

Refleksi

JURNAL KAJIAN AGAMA DAN FILSAFAT

“Reorientasi Ilmu-ilmu Ushuluddin”

WACANA

Abdul Majid Khon
Modernisasi dalam Sunah

Ilyas Supena
Epistemologi Tafsir, Ta’wil, dan
Hermeneutika: Kajian Komparatif

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A Contemporary History of Suicide Bombing:
A Sociological Approach to 9/11

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Korupsi dalam Perspektif Tasawuf Tahriki

TULISAN LEPAS

Daud Effendy AM
Relasi antara Manusia dan Lingkungan Alam

Refleksi

Jurnal Kajian Agama dan Filsafat

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Jurnal Kajian Agama dan Filsafat
Vol. X, No. 1, 2008

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REORIENTASI ILMU-ILMU USHULUDDIN

Jurnal **Refleksi** di awal tahun 2008 ini mengusung tema Reorientasi Ilmu-ilmu Ushuluddin Para kontributor pada edisi kali ini mengajak pembaca untuk melakukan kajian ulang terhadap ilmu-ilmu Ushuluddin terkait dengan bangkitnya minat banyak orang Barat untuk melakukan studi-studi terhadap Islam sebagai respons positif partisipatoris dalam aksi dunia melawan terorisme, sebagaimana yang diungkapkan oleh M. Amin Nurdin dan Dadi Darmadi. Menurut keduanya -mengawali tulisan pada edisi pertama tahun ini-, sekarang adalah saatnya untuk mengkaji ulang salah satu disiplin ilmu dalam studi Islam yaitu Ilmu Kalam. Tulisan keduanya berusaha untuk menjadikan Ilmu Kalam sebagai ilmu terapan dengan melakukan reorientasi terhadap metode dan tema pokok bahasan yang lebih implementatif, sehingga disiplin ilmu ini kembali menjadi sebuah khazanah intelektual Islam yang kaya, cerdas, dan inspiratif bagi penyelesaian permasalahan umat manusia.

Selain Ilmu Kalam, hadis juga merupakan warisan Islam yang hingga saat ini masih menjadi kajian utama dalam studi Islam setelah al-Qur'an. Ahmad Lutfi Fathullah dalam tulisannya yang merupakan ringkasan disertasinya melakukan telaah ulang terhadap kesahihan hadis-hadis yang terdapat di dalam kitab Durratun Nasihin, salah satu kitab hadis terpopuler di nusantara dan sering-kali dijadikan referensi oleh para pemuka agama dalam menyampaikan nasihatnya. Penelitian Ahmad Lutfi Fathullah membuktikan bahwa tidak sampai 40% hadis yang terdapat di dalam kitab tersebut yang memiliki kualitas hasan dan sahih. Sisanya adalah daif (21%), sangat daif (5,7%), bahkan palsu (30%).

Masih berkaitan dengan perlunya reorientasi ilmu-ilmu Ushuluddin, Abdul Majid Khon dalam tulisannya menyampaikan perlu adanya modernisasi dalam sunah atau hadis, tepatnya dalam memahaminya. Modernisasi yang dimaksud diperlukan karena Sunah sosial merupakan jumlah mayoritas dalam hadis sebagaimana ayat-ayat sosial dalam al-Qur'an. Oleh karenanya, interpretasinya perlu diperbaharui sesuai dengan kondisi perkembangan masyarakat dan ilmu pengetahuan yang terus

berkembang. Menurutnya, proses modernisasi Hadis atau Sunah sangat diperlukan setiap masa agar Hadis tidak ditinggalkan oleh umatnya dan pelaksana Hadis tidak dipersepsikan kuno, ketinggalan zaman, fanatik dan lain-lain. Sunah Nabi sesungguhnya tetap relevan dengan zaman dan tempat manakala pemangku sunah mampu memahaminya dengan baik dan benar.

Upaya untuk melakukan reorientasi metode sebagaimana disampaikan M. Amin Nurdin dan Dadi Darmadi atau modernisasi interpretasi ala Abdul Majid Khon juga diamini oleh Ilyas Supena yang mengangkat tema epistemologi tafsir, takwil, dan hermeneutika sebagai metode baru dalam memahami al-Qur'an. Tulisan ini berusaha untuk menampilkan perbedaan yang distingtif di antara ketiga metode tersebut. *Pertama*, tafsir cenderung mengedepankan watak objektivisme dengan berpedoman pada pendekatan bahasa (*dalālah lughawiyah*), sedangkan takwil cenderung mengedepankan watak subjektivisme dengan berpedoman pada pendekatan intuitif akal. Berbeda dengan keduanya, hermeneutika cenderung mengedepankan watak inter-subjektivisme dengan menggunakan pendekatan historis, sosiologis dan psikologis.

