HELL IN IBN ‘ARABI ACCORDING TO AL-SHA’RANI

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Abstract: Ibn ‘Arabi and his teachings were enormously influential and controversial in post-classical Islamic thought and Sufism. Attitudes towards his ideas ranged from sympathy and admiration to outrage and denunciation as disbelief. One major champion and interpreter of Ibn ‘Arabi was the Egyptian Sufi ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha’rānī, who believed that the Andalusian mystic was divinely inspired and an outstanding source for many religious sciences. Al-Sha’rānī’s contribution to the Akbarian tradition has been largely neglected by modern scholars, who have tended to consider him a simplifier of Ibn ‘Arabi’s teachings. This article aims to advance our knowledge of al-Sha’rānī’s engagement with Ibn ‘Arabi by examining his treatment of Ibn ‘Arabi’s controversial belief that the heat and chastisement of hell will eventually terminate, even for Iblīs. It shows that al-Sha’rānī’s tendency to stress Ibn ‘Arabi’s orthodoxy while criticizing or avoiding some of his views and dissociating the Greatest Master from them, which he shared in part with the Shādhiliyya, is reflected in his engagement of this issue.

Keywords: Ibn ‘Arabi; al-Sha’rānī; Concept of Hell; Shādhiliyya.

Kata kunci: Ibn ‘Arabī; al-Sya rānī; Konsep Neraka; Syādziliyyah.

Introduction

In the post-classical period of Islamic thought, many Sufi scholars were attracted to the ideas of Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240). It is sometimes said that his works almost became the standard source for Sufi manuals composed by post-classical Sufis. This is in fact not an exaggeration but indeed an essentially indisputable reality in the Islamic world during that period. Furthermore, Ibn ‘Arabī’s influence has extended beyond Sunnites to Shi’ites, especially the Imāmites.¹

Because Ibn ‘Arabī’s teachings are difficult to understand for many Muslims, later Sufis wrote commentaries on his popular works, especially Fuṣūṣ al-Hikam and al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya. Muslim scholars can be classified into three groups based on their reactions to these works. The first group consists of those who seem to be sympathetic towards Ibn ‘Arabī and even embrace his opinions. The second group consists of those who react negatively, considering Ibn ‘Arabī’s writings misleading and sometimes even accusing him of unbelief. The third group consists of those who represent a mean between the positions of the first two groups. Although they admire Ibn ‘Arabī’s works, they contend that some ideas expressed therein are inauthentic and thus must be contested.

One outstanding Muslim scholar with a major interest in Ibn ‘Arabī was ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha rānī (d. 973/1565). Although he devoted several
books to presenting and elucidating Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, his treatment of the mystic appears to have been largely ignored by modern scholars. Alexander Knysh, for example, seems to dismiss al-Shaʿrānī as a simplifier of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings but does not justify his stance. What aspects of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought did al-Shaʿrānī simplify? It seems that the answer to this question should be established through a close study of al-Shaʿrānī’s works, which indeed cover a wide range of ideas set forth by Ibn ʿArabī.

Due to the lack of scholarly attention to al-Shaʿrānī’s engagement with Ibn ʿArabī, I focus here on his treatment of Ibn ʿArabī’s controversial teaching about the nature of hell, especially in his al-Kibrīt al-Aḥmar fī Bayān ʿUlūm al-Shaykh al-Akbar and al-Yawāqīt wa-l-Jawāhib fī Bayān ʿAqāʾid al-Akābir. I aim to determine the extent to which al-Shaʿrānī’s views are consistent with those of Ibn ʿArabī.

Al-Shaʿrānī and Ibn ʿArabī

It is helpful to begin by discussing al-Shaʿrānī’s general perspective on Ibn ʿArabī and his approach to interpreting his thought. That Ibn ʿArabī is an important and inspiring figure for al-Shaʿrānī is evident simply from the fact that he wrote many books in his defense. He believed that Ibn ʿArabī composed his works according to the knowledge he received through the angel of inspiration (malak al-īlham) and, consequently, that he is inspired by a divine authority that cannot be challenged. In this regard, al-Shaʿrānī quotes Ibn ʿArabī’s statement that “what I wrote in my books and my authorship do not originate from [the use of] speculative reason, but rather from the inspiration of the angel of inspiration.” Al-Shaʿrānī also thinks that Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas cannot be rejected because they do not contradict the Quran and the Sunnah.

He indicated that in Chapter 367 of the Futūḥāt with his remark, “We have nothing else to follow but the law of Muḥammad (PBUH) […] And I have not asserted anything in this book that is not in conformity with the law, and I do not at all depart from the Book or the Sunnah. And his statement in Chapter 365 [also reveals that], “Know that everything I have said in my gatherings and writings originates from the Presence of the Quran and its treasures, for I was granted the keys to understanding it.”

