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in Tetralogy *Laskar Pelangi***

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Symbolic and Philosophical Meanings**

Mukhoyyarah, Didin Saepudin, M. Ikhsan Tanggok

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A Linguistic Landscape Study**

Kartika Nuswantara, Hurrotul Firdausiyah, Zuliati Rohmah, Diana Nur Sholihah

**Representation of the Self and Other in Joe Biden's
Democratic National Convention Speech**

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Table of Contents

Editorial Team

Table of Contents

A Cognitive Linguistic Approach to Life Metaphor in Tetralogy *Laskar Pelangi*(1)

Merry Lapasau, Sulis Setiawati

Chinese Culture in The Cirebon Sultanate: Symbolic and Philosophical Meanings(15)

Mukhoyyaroh, Didin Saepudin, M. Ikhsan Tanggok

Islamic Book and Islam in Indonesia: a Historical Perspective(29)

Jajat Burhanudin

Multilingualism in Sunan Ampel Tomb Complex: A Linguistic Landscape Study.....(43)

Kartika Nuswantara, Hurrotul Firdausiyah, Zuliati Rohmah, Diana Nur Sholihah

Representation of the Self and Other in Joe Biden’s Democratic National Convention Speech(57)

Ingrit Vianica, Trisnowati Tanto

The Study of Mosque Management in Indonesia and Spain: Majority and Minority Muslim Factors(71)

Sukron Kamil, Zakiya Darojat

INSANIYAT

Journal of Islam and Humanities

The Study of Mosque Management in Indonesia and Spain: Majority and Minority Muslim Factors

Sukron Kamil¹, Zakiya Darajat²

¹Department of Arabic Literature, Faculty of Adab and Humanities, Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia

²Department of History and Islamic Civilization, Faculty of Adab and Humanities, Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia

Email: sukronkamil@uinjkt.ac.id
zakiya.darajat@uinjkt.ac.id

Abstract

This article aims to analyze and compare the management of mosques between two countries; Indonesia, where Muslims are the majority population, and Spain where Muslims are the minority. The research question is summed upon how the Muslims respond to the mosque management in two countries, Indonesia and Spain. Constructed by both research methods, qualitative and quantitative, this article lists mosques in urban areas both in Indonesia and Spain and analyzes several aspects related to mosque management. The number of questionnaires distributed was 100 to Indonesian Muslim communities in Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi), and 100 Muslims in the City of Madrid and Sevilla, in Spain. The study found high scores for mosque management in urban Indonesia related to the community's satisfaction with the mosque services either in the social field (as the power of civil society) or in the main service fields (worship/da'wa). Meanwhile, the score for managing mosques in Spain is low. This fact is related to the issue of better access to resources: economic, socio-cultural, and political mosques in Indonesia as they are the majority population. On the other hand, Spanish Muslims often face various obstacles in building mosques, one of them being tied up with the issue of Islamophobia. In conclusion, Mosque management in Indonesia seems better than in Spain both in social services and in worship/da'wah.

Keywords: Mosque Management, Indonesian Muslim Majority, Spanish Muslim Minority, Worship/da'wa services, Islamophobia

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Introduction

The management of mosques in Indonesia, where Muslims are the majority population, seems not all or fully can be considered ideal. Unlike the mosque during the Prophet's time as a center of activities, (Gazalba, 1996; Sutarmadi, 2001) or a state mosque and Islamic



mass mosque, many Muslim community mosques in Indonesia only operate in the field of worship/da'wa, not much in the social field (as the power of civil society). This happens due to ideological reasons (religious beliefs), some because of limited resources, and some because of both. For reasons of religious belief, the mosque is understood to only function as a sacred place of worship, which should not be polluted by worldly activities, which is not Sahrawi (life after death/sacred). The issue of eating in mosques, for example in fiqh (Islamic law), is debated, although strong opinions are what are permissible based on some of the Prophetic traditions (hadith) (Sabiq, n.d., p. 180). Of course, as long as the cleanliness of the mosque is maintained. For scholars who forbid, the act of eating at the mosque is considered to pollute the place of prayer.

Some mosques do not move in the social field because of limited resources, both limited state (government) resources, and poor community resources. In the rural side, where local government aid to mosques is low and also economically weak communities, making mosques difficult can be expected as an institution that can cooperate with the Government in solving social problems. Of course, it is more difficult to be a force that can criticize the Government, because of the weak independence of the mosque, both in attitude, in the economy, and education. (Kuper & Kuper, 2000; Prasetyo & Munhanif, 2008, pp. 113–115 and 8–9) In summary, it is difficult to act as power or civil society organization.

Some mosques are already engaged in the social sector, but because the resources they have are limited, their movements or activities are not maximized. Even this type of mosque does not/cannot fully move in the social/power sector of civil society. In addition to economic factors that are not strong which are sourced from the Government and especially from the people who become worshipers (congregation), also because of the weak human resources of the managers. The way to manage this type of mosque is still amateurish, not professional. This type of mosque is also a weak network, both local, national, and international.

Some mosques in Indonesia, in the management of the field of worship/da'wa, some are still weak. Carpets, ablutions, bathrooms, priests (imam), or preachers (khatib) are all inadequate. If the dirty size of the bathroom, toilet, and place of ablution is used, it is not only the weak point of the mosque, but also some other Islamic institutions. Viewed from this side, some mosques in Indonesia are far behind from places of worship or Christian institutions. The same thing happened with priests and preachers who sometimes had the ability to read the Koran and insights into its diversity (not standard). The same is true with the imam and khatib who sometimes have the ability to read the Qur'an and religious insights are inadequate (nonstandard). Worse yet, sometimes a small number of priests and preachers like this feel themselves right, while others are wrong.