Kedua, sumber pengetahuan tafsir adalah teks, ta'wil adalah "experience" (pengalaman) batin, sedangkan hermeneutika adalah dunia teks (*world of the text*), dunia pengarang (*world of the author*) dan dunia pembaca. (*world of the reader*). Ketiga, tolak ukur validitas keilmuan yang digunakan dalam tradisi pemikiran tafsir adalah keserupaan atau kedekatan (*muqārabah*) antara teks atau *signifier* (*al-lafzh*) dengan *signified* (*al-ma'na*), sedangkan tolak ukur tradisi pemikiran taw'il hanya dapat dirasakan dan dihayati secara langsung (*al-ru'yah al-mubdsyirah, direct experience*) oleh intuisi, *dzauq* atau psiko-gnosis. Sementara hermeneutika lebih bersifat dialogis dan dialektis antara dunia teks (*world of the text*), dunia pengarang (*world of the author*) dan dunia pembaca (*world of the reader*).

Kebutuhan akan reorientasi dan modernisasi ilmu sebagaimana disampaikan pada awal editorial ini salah satunya didukung oleh bentuk partisipasi dalam aksi dunia terhadap terorisme yang ditandai dengan peristiwa teror bom bunuh diri di Amerika Serikat yang kemudian dikenal dengan "9/11". Usep Abdul Matin menelaah peristiwa bersejarah tersebut dengan menggunakan pendekatan sosiologi. Ia menyimpulkan bahwa faktor yang mendorong pelaku melakukan teror bukan persoalan pribadi,

melainkan lebih pada respons terhadap isu-isu sosial yang ada, khususnya atas apa yang dialami oleh saudara-saudara mereka di Afghanistan.

Selain terorisme, persoalan besar yang belum dapat diselesaikan di negeri kita tercinta ini adalah korupsi. M. Arrafie Abduh mencoba menawarkan sebuah solusi dalam bentuk upaya tindakan preventif agar seseorang tidak melakukan korupsi melalui metode tasawuf tahriri atau sufisme dinamis, sebutnya. Sufisme dinamis menganggap korupsi (fasad dalam term al-Qur'an dan *risywah* dalam term hadis), kolusi dan nepotisme adalah perbuatan syirik. Bahkan syirik tersebut lebih jauh menyebabkan kerusakan lingkungan dan publik serta penderitaan umat manusia yang berkepanjangan.

Relasi antara rusaknya manusia dan kerusakan lingkungan yang terjadi pada kasus korupsi perspektif tasawuf tahriri tersebut, secara spesifik dipaparkan oleh Daud Effendy AM dengan tulisannya yang menjadi akhir dari rangkaian tulisan dalam **Refleksi** edisi kali ini dengan topik relasi manusia dengan lingkungan alam. Menurutnya, baik atau buruknya relasi antara manusia dan lingkungan ditentukan oleh kualitas peran manusia dalam berpikir, bersikap dan berperilaku di tengah-tengah lingkungannya. Standar penilaiannya tidak semata-mata ditentukan oleh manusia secara sepihak akan tetapi ditentukan oleh standar mutlak yaitu hukum Tuhan. Hal itu sebagai konsekuensi dipilih dan ditetapkannya manusia sebagai khalifah dalam menjaga keseimbangan di tengah-tengah kehidupan di muka bumi. Oleh karena itu relasi yang dimaksudkan adalah relasi yang mampu membangun suatu sistem kesalehan yang holistik agar terjadi kedamaian dan kesejahteraan.

Selamat membaca.

Redaksi

A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF SUICIDE BOMBING: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO 9/11

Usep Abdul Matin

Abstract: *I argue in this paper that the 9/11 phenomenon was not individual problem, but a problem of larger social issues. In the introduction of this paper, I clarify the above statement by Peter Berger in light of C. Wright Mills' idea of the sociological imagination. Having clarified this, I discuss the behavior of the 9/11 hijackers in light of conflict and functionalist-oriented paradigms.*

Keywords: Contemporary History; Phenomenon; Sociological Approach; Suicide Bombing.

