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EDITORIAL

RELASI ISLAM DAN KEKUASAAN: PLURALITAS TAFSIR ATAS BUDAYA DAN POLITIK MUSLIM

Perkembangan reformasi telah menawarkan banyak ruang kebebasan, baik dalam wacana maupun praktik politik. Beragam khazanah intelektual dibongkar kembali untuk dipajang dalam etalase ekpresentasi kehidupan politik bangsa. Tak terkecuali khazanah dunia muslim yang secara historis telah memperlihatkan keintimannya dengan politik kekuasaan dengan rasa dan warnanya yang beragam. Sebagai sebuah wacana, ia berhak untuk ditafsirkan, diaktualisasikan, bahkan mungkin dibiarkan sebagai realitas masa lalu. Melihat transisi politik kebangsaan yang terus mencari bentuk dan di tengah wacana politik keagamaan yang sering melahirkan kesyahduan historis, maka kami berhasrat untuk menampilkan beragam wacana tersebut dalam bingkai pluralitas politik kekuasaan Islam. Pluralitas wacana merupakan medium untuk meletakkan perbedaan sebagai keindahan yang memberi sinergi untuk melahirkan yang terbaik di antara sekian wacana yang ada.

Refleksi kali ini menurunkan beberapa tulisan yang menawarkan wacana sosio-politik yang hadir dalam khazanah Islam sejak masa Khalafa al-Rasyidin, masa klasik dan pertengahan, serta realitas kontemporer yang terjadi di Indonesia.

Tulisan pertama disajikan oleh Sirojuddin Aly yang mengulas secara mendalam beberapa sistem pemilihan kepemimpinan yang berlangsung pada masa Khalafa al-Rasyidin. Menurutnya proses kepemimpinan dari empat khalifah (Abu Bakar, Umar, Utsman, dan Ali) melahirkan paradigma yang berbeda. Pada masa Abu Bakar diterapkan sistem pemilihan langsung dan bebas, sementara kepemimpinan Umar dilakukan melalui pencalonan oleh pemimpin sebelumnya, yaitu Abu Bakar yang kemudian dipilih oleh rakyat. Sementara pada masa Utsman pemilihan dilangsungkan melalui panitia pemilihan yang dibentuk oleh Umar. Sedangkan kepemimpinan Ali diawali oleh pengakuan tokoh senior yang memiliki kharisma yang kemudian didukung oleh masyarakat. Proses pemilihan Ali

berlangsung dalam masa krisis karena adanya persaingan di kalangan sahabat pasca terbunuhnya Utsman.

Islam dan politik merupakan dua entitas yang unik karena keintimannya dalam merangkai kekuasaan dalam Islam. Hal ini terlihat dari wacana yang berkembang di kalangan pemikir politik muslim dalam melihat relasi agama dan negara. Sukron Kamil menelaah pemikiran politik Islam yang, menurutnya, sangat kaya atau bersifat *polyinterpretable*, sehingga sulit digeneralisir dengan mengecapnya sebagai otoriter atau demokratis. Sulit dipungkiri bahwa dalam sejarahnya Islam melahirkan beragam praktik politik kekuasaan, mulai yang otoriter sampai yang demokratis. Tulisan ini ingin melihat khazanah pemikiran politik Islam klasik dan pertengahan yang terkait dengan beberapa isu seperti hubungan agama dan negara, legitimasi otoritarianisme, bentuk pemerintahan teokrasi, demokrasi, dan aristokrasi, serta isu tentang masyarakat ideal. Dari pemaparan tersebut diharapkan dapat diperoleh gambaran yang lebih komprehensif tentang konsepsi politik Islam yang berkembang pada masa tersebut relevansinya dengan saat ini.

Pluralitas wacana di dalam Islam mencerminkan adanya realitas yang beragam pula. Oleh karena itu perkembangan sosial budaya umat Islam akan ikut menentukan pergeseran kategorisasi yang sering dilakukan oleh para pengamat terhadap umat Islam. Muhamad Ali mencoba menelaah lebih jauh perdebatan yang meletakkan umat Islam Indonesia dalam kategorisasi-kategorisasi yang harus dikritisi karena adanya kemungkinan terjadinya konvergensi di antara kategorisasi tersebut. Sulit dipungkiri bahwa salah satu penemuan penting dalam menelaah sisi sosial umat Islam adalah kategorisasi kepercayaan dan perilaku orang Islam, yang membuktikan pluralitas Islam. Namun demikian, kategorisasi-kategorisasi —seperti santri-abangan-priayi, tradisionalis-modernis, politikal-kultural, fundamentalis-liberal, menurut Ali, harus disikapi secara kritis. Kategorisasi yang paling tepat adalah yang lebih dekat kepada kenyataan. Santri-abangan-priayi yang dikembangkan pada tahun 1960-an menunjukkan sentrisme Jawa dalam studi Islam Indonesia dan memperlihatkan suatu sistem tertutup yang statis, yang harus hati-hati ketika digunakan untuk menunjuk orang Islam di luar Jawa dan di masa sekarang. Pembedaan politikal-kultural juga sulit diterapkan dalam banyak kasus, seperti kasus ketika sebuah kelompok Islam terlibat dalam dua kegiatan politik dan kultural sekaligus.

Realitas sosial tidak selalu berjalin berkelindan dengan ajaran agama. Ajaran agung yang diwartakan oleh agama sering terhempas oleh kenyataan penyimpangan perilaku yang dipertontonkan oleh pemeluk agama, bahkan oleh tokoh agama itu sendiri. Inilah yang terlihat dari korupsi yang melanda negeri Indonesia, sebuah negara yang mayoritas penduduknya muslim. Korupsi di negeri ini merambah ke semua lini bagaikan gurita. Penyimpangan ini bukan saja merasuki kawasan yang sudah dipersepsi publik sebagai sarang korupsi. Tapi juga menyusuri lorong-lorong instansi yang tak terbayangkan sebelumnya bahwa di sana ada korupsi. Satu per satu skandal keuangan di berbagai instansi negara terbongkar. Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) yang dipenuhi aktivis demokrasi, akademisi, dan guru besar, pun tak steril dari wabah korupsi. Di Departemen Agama (Depag), kasus korupsinya bahkan telah menyeret mantan orang nomor satunya sebagai tersangka. Tulisan Achmad Zainuri ini mencoba mengungkap akar tradisi dan kultural dari penyimpangan tersebut.

Perkembangan penafsiran terhadap sosial keagamaan lebih mengacu pada peran positif yang dimainkan oleh agama, walaupun sulit dipungkiri bahwa sebagian orang menganggap agama sebagai candu kemajuan. Figur-figur seperti Namrud, Firaun, Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, Nietzsche, dan lain-lain, memandang peran agama secara sosio-politis menunjukkan fungsi yang justru menghalangi kemajuan masyarakat, mengancam kekuasaan dan sistem yang telah dibangun oleh elite agama, budaya, atau politik. Namun melihat perkembangan masyarakat kontemporer, agama seperti sebuah spirit yang banyak dipertaruhkan sebagai ideologi alternatif bagi kehidupan saat ini. Agama dianggap sebagai petunjuk bagi manusia menuju jalan keselamatan dan kebahagiaan di dunia dan akhirat. Itulah telaah Kusmana yang melihat peranan penting agama (Islam) bagi kehidupan manusia. Menurutnya, terdapat signifikansi yang kuat pesan Islam dari sisi rahmat dan kesalehan sosial.

Tata kehidupan dunia diwarnai oleh beragam ideologi. Masing-masing ideologi menawarkan masa depan yang paripurna. Sosialisme mengagungkan kolektivisme dan mengabaikan individualitas yang bertujuan akhir untuk pemenuhan kebutuhan yang bersifat material. Sebaliknya kapitalisme (liberalisme) menempatkan manusia sebagai individu yang bebas dan berhak menentukan sendiri hidupnya. Karena itu, boleh melakukan apa saja yang dipandang baik dan benar bagi kepentingan dan keuntungan dirinya. Dari kedua ideologi besar dunia tersebut, Islam tidak

menafikan atau menempatkan diri pada salah satu kutub tersebut. Islam hadir sebagai jalan tengah di antara ekstremitas beragam ideologi secara seimbang dan adil. Karena itu hubungan yang hendak dibangun oleh Islam adalah kemitraan dan kerja sama yang saling menguntungkan untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraan hidup seluruh anak manusia. Tulisan Masri Mansoer ini mengulas sisi universalitas Islam sebagai landasan yang paripurna untuk membangun tatanan masyarakat dunia.

