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The Roots of Violence in Western Social Theories: In Search of Solution for Islam and Modernity

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Abstract

I argue that if we recognize the roots of violence in modern social theories, we may have at least a picture of how to solve the problem of violence for both Islam and modernity. I use the term "violence" to refer to an idea or an action that explicitly endorses revolt or physical conflict in attaining a goal. I will review fourteen social theories of the colonial and post colonial period from the beginning to the end of the Twentieth Century, as presented by Charles Lemert in his book, Social Theory: The Multicultural & Classic Readings (1993). Next, I refer my understanding of violence and its solutions for Islam and modernity on my interpretation of the types of violence that I took from Lemert's book. I discuss my argument in the following subtitles. The first subtitle is introduction to capitalism as the answer to Islam and modernity. The second item is my finding about the notion of violence as a concept that is actually originated in the Western social theories of the colonial period. The third point is the degree to which I find that the roots of violence are also originated in the Western social theories of the post-colonial period. The fourth point of my article conveys the term "violence" used in linguistics by two French philosophers: Jacques Derrida and Michelle Foucault. The fifth element concludes this article by strengthening the above-mentioned assumption.

Keywords: Roots of violence; modern social theories; islam and modernity; western social theories; post-colonial period

Introduction

I choose capitalism as the solution for Islam and modernity, for the following reasons. In reviewing the social theories of the twentieth century, I find that only one persists into the Twenty-First Century, namely capitalism. Fascism and Nazism came to an end in the Twentieth Century. With the breakdown of the Soviet Union, communism largely disappeared, though it still exists in some limited forms in the Twenty-First Century. History

seems to affirm capitalism.

In terms of economy, "capitalism" means a market-based system of supply and demand. In politics, capitalism means that people take part in the decision-making (Amal, 2003), and an individual's making of decision in capitalism operates in a condition of participation (Rojek, 1985). More specifically, as Habermas argued, capitalism emerges in liberal democracy that rejects repression. According to Vahdat, "… capitalism and modernity are closely related, the dialectic of capitalism and the modernity is most evident in the connection between free market and freedom of contract" (Vahdat, 2002), not in class clash. In this regard, capitalism seems suitable to Muslim countries. The September 11 tragedy has informed the Muslim world that there are Islamists or radical Muslims who reject not just Western policies, but the most basic principle of modernity, tolerance. If communism, for instance, were applied to Muslim countries, its violence would ignite their radicalism.

Technically, capitalism can be applied to the Muslim world to the extent that the Muslim community (ummah) can decide whether to make peace with modernity, in particular, to adapt to the key principle of a secular state and religious tolerance. This is important, because fears of Islamic extremism in the world have increased following 9/11. For this reason, developing tolerance among Muslims may reduce these global fears of Islamic radicalism from both moderate Muslims and non-Muslims.

Methods

In this regard, the application of Islamic law (sharī'ah) in Muslim countries should adopt Habermas' public sphere theory. The application of the sharī'ah should be linked to good life (truth, justice, and freedom), and to good communication. Agreement should be based on free and equal debate with rational argument, not on repression. Sharī'ah, in sum, should be about justice, fairness, and good communication. Muslims should not insist that sharī'ah be exactly the way Imam Shāfi'ī (150 H/767 AD.-204 H/819 AD.) studied and understood it [more than] eight centuries ago, (Kurzman, 2002) since Imam Shāfi'ī himself never said so. History reveals that although Imam Shāfi'ī was a respected scholar, he was willing to change his opinions. That is, Imam Shāfi'ī withdrew his earlier opinions (qawl qadīm) when he formed his new opinions (qawl jadīd)--in some instances--that had stronger in light of the evidences of local conditions after he arrived in Egypt until his death (199-204AH) (Kurzman, 2002). I use the terms "qawl qadīm" to represent Imam Shāfi'ī's opinions--by way of written and oral transmission--prior to his arrival in Egypt (before 199AH) (See Kurzman, 2002); (Jāwī, 2004); (Nawawī, 1990). So it is very clear that his opinions were not based on an absolute sharī'ah, but vary on discrete contexts.