Abstrak: Penulis mengemukakan dalam makalah ini bahwa fenomena 9/11 bukanlah masalah individu, tetapi masalah dari isu-isu sosial yang lebih luas. Pada pendahuluan makalah ini, saya menjelaskan pernyataan di atas oleh Peter Berger dengan mengacu pada gagasan imajinasi sosiologis oleh C. Wright Mills. Setelah memperjelas hal ini, saya membahas perilaku para pembajak 9/11 dalam konteks paradigma konflik dan fungsionalis.

Kata Kunci: Sejarah Kontemporer; Fenomena; Pendekatan Sosiologis; Bom Bunuh Diri.

“It can be said that the first wisdom of sociology is this—things are not what they seem. This too is a deceptively simple statement. It ceases to be simple after a while. Social reality turns out to have many layers of meaning. The discovery of each new layer changes the perception of the whole.”

--Peter Berger--¹

Introduction

Peter Berger's statement that “social reality turns out to have many layers of meaning” reminds me of his sociological syllogism: society as human product, society as an objective reality, so man is a social product, and this social product is formed by institution.² Peter Berger's model will help me to decide first what kind of subculture created the desire to commit the 9/11 atrocities. To find this subculture, I refer to Bruce Lincoln's *Holy Terrors*. There, he mentions that the Al-Qaeda network, a religious sect, interpreted, regulated, and used some verses in the Holy Qur'an to justify the 9/11 attacks.³ If we understand Peter Berger's statement up to this point on institutions, we might be trapped by our own prejudices. We might think that 9/11 occurs as a necessary action of the Al-Qaeda institution's own making. Therefore, we should continue to read carefully Peter Berger's statement, “Things are not what they seem.” This expression contains sociologically a deep perceived meaning on how to treat the problem of suicide bombings in the case of 9/11. Peter Berger's words suggest treating this suicide bombing by conceptualizing that some of the hijackers' institution's worst problems were a result of social forces. So, sociologically, Al-Qaeda, a subculture, shares religious beliefs that set them apart from the larger culture and the rest of society.⁴ In other words, these beliefs are not the larger culture but “personal troubles” of Al-Qaeda's institution.

I use the phrase “personal troubles” from C Wright Mills' idea of the sociological imagination. He asserts that we should be able to look beyond personal troubles to see the context of social issues operating in the larger society.⁵ Lisa J. McIntyre says that Mills' idea of sociological imagination in the sociological perspective of Durkheim on the problem of suicide.

Durkheim said that suicide was not a personal problem, but a social issue. What Durkheim meant by social issue was a statistical social integration across different European countries. He found that people with weaker connections to their social groups were more likely to commit suicide and social integration helped, for instance, to explain why Protestants had higher suicide rates than Catholics, across Europe. The reason in Durkheim's findings was that the Protestants were encouraged by their religion to be independent.⁶ Lisa J. McIntyre and Durkheim, however, did not say that suicide among the Protestants was due to their religious beliefs but rather to their lack of social integration. This is why I do not say that the 9/11 atrocity was due to Al-Qaeda's religious beliefs, but that there must be social forces that endorsed them to justify their religious beliefs of *jihad* (holy war against the infidels) to commit this catastrophe. I would rather point to these social forces as explaining the hijackers' motivation rather their personal interpretation of *jihad*. If I explain the hijackers' individual interpretations more than the social forces, it means that I am trapped by my own prejudice, or the hijackers' "personal troubles."

Furthermore, Lisa J. McIntyre's above explanation helps me to conceptualize that religion in the view of Durkheim is a part of society, not a private concern. It seems to me that Durkheim is a functionalist: society is essentially a set of interrelated parts of institutions, beliefs, values, customs, and norms. Each of these parts functions in a particular way. These parts can be understood as a whole.⁷ So, the term "interrelatedness" is a key word of functionalism. I can then say that, according to functionalist paradigm, religion cannot be understood in isolation from other parts. To enable me to explain the interrelatedness of 9/11 and other parts of society, I simply apply to this paper some functionalist terms: "risk reduction," "scapegoating and displacement," and "supplying popular culture villains." I take these terms from Herbert J. Gans' essay "Positive Functions of the Undeserving Poor," in Ferguson's *Mapping the Social Landscape*.⁸

Finding the key term "interrelatedness" in the functionalist paradigm inspires me to find a key term in the conflict paradigm. Karl Marx said that "the history of all hitherto society is the history of class struggles."⁹ He said so in reaction against the capitalist economic system, in which the whole of society divides into the two classes of property owners (bourgeoisie) and property less workers (proletariat). The bourgeoisie demands to earn profits, whereas the proletariat desires to gain some profit to survive.