Refleksi kali ini juga menurunkan tulisan yang mengulas perjalanan sejarah Hadis Nabawi yang panjang dan berliku. Perjalanan ini melahirkan kontroversi dan perseteruan wacana. Salah satu persoalan krusial yang kerap menjadi bahan perdebatan di pelbagai kalangan adalah menyangkut sejarah penulisan dan pembukuan Hadis. Bahkan, wacana (*discourse*) mengenai kodifikasi ini telah dijadikan senjata ampuh oleh orientalis dan para *inkar al-sunnah* (suatu kelompok yang menentang Sunnah) untuk mendiskreditkan Hadis atau Sunnah serta menggugat autentisitasnya sebagai sumber hukum Islam kedua, setelah al-Qur'an. Pertentangan di kalangan umat Islam, demikian halnya yang menjadi kritik para orientalis, berkutat pada persoalan keabsahan penulisan dan pembukuan Hadis jika dilihat dari aspek pertimbangan normatif, hingga akhirnya bermuara kepada keraguan terhadap otoritas Sunnah itu sendiri dalam sistem besar: Syariat Islam. Tulisan Ahmad Tholabi Kharlie ini berusaha memberikan klarifikasi awal terhadap pro-kontra seputar kodifikasi Hadis Nabi tersebut.

Rangkaian sajian tulisan dalam **Refleksi** kali ini merupakan ekspresi dari relasi ajaran langit dengan realitas historis yang tidak selalu berjalin berkelindan. Tentu, koneksitas antara ajaran langit dan realitas historis adalah harapan yang harus terus disuarakan secara sistematis dan dapat dipertanggungjawabkan secara ilmiah. Selamat membaca.

Jakarta, Agustus 2005

Redaksi

UNDERSTANDING MUSLIM PLURALITY: PROBLEMS OF CATEGORIZING MUSLIMS IN POSTCOLONIAL INDONESIA[1]

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Abstract: *Islam in Indonesia has received significant academic attention. One important finding is the categorization of beliefs and behaviors of Muslims, which proves the plurality of Islam. However, these categorizations—such as santri-abangan-priayi, traditionalist-modernist, political-cultural, fundamentalist-liberal, great tradition-little tradition, and global-local—must be critically approached. The most appropriate categorization is one that is closer to reality. The santri-abangan-priayi categorization developed in the 1960s demonstrates Javanese centrism in the study of Indonesian Islam and shows a static, closed system that should be carefully used to refer to Muslims outside of Java and in the present era. The traditionalist-modernist category actually carries modernization assumptions and therefore should not be viewed statically. The differentiation of political-cultural is also difficult to apply in many cases, such as when an Islamic group is involved in both political and cultural activities simultaneously. Similarly, the terms great tradition-little tradition to refer to Sharia Islam and Sufi Islam are less relevant in cases where specific Islamic groups practice both Sharia and Sufism simultaneously, besides the fact that the terms big and small assume one pattern is more valuable than others religious patterns. The global and local perspectives in understanding the diversity of Islam can avoid overly general labeling, but it is still difficult to determine which aspects are global and which are local and challenging to measure religious change accurately. Even more challenging in understanding the plurality of Islam is how to determine a religious act and what is not religious (secular).*

Keywords: *Muslims in Indonesia; Pluralism; Traditionalist; Modernist; Santri; Javanese.*

Abstrak: *Islam di Indonesia telah mendapat perhatian akademik yang cukup besar. Salah satu penemuan pentingnya adalah kategorisasi kepercayaan dan perilaku orang Islam, yang membuktikan pluralitas Islam. Namun demikian, kategorisasi-kategorisasi —seperti santri-abangan-priayi, tradisionalis-modernis, politikal-kultural, fundamentalis-liberal, great tradition-little tradition, dan global-lokal, harus disikapi secara kritis. Kategorisasi yang paling tepat adalah yang lebih dekat kepada kenyataan. Santri-abangan-priayi yang dikembangkan pada tahun 1960-an menunjukkan sentrisme Jawa dalam studi Islam Indonesia dan memperlihatkan suatu sistem tertutup yang statis, yang harus hati-hati ketika digunakan untuk menunjuk orang Islam di luar Jawa dan di masa sekarang. Kategori tradisionalis-modernis sebetulnya memiliki asumsi modernisasi dan karena itu tidak boleh dilihat secara statis. Pembedaan politikal-kultural juga sulit diterapkan dalam banyak kasus, seperti kasus ketika sebuah kelompok Islam terlibat dalam dua kegiatan politik dan kultural sekaligus. Begitu pula istilah tradisi besar-tradisi kecil untuk menunjuk Islam syariah dan Islam sufistik, kurang mengena dalam kasus-kasus di mana kelompok Islam tertentu mengamalkan syariah dan tasawuf sekaligus, selain bahwa istilah besar dan kecil menganggap satu corak lebih bernilai ketimbang corak keagamaan lain. Perspektif global dan lokal dalam memahami kemajemukan Islam mampu menghindari pelabelan yang terlalu umum, namun masih sulit menentukan mana aspek yang global dan mana yang lokal dan sulit mengukur perubahan agama (religious change) secara pasti. Lebih sulit lagi dalam upaya memahami pluralitas Islam adalah bagaimana menentukan suatu perbuatan bersifat keagamaan (religious) dan mana yang bukan keagamaan (secular).*

Kata Kunci: *Muslim Indonesia; Pluralisme; Tradisionalis; Modernis; Santri; Jawa.*

OVER the last fifty years, Islam in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, has received greater scholarly attention from political scientists, historians, and particularly anthropologists. In the continuing efforts to understand Muslim beliefs and practices in Java in particular and in the archipelago in general, the number of studies of Islam –its history, politics, economy, and culture– has increased significantly.

In these works, however, there is still a tendency to label or categorize Muslim beliefs and practices using terminologies that might not be used by Muslims themselves. While some of these categories and terminologies are in fact accepted and incorporated by Muslim scholars and other specialists into their own academic language, others have a limited application. In this paper, I will examine the different ways in which a number of prominent Western and Indonesian scholars have categorized Islam and Muslims, and will then assess the value of their categorizations in understanding Muslims in postcolonial Indonesia. The categories I will discuss

are *santri-abangan-priyayi*, traditionalist-modernist, political-cultural, fundamentalist-liberal, great-little tradition, and the global-local.

Santri, *Abangan*, and *Priyayi*

In the systematic categorization Javanese Muslim beliefs, the most important and influential scholar is undoubtedly the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, who carried out ethnographic fieldwork in the village of Modjokuto in east central Java between 1952 and 1954. Geertz intended to demonstrate the complexity, depth, and richness of Javanese spiritual life although, as we shall see, his categorization was in many ways problematic.[2] He developed three subvariants or sub-traditions within the general Javanese religious system: *abangan*, *santri*, and *priyayi*. *Abangan* was more closely associated with the Javanese village and *santri* with the commercial world, although there are some *santri* elements in the village, *priyayi* was linked to the court or bureaucracy. Religiously, *abangan* were more animistic and *santri* more Islamic, whereas *priyayi* were more Hinduistic. Geertz claimed that these categories were not constructed types, but terms and divisions the Javanese themselves applied.[3]

Let us consider the first category, *abangan*. According to Geertz, the core practice of *abangan* is the *Slametan*, the communal feast, which symbolizes the social unity of participants. The feast is held in various occasions, such as birth, circumcision, marriage, and death.[4] The Javanese celebrate Islamic holy days, but there are additional calendrical, village, and intermittent *Slametans*.[5] *Slametan* is also held to protect the participants against the spirits.[6] Belief in spirits provides them with a set of ready-made answers to the questions posed by puzzling experiences. An *abangan* may also be involved with curing, sorcery, and magic.[7]

