SECTARIANISM IN ISLAM:

THE STUDY OF KHAWARIJ AND MAJLIS MUJAHIDIN INDONESIA

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Abstract. *Basically, the study of sectarianism refers to the problem of understanding within a certain group, school, or belief. However, in its development this term has developed and is almost always associated with the study of the fanaticism of the madzhab (al-ta'asshubiyyah) and political partisans (al-hizbiyyah). Therefore, sectarianism as an ideology or ism often creates negative-destructive consequences, especially by creating a heroic attitude in defending the group as well as opposing other groups who are not in the same direction. In fact, not infrequently it creates radical attitudes on other parties in the name of the truth (read: religion) which they believe. This paper discusses sectarianism in Islam by using "multiple objects"; analysis of the Khawarij group as a portrait of classical sectarianism that had occurred in the early days of Islam as well as pulling it back to the present by analyzing the Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) as a portrait of sectarianism that occurred in Indonesia in a modern context..*

Keywords: sectarianism; khawarij; majlis mujahidin indonesia (MMI)

Abstrak. *Pada dasarnya, kajian tentang sektarianisme merujuk pada persoalan sempalan paham dalam sebuah golongan, mazhab, maupun kepercayaan tertentu. Namun dalam perkembangannya istilah ini berkembang dan hampir selalu dikaitkan dengan kajian fanatisme madzhab (al-ta'asshubiyyah) dan partisan politik (al-hizbiyyah). Karena itu, sektarianisme sebagai sebuah paham atau isme seringkali memunculkan konsekuensi-konsekuensi negatif-destruktif terutama dengan memunculkan sikap heroik dalam membela kelompoknya sekaligus pertentangan kepada kelompok lain yang tidak searah. Bahkan tak jarang menimbulkan sikap-sikap radikal pada pihak lain atas nama kebenaran (baca: agama) yang diyakininya. Tulisan ini membahas tentang sektarianisme dalam Islam dengan menggunakan "objek ganda"; analisa pada kelompok Khawarij sebagai potret sektarianisme klasik yang pernah terjadi pada masa-masa awal Islam sekaligus menariknya ke masa kini dengan menganalisa kelompok Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) sebagai potret sektarianisme yang terjadi di Indonesia pada masa modern.*

Kata Kunci: *sectarianism; khawarij; majlis mujahidin indonesia (MMI)*

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Introduction

First of all, the study of sectarianism in Islamic history has to deal with the fact that its emergence is always motivated by various factors, from group fanaticism, political affiliation, to religious views. Thus, sectarianism always has the potential to emerge in a community, including religion. Therefore, the study of sectarianism can be considered as an effort to uncover the roots and visions that are the motives for the birth of sectarian attitudes both in the social, political, and religious spheres. Not surprisingly, sectarianism in Islam is almost always associated with the study of *mahdzhab* fanaticism *(al-ta'asshubiyyah)* and political partisans *(al-hizbiyyah)* (Jonathan P. Berkey: 2003, 83).

In one of the stages of Islamic history and civilization, the arbitration event *(al-tahkim)* that occurred during the reign of Ali Ibn Abi Talib, which might be considered as the culmination point of the emergence and spread of sectarianism in Islam. The event seemed to confirm the existence of a paradigm shift in Islamic politics; from what was originally a *da'wah* strategy then it was constructed in such a way as to be a political strategy through justification of religious discourse, either through discourse of interpretation, hadith, to theology. In other words, this political-sectarian constellation is framed in a theological framework.

It is undeniable that this historic event later turned into a genealogical portrait of Islamic political reasoning. This is very obvious, considering that the controversy in the power-politics space has contributed to the construction of the sectarian consciousness of the Muslims as well as tore apart their unity into several groups or sects. In addition, this historical event is also a fragmentary portrait of sectarian political history which also initiated the emergence of Islamic sects in their earliest days. Such as Shia, Khawarij, and Murjiah. Not a few historians link or justify this sectarian reasoning with the hadith which asserts that Muslims will be divided into 73 groups (Abdurrahman Badawi: 1997, 33-34).

This paper is mostly a summary of the materials in some literature on theological and political studies in Islam. Because the scope of the discussion is very broad, this paper will focus on only two things. First, the identification of the motives for the birth of sectarianism in the classical period of Islam within the scope of political struggle and religious discourse (theology), especially the Khawarij sect. Second, the implications of Khawarij sectarianism in the construction of Islamic thought and politics at the present time through a search on groups that display understandings and attitudes that are identical to the Khawarij, especially in Indonesia.