This chasm, according to Marx, must disappear by changing the society's structure, not individuals;¹⁰ capitalism must be abolished. The key phrase of the conflict-oriented paradigm is "abolishing capitalism." Now, I can apply this Marxist perspective to the case of 9/11 by saying that the 9/11 terrorists were killing themselves for the sake of the "working class." This term refers to people in Afghanistan whose energy was used by the U.S. to expel the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. The Afghans admitted this extrapolation after the war.

So, both functionalist and conflict paradigms see the social changes occurring in a larger society, not merely in an individual. This approach is typical in sociology. I was also prompted to use this approach from my reading of Karp's "Speaking of Sadness." There, he says that sociological imagination requires analysis of the connections between subcultures and their histories.¹¹ I was also encouraged from my reading of Coontz's "How History and Sociology Can Help Today's Families," which explains that the sociological approach is a virtue. It enables us to relate the personal issues to historical contexts.¹²

On the basis of my reading of these sociological works, I decided that I must first take this 9/11 phenomenon into account not only as a matter of what was *really* going on but also as a matter of what the 9/11 terrorists' *thought* was going on. Reality is important. Even when the 9/11 disaster has passed away from us, this catastrophe can still have real influences.¹³ Nevertheless, reality is only one factor that we must take into account to understand how social changes prompted 9/11. This is my goal in this paper.

The Behavior of the 9/11 Hijackers in Light of Functionalist and Conflict Oriented Paradigms

Apart from judging that the 9/11 behavior was both positive and negative, terrorism persists. I base this idea on the functionalist view of social class, which is concerned with how stratification may benefit society. So, I am not arguing that the 9/11 horror is inherently acceptable, but rather giving a functionalist perspective analysis of how terrorism benefits the social system as a whole. I am trying to explain why terrorism still persists ubiquitously, it cannot escape from us, it surrounds us, it could also be inside of Us, and we take it whatever we go.¹⁴

I will discuss three sets of sociological functions of 9/11: “risk reduction,” “scapegoating and displacement,” and “supplying popular culture villains.” The first two are microsocial functions because they take place at the scale of everyday life. The term “micro” does not refer to “personal trouble,” but to that scale of everyday life. The third one deals with the media as the producers of the 9/11 culture villains.

Risk reduction is a way of dealing with actual or perceived (imagined) threats to physical safety, for example, threats from people who look like Arabs, or whose names sound Arabic. Such people are burdened with the stigma of being perceived as cultural threats. I will take an example from Prof. Lawrence’s *New Faiths, Old Fears* where he depicts a Duke Muslim undergraduate student, whose name is Arabic and who is an Arab Muslim, Abdullah al-Arian. This student, while working as a White House intern in June 2001, was rejected from meeting about the faith based and community initiatives chaired by President George W. Bush. The reason he was given was a technical error in security clearance. Clearly, it masked an evident fear of an Arab Muslim.¹⁵ The reason he was given was a technical error in security clearance. Clearly, it masked an evident fear of an Arab Muslim. Another example would be my Indonesian friend, who received a Fulbright scholarship, like me, to study in the U.S. He had not yet been given his visa to fly to the U.S. His Arabic name was similar to the names on the list of wanted terrorists. Two other examples are my sister and me. I called my sister in Indonesia, when I was in the U.S. She said that her son is now wearing a beard. Imagining Osama bin Laden’s beard on the one hand and the unemployment crisis on the other, she became worried, What if her son could not get a job in an international company in Indonesia because of his beard? When I studied in the U.S. and returned to Indonesia for a while, my friends often asked me a joking question: “Did any police come to you?” (They asked me this question because my middle and last names, “Abdul Matin,” resemble an Indonesian Bali bomber’s name, “Dul Matin”).¹⁶

Risk reduction then distances the labeled from those who label them. So, by stigmatizing the 9/11 Muslim hijackers, labelers protect themselves from the responsibility of having to associate with them, which reduces their risk of being hurt or angered by them. In another functionalist term, we name this behavior of the labelers “scapegoating and displacement.” The labelers label to achieve emotional satisfaction. In other words, they

do this labeling because they have feelings of revenge and punitiveness toward the Arab Muslim hijackers. Seeing this reality, I would say that Prof. Lawrence's thesis is true, as a result of violent acts, people often react with violence in the form of anger and distorted thinking. Islam and Arabs in general become stigmatized in the process.¹⁷

Another function that keeps terrorism persistent is "supplying popular cultural villains." This function is the degree to which the media as the producers of culture reinforce terror by showing crime news and action movies. These media could be radio, television, novels, books, and newspapers.