Following Habermas' public sphere theory, I argue that sharī'ah should be actual and contextual; it must be about the state providing essential services to the community. If Muslim states are just, providing the needs of all the people, with the rich socially responsible for the poor, then they will have come to a point where they may speak of sharī'ah. However, they should not talk about sharī'ah, until they have achieved such a level of social justice. This solution also reiterates the linguistic technique of play (le jeu) of Derrida and Foucault, that is to say, it dares to produce a certain effect of meaning. The social responsibility of the rich toward the poor also manifests Du Bois' theory of double consciousness.

The best example for this is Malaysia under its Muslim leader, Mahathir. He applies capitalism to the state while making Islam an official religion of the state. As a result, Malaysia is successful in the competitive world of free market capitalism. Moreover, he has

made it an academic policy to teach scientific and technical subjects at universities in English (Lawrence, 1998). In comparison to Malaysia, Islamic schools (madrasahs) in Indonesia—now, according to Indonesian Education Law of 1989—are equivalent to "secular schools", and Islamic boarding schools (pondok pesantren) have also been modernized (Jabali & Jamhari, 2002). Indonesian madrasahs are not the same as those in Afghanistan. Muslim countries, which insist on the enforcement of sharī'ah, remain in conflict. Sudan, for instance, with a population of 73 % Muslims, has the longest conflict in African history due to the campaign of its leaders for sharī'ah enforcement (D.J./Mus, 2003). Also, in 1963, Muslims in Kenya had tried to separate from Kenya on the basis of the sharī'ah enforcement with terrible consequence (Anonymous, 2003).

Last but not least, I would say that violence is reciprocal: just as violence is a part of modernity, so modernity is a part of violence. The degree to which the public sphere of Habermas should be applied to the implementation of sharî'ah in the Muslim world remains an open and interesting question. Meanwhile, Muslims must stop blaming the West and try to learn the Western connection of knowledge to justice to fairness. The persistence of capitalism, together with the feebleness of other sorts of violence, may reinforce what Prof. Bruce B. Lawrence concludes about the future of the Muslim world: "Accommodation more than violence will be the preferred outcome for Muslims as for non-Muslims" (Lawrence, 1998).

Results and Discussions

1. The Roots of Violence in Western Social Theories of Colonial Period

The central issue of modernity at the outset of the Twentieth Century was the idea of tolerance. In his double-consciousness theory, depicted in 1903, Du Bois (1868-1963) named and regarded it as the necessary ingredient for social solidarity and social responsibility from the "great Culture states" such as England, Germany, and France toward the states such as India, Egypt and Central Africa, Borneo [Indonesia], and the Fiji Islands (Lemert, 1993). [I would call these latter states "minor culture states" in opposition to the former great Culture states]. Du Bois further explained that the great Culture states should allow the minor culture states to work out their own civilization problems.

Meanwhile, Du Bois also argued that the great Culture states themselves should implement this tolerant recognition toward one another; for instance, German racial pride should not suffer in bowing to the Slav's genius. Each race and nation should realize the good, the beautiful and the true life for mankind in its own unique way. The aim, he said, was to pave the way to the realization of a tolerant humanity.

Du Bois also asserted that tolerance should run within the great Culture states themselves toward their minorities. In this regard, he stressed that Negros and white Americans must be co-workers in culture. Furthermore, Du Bois said that responsible social tolerance should be in tandem with the five modern leading ideas of European civilization: 1) justice, namely full free recognition, 2) continuation of organization, i.e., conserving the civilization of the past in producing a new culture, 3) authority, i.e., recognition of human difference of capacity, 4) freedom, i.e., an abolition of slavery, and 5) knowledge, i.e., to dare to know and to cultivate science.

Du Bois warned that the negative side of the justice pillar was the degree to which those who will not support these five pillars of civilization must be forcibly restrained from destroying them. To avoid this possibility, Du Bois proposed an alternate solution: those who

could support human culture s7hould distribute their moral, physical, and industrial training and encouragement without any prejudice and discrimination to those who could not support human culture on their own, whoever he or she was (Lemert, 1993). Du Bois did not admit the excessive control action as a legitimate part of modernity. He advocated tolerance over violence.

