies new social movement theory, which emphasizes cultural factors rather than structural factors. It applies this theory to examine how music as a cultural resource and cultural product is produced internally by Islamic movements as a framing device to communicate movement messages and ideas, recruit and mobilize potential participants, especially youth, and strengthen the sense of collective identity among Muslims involved in the ABI movements.

War of Legitimacy in the Waves of Identity Politics

Experts and analysts have offered different perspectives on the ABI movements. Some see it as a symbol of the victory of political Islam and the end of pluralistic democracy in Indonesia because public opinion tends to favor religious-based identity politics. Others see the wave of sectarian hatred expressed during the ABI movements as a by-product of the motivations of the political elite, who sought to achieve political victory in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election by exploiting religious and ethnic sentiments (Priamarizki and Haripin 2016; Nugroho 2017).

The first point of view represents the concerns of some political revival actors in Indonesia who have exerted increasing influence since the Reformation. Since the fall of Soeharto's New Order in 1998,

Islamic politics has taken on a greater role in Indonesian public life (Tanuwidjaja 2010, 29-49). In the political sphere, the phenomenon is marked by the emergence of Islamic ideological parties on the national political stage that redefine the issues of the Jakarta Charter and advocates for the implementation of Islamic law through parliamentary lines (Nashir 2007, 272-274). In the cultural sphere, the phenomenon is marked by the rising tide of Islamic militancy which is characterized by the strengthening of religious symbols, the proliferation of Islamic institutions and the emergence of new Islamic-based lifestyles (Hasan 2009a, 229-250). In the socio-religious sphere, the phenomenon is marked by the emergence of radical Islamist movements and Islamic vigilante groups campaigning for the implementation of *sharia*, calling for jihad, attacking minorities and calling for the obligation of *amar ma'rūf nahy munkar* in the public sphere (Hasan 2008, 1-17; Menchik 2014, 591-621). This conservative current, morally rigorist and often intolerant of religious minorities, has seen its influence grow within Muslim organizations (Feillard and Madinier 2011, 272), including mainstream Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah (Wahid 2009, 179-220).

Given these dynamics, the assumption that the ABI movement is indicative of the victory of political Islam and of a weakening democracy in Indonesia is quite reasonable. Nevertheless, the view is not entirely true. In reality, Indonesia's post-reformation public sphere is also characterized by the development of post-Islamist discourse and a movement that campaigns on democratic values, tolerance, freedom and human rights (Ansor 2016, 471-515). Although the influence of the Islamist movement in Indonesia's post-New Order political and cultural milieu tends to strengthen, it is always balanced by the voices of pro-democracy Islamic groups expressing their concerns about Islamist threats to a pluralistic and democratic Indonesian society. Even Muslim-majority representatives of Indonesia—NU and Muhammadiyah—consistently voiced their opposition to religious radicalism while promoting interreligious harmony, democracy, egalitarianism, and gender equality (Hasan 2009b, 132-133).

Beyond the question of the dynamics of Islam in post-New Order Indonesia, the assumption of some circles who see the ABI movement as a symbol of the victory of political Islam tends to be problematic if we consider the fact that the Islamic elements involved in ABI are not

only dominated by radical Islamist groups such as Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI), Indonesian Liberation Party (HTI) and Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), but also involve other Islamic groups such as Jemaah Tarbiyah-Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Salafi, Indonesian Islamic Students (PII), Islamic Students Association (HMI) and so on. It even involves Islamic groups that have been identified as moderate such as NU and Muhammadiyah. Although the two mainstream organizations institutionally declare no participation in the action, the two organizations do not forbid their members from participating in the action provided that they do not use official organizational symbols and attributes (NU Online 2016; PWMU 2016; Okezone News 2016a). However, the appeal to not use the official attributes of the organization itself is ignored by some *Nahdliyyin* (Sinar Rakyat 2016).

In addition, the individuals involved in the ABI movement do not only came from conservative camps such as Rizieq Shihab, Muhammad Al Khathath, Bachtiar Nasir, Munarman, Abu Jibriel and Tengku Zulkarnain but also from among celebrity and populist preachers such as Abdullah Gymnastiar (Aa Gym) and Arifin Ilham, and from 'secular' circles such as Rachmawati Soekarnoputri, Ratna Sarumpaet, and Ahmad Dani. Even some politicians and members of Parliament are involved in the action, such as Fahri Hamzah, Fadli Zon, Fahira Fahmi Idris, AM. Fatwa, Ali Mochtar Ngabalin, Abraham Lunggana (Haji Lulung), Amien Rais, Sodik Mudjahid, Lucky Hakim, Rhoma Irama and Adhyaksa Dault (Online Voice 2016; Tirto Online 2016). As such, the sociological profile of the demonstrators involved in the collective action also varies considerably across class, linking elements of the urban poor, middle class, sectarian religious leaders, political elites and brokers who have an interest in mass mobilization (Anugrah and Izzati 2016). The participants involved in the mobilization appear to transcend the boundaries of class—from the lower-middle class to upper-middle class—as well as the barriers of identity—conservative, radical, secular, traditional, moderate and so on (Rais and Bagir 2016, 10).

On the other hand, the second viewpoint, which sees the ABI movements as a by-product of political elites who exploit ethnic and religious sentiments for political gain is not entirely wrong, although there is no empirical evidence available to sufficiently justify that assumption. Such assumptions can only be assessed intuitively by the fact that the

ABI movements appeared alongside Jakarta's Gubernatorial Election in 2017, which involved the campaigns of three pairs of candidates, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono-Sylviana Murni, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama-Djarot Saiful Hidayat, and Anies Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno. Speculation surrounding the relationship between ABI and the political interests of the candidates ahead of the Jakarta Election had had circulated widely because a team of lawyers from Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok), in a further hearing of alleged blasphemy in North Jakarta District Court on January 31, 2017, questioned a telephone conversation between Ma'ruf Amin, the Chairman of Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) as well as the Chief Adviser of NU, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the former president of Indonesia.

In the trial, Ma'ruf Amin, who was present as an expert witness, was questioned about a phone call from SBY that allegedly contained two requests; the first was for the running mate of the Jakarta gubernatorial candidate, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono-Sylviana Murni, to be accepted at PBNU, and the second was to immediately issue a *fatwa* regarding alleged blasphemy by Ahok (Liputan6 Online 2017a; Tempo Online 2017). Although Ahok's lawyers' accusation surrounding the content of the conversation were ultimately unproven in the hearing, and SBY himself has clarified that the conversation had no connection with the *fatwa* issued by MUI (Republika Online 2017a). However, the phone call signaled to the public and created speculation that the ABI movement was charged with political motives. Even when Muslims staged 411 Action (ABI II), which ended in a riot, President Joko Widodo had issued an official statement that the action was led by political actors (Kompas Online 2016a, Detik Online 2016a), although those involved in the ABI movement denied the allegations.[2]

Although there are some indication that the ABI movement was driven by political interests, it would be a mistake to consider it as merely a by-product of political elites fighting in the elections of Jakarta. This is based on several reasons. First, this assumption tends to ignore the historical and sociological context behind ABI movements. Second, this assumption seems to position groups of Islamic movements such as PFI as merely a 'tool' of elite political interests, and denies the fact that they are active agents. Thirdly, this assumption is unable to explain why so many people from different social organizations and classes were willing to engage and sacrifice the time, effort and cost to participate in the movement.[3]

Although the political motivations behind the ABI movement cannot be completely ignored, it is important to consider some of the historical and sociological contexts that precede ABI. As Wilson (2016) notes, what many have failed to consider, or have simply ignored, is the massive groundswell of anger and resentment generated by Ahok's evictions policy. Since taking office as governor in 2014, Ahok has presided over one of the most aggressive campaigns of evictions and forced displacements in the modern history of Jakarta City. Reliable statistics on the numbers directly impacted are difficult to come by. However, reports compiled by the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH Jakarta) estimate that there were 113 cases of forced evictions during 2015, involving 8,145 Heads of Families and 6,283 Business Units. Of the total 113 eviction cases, 18 cases (16%) were decided through deliberation, while 95 other cases (84%) were unilaterally evicted without going through deliberation procedures with the residents. LBH Jakarta also showed that out of 113 cases of eviction, only 32 cases were relocated and 9 cases were given renumeration, while 72 other cases (67%) were not given any recompense. Based on these facts, LBH Jakarta concluded that the evictions carried out by Jakarta Provincial Government during 2015—under Ahok's leadership—were not in accordance with human rights instruments because they violate the right to housing, the right to work, and the right to property (Januardy and Demadevina 2016, i-ii, 13-18, 20-21, 24).