The aspects that the author will try to describe in this paper include; first, sectarianism in historical portraits. Second, the history of the Khawarij which is examined from the point of view of power-politics, shifts, and their implications for theological polemics. Third, the phenomenon of radical Islamic groups that represent the current of radicalism under the name of religion in contemporary times, which in this case the author specifically chooses MMI. In other words, this will be revealed based on an analysis of practical political activities which in the level of application are the successors or at least resemble the political praxis that was carried out by the Khawarij group in the classical period.

Sectarianism; Definition and its Relation to Political-Religious Discourse

The term sectarianism comes from the word 'sect' which means a group of people who have the same beliefs or views in a religion. According to *Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia*, the term sectarianism

can be interpreted as a spirit to defend a sect or sect, belief, or religious view that is different from the religious view that is more commonly accepted by adherents of that religion. Thus, the term sect is more likely to refer to a group, sect, or group within a religion or belief.

Sectarianism is bigotry, discrimination, or hatred that arises as a result of differences between groups, such as differences in religious denominations or political factions. Thus, the term sectarianism almost always refers to sects, which arise due to certain points of view or differences in understanding, both religious and political. Considering that sectarian understandings and attitudes are explored in order to support and defend the group or understanding they adhere to, their attitudes or behaviors often have the potential to be anti-communication, reactionary, highly emotional, uncritical, arrogant and anti-dialogue, and often end up with attitudes of radicalism and anarchism which on the one hand defending their group blindly and rejecting the understanding or attitude of other groups that are different from those on the other hand.

As mentioned in the previous section, sectarianism in Islam cannot be separated from the struggle between political and religious discourses. It can also be said that genealogically, it appears to the surface as a logical consequence when there is a struggle between political discourse and religious discourse. Therefore, this section will also briefly review how sectarianism was born through the construction of political struggles and continued into religious discourse in the early days of Islam.

Politics itself can be interpreted as a way or strategy of a society in managing life within the framework of power or state administration. In Arabic-Islamic terminology, the political term is translated as al-siyasah which was evolved from the verb *sasa-yasusu* which has the etymological connotation of *al-wilayah wa al-ri'ayah* (power and maintenance). Through this etymological understanding, then *al-siyasah* in its meaning in terms can be referred to as a human path or strategy that guides, regulates, manages, or controls them to achieve happiness in this world and the hereafter. This kind of political understanding presupposes a social-collective praxis that is not only oriented towards achieving worldly happiness but also has a close relationship with the salvation of the hereafter. Thus, Islam can thus be called a religion and a political system (religio-politic/ *al-din wa al-siyasah*). (Muhammad 'Ali at-Tahanawi: 1996, 993).

This kind of political reasoning has basically existed and been applied since the early period of the prophetic era. However, it has not been officially referred to by the name of a particular system, as during its development it was called the *Khilafah* and Dynasty system. This is because politics at the time of the Prophet, its intensity, was more directed at the strategy of Islamic da'wah to construct a society structure free from sectarian-discrimination *(Ummatan Wahidatan)* while at the same time building economic stability and community welfare. This kind of political understanding of Islam was reflected in the Medina Charter which became the collective constitution of the Medina community at that time. In other words, borrowing from al-Jabiri's analysis, the political phenomenon *(al-mudzhar al-siyasi)* in this prophetic period was interpreted as the practical efforts of the early Muslims in the process of externalizing socio-political imaginations, both within the framework of strategy and strategy. spreading religion and realizing the unity of Muslims, as well as a way of self-defense from political opponents, especially from the Quraysh (Muhammad Abed al-Jabiri: 2000, 57).

In its development, the spirit of liberation and equitable distribution of community welfare as the most prominent orientation of the political steps taken by the Prophet slowly began to fade with the emergence of sectarian polemic seeds after the Prophet's death. Furthermore, at a later stage there has

been a kind of political paradigm shift; from what was originally politics as a medium of da'wah to realize a society free of discrimination and comprehensive welfare, it shifted to 'political Islam' which often used religious discourse as an instrument to gain power, dominate, and alienate political opponents. As it culminated in the reign of Ali ibn Abi Talib.

Khawarij Emergence History: An Identification to Sectarianism

To identify the sectarianism that existed in the Khawarij sect from the perspective of Islamic history, both as a political movement and a theological-religious movement, the political-power chaos that occurred during the reign of Ali Ibn Abi Talib or known as *al-fitnah al-kubra* very important as a starting point.