Geertz's second category is *santri*, which originally meant *student*, of the *pesantren* (boarding school). It was used by Geertz to re. fer to those "true" Muslims, as they call themselves, or "Javanese Arabs", as their opponents call them.[8] Their opponents call them so because the *santri* act more like the Arabs than indigenous Javanese, Geertz observed that toward the middle of the nineteenth century the isolation of Indonesian Muslims from Islamic centers in the Middle East began to break down. Arab traders came in increasing numbers to settle in Indonesia and transmitted their "orthodoxy" to the local merchants.[9] Indonesians also began to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca in increasing numbers. This new interaction with the

center of Islam contributed to the development of local Islamic learning. As a result, rural Islamic schools and mosgues became centers for religion and learning, and those who lived in this environment were called *santris*. Geertz observed that *santri* began to see themselves as "minority representatives of the true faith in the great forest of ignorance and superstition, protectors of the Divine Law against the pagan crudities of traditional customs."[10] But the drift toward "orthodoxy" (literally, "proper belief") in rural areas was slow. It was in the towns that merchant ethics, nationalism, and Islamic modernism combined to produce a greater militancy. With the founding of the Muhammadiyah by a returned pilgrim in 1912 and the birth of its political counterpart *Sarekat Islam* (The Islamic Union) in the same year, the sense of "orthodoxy" spread beyond the towns to the villages.[11]

Geertz outlined some general differences between *santri* and *abangan*. The *santris*, he said, are more concerned about Islamic doctrine, especially its moral and social interpretation. Urban *santris* are different from rural *santris*. According to Geertz, *santris* in the towns are more "apologetics", that is to say, they are committed to the defense of Islam as a superior ethical code and a social doctrine for modern society. In the countryside the doctrinal aspect is less marked: there the *santri* ethics remain closer to the *abangan*. But rural *santris*, said Geertz, are different from the *abangans* in their self-declared religious superiority and their insistence that Islam is doctrinal. *Abangans* are fairly indifferent to doctrine but are concerned about ritual details while remaining tolerant about religious beliefs. They said, "Many are the ways," whereas the *santris* regard *abangan* rituals as heterodox. Another difference between the two, said Geertz, lies in social organization. For the *santris*, religious organizations are important, for them, the sense of community (*ummat*) is primary, while the *abangans* are more focused on the household, or family. *Santris* seek to apply the Islamic law through organizations, primarily through four types of social institution: political parties, religious schools, ministry of religion, and more informal congregational organizations.[12]

Within the *santri* variant, Geertz made another categorization: conservative (*kolot*) versus modern (*moderen*). The conservative, he said, tends to emphasize a relationship with God in which one's life is fated by God's will, whereas the modern tends to stress a relationship with God in which hard work and self-determination are important. The conservative tends

to hold to a "totalistic" concept of the role of religion in life, in which the religious and the secular tend to be blurred, whereas the modern holds a narrower notion of religion in which the secular and the sacred tend to be distinct. The conservative tends to be less concerned with purity of their Islam and more willing to allow non-Islamic rites at least a minor place within the religious sphere, whereas the modern tends to be concerned with a purity of Islam. The conservative tends to rely on the detailed scholastic learning in traditional religious commentaries, whereas the modern tends to be pragmatic and to rely on the general reference to the Koran and the Prophetic tradition (*Hadith*).[13] Geertz summarizes this *kolot-moderen* distinction in the following manner: A "fated" life versus a "self-determined" one: a "totalistic" view of religion versus a "narrowed" one, a more "syncretic" Islam versus a "pure" one, an interest in "religious experience" versus an emphasis on "the instrumental aspect of religion", the justification of practice by "custom" and "scholastic learning" versus justification by the "Spirit of the Koran and the *Hadith*".[14]

The third category is *priyayi*, a term applied to the Javanese nobility. Geertz saw the *priyayi* as being closer to the *abangan* because both represent a not-purely-Islamic-group. Nonetheless, the *abangan* tradition serves to define the basic social interrelationships of the land-bound peasantry, whereas the *priyayis* are in the towns. As aristocrats, see themselves as superior to the non-*priyayis* because of wealth, life style, or most importantly descent, and they conceive of life in terms of hierarchy, power, and privilege. The *priyayis* have three major foci of religious life: etiquette, art, and mystical practice. In terms of etiquette, the *priyayis* use the refined (alus) Javanese language, and tend to be indirect and to avoid conflict. In terms of arts, they have shadow puppet (*wayang*), percussion orchestra (gamelan), court dances (*joget*), and textile decoration (batik). Although *wayang* and the gamelan music are also performed in the *abangan* and even *santri* contexts, it is largely the *priyayis* who regard the *wayang* as an expression of their values.[15] Religiously, the *priyayis* endorse mysticism (*kebatinan*, inner-selfness), that is, an applied metaphysics, or a set of practical rules for enrichment of man's spiritual life.[16] *Priyayi* mysticism holds to religious relativism that all religions are the same. The *priyayis* call the *santris* fanatics, as opposed to themselves who are tolerant.[17]

Having described the three religious' variants, Geertz argued that there are many common values and some interrelationships among these three

variants. He summed up his points as follows: First, there is considerable antagonism between the adherents of these groups and the antagonism is increasing: second, despite these differences, Javanese do share many common values, third, several factors tend to exacerbate conflict among the three groups while several others tend to moderate it. The exacerbating factors are intrinsic ideological differences, the changing system of social stratification and increased status mobility, the struggle for political power, and the need for scapegoats. The moderating factors are the sense of a common culture, the fact that religious patterns do not become embodied in social forms, a general tolerance based on a "contextual relativism", and the steady growth of social mechanisms for a pluralistic form of social integration.[18]

Geertz's theories have stimulated further studies.[19] Most scholars seem to accept Geertz's typology of *santri-abangan-priyayi*, but felt more refinement was necessary. Following Geertz, another anthropologist James L. Peacock agreed with the three variants but developed the *santri* category further. Geertz had divided the *santri* into the reformist (*santri moderen*) and traditionalist (*santri kolot*). To reinforce the distinct characteristics of the reformist *santri*, Peacock combined Geertz's cultural analysis with psychological analysis as well as statistics.[20] According to Peacock, the reformist displayed several particular characteristics: theologically, the reformist believed in ijtihad (rational personal interpretation of Islam) and purification of tradition. Organizationally, they were members of the Muhammadiyah (founded in 1912 in Jogjakarta) or other reformist organizations. Educationally, they were students of Muhammadiyah, either of the government or of the madrasah (nongovernmental Islamic schools). In contrast with the syncretizes, the reformists had less belief in sacred relics, in messianic princes, in spirits, were less likely to participate in *Slametan* (communal feasts), and placed a higher priority on observance of the five daily prayers than on meditative communion with God.[21] Thus, Peacock simply reinforced the categorization Geertz had proposed. Unlike Geertz who relied on qualitative sources, Peacock provided more quantitative material by drawing on psychological and statistical accounts of the modern *santri* variant.

The historian Merle Ricklefs also followed Geertz's theory while developing it further. Ricklefs argued that an accurate depiction of Javanese so-

ciety requires a three-dimensional model with vertical, horizontal, and lateral axes. The vertical axis defines social class, with several important major classifications and infinite minor gradations. At the top is the elite, *priyayi*. At the bottom is peasant, called *wong cilik*, little man. On a horizontal axis, the religious distinction ranges from the nominally Muslim *abangan* with little knowledge or concern about Islam and who is committed to Javanese culture, to the *santri* who takes Islam as the principal regulating factor in daily life. The third axis is within the ranks of the *santri*: the old fashioned (*kolot*) and the modernist (*moderen*). Thus, according to Ricklefs, there are a number of combinations: *priyayi-santri*, *wong cilik-abangan-kolot*, *priyayi-abangan-kolot*, *priyayi-abangan*-modern, *wong cilik-santri-kolot*, *wong cilik-abangan*, and so forth.[22] In other words, Ricklefs argued against a tendency towards binary categorization that he saw I Geertz's work.