On the side of the Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta, the purpose of the evictions was to maintain public order and interest. Ahok himself stated that the evictions were done for the good of all the citizens of Jakarta. Ahok even asserted that the forced eviction policy has a strong legal basis because the land occupied by people in one region belongs to the state (Kompas Online 2016b, Antara News 2016, Kumparan Online, 2017). The evictions policy was immensely popular amongst the city's middle-class and was seen to be part of an uncompromising effort to tackle endemic problems of flooding, traffic congestion and lawlessness. Nevertheless, in the eyes of some victims, the evictions were ordered arbitrarily, which in turn triggered a wave of anger and resentment and that spread far beyond the tens of thousands directly impacted through extended family, friends, neighbors and social, cultural and work networks. This anger, unsurprisingly, found avenues of expression and amelioration in the ABI movement.

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It is in this context that Islamic groups such as FPI—who have long rejected Ahok's leadership—appeared as 'saviors' who facilitated, canalized and expressed victims' complaints and grievances through a series of collective actions and mass mobilizations against Ahok. On various occasions, FPI criticized Ahok's evictions policy, while attacking the Governor as a despotic and arbitrary leader (Tribun News 2016; RMOL Jakarta 2016; Merdeka Online 2016). The relationship between FPI and Ahok has long been characterized by hostility. The peak of these hostilities occurred when Ahok planned to disband FPI at the end of 2014 (BBC Indonesia 2014, Detik News 2014a). Amidst the growing animosity between FPI and Ahok, the eviction policy was followed by a wave of anger and disappointment from a number of victims, which provided powerful ammunition to FPI to delegitimize Ahok's leadership. The role of legitimacy in the dynamics of social movements has been well noted by Haunss (2007):

> Social movements challenge their opponents' legitimacy almost by definition. Their claims are not only about changing policies or fulfilling demands, but also usually contain an element of criticism concerning the established procedures of decision making … Social movements develop when other channels of influence are not available, or are, at least, not promising. Instead of relying on the institutionalized forms of political representation, social movements directly represent their participants' claims (Haunss 2007, 161).

There is no doubt that FPI, as an established actor in social and political conflicts (Wilson 2008, 192-210; Wilson 2014, 1-8; Munajat 2012), had the ability to use various discursive and cognitive strategies to legitimize its actions and delegitimize its opponents. In the context of this discursive strategy, we need to examine the process of "diagnostic framing" and "master frames" used by FPI to delegitimize Ahok's leadership. As noted by Snow and Benford (1988, 200), "diagnostic framing involves the identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality." Diagnostic frames contain not only a description of the problem, but also attribute responsibility or blame to a person, organization, or institution that, then, becomes the subject of protest. According to Haunss (2007, 166), "this attribution often takes the form of a (de-)legitimation statement."

Within the context of social movements, "master frames were originally conceptualized as collective action frames that have expanded in scope and influence such that they color and constrain the orientations

and activities of other movements within cycles of protest" (Snow 2004, 390). Master frames perform the same function as movement-specific collective action frames, but they do so on a larger scale. In other words, master frames are generic, while specific collective action frames are derivative (Snow and Benford 1992, 138). In this context, a plethora of studies have called attention to the ways in which movements identify the "victims" of a given injustice and amplify their victimization. Taken together, these studies support Gamson's (1992a) conceptualization of "injustice frames" as a mode of interpretation generated and adopted by social movements to define the actions of an authority as unjust (1992a, 7, 31-34). Gamson noted that "collective action frames are injustice frames" (1992b, 68). In other words, Gamson defined injustice frames as the master frames. According to Haunss (2007, 167), these injustice frames are often used by social movements to make statements about the illegitimacy of political actors who are thought to be responsible for an injustice.

In some FPI demonstrations that occurred prior to the ABI movement, the diagnostic framing initially centered on the marginalization of Muslim interests under Ahok's leadership. In the eyes of the FPI, Ahok as a non-Muslim leader is the source of the catastrophe that caused the fall of the Islamic *ummah* of Jakarta, due to his government's perceived anti-Islamic policies. This diagnostic framing was developed by the FPI long before Ahok launched the evictions policy, the Jakarta Election and the '*al-Mā'idah scandal*'. At that time, FPI had disputed the legitimacy of Ahok's leadership as Acting Governor of Jakarta, succeeding Governor Joko Widodo who was officially sworn in as President of the Republic of Indonesia following his victory in the 2014 presidential election. FPI even appointed a rival governor of Islamic leaders KH. Fakhrurrozi Ishaq, in what can be defined as a "prognostic framing"[4] strategy to delegitimize Ahok's leadership (Kompas Online 2014; Santri News 2014). This occurred in addition to other prognostic framing strategies, such as demanding that the city council not indict Ahok, threatening to hold a referendum, a march of '*constitutional jihad*' to depose Ahok and so on (Merdeka Online 2014a; Merdeka Online 2014b; Detik News 2014b). FPI's delegitimization of Ahok's leadership is based on the understanding that he is an arrogant, non-Muslim and anti-Islamic figure (Tempo Online 2014; VOA-Islam 2014; Suara Islam 2014). The rejection of Ahok was conveyed in a number of demonstrations around

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Jakarta City Hall and Jakarta House of Representatives Building ahead of Ahok's inauguration as Governor of Jakarta (Republika Online 2014; Sindo News 2014). In a series of demonstrations, Rizieq Shihab, the High Priest of FPI, straightforwardly expressed his rejection of Ahok and declared that Ahok is the enemy of Islam: "We do not allow Ahok to lead Jakarta" (Liputan6 Online 2015), "Ahok is the enemy of Islam, the lover of pork food, do not deserve to lead Jakarta!" (Detik News 2014c).

When Ahok officially became the Governor of Jakarta and embarked on a massive eviction campaign, FPI began to gain new ammunition to voice its rejection of Ahok's leadership by emphasizing the injustice experienced by the evictees. The use of "injustice frames" as a discursive and cognitive strategy proved to be effective enough to mobilize the disenchanted masses and those who disagree with eviction policies. As noted by Wilson (2016), many youths who participated in the 1410 Action (ABI I) were the same as those who protested Ahok's arrival in Penjaringan on June 23, 2016.[5] But it is important to note that the 1410 Action came to a head after accusations of 'religious blasphemy' or the surfacing of the '*al-Mā'idah scandal*'. In other words, although the injustice frames played an important role in mobilizing people during ABI I and in subsequent ABI movements, it seems less precise to position injustice frames as the dominant frames in motivating collective action.