Gramsci's idea of hegemony may help me explain this media segment. According to Gramsci, media are agents through which individuals internalize specific ideas, and ideologies of the dominant groups.¹⁸ As a victim of the 9/11 hijackers, the U.S. condemns very much terrorism. This is a U.S. cease-terror campaign that has dominated dominant groups in the U.S.; for instance, the media owners endorse this idea to their staff to fill their media with Muslims' terror. Some examples are discernible in the following media published in the U.S. *The Economist* (September 11, 2003) published Peter David's "Survey: Islam and the West (In the name of Islam),"¹⁹ and Arnold Toynbee's *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*.²⁰ Both writers regard 9/11 as an individual trouble or personal trouble because they claim that 9/11 was a product of the hijackers' religious beliefs of the *jihad* (holy war against the infidels). Two other examples would be Time and a novel. Time magazine (January 26, 2004) presented a picture showing a person holding the Qur'an in his right hand and a bomb in his left hand with the title "The Rise of the *Jihadists*." This article quotes an Iraqi warrior's statement that he will make regular attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq.²¹ Cantrell and Vaughan wrote a novel entitled: *Saddam: The Face of Evil* with Saddam's picture. On the cover page, they mention "... inside the horrific mind of the Butcher of Bagdad."²²

The media satisfy audience demands for revenge against terrorism after 9/11. Meanwhile, consciously or unconsciously, these media have played a long-term role in supplying American popular culture with villains. Therefore, we can say that the stigmatized 9/11 atrocities persist because they are useful in variety of ways to the people who are not terrorists. In addition, the influence of 9/11 remains in the way that even the actual rate of terror is going down, we would predict that the fear of the reader of

news magazines Would increase, which would have an important consequence. For instance, people will purchase guns for safety. For the U.S.; the influence of the 9/11 suicide is significant, “it has caused quick and pervasive changes in the population’s freedom of action, the overall economy, even world outlook”.²³

Now, I will explain 9/11 in light of conflict-oriented paradigm. The functionalist-oriented paradigm, as I depicted above, deals with the persistence of 9/11. This paradigm helps me understand and explain the events after 9/11, in which 9/11 persists. In conflict-oriented paradigm, I will explain the larger trend of social events that prompted 9/11.

I argue that terrorism is a product of the social force of capitalism. Terrorism is a response to the irrationality of capitalism. Terrorism and capitalism are reciprocal in their characters, terrorism persists as long as capitalism continues because terrorism accommodates the victims’ feeling of the irrationality of capitalism, whereas capitalism protects those who own property.²⁴

Capitalism is historically a promise of a new and better world for America and France. The political revolutions in both countries, America (1760-1791) and French (1789-1799), have impelled dramatic changes throughout America, England, and across modern Europe. The changes offered much democracy in politics, science in culture, and capitalism in the marketplace.²⁵ The opposition to these dramatic changes came from a German scholar, Karl Marx (1818-1883). He moved to Paris (1843) where he met Friedrich Engels (1820-1895). With Engels, he wrote and published *The Communist Manifesto*, which endorsed the dominant intellectual and political force behind the working people’s movement known as the international against capitalism. Marx stated that capitalism denied human nature, the benefit of the product the worker produced belonged most to the labor owner. As a result, the worker’s labor was alienated and devaluated.²⁶

This contradiction led a new world conflict from 1919 to 1945, full of world wars and a holocaust. During this period, the failure in the capitalist world-system had occurred: the U.S. gross national product collapsed in 1929. The U.S. rivals became stronger: fascism by Benito Mussolini (1932) in Italy, Nazism by Hitler (1889-1945) in Germany, and Marxism by J.V. Stalin (1913) in Russia.²⁷

At the end of World War II (September 2, 1945), the U.S. was politically lifted where the war had crushed others in most of Europe (Germany, England, Russia, and Italy). Parts of Africa, and much of Asia including Japan lay wasted. This circumstance made the U.S. capitalist world-system rise without rivals. The U.S. possessed wealth of every kind: real capital and income, industrial capacity and know-how, spiritual self-confidence, and intellectual and technical capital, which developed in the war effort. The U.S. production such as steel, oil, electricity, and automobiles dominated half or more of the world. The U.S. was also stronger in scientific knowledge where inventive genius, productive capacity, and moral force were grounded. As a result, the U.S. was the country that was able to invent, produce, and organize the ultimate weapon. The use of the atomic bomb in the summer of 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a symbol of this U.S. military power. So, in 1945, the U.S. was the perfect fulfillment of the modern world in politics (democracy), economy (capitalism), and knowledge (science).²⁸ According to Gramsci's idea of hegemony, hegemony is the degree to which the dominant group's culture exercise throughout society.²⁹ Following Gramsci's idea, I can say that since 1945, the U.S. has become a hegemonic country in the world, a model of modernity. The root of modernity is the U.S. hegemony, then.

