

Refleksi

JURNAL KAJIAN AGAMA DAN FILSAFAT

“Fundamentalisme Islam”

WACANA

Kusmana

Gerakan Sosial dan Anarkisme: Sebuah Analisis Teoritis

Chaider S. Bamualim

Fundamentalisme Islam, Krisis Modernitas dan Rekonstruksi Identitas

Jajang Jahroni

Islamic Fundamentalism in Contemporary Indonesia

Noryamin Aini

Ridda (Apostasy) and the Ambiguity of Islamic Legal Discourses

Muhamad Ali

Agama Sebagai Faktor Konflik dan Integrasi

ANALISIS BUKU

Ismatu Ropi

Melacak Akar Perang Suci: Perkembangan Ide *Jihād* dalam Tradisi Islam

Refleksi

Jurnal Kajian Agama dan Filsafat

Refleksi
Jurnal Kajian Agama dan Filsafat
Vol. IV, No. 1, 2002

Dewan Redaksi

M. Quraish Shihab
Hamdani Anwar
Zainun Kamaluddin Fakhri
Komaruddin Hidayat
M. Din Syamsuddin
Kautsar Azhari Noer
Said Agil H. Al-Munawwar
Amsal Bakhtiar

Pemimpin Redaksi

Kusmana

Anggota Redaksi

Din Wahid
Bustamin

Sekretariat

Burhanuddin

Penerbit

Fakultas Ushuluddin UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta

Alamat Redaksi

Jl. Ir. H. Djuanda No. 95, Ciputat, Jakarta Selatan
Telp. (021) 749 3677, 749 3579, 740 1925
Fax. (021) 749 3677
Email: jurnalrefleksi@yahoo.com

Refleksi adalah jurnal yang terbit 3 (tiga) kali setahun, telah diakreditasi oleh Departemen Pendidikan Nasional RI melalui SK No. 395/DIKTI/Kep./2000. Refleksi menerima kontribusi tulisan berupa artikel, liputan akademik, laporan penelitian, dan tinjauan buku. Panjang tulisan minimal 10 halaman kuarto spasi ganda. Isi tulisan merupakan tanggung jawab penulis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Articles

- 1-18 **Gerakan Sosial dan Anarkisme: Sebuah Analisis Teoritis**
Kusmana
- 19-38 **Fundamentalisme Islam, Krisis Modernitas dan Rekonstruksi Identitas**
Chaider S. Bamualim
- 39-54 **Islamic Fundamentalism in Contemporary Indonesia**
Jajang Jahroni
- 55-76 ***Ridda* (Apostasy) and the Ambiguity of Islamic Legal Discourses**
Noryamin Aini
- 77-90 **Agama Sebagai Faktor Konflik dan Integrasi**
Muhamad Ali

Book Review

- 91-102 **Melacak Akar Perang Suci: Perkembangan Ide *Jihād* dalam Tradisi Islam**
Ismatu Ropi

Document

- 103-118 **Agama dan Tantangan Sains Modern**
Amsal Bakhtiar
- 119-132 **Humanisme Freudian dan Pandangannya tentang Agama**
Mudji Sutrisno
- 133-142 **Pemikiran Politik Ahmad Khan**
Masykur Hakim

FUNDAMENTALISME ISLAM

TEMA yang diangkat oleh redaksi *Refleksi* untuk edisi kali ini adalah *fundamentalisme Islam*. Pengusungan tema ini diilhami oleh munculnya beberapa organisasi/ gerakan Islam yang kurang lebih bernuansa radikal di Indonesia, terutama setelah tumbanganya rezim Orde Baru, ditambah dengan semaraknya berbagai aksi yang dilakukan oleh organisasi/ gerakan tersebut di atas, tentunya dengan tidak mengabaikan aspek historis dari kemunculan dan perkembangan gerakan sosial keagamaan masyarakat Islam secara umum.

Ada enam artikel yang berkaitan dengan tema ini yang masuk ke meja redaksi, lima artikel dikategorikan ke dalam rubrik wacana dan satu artikel ke dalam rubrik analisis buku. Pertama, artikel Kusmana *Gerakan Sosial dan Anarkisme: Sebuah Analisis Teoritis*. Tulisan ini sesungguhnya tidak berkaitan secara langsung dengan tema edisi *Refleksi* kali ini, tapi substansi bahasannya —walau merupakan penjabakan awal atau catatan *preliminary*— memberi kepada pembaca informasi teoritis fenomena gerakan sosial di mana fundamentalisme agama itu sendiri merupakan salah satu fenomena gerakan sosial. Penulis mencoba menjelaskan hubungan gerakan sosial dan anarkisme dalam wacana gerakan sosial, demokrasi dan gerakan sosial keagamaan. Dia menggali kemungkinan model ekspresi hubungan keduanya melalui penjelasan pengertian, ruang lingkup, sejarah dan inferensi teoritis gerakan sosial dan anarkisme dari jendela demokrasi dan keagamaan.