If we observe the dynamics of "contentious politics"[6] within the ABI movement, the most dominant master frames of the movement of public opinion and mass participation can be argued to be "identity frames", that is Islamic identity. The use of identity framing is apparent in a number of derivative frames that circulated during the ABI movement, such as 'Infidel Leader', 'Holy Qur'an Offender', 'Religion Offender', 'Ulama Offender', 'Islam Defender', 'Holy Qur'an Defender', 'Ulama Defender', 'Constitutional Jihad' and so on. This framing process departs from the issue of collective identity that were consistently endorsed by FPI and other Islamic groups throughout the ABI movement and gained strong resonance amongst Muslims. The issue of collective identity is also central to "motivational framing"[7] which was able to mobilize people from different Islamic groups and social classes—including those who were previously only passive viewers—to 'jihad' and 'take to the streets' in the ABI series at the end of 2016.

Ballad of Blasphemy at the Political Stage of Jakarta City

The Islam Defense Action (ABI) was initially triggered by a speech made by Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) during his working visit to Kepulauan Seribu (Thousand Islands), on September 27, 2016. In this speech, Ahok talked about the policy and program of grouper cultivation. He assured the Thousand Islands residents that the program will continue to be implemented even if he is not re-elected Governor of DKI Jakarta in the 2017 Gubernatorial Election. The speech initially did not cause public controversy or ignite the emotions of Muslims. Even when the speech, which is about 1 hour and 48 minutes in duration, was officially uploaded on the Jakarta Provincial Government's YouTube account on September 28, 2016, it did not garner much attention. However, after Buni Yani uploaded a 30 second snippet of the video on his Facebook page on October 6, 2016, Ahok's speech soon became viral and ignited the emotions of Muslims. The title of the Buni Yani's Facebook status was "Blasphemy of Religion?", with an attached segment of the transcript, which read: "Father-Mother [Muslim voter] ... lied to *Surat al-Mā'idah 51*" [and] "go to hell also [Father-Mother] fooled" (Detik News 2016b).

Buni Yani's Facebook[8] status was shared by tens of thousands of people. It became viral and invoked anger and condemnation among Muslims. Although Ahok had time to apologize to the public, anger among Muslims continued to surge. Some groups even reported Ahok to the police on allegations of 'blasphemy' and demanded that Ahok be tried and imprisoned (Sindo News 2016; Okezone News 2016c; Tirto Online. 2016d). The anger of some Muslims over Ahok's controversial statement later metamorphosed into a series of protests and demonstrations after the MUI issued the Religious Attitudes and Opinions of the Indonesian Council of Ulama on October 11, 2016, which among others stated that "Basuki Tjahaja Purnama's statement can be categorized as: (1) insulting the Holy Qur'an; and or (2) insulting scholars who have legal consequences" (Detik News 2016c; Hidayatullah Online 2016; Panjimas Online 2016). The MUI's Religious Attitudes and Opinions were then used by Islamic groups incorporated in the National Movement to Safeguard the Fatwas of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (GNPF-MUI) to mobilize Muslims to demand the government and law enforcement officials to process allegations of blasphemy against Ahok.

Shortly after the MUI issued its Religious Attitudes and Opinion, FPI held an Islam Defense Action on Friday, October 14, 2016 (1410 Action or ABI I). This action was conducted in front of City Hall, Jalan Merdeka Selatan, Central Jakarta. The demonstration demanded that Ahok be investigated on charges of blasphemy. However, this demonstration did not receive considerable attention. Nevertheless, the number of people who participation in this demonstration was much greater than the previous FPI actions that were held to delegitimize Ahok's leadership as a non-Muslim Governor. Large numbers of participants was possible because the demonstration was held after the MUI issued the Religious Attitudes and Opinion. The collective action frame used also shifted from the issue of non-Muslim leadership to the issue of 'blasphemy', 'defending Islam' and 'defending the Holy Qur'an'. This can be seen, among other things, in the "Defending Islam Petition" which was read by Rizieq Shihab in the middle of the demonstration:

> In connection with the rise of religious attitudes of MUI which states that Ahok despises Islam and tarnished the Qur'an and belittled the clerics and insulted the Muslims. So the ḥabā'ib and the ulama and the Islamic leaders and all the participants who are members of the Islam Defense Action, stated that the state and the Indonesian government, especially the law enforcement officers from the police and prosecutor's office and the court should immediately and quickly process Ahok's religious blasphemy without intervention and pressure from any party. If the Indonesian state and government protect the perpetrator of religious blasphemy, then ḥabā'ib, ulama and Islamic leaders belonging to the Islam Defense Action, along with all Muslims, call on all Muslims to act jointly or independently enforce Islamic law against religious offenders, namely the death penalty (Panjimas TV 2016b).

Unlike some previous FPI collective actions, in ABI I, FPI did not merely use conventional repertoire of contention such as protests, demonstrations, speeches and petitions,[9] but also using music to frame conflict issues and arouse the collective emotions of the participants. In ABI I, Rizieq introduced the song "*Si Ahok Durjana*" and invited the participants to sing along during the march that started at the Istiqlal Mosque and ended at the City Hall of DKI Jakarta. According to Awit Masyhuri, one of the Secretary Generals of FPI who was also known as the 'podium lion', the song was written by Rizieq himself. Awit Masyhuri also described Habib Rizieq Shihab as having an artistic soul (Panjimas Online 2016b).

The use of music by FPI to represent Islamic groups has a contested history. In the tradition of Islamic law, the use of music has been debated extensively, and continues to be in the present day. The absence of Qur'anic verses that explicitly prohibit or allow music, in addition to disputes about the authenticity of the Prophet's traditions relating to music, has fueled an ongoing debate about the status of music in Islam. Over the centuries, the debate has sparked various arguments between theologians, *fuqahā'*, philosophers and sufis. Henry George Farmer, one of the leading Arab-Islamic music historians, described the ongoing debate as "the most interesting of Arabic polemical literature" (Farmer 1941, 22). In the context of the debate, Islamists can be described as vanguards who reject the use of music, on the basis that music is forbidden in the teachings of Islam. Even in the Western popular imagination, Muslims are often described as 'music-phobic' because Islam imposes strict rules on musical activity in various contexts and periods of Islamic history (Rasmussen 2010, 9).

Rizieq Shihab appears to support a more flexible stance towards music. This is apparent in his own description when receiving a group of musicians and art workers who were members of the "Indonesia Tanpa JIL"[10] community in 2012. A group of musicians and art workers who came to the FPI headquarters were led by the vocalist of the metal band *Tengkorak*, Ombat, known as the founder of the "One Finger Movement"[11] in the Indonesian metal music scene. During the meeting, Rizieq said that music and songs are forbidden according to *mutaqaddimīn* scholars. But *muta'akhkhirīn* scholars do allow music under the rule of *"ḥasanuhu ḥasan wa qabīḥuhu qabīḥ*", which means good music is good (*ḥalāl*) and bad music is bad (*ḥaram*). That is, music is lawful if it does not forget Allah, does not have verses that are contrary to sharia, and invites the listener to remember and be close to Allah. In contrast, music that forgets Allah, that is pornographic and/or worships demons is unlawful. According to Rizieq, a figure who emphasizes such rules is Sheikh Yusuf Qaradlawi. Rizieq also asserted that "FPI is not anti-music. We just ask the friends of Muslim musicians for the *Islamization* of Indonesian music and to use music as a medium of proselytizing!" (Suara Islam 2012).