William James (1842-1910) explored this excessive control action in 1890. In his psychological theory of the self and its selves, he argued that human beings have a tendency toward such forcible control, because an individual tends to act differently when he lives in a different group. James gave several examples: a boy acted to be well-behaved enough before his parents and teachers, but he swaggered like a pirate among his 'tough' young friends. James describes this as 'club-opinion': he concluded that people should discriminate between their different selves. James gave an example of one who suffered from this forcible control illness saying: "As a politician I regard him as an ally, but as a moralist I loathe him" (Lemert, 1993). In this regard, James did not regard a discriminative opinion as a result of forcible restraint as modernity. Therefore, I would include a discriminative opinion as a form of violence, not as modernity.

It seems to me that forcible control was not only a complex psychological problem in the colonial period, but also a deeply political problem for all modern life.

In 1922, through his Marxist theory of the irrational chasm between subject and object, Georg Lukács (1885-1971) advocated proletariat revolt against the bourgeoisie (property owner). The chasm that Lukács referred to was the gap between the subordinate position of a member of the proletariat as a commodity compared to the higher position of the bourgeoisie as an employer and a consumer. According to Lukács, when the members of the proletariat themselves realize their objective position, they will be driven to abolish the bourgeoisie's class.

Lukács stated that under capitalism, this abstract society is monotonous and almost unalterable. The society's rigidity could only be broken by the proletariat's catastrophic action against the bourgeoisie. The goal was to create a prosperous society without class, i.e., communism (Lemert, 1993). Lukács' Marxist social theory, then, regards capitalism as a form of violence that should be abolished by destructive action (violence). While Lukács regards capitalism as forcible restraint, I will not regard capitalism as violence for I do not yet have enough evidence to reach that conclusion. With respect to forcible control, capitalism was clearly a deviation from the justice concept. We now have three sorts of violence: 1) forcible restraint, 2) communism, and 3) capitalism. So, according to Georg Lukács, history was the only solution to the excessive control problem.

Lukács' subject and object concept was further explained theoretically by his young disciple, Karl Mannheim (1893-1947). Mannheim wrote his two theories of sociology of knowledge in 1939 and ideology in 1926. Sociology of knowledge was about inherited or historical knowledge: every individual is in a ready-made situation, in which he or she receives patterns of thought and of conduct. The ideology was about how we know the present (objective) situation of thought. Mannheim's ideology had two meanings: particular and total. Entertaining a particular ideology involved being skeptical toward the opponent's ideas or another class's ideas. This meaning referred to divergent thought systems of individuals among the proletariat. This meaning could help us understand and interpret the development of mass psychology from the different behavior of individuals as member of a crowd (proletariat). It also clarified understanding in allowing us to recognize the social

settings of individuals (Lemert, 1993).

In his analysis of art, war, and fascism in 1936, however, Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) criticized the destructive action of Marxist theory when it introduced aesthetics into political life. He judged that fascist society was immature enough to incorporate technology as its organ, because fascists regard war as beautiful and used it as a means to reach their ends. The purpose of war in fascism seems to me for maintaining the property system of communism against capitalism (Lemert, 1993). Benjamin regarded fascism's political action as a response to communism, and so fascism also became a form of violence, in addition to forcible control, communism, and capitalism.

In his essay, "Why Theory", published in 1963, Louis Althusser argued that Lenin used Marxist theory systematically to solve capitalist exploitation in Russia, and to examine the methods and objectives of the Russian Democratic Party in 1902. In this regard, Lenin used the Marxist materialist dialectic (theoretical practices) or spontaneity of the masses as the basis of his movement. Marxist theoretical practice, then, was a combination of Marxist theory and politics. Ideological errors might occur, if this Marxist dialectic was not active. This means that the theory and practice were inseparable for socialists (Lemert, 1993).

I conclude that there are three types of violence in Western social theories in the colonial period: forcible restraint, communism, and fascism. With respect to capitalism, Marxist theory regards it as violence for the reason that Marxist theory sees the bourgeoisie's class as a forcible controller. I do not include capitalism as violence, for I will examine it first with reference to post colonial social theories, beginning with the three social theories of Habermas (b. 1929): 1) emancipatory knowledge, and 2) communicative competence, which are interrelated and an elaboration of Habermas' public sphere.

2. The Roots of Violence in Western Social Theories of Postcolonial Period

I argue that capitalism is not violence. Habermas established his emancipatory knowledge concept in 1968, the communicative competence idea in 1970, and the public sphere theory in 1962. Habermas' emancipatory knowledge is a concept that attempts to liberate humankind from dependence on what he calls "objectivism": superiority or depersonalization. This reification is positivist in its character, like the reification of Adolf Hitler's Nazism. Hitler based Nazism's objectivism on the theoretical and pseudoscientific principles of works of Comte de Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and Alfred Rosenberg. The positivist objectivism Habermas describes, then, is superiority or reification that involves pseudoscientific elements.