As far as can be observed in the narrative of the political history of Islam, in the early days of his reign there were two oppositions among the internal companions that Ali Ibn Abi Talib had to face. Both of them have triggered a very powerful internal conflict and ended with a 'brother' war among Muslims at that time. First, the opposition of Talhah Ibn 'Ubaidillah and Zubair Ibn al-'Awwam who received political support from Aisyah RA (d. 57 H). According to this opposition group, the succession of the caliphate after Uthman Ibn 'Affan is more entitled to be given to Talhah or Zubair and not to Ali Ibn Abi Talib. This problem reach its peak by the outbreak of war between Ali Ibn Abi Talib's group and the Talhah and Zubair groups supported by Aisyah, known as the *Jamal* war in Iraq in 36 H/656 AD. In this war, Talhah and Zubair were killed. Meanwhile Aisyah was sent back to Mecca. (Jalal al-Din al-Suyuthi: 1971, 111-112).

Second, the opposition carried out by Mu'awiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan with his reluctance to accept allegiance to Ali Ibn Abi Talib while prioritizing his demands to Ali to resolve the issue of the killing of Uthman Ibn 'Affan who incidentally was a close family of Mu'awiyyah. The peak of the opposition of this group was the outbreak of war between Ali Ibn Abi Talib and Mu'awiyyah, which known as the *Shiffin* war. (Josef W. Meri: 2006).

In historical records, the conflict between Ali Ibn Abi Talib and Mu'awiyah was motivated by several policies of Ali Ibn Abi Talib which were considered unfair by Mu'awiyyah. The policies which considered are the policies regarding the placement of Mu'awiyah in Sham, the dismissal of the governors appointed by Uthman, and the recall of state land which, in Uthman's time, was distributed among his relatives. These policies made Ali Ibn Abi Talib's position increasingly vulnerable to rebellion. The events of this conflict confirmed that the jealousy and nepotism on the part of Mu'awiyyah was so strong that it ultimately became the essential motive for Mu'awiyyah to revolt against Ali Ibn Abi Talib's government and declare a 'counter government' in Damascus. Mu'awiyyah then began to spread political issues by accusing Ali Ibn Abi Talib of being the cause of the murder of Uthman Ibn Affan. He also began to call on the people of Damascus to stage a coup against the government of Ali Ibn Abi Talib as well as to carry out revolutionary propaganda.

In short, the peak of the political contellation between Ali Ibn Abi Talib and Mu'awiyyah was the outbreak of the *Shiffin* war. In the battle, Ali Ibn Abi Talib's troops were able to push Muawiyyah's troops. It was in this state of urgency that Amr ibn al-'Ash, who was known as an accomplished politician and a right-hand man of Mu'awiyyah, asked for a truce by lifting the Qur'an up. So that some of Ali Ibn Abi Talib's troops, especially the Qurra' urged Ali Ibn Abi Talib to accept the peace

offer. This condition then initiates an agreement from two parties to conduct arbitration *(al-tahkim).* From this *al-tahkim* incident, Abu Musa al-Asy'ari who became the representative of Ali Ibn Abi Talib and Amr Ibn al-'Ash who represented Mu'awiyah's side, later became the forerunner to the release of several troops from Ali's ranks. Ibn Abi Talib known as the Khawarij sect. the troops' turning away, from being initially loyal supporters of Ali Ibn Abi Talib, was caused by the view that it could not be decided by human arbitration through the well-known jargon *la hukma illa Allah.* For them, the decision is only and absolute from Allah SWT. and must return to the Qur'an and Sunnah. So that Ali Ibn Abi Talib, for them, is considered to have committed a major sin (*murtakib al-kabair*) by accepting the results of human decisions. And because of that, Ali ibn Abi Talib had disbelieved and had to be fought and killed (Mas'ud al-Hasan: 1994, 133-134).