Dua artikel berikutnya merupakan tulisan yang sebagian data atau *remarksnya* diambil dari hasil penelitian yang dilakukan oleh Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya (PBB) UIN Jakarta bekerja-sama dengan Pemda DKI pada tahun 2000, di mana kedua penulis ini menjadi salah satu penelitiannya. Artikel Chaider S. Bamualim, artikel kedua edisi ini, *Fundamentalisme Islam, Krisis Modernitas dan Rekonstruksi Identitas*, berupaya menjelaskan fenomena gerakan radikal Islam atau fundamentalisme Islam sebagai upaya pencarian umat Islam, terutama kaum mudanya, akan identitas eksistensial modernnya yang bersifat resistan. Sifat resistensi ini merupakan implikasi logis dari gerakan pencarian identitas mereka ke

fundamen-fundamen agama. Sebagai ilustrasi, penulis mengambil fenomena fundamentalisme Islam Indonesia kontemporer yang diambil dari penelitian di mana ia sendiri terlibat.

Artikel yang ditulis oleh Jajang Jahroni, berjudul “*Islamic Fundamentalism in Contemporary Indonesia*,” merupakan artikel ketiga edisi ini, memberikan gambaran sekilas tentang beberapa gerakan yang dicakup dalam penelitian. Penulis juga memberikan kerangka teoritis. Menurutnya, secara doktrinal, Islam radikal mempunyai landasan teologisnya dalam al-Qur’an. Secara historis, penulis menambahkan bahwa gerakan Islam radikal dapat ditelusuri sampai pada Ahmad bin Hanbal yang terus turun ke Ibn Taymiyya. Ide-ide mereka kemudian diadopsi oleh gerakan Wahhabiyah di Arab Saudi. Ketika menjelaskan gerakan munculnya fenomena gerakan ini di Indonesia, penulis menggunakan teori deprivasi kultural yang diakibatkan oleh arus modernisasi dan sekularisasi yang diterapkan di Indonesia. Deprivasi kultural ini melahirkan aleansi yang pada gilirannya memunculkan “*resistant identity*.”

Artikel keempat ditulis oleh Noryamin Aini dengan judul “*Ridda (Apostacy) and the Ambiguity of Islamic Legal Discourses*.” Di tengah maraknya berbagai tuduhan murtad yang dilontarkan oleh beberapa kelompok Islam radikal terhadap sesama saudaranya yang seiman, artikel ini mempunyai tempat yang signifikan. Penulis berpendapat bahwa konsensus jumah *fuqahā’* menyatakan bahwa hukuman bagi seorang Muslim murtad adalah pidana mati. Namun analisis hermeneutik dan kritisisme gramatologis menunjukkan sejumlah kelemahan baik dalam bentuk ambiguitas atau inkonsistensi metodologis logika hukum yang dipakai para *fuqahā’* ketika mereka menafsirkan serangkaian *nass* yang menjadi dasar penetapan hukuman mati bagi orang murtad tersebut. Satu kesimpulan yang mengakhiri tulisan ini bahwa peristiwa-peristiwa hukum yang dijadikan rujukan para *fuqahā’* untuk menetapkan ketentuan hukuman bagi orang murtad sarat dengan muatan politik, dan karenanya, peristiwa-peristiwa tersebut harus dilihat dalam konteksnya secara proporsional.

Sementara itu, artikel kelima “*Agama sebagai Faktor Konflik dan Integrasi*” ditulis oleh Muhamad Ali. Artikel ini mencoba menganalisis berbagai konflik yang berbau keagamaan yang akhir-akhir sedang terjadi di berbagai wilayah di Indonesia, terutama di Maluku. Dalam analisisnya,

penulis berpendapat bahwa agama memang bisa saja diumpamakan pedang bermata dua, yang satu diarahkan untuk kebaikan (perdamaian) dan yang lainnya diarahkan untuk memotivasi konflik. Namun demikian, sebenarnya agama netral saja, bahkan semua ajaran agama mengandung perdamaian bagi semua umat manusia. Satu hal yang tidak dapat dipungkiri adalah pemanfaatan agama oleh kelompok-kelompok tertentu untuk kepentingan yang berbeda. Jika kepentingan ini berbenturan, maka agama sangat mungkin untuk difungsikan sebagai bahan bakar guna menyulut konflik.

Di samping artikel-artikel tematis di atas, redaksi juga menerima beberapa artikel lepas. Pertama artikel Amsal Bakhtiar *Agama dan Tantangan Sains Modern*. Dalam tulisannya, Bakhtiar memotret tantangan dan kemungkinan peran yang dapat dimainkan agama di zaman modern ini. Sejarah mencatat selalu ada gesekan antara ilmu termasuk sains dan teknologi di dalamnya dengan cara pandang, pandangan dunia dan termasuk agama yang dianut masyarakat. Dalam setiap gesekannya selalu terjadi *sharing* baik berat sebelah atau saling mempengaruhi. Tantangan agama di zaman kemajuan sains dan teknologi adalah bagaimana agama atau agamawan merespons perubahan nilai, tradisi, dan teknik hidup yang semakin bersandar pada sains dan teknologi. Menjawab pertanyaan ini penulis yakin akan keharusan agama beradaptasi dengan situasi barunya. Sedangkan peran yang mungkin dilakukan agama di zaman modern ini adalah agama harus difungsikan sebagai *agent of values* (sumber nilai) yang memberi spirit dan moralitas universal bagi penggunaan sains dan teknologi.

Kedua, tulisan Romo Mudji Sutrisno berjudul *Humanisme Fruedian dan Pandangannya tentang Agama*. Romo Mudji menjelaskan pokok-pokok pemikiran Fred tentang *Id*, *Ego* dan *Super Ego* dan kata kunci lain yang menunjukkan humanisme Freud. Kemudian dia menganotasi beberapa karya Freud yang ada kaitannya dengan agama dan memberi catatan kritis.