Reacting against this positivist objectivism, Habermas says that objectivism should be defined not through the power of renewed theoria, "but [through] what it conceals: the connection of knowledge and interest" [good and true life] (Lemert, 1993). Here is important for me to add that the prominent belief of Adolf Hitler's Nazism is that an Aryan German race was superior to all others, particularly Slavs, and Jews. On the basis of this superior belief, Hitler intended to rule Jews and others violently. Hitler based this belief on 'social Darwinism' (Anonymous, 1994); (Kirk, 1958).

It seems to me that Habermas' emancipatory knowledge theory has several shortcomings. He does not show his reader why a society free from objectivism is better than the society of a tyrant, nor why human beings should create a society free from despotism and reject tyrannical society. He does not make a normative judgment that contains a rational basis for social and psychological affairs as scientifically as empirical natural sciences do.

One who overlooks the relationship between Nazism and Habermas' intellectualism must say that this theory of Habermas is ambiguous. By contrast, I would say that this Habermas' emancipatory knowledge theory indicates he reacted against Nazism's positivist objectivism.

At the end of World War II (September 2, 1945), Habermas was especially distressed by the Germans' "collectively realized inhumanity": the Germans in that time, as characterized by Habermas, showed a notable lack of response to the revelations in the Nürenberg trials about the Nazi death machine (Moses, 2007). Habermas focuses on this reaction, because his two other notions, communicative competence and public sphere, demonstrate that he reacts against positivist objectivism. These two other notions also show that he supports the connectedness of humankind and the orientation toward the good and true life as a solution.

In his communicative competence theory, Habermas depicts in detail a specific logic of communicative processes, such as 'particular form of intersubjectivity of mutual understanding', and 'idealization of the concept of ideal speech situation'. He includes in this communication competence claims of validity in speech, such as truth, normative rightness, and truthfulness. These claims can be discussed and criticized interchangeably. A listener can refute these claims from a speaker, and in turn, the listener can offer his or her own different claims of validity. So the claims of validity of speech, in Habermas' view, are neither arbitrarily offered nor blindly accepted. He asserts that the goal of communicative action must be rational; that is to say, it should not be practiced to influence others, but to reach an agreement or mutual understanding of intersubjectivity about very important things in the world, namely the ideas of truth, justice, and freedom (Lemert, 1993); (Bullock and Woodings, 1983); (Sanford, 1999); (Craig, 1998).

The communication that connects humankind to the good intention in life, says Habermas, can work only in an ideal speech situation or living community, in which all participants seek a rational consensus. This is to say, an agreement should be based on the basis of free and equal debate, not on repression. If such communication does not work, according to Habermas, it indicates that the institutionalization of political and economic power is repressive (Lemert, 1993). These two concepts, emancipatory knowledge and communicative competence, seem to be an elaboration of his public sphere theory, first published, in 1962, seventeen years after the end of World War II. Nancy Fraser supports Habermas in her essay: "Rethinking the Public Sphere", but she says also that Habermas' public sphere solves at least two confusions.

The first is a confusion that has long overwhelmed progressive social movements and the political theories associated with them. She gives an example of socialist and Marxist failure in combining the state apparatus with the public arenas of citizen discourse and association. This combination inevitably resulted in the socialist vision becoming institutionalized in an authoritarian-static form instead of in a participatory-democratic form. This result has jeopardized the very idea of socialist democracy (Fraser in Calhoun, 1992). Second, Habermas' public sphere theory is useful to explain confusion in contemporary feminism, since many feminists use it to refer to everything outside the domestic or familial sphere (Fraser in Calhoun, 1992).

Seeing the advantages of Habermas' concept of the public sphere, Nancy Fraser defines this concept as follows: "the public sphere … designates a theatre in modern societies, in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, and hence an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction" (Fraser in Calhoun, 1992). The medium of talk and the

arena of discursive interaction embedded in this definition elucidate what Habermas means by emancipatory knowledge and communication competence. This theory could be useful to develop civil society in the Muslim world: promoting the emergence of the individual together with the emergence of political and civic rights and freedom (Vahdat, 2002).