Referring to the above historical context, it is no coincidence that Rizieq created the song and used it as a repertoire of contention during the ABI movements. In addition to Rizieq's fairly flexible view of music,

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the use of songs during the ABI movement seems to deliberately frame conflict to gain support, sympathize with the masses, and recruit new constituents of young people. This is evident in the many reproductions of *Si Ahok Durjana's* songs uploaded online to YouTube. For example, Salman Thaher Algebra reproduced and uploaded the song *Si Ahok Durjana* to YouTube in a video that featured the animated character *Spongebob* (Algebra 2016). This 0:33 second video has been viewed as many as 9,427 times since September 15, 2017. This song was also performed by street singers accompanied by guitar and percussion at a food stall in Jakarta. This was filmed and uploaded on YouTube by Adi Supriadi. This 3:39 minute video has been watched 11,011 times since 15 September 2017 (Supriadi 2016). On another occasion, it was sung by a group of young people who are members of *Hadroh Al Hasbiy*, using the musical accompaniment *marawis*. This was filmed and uploaded on YouTube by Tegal Kunir. This 3:39 minute video has been viewed 983 times since September 15, 2017 (Kunir 2017). Rizieq himself often sang the song of *Si Ahok Durjana* on various other occasions, for example in a *Tabligh Akbar* event organized by *Majelis Ta'lim As-Syifa'ul Qulub* led by Habib Sahid Bin Yahya in West Jakarta (Majelis As-Syifa'ul Qulub 2017). This song was also often sung by Islamic groups in various *Tabligh Akbar* and *Mawlid Nabi* events throughout the ABI movement, as can be seen in various videos uploaded on YouTube (Fansub Islam 2016; Admin Ilmusiana 2016; Sugianto 2017).

The song of *Si Ahok Durjana* itself represents a discursive and interactive practice that combines the "identity frame" with the "injustice frame", so as to represent Ahok as blasphemous and an oppressor of the people. The complete lyrics of the song *Si Ahok Durjana* are as follows:

> "*Allahu Akbar / Allahu Akbar / Allahu Akbar / Allah Allahu Akbar / Agama dinista / Al-Qur'an dinoda / Ulama dihina / Si Ahok durjana / Hak rakyat disita/ Si miskin disiksa / Pegawai dipaksa / Si Ahok durjana / Presiden membela / Aparat menjaga / Walau banyak salah / Si Ahok durjana / Ayo kita bersatu / Ganyang kepala batu / Apa anda setuju / Ahok harus dibunuh*."
>
> "Allahu Akbar / Allahu Akbar / Allahu Akbar / Allah Allah Akbar / The religion is offended / The Qur'an is insulted / The Ulama is humiliated / Ahok the Wicked / The people's rights is confiscated / The poor is tortured / The employee is forced / Ahok the Wicked / The President defend / Although many wrong / Ahok the Wicked / Let's unite / demolish the stone head / Do you agree / Ahok must be killed."

As can be seen in the song lyrics above, the identity frame is reflected in the phrase "the religion is offended", the Qur'an is insulted" and "the Ulama is humiliated". In the eyes of Muslims, the desecration of the Qur'an is a very sensitive issue, because it offends their fundamental beliefs. This can be seen, for example, in the case of Salman Rushdie's novel "The Satanic Verses" in 1998, which sparked outrage among Muslims around the world. Adian Husaini, one of the founders of the Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought and Civilizations (INSISTS), compared Ahok's case with Salman Rushdie's (Husaini 2016). Although during ABI I Ahok was not designated as a suspected perpetrator of blasphemy, the image of Ahok as a 'religious offender' was echoed by FPI and other Islamic groups on various occasions through social networks and virtual communities such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and WhatsApp. The framing process reflects religious identity, which resonated strongly with Muslims. As Quintan Wiktorowicz notes:

> "The ability of a movement to transform a mobilization potential into actual mobilization is contingent upon the capacity of a frame to resonate with potential participants. Where a movement frame draws upon indigenous cultural symbols, language, and identities, it is more likely to reverberate with constituents, thus enhancing mobilization" (Wiktorowicz 2004, 16).

In addition to the identity frame, the *Si Ahok Durjana* song also carried the "injustice frame", which strengthened the perception of Ahok as 'the oppressor of the people'. The injustice frame is reflected in the phrases "the people's right is confiscated", "the poor are tortured" and "the employee is forced". In the case of anti-Ahok demonstrations and the ABI movements, the injustice frame referred to Ahok's leadership style, which was considered arrogant, and his controversial policies of evicting and dismissing civil servants during his term as Governor of Jakarta (Poskota Online 2015; Kompas Online 2016d). As aforementioned, Ahok's controversial policies have fueled the anger and disappointment of some, and were used by FPI to delegitimize Ahok's leadership and mobilize people who disagreed with his policies. As noted by Benford and Snow (2000, 620), one of the factors determining the success of the resonance of a frame is its empirical credibility, namely the apparent fit between the framings and events in the world. The issue here is not whether diagnostic and prognostic claims are actually factual or valid,

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but whether their empirical referents lend themselves to being read as 'real' indicators of the diagnostic claims (Benford and Snow 2000, 620). Thus, despite Ahok's controversial policy gaining considerable public support, especially among the urban middle classes, it was used by the FPI as a diagnostic frame to show that the policy was a 'real' indicator of the governor's arrogance and injustice. The religious identity frame also operated on a similar logic. Although Ahok had not been named as a suspect, Ahok's alleged statement in the Thousand Islands video uploaded by Buni Yani has been used as a diagnostic claim by FPI to show that the statement is a 'real' indicator of religious defamation.

The framing process undertaken by FPI in ABI I was quite successful in mobilizing Muslim sentiments and constituents who previously only spectated of the actions of FPI. This can be seen in the involvement of eviction victims from several areas of DKI. Nevertheless, the number of participants in ABI I was less significant than those in ABI II and ABI III. However, the rhetoric that arose in ABI I tended to be filled with violence. In ABI I, accusations of religious blasphemy were combined with overtly racist hate speech. The various forms of symbolic acts and religious idioms used during ABI I are still strongly associated with the rhetoric of the FPI. This is very different from ABI II and ABI III, which involved a much larger number of participants, and which crossed the boundaries of socio-religious identity. Mass participation in ABI II and ABI III was also possible because Rizieq Shihab and other Islamic actors engaged in what Snow et al. (1986) call "frame transformation".

The term "frame transformation" refers to the effort to redefine activities, events, and biographies that are already meaningful from the standpoint of some primary framework, in the terms of another framework, such that they are now "seen by the participants to be something quite else" (Goffman 1974, 43-44). Under certain conditions, programs, causes, and values promoted by social movements may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames. In such cases, the social movement will change the frame by radically and systematically rearranging it so participants can see it as something else. Through this strategy, new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or "misframings" reframed in order to garner support and secure participants (Snow et.al. 1986, 473-476).

The 'frame transformation' began with the 'rebranding' the movement's organization during ABI II, without changing the master frame. The name "Islamic Defense Action" (ABI) is still used, but the tactical organization that mobilized ABI II is no longer FPI, but the National Movement to Safeguard the Fatwas of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (GNPF-MUI). Interestingly, the word "*fatwa*" is used as a framing strategy to build an ethos of compliance to the *ulama* among Muslims. The use of the word fatwa obscures the fact that the products issued by MUI are not fatwas, but religious attitudes and opinions. As Ichwan (2016) notes, MUI's religious attitudes and opinions are inconceivable without the role of GNPF-MUI and all its supporting elements that upgraded it to "MUI fatwa" and advocated it through various media, forums and networks. Without the legitimacy of the "MUI fatwa", the ABI movement could not be imagined, nor would it have gained the widespread sympathy and support of Muslims, particularly the '*floating ummah*' and '*floated ummah*' who are largely moderate Muslims, and who may otherwise consider FPI and FUI as controversial and resist their calls to mobilize (Ichwan 2016, 89).