The fact that mosques have not all moved in the social field, or at least not maximally engaged in the social field, not only occurs in rural Indonesia, but also in some villages in urban areas. In a small number of mosques in villages in urban areas in Jakarta alone there are even sermons (khutbah) delivered in pure Arabic. For example in one of the mosques in Pasar Jumat, South Jakarta. The Jum'at sermon in the view of conservative Muslims must be in Arabic by following the salaf Muslim (orthodox Islam), unless no one can. This is because the sermon is considered a substitute for the two rak'ah prayers that must be in Arabic, from four rak'ahs in the midday prayer (Zuhur) on an ordinary day, (Al-Bajuri, n.d., p. 220) because Friday prayers after the sermon are only done with two rak'ahs. The sermon as well as the prayer must be delivered in Arabic and delivered in a short time, about the measurement of two rak'ah prayers.

Moreover, activities such as dialogue between religions involving non-Muslims must enter the mosque. For most mosques in Indonesia, it seems difficult to do. One of

them, because based on QS. at-Tawbah/9: 28, Imam Abu Umar and al-Auza'i based on the letter Umar bin Abd-Aziz, one of the caliphs of the fairest Umayyad dynasty, prohibits non-Muslims (Jews and Christians) from entering the mosque Muslims as a whole, according to the sound of the earliest verse, that non-Muslims (the polytheists) are impure inwardly. (As-Shabuni, 2001, pp. 346 and 492–493; Katsir, n.d.) Of course, its notes, some Muslim scholars understand, based on that verse too, since the 9th year of the Hijriah, polytheists (musyrik/non Muslim) were prohibited from entering the al-Haram mosque only. To enter the mosque outside the al-Haram mosque is permissible, and this is a strong opinion. The reason, according to the practice carried out by the Prophet who received guests of the Christian Bani Najran at the mosque. In fact, the Prophet allowed them to hold services at the mosque. This fi'li hadith (the Prophet's deed) serves to interpret the verse above. In fact, based on other hadiths, non-Muslims (polytheists) such as the Tsamamah before being Muslim are allowed by the Prophet Muhammad to sleep in mosques other than Muslims. (Hisyam, n.d., pp. 426-428; Huston Smith, 2004, p. 293; Sabiq, n.d., pp. 426–428, 293, and 180)

If in Indonesia where the majority of Muslims are like that, what about mosques where Muslims are a minority population such as in Spain. Besides there are many limitations as Muslim minorities, moreover they as immigrants generally work as unskilled workers, also now they face the threat of Islamophobia. Article 14 and 16 of the 1978 Constitution of Spain does confirm its constitutional guarantee of ideological freedom and religious freedom which prohibits coercion; asserting that Catholicism is no longer the official religion of the state; and guarantee equality before the law for followers of religion. Therefore, being discriminated on the basis of birth, race, gender, religion, opinions or other conditions is not justified. Spain, based on these two articles, also ensures its position as a secular state that guarantees co-existence among its people (citizenship pluralism), equality among followers of religion, and freedom of worship for them. The Spanish state no longer recognizes Catholicism as an official religion that has certain privileges as before, and that means a statement of the separation of religion and state (article 16 paragraph 3).

Thus, Spain formally since 1978 has embraced secularism, at least in terms of religious neutrality, or non-denominational countries. (De La Hera Alberto and Rosa María Martínez de Codes : Spanish Legislation on Religious Affairs, 1998; Moran, 1995, pp. 25, 39–40) Secular state/secularism that is applied in Spain is not as freedom from religion (erosion of religion), but freedom of religion, which means that religion is not abandoned/hostile. (Jacoby & Yavuz, 2008) In Spain too, if in 2009 or 2010, there were around 598 mosques, in 2013 there were 690 mosques. (Astor, 2018, 2009)

However, now in Europe in general, including in Spain, new bad nationalism is being born, xenophobia, which does not like everything related to strangers. The deterritorialization process, especially economic globalization that invites the presence of immigrant workers needed in the industrialization process after World War II in Europe seems to have an influence, where the dominant ethnicity in the nation-state in Europe feels threatened by the presence of minorities since post-World War II. Moreover there is a trigger, namely the occurrence of terrorism committed by certain groups in the name of Islam in a number of European countries, including in Madrid, Spain. Therefore, mosques and Muslim communities in Spain are now experiencing xenophobia or Islamophobia. The mosque is now part of the object/place that was attacked. In 2017, from the 546 attacks on Muslims, 7% went to the mosque. (Bayrakli & Farid Hafez, 2018)

Nevertheless, may be the management of mosques in Spain can be better from Indonesia as Muslim majorities, because of the Spanish economic factors that may be more advanced than Indonesia, there are minority Muslim elites who are strong economic and

other resources, or especially the support of Muslim countries, especially the Middle East who want to pour funds to construction and maintenance of various mosques in Spain, because of their religious sentiment. This means that the minorities factor can have no effect on the bad management of the mosque. It could also be the high social activities of mosques in Spain, especially in activities that are open to non-Muslims who become the majority in Spain because of pragmatic factors where they as minorities must follow the wishes of the majority.

Therefore, the question is: do the majority and minority factors influence the management of mosques in Indonesia and Spain? From these two countries, which management of the mosque is better, both seen from activities in the field of worship/da'wa (preaching), as well as in the social field (the power of civil society)? How about the Islamization of the public space carried out by the mosque, were to strengthen the Islamic faith/symbol, the mosque's religious activities are heard up to the public space outside the mosque because it uses loudspeakers? These three things will be discussed in this paper.

Method

This paper is constructed from the research conducted by the authors as qualitative research based on quantitative research. It is called qualitative because what is used as the material is the result of in-depth interviews and especially the results of literature studies. Called quantitative, because the basis for analysis in writing is the result of calculating the questionnaire. The number of questionnaires distributed was 100 to Muslim communities in Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor [City], Depok, Tangerang [City], and Bekasi [City]), in Indonesia, and 100 Muslims in the City of Madrid and Sevilla, in Spain. Questionnaires were purposively disseminated, to represent Muslims in the two countries' affairs, both educational background, economic level, religious school, gender, age, and activity in religious organizations. we choose Indonesia as the object of research because Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, and we choose Spain because this country used to be a Muslim country (8th-15th century AD) but is now a secular country with a Muslim minority.