Ketiga, *Profil Politik Ahmad Khan* karangan Masykur Hakim menjelaskan bahwa Ahmad Khan adalah salah satu figur intelektual Muslim India fenomenal, dikritik karena praktik agamanya yang longgar dan dipuji karena pemikirannya yang segar. Dia dianggap telah memberikan kontribusi penting dalam wacana pembaharuan pemikiran dalam Islam abad 19 di dunia Islam umumnya dan khususnya di ranah

sub-Continent. Namun demikian, selama ini, pembahasan tentangnya lebih banyak dalam pemikiran keagamaan, sosial dan pendidikan, dan masih jarang yang memotret pemikiran politiknya. Menurut penulis, secara politis, Akhmad Khan menganut pandangan yang bercampur antara pragmatisme dan idealisme. Pragmatismenya terlihat dalam sikapnya untuk mencairkan kecurigaan Inggris, penjajah, agar tidak melakukan penyerangan-penyerangan terhadap bangsa India, sedangkan idealismenya terkesan tidak realistis, seperti misalnya ia berpendapat bahwa negara harus berbasis agama dalam hal ini agama Islam, padahal mayoritas penduduk masyarakat India adalah Hindu.

Satu artikel lagi terkait dengan radikalisme agama untuk rubrik analisis buku, ditulis oleh Ismatu Ropi, dengan judul “*Melacak Akar Perang Suci: Perkembangan Ide Jihad dalam Tradisi Islam.*” Artikel ini merupakan analisis terhadap buku Reuven Firestone yang berjudul *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam*. Sebelum mengurai buku ini, penulis menyinggung sebuah paradoks yang muncul akibat perbedaan sikap dan penafsiran terhadap doktrin keagamaan. Paradoks yang dimaksud adalah bagaimana kita menjelaskan agama yang selalu mengajarkan kebaikan dan perdamaian di satu sisi, tapi juga membenarkan peperangan? Dalam konteks ini, isi buku ini menjadi penting, karena buku ini, menurut penulis, mengungkap evolusi konsep jihad dalam Islam.

Terakhir, kritik dan saran sangat kita harapkan. Untuk edisi yang akan datang kita akan memotret fenomena “gerakan” pemikiran Islam liberal sebagai pengimbang wacana gerakan “fundamentalisme” atau “radikalisme” Islam. Selamat membaca.

Ciputat, 20 April, 2002

Tim Redaksi

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA

Jajang Jahroni

Introduction

Some ideas of Islamic fundamentalism have been nurtured by the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia that took place in the late of the nineteenth century. The Wahhabi can be classified as, following Arjomand's term, the scriptural fundamentalism,¹ which stresses the importance of the return to the pristine source of Islam, the Holy Koran and the Tradition of the Prophet. Its roots are found in the thought of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), who led the Salafi movement, and then the Hanbalite school. Ibn Taymiyya is one of the most eloquent Sunnite Critics against philosophy and Shi'ism. He regards that philosophy and Shi'ism² could corrupt the beliefs of Islam. Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Taymiyya's predecessor and the founder of the Hanbalite school, advocates the idea of the superiority of *sunna* (prophetic tradition) over reason. He holds the opinion that the Holy Koran is created. Closer to the first periods of Islam, we find the Kharijite, who denounced the *tahkim* (arbitration) and considered those

who accept it as *kāfir* (infidel). Referring to the Koran, they argued “there is no law but the law of God”.

But this historical documentation is not enough to explain the complexities of Islamic fundamentalism in the modern periods. The subordinate position of the Muslim world has provided the fertile grounds for Islamic fundamentalism to revive. In the 19th and 20th centuries, most of the Muslim countries have been subjugated under the western imperialism and domination. Following their independence in the 1950s and 60s, they faced huge problems in economic, social and political life. In some countries, Muslims should face authoritarian leaders such as Gamal Abdul Naser of Egypt and Soekarno of Indonesia. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood challenged the secular ideology introduced by Naser, while in Indonesia the Masyumi Party opposed the authoritarianism led by Soekarno.

Modernization waves began to pervade all parts of the Muslim worlds in the last quarter of the last century. The process of modernization, which is always marked by secularization, makes Muslims feel insecure facing this world. It has caused dramatic changes and raised serious problems to the life of Muslim communities. This feeling is related to the fact that Muslim communities are the least prepared groups entering the modern era. They were still living in the traditional modes when the assaults of modernity invaded their life. Instead of becoming modern, some of them decided to escape from it and created small and exclusive groups. This is the so-called “the enclave culture.”³ The reason behind this escape is clear that they want to perform their religious beliefs without being harassed by any bad side of modernity.⁴

It is important to note that the spirit of Islamic fundamentalism is also influenced by the millenarian beliefs. In one prophetic tradition, it is stated that “God sends a reformer to His ummah in every century.” This belief was felt strong when, in 1978, Muslims all over the world, celebrated the coming of the new century according to Islamic calendar. The fifteenth century of *Hijriyah*, as many Muslims believe, is the century of Islamic revivalism.⁵ The millenarian beliefs are frequently mixed up with the messianism, Mahdism, and Sufism as it happens in the Usman Fodia movement in Nigeria and Sudan. This also holds true for some radical movements in the 19th and 20th centuries of Indonesian history.