Habermas' public sphere theory seems to support liberal democracy and global capitalism, as practiced in the United States of America. Habermas criticizes the Federal Republic of Germany for not fully adopting impulses from American political culture during the first post-war decades. He says, while using the pronoun 'we' in reference to himself and the Germans, that when we adopted the political theory of the enlightenment, we became acquainted with the radical democratic spirit of the American pragmatism of Peirce, Mead and Dewey. Unfortunately, according to Habermas, the German neoconservatives "are turning away from these traditions and drawing on other sources. They are reaching back to a German constitutionalism, which reduces democracy to little more than the rule of law, …" (Habermas in Piccone, 1983). He also explicitly states that the most advanced society, i.e., the United States, is exemplary in its understanding of modernization processes. This, says Habermas, provides the common denominator of liberal social theories (Habermas in Piccone, 1983).

So Habermas' public sphere concept precisely refers to a creation of a living community, in which American liberal democracy and capitalism thrive. This is further discernible in his explicit challenge to the neoconservatives of the Federal Republic of Germany to "welcome the development of modern science, as long as this only goes beyond its sphere to carry forward technical progress, capitalist growth and rational administration [liberal participatory democracy]" (Habermas, 1981). Habermas does not regard capitalism as violence. Indeed, the public sphere, for him, is a living institution where liberal democracy and global capitalism work. He denounces not only Nazism, but also "fascism that gave birth to the freak of a national physics and Stalinism to that of Soviet Marxist genetics" (Lemert, 1993).

This criticism of Habermas shows that he seeks both to reclaim his public sphere concept as an ideal with an emancipatory sphere both in politics like civil society, and in culture like the emergence of self-defining (Vahdat, 2002). In light of this criticism from Habermas, I argue that violence is not a truth. The following explanation of social theories will support this argument. I will start from the theory of the eccentric self and the discourse of the other of Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) which Lacan wrote in 1957. Lacan classifies human psychology into three parts: the self, the double of myself, and the Other between self and double of myself. The Other acts as a guarantor of truth and lie. This can make the self become the double self. When the self lures its adversary, it moves contrary to its actual movement. When it proposes peace negotiations to its opponent, it may signify convention. In this regard, the Other appeals within the connotations of betrayal and convention. This Other can change the whole course of human history.

The point is the degree to which Lacan explains that human beings could psychologically change when they interacted each other, in which their Others could either betray or protect others' Others (Lemert, 1993). So Lacan saw that violence was a human instinct, embedded in human psychology.

Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) seems to reiterate Lacan's opinion with his decolonizing theory that he wrote in 1961. Fanon says that decolonization is a historical process: it could not be understood except by its historical form and content. For this reason, he found that the

possibility of changing the whole social structure in Algeria from the bottom up depended on the consciousness of the colonizers who possessed all means of violence. This possibility was also contingent on the colonized society of Algeria using all means, including that of violence, on the other.

For Fanon, naked decolonization was the meeting of these two forces. Thus decolonization was always a violent phenomenon, that is to say, it advocated replacing a certain "species" of men (the colonized people) by another "species" of men (the colonizers) (Lemert, 1993). Decolonization and colonization are both sorts of violence. The problem is the degree to which one can answer the question: which one of these two sorts of violence is true?

The institutionalization theory that Peter Berger (1929-2017) and Thomas Luckmann (1927-2016) conceptualized in 1966 may help us answer this knotty question. Both social theorists say that man can produce an environment by entering the social realm. To this end, he must externalize himself in activity, from which his social stability arises. Human activity is contingent on habitualization that provides direction and specialization of activity. This habitualization, though it does not belong to the human organism, can be created only by the course of his ongoing externalization. Whenever there is reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors, institutionalization occurs. "The typifications of habitualized actions that constitute institutions are always shared ones" (Lemert, 1993).

On the basis of this theory, we can answer the previous question by analyzing violence in Fanon's decolonization theory. According to Fanon, violence is a mutually habitualized action between two collective groups: the colonizers and the colonized. This example is relevant to the theory of institutionalization, because this theory states that "reciprocal typifications of actions are built up in the course of a shared [dialectical] history". In other words, institutions are products of history. Empirically, historical and objective reality during the process of habitualizing violence comes from the colonizers who perpetuate the existence and the social change possibility of the colonized people. In the course of this process, the colonized internalize or bring the meaning of decolonization into violent consciousness: to decolonize is to use violence against the colonizers' violence. So violence is a human product. It is also an objective reality. The human being is, in this sense, a product of human violence.