Result and Discussion

The study found high scores for mosque management in urban Indonesia related to the community's satisfaction with the mosque services either in the social field (as the power of civil society) or in the main service fields (worship/da'wa). Meanwhile, the score for managing mosques in Spain is low. This fact is related to the issue of better access to resources: economic, socio-cultural, and political mosques in Indonesia as they are the majority population. On the other hand, Spanish Muslims often face various obstacles in building mosques, one of them being tied up with the issue of Islamophobia. The results of our research on mosque management in two countries, Indonesia and Spain, and how to do Muslims respond to mosque management, are as follows:

Management of Mosques in Indonesia and Spain as Da'wa Institutions and Civil Society Institutions

This research found that in general, the score on the management of mosques in Indonesia was quite high, both mosques as institutions of worship and da'wah which were the main services of mosques, as well as in social services (mosques as the power of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

Table 1
Mosque Management Score in Indonesia

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Low	67	44.7	44.7	44.7
	High	83	55.3	55.3	100.0
	Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Based on the categorization of scores on worship and social service variables as shown in table 2 below, the table above explains the score on the management of mosques in Indonesia. Mosque social services are measured by: education/training, guidance/counseling, provision of sports facilities, economic enterprises such as cooperatives/minimarkets, arrangement of the Janazah/deceased), medicine/health, and the role of mosques in solving problems of the surrounding community. While the main services are measured by: adequate buildings, mosque cleanliness, adequate carpets, adequate prayer imam/leaders, adequate khatib/preacher, worship activities during Ramadhan to Eid al-Fitr, management of ZISWa (Zakat, Infaq, Sadaqah, and Waqf), Hajj guidance, religious library services, and on-line religious extension services.

Based on mosque management scores, the management of mosques in Indonesia falls into the high category. The percentage score is 55%. This means that most urban Muslim respondents, at least in Jabodetabek in Indonesia, are satisfied with the management of mosques, both in social services and in the main services of mosques as places of worship and da'wa. Details of the percentage of each aspect between mosque social services and the main services of mosques in Indonesia can be seen in the following table 2.

Table 2
Details of the Management of Mosques in Indonesia

Statement items in SA (Strongly Agree)%, A (Agree)%, D (Doubtful)%, Da (Disagree)%, and SDa (Strongly Disagree)%.

27.	I am satisfied with the mosque's social services, as follows:	SA	A	D	Da	SDa
	a. education/training	38	51	7	3	1
	b. guidance/consultation	28	59	10	3	1
	c. providing sports facilities	20	47	21	9	3
	d. economic businesses such as koperasi / minimarkets	22	51	17	5	5
	e. arrangement of the <i>janazah</i> /deceased	35	51	10	3	1
	f. medicine/health	26	50	15	7	2
	g. roles in solving problems around	31	50	15	3	0

28.	I am satisfied with the main services of mosque in terms of:	47	47	5	1	0
	a. adequate building					
	b. cleaning service	49	43	7	1	0
	c. adequate prayer imam/leaders	53	40	6	1	0
	d. carpet for prayer/salat	54	42	4	0	0
	e. adequate khatib / preacher	51	42	6	0	0
	f. worship activities during Ramadhan to eid	55	37	7	1	0
	g. management of ZIS (collection, management and distribution)	55	38	6	1	0
	h. hajj guidance	32	49	13	6	0
	i. religious library services	36	42	15	7	1
	j. online religious empowering services.	27	39	25	8	1
29.	Mosques need to use loudspeakers to echo the symbols of Islam that reach public spaces outside the mosque area.	62	33	4	7	0

Unlike the management of mosques in Indonesia, in general, the management of mosques in Spain is low. Table 3 below shows the findings.

Table 3
Mosque Management Score in Spain

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Low	107	63.3	63.3	63.3
	High	62	36.7	36.7	100.0
	Total	169	100.0	100.0	

The score table above shows scores for managing mosques in Spain (Madrid and Sevilla). Based on the scores obtained from the initial variables, the management of mosques in Spain falls into the low category with a percentage of 63%. This means, that most Muslim respondents in Madrid and Spain feel less/dissatisfied with the management of mosques, both in social services and the main services of mosques as places of worship/da'wah. The details of each aspect of mosque social services in Spain and its main services can be seen from Table 4 below.

Table 4

Details of Management of Mosques in Spain

Statement items in SA (Strongly Agree)%, A (Agree)%, D (Doubtful)%, Da (Disagree)%, and SDa (Strongly Disagree)%.

		SA	A	D	Da	SDa
27.	I am satisfied with the mosque's social services, as follows:	17	64	14	4	6
	a. education/training	13	43	34	8	1
	b. guidance/counseling	2	5	11	28	53
	c. providing sports facilities	4	5	12	28	51
	d. economic businesses such as koperasi / minimarkets	3	8	7	34	48
	e. arrangement of the <i>janazah</i> /deceased	2	10	4	33	51
	f. medicine/health	6	25	47	18	5
28.	I am satisfied with the main services of mosque in terms of:	35	43	10	10	2
	a. adequate building	24	43	25	8	0
	b. cleaning service	13	29	35	22	1
	c. adequate prayer imam/leaders	30	44	15	9	1
	d. carpet for prayer/salat	9	21	47	21	2
	e. adequate khatib / preacher	15	56	19	9	1
	f. worship activities during ramadhan to eid	15	41	31	11	1
	g. management of ZIS (collection, management and distribution)	10	25	27	36	2
	h. hajj guidance	5	14	14	59	9
	i. religious library services	4	8	12	61	14
	j. online religious empowering services.	3	5	8	73	11
29.	Mosques need to use loudspeakers to echo the symbols of islam that reach public spaces outside the mosque area	3	5	8	73	11