Writing thirty years after Geertz, another anthropologist, Andrew Beatty, implicitly accepted the categories of *santri* and *abangan*, while making some qualifications. According to Beatty, Geertz's three religious variants seem to inhabit separate worlds and each group is consistent with its separate identity. However, in the 1990s Beatty observed that much of the rural Java was populated by heterogeneous communities, and many individuals in these communities were neither clearly *santri* nor *abangan* but something in between. *Santri*, for example, lived intermingled with *abangan*. According to Beatty, this zone is that of compromise, inconsistency and ambivalence which cannot be captured by a categorical opposition of *santri* versus *abangan*. He argued that the complexity of Javanese civilization resides not just in plurality but in interrelation, in the dynamics of religious adaptation and change.[23]

Santri, *Abangan* and *Priyayi* in Contemporary Indonesia

Having briefly reviewed Clifford Geertz's categories of Javanese religion and development of these categories, we can now assess their value in understanding contemporary Islam in different areas in Indonesia. The three variants (*santri-abangan-priyayi*) have some applicability in the Javanese case. Although Geertz did not 'discover' these terms, he made the first and the most systematized and detailed cauterization of their usage. These categories are the most widely cited in scholarly studies not only of Javanese religion but of Indonesia in general. The basic distinction between

santri and *abangan* continues to be one of the most widely invoked categories for analyzing Javanese society, politics, and religion. Any introduction of Indonesian Islam has employed *santri-abangan* categories as indigenous terms to refer to internal diversity of Javanese religion.[24] Thus, for example, the distinction between *santri* and *abangan* has been used to explain patterns of elite competition in the prewar, Japanese, and early independence periods (Benda, 1983), party mobilization and voting patterns in the 1950s (Feith 1957, Mortimer, 1982), Jay, 1963, Lyon, 1970), the failure of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to build an effective class alliance of rural poor (Mortimer 1982, Wertheim, 1969), and the intensity of violence that accompanied the destruction of the PKI during 1965-67 (Jay, 1971; Weltheim, 1969). Developments under the New Order government (1966-98) have been explained with similar reference to this primordial socio-religious distinction between *santri* and *abangan*. Likewise, a journalist Adam Schwarz, attempted to explain Indonesian politics from the early to late twentieth century in terms of *santri-abangan* differences. Adam Schwarz suggests that Muslim religious movements and political parties reflect the intra-*santri* debate and the *santri-abangan* differences.[25] In the absence of any better way of describing Muslim society in Indonesia, Greg Barton also saw that the terms became established usage.[26] In short, these scholars saw interactions between *santri* and *abangan* as the main feature in the development of the Javanese community.[27]

Problems have arisen when other researchers have used *santri* and *abangan* as bounded, distinct, and unchanging classifications. As time passes, categories of *santri* and *abangan* may not have been used as they were in the 1960s. For recent scholars, *santri* and *abangan* seem to be static categories and closed worldviews in which neither a person nor a group can change and adapt to new circumstances. Geertz himself did not claim that his variants were static, but later scholars and public figures tend to see *santri* and *abangan* in a binary opposition. For example, the president of The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Hidayat Nur Wahid, regarded Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as *abangan* Muslim.[28] Hasyim Muzadi, the leader of the Nahdlatul Ulama, was described as *santri* whereas Megawati Soekarnopoetri was seen as *abangan*, it was said that *santri-abangan* would become partners in the national race for president-vice president on July 5, 2004.

In the popular level in Java today only a few non-religious Muslims would choose to describe themselves as *abangan*. More Muslims would prefer to be considered a "good Muslim," although they do not necessarily want to be called *santri*. Members of the *dakwah* movement that flourishes on campuses, for example, do not label themselves as *santri* although they claim to be "more" Islamic than other students. The term *santri* is today used to refer to the students of *pesantren*, rather than to mean "good Muslim" in general.

Some researchers have been more forthright in their rejection of Geertz's categories. The anthropologist, Eldar Braten, who carried out fieldwork in Java in the 1980s, claimed that the categories of *santria-bangan-priyayi* could not completely be used for the people he was dealing with some thirty years after Geertz's studies. In some cases, people did not even know the terms, in others they carried a different meaning from the one Geertz had identified. Different historical realities produced different notions of what it implies to be a Muslim, and instead of finding clear-cut categories, Braten discovers a situation characterized by contradictions.[29]

Yet while later scholars tended to see polarization between the three variants, a careful reading of *The Religion of Java* shows that Geertz himself saw them as interrelated He argued that the three groups shared many common values and "were not nearly so definable as social entities as a simple descriptive discussion of their religious practices would indicate".[30] Yet although he believed that a shared core of common values tended to counteract the divisive effects of variant interpretations of these values, Geertz also felt that ideological, class, political, and psychological factors contributed to conflicts among the three groups.[31] Furthermore, although Geertz noted that the categories were not static, the tenor of his research implied that a person labeled *santri* at one time would not likely be *abangan* in other times, and that group cannot be *abangan* in this place but a *santri* in another.

The most problematic of Geertz's categories was undoubtedly that of *priyayi*. Western scholars, such as G.W.J. Drewes (1966, 1978) and Donald Emmerson (1976), and Indonesian scholars, such as Harsja Bachtiar (1973), and Supardi Suparlan (1976), disagreed with some of the details of Geertz's theory.[32] Supardi Suparlan, for example, observed that *priyayi* denotes a social class —the nobility— rather than a sectarian religious group, and that many *santri* elements are found in the *priyayi* culture.

These early criticisms were reiterated in the late 1980s by Mark Woodward, who argued that the court of Jogjakarta was more Islamic than Geertz had suggested. Woodward contended that Islam, in its legalistic and mystical forms, is the predominant force in the religious beliefs and rites of central Javanese.[33] Furthermore, said Woodward, instead of making a distinction between orthodox and syncretic Islam, one needs to distinguish legalistic from mystical Islam. Javanese Muslims are either normatively pious (shariah-minded) or mystical (Sufism/*tasawuf*-minded). He suggested that it is the relationships between these two modes of religiosity that characterized Javanese Islam.[34]

Over the last ten years, Robert W. Hefner has assumed prominence as a commentator on Indonesian Islam, and has criticized Clifford Geertz for what he believes is a marginalization of the role of Islam in Java. In Hefner's view, Geertz implied that *abangan* and *priyayi* are not Islamic and Javanese were predominantly nominal or not "true" Muslims. For Hefner, Islam has not declined as a cultural force in Indonesia, and its role has long been predominant in Javanese culture and politics.[35] Hefner wrote on Geertz, "Rather than talking of pluralism and subalterity within Islamic tradition, then, Geertz tended to see the Javanese Muslim community as split between those whom he effectively regarded as true Muslims, the so-called *santri*, and those whom he thought only nominally Islamized, the *abangan*." Hefner criticized Geertz in that his categorizations exaggerated Hindu-Buddhist influences and oversimplified Islamic ones.[36] Following Koentjaraningrat (1963), Kartodirdjo (1966), Ricklefs (1979). Dhofier (1978), and Boland (1982), Robert Hefner argued that Geertz's use of the term *priyayi* does not conform to Javanese usage, where the term refers to a distinction of social class (*priyayi*, or aristocrat, as opposed to *wong cilik*, or common people), not religious culture. In fact, some *priyayis* have been devout Muslims (Nakamura, 1983). Because the distinction between *abangan* and orthodox Muslims tends to cut across classes, there are peasants and aristocrats who are *santris*, and others who are *abangans*.

What seems to be missing in these criticisms is the location of Geertz in a context. Geertz wrote in the 1950s and the 1960s in Modjokuto, a village in Java. His categories should not be generalized into all parts of Indonesia and into all times. Geertz was himself influenced by previous scholars, including Robert Redfield, who worked on seventeenth and

eighteenth Western European society. Redfield (1954) proposed a distinction between gentry and peasantry which Geertz found persuasive and then used in the context of Javanese society. The gentry represented Redfield's "Great Tradition" as the peasants represented the "Little Tradition." Thus, Geertz wrote, "the *abangans* are Java's peasantry, and the *prijajis* its gentry. *Abangan* religion represents the peasant synthesis of urban imports and tribal inheritances..."[37] In other words, Geertz did not write his ideas in a theoretical vacuum.

Nor did Geertz ever claimed that *santri-abangan* could be used for the places outside Java. He was fully aware that the terms *santri* and *abangan* were not used in the outer islands such as Sumatera, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Maluku, but other researchers have tended to use *santri-abangan* when speaking of Islam in other parts of Indonesia. It is wrongly assumed that the *santri-abangan* distinction is typical of Indonesian Islam. The distinction between *santri* and *abangan* has even been made a parallel to the "orthodox" and the "heterodox". To be *santri* is to be orthodox and to be *abangan* is to be heterodox. later researchers worked on more recent times and in other places. In short, Geertz's ideas run dangerously close to being static because they have been applied by later researchers working in different places and in very different contexts. Critical scholars need to be aware of the fact that Geertz was an anthropologist working on a particular society at a particular time. His theories, influential thought they have been, should not provide the basis for generalization and simplification about Indonesian Islam.