The incident above confirms that the sectarianism that was so strong within the Khawarij was originally purely political. However, in its development, this sectarianism was also dragged into the theological-religious discourse on a massive scale. At least this thesis can be proven by the fact that there is a 'confusion' in their way of thinking and political maneuvering. Where at first the urgency to accept *al-tahkim* was the Khawarij with the assumption that the way of peace was in accordance with Allah's commands in the Qur'an such as QS. Ali Imran: 23. Meanwhile, when the results of *al-tahkim* were considered as a loss to their side and benefited Mu'awiyah they turned around by stating that Ali ibn Abi Talib had made a big mistake in accepting the results of *al-tahkim.* One of the figures considered to have an important role in launching such political attitudes is al-Asy'ats. At this point, there is a very acute struggle between political discourse and religious discourse. So it is not uncommon for religious discourse to be interpreted in such a way in order to support and legitimize its political visions.

So it becomes very clear that the al-tahkim incident has become the starting point for the instrumentalization of religious discourse in legitimizing the political visions promoted by the Khawarij sect. As this has been felt by Ali Ibn Abi Talib when the Khawarij sect issued the jargon *la hukma illa Allah* at the time of the event of *al-tahkim.* It is narrated that when Ali Ibn Abi Talib heard some of his troops say *'the law belongs only to Allah'* he commented: *'the sentence is true, but the meaning is wrong'* [.....] (Abdul Wahhab al-Najjar: 2009, 439) .

In the end, the Khawarij sect decided to kill three people they considered to have sinned greatly by their involvement in the arbitration event, Ali, Mu'awiyah, and Amr ibn 'Ash. A group of Khawarij meet in Mecca after the battle of Nahrawan to plan a vision of revenge for the killing of some of their comrades at the battle of Nahrawan. They say to each other "if we sell our lives to God and kill the leaders of heresy, we will cleanse the earth and God's servants from them and avenge the blood of our brothers and sisters, the martyrs of Nahrawan" (Ibn Abi al-Hadid: 1979, 113).

Until the end of his life, Ali still adhered to the principles of moral justice. Al-Tabari narrates that Ibn Muljam was brought to Ali, who asked him, "Didn't I do you good?" "Yes," replied Ibn Muljam. "What prompted you to do this?" asked Ali. Bitterly Ibn Muljam replied "I have sharpened my sword for forty days and pray to God that with this sword I can kill the evil ones of His creatures" Ali then said to his son Hasan and the people around him, "life for life; if I die, kill him as he killed me. But if I live, I will decide the punishment" (Ibn Jarir al-Tabari: 1963, 145-146).

The Khawarij's opposition to the government after the assassination of Ali continued during the Bani Umayyah and Bani Abbassiyah eras. This is very possible, considering that behind their opposition to the government there is always a 'understanding motivation' that government must

always be based on Islamic teachings. Therefore, every government official or government system that deviates and is not in accordance with Islamic teachings must be removed and overthrown. Moreover, he must be fought, killed, and fought.

The political issues above become more complex when the claims of *kafir* (infidels) on each individual or group, especially those who have government positions, which are considered not in accordance with Islamic teachings develop in the scope of theological debate. As is commonly known in the scientific literature of *Kalam*, that the issue of whether a major sinner (*murtakib al-kabair*) is an infidel or not has caused a long debate among internal Muslims at that time. Even differences of opinion regarding this matter are also one of the reasons for the emergence of sub-sects within the Khawarij themselves. As to the number of sub-sects of this division, historians differ, from 18, to 20, or even more. Such as Muhakkimah, Azariqah, Najdat, 'Ajaridah, Sufriyyah, Ibadiyyah, Sufriyah, and so on.

Apart from the doctrinal discourse of each splinter group in the Khawarij, there are two important characteristics that unite them. First, having strong courage and heroism to defend one's beliefs (*al-syaja'ah wa sur'at al-indifa'*). So they are very easy to commit murder and war on anyone who does not conform or is considered against the teachings of their religion. Second, they are people who are very diligent in worship and asceticism *(al-mubalaghat fi al-'ibadah wa al-zuhd)*.

Through the description above, it can be clearly understood that sectarianism has the potential to cause negative-destructive implications in many ways and especially to opponents or groups or individuals who are not in line with their political visions. In addition, with the description above, it can also be seen that there are two 'patterns' or important characteristics of individuals and groups when they are dominated by sectarianism in order to fulfill their political desires. First, the tendency to monopolize the truth in its political steps by colliding with religious discourse. Where this is often done with efforts to interpret religious texts (al-Qur'an and Sunnah) in a literalistic way. For example, to mention an example as recorded by Husein al-Dzahabi, in interpreting the verses of the Qur'an regarding the obligation of Hajj.

It means:

performing Hajj is a human obligation to Allah, namely (for) those who are able to make a trip to the Baitullah. Whoever denies (the obligation of Hajj), then surely Allah is Rich (does not need anything) from the worlds.