If seen based on the details of the two tables based on the statement of attitude of the respondents strongly agree/agree, then mosque services in urban Indonesia (Jabodetabek) are considered to be entirely good, except less convincing in three respects, although the numbers are still quite good, around 7. These are: (a) online religious counseling services (confirmed 66% of respondents [agree and strongly agree], the rest are divided between those who are doubtful and disagree/strongly disagree); (b) provision of sports facilities (agreed to be 67% of respondents), and (c) economic enterprises such as cooperatives/minimarkets (agreed to be 73% of respondents) (the value is between 6-7). Apart from the three services, it was agreed/rated well by 76 to 95% of respondents (grades between 8 or 9). Of course, if the number of approvals or assessments is, especially in the three things above, as psychological numbers, the numbers will be lower. The reason, may be that respondents who judge it, psychologically do not judge as objectively as possible, because they are asked to assess the mosque as a sacred building, the house of God. They also psychologically cannot be separated from judging, just as they judge things that are profane.

Therefore, the data in the paragraph above shows the importance of mosques in Indonesia, especially in its cities, to improve services in the three things above. All three by Muslims in Jabodetabek are considered as the weak point of managing mosques in Indonesia. In fact, all three are very important for urban communities. When Alvara's

research stated that 17.8% of students and 18.4% of students agreed on khilafah as an ideal form of state and 16.8% of students and 18.6% of students agreed on Islamic ideology as an Indonesian ideology, another research conducted by Alvira mentioned: 8 of the 10 generations of millennials connected to the internet, 40% have Instagram, and on average they consume internet over 7 hours a day. (Ali, 2018; Ocktaviany, 2018) Therefore, strengthening mosques in their role in the field of online religious counseling services has become urgent, especially in the interest of dispelling Islamic radicalism that has begun to strengthen among the younger generation who have difficulty living without gadgets, especially social media and other internet services.

Furthermore, Amin Mudzakkir, LIPI (Indonesian Institute of Sciences) researcher, said that the weak online religious education service of da'wah is a weak point of Islamic institutions, including Islamic organizations and mosques. Da'wah through technology carried out by salafists (fundamentalists), especially radical fundamentalism, is far stronger, than moderate Muslims, including moderate mosques. They are keen to preach Islam in its moderate version to internet users, especially to the millennial generation as the largest internet user. Just check, he stressed further, for example in Alexa, influential websites belong to radical fundamentalism. Websites belonging to mass organizations such as Muhammadiyah for example are unknown. Also, the website of the mosque.

Likewise, the mosque's social services in Indonesia which are still considered not good, are not as convincing compared to other services, namely the provision of sports facilities. As online da'wa services which in reality are still low, because the respondents' assessment seems to be a psychological assessment, a few mosques have adequate sports services, some even have none, because of limited land. In Jakarta, a large mosque that has sports services such as a large soccer field and other sports fields is Al-Azhar Mosque, in Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta. In mosques based on community, there are also sports services, but very limited. For example, badminton court.

In fact, in urban areas, the needs of worshipers for sports facilities are very important, although they can be obtained from non-mosque services, including commercial ones. As can be observed, the type of work in urban areas, especially for services, requires more brain work, rather than physical labor, because physical labor is only needed in work areas such as construction and factories. Therefore, if it is not balanced with sports, then various diseases will come, even for those who are young. The existence of sports services as a game can also attract young people, besides being able to function to create a generation that is healthy, fit, and muscular. That way, not only can they make the resilience of Muslims and the nation increase, but also can be used as a force for the transformation of Muslims and even the state, as Najib Mahfuzh criticizes the lack of attention of Islamic institutions to sports facilities to form a strong generation. (Kamil, 2013, pp. 319–332) That possibility will be even greater if the mosque is coupled with attractive technological facilities for young people. For example, camera technology services for making good pictures and videos. Mosques, therefore, will be more attractive to young people. (A. Mudzakkir, personal communication, January 18, 2019)

With the strengthening of sports facilities in mosques, the mosque carries out the hadith narrated by Nasai that instructs Muslims to teach the younger generation to exercise horses, archery training, and swim. (Purnama, 2015) Also carries out the words of wisdom taught in madrasa and pesantren (Islamic boarding school): *al-Aql as-salim fi al-jism as-salim* (healthy mind is in a healthy body).

As services in the two fields above, mosque social services in Indonesia which are still considered to be bad, not as convincing compared to other services, are in economic business services such as cooperatives/minimarkets. This service is important for efforts

to create mosques as CSOs that are economically independent. At least, the source of the mosque's funding is not only from the donations but also from the results of Ta'mir's (officers) own business. That way, the mosque can not only be financially independent but also can empower the poor Muslim community around it. The reason is that in Islam poverty can bring people to kufr (deny [unbelieve]), which is why ZISWa (Zakat, Infaq, Sadaqah, and Waqf [Endowments]) is presented so that the ZISWa results obtained can be their economic stimulus.

Indeed, in addition to the three fields above, there is one mosque social service in Indonesia (urban Jabodetabek) whose value/approval is below 8, although almost 8, namely religious library services (confirmed 78%). If this is considered a psychological assessment of the place they love or a place that is considered sacred, then the value/agreement of the respondent for one service can be even lower. Therefore, mosque services in urban Indonesia in this field according to respondents still need to be improved. This fact is of course an irony because it is no religion whose first revelation is the command to read (Iqra), accept Islam, even Allah's command in reading at this first revelation is repeated twice. However, the mosque alone in reading services as an effort to fulfill the first revelation of Islam was still not high. This is not to mention if examined further. From the library in the mosque, how often and how many congregations visited it. Allegedly, the answer is likely to be low. The reason is that a common tradition in Indonesian society, even in Jabodetabek as cities, is the majority of oral and listening traditions, not reading. Naturally, if TV is owned by almost everyone in his house, while books, only a few people have it.