A final reason for the indisputability of Ibn ʿArabī’s views in al-Shaʿrānī’s eyes is that he considers the Futūḥāt the supreme reference for both Sufism and other Islamic sciences such as jurisprudence, Quran commentary, and hadith:

Know, O brother, that I have studied the books of the Sufis to such an extent that I cannot count them, yet I have not come across a book
that incorporates the words of the People of the Way better than *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyyah*, especially in terms of his discussion of the secrets of the law and account of the objectives of the mujtahids who derive their conclusions from it. If a legal mujtahid were to survey this book, his knowledge would grow, and he would become acquainted with the secrets about the methods of derivation and valid argumentation that he had never possessed. If a Quran commentator, hadith commentator, rationalist theologian, hadith scholar, linguist, Quran reciter, dream interpreter, natural scientist and doctor, geometrist, grammarian, logician, Sufi, knower of the Presence of the divine names, or lettrist [were to read the book], the case would be the same. It is a book that benefits the experts in these sciences with the knowledge that never occurred to them before.⁴

Notwithstanding such praise, al-Shaʿrānī admits that he sometimes cannot understand Ibn ʿArabiʾs teachings. In these cases, he hopes for the assistance of other Muslim scholars:

Know, O my brother, that I have studied innumerable treatises written by the People of Unveiling, and I have not found their expressions more comprehensive than those of the perfect, enlightened trainer of the gnostics, the shaykh Muḥyī l-Dīn b. al-ʿArabī, may God show mercy to him. For this reason, I have based this book on his words in the *Futūḥāt* and other [texts], not on those of other Sufis. However, I came across some passages in the *Futūḥāt* that I did not understand. I have mentioned them so that Muslim scholars might consider them, confirming the truth and invalidating the incorrect wherever they encounter it. But do not think, O my brother, that I mentioned them because I believe [what] they [contain is] correct and am satisfied with them as [expressions of] my beliefs.⁵

When al-Shaʿrānī is simply unable to comprehend an idea of Ibn ʿArabiʾ, he points to his weakness rather than blaming the shaykh or considering him wrong. He agrees with his teacher Zakariyyā al-Anṣārīʾs (d. 926/1520)⁶ prescription of three approaches applicable and corresponding to three types of views held by Muslim scholars. First, it is obligatory to agree with the opinions of scholars that are clearly in agreement with the Quran and the Sunnah. Second, it is forbidden to agree with their opinions if they explicitly contradict the Quran or the Sunnah. Third, it is best to remain neutral if their opinions neither conform with nor contradict the Quran and the Sunnah.⁷ When encountering interpretive difficulty with Ibn ʿArabiʾs teachings, al-Shaʿrānī adopts the third approach of neutrality, which accords with his conviction that Ibn ʿArabiʾ was inspired by the angel of inspiration and thus did not make any mistakes in his writings.
The Shādhiliyya and Ibn ʿArabī

Michael Winter rejected that al-Shaʿrānī belonged to the Shādhiliyya, since, he argued, it was an urban elite order in Egypt at the time, and al-Shaʿrānī came from a rural area. Yet, al-Shaʿrānī was affiliated with the Shādhiliyya, in addition to numerous other orders, and is even considered the forty-first headmaster of the Shādhiliyya in Shādhilī hagiography. Moreover, it was common for Sufis to travel from one place to another to meet shaykhs and be initiated into various orders, and al-Shaʿrānī was twelve years old when he moved to Cairo, making it likely that there he was initiated into the Shādhiliyya.

Scholars debate the influence of Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd (oneness of being) on the Shādhiliyya. J.C. Garcin and E.M. Sartain insist that there has not been any such influence, while Éric Geoffroy asserts that the Shādhilīs approve it. Since they base their divergent opinions on the same source, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī’s Taṣyīd al-Ḥaqīqa al-ʿAliyya wa-Taṣḥiyd al-Ṭariqa al-Shādhiliyya, we must examine this text. Al-Suyūṭī in fact neither employs the term waḥdat al-wujūd nor clearly indicates whether he accepts the teaching. Rather, he aims to refute the doctrines of incarnation (ḥulūl) and unification (ittiḥād). We might therefore suggest that the author espouses a “lesser” monism, likely closer to waḥdat al-shuhūd (oneness of witnessing). Although this position is not necessarily embraced by all Shādhili masters, it might be suggested that most of them affirm it. Al-Suyūṭī likens the relationship between the existence of God and that of the world to the relationship between the physical body of a person and its in a mirror: what appears in the mirror is neither identical nor entirely distinct from the body. This kind of monism seems more acceptable to opponents of the idea that the existence of God is identical to that of the world. Those who espouse this view are “atheist existentialists” (wujūdiyya mulḥid). They differ from “monotheist existentialists” (wujūdiyya muwahhid), who believe that the world is simply the shadow of God’s existence and thus itself has no real existence, while it cannot be said that its existence is identical to that of God (sewujud dengan Tuhan).