Regarding this verse, the Khawarij group interprets it literally by saying that people who do not perform Hajj are actually infidels regardless of the context that the obligation of Hajj in that verse applies to people who have the ability to do it, both physically, psychologically, and economically (Muhammad Husein al-Dzahabi: 2000, 225-228).

Second, because of the monopoly of truth, they are easy to judge or claim other people or groups are wrong, even infidels. Therefore, radicalism in the name of religion they easily perceive as the most correct solution by carrying out killings and wars against individuals or groups who have different directions, both in the political field and in religious views.

Implications of Sectarianism in Contemporary Context

Based on the identification of the characteristics inherent in the Khawarij, as an implication of sectarianism, it is very possible if it still exists and is carried out by some radical groups in contemporary times although, of course, in forms and patterns that may not be entirely the same. Although in the context of contemporary politics, especially in the framework of global politics, the issue of religious radicalization is more complex and complicated, and contains various variables and requires serious research to reveal it, the phenomenon of Khawarijism as an ideology can still be found, at least with identical characteristics and patterns. As 'Awaji stated in the introduction to his book, that although the Khawarij as a sect are quite difficult to find except as a minority group that spreads to Morocco, Zanzibar, Oman, South Arabia and even then only a splinter from the Khawarij known as Iba'diyyah, but his political reasoning and attitude are hard to deny that he still exists today.

In the context of Indonesia, for example, in the last decade, the public was again shocked by the incident called the terrorism case carried out by Warman and his friends and Warsidi in Lampung, which in several analysis of the figures, his actions were suspected by motives to actualize Dar al-Islam. in a destructive, imperial, and radical way. The event seems to have been influenced by puritan-revivalist movements as is the case in many Middle Eastern countries.

These organizations have ideological bases and movement strategies that are different from previous Islamic organizations. They are suspected of being puritanical, militant, radical, scripturalist, conservative, and exclusive. Although they have a spectrum of different ideological platform movements, in general they have the same vision, namely the establishment of an Islamic State and the actualization of the formal-constitutional application of sharia, both in the realm of society and the state. As a result, the movements they carry out often find themselves deadlocked and even appear to be confrontational with the existing social and political system.

To see a clearer pattern, here the author will reveal one of the organizations which, as far as the author can observe, both political and religious movements are very identical to the movement that was carried out by the Khawarij sect in classical times, namely Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). This organization was officially formed in the early days of reformation, precisely on August 5-7, 2000. The inauguration ceremony was held in Yogyakarta with the attendance of more than 1800 participants who came from 24 provinces in Indonesia and several representatives of Islamic organizations from abroad (Jamhari : 2004, 48).

Basically, the establishment of this organization cannot be separated from the political chaos that occurred from the Old Order to the New Order which, in the view of this group, has often marginalized Muslims in Indonesia, especially in their participation in political constellations. In other words, the birth of this organization, socio-politically, is a response to government policies, which, according to them, are full of 'de-Islamization' by not opening up any space for Islamic political movements. This is then closely related to the political-religious construction that they carried out in the future, namely the desire to establish Negara Islam (*Daulah Islamiyyah* or Islamic State). Therefore, this organization later claimed to be the successor to the previous movement, which is Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). The argument they usually put forward regarding this vision is a strong belief in themselves that Islam is a religion and a state *(al-din wa al-daulah)*. Therefore, the establishment of an Islamic state is a necessity.

Meanwhile, the steps that must be taken in order to achieve the political-religious vision that they have built are the simultaneous and integrated program of enforcement and implementation of Islamic law in an environment that includes three things. First, the enforcement of Shari'a in the political, economic, social, cultural, and state defense and security fields supported by the strengthening of the 'true' Islamic monotheism among Muslims. Second, the socialization of Islamic law as a whole (*kaffah*) to all components of the nation effectively and efficiently. Third, the development and improvement of the ability of the people in an effort to enforce Islamic law.

Other than that, MMI is also aggressively indoctrinating their ideas through religious lectures which they actively hold in Central Java. Where the materials presented, the intensity, were about the obligation to implement Islamic law in Indonesia as well as harsh criticisms of the New Order government. Therefore, at this stage of its development, the recitation which took place since 1983 later evolved into a kind of 'Islamic movement' with strong aspirations to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, which was later known as the *'Usrah* movement'.