However, when compared between mosque services in Indonesia and mosque services in Spain, if detailed according to table 4 above, both in social services and worship/da'wa, many variables are measured in research that is not agreed upon (not considered good/approved) by Muslim respondents in Madrid and Sevilla. Mosque social services in Spain are considered good only in two areas: education/training (agreed [agree and strongly agree] by 81%), and guidance/counseling (agreed 56%). This means that the social services (mosque function as CSO) is bad/low, even is very bad. Furthermore, there are many whose numbers are below the value of 1 (considered good by respondents below 10%). This conclusion can be seen from the low/poor services of mosques in Spain in the provision of sports facilities (7%), economic enterprises such as cooperatives/minimarkets (9%), arrangement of the jenazah/deceased (11%), medicine/health (12%), and roles mosque in solving community problems around it (31%).

Whereas in its main services (worship/da'wa), it is almost comparable between mosque services that are considered bad (not approved) and those that are considered good (approved). Services considered good include: adequate buildings (agreed [agree and strongly agree] by 78%), mosque cleanliness (67%), adequate carpets (74%), worship activities during Ramadhan to Eid (71%), management ZISWa (Zakah, Infaq, Sadaqah, and Waqf [Endowments]) (56%). The rest is low management: adequate prayer imam/leaders (30%), adequate khatib/preacher (42%), pilgrimage guidance (35%), library services (19%), and online religious empowering services (12%). This means that in only basic services, management of mosque services in Spain is from 1-4 only, under five.

Only in the field of excellence, when compared with the approval of Indonesian respondents, the maximum agreed (considered good management of the mosque) a maximum of 81% of respondents. Whereas in the public in Indonesia, which considers good management of mosques can reach 95%. It could be said, the highest value that respondents in Indonesia agreed on in managing the mosque was 95, while in Spain 81. If it was considered a psychological number because they were asked to rate a place that was loved or sacred, then certainly the number of mosques in Spain would be lower. If the number reaches only

eight, mosque services in Indonesia must be repaired, so almost all mosque services in Spain, both social services and worship services, still need to be repaired. Even the highest value for primary services is only 78. Even if they want to be issued, only education/training services are good.

It could be seen that there are cultural differences between the Spanish Muslim community and Indonesia. Considering that Spanish people live in Europe, they are accustomed to assessing objectives, objectively as possible, in assessing anything, including mosques. While in Indonesia, especially on the island of Java, there is a very strong harmonious culture affecting the people. (Wijayanto & Zachry, 2009) Moreover, the one consideration is the mosque. Because of this, the measurement of the assessment may be different.

However, it seems that the fact/data of the low management of mosques in Spain is true because it is more related to the reality of Spanish people as a minority. In the construction of the mosque alone, many of the Spanish Muslims experienced rejection in various places, as will be explained below. Therefore, resources, including economic, political, and cultural resources, which they have are indeed lower, (I. Hernandez, personal communication, December 2018) and access is even more difficult.

Islamization of Public Spaces by Mosques in Indonesia and Spain

Based on tables 3 and 4 above, there is also interesting data that seems to be important to discuss, namely whether the mosque needs to use loudspeakers to echo the symbols of Islam that reach public spaces outside the mosque area or not. It is interesting because the data is between heaven and earth. The number of Indonesian respondents who agree/strongly agree is 95%, while respondents in Spain are only 8%. This data is related to cultural differences, both mindset and taste patterns, and religious practices in different mosques are almost 100%.

One hundred percent different from the practice of mosques in Spain - like the Abu Bakr Mosque in Estrecho Madrid-- where the call to prayer is only heard around the mosque, not to the public space outside the mosque, in Indonesia, even in a minority area like in Bali, the mosque can call to prayer using loudspeakers. Azan was heard far away in public spaces outside the mosque. In areas where the majority of Muslims, such as those in Jabodetabek, are the place for research, of course, this is even more common. Because the call to prayer used to be heard in the far public space, for the general Muslim public in Indonesia, it becomes strange if the call to prayer is not heard in their public spaces. Some Indonesian people even, if they go to North European or North American countries, for example, one that is missed is the absence of a call to prayer in the public space. For them, the call to prayer is voiced through loudspeakers, although some of the calls to prayer are bad like church bells heard in public spaces in countries where Christians are the majority of Christian culture is the dominant culture.

In fact, religious activities in Indonesia that are spread through loudspeakers for the sake of syiar (the appearance of symbols) and Islamic preaching are not only azan, iqâmah, and praying, but also recitations and celebrations of major holidays. Those who also do almost the same thing, not only the mosque, but also the majlis ta'lim (the meeting room for Islamic studies for the general public), as well as some Islamic boarding schools and madrassas.

More like the same phenomenon in the month of Ramadan. In this month, especially in the village, many phenomena of reading the Qur'an until midnight over 10 pm through loudspeakers. With the voice and the ability to read the Qur'an which is not standard too. In part, some even do it until dawn arrives. For some Muslims who are the perpetrators, the activity becomes part of the qiyâm Ramadhan (worship at the night of Ramadhan) to

hunt down merit that is multiplied in the holy month. However, in fact in Islam itself these activities are problematic. The reason, because Islam is not a religion that only emphasizes the attitude to worship only. If it is done alone by not using a loudspeaker it might not be a problem. However, it becomes problematic, especially for those who work full time during the day of Ramadan. The reason, because the phenomenon is not under the principle of physical and spiritual balance. Exactly contrary to the hadith of the Prophet: "Indeed every person who has rights must be fulfilled his rights", where the body has the right to be rested with sleeping.