This institutionalization theory states that an institution is not only historical but also hegemonic. Hence, we can say that the colonizers are the controllers of human conduct in the colonized states. The violence that the colonizers use in the form of weapons and tanks indicates their excessive restraint but they also project a Marxist ideology. With references to Du Bois' double-consciousness idea, we see that the great Culture states should give social responsibility to the minor states by allowing the minor states to work out their own social change.

In view of these theories, we can say that the violence that colonizers use, in Algeria, for instance, is truly violence--so is the violence of the colonized, because they also used all means possible, including that of the colonizers' violence.

3. Linguistic "Violence" of Social Theories of Post Colonial Period

Violence also exists in linguistics. This is traceable in the linguistic concept of Jaques Derrida (1930-2004), and Michel Foucault (1926-1984). In his De La Grammatologie (1967), Derrida objects to a linguistic condition in which, language is threatened (menacé),

employed continously (desamparé), and limited by excessively boundless signifier (signifié) (Derrida, 1967). Derrida's objection amounts to a critique of Western philosophers such as Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger who said that meaningful and true discourse can occur only in signifier (signifié/langage parlé): the set of sounds, or written marks (une langue de mots) (Derrida, 1967); (Lemert, 1993). As long as speaker and listener can always be present to one another, meaningful discourse can occur. For this reason, Derrida also describes this signifier as "phonetic writing" (l'écriture phonétique) (Derrida, 1967).

By contrast, Derrida reverses this idea and says explicitly that the signifier has always functioned as the signified (le signifié y fonctionne toujours déjà comme un signifiant) (Derrida, 1967). He asserts that writing's entire theory and form (including its technical aspects) infects human speech from its very origins. This is what he calls trace (Derrida, 1967). It is embedded in every single sign or word as much as its absence of meaning as the presence of the other from which it differs. Derrida finds that the trace is a linguistic element that is missing from Western philosophers. He names his contrast theory to theirs "decentering", (dé-sédimentation, la dé-construction) (Derrida, 1967), and he calls his approach "semiotic" or the science of signs (la science des signes) (Derrida, 1967). Derrida, thus, regards the signifier as a word's true meaning "colonizer, or prison or limiter", because it controls or limits the meaning of word.

I am amazed by the degree to which Derrida regards his decentering theory as intrinsic violation (violence nécessaire) (Derrida, 1967). Derrida says this in order to show the radical technique of his theory, namely the play (le jeu). He says that the advancement of writing is the advancement of the play. It is about "erasing the limit (effaçant la limite), because of which one can set the circulation of signs [words], making by itself all the signifiers convincing [meaningful] (entraînant avec soi tous les signifiés rassurants), reducing all fortresses (réduisant toutes les places-fortes), all the shadows outside the play that control [limit] the scope [of the meaning] of language (tous les abris du hoirs-jeu qui surveillaient le champ du langage)" (Derrida, 1967). His aim with this decentering technique is to show that the signified contains truth (la vérité) of sign, i.e. trace (Derrida, 1967). So, Derrida denies that Western metaphysics, as expressed in philosophy, has satisfied the yearning for the sign (word). Derrida's theory in linguistics has made a great contribution to the thought of the post-colonial era, and as we will see, Foucault supports Derrida's theory.

In 1971, Foucault indirectly admitted Derrida's decentering theory as "violent" theory (Lemert, 1993). Foucault supports it, denouncing a mode of what he called logophobia (fear or distrust of words). This was, says Foucault, a mode of Western fear of words, of everything that can possibly be violent, querulous about discourse. He also mentions another Western mode, logophilia (loving words). This mode rejects the technique of discourse's play. What he meant by this technique is the degree to which that he advocates that the structures of language themselves should be brought into play, producing a certain effect of meaning. He explicitly says that one of the solutions to overcoming these two fears is "to abolish the sovereignty of the signifier" on one hand, and to grasp the meanings lying within it on the other (Derrida, 1967).