Meanwhile, the existence of Pondok Ngruki is also very important to be explained here because of its very strong role in the process of spreading and forming a community that carries the ideals of implementing Islamic law and the establishment of an Islamic state. In fact, this hut can be called the main center in spreading radical ideas and cadre of this group compared to other programs, as mentioned above. Although this boarding school, institutionally, is not much different from general educational institutions in Indonesia such as the level of education, from MTs, MA, KMI, KMA, MS, and MA, what distinguishes it is the distribution of the curriculum. Where the substance of the lesson is oriented intensely on materials related to the implementation of Islamic law. For example, in *Akidah* lessons, the emphasis is not only on the oneness of God (*tawhid*) or explanations of the pillars of faith, but the most important thing is the rejection of various views and state institutions that are not based on Islamic teachings. This can be seen in one of the quotes related to the contents of one of the textbooks (*kitab muqarrar)* which is officially taught in this place

"Doing deeds for the sake of the homeland is syirik and destroys the value of the two sentences of the syahadat. Indeed, a Muslim is prohibited from defending his homeland unless the rules or laws are based on Islam. If his homeland is truly based on Islam and practices Allah's law, then it is permissible for him to do good deeds and fight to defend his homeland, because that means defending Islam. but if the deed is defending the homeland which clearly rejects Islam, it is syirik.":

The quote above shows that rejection of state systems and institutions is one of the main materials and is taught from an early age in this boarding school. This of course is based on their understanding that Islam officially regulates all aspects of life, including socio-political and state administration issues. Therefore, Islamic law must be applied not only at the level of individual Muslim lives, but also at the level of state systems and institutions. Moreover, for them, a Muslim must not only reject the basis and system of the Indonesian state, but a Muslim must not acknowledge the existence of the Indonesian state. As it can be seen in the following quote:

"Then giving the government the right, forbidding, forbidding, justifying, making laws and Shari'a to other than Allah is shirk and destroys the syahadat. Included in this act is the so-called 'understanding of democracy'. Because it means full power to determine the form and laws of the state in the hands of the people. This is clearly not justified by Islam, because full sovereignty is only in the hands of Allah, not in the hands of the people and not in the hands of the leader (government). So the

will of the people must be controlled, if the will is contrary to the will of Allah, it cannot be followed because following the will that is contrary to the will of Allah is shirk."

At this point, it can be understood that this group has constructed exclusive attitudes by bringing up categorization of Muslims when dealing with political struggles that are reflected in the system and state structure, from 'true' Muslims and 'shirk' Muslims. In fact, this categorization, at a later stage, does not only apply to individual Muslims but to all political groups and parties that aim to destroy Islam or hinder efforts to enforce Islamic law. Therefore, they then develop a strategy of struggle against the people or groups mentioned above with the formulation of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* and *jihad fi sabilillah* with the legal nature as mandatory. In this case, there are three important steps that they emphasize and at the same time become the main agenda. First, organize a congregation to fight the infidels. Second, arrange a neat line of soldiers. Third, prepare the power of weapons.

At this point, it becomes clear that in order to achieve its political desires, MMI has easily clashed its political discourses with religious discourses. Especially their attitudes which often drag religious discourses to legitimize their political attitudes. Therefore, that attitudes such as exclusivity, intolerance, and even radicals have become the 'real face' for this group. Once again, with the emergence of such groups, it is reaffirmed that sectarianism in the 'body' of individuals and groups, as happened in the Khawarij sect in classical times, has the potential to cause negative-destructive thought patterns and attitudes, both in the social sphere, politics and religion.

Conclusion

Thus are the overview of sectarianism and its implications. This paper, of course, again, does not pretend to provide a thorough, detailed, and complete description. There are many segments that have not been touched. Among them is the study of sectarianism within the scope of other classical theological sects, such as the Mu'tazilah, Shia, and so on. There are also groups that are suspected of being hard and radical in contemporary times on an international scale, such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, al-Nusra Front, Laskar e-Taiba and so on. It is also necessary to conduct a formal study related to Islamophobia in countries with a non-Muslim majority population.

In addition, the study of sectarianism can be expanded by conducting studies in countries that do not adhere to the Islamic system (*daula islamiyyah*). As in Indonesia for example, thorough studies on groups that aspire to reform the democratic system into a caliphate system, such as the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII), Laskar Jihad, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and so on should be done. Finally, this study can still be sharpened by taking a more specific context, both in terms of location and time.

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