It can be difficult to differentiate between waḥdat al-shuhūd and waḥdat al-wujūd because both terms are intended to indicate that God is the only truly existent being. However, the theories differ in their expressions of this notion. In waḥdat al-shuhūd, emphasis is placed on the experience of a mystic: he is said to witness God as the only being in existence through contemplating Him and ignoring other beings; that is, the existence of beings other than God is not totally denied, but rather only ignored. On the contrary, waḥdat al-wujūd represents the conviction that existence belongs...
to God alone; thus, existent beings (i.e., the phenomenal world) are only manifestations of God. Hence, the ontological relationship between God and the phenomenal world is likened to that between, for instance, the sea and waves; only water exists; when it is in motion, it becomes waves and foam, while when it stretches over a large area, it becomes a sea; but the essence or reality of these diverse forms remains water.\textsuperscript{16} Meanwhile, the phenomenal world is considered to be made up of accidents, regardless of whether they are corporeal things or real accidents.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore, \textit{wahdat al-shuhūd} denies the existence of beings other than God in a relative sense, while \textit{wahdat al-wujūd} denies it in an absolute sense.

An objection to \textit{wahdat al-wujūd} is that it risks leading one to think that the phenomenal world is identical with God since it is simply a mode of His existence. Al-Suyūṭī, for example, criticizes this idea as implied by Ibn al-Fārīḍ’s (d. 632/1235) assertion that the infidels’ worship of fire, idols, and other objects is in fact worship of God.\textsuperscript{18} Nūr al-Dīn al-Ranīrī (d. 1068/1658) likewise considers this to be the danger of believing that the existence of the phenomenal world is identical with that of God.\textsuperscript{19}

Even though many Shādhilī masters espouse a less intense monism, they do not necessarily oppose the works of Ibn ʿArabī. Al-Shaʿrānī, for example, admires Ibn ʿArabī even more than al-Junayd (d. 298/910). Despite his lofty reputation in Sufism, al-Junayd is viewed only as the teacher for beginners, whereas Ibn ʿArabī is seen as the teacher for gnostics.\textsuperscript{20} From this perspective, it is right to conclude that al-Shaʿrānī’s position differs somewhat from that of other prominent Shādhilis, who highly admire al-Junayd. Al-Suyūṭī, for instance, states that the Shādhili way is identical with that of al-Junayd and views his way as superior to others due to its consistency with the Quran and the Sunnah.\textsuperscript{21} Al-Shaʿrānī may have been influenced by Ibn ʿArabī, who accused al-Junayd of failing to espouse true monotheism (\textit{tawḥīd}) at the time of his death. According to Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), Ibn ʿArabī insulted al-Junayd for not maintaining \textit{wahdat al-wujūd}.\textsuperscript{22} It is true that al-Junayd never asserted the union between God and the phenomenal world. What he meant by \textit{tawḥīd} is rather the separation of God from that which is originated in time.\textsuperscript{23} Al-Junayd strongly warned Sufis not to espouse a wrong understanding of \textit{tawḥīd} in which the Eternal (God) is seen as the phenomenal or vice versa.\textsuperscript{24} It is because al-Junayd did not advance the unity of existence that Ibn Taymiyya considered him to have held the correct understanding of \textit{tawḥīd}, while Ibn ʿArabī’s understanding of that notion, he thought, is simply wrong.\textsuperscript{25}

Although, as we have seen, al-Shaʿrānī admired the \textit{Futūḥāt}, he
admitted that in abridging it he had to omit any ideas that he considered inauthentic. It appears that, just like other Shādhilīs, al-Shaʿrānī sometimes adopted a cautious approach to explicitly monistic statements of Ibn ʿArabi by interpreting them according to the moderate Shādhili attitude towards monism. This is why his writings are not considered totally Akbarian.