Islamic fundamentalism emerges as a reaction against any forms that potentially threaten Islam. The threat can be heterodox beliefs, fallacious ideologies, or political and social disorder. The need for the return to the genuine sources of faith has become the central theme of these movements. The true believers hold the idea that the Holy Script is the only source for Muslims as it is understood and practiced by the Prophet and the Companion. The first pious generations of Islam (*al-salaf al-sālih*) are the best examples to be imitated by Muslims. Their exemplifies are encapsulated in the *shari'a* (the law of God). They were the true Muslim believers who produce the Golden Ages of Islam. The pristine Islam is sought due to the fact that the existing Islam has been contaminated by “accretions and alien influences”.⁶

Indonesia's Experiences

Ever since the last four years of the Reformation Era, precisely after the fall of Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia has been identified with the emergence of a number of Islamic fundamentalist organizations, which is aimed at either applying Islamic law or establishing Islamic state. These organizations were founded in several big cities in Java as well as outside Java. *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI-Islamic Defenders Front), *Forum Komunikasi Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah* (FKAWJ-Communicative Forum of The People of the Prophetic Tradition and the Companions), *Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI-Indonesian Muslim Fighters Forum), and *Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim antar-Kampus* (HAMMAS-Muslim Students Association intra-Campuses) are among the newly born organizations in contemporary social and political life in Indonesia.

Muslim fundamentalists seemed to have failed to attract great followers from Indonesian Muslim communities. Since Indonesia's independence in 1945, some fundamentalist ideas have evolved and been transformed into political actions. Muslim groups founded Islamic political parties that supported the Islamic political ideals. But they failed to realize their aspirations because of the tight control by the government. In the late of the 1950s, Soekarno banned any ideological and political movement. Instead, he proposed the “Guided Democracy” policy, in which the meaning of democracy was reduced into a matter of an authoritarian state.

During Soeharto's era, the situation was worse. A sole ideology was imposed by making Pancasila as national ideological bases to be followed by

all political and social organizations. All democratic movements were oppressed and stigmatized as the opponents of Pancasila. During this era, Islamic fundamentalist groups grew stronger than before, especially since the Iranian Revolution took place in 1979, which was considered to be the most remarkable event in the modern Islamic history. One lesson taken from this event is that Islam was in fact able to serve as the ideology of the resistance. Even though this event has a typically Shiite overtone, to which Indonesian Muslims do not subscribe, but rather to Sunnite Islam, it echoed as far as Algeria in North Africa and Indonesia in Southeast Asia.

Indonesian political situation changed in 1998, giving more spheres to the public to express their opinions. This situation was used by fundamentalist Muslims to express what they had been feeling. They claim that the presence of these organizations fitted to the Spirit of freedom of expression, which is extremely important in democracy. They also argue that their ideological movements can be traced back to the first days of the Indonesia's independence in 1945, in which the idea of Islamic state was not given any chance at all. On the basis of evidences found in earlier development, it is historically proved that Muslims were free to perform their own religious law (*shari'a*). But this idea was then deleted without any reasonable argument accepted by Muslim factions.

Muslim fundamentalists had no enough chance to realize their programs. But the spirit of the establishment of Islamic state could be found anywhere, especially in *Darul Islam* movement embarking upon several places in the country. It is believed that *Darul Islam* movement was actually an expression of disappointment of a number of Muslim groups to social and political situation in the country, which was not supportive to their political aspirations. As long as the state Islam relationship has not been resolved, as the proponents of this movement believe, the objective of Islamic state would remain alive in Muslims' consciousness.⁷

The problem is that not every Muslim —not to say non-Muslim believers— support the notion of the application of Islamic law, let alone Islamic state. Prior to the Annual Session of the General Assembly, held in 2000, when a number of Muslim organizations demanded the stipulation of the Jakarta Charter, in which the application of Islamic law for Muslims is clearly formulated and guaranteed, some Muslim intellectuals, led by Nurcholish Madjid, responded to this by giving an official statement rejecting this plan, assuming that this would only lead the country

into chaos. He argues that Pancasila is the best common platform for modern Indonesian communities shared by Muslim as well as non-Muslim groups.

The Reformation does not only give promises and hopes but also euphoria's and anarchies. Nowadays, it is very usual to see demonstrations in Senayan Jakarta, where the office of the House of Representative is located. If democracy is understood as demonstration, it is still tolerable. But if it is understood as anarchy, it is a misleading. The problem is that a number of fundamentalist Muslim organizations express their opinions by showing swords and knives and destroying certain places considered un-Islamic. It is already known that the FPI, the largest radical Muslim organizations in Indonesia, make several actions by means of destroying several places. Bar, discohèque, casino, pub, café, and prostitution places are its hard targets.

One of the important actions made by Muslim fundamentalist Organizations is the attack on the KOMNASHAM's (National Commission on Human Rights) office in Menteng Jakarta. This action was following the result of the KOMNASHAM's investigation concerning the Tanjung Priok massacre in 1983, where hundreds of Muslims, as many believe, were killed and the notorious L.B. Murdani, a Christian and the chief general of the armed force at that time, was allegedly involved. The FPI accuses the KOMNASHAM of being unfair in the investigation, according to which the massacre was due to *force majeure* and only a few people were killed. The FPI demands the government to abolish the KOMNASHAM, for the body is not independent in undertaking its duties.