Traditionalist and Modernist Muslim

Another categorization related to the *santri-abangan* distinction is traditionalism and modernism. No one is certain about who first used the term traditionalism-modernism for analyzing Indonesian Islam. But at least in the early 1970s, an Indonesian political scientist, Deliar Noer, trained at Cornell University, wrote a book in which he explained Indonesian Muslim movements, especially during the period between 1942-1945, by using traditionalist-modernist categories. Deliar Noer did not reject Clifford Geertz's ideas, but situated them in a more historical framework. Deliar Noer argued that the modernist or reformist drew inspiration from reformist ideas in Egypt particularly Muhammad Abduh, whereas

the traditionalists were more localized. The organization of Muhammadiyah (founded in 1912) was a representative of the modernist, whereas the Nahdlatul Ulama (founded in 1926) was the traditionalist. The traditionalists were mostly concerned with Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*); they recognized imitation in religious affairs (*taqlid*) and rejected the validity of individual efforts to rationalize religious matters (ijtihad). They were also concerned with Sufism (mysticism). The traditionalists were the followers of the existing schools of thought (*mazhab*). They participated in some mystical practices which were, from a reformist point of view, close to polytheism or associating God with beings and objects (shirk). They venerated shrines, graves of saints (*keramat*), gave offerings to spirits, held communal feasts (*slametan* or *kenduri*) and used charms or amulet (*azimat*) to protect themselves from evil spirits or bad luck. They did not question whether or not these practices were compatible with Islam.

On the other hand, the modernists, Deliar Noer observes, were concerned with the nature of Islam in general. To them Islam was compatible with modern times and encodes understandings of progress, knowledge, and science. In modernist eyes, the traditionalists were guilty of introducing innovation in religious matters (*bid'ah*). The modernists recognized only the Koran and the *Hadith* (prophetic tradition) as the basic sources of their ideas and practices. They maintained that the gate of ijtihad (rational interpretation of Islam) was still open. The modernist teachers did not endorse the infallible position of the traditionalist teachers (*kijaji*). They readily adopted the organizational and educational method and ideas of the West, including those of Christian missionaries, as long as these were not in violation of the principles of Islam.[38] In general, however, both the traditionalists and the modernists claimed that they merely differed from each other in details (*furu'*), but were in agreement as far as Islamic principles (*usul*) were concerned. The principles are the pillars of Islam (*rukun Islam*), comprising the belief in God and in Prophet Muhammad, prayer, alms giving, fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca, and the pillars of belief (*rukun Iman*), (belief in God, in Angels, revealed scriptures, prophets, the Day of Judgment, and the destiny of man for good or evil.) The modernist-traditionalist distinction became widely used and was then reinforced by other scholars of Indonesian Islam partly because the modernist-traditionalist categories seemed to be "present-oriented" and therefore appealed to contemporary specialists.

The traditionalist-modernist categorization treats Muslims as historically and sociologically similar to other religious communities in the modern world. The strength of this category is that Muslims can be "modernized". It was previously assumed that Muslims were inherently "traditionalist" or "conservative" in their religious beliefs and practices. They could not be "Westernized" because Islam and the West are inherently incompatible. However, it is worth noting that tradition and modernity are originally a Western construct. According to modernization theory, history moves in a linear fashion from tradition to modernity. All other peoples, including Muslims, should follow this direction from tradition to modernity. In short, the tradition-modernity paradigm follows modernization theory, that is, it is a theory explaining the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect an unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, and permit his control over the environment.[39] In this sense, making Muslims part of world history also means making them part of European-American history.

There are other problematic issues in relation to the traditionalist-modernist division. While Muslim modernists are happy to claim themselves as modernist, "traditionalists" would not classify themselves in this fashion. Few people like to be called traditionalist or conservative. Moreover, although using the terms himself, the political commentator Greg Barton has admitted that in many respects the terms of Islamic "modernism" and Islamic "traditionalism" are "confusing and unhelpful." When Islamic modernism first came to Indonesia at the beginning of the twentieth century it was a progressive and reformist movement, but mid-way through the century there were signs that parts of the modernist movement were becoming conservative. In time, the modernist movement became focused on preserving the distinctiveness of its people and their practices against the influences of an increasing secular world. By the end of the twentieth century, Greg Barton argued, the modernists were divided into the moderate and the conservative. At the same time, although rural traditionalists continued to be culturally conservative, many of their sons and daughters, having graduated from *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) and gone on to higher studies (such as the State Institute for Islamic Studies, IAIN), were at the forefront of progressive thought and religious reform. A number of scholars, such as Abdurrahman Wahid and the younger generation

of the NU in particular, were in many respects modernists in their orientation, whereas many Muhammadiyah scholars were becoming conservative because they grew up with limited knowledge of Arabic writings and were not able to participate in the re-examination of Islamic teachings.[40]

In sum, then the traditionalist-modernist distinction is helpful in some respects but it is problematic as well. The use of these convenient terms is common among Westerners and Muslims alike, but one needs to be aware of the Western assumptions behind the distinction, and recognize that this distinction is not static. As Greg Barton pointed out, within the *santri* community a distinction is made between modernists, most of whom belong to the organization Muhammadiyah, and traditionalists, the vast majority of whom belong to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).[41] On Java the traditionalists outnumber the modernists, particularly outside the big cities, but on other islands the situation is very different. In most of Sumatera and in southern Sulawesi the modernists easily outnumber the traditionalists.

Political and Cultural Islam

Now let us turn to the next categorization, more political in nature, which emerged as many Muslims become political ideologues and activists, whereas other Muslims remain a-political. The distinction between "political" and "cultural" Islam surfaced in the postindependence period when Muslims became more involved in Islamic political parties or Islamic movements. The ideological struggle in Indonesian politics after independence in 1945 has often set the nationalist aside from the religious (Islam), the former advocates a tolerant state philosophy of Pancasila (the five pillars), whereas the latter stresses Islamic concerns, such as the establishment of an Islamic state or the implementation of Islamic law (*sharia*).

The New Order era (1966-1998) was marked by the dynamic relationships between Muslims and politics, and various scholars have shown how that the government s policies contributed to the relationship between Islam and politics. Political Islam is the Islam that becomes a focus for political mobilization and participation.[42] Robert Hefner, for example, argued that the New Order marginalized political Islam, but was tolerant of cultural Islam. According to Hefner, political Islam refers to those Muslims who promote specifically political concerns and goals. Cultural Islam, on the other hand, refers to those who are participants in or Supporters of

non-political affiliations such as the Islamic organization of the Muhammadiyyah, the Nahdlatul Ulama, the Unity of Islam (Persis), and Al-Irsyad. Muslims involved in social, religious, economic, and cultural activities without an interest in politics are categorized as cultural Muslims. According to another definition, political Muslims are those who hold that Islam is a total way of life, including economics and politics. More specifically, cultural Muslims are those who distinguish between the religious and the secular. Robert Hefner coined the term "civil Islam" to refer to a cultural Islam that promotes universal values such as justice and tolerance, rather than an Islamic state or an exclusively Islamic social system (*nizham Islami*).[43] Hefner further argued that civic Muslims are not those who restrict religion to the private domain, they are those who promote Islamic substantive values such as tolerance, justice, democracy, and pluralism. For Hefner, the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama were the two foremost representatives of "civil Islam", whereas Islamic political parties represented "political Islam".

One of the advantages of the political-cultural distinction is that Muslims are seen according to their political orientation. Politics is one of the fields in which Muslims have historically been engaged, the first problem after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century was political leadership, which led to the internal schism between the Shiite and the Sunni. On the other hand, there have been always Muslims who made a distance from politics and remain active in non-political activities.

However, the political-cultural distinction, like other categorizations, raises certain problems. In the first place, different scholars use the term "political Islam" in different ways. For example, the political scientist Harold Crouch refers not merely to Muslims involved in politics, but to Muslim politicians whose political agenda is inspired by distinctively Islamic concerns. In other words, an Islamic political agenda is the main characteristic of political Islam. Harold Crouch further suggests that political parties in Indonesia distinguish between "inclusive" and "exclusive" parties. An inclusive party would be a party which includes both Muslims and non-Muslims. Thus, the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), Nationalist Awakening Party (PKB), Party of Golkar, and National Mandate Party (PAN) are inclusive, whereas the National Unity Party (PPP), The Crescent and Star Party (PBB), and Prosperous Justice party (PKS) are exclusive.[44] According to Harold Crouch's definition, The National

Unity Party (PPP), the Crescent and Star Party (PBB) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) are representatives of contemporary political Islam.