One study suggests, however, that the most significant Shādhilī, Ibn ʿAṭāʾillāh (d. 709/1309), is indebted to the teachings of Ibn ʿArabi. Certain Sufis tend to rank Ibn ʿAṭāʾillāh’s works lower than those of Ibn ʿArabī, probably because they articulate less the concept of wahdat al-wujūd. This is indeed precisely the view of the greatest Indonesian Sufi, ʿAbd al-Ṣamad al-Palimbānī (d. 1205-6/1791), who lived in the twelfth/eighteenth century and studied in Mecca under the hand of the great Sufi master of the time Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Sammān (d. 1189/1775). According to al-Palimbānī, Sufi works do not all have the same quality. Some are for elementary Sufis, including the works of Ibn ʿAṭāʾillāh such as al-Hikam, Isqāt al-Tadbīr, and Laṭāʾif al-Minan; others are for intermediate Sufis, such as al-Shaʿrānī’s al-Yawāqit and al-Kibrīt al-Āḥmar; and yet others for advanced Sufis, including the writings of Ibn ʿArabī and some by his followers. In this scheme, the writings of the most important Shādhilī are thus considered most elementary.

Although al-Shaʿrānī’s writings are appraised higher than those of Ibn ʿAṭāʾillāh, they are still ranked lower than those of Ibn ʿArabī and his supporters. One questions the reason for this classification, given that the abovementioned works by al-Shaʿrānī are abridgments of the Futūḥāt. Perhaps, al-Palimbānī thinks that al-Shaʿrānī does not fully endorse the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī, but rather concentrates on simplifying them to render them orthodox.

Al-Shaʿrānī’s Interpretation of Ibn ʿArabī’s Concept of Hell

Since al-Shaʿrānī believes that Ibn ʿArabī’s writings are the result of divine inspiration, he objects to Ibn ʿArabī’s unorthodox ideas by contending that others later inserted them into his works. He tells us that this approach was adopted by several scholars, such as Abū Ṭāhir al-Mazanī al-Shādhilī, who personally informed al-Shaʿrānī about the method.

One seemingly unorthodox idea espoused by Ibn ʿArabī is that the inhabitants of hell will eventually enjoy their abode and thus not even desire to exit. The authenticity of this teaching has been confirmed by many commentators on Ibn ʿArabī’s works. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī (d. ca. 730/1330) stresses that Ibn ʿArabī did not entirely deny suffering
in hell. Rather, its dwellers will suffer terribly for a very long time before becoming accustomed to their punishment. Henceforth, they will no longer experience pain and suffering from the heat of hellfire, and when the wind from paradise blows over them, they will not enjoy it because their bodies will not be capable of adjusting to its briskness and coldness. For this reason, they would not even desire to enter paradise.\textsuperscript{30}

Al-Sha‘rānī rejects this understanding and maintains that Ibn ʿArabī never held such a view. Rather, he claims, others inserted it into his works to discredit him. Al-Sha‘rānī explains that such a notion about hell contradicts the Quran and hadiths, which clearly state that the inhabitants of hell will imagine and anticipate their release. He writes:

One who related to Shaykh Muḥy al-Dīn the statement, “the inhabitants of the Fire take pleasure from entering the Fire, and if they are brought out from it, they suffer from their exit,” has lied and slandered. If anything as such is found in his books, it has been inserted [by someone else]. For I read his entire book \textit{al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya}, and I saw that it is full of statements about the punishment of the people of the Fire. This is one of his greatest books and the last to be written.\textsuperscript{31}

Al-Sha‘rānī thus disagrees with the idea that the eternal dwellers of hell will finally experience joy and pleasure, even though both the \textit{Futūḥāt} and the \textit{Fuṣūṣ} assert this and, although controversial, Ibn ʿArabī was not the first Muslim author to posit such. In his voluminous Quran commentary, Ibn ʿArabī’s contemporary Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) notes that belief in the limited duration of hellfire through its becoming cold and pleasant can be supported by both scripture and reason, though he himself, adducing scripture, denies the notion.\textsuperscript{32} Ibn Taymiyya, however, argued that while hell itself will not disappear, its fire will cease, thus causing its inhabitants, including disbelievers, to enjoy.\textsuperscript{33} His reasoning is that while paradise is eternal due to its derivation from the divine name “Blesser” (\textit{al-Naʿīm}), which, denoting God’s essence, is itself eternal, “punishment” (\textit{ʿadhāb}) signifies only a creation of God and thus is perishable.\textsuperscript{34} Hence, Ibn Taymiyya agrees with Ibn ʿArabī on several points: 1) the distinction between God’s eternal attributes of essence and temporally-originated attributes of the act, which is upheld by the Ashʿarites and Muʿtazilites; 2) the manifestation of the divine attributes and names in paradise and hell (see below); and 3) that hell is eternal, but the suffering of its dwellers is not. It thus seems that Ibn Taymiyya was influenced by Ibn ʿArabī