Most of Islamic fundamentalist groups send their soldiers to Ambon to help Moluccan Muslims to fight against radical Christians. The Moluccan battlefield, as an eye-witnessing soldier calls it, is the battle of *jihād* (the holy war), where the soldier longs for martyrdom (shahid). They believe that Ambon tragedy is in fact an international conspiracy to split the large Indonesia into small pieces of countries, some of which are to be controlled by the West-affiliated Christians. It is therefore incumbent upon all Muslims to protect and defend their country from any aggression and invasion.

All of radical Muslim groups strongly rejected the presence of the Israeli delegation during the IPU (International Parliamentary Union) conference held in 2000 in Jakarta. This rejection was due to the fact that the Israelis make many violations against the human rights of the Palestinian

as well as the Arabs. Should the committee of the conference insist to inviting them, radical Muslim organizations would marshal in Jakarta, and the Soekarno-Hatta airport would be sieged. The Israelis were not allowed to enter Indonesia. They would immediately be deported as soon as they arrive in the country.

Another important feature of Islamic fundamentalist organizations is that they have international networking with some Middle Eastern figures such as Moammar Qaddafi, and radical-links of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization). Some sources state that Qaddafi provides military training. But these allegations are officially denied, arguing that the donations are provided by their members, and special soldiers are trained by senior leaders. However, this denial does not stop people from speculating. A number of top-rank armed force officials appeared in the first anniversary of the FPI, which leads people to assume that both actually have mutual relationship. But again, as Misbahul Anam assures, the former General Secretary of the FPI, that the FPI is really independent and is not tempted to low political intrigues.⁸ To give better understanding, herewith I would like to provide a brief profile of organizations.

Front Pembela Islam

Of the four radical Muslim organizations, *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI) seems to be the largest organization, which claims to have around fifteen million members and supporters all over Indonesia. It was founded on August 17, 1998 in Jakarta, coincident with the 53rd anniversary of the Indonesia's independence. The idea of its foundation was initiated by *Habib* Muhammad Rizieq Shihab and Misbahul Anam. Both were really concerned with the corrupt conditions, in which Muslims were unable to solve. The organization is intended to destroy all kinds of corruption which are considered against the laws of God. Both invited such Muslim leaders as K.H. Damanhuri, K.H. Cecep Bustomi, and *Habib* Idrus Jamal al-Lail to join in the organization.

It is clearly stated that the aim of the organization is to stipulate Islamic law for Muslims in Indonesia, Current multi-dimensional crises facing Indonesia are, according to the FPI, due to the blindly Western-affiliated Indonesia's politics and economics and the adoption of secular laws, which are in fact inappropriate for Indonesians. To realize this aim, the FPI has created the National Commission for the Application of Islamic Law. The

task of the commission is to socialize the program to the members as well as other Muslim communities. Local commissions are created in several provinces in the country, in which the program is introduced to the levels of the grass roots.

Responses to this program are positive. The FPI argues that in the grass root level, the idea of the application of Islamic law is high, it remains alive in the consciousness of people. In some regions in Java as well as in Sumatra, as the implementation of this program, the FPI argues, Islamic law has been really applied. Along with the autonomy program of the government, the application of Islamic law will run smoother than before. One by one the provinces in which Muslims become the majority will, the FPI predicts, choose Islamic law instead of secular law. For the final phase, whether or not Islamic law is applied in national scope, the FPI proposes the National referendum. If the majority of Indonesian people vote for Islamic law, Islamic law would be applied nationally, and if they vote for secular law, Islamic law could only be applied in certain provinces in which the majority vote for it. But Shihab, the chief leader of the FPI, believes that the majority would vote for Islamic law.

To support this program, Shihab writes an important book entitled *Dialog Piagam Jakarta*.⁹ The reason for this undertaking is clear that Shihab wants to provoke his audiences by way of rewinding the old song of the Jakarta Charter, in which the application of Islamic law is clearly guaranteed. According to the FPI, the application of Islamic law does not necessarily mean the establishment of Islamic state. There is no single verse in the Holy Koran imposing the Muslims to establish Islamic state, while one can easily find the verses, where Muslims should follow the law of God.

Institutionally speaking, the FPI does not require its members to embrace one particular school of law (*mazhab*). But rather they are free to choose whatever *mazhab* they like. But when Misbahul Anam assumed the General Secretary of the organization, he gave the members certain teachings taken from different sources. The teachings are about the *fiqh al-jihād* (the book of struggle, containing its principles, methods, and practices), combined with Tijaniyya order litanies, of which he becomes the murshid (teacher). But these teachings are no longer available after Anam's resignation in 2000.

The fact that Anam left for the FPI is really surprising. The answer to this question is easy to find out. Since Anam is a non-*ḥabīb*, one can easily conclude that this resignation was due to the fact that the FPI is more controlled by the *Ḥabā'ib*-origin top leaders than the indigenous ones. On the one hand, Anam is a Javanese, growing in some Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) *pesantrens* in Java, though later on follows the modernist Muhammadiyah and the hard-lined student wing, the PII (*Persatuan Pelajar Islam*, Indonesian Muslim Students). On the other hand, Shihab is a *ḥabīb*, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, graduated from King Saud University in Riyadh, and a strictly *sharī'a* oriented person.