'Frame transformation' also occurs at the level of activity and discourse. ABI I was dominated by FPI-style violence. This is in contrast to ABI II and ABI III. In ABI II, the movement's actors reframed the discourse of action through the use of the term "*Aksi Damai*" (Peaceful Action) (Detik News 2016d). ABI III is even referred to as "*Aksi Super Damai*" (Super Peaceful Action), in which one of the core actions was not a demonstration, but Friday prayers in congregation at Monas Monument (Detik News 2016e). The re-naming of these organizations, activities and discourses of action played an important role in the dynamics of the movement. As Jasper notes:

> [N]aming is a central activity of any movement, for attaching labels to activities and aspects of the world around us help us change our minds, see new vistas, and rearrange our feelings about others (Jasper, 1997, 11).

Interestingly, in both ABI II and III, Rizieq Shihab also initiated a radical frame transformation. The song of *Si Ahok Durjana*, which was used as a framing device in ABI I, was not in used in ABI II and ABI III. Rizieq introduced a new song, "*Mars Aksi Bela Islam*", which is entirely consistent with the master frame of the ABI movement and resonated with Islamic identity, namely belief in glory of the Holy Qur'an. The complete lyrics of *Mars Aksi Bela Islam* are as follows:

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> *"Al-Qur'an Imam kami / Al-Qur'an Pedoman kami / Al-Qur'an Petunjuk kami / Al-Qur'an Satukan kami / Al-Qur'an Imam kami / Al-Qur'an Pedoman kami / Al-Qur'an Petunjuk kami / Al-Qur'an Satukan kami / Aksi Bela Islam, Aksi Bela Islam / Aksi Bela Islam, Allah Allahu Akbar / Aksi Bela Islam, Aksi Bela Islam / Aksi Bela Islam, Allah Allahu Akbar / Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar/ Allah Allahu Akbar / Aksi Bela Islam, Aksi Bela Islam / Aksi Bela Islam, Allah Allahu Akbar."*
>
> "The Qur'an is our Imam / The Qur'an is our Guidance / The Qur'an is our Guidelines / The Qur'an Unite us / The Qur'an is our Imam / The Qur'an is our Guidance / The Qur'an is our Guidelines / The Qur'an Unite us / Action to Defend Islam, Action to Defend Islam / Action to Defend Islam, Allah Allah Akbar / Action to Defend Islam, Action to Defend Islam / Action to Defend Islam, Allah Allah Akbar / Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar / Allah Allah Akbar / Action to Defend Islam, Action to Defend Islam / Action to Defend Islam, Allah Allahu Akbar."

The song was first launched by Rizieq at the Istiqlal Mosque during ABI II, before the demonstrators left for the State Palace. The ABI movement organizers first briefed the participants before Rizieq introduced *Mars Aksi Bela Islam*. Bachtiar Nasir, for example, emphasized to the participants that ABI II was a "Peaceful Action". He stated the following:

> Today we are ready to prove that we value purity, like to keep the peace, and we do not destroy anything, ready? Well, we prove to the world that we are a civilized people and will not use violent words, ready? Our words are all good, ready? Later we will be exemplified by Habib Rizieq with his Mars, we will be exemplified by Ustadz Arifin Ilham *dhikr*, which we will read while marching to uphold *dhikr* (Sutomo 2016).

After delivering his directive, Bachtiar Nashir then handed the stage to Rizieq to introduce *Mars Aksi Bela Islam*, and the demonstrators joined in singling along. At the end of his speech, Rizieq asserted that ABI II was authorized by the GNPF-MUI and reiterated that the action was a "Peaceful Action". Here is the speech of Rizieq:

> Along the way we bring our march of struggle, okay? *Takbir*! *Takbir!* Today we are all led by the MUI's National Movement to Safeguard the Fatwas, agree? The chairman of the GNPF is Ustadz Bachtiar Nashir, who will make a decision on the ground, there are no two commandos, and I with the *ḥabā'ib*, along with the *ulama*, will be the supervisor, advisor, controller, so that this movement does not deviate from the goal, agree? And our field action commander today is H. Munarman ... Ready for a Peaceful Action? Ready for non-violent action? Ready for action without riot? (Sutomo 2016).

The launch of *Mars Aksi Bela Islam* at Istiqlal Mosque was recorded and uploaded to YouTube prior to the events of ABI III, and shared by various organizations and people, including: Bambang Sutomo (2016), YIA Channel (2016), FSRMM TV (2016), Discover Jakarta TV (2016), Padamu Jua (2016) and so on. Different versions of the song were also reproduced and uploaded on YouTube by different people, including: Ismukandar Mandji (2016), Aan Setiawan (2016), Habib Rizieq Shihab (2016) Farid Hamz (2016), and Hidayah Voice (2016). These videos had a significant audience. Even videos uploaded by Farid Hamz, a channel that provides information about Islamic news and apocalyptic stories, have been accessed by about 303,115 viewers since September 12, 2017.

YouTube and other forms of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and WhatsApp were used to disseminate *Mars Aksi Bela Islam*. This proved to be an effective tool of micro mobilization as it contributed to the larger number of demonstrators in ABI III. The term "micro-mobilization" refers to the various interactive and communicative processes that affect frame alignment. According to Snow et al. (1986, 464), the frames developed and disseminated by a social movement are intended to achieve certain goals, such as recruiting new members, gaining follower support, mobilizing participants, and obtaining resources. During this process, social movements use certain strategies to link their interpretive frames and interests with constituents and resource providers. Snow et al. (1986) refer to this as a process of "frame alignment", which involves:

> The linkage of individual and SMO [social movement organizations] interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary. (464)

According to Snow et al. (1986, 467-469), the frame alignment process consists of four categories: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. The use of social media to disseminate the master frames and derivative frames, including songs such as *Mars Aksi Bela Islam*, belong to the category of "frame bridging". According to Snow et al. (1986), frame bridging refers to the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem (467). In other words, frame bridging involves the linkage of a movement with unmobilized

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sentiment pools or public opinion clusters. These sentiment pools refer to aggregates of individuals who share common grievances but lack the organizational base for expressing their discontent and acting in pursuit of their interests. This bridging is affected primarily by organizational outreach and information diffusion through interpersonal or intergroup networks, such as the mass media, the telephone, and direct mail. In recent years, opportunities and prospects for frame bridging have been facilitated by the advent of new information and communication technologies such as the internet, electronic mail, social media and so on.

In addition to the frame alignment process, another very important aspect of the framing process is "frame resonance". The ability of a movement to shift from potential mobilization to actual mobilization depends on the ability of a frame to influence potential participants. According to Benford and Snow (2000, 619), the success of frame resonance is determined by two interrelated factors, namely the credibility of the proffered frame and its relative salience. The credibility of frame depends on three factors: frame consistency, empirical credibility, and the credibility of the frame articulators or claims makers. The frame consistency refers to the congruency between a SMO's articulated beliefs, claims, and actions. The empirical credibility refers to the apparent fit between the framings and events in the world. The credibility of the frame articulators refers to the status and/or perceived expertise of the frame articulator and/or the organization they represent from the vantage point of potential adherents and constituent (Benford and Snow 2000, 619-620).