Another problem in this distinction is the tendency to overlook the fact that one group can be simultaneously political and cultural. A group such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) became a political party before 1984. In addition, one group can be "political" at one time and "cultural" at another. Moreover, political Islam is not a monolithic entity, since there are Muslims who are engaged in Islamic political parties, while others promote political ideas without being members of any political party. Amin Rais, for example, used to be the chief of the Muhammadiyah and then became a leader of the National Mandate Party. Abdurrahman Wahid and Hashim Muzadi, from the NU, have become political leaders. In short, political-cultural distinction is helpful in some situations, but should not be seen as a bounded classification resistant to change or reinterpretation.

Fundamental and Liberal Muslim

While the distinction between cultural and political Islam was based on political orientation, the next categorization is primarily based on doctrinal orientation: fundamentalist and liberalist Islam and has been shaped by academic debates that include more Indonesia scholars. Indonesian scholars and socio-political commentators have tended to use "fundamentalism", a term borrowed from American Christian groups in the early twentieth century who wished to orient their religious practice to the fundamentals (as they saw them) of particular Biblical Christian teaching.[45] Because "fundamentalism" has been broadly used to refer to any movement that has a strongly religious element, it has become an overarching category for any ideas or groups that encourage a religious rigidity manifested in social, political, and economic fields. Thus, strict adherents of Islam have been generally labeled as "fundamentalists", Muslim women who wear headscarf have also been easily labeled "fundamentalists", men who demonstrate on the streets against the U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East would be called "fundamentalists", Muslims who promote the Islamic state in their countries are "fundamentalists".

Most "fundamentalists" do not use the term "fundamentalism" in reference to themselves. In Indonesia, fundamentalist Islam, or other similar terms such "militant Islam", "radical Islam", and "revivalist Islam" are only used by those outside the group. Although there are some exceptional cases

in which fundamentalists do use the term,[46] such labels are normally seen as pejorative. Another term "Islamism" is now preferred to replace the term Islamic fundamentalism because the former is seen less negative. Islamism is an idea or movement that struggles for an Islamic cause. Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism can be used to refer to the same ideas, although the first has more positive connotations. In a survey done in 2002, the term "Islamism" was used in reference to a number of indicators, such as the Islamic state, the implementation of Islamic law, or the Islamic parties.[47]

In a survey carried out in 2001 some Indonesian scholars at the Center for the Study of Islam and Society, in the absence of a better term, employed the terms fundamentalism, radicalism, and Islamism to refer to Islamic groups whose fanaticism and ideological basis are directed towards replacing the existing value system in society. If necessary, they are willing to employ physical force as means of achieving their goals. In other words, radical Islam is used to describe a group of Muslims who promote replacing the established secular social and political order with a regime based on a particular interpretation of Islam. To create an idealized regime, some radical Muslims pursue their goals peacefully and in stages, through education. Others choose the route of open politics, contesting public offices in the executive and legislative branches. Some of these groups used the term jihad to refer to the struggle in the path of God. In contemporary Indonesia, these groups include Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), led by Habib Rizieq Shihab, and Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah (FKAWJ), led by Jafar Umar Thalib. Other Islamic parties, such as the National Unity Party (PPP), The Crescent and Star Party (PBB), and Prosperous Justice party (PKS), are also regarded as fundamentalist.[48]

"Liberal Islam" is the most recently used term in Indonesian Islam. The first scholar to employ it was Leonard Binder, a political scientist at the University of Chicago in his book *Islamic Liberalism* (1988), but the term became more developed in Charles Kurzman's book *Liberal Islam: A Source Book* (1999). The first organization to use the term "liberal Islam" was the Islamic Liberal Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL), which was founded in 2001. The major character-is tic of liberal Islam is a "rational" interpretation of Islam. Liberal Muslims claim to promote democracy, tolerance, pluralism, human rights, and gender equality. For these liberal

Muslims, there is no such thing as an Islamic State and the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia should be rejected. The Liberal Islam Network emerged as a response to Islamic fundamentalism in post-Suharto Indonesia (since 1998), initiating a new categorization in Indonesian Islamic discourse: the fundamentalist and the liberalist Muslim.

It should be borne in mind that although fundamentalism and liberalism are Western constructs, it is advantageous to use these terms in a comparative context. Certainly, it is convenient to discuss Islam by using popular or widely-accepted terms such as fundamentalism and liberalism. Yet from the outset these terms require clarification because there of the confusion and misunderstandings that can arise when they are applied to Muslims. Most Muslims can be regarded as fundamentalist because they believe they have to obey the fundamentals (principles) of their religion, but "fundamentalism" is often used pejoratively to label others who carry out strict religious activities which some consider should be condemned and suppressed. The other term, "liberalism" is also problematic in understanding Muslim beliefs and behavior. Liberalism in Western use has different meanings in different contexts. Liberalism in the United States is different from that in Europe. Economic liberalism is different from political liberalism, and religious liberalism is also different from political liberalism. Thus, fundamentalism is as diverse as liberalism. In other words, the fundamentalist-liberalist distinction, like any Other, should be used in a spectrum and in a not-static fashion.

Great Tradition and Little Tradition

Now we turn to consider another categorization based on culture: great and little, or high and low tradition in Islam. This distinction has its advantages as well as disadvantages in analyzing Muslim societies in Indonesia and elsewhere, and is still influential today.[49] The concept of a "great tradition" and a "little tradition" were first proposed by R. Redfield in his 1954 book entitled *The Little Community/Peasant Society and Culture*.[50] It was Ernest Gellner, however, who developed the distinction between high and low tradition in relation to Islamic societies. Although Ernest Gellner referred to Islamic communities in general and did not talk specifically about Islam in Indonesia, he employed categories that were later used by other scholars to refer to the case of Indonesian Islam as well. Gellner argued that Islam survives as a serious faith pervading both a folk tradition

and a great tradition. Influenced by the theory of modernization, Gellner argued that the Islamic great tradition is "modernizable". He observed that the operation of the Islamic great tradition emerged as the continuation and completion of an old dialogue within Islam between the orthodox center and deviant error, between knowledge and ignorance, political order and anarchy, civilization and barbarism, town and tribe, Holy Law and mere human custom, a unique deity and usurper middlemen of the sacred. According to Gellner, these polarities are latent in Islam. The folk tradition, on the other hand, represented cultural backwardness, hierarchy, non-egalitarianism, hereditary position, tribalism, and religious impurity.[51] Throughout history the two traditions flowed into and influenced each other. They also erupted into conflict, when reformers revived the alleged pristine zeal of the high culture, and united tribesmen in the interests of purification and of their own enrichment and political advancement.[52] Thus, for Gellner, the Islamic great tradition is characterized by scripturalism (the idea that religious scriptures are at the highest position), egalitarianism (human and gender equality), and modernism (science and progress), whereas the Islamic little tradition is marked by tribalism, localized customs, kinship, and saints.

Critics of Gellner's views would content that it is difficult to find which tradition is "great", and which one is "little" in Muslim beliefs and practices. It is too simplistic and now increasingly pejorative to label a Muslim practice as low, uncivilized, backward, and so forth, whereas another practice is "great" (i.e. civilized.) To claim that a practice is "high" or "great" is not only hierarchical but also ethnocentric. In addition, the great-little distinction again implies a static, unchanging situation and a lack of internal diversity.

Having reviewed *santri-abangan-priyayi*, traditionalist-modernist, political-cultural, fundamentalist-liberal, and great-little categorizations, we now come to our last approach in understanding Muslim diversity: the global-local perspective. This is in some respects a critique of the previous categories, although, as we shall see, some problems need to be addressed.