The structure of the organization, where the *Ḥabā'ib*-dominated Consultative Assembly (*Dewan Syuro*) becomes the highest commission, such persons as Anam and Cecep Bustomi, a Bantenese and the founding father leaving the organization and establishing *Laskar Hizbullah* (the Brigade of the Party of God), can easily be excluded from the organization. It is generally assumed that the presence of the FPI is in fact a means to accommodate and facilitate the *Ḥabā'ib*'s interests. This can be seen the overall structure of the organization, where almost important positions in the FPI belong to the *Ḥabā'ibs*. While the second part is dominated well-educated young Muslims, coming from middle class families, who long for the advent of the Golden Ages of Islam, the last part is dominated by ordinary Muslims, the die-hard loyalists of the FPI, who long for martyrdom in the battle.¹⁰

Forum Komunikasi Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah

Forum Komunikasi Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah (FKAWJ) is a Yogyakarta-based fundamentalist organization. It was founded when Indonesia began to collapse, in the beginning of 1998, during which Habibie, the vice president, due to his Muslims-profiting policies, as most Muslims might hope, could come into power replacing Soeharto. The FKAWJ supported Habibie. This support was made in some actions. But when Gus Dur was elect-president, the FKAWJ then realized that Gus Dur was totally different to Habibie. This controversial figure would only give the Muslims confusion and disillusionment. According to the FKAWJ, Gus Dur was unable to solve several problems facing the nation, be that religious conflict, separatist movement, or economic crisis. It is this fact that makes the FKAWJ criticizes Gus Dur for a number of reasons.

It is Ja'far Umar Thalib, a *Hadrāmī* stock in origin, who declares the FKAJW. After studying in several madrasahs in his town, Malang, in 1983 Ja'far moved to Jakarta and enrolled at Academy for Islamic Sciences and Arabic's (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab-LIPIA*). When he was young, Ja'far had been a hard-lined Muslim activist. He was involved in al-Irshad, a Hadrami-dominated organization, and, together with the PII, rejected Pancasila as the sole basis for political and social life. Feeling dissatisfied with Indonesia's circumstances, Ja'far fled to Saudi Arabia and Yemen. He spent there around six years, during which he studied with several *Sheikhs* such as Sheikh Nasar al-Din al-Albani, Abdullah ibn Baz, Mufti al-Hadi, and Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi. In his return to Indonesia, Ja'far travelled Pakistan and studied in Maududi Institute for years. From Pakistan, he infiltrated to Afghanistan, where he made a direct contact with Abu Sayyaf and Sheikh Rabbani, the Taliban top leaders.

Ja'far taught in several *pesantrens* in Salatiga and Yogyakarta. Together with Abu Nida, he found *Jamā'ah al-Turāth al-Islāmī* in Yogyakarta. This organization was involved in clandestine movements held together with Muslim Brotherhood wing as well as Indonesian Islamic State (NII). But after some disputes, Ja'far left Abu Nida and developed his *pesantren*, *Ihyā' al-Sunnah*, from which the FKAJW was founded.

Similar to the FPI, the FKAJW does not have special doctrines for its members. The forum was created as a means for communication between its members. The term *ahl al-sunnah wal-jamī'ah* indicates that the members of the forum embrace several religious doctrines as understood by the majority of Muslim people. According to the FKAJW, there are only three major sources to be followed by all Muslims named the Holy Qur'an, the Sunnah and the Consensus of the Companions. These sources are called *manhaj ahl al-sunnah wal-jamā'ah* (The Path of the People of the Prophetic Traditions and the Companions).¹¹ The FKAJW believes that Muslims should imitate the Prophet in a very literal sense. It is hardly surprising that all the members wear white *ghamis* (traditional Arab cloth) and let their beards grow long.

The FKAJW aims at applying Islamic law in Indonesia. Unlike the FPI that applies the top-down strategies, the FKAJW suggests that Islamic law be practiced individually. If all Muslims realize and practice Islamic law, it would surely influence the country in general. Based on this understanding, the FKAJW strongly opposes the struggles of the Indonesian Islamic

Nation (NII) which, according to the former, would raise social disorder. The FKAJ's strategy has a typically Sunnite Overtones, which always prevent social disorder in political life.

The members of the FKAJ are scattered in some regions in Yogyakarta, Middle and East Java. Most of them are high school students as well as Muslim student coming from such various universities as Gadjah Mada, Diponegoro, and Airlangga. The FKAJ also builds several *pesantrens*, in which the ideas of the organization are disseminated. A number of the top leaders of the organization are the graduates from Middle East universities. To support its tasks, the FKAJ has a special soldier called *Laskar Jihad* (LJ-the Soldier of Struggle).¹² The FKAJ sends regular soldiers to Molucco and other places in the country. The LJ was founded in January 30, 2000. It has more than 10.000 well-trained soldiers, 1300 of whom have been sent to Molucco. The soldiers are recruited from ordinary Muslims and other Muslim organizations like the NII and FPI through strict selection.