Furthermore, I will connect the U.S. capitalism clash to the Middle East. This conflict started since the U.S. support for Israel in the 1973 October war. Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan had lost their territories. During this war, the U.S. supported Israel by airlifting crucial equipment to the Israel military. In retaliation, in 1974, the major Arab oil producers, which participated in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) instituted the oil embargo on Israel's allies, particularly the U.S, Japan, and European nations.³⁰ This embargo affected U.S. economic life such as gasoline rationing, and inflation.³¹ This circumstance forced President Nixon to impose a series of policies such as lowering highway speed limits, reducing nonessential lighting, minimizing heat in home and offices, darkening monuments in Washington, and voluntary cutting back on driving. A sense of crisis and anger to the Arab use of oil as a weapon emerged throughout the American media.³²

Nevertheless, the oil embargo taught the U.S. that the military strength was not the only basis of its world economic and political relations, the U.S. needed strength, as President Jimmy Carter suggested, the ability to

manage a new international order. The U.S. forced a worldwide nuclear alert. Having taken this lesson into account, the U.S. joined with the Soviet Union in cosponsoring a UN cease-fire resolution to stop Israel's counterattack on Egypt's Third Army Corps. The U.S. responded to this cooperation by positioning its forces in Egypt to send U.S. troops to this region. This implies that the U.S. helped Egypt not only due to the embargo but also to protect Egypt and the Middle East from the Soviet Union's intervention. This worldwide nuclear alert was successful because OPEC ended their embargo in 1978.³³ This success meant a lot to the U.S. For example, in the winter Olympics in 1979, the U.S. students' hockey won a game over the Soviet's group. This was the first time the U.S. beat the Soviet in hockey since 1960. In general, since 1979, the U.S. has become the perfect fulfillment of postmodernity not only in politics, science in knowledge, and capitalism in economy, but also in international order in management.³⁴

Subsequently, I will connect this U.S. postmodernity to Osama bin Laden, the most wanted Saudi Arabian man. The Saudi political elite mostly belong to the same family/tribe. This kinship has led them to seek protection from the U.S. Since the 1940's, the U.S. military patronage has existed in Saudi Arabia, through which the Saudi political elite have learned the ropes of diplomacy. They have also learned from their position as official custodians of the holy places in Mecca and Medina.³⁵ In addition, the Saudi political elite have also learned the U.S. marketplace or capitalism. I visited Mecca in 1998 for performing little pilgrimage (*'umrah*), I lodged at the Hilton Hotel and right opposite to it and Ka'ba was McDonald's and Coca Cola restaurant. Ka'ba is a center direction to which the Muslims face in their five-time-a-day prayers.³⁶ This process of learning was promoting a conservative religious discourse to maintain the Saudi political elite's interests as well as American interests in the Gulf. So, in terms of religion, the close alliance with the U.S. does not bother the Saudi political elite's vision of Islam. The Saudi political elite have both experience and patronage by the U.S.

Unlike the Saudi political elite, the Taliban understood world politics and the position of Afghanistan in the world after the withdrawal of the Soviets. The Taliban had suffered from a civil war and from Soviet intervention for twenty years. The U.S. to maintain its hegemony in Afghanistan and to spearhead an international alliance to stop the Soviet's invasion

to Afghanistan used this chaos. This alliance consisted of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and all sorts of Muslim fundamentalists including Osama bin Laden. Under the Geneva accords of April 1988, the Soviet withdrew from Afghanistan.³⁷

If we compare between the U.S. hegemony in Egypt and Afghanistan, the U.S. sending the troops to both countries seems to be the same: the U.S. tried to prevent other countries from a Soviet invasion. Taking this comparison into account, we can perceive that the battle in Afghanistan was mainly a battle between two superpowers. The Taliban, different *mu-jahidin* and fundamental groups, and Osama bin Laden, seem to be able to admit this perception after the war. In other words, they felt left to their fates and discontented after the Soviet's withdrawal from the Afghanistan.