The resonance of a collective action frame is influenced by its salience to the target audience of the mobilization. Benford and Snow (2000) have identified three dimensions of salience: namely centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. Benford and Snow (2000) describe the three dimensions as follows:

> Centrality has to do with how essential the beliefs, values, and ideas associated with movement frames are to the lives of the targets of mobilization… Hypothetically, the more central or salient the espoused beliefs, ideas, and values of a movement to the targets of mobilization, the greater the probability of their mobilization… Experiential commensurability constitutes a second factor contributing to a collective action frame's salience. Are movement framings congruent or resonant with the personal, everyday experiences of the targets of mobilization? Or

> are the framings too abstract and distant from the lives and experiences of the targets? Hypothetically, the more experientially commensurate the framings, the greater their salience, and the greater the probability of mobilization… The last factor that appears to have significant impact on frame resonance is narrative fidelity. To what extent are the proffered framings culturally resonant? To what extent do resonate with the cultural narrations…? Hypothetically, the greater the narrative fidelity of the proffered framings, the greater their salience and the greater the prospect of mobilization. (621-622)

The ABI's success in mobilizing masses in large numbers is closely linked to the master frame devised by the movement organizers, that is, the "identity frame" that centered on the fundamental beliefs of Muslims and the holiness of the Qur'an. However, the resonance of the frame depends not only on its consistency with cultural symbols and narratives, but also on the reputation of the individual or group responsible for articulating the frame. The ABI series involved popular Islamic figures who were revered at the grass roots level. In addition to Rizieq Shihab who was widely known as a popular Islamic preacher, especially among Muslims in Jakarta, ABI was also associated with other figures across Islamic groups, such as celebrity preachers AA Gym and Arifin Ilham. Their involvement adds value to ABI as they shape religious knowledge through popular and social media. It is no coincidence, therefore, that ABI III was able to recruit and mobilize large numbers of people, even exceeding the number of student demonstrators in 1998—a series of student demonstrations demanding reform and the resignation of authoritarian president Soeharto.

Based on the observations outlined in this paper, it is clear that music was used by movement leaders as a framing device that communicated cognitive meanings, appealed to grievances, delegitimized ruling authorities, presented a collective memory, and awakened a collective Islamic identity. As Corte and Edward (2008) put it, music is not just a cultural resource and product that social movements may create themselves or simply have at their disposal, but music can also be a framing device through which movement ideas are expressed and communicated. Music and lyrics are very effective forms of media that can be used to propagate movement ideas (Corte and Edwards 2008, 9). Roy calls the use of culture by social movements to achieve its goals are a "cultural project" (2020, 7). For social movements, a cultural project is a self-conscious attempt to use music, art, drama,

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dance, poetry, or other cultural materials, to recruit new members, to enhance the solidarity of members, or to persuade outsiders to adopt the movement's program. Social movements engage in cultural work for two purposes: to persuade outsiders to adopt new beliefs or ideologies while recruiting new members (culture-in-content), and to galvanize the solidarity of existing members or deepen the boundaries between insiders and outsiders (culture-in-relations) (Roy 2010, 7-8).

Nevertheless, the role of music in the ABI series does not stand alone. It is mediated by other forms of popular culture and by social media. In this case, the effectiveness of music as a framing device in the ABI series cannot be separated from the role of social networks, both formal and informal, real or virtual. Some scholars distinguish between 'formal' and 'informal' ties to social movements (McAdam and Paulsen 1993, 640-667). 'Formal' ties refer to membership to organizations, while 'informal ties' are interpersonal links such as family, friendships, and social contacts. Informal ties are crucial factors in prompting engagement with Islamic activism. Social movement scholars also recognize that the concept of social network does not merely reflect the link between concrete actors through specific ties, as articulated by the 'realist' view, but also as 'phenomenological realities' and 'networks of meaning' as suggested by some phenomenologists (Diani 2003, 6; Passy 2003, 27). As argued by Jasper and Poulsen (1995, 495), "networks are important because of the meanings they transmit." In the present context, the process of meaning construction and dissemination is easily transmitted by information and communication technologies, such as social media. Everyone who watched and followed the ABI movements were influenced by the movements' use of virtual networks created in WhatsApp and Facebook to frame the issue of religious blasphemy, desecration of the Holy Qur'an and humiliation to the *Ulama*.

Most significantly, music was used during the ABI movement to evoke the spirit, emotions and collective identity in the event of the action itself. The role of music in generating a collective spirit was well documented by Aris Prasetyo, who participated in ABI II. In his testimony contained in the book entitled *Mengetuk Pintu Langit: Kesaksian Peserta Aksi 411 & 212*, Aris Prasetyo described his personal experience as follows:

> It was 10:35 am, as we started walking toward the Istiqlal Mosque. However, we did not have time to set foot in the mosque, our step was

> stopped witnessing so many people who come from various parts of the country, even a mosque of Istiqlal was not able to accommodate them. We saw Muslims who were not accommodated inside or in the courtyard of the mosque, simultaneously holding prayer rugs on the highway ... For the first time in my life I performed prayers together with so many Muslims from all over the region on the TransJakarta bus stop ... This is amazing, to meet and to struggle with my brothers, the defenders of the Qur'an. My heart shook with emotion. After Friday prayer, my friends and I started moving into the middle of the crowd of march participants, when *Mars Aksi Bela Islam* song sung. I did not follow the previous Islam Defense Action. So I'm still trying to digest and remember the lyrics of the march. It did not take long for me to try to memorize it. Then we move from Jalan Ir. H. Juanda to Jalan Medan Merdeka Selatan, excitedly singing march of *Mars Aksi Bela Islam* song (Prasetyo 2017, 87-88).

Music was also used prominently in ABI II to generate emotion and a collective identity, most notably when the demonstrators sang *Mars Aksi Bela Islam* at the National Monument, after singing *Indonesia Raya*. The momentum generated for ABI III was in part led by a popular *nashīd* group affiliated with the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Izzatul Islam.[12] ABI III was also attended by President Joko Widodo and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, and hundreds of thousands of people, who sang *Mars Aksi Bela Islam* with a great deal of enthusiasm. This shared musical experience was a symbolic and ritualistic event that aroused a collective identity, memory and imagined feelings of Muslim unity (*ukhūwah Islāmīyah*). The use of the term 'ritual' here followed Small's (1987) definition of ritual as "an action which dramatizes and re-enacts the shared mythology of a social group" (75). As noted by Eyerman and Jamison (1998, 35-36), singing a song at a political demonstration is a ritualistic event. In such ritual events, the song serves to reunite and remind participants of their place in a "movement" and also to locate them within a long-standing tradition of struggle and protest, or, as in the case of the *Mars Aksi Bela Islam*, a tradition of religious identity. The effect here is probably more ideological than utopian, in that it links back to the past rather than envisioning a not-yet-existent future. But collective singing rituals can also capture, in a brief, transient moment, a glimpse of, and a feeling for, a spiritual bonding which is both rational and emotive at one and the same time (Eyerman and Jamison 1998, 36)

The role of music as a ritual in collective action is important to emphasize. Many studies of music and social movements in general tend to reduce the role of music to that of literal transcription of pre-

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established political goals. Music, in this perspective, is seen as a way of communicating what already exists as a set of goals or values. In other words, music tends to be placed as a "footnote to the movement" (Street, et al. 2007, 6). Citing Kelley (1997, 37), Street et al. (2007) stated that there is a real danger in reducing music to a form of literal communication in which the pleasures that it generates and the forms in which it operates (as sound and rhythm, as well as words) are obliterated. If music has a role in collective action, our understanding of it must acknowledge its particular qualities and attributes as music. Accordingly, when assessing the relationship of music and collective action, we have to do more than report the words spoken or indeed the lyrics sung. Moreover, we need to acknowledge the other gestures and forms of expression that constitute the event (8). Bennett (2001, 131, 110-130), as quoted by Street et al. (2007), talks of how music, particularly through its rhythmic patterns, can 'energize' our moral sentiments. The repetition within songs and the experience of singing, she argues, enchant us and conjure up new meanings, identities and collectivities (8). In a similar vein, Frith (1996) states that music making and music listening are bodily matters; they involve what one might call "social movements". In this respect, musical pleasure is not derived from fantasy, but is experienced directly: music gives us a real experience of what the ideal could be (274).