Global and Local Perspective

The global-local categorization is concerned with context, rather than characterization or classification of Muslims. Like other religions, Islam faced the issues of globalization, which becomes a context, a situation that

affects Muslim behavior, including scholarship on Islam. Some scholars, however, make a clear distinction between "global" and "local" Islam. Global Islam is the Islam that can be found anywhere among Muslims throughout the world and throughout history, while "local" Islam is locally specific. For example, in the 1980s, Dale F. Eickelman wrote an article on how to study Islam in local contexts.[53] He proposed that the middle ground between the village context and that of "Islam of all times and places" be taken as the basis for comprehending Islam as a world religious tradition. Another scholar, Martin Rossler pointed out that the local form which a world religion assumes may differ considerably from its wider normative structure. He attempted to show that such differences result from a complex construction and transformation of systems of meaning.[54]

The most recent contribution to the study of Islam in terms of the global-local framework is a collection of articles entitled Muslim Diversity edited by Leif Manger (1999). According to Manger, Gellner's description of Islam as a distinct historical totality, portraying a correlation of social structure, religious belief and political activity to an extent that makes Islam a blueprint of the social order (Gellner, 1982). Like Geertz's theory of core symbols (*santri-abangan-priyayi*), Gellner's ideas attempt to reduce Islam and the lives of Muslims to idealized patterns. Leif Manger and contributors to his collection attempt to look at ways to deal with dynamism in order to accommodate descriptions of a wide variety of beliefs and actions labeled Islamic by people themselves. Their starting point is the diversity of Islam.[55]

The scholars in Muslim Diversity consider the way Islam has developed in its many local forms. For these scholars, the great tradition and little tradition are static typologies of what is great and little, high and low, developed and underdeveloped, civilized and uncivilized. These concepts limit instead of enhance insights into the complexities of local life. Instead of looking at the idealized forms, one should examine the many processes that become Islamic and the many discourses that people express. A scholar needs to observe how people are pursuing various concerns in their lives within contexts. At the same time, Islam is not only a product of local, regional, and national situations, but also has a global nature in that for believers it contains generalized truths.

Katy Gardner's essay, "Global Migrants and Local Shrines: The Shifting Geography of Islam in Sylhet, Bangladesh," shows how difficult it is

to assume a unified terminology within Islam. The migrants she describes may appear fundamentalists in the sense that they base their views on *adab* (religious ethics), but at the same time they are modernists in the local Sylhet context. However, theirs is not a modernism oriented towards secularism but one informed by religious traditionalism. In this case the notion of great tradition and little tradition is thus highly problematic in this case.[56]

A number of possible issues that can be addressed within the global-local paradigm. The historian William R. Roff, for example, asks the following questions as a means of understanding Muslim behavior:

How may we understand the nature, impulse, and dynamic of Muslim social and political action? More specifically, what are the relationships, direct or dialectical, between the prescriptions and requirements of Islamic belief, socially reproduced (of 'being Muslim', in short), and the economic, political, and social circumstances of the lives of actual Muslims? How are the real or supposed imperatives of "being Muslim' understood, and in what terms and by whom, and with what social implications, are they expressed, conveyed, urged, argued, and acted upon?[57]

In another study, Mark Woodward provides a brief history of Indonesian Studies and why in Islamic factor has been peripheral in area studies and colonial Orientalism. He proposed a new paradigm in Indonesian Studies, that is, to focus on "how Indonesian cultures are Islamic", rather than on "whether or not Indonesians are Islamic". For him, it is the localization of Islam that needs to be the focus of study. The term "local Islam" consists of two elements-it is mistaken, Woodward argues, to neglect the "local" as it is to ignore the "Islam".[58]

Nonetheless, a number of issues still require attention from scholars using this global-local perspective. First, complexity needs terms and simplifications. If one simply argues that Muslims are complex and diverse he or she does not contribute much towards understanding what is actually going on. One should make sense of the complexity in terms that can be understood by academia or the readers at large.

Second, determining what is local and what is universally Islamic requires an adequate understanding of Muslim texts and doctrines as well as local cultures. For example, Geertz's argument that *Slametan* is non-Islamic (but uniquely localized Javanese) is misleading because some elements of this practice are also sanctioned by the Islamic texts. This mistake

occurred because Geertz did not know Islamic teachings or texts on this particular practice. Geertz's focus has been on the localized dimension, rather than the Islamic one and a focus simply on uniqueness can overlook commonalities.

Third, itis not easy for academics to find what is changing and what is unchanging in religious belief and practice. Religious change js one of the most elusive issues. In this regard, I should agree with Clifford Geertz when he argues that "religious change is not measurable as economic change." In the religious sphere, old wine goes as easily into new bottles as old bottles contain new wine. It is not only very difficult to discover the ways in which the shapes of religious experiences are changing, or if they are changing at all, it is not even clear what sorts of things one ought to look at in order to find out. For Geertz, the comparative study of religion has been always Characterized by the elusiveness of its subject matter. Itis a matter of discovering just what sorts of beliefs and practices support what sorts of faith under what sorts of conditions. Our problem, Geertz suggested, is not to define religion but to find it.[59]

Fourth, it is also difficult to determine which practice is religious, and which one is non-religious. The concept of "religion" is originally Western. Perhaps in many cases local people see everything religiously. They may believe that their economic activities are part of their religious duty. In other cases, local people may see no clear distinction between the religious and the non-religious, and in lived experiences the distinction academics may create is guide blurred or non-existent.

Finally, it is worth noting that movements of ideas and peoples are now becoming more influential than they were in the past. It is therefore important to untangle the new transnational and trans local linkages between people without becoming trapped in a bipolar 1ocal-global perspective. Contemporary, supra-local identities (diaspora, refugee, migrant, etc.) are not spatial and temporal extensions of a prior identity rooted in locality nor do we have to see the global as a new artificially imposed or inauthentic type of identity. In sum, then the global-local perspective is useful in some respect, but it is problematic in others. The "spatial identity" that the perspective entails is only one of different ways in which Muslims make identity boundaries.

Conclusion

Categorization has long been seen as a principal scholarly task, not only in the sciences, but also in the arts and humanities. Because the realities are complex and diverse, they are of necessity simplified by observers according to their own perceptions and assumptions. At the same time, scholars also understand they should try to come as closer as possible to the "realities". As this paper has shown, while many scholars in Indonesia have sought to understand Muslims in their own terms, the very terms they use have been influenced by outsiders. Yet on this issue, I would agree with the French philosopher Claude Lévi-Strauss. "Words", he says, "are instruments that people are free to adapt to any use, provided they make clear their intentions."[60] Categorization becomes useful and helpful if it clarifies what one is trying to say in order to facilitate communication and understanding. However, while clarity is important in the academic enterprise, the content of any category can always be questioned and debated.

As we have seen, complexity and diversity are the main features of Muslim societies. Models such as the orthodox (*santri*)-heterodox (*abangan*), the traditionalist-modernist, the fundamentalist-liberal, the political-cultural, the great-little, and the global-local, are all useful, but these categories should not be seen as static and unchanging. In this regard, I agree with Mark Woodward who contends that there is no one "local Islam" in any place but many, some of which have larger numbers of adherents and others are personalistic in character. He argues that the purpose of ethnology or the history of religions is not to construct a comprehensive catalog of religious belief and modes of ritual action. Even if this were possible and it clearly is not, such a catalog would only describe, rather than explain, religious and cultural variation. But the goals also should not be restricted to personalistic interpretation. Rather, the goals should be to characterize the range of variation, to isolate the assumptions upon which religious discourse is based, and to explore the ways in which variation and discourse are shaped by social, political, and economic variables as well as by more purely religious concerns.[61]

The future direction of Islamic studies in Indonesia is directed towards the ongoing effort of developing a theory of religious beliefs and practices. Religion is not only a set of doctrines, norms, legal precepts to be enacted by individuals or groups, but includes the ways in which individuals or groups interact with these patterns and use them to interact with their God

and with their environment.[62] Islam, or more accurately Muslims, has been always dealing with text and context. The context can be spatial, mental, or psychical, but the dynamic interplay between text and context should not be overlooked in any studies of Islam.