In such wakefulness, these disgruntled groups watched the U.S. hegemony persisting in the Middle East and Muslim world. For instance, they observed the U.S. intervention in the Gulf in 1990, and the U.S. support to the political elite in the Muslim world. The more the disappointed groups saw this U.S. hegemony, the more these people felt hurt. This might have made them aware of the U.S. military patronage in Middle East countries. The U.S. commoditized the Middle East countries' products, especially oil.³⁸

Moreover, in the case of capitalism in Hawai'i, Trask regards that capitalism as a prostitution of the commoditized countries' cultures, for instance, multinational corporation companies own the Hawaiian profits, and this situation exposes the Hawaiian women to survive by selling their sexual capacities.³⁹ Briefly, capitalism has its own heresies that disappointed fundamentalist Muslim groups in Afghanistan. So, the complex shared discontented feeling justified these fundamentalist Muslim groups to hate the heresies and irrationality of capitalism. This further justified the 9/11 hijackers by releasing their actions in terms of "*jihad*" (holy war against the infidels). Finally, they implemented this release on 11 September 2001 by attacking the U.S. twin towers of the World Trade Center in Manhattan, the Pentagon, and in the plane in Pennsylvania. These attackers then did so because they felt displeased after the U.S. drove the Soviet Union's troops' out of Afghanistan. Regarding these groups as laborers and the U.S. as the owner of these laborers' labor, we can say that this 9/11 attack was for this working class's sake.

If we return to the functionalist-oriented paradigm, the 9/11 attack then may accommodate the inspiration of both Muslim and non-Muslims who hate the heresies and the irrationality of the capitalism. This accommodation makes 9/11 persistent. For instance, I saw in my own country, Indonesia, people wearing T-Shirts with the picture of Osama bin Laden on them. Seeing this reality, I would say that what Kepel says might be true that the 9/11 attack aimed at establishing universal solidarity among Muslims in reaction to the suffering of their Afghan brothers.⁴⁰

Conclusion

I approach the 9/11 event in this paper as a case of suicide bombing in light of conflict and functionalist-oriented paradigms. This reading has led me to conclude that the 9/11 atrocity was not simply an individual problem, or a reflection of personal troubles of the 9/11 hijackers themselves, but rather a consequence of a larger trend involving social issues. This larger trend is a holistic trend. Prof. Lisa Peloquin uses this term “holistic” to articulate a process in less individualistic and more cultural terms.⁴¹

The two paradigms that I used in this research paper are also holistic paradigms. These paradigms seem to reiterate what Peter Berger said earlier about sociology, “Things are now what they seem.” Following these paradigms, I assert that the 9/11 hijackers’ attack was not *jihad* for *jihad*’s sake, but a use of *jihad* as a concept to attack capitalism that had victimized an opposed class, the Afghan brothers. This *jihad* was to legitimize the interests of this working class. The term “working” here signifies the energy that the discontented Afghan and Muslim groups offered to the U.S. in expelling the Soviet from Afghanistan. In light of the functionalist-oriented paradigm, the 9/11 attack is still ongoing. It is evidently useful for the culture producers, they use it for entertainment, and fun, as well as for expressing revenge against the 9/11 terrorists. Using the functionalist-oriented paradigm, I can say that the culture producers in sociology could be us, people surrounding us, or institutions like the media.

Last but not least, in this paper, I also found an interesting definition of modernity and postmodernity. Both terms are defined according to the U.S. history of power. Modernity is the degree to which the U.S. started to be a “perfect” country in the fulfillment of democracy in politics, knowledge in science, and an economy that exemplifies capitalism. Postmodernity is the degree to which the U.S. added into these three elements

of modernity an international order in management: a worldwide nuclear alert. Modernity has happened since 1945. Postmodernity occurred after the U.S. worldwide cease-terror campaign as a new element to postmodernity. Along with this evidence, I can say that the time starting from 9/11 is the time beyond both modernity and postmodernity, this is the period of mega-modernity.

Endnotes:

1. Peter L. Berger, *The Invitation of Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective*, (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1963), pp. 21, 23, 24.
2. Charles Lemert (ed.), *Social Theory: The Multicultural and Classic Readings*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), p. 388.
3. Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11*, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 7 and 8.
4. About subculture, see Lisa J. McIntyre, *The Practical Skeptic: Core Concepts in Sociology*, (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002), second edition, pp. 107-109.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 28; Emile Durkheim, "Anomy and Modern Life," in John J. Macionis, Nijole V. Benokraitis (eds.), *Seeing Ourselves: Classic, Contemporary, and Cross-Cultural Readings in Sociology*, (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003), p. 485.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 29, and 38-39.
8. Herbert J. Gans, "Positive Functions of the Undeserving Poor: Uses of the Underclass in America," in Susan J. Ferguson, *Mapping the Social Landscape*, (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002), pp. 300, 302-302, and 308-309.
9. Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Susan J. Ferguson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 454.
10. Karl Marx, Alienated Labor, in John J. Macionis, Nijole V. Benokraitis (eds.), *Op. Cit.*, pp. 279-282, see also Lisa Marie Peloquin, "Week 5 Handout — Section 1 & 5," Sociology 10D, Spring 2004, pp. 1-2. I received this unpublished handout from my Teaching Assistant, Dr. Ivan Shin.
11. David A. Karp, "Speaking of Sadness: Depression, Disconnection, and the Meanings of Illness," in David M. Newman, *Sociology: Exploring the Architecture of Everyday Life*, (Thousand Oaks, California, London, New Delhi: Pine Forge Press, 2002), third edition, p. 32.
12. Stephanie Coontz, "How History and Sociology Can Help Today's Families," in Lisa J. McIntyre, *The Practical Skeptic., Op. Cit.*, pp. 7, 13, 14, and 16.
13. See, for instance, Lisa J. McIntyre, *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4, and 14-15.
14. Herbert J. Gans, "Positive Functions of the Underserving Poor," in Susan J. Ferguson, *Loc. Cit.*
15. Bruce B. Lawrence, *New Faiths, Old Fears: Muslims and Other Asian Immigrants in American Religious Life*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 4.
16. Even my English teacher at Duke said in class in a semi-joking way that she thought that I brought a bomb in side of my jacket, that I look like terrorist, that all Muslims are terrorists.

17. Bruce B. Lawrence, "The Islamic Idiom of Violence: A View from Indonesia," in Mark Juergensmeyer (ed.), *Terrorism and Political Violence*, (London: Frank Cass, Autumn 1991), volume 3, p. 82.
18. Charles Lemert (ed.), *Social Theory: The Multicultural and Classic Readings*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), p. 20.
19. Peter David, "Survey: Islam and the West (In the Name of Islam)," in *The Economist*, September 11th 2003 or http://www.economist.com/surveys/displayStory.cfm?Story_id=2035148 (9/19/2003).
20. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' 'Jhon L. Esposito: Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam," in *The Muslim World*, (Hartford: The Duncan Black Macdonald Center at Hartford Seminary, Fall 2002), Volume 92, Numbers 3 & 4, pp. 494-500.
21. Romesh Ratnesar with Phil Zabriskie, "The Rise of the Jihadists," in *Time*, January 26, 2004, pp. 31-32.
22. Mark Cantrell and Donald Vaughan, *Saddam: The Face of Evil*, Ed. By Nicholas Marer, (Florida: American Media Inc., June 2003), p. cover page.
23. Cindy C. Combs and Martin Slann, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, (New York: Facts on File, 2002), p. 205.
24. Kari Marx, "Alienated Labor," in John J. Macionis and Nijole Benokaitis, *Op. Cit.*, p. 299.
25. Charles Lemert, *Op. Cit.*, p. 22.
26. *Ibid.*; Kari Marx, "Alienated Labor," in John J. Macionis and Nijole Benokaitis, *Loc. Cit.* Lisa J. McIntyre, *Op. Cit.*, p. 20.
27. Charles Lemert, *Ibid.*, pp. 191, and 271, about the dates see <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm>
28. Charles Lemert, *Ibid.*, p. 271.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
30. Melanie McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 134.
31. Charles Lemert, *Op. Cit.*, p. 451.
32. Melani McAlister, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 134-135.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-136.
34. Charles Lemert, *Loc. Cit.*
35. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi', "Jhon L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam," in *The Muslim World*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 496.
36. I went there as a tour and little pilgrimage (*'umrah*) guide on the financial aid of Minister of Financial Affairs of Indonesia in that time, Dr. Fuad Bawazier.
37. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi', "Jhon L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam," in *The Muslim World*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 497.
38. Melani McAlister, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 136, 155.
39. Haunani-Kay Trask, "Lovely Hula Hands: Corporate Tourism and the Prostitution of Hawaiian Culture," in Susan J. Ferguson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 104.
40. Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trait of Political Islam*, (London, New York: LB. Tauris, 2003), pp. 2, and mainly 4.

41. Lisa Marie Peloquin, "Vibrant Weave: "Holistic Healing" and the Embodiment of Community in a Southern Mill Town," PhD dissertation, Department of Sociology, Duke University, 2003, pp. 12, 117, and 147.

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ISSN 0215-6253 (print)



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ISSN 2714-6103 (online)



9 772714 610004