Since Rizieq Shihab launched *Mars Aksi Bela Islam* during ABI II, the song continued to be consistently used by Rizieq himself and Islamic groups in various occasions, including ABI III, during Ahok's trials and in religious events such as *Tabligh Akbar* and *Mawlid Nabi* (Birthday of the Prophet). In addition to being sung during ABI III, *Mars Aksi Bela Islam* was used during other movements initiated by the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI), namely ABI IV (112 Action) on February 11, 2017 (Majelis Sirah 2017), ABI V (212 Action Volume 2) on February 21, 2017 (Pangeran Ganteng 2017), ABI VI (313 Action) on March 31, 2017 (VOA Islam TV 2017). *Mars Aksi Bela Islam* is also sung by Islamic groups during Ahok's trials held at the auditorium of the Ministry of Agriculture in Ragunan, South Jakarta (Swamedium 2017a, Swamedium 2017b; Swamedium 2017c). *Mars Aksi Bela Islam* is also often sung in religious events such as *Tabligh Akbar* and *Maulid Nabi* (Alwaly TV 2017; N5S (Negeri 5 Sekolah) 2017; Kiza 2017; Better Indonesia 2017).

The fact that *Mars Aksi Bela Islam* continues to resonate beyond the historical context of ABI suggests that music played an integral role in its dynamics, and should not be readily dismissed by scholars. It can be argued that music can transcend other forms of framing devices because its characteristics are not tied to space and time. In the case of ABI, music not only evoked a collective idea of Islamic sanctity and a belief in the glory of the Qur'an, but also generated a collective memory of the ABI movement itself as an 'imagined moment' of Islamic unity.

Conclusion

The emergence of the ABI movement cannot be separated from two main factors. First, the disappointment and exclusion of urban poor due to the middle class oriented policies of Ahok's governorship. Second, the widespread influence of conservative Islamic movements that promoted ideas of social change based on identity politics and religious ideology following the Reformation. These two factors were further exacerbated by the behavior of political elites who exploited ethnic and religious sentiments to gain popularity, electability and political victory in electoral contestations in Indonesia, particularly in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. Nevertheless, the success of the mobilization in ABI series cannot be attributed solely to issues of class struggle, to the liberal development project itself, or to the widespread influence of conservative Islamic discourse and ideology among urban Muslim communities. Its success was also determined by the ability of ABI organizations and actors to use mechanisms of participatory democracy, combined with populist and anti-establishment narratives, and the creative mainstreaming of their image and message through social media and popular culture.

These factors show that the conservative Islamic groups that have often been associated with radicalism and extremism began to change their tactics by adopting new symbols and language designed to eliminate the negative stigma of their movement while attracting the sympathy of citizens uncomfortable with violence. This new approach places greater emphasis on semantic elements, language and cultural production. The aim is to translate old values and objectives in ways that are more appealing to the majority. The content and the agenda of conservative Islamic groups are thus reframed in more desirable terms. This new approach and vocabulary differentiates them from older

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Islamist movements and organizations which promoted the same aims, but were less successful in attracting popular support.

The rise of conservative Islamic populism in Indonesia shares some similarities with the global emergence of illiberal, right-wing conservative movements in Europe, America and Asia in its use of identity politics to mobilize those marginalized by the 'liberal' project. Some writers refer to such movements as "uncivil society" (Kopecký and Mudde 2003; Stephen 2009) or "conservative civil society" (Youngs 2018). These movements involve a mixture of religious and nationalist values, along with an often-vague desire to hang onto or resurrect traditional identities. Most of their agendas involve the search for protection—protection from change, from outside economic pressures, from new kinds of identities and moral codes. Curiously, these groups generally want a stronger state and more robust government intervention to provide this protection (Youngs 2018, 10-11).

Conservative movements share many features but are far from uniform. Some define themselves in terms of an adherence to conservative socio-religious values, while others define themselves as the defenders of ethnic and national identity. Some are willing to use violent tactics and others categorically reject such extremism in favor of milder and more practical approaches to civic activism. Some are happy to partner with other ideological strands of civic activism, while others are unapologetically uncooperative. Some reject democratic norms and crave authoritarian rule, while others accept democracy but are ambivalent towards the core values of democracy—illiberal democracy. For example, in Thailand, most conservative movements are clearly indulgent of authoritarian rule (Sombatpoonsiri 2018). In Turkey, it is illiberal in many senses but is less overtly nondemocratic (Zihnioğlu 2018). In Brazil, conservatives question the adequacy of democratic norms (Von Bülow 2018). In Poland, conservative activism is closely aligned to a project of political illiberalism (Marczewski 2018). In Georgia, conservatism is more related to the spirit of nativism and the rejection of Western democracy and global liberalism (Nodia 2018).

The ascendance of conservative groups is often held to be inseparable from the rise of digital technology and social media. Some groups undoubtedly became experts in digital activism and embraced the current wave of fake news, hoaxes and propaganda. Thus, the rise of conservative civil society is closely related to a 'post-truth' world, in

which "objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief" (Oxford Dictionaries 2016). In such circumstances, truth cannot be objectively determined and boundaries between truth and lies, honesty and dishonesty, fiction and nonfiction become blurred (Ball, 2017; D'Ancona, 2017; Keyes, 2004). The ABI movement, which involved hundreds of thousands of Muslims, aptly illustrates the circumstances of a post-truth world. The accusations of blasphemy against Ahok were triggered by video footage of the Governor's speech uploaded on Facebook, which was then shared by tens of thousands of people and immediately went viral and fueled anger and condemnation among Muslims.

There are many factors that contributed to the success of the ABI series and there is no simple analysis that can give us a final and comprehensive answer. However, a key factor, as this paper has shown, is the ability of conservative civil society organizations and actors to frame their images and messages creatively through social media and popular culture. Among these, music has been used consistently as a repertoire of contention and as a framing device to stir a collective identity of Islamic sanctity and belief in the glory of the Qur'an. This allowed the ABI movement to transcend the barriers of religious identity and appeal to Muslims across classes. Nevertheless, the role of music in the ABI series does not stand alone, but is mediated by social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, WhatsApp and other social networks, both formal and informal. Music generated momentum for the ABI series by stirring spirit, emotion and collective identity. The use of music during the ABI series of movements was able to create an "imaginary moment" of the unity of Islam. This shows that music played an important and integral role in the dynamics of the ABI movement.

Finally, more analysis is needed to fully understand the implications of the rise in conservative activism. The emergence of various illiberal and conservative non-governmental organizations (NGOs) represents a threat not only to the participative element of liberal democracy, but also to democracy itself. Although it may not be their intention, conservative NGOs promote polarization and animosity within society. They provoke conflicts between majority and minority, reduce social trust and bring into question the authority of both the state and accepted science. This paper does not cover these issues in detail, but

it has shown that many conservative movements define themselves as a counterpoint to the state, civil society, and international institutions. Notably, many conservative organizations insist they have deeper and more authentic societal roots than what they portray as a liberal civil society that is supported by the state and international donors. They contend that the dominant liberal narrative marginalizes conservative organizations by imposing human rights discourse and censoring hate speech.