Some of the phenomena of religious awareness echoed by using loudspeakers are also considered by some groups such as Vice President Jusuf Kala (JK) to be too strong in carrying out Islamization of public space. That is, the freedom to worship in Indonesia by some people is considered to be in the category of being too free, so that some of them are already at a disturbing level. For example, reading shalawât (pray for Prophet Muhammad to get mercy) or the Qur'an through a cassette tape from a reciter. Even though the reading was good, but because it was echoed through loudspeakers at the time of the morning prayer which was then followed by a call to prayer, the activity was considered to be disturbing. Therefore, JK had requested the termination of recitation through cassette recordings through loudspeakers, especially those carried out an hour or half an hour before dawn (shubh) prayer. For him, if you want to do it just 10 minutes before adzan, the call to prayer. (Rastika, 2015) Although it aims to awaken Muslims to pray at dawn (shubh), this is considered by JK and some people in urban areas are disturbing, especially for those who have just returned from work and are going to sleep or those who are sleeping very late at night. The matter of the Vice President's protest over this phenomenon had become a controversial issue in Jakarta. In Medan, precisely at Tanjung Balai, Asahan, protests from a Chinese citizen against the phenomenon have triggered the burning of one monastery and four temples on Friday, July 29, 2016 by some Muslims. (Anarcho, 2016)

Therefore, it is natural for the call to prayer or religious activities to be spread to public spaces using loudspeakers to be criticized/protested by Muslim minorities in the Netherlands such as the management and congregation of the Al-Hikmah Mosque, The Hague, a mosque which was previously the Immanuel Church. There were many native Dutch Muslims or Muslims from Indonesia when they returned to Indonesia protesting the phenomenon of reading the Qur'an and the dawn (shubh) call to prayer that was exchanging loudspeakers. For Dutch Muslims, Indonesian Muslims will be better off doing the call to prayer, especially at dawn (shubh), without passing loudspeakers until that is heard into the public space (A. N. Sulhan & Hambali, personal communication, Agustus 2016)

Presumably, in addition to the differences in the practice of religious culture as mentioned above it has been revealed, as well as differences in mindset and taste typology between Muslim minority communities in Spain, as well as the Netherlands, with a majority Muslim Indonesian community. The Spanish minority Muslim community is accustomed to living with the values of individual freedom. Religion, therefore, must be subject to and applied in this framework. They then chose the call to prayer and other religious social activities not to be spread without using audible loudspeakers to public spaces outside the mosque. Of course, their position as a minority also affects those who do not want to disturb the non-Muslim majority. While the Muslim community in general, Indonesia has a stronger vision and tradition of amar ma'rûf and nahyi munkar (order good and forbid evil) who are also influenced by the community (communal) tradition, where an individual becomes an inseparable part of his community. As a result, visions such as the Muslim community of Spain - and the Netherlands - such as the results of the questionnaire above are unknown or even foreign to the Indonesian Muslim community.

Mosques and Factors of Minorities Muslims in Spain

The above has been revealed, based on tables 2 and 4 that have been revealed above, the score of mosque services in Spain is low and the score of mosque services in Indonesia is high. The question is why is that so? As mentioned above, it seems that this data is related to resource issues. The resources possessed by mosques in Indonesia are better, and that is related to a far greater number of Muslims because, in Indonesia, Muslims are the majority population. While in Spain, Muslims are a minority population, whose numbers are much lower, as will be explained later.

According to Ibrahim Hernandez, Chair of the Sevilla Mosque Foundation, Islam in Spain is still very young and not strong, compared to other European Union countries. Moreover, when compared with Muslims who become the majority such as Indonesian Muslims. Therefore, Muslims in Spain are far behind in terms of internal organization and growth, including in the management of mosques. (I. Hernandez, personal communication, December 2018) The Sevilla Mosque alone, building has not become a property right, but only the right to use, because its legal status is still contracted.

This is meaningful, the existence of Muslims in Spain today should not be imagined as a continuation of the classical Islamic period (7th to 15th century), which became the center of western Islamic world civilization. As revealed in the previous chapter, since 1492, Islamic rule ended in Spain and since 1606 there have been no more Muslims there. (Yatim, 1997, p. 100) The existence of Muslims in Spain is new, as is the presence of Muslims in other countries in Europe. The existence of Muslims in Spain continued to exist today in general after World War II (1945).

In contrast to other European countries such as France and Germany whose number of Muslims is around 4-7% of the total population (in France there are 5 million Muslims and in Germany 4 million Muslims), in Spain the number of Muslims is the same as in Britain, which is 2 million Muslims. Whereas in all of Europe there are 17 million Muslims. The Muslim population in Spain is dominated by ethnic Moroccans. (Astor, 2018, pp. 14–19)

Therefore, it is natural, if Muslims in Spain lack their socio-economic status, they lack organization, because of their position as a minority group. Economically for example, even though educated and skilled Muslims have slowly begun to enter the white-collar jobs, the majority of Muslims in Spain work in blue-collar jobs in heavy industries. Most of them are less educated, have no skills, and do not have good technical skills. In Madrid for example, 87% of Muslims work as employees, and 13% work alone. They work mainly in the construction sector. That too later (around 2010), many were unemployed or switched jobs. (Faria, 2010)

With such economic conditions, social and political culture as a minority group, the resources to carry out large social projects such as good mosque management are far more limited, than in countries where Muslims are the majority, such as Indonesia. This is again coupled with the absence of financial assistance from the Spanish government, because religion is not an obligation, plus the priority needs of minorities are different, compared to the people who become the majority of the population. (Luqman, personal communication, December 17, 2018)

In the context of the mosque, Yolanda Aixela Cabre, an expert on Muslim minorities in Spain viewed that in general, mosques were more rejected than the existence of Muslims themselves, because of the Islamophobic attitude of the Spanish indigenous people which had recently strengthened since 9/11 had increased, followed by terrorist attacks Islam in various places in Europe. (Y. A. Cabre, personal communication, January 16, 2019) Therefore, it is understandable, if the mosque in Spain has a low level of management because the existence of mosques in various places has been rejected, because of their existence as a minority.