Endnotes

1. Would like to thank Prof Barbara W. Andaya for her valuable comments and advise in shaping this article. This paper was presented at the Asian Studies at the Pacific Coast/ASPAC 2004 Conference held at the University of Oregon, Eugene, June 18-19, 2004.
2. Clifford Geertz, *Religion of Java* (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p.7.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
4. *Ibid.*, pp.38-76.
5. *Ibid.* pp.77.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-4.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 86-111.
8. Geertz wrote, "the kinds of *santris* vary from those whose difference from their *abangan* neighbors seems to lie entirely in their insistence that they are true Moslems, while their neighbors are not, to those whose commitment to Islam dominates almost all of their life." Geertz also described *santri* as purer Muslims. He said, "the purer Islam is the subs traction that I have called *santri*." *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 127.
9. Orthodoxy is originally a Christian concept, but it can be applied to other religions as well. Orthodoxy literally means "proper belief", but can be defined as a situation in which the content of a person's faith is the critical component in determining whether or not a believer is a member of community. Having proper belief is what ultimately indicates the individual's status in relationship to the group. See John Kaltner, *Islam: What non-Muslims Should Know* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003) pp. 25-6.
10. *Ibid.*, p.125.
11. *Ibid.*, p.126.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-30.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 149-50.
14. *Ibid.*, pp .159-60.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 277-88.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 310.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 336.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 355-6.
19. It is *The Religion of Java* that has attracted scholarly debates. His other books, including his lecture entitled *Islam Observed*, received less attention from other scholars. In 1967 Geertz gave a lecture at Yale University on Islam in Indonesia and Morocco, which later became a book Islam Observed. He argued that Morocco and Indonesia represented two different classical Islamic styles or orientations; Islam in the former was more activist, rigorous, and dogmatic, whereas Islam in the latter syncretistic, reflective, and multifarious. He based this differentiation on a sixteenth-century figure, Javanese Sunan Kalijaga, in Indonesia and on a seventeenth-century figure, Sidi Lahsen Lyusi, in Morocco. How-

ever, even in the Modjokuto area in Indonesia, the contrast between the more self-conscious Muslim and the self-conscious "nativist" grew steadily more acute and until 1970 it formed the major cultural distinction. Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p.20, 29; Clifford Geertz, "Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example", *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz* (New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1973), p.149.

20. James L. Peacock, *Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam* (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 26-7.
21. *Ibid.*, p.50.
22. M.C. Ricklefs, "Six Centuries of Islamization in Java," in Nehemia Levtzion (ed.), *Conversion to Islam* (London & New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), pp. 118-20.
23. Andrew Beatty, *Varieties of Javanese Religion: An Anthropological Account* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 115-6.
24. See for example Robert Day McAmis, *Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002).
25. Adam Schwarz, *Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Boulder & San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 162-93.
26. Greg Barton, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid* (Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2002), in footnote 1, Chapter 2, p. 388.
27. Hefner, "Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 46, 3 (Aug. 1987), pp. 533-4.
28. *Republika*, March 28, 2004.
29. Eldar Braten, "To Colour, Not Oppose: Spreading Islam in Rural Java", Leif Manger (ed.), *Muslim Diversity*, pp. 150-72.
30. Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, p.355.
31. *Ibid*. p.356.
32. GM. Drewes, "New Light on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia?", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volken Kunde*, 122, 1966; Drewes, *An Early Javanese Code of Muslim Ethics* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), Donald Emmerson, *Indonesia's Elite: Political Cultural and Cultural Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), Harsja W. Bachtiar, "The *Religion of Java*: A Commentary", *Madjalah Ilmu-ilmu Sastra*, 5-1, 1973, pp. 85-118.
33. Mark Woodward, *Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta*, (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989), pp. 2-5. Ricklefs supported the argument that by the eighteenth century, Islam had been dominant in the court. See M.C. Ricklefs, *The Seen and Unseen Worlds in Java, 1726-1749: History, Literature, and Islam in the Court of Pakubuwana II* (Honolulu: Allen & Unwin & University of Hawaii Press, 1998).
34. *Ibid*, p.6.
35. Geertz actually revised some of his arguments in *Religion of Java*. By 1995, he wrote that Javanese had been more Islamic that they used to be in the 1950s and 1960s. See Clifford Geertz, *After the Fact: Two Countries, Four decades, one Anthropologist* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
36. Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (eds.), *Islam in An Era of Nation States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), pp. 14-5.
37. Geertz, *Religion of Java*, pp. 227-8.

38. Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 300-8.
39. C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975), p.7; Jerry H. Bentley, *Shapes of World History in Twentieth Century Scholarship* (Washington: the American Historical Association, 2003), pp. 8-11.
40. Greg Barton, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography*, pp. 66-7.
41. Greg Barton, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid* (Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2002), pp. 62-79.
42. Donald J. Porter, *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia* (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002), Donald J. Porter, "Citizen Participation through Mobilization and the Rise of Political Islam in Indonesia", *The Pacific Review*, 15, 2 (2000), pp. 201-24.
43. Hefner, *Islam in an Era of Nation-States*, p.22; Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, c2000).
44. Harold Crouch, "The Recent Resurgent of Political Islam in Indonesia", *Islam in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Recent Developments* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp. 1-6.
45. The term fundamentalism has been extended to other religions. For example, many Sikhs in the 1980s were labeled as "fundamentalists" because of their campaign for Khalistan. In the 1990s extremist Hindu nationalists became labeled as "Hindu fundamentalists." There are also "Jewish fundamentalists", those who see the eradication of the Palestinian presence in "Greater Israel" as a divine imperative, and "Buddhist fundamentalists" who are engaged in a civil war in Sri Lanka with Tamil Hindus. See Malory Nye, *Religion: The Basics* (London: Routledge, 2003), p.194.
46. For example, the activist Ahmad Sumargono, now one of the leaders of Party of the Moon and Stars (PBB), wrote a book entitled "I am a Fundamentalist". See Ahmad Sumargono, *Saya Seorang Fundamentalis: Refleksi Ideologis H. Ahmad Sumargono* (Bogor: Global Cita Press, 1999).
47. Saiful Mujani & R. William Liddle, "Islamism in Democratic Indonesia: Findings of a New Survey", *Journal of Democracy*, January 2004.
48. Jambari, "Indonesian Fundamentalism?", *Studia Islamika*, 9, 3 (2002), pp. 183-9; Saiful Muzani & William Liddle, "Islamism in Democratic Indonesia: Findings of a New Survey", *Journal of Democracy*, January 2004.
49. The Indonesian historian Azyumardi Azra, for example, still used the folk great tradition distinction. Azyumardi Azra agreed with Gellner in that Sufism (mysticism) in many respects represented the folk, or low, or popular Islam because it can accommodate local cultures. But Azyumardi Azra argued that Sufism is not monolithic. There is for example a Neo-Sufism that emphasizes the life in this world. Muslim mystics such as Nur al-Din al-Raniri, Abd al-Rauf al-Sinkeli, and Nawawi al-Bantani, viewed the world positively. They were also concerned with the Islamic law (*sharia*), although they did not fall into *fiqh* (legalistic products of jurisprudence). Thus, Azyumardi Azra argued, great-little tradition distinction is helpful, but the Muslim reality is more diverse than this distinction suggests. See Azyumardi Azra, *Renaissance Islam Asia Tenggara* (Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 1999), pp. 23-4.
50. R. Redfield, *The Little Community/Peasant Society and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).
51. Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 5.

52. Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society*, in Hefner, *Islam in an Era of Nation-States*, p. 20.
53. Dale F. Eickelman, Study of Islam in Local Contexts", *Contributions to Asian Studies*, 17, 1982.
54. Martin Rossler, however, is still trapped in the bipolar great-little tradition distinction. See Martin Rossler, "Islamization and Reshaping of Identities in Rural South Sulawesi," in Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (eds.), *Islam in An Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 298.
55. Leif Manger (ed.), *Muslim Diversity: Local Islam in Global Contexts* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999), pp. 2-4.
56. Katy Gardner, "Global Migrants and Local Shrines: The Shifting Geography of Islam in Sylhet, Bangladesh", Leif Manger (ed.), *Muslim Diversity*, pp. 3757.
57. William R. Roff (ed.), *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 1-2.
58. Mark W. Woodward, "Talking Across Paradigms: Indonesia, Islam, and Orientalism," in Mark R. Woodward (ed.), *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought* (Arizona: Arizona State University, 1996), pp. 38-9.
59. Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed*, p. l.
60. Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, trans. by Richard Mayne (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), p.3.
61. Mark Woodward, *Islam in Java*, pp. 77-8.
62. Please compare this with Reinhold Loeffler who tends to study Muslim as individual rather than as a collective group, *Islam in Practice: Religious Beliefs in a Persian Village* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988). For a theory of practice, see for example, Michael de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984).

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