Although conservative organizations do not enjoy the same level of support as well-established, liberal-oriented NGOs, or moderate Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, they have become more influential and high-profile in recent years. This trend will continue alongside the increasing influence of digital technology, social media and popular culture. The state must not ignore this rising trend of conservative activism, but it should not only favor groups that are hostile to it. The state will need to strike a careful balance in responding to the growing influence of conservative activism.

Endnotes

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1. The ABI phenomenon has attracted the attention of the public and the national and international media because of the large number of participants who were involved. On ABI I, October 14, 2016 (1410 Action), it was estimated that 15,000 people participated; on ABI II, 4 November 2016 (411 Action), an estimated 200 thousand participated; and on ABI III, December 2, 2012 (212 Action), an estimated 500 thousand participated, with some claiming 7.5 million. The number of participants in the three demonstrations was signifiant, and was even observed by various circles to be the biggest demonstration after Soeharto's downfall in May 1998. See (Republika Online 2016a, Republika Online 2016b; Tempo Online 2016a; BBC Indonesia 2016).
2. The allegations made by President Joko Widodo to the ABI movement even spread to the issue of *coup d'état* and impeachment of the president who led to the arrest of several actors before the 212 Action. See (Tirto Online 2016; Liputan6 Online 2016).
3. A number of residents from several areas such as Ciamis and Banten were willing to walk from their respective areas to participate in the 212 Action. See (VOA Indonesia 2016; Okezone News 2016b).
4. Snow and Benford define prognostic framing as "a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what need to be done." The purpose of prognostic framing is not only to suggest solutions to the problem but also to identify strategies, tactics, and targets. See (Snow and Benford, 1988: 199-201).
5. At that time, hundreds of citizens on behalf of the People Struggle Society of Indonesia (*Serikat Perjuangan Rakyat Indonesia*) staged a demonstration at Jalan Raya Bandengan, Penjaringan, North Jakarta, in order to reject the arrival of Ahok and the entourage who wanted to inaugurate the Child Friendly Public Open Space (*Ruang Publik Terbuka Ramah Anak*) in the area. Rejection led to chaos as a result of the disappointment of citizens who felt tyrannized by policies that were considered to be arrogant and arbitrary. See (Republika Online 2016c; Tempo Online 2016b).
6. In the study of social movements, the concept of "contentious politics" is used to describe the characteristics of social movements as political performances that are interactive. Contentious politics is an episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants. Contentious politics occurs when ordinary people—often in alliance with more influential citizens and with changes in public mood—join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents. When backed by well-structured social networks and galvanized by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols, contentious politics leads to sustained interaction with opponents, which in turn is transformed into social movement. See (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2004, 5; Sidney G. Tarrow 2011, 6).
7. Snow and Benford define motivational framing as "a call to arms or rational for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action." See (Snow and Benford, 1988: 199).
8. Buni Yani's personal account has been unilaterally blocked by Facebook since April 8, 2017. Buni Yani himself has been designated as a suspect by Polda Metro Jaya and has faced trial in Bandung District Court. On November 14, 2017, the Panel of Judges of PN Bandung dropped Buni Yani's one-year prison sentence to 6 months. The verdict was lower than the Public Prosecutor's demand, which is two years in prison. See

(Republika Online 2017b; Kompas Online 2016c; Liputan6 Online 2017b).

9. The term "repertoires of contention" was introduced by Charles Tilly to describe the constellation of specific tactics and strategies developed over time and used by protest groups in collective action to catapult claims against specific individuals and groups. Tactics and strategies chosen by social movements can take on diverse forms, ranging from protests, demonstrations, parades, petitions, grand gatherings, musical and theatrical performances, to violent acts such as piracy, rebellion, suicide bombings and so on. See (Tilly 1978, 151-159; Tarrow 2011, 7-8).
10. Indonesia Tanpa JIL is a community that voices opposition to the Liberal Islam Network (JIL). The main mission of this community is to counter the ideology of liberalism and secularism spread by JIL figures such as Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Luthfi Assyaukanie and others. The decision to form JIL was initiated on March 9, 2012, when about 150 members of FPI organized "*Apel Siaga Indonesia Tanpa JIL*" at Hotel Indonesia roundabout, Jakarta. This standby march is claimed as a counter-action over the demonstration "Indonesia Tanpa FPI" held on February 14, 2012. See (BBC Indonesia 2012; Wardana 2012).
11. The "One Finger Movement" community was declared by Ombat at the "Urban Garage Festival" concert at Rossi Music Center, Fatmawati, South Jakarta in March 2010. The Urban Garage Festival is a charity event initiated by several Indonesian musicians and underground bands to build Muslim Indonesian solidarity with Muslim brothers in Palestine. All proceeds from concert ticket sales are donated to Palestinian Muslims. This concert is an inaugural event featuring underground bands that carries the vision, mission and Islamic ideology in music, such as Tengkorak, Purgatory, Aftermath, The Roots of Medina and so on. In the concert, M. Hariadi Nasution, known by the nickname "Ombat", declared a change of "Salam Tiga Jari" commonly used by metalhead with "Salam Satu Jari" as a symbol of tauhid. See (Sabili Online 2010; Saimuslim 2010; Setobuje 2010).
12. This group, nicknamed Iziz, uses strong, rock-inspired harmony singing, repetitious lyrics, fast tempos and a preference for marching music with such titles as "*Hai Mujahid Muda, Kembali*" (Hey, Young Fighter, Return), a song about the war in the Moluccas. Distinct from other nasyid groups such as Raihan and SNada, which accept the validity of some musical instruments and prefer to experiment with hip hop, urban, and other forms of current popular music, the members of Iziz state that the human voice is the sole instrument allowed in religious entertainment, with an exception being made for the frame drum on account of its overt religious associations. See (Barendregt 2011, 244).

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2. Booth, Anne. 1988. "Living Standards and the Distribution of Income in Colonial Indonesia: A Review of the Evidence." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 19(2): 310–34.
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5. Utriza, Ayang. 2008. "Mencari Model Kerukunan Antaragama." *Kompas*. March 19: 59.
6. Ms. *Undhang-Undhang Banten*, L.Or.5598, Leiden University.
7. Interview with K.H. Sahal Mahfudz, Kajen, Pati, June 11th, 2007.

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تم اعتماد ستوديا إسلاميكا من قبل وزارة البحوث والتكنولوجيا والتعليم العالي بجمهورية إندونيسيا باعتبارها دورية علمية (رقم القرار: 32a/E/KPT/2017).

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PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia
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قيمة الاشتراك السنوي داخل إندونيسيا:
لسنة واحدة ١٥٠,٠٠٠ روبية (للمؤسسة) ونسخة واحدة قيمتها ٥٠,٠٠٠ روبية، ١٠٠,٠٠٠ روبية (للفرد) ونسخة واحدة قيمتها ٤٠,٠٠٠ روبية.
والقيمة لا تشتمل على النفقة للإرسال بالبريد الجوى.

ستوديا إسلاميكا
مجلة إندونيسيا للدراسات الإسلامية
السنة الثامنة والعشرون، العدد ١، ٢٠٢١

ستوديا اسلاميا

ستودي اسلاميا

مجلة **إندونيسية** للدراسات الإسلامية

السنة الثامنة والعشرون، العدد ١، ٢٠٢١



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Jamel Rombo Cayamodin & Abdulhamit Durakoglu

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I Gst. Pt. Bagus Suka Arjawa & Zulkifli

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جاجانغ أ راحمانا