Yolanda's view was echoed by Avi Astor, (Astor, 2018, 2009) a mosque expert in Spain, as shown in the table below:

Table 5
Data on some mosques in Spain and opposition to it

Autonomous Community	Muslim Population	% Total Population	Mosque	Cities Host to Mosque Opposition
Catalonia	326,697	4.4	135	30
Madrid	220,418	3.5	68	0
Andalusia	206,568	2.5	72	3
Valencia	148,108	2.9	63	8
Murcia	68,352	4.7	42	3
Melilla	37,763	51.5	4	0
Aragon	35,685	2.7	25	0
Ceuta	32,374	41.2	37	0

According to Avi Astor, based on 2013 data, there are 690 mosques in Spain. However, based on the data presented above, rejection of the construction or existence of mosques occurs in many places. The most are Catalonia and Valencia, although in many places there is no resistance at all. Other data presented by Asvi Astor made data on the low service of mosques in Spain more understandable. Based on a survey of Spanish attitudes towards a group of Spaniards who refused to build a mosque, (1) in Catalonia, 56.59% accepted (agreed) with the attitude of a group of Spanish people who in opposition to building a mosque and 39.0% refused, the rest did not respond. (2) In Madrid 31% received, 57.8% refused, and the rest did not respond. So, in Madrid, where there are no cases of rejection of mosques, 3 out of 10 Spaniards accept opposition to the mosque. (3) In Andalusia, 37.8% received, 51.9% refused, and the rest did not respond. (4) In Valencia 40.3% received, 51.1% refused, and the rest did not respond. (Astor, 2018, p. 42)

Other data was submitted by al-Arabiya News Chanel, July 20, 2010. Based on the information presented by this media, in the last 12 years until 2010, more than fifty anti-mosque movements have emerged in Spain and most have succeeded in closing mosques. According to the July 2010 Telegraph Report, a popular mosque in Lleida was even closed, because it was too full. This mosque is often filled with more than 1000 people, even though the official capacity is only 240 people. (Spain Closes Mosque, Arrest Imam, 2010)

In addition to Catalonia and Lleida, opposition to building a mosque also took place in Cordova and Alicante. There around 2014, several Islamic groups wanted to build a large mosque in Medina Azzahra, near from Cordoba. It is planned that the mosque will also function as an Islamic Center in Europe. The mosque will be funded with funding from Saudi Arabia and/or the United Arab Emirates. The land for the mosque has been purchased through an intermediary. However, the Cordova City Government continued to postpone the mosque construction project. Muslims who have no more than 1,000 Muslims, although the local Muslim association claims there are 4,500 Muslims, questioned the delay in the construction of a large mosque that has not been built until now. (Spain 2015 International Religious Freedom Report, 2015)

The same thing happened in Alicante. In the 1990s the Centro Cultural Islámico de Alicante (Alicante Islamic Cultural Center) which also functioned as a mosque was also opened opposite the beach of Postiguet, one of the most popular beaches in Alicante.

Religious services and other Islamic activities were held there. The Alicante Islamic Culture Center has all basic facilities. From the room for women which also function as classrooms for children, space for men, restaurants, toilets, to study rooms. In this place, there are also classes in Arabic.

However, since the events of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks --coincided with the commencement of the process and search for police in places managed by immigrant Muslims-- the closure of around twenty mosque places took place. Communist infectious “threats” to the West throughout the second half of the twentieth century have disappeared since the “threat” of Islam is a substitute for the Communist “threat.” Anti-Islamic sentiments are often addressed to mosques as physical manifestations of Islam. Mosques are understood by the indigenous Spanish and European public as a symbol of Islamic domination in the West, (Collins, 2018) especially when added to other Islamic symbols, for example, Muslim graves, halal restaurants, Islamic banks, and Islamic schools. On December 17, 2005, the City Council implemented an order to close the mosque which is also the Alicante Islamic Cultural Center. The reason that arises, that it does not have permission for Islamic activities, and security measures are lacking.

The closure sparked protests from the Muslim community and 300 Muslims occupied the beach of Postiguet to perform Friday prayers because there were no mosques. Prayer activities on one of the busiest beaches in Alicante have a large impact on the population and produce direct effects. On the same day, the City Council promised to provide a place for worship for Alicante Muslims. Shortly after, the City Government gave a building in the industrial area of Pla de la Vallonga to be used as a temporary mosque for free. However, the building provided was previously a warehouse for containers and road cleaning vehicles. The Moroccan community, therefore, complained about the condition of the warehouse intended as a replacement mosque. The building is not clean and bad, a place that is not ideal for worship. However, there is no other choice. The location of the new mosque is also outside the city, a few kilometers away from the initial mosque. The pattern of marginalizing mosques from the crowds that appear in the city becomes on the outskirts. (Cabre, 2007) The pattern of removing mosques as a symbol of Islam in the middle of the city was carried out by the City Council.

It turned out that the pattern of building permits or buildings used for mosques in a place on the outskirts of the city that was far from the views of the citizens was also taken by other city governments. Barcelona City Government for example. Mosques in Spain, especially their cooperation, have become conflict zones. So far, in Spain, there are four types of conflict zones: mosques, Muslim shops, graves, and racist attacks on mosques as worship facilities for Muslim communities. This racist attack in 2003 occurred twice in Catalonia and once happened in Madrid. (Zapata-Barrero, 2006, pp. 163–167)

Even though it happened in many places, Catalonia was the place where there was the most opposition to mosques in Spain, compared to other Spanish regions (see table 5 above). In Madrid as a big city even the biggest because of its position as the capital city, for example, did not happen at all. The question is why? Among the factors are real socio-spatial divisions and a lack of confidence in the commitment of the state (city government) to managing the challenges that accompany immigration. Allegations of cultural incompatibility were also pinned to Muslim immigrant communities. (Astor, 2009)

However, despite the problem of opposition to the mosque and the phenomenon of Islamophobia, the number of mosques from day to day in Spain is increasing, according to the needs of the Muslims there which continue to increase. There were around 598 mosques in Spain in 2009 or 2010. In 2013, as stated above, there were 690.