Some publications are made by the FKAJ, in which its ideas, programs, and plans are disseminated to its members as well as other Muslim groups. Maluku Hari Ini (Molucco Today), the bulletin containing the current information about Molucco, is widespread throughout the country, reviving the spirit of *jihad* for Muslim communities. It is also sent to a number of Middle Eastern countries, Europe and the US. Another publication is *Salafy*, a-monthly magazine containing religious doctrines. The FKAJ also translates several Arabic books into Indonesian made by the Middle East hard-lined ulama.

Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia

Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) was founded in Yogyakarta on August 7, 2000. The background to its foundation is closely related to Muslims desire to create an Islamic *daulah* (state). The MMI argues that since Islam is a *din wa daulah* (religion and state), it is thus incumbent upon Muslims to create an Islamic state. Islamic state is founded in national and international scope. The capital city of Islamic caliphate, according to the MMI, will be located in Jerusalem, in which the Mosque of Aqsa, the Holy Place where the Prophet began his spiritual journey, is located. The question of why the capital of Islamic caliphate be located in Jerusalem, instead of Mecca or Madina, is not quite obvious. But since Jerusalem is the third

Holy Land in Islam, which is now ironically being occupied by Israelis, the answer to the question is easy, Muslims should liberate the city from this occupation.

In August 5, 2000, the MMI held Indonesian Mujahidin National Congress in Yogyakarta. Around 1200 attendants all over the country came to the congress to formulate the guidelines of the organization. The outcome of the congress was revealing, giving the spirit of unity to the opposing factions within the MMI. It is reported that most of the opposing factions within the MMI originally come from *Darul Islam*. When the big ship sank, all the passengers survived themselves. What is needed now is reorientation and building another ship. Some factions at least claim that the MMI is the continuation of *Darul Islam* movement.

A number of Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders like KH. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir,¹³ A.M. Saefuddin, Deliar Noer, and K.H. Alawi Muhammad are involved in the MMI. Saefuddin is the former minister of agriculture during Habibie's cabinet, while Noer is the chief leader of the PDU (*Partai Daulat Umat-Sovereign People Party*), a small party in the parliament. The former used to be the parliament member of the PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan-United Development Party*) and was very critical to Megawati, the current PDI-P (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan—Indonesian Struggle Democratic Party*) Chairperson, during controversy on woman's appointment president. The last figure is Alawi Muhammad, the most vigorous foe of Gus Dur. Muhammad is a Madurese charismatic NU leader, where the NU's supporters are located. He refused to join the PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa-Nation Awakening Party*), a NU-sponsored party, arguing that the PPP is the only party for Muslims.

Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim antar-Kampus

Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim antar-Kampus (HAMMAS) was founded in Jakarta on October 1, 1998. It was first initiated by only twenty students coming from *Jabotabek* (Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi). Its short name is taken from the Palestinian HAMAS (*Haraka Muqāwama al-Islāmiya—Islamic Resistance Movement*), a radical Muslim organization led by Sheikh Ahmad Yasin. The foundation of the HAMMAS is closely related to several Christian-dominated student organizations founded in several campuses in Jakarta, which seemed to control national student movement.¹⁴

The HAMMAS strongly criticizes several activities held by Muslim organizations, which relatively have no direct effects to Muslim communities. Feeling disappointed in the circumstances, the HAMMAS more focuses on activism than intellectualism. In the beginning of 1980s, new activism began to pervade several campuses in big cities in Indonesia, sponsored by those Muslim students, by whom the HAMMAS was then founded. This action can be seen in *jilbāb* (veil) and *pardah* (burqa) movement, replacing mini skirt, jeans and t-shirt. One of the strategies used by the HAMMAS for the dissemination of Islamic values in campuses is by way of making small circle of discussion (*halaqah*), where various Islamic subjects are openly taught, and showing Islamic lifestyles towards others.

It is obvious that HAMMAS gives a hint to the established student organizations, be that HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* –Muslim Students Association), PMII (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* –Indonesian Muslim Student Movement), or IMM (*Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah* –Muhammadiyah Student Organization). In spite of such criticism, the HAMMAS does not refuse to cooperate with any organization as long as it fits to Islamic principles. Together with the HMI, IMM, GPI (Gerakan Pemuda Islam-Muslim Youth Movement), and PII, the HAMMAS are involved in the GEMUIS (Gerakan Muda Islam-Young Muslim Generation Movement).

By observing references used in its discussions, one can easily assume that Islamism brought by the HAMMAS has been strongly influenced by at least Muslim Brotherhood and Shiite contemporary thinkers. Such works of Sayyid Qutb, Said Hawa, Ali Shariati and Murtadha Mutahhari are of important books used by the HAMMAS. It is necessary to note here that all non-established Muslim student movements have been inspired by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.

It is hardly surprising that the HAMMAS is involved in several actions against the KOMNASHAM and rejects the presence of Israeli delegation in the IPU conference as well as the government's plan to open commercial relationship with Israel. The HAMMAS argues that Gus Dur was incapable of recovering Indonesia from crisis. Instead of resolving problems, Gus Dur made new problems. He was a part of the problems. He therefore should renounce his power and gives it to someone else. In spite of being involved in such actions, the HAMMAS refutes to be categorized as having

political interest or political affiliation to any political parties in the parliament.