In order to deliver the West and Europe from these two fears, Foucault urges strongly that they should associate religious, juridicial, therapeutic, and political discourse to "ritual function", and "fellowship of discourse" in an interchangeable way (Lemert, 1993). In terms of ritual, a speaker should employ the whole range of utterances, gestures, behavior, circumstances, and signs that must accompany discourse. In terms of fellowship of discourse,

an ultimate object of knowledge of a certain group should be circulated and transmitted to the other groups. For example, the ritual recitation among poets should not only be circulated among this group. This interplay can exchange meanings of words and the knowledge. In this regard, he called knowledge not a secret appropriation, but the social appropriation of discourse.

Foucault found that doctrine (religious, political, philosophical) tends to abolish the social appropriation of discourse. For instance, fanatical exaggeration of a doctrinal system, adherence to a class, social, or racial status, or to a nationality or an interest, or a struggle, or a revolt are all problematic. So, doctrine effects subjection: speaking subjects to discourse, and discourse to the group, and speakers. Along with this criticism, Foucault rejected the philosophical definition of discourse as an activity that includes writing, reading, and exchanging, and these three should never involve anything but signs (words) (Lemert, 1993). For both Foucault and Derrida, then, discourse includes not only these four linguistics elements, but also trace, which is the most important.

Derrida and Foucault's usage of the phrase "intrinsic violence" does not mean true violence, for they themselves do not mention explicitly that those who believe in the limited discourse to its signifier must be attacked. By contrast, they argue that the signifier is the "decolonizer" (limiter) of trace, and play produces a certain effect of meaning. Therefore, I would not apply the phrase "intrinsic violence" beyond such linguistic innovation.

Of the fourteen social theories described in Lemert's book, there is one left to consider, Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002). In 1974 and 1980, Pierre Bourdieu published his inventive Marxist theory of "structures, habitus, practice" against capitalism. He says that objectivism and habitus can produce two objectifications of history. First, the objectifications of bodies: the condition of the proletariat as product, as spectacle, as acting-out-of rules, means that their personal power is used by a particular class. Bourdieu calls this structure objectivism. Second, the objectifications of history: history produces itself by realizing the first objective structure. Bourdieu calls this second structure "habitus" or common sense, behaviours, or self-consciousness exist themselves that govern the product to act. Bourdieu's theory is violent in the sense that he says that to act without violence tends to exclude the extravagances (objective conditions of the proletariat). He also quotes Marx's statement that accuses the capitalists of depersonifying the capital (Lemert, 1993).

Conclusions

Western social theories offer six types of violence with respect to modernity in the Twentieth Century: 1) forcible control rooted in the idea of giving full recognition to justice, 2) communism originating from Marxist theory, 3) fascism, 4) Nazism, 5) colonization, 6) and decolonization.

I do not include capitalism as a type of violence, for in my study I do not find it stated explicitly that capitalism reaches its goal by means of violence. The recognition of capitalism as a violent system comes from Marxist theory.

There is another kind of violence that I find in this research. Following Derrida, I term it "intrinsic violence". I do not include it in my list, for it excludes physical means of violence; instead, it deals with reconstructing a view point where the true meaning is not to be found in the written text, but rather behind it, i.e., in its presuppositions.

In reiteration to this concept, I would like to say that Muslims, who want to constitute

sharī'ah, are first to be genuine and circumstantial. That is to say, they have initially to come to a point where they are able to dare to know about how to detach sharī'ah from repressive behavior, and insist that sharī'ah be exactly the way to perpetuate good services for all human beings through open and equal debate.

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1. It has not been published elsewhere.

2. The paper is research findings, conceptual idea, science development on a certain field, and theory application study.

3. The Manuscript typed with Microsoft Word, Font Times New Roman size 12, spacing 1 on A4 size paper with a margin of 3.5 cm from the left edge, 3 cm from the right edge, 3 cm from the top and bottom edges. The length of 15-20 manuscript pages including a list of references. Writer (s) must follow the journal template that can be downloaded at Insaniyat Open Journal System http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/insaniyat

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5. Article contains title; writer's name, author affiliation (department, faculty, university / or institution), complete address of the affiliation and Author's corresponding email.

6. Abstract is written for about 250 words. It pervaded research objectives, methodology, discussion and result, and conclusion with maximum 5 keywords that represent the research core.

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
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