The first mosque in Spain is the Morabito Mosque in Cardova, as revealed in the

previous chapter. Next, in 1980 Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz founded a mosque in Marbella, Malaga, 1980. The mosque accommodates 400 worshipers and the tower is 25 meters high. In 1983, the Abu Bakar mosque described above was built with an area of 3,500 square meters. The mosque is equipped with a tower and stands on four floors. The Madrid media often called it the center of Arab diplomats in Spain gathered. As Muslims, of course, that must happen, at least they gather for Friday prayers, obligatory worship once a week for Muslims. In 1992, the Umar bin Khattab mosque which was also mentioned was mentioned above. This mosque was built at the cost of King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz. The area of the main room is 550 square meters. This mosque can accommodate 700 Muslim male worshipers and 130 Muslim female worshipers with separate rooms. Before the Roman mosque in Italy was established in 1997, the mosque of Umar bin Khattab Madrid was the largest mosque in Europe.

In 1992 there was also the Valencian Islamic Cultural Center which also functioned as a mosque. The mosque is funded by the state of Kuwait. In the 2000s, there were at least 3 more mosques in Spain. In 2001, there was a mosque and an Andalusian Study Center in La Puebla de Don Fadrique, Granada. This mosque stands in an agricultural field with an area of 120 acres. Source of funding for its construction from Syeks Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasim, emir of Syarjah, United Arab Emirates. In 2003, the Great Mosque of Granada stood in the Albaicin area, which was built by several Islamic countries (Libya, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia). In 2007, a large Islamic Center and mosque were also built in Malaga. The buildings are built on 4000 square meters of land. Source of funds from Suhail Foundation, Saudi Arabia. The mosque, which houses 1000 worshipers, is equipped with a kindergarten, auditorium, lodging rooms for men and women, and even translation services. (Nilesen, 2010, p. 487)

In addition, even though social services and worship/da'wa of mosques in Spain are low, it does not mean that there are no service-representative mosques in Spain. Besides of the mosques mentioned above such as the Malaga mosque, the Umar bin Khattab mosque above can be called a representative mosque. It is located in the Barrio-de conception region known as the M-30 Mosque, a strategic area. The largest mosque in Europe before the Rome mosque in Italy stands it is equipped with various services. The building is very representative, with carpets for adequate prayers and priests (imam) brought in from Saudi, whose Qur'anic reading and memorizing abilities are adequate. In short, it is convenient to be a place of worship. The mosque is also equipped with schools from elementary to secondary schools, services for the management of janâzah (corpses), religious marriage services which are then reinforced by civil records, space for conferences, canteens, and restaurants with typical Arabic food. Who can observe this mosque restaurant is also not only Muslim but also non-Muslim. In summary, in addition to services primarily in the field of worship/da'wa which is adequate, also in social services. Umar bin Khattab Mosque is also worthy of being a small CSO (Civil Society Organization).

Conclusion

The conclusion that can be taken is that the score for managing mosques in Indonesia is high. This indicates that the urban Muslim community in Indonesia, at least in Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi), is satisfied with the service of the mosque, both services in the social field and the main service areas (worship/da'wa). Mosque social services in this research are measured by: education/training, guidance/counseling, provision of sports facilities, economic enterprises such as cooperatives/minimarkets, management of bodies (corpse), treatment/health, and the role of mosques in solving problems of the surrounding communities. This means that the function of the mosque as a CSO (Civil

Society Organization), based on that measurement, is good/high, even very good. While the main services (worship/da'wa) are measured by: adequate buildings, mosque cleanliness, adequate carpets, adequate priests/imam, adequate religious speaker, worship activities during Ramadhan to Eid al-Fitr, management of ZISWa (Zakat, Infaq, Sadaqah, and Waqf [endowment]), Hajj guidance, religious library services, and on-line religious extension services. However, there are three mosque services in urban Indonesia (Jabodetabek) that are less, at least, not as good as the others. The three weak services are online religious counseling services (da'wa), provision of sports facilities, and economic businesses such as cooperatives/minimarkets. This shows the importance of mosques in Indonesia, especially in their cities, to improve services in the three things above. All three, by Muslims in Jabodetabek, are considered as the weak point of managing mosques in Indonesia.

Meanwhile, the level of management of mosques in Spain is low, both in social services and in worship/da'wah. Mosque social services in Spain are considered good only in two areas: education/training and guidance/ counseling. The rest of the mosque's social services in Spain are bad, even some of them are very bad (provision of sports facilities, economic businesses such as cooperatives/minimarkets, management of Janazah (corpse), treatment/health, and the role of mosques in solving problems surrounding communities). This means, that the function of the mosque as a CSO is bad/low, even very bad. While the main services are almost comparable between mosque services which are considered bad and those that are considered good. Mosque services in the area of worship/da'wa that are considered good include adequate buildings, mosque cleanliness, adequate carpets, worship activities during Ramadhan to Eid al-Fitr, and management of ZISWa (Zakat, Infaq, Sadaqah, and Waqf [endowment]). The rest of the management in the area of worship/da'wa is considered low.

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إنسانيات

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Vol 6, Number 1, November 2021

**A Cognitive Linguistic Approach to Life Metaphor
in Tetralogy *Laskar Pelangi***

Merry Lapasau, Sulis Setiawati

**Chinese Culture in The Cirebon Sultanate:
Symbolic and Philosophical Meanings**

Mukhoyyaroh, Didin Saepudin, M. Ikhsan Tanggok

Islamic Book and Islam in Indonesia: a Historical Perspective

Jajat Burhanudin

**Multilingualism in Sunan Ampel Tomb Complex:
A Linguistic Landscape Study**

Kartika Nuswantara, Hurrotul Firdausiyah, Zuliati Rohmah, Diana Nur Sholihah

**Representation of the Self and Other in Joe Biden's
Democratic National Convention Speech**

Ingrit Vianica, Trisnowati Tanto

**The Study of Mosque Management in Indonesia and Spain:
Majority and Minority Muslim Factors**

Sukron Kamil, Zakiya Darajat

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