Resistance Identity

Modernization has raised huge problems in the life of Muslim community. This problem is due to the fact that many Muslims are not ready to accept modernity and globality. The failure of Muslims to anticipate modernization and globalization leads to the disruption of traditional modes of Muslim societies. Castells explains how “Muslim’s inability of adapting the conditions of global competition and technological revolution finally lead into frustration.”¹⁵

Islam never gives any chance to secularism. Religion can be taken away from the state, but it cannot be taken away from the society. Instead of receiving modernization and globalization, of which secularism becomes the part of it, a number of Muslims reject any ideas imported from the West. Not only do radical Muslims reject modernity and globality, they also look at some issues such as democracy, human rights, and feminism with suspicions. Muslims feel insecure with this getting secular world and look at this life with fears. As a consequence, these groups then create ‘their own world’ by keeping distance from ‘secular world’.

Religion is the source of meaning. When a particular religious believers face new problems in their daily life, they would look at this source to find answers in order to fit to the teachings of God. This is the first function of religion. But religion can also function as the source of identity, according to which religious believers should behave and perform their conducts. The problem shows up when true religious believers feel threatened by poverty, epidemic disease, economic crisis, political disorder, secularization, westernization, etc. In this case, religion can function as the source of resistance. This is what Castells calls ‘resistance identity’. Islamic fundamentalism is thus an expression of resistance against unfavorable conditions.

Concluding Remarks

The emergence of radical Muslim organizations in the last three years in Indonesia can be explained as follows. There are three main factors in-

volved in this process. But it is necessary to note that each factor is interwoven and overlaps each other. The first is that the ideas of fundamentalism are embedded as such in the body of Islam.

The second is related to the state-society relationship. During Soekarno and Soeharto's eras, Muslim fundamentalists did not successfully disseminate its ideology due to the tight political control made by both leaders. But when Reformation exploded four years ago, then followed by the weak government, everybody could express his feeling. It is during this weak government that Islamic fundamentalist organizations emerged and made their actions.

The third is that most Muslim people are actually not ready to live in, following Alvin Toffler's term, "the third wave" of modernization and globalization. This is resulted in the disruption of Muslims who still live in traditional networking societies. Fundamentalist Muslims respond modernization and globalization with suspicion and even rejection. []

Endnotes

1. Said Amir Arjomand, "Unity and Diversity in Islamic Fundamentalism," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Comprehended* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 180.
2. Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas, 1982), p. 18.
3. Emmanuel Sivan, "The Enclave Culture", in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, pp. 11-68.
4. Valerie J. Hoffman explains the psychological elements of Islamic fundamentalism. See Valerie J. Hoffman, "Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychological Profiles," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, pp. 199-230.
5. Manuel Castells, *The Power of identity* (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), p. 13.
6. Said Amir Arjomand, *Loc. cit.*
7. Al-Chaidar, *Sepak Terjang KW 9 Abu Toto Sheikh A.S. Panji Gumilang Menyelewengkan NKA-NII Pasca S.M. Kartosuwirjo* (Jakarta: Madani Press, 2000), p.11.
8. Interview with Ustadz Misbahul Anam, former Secretary General of the FPI, August, 2000.
9. *Habib* Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, *Dialog Piagam* Jakarta, 2000.
10. The FPI is concerned with the destruction of the corrupt condition (*pemberantasan maksiat dan munkarat*) and some issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian issues, the *jihad* issues, anti-American campaign after September 11, and the localization of gambling in Jakarta.
11. See, www.laskarjihad.co.id.
12. The FKAMJ, with its paramilitary troop, the *Laskar Jihad*, has been involved in Ambon and Poso. The *Laskar Jihad* does not accept the results of the Malino Treaty, a reconciliation meeting sponsored by the Indonesian government to end Muslim-Christian conflicts in Molucco. The LJ makes a large coverage on the activities of the radical Christians and the RMS (*Republik Maluku Selatan* –Southern Molluco Republic). Ja'far Umar Thalib, the leader of the FKAWJ, is allegedly involved in some attacks against Christian groups. He was captured by the Indonesian police on May 5, 2002 and The LJ was forced to leave Ambon.
13. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is the member of the Consultative Body (*Majlis Syuro*) of the MMI. He is allegedly linked to the Al-Qaida networking, Osama bin Laden-led D organization, in Southeast Asia. Ba'asyir was once questioned by the Indonesian police about this allegation. But this is officially denied by the MMI.
14. See, www.hammas.4t.com
15. Castells, *Ibid.*

Bibliography

- Arjomand, Said Amir. "Unity and Diversity in Islamic Fundamentalism," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Al-Chaidar, *Sepak Terjang KW 9 Abu Toto Sheikh A.S. Panji Gumilang Menyelewengkan NKA-NII Pasca S.M. Kartosuwirjo*. Jakarta: Madani Press, 2000.
- Castells, Manuel. *The Power of identity*. Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.
- Enayat, Hamid. *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, Austin: University of Texas, 1982.
- Hoffman, Valerie J. "Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychological Profiles," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*.
- Sivan, Emmanuel. "The Enclave Culture", in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*.
- Ustadz Misbahul Anam, former Secretary General of the FPI, August, 2000.

Some parts of this article are based on the research "*Radikalisme Agama di Indonesia*" made by the Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya-IAIN Jakarta 2000, in which I was involved. I make some theoretical frameworks concerning Islamic fundamentalism. I also up-date the information concerning the objects of the research.

Jajang Jahroni is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Literature of UIN Jakarta

ISSN 0215-6253 (print)



9 770215 625008

ISSN 2714-6103 (online)



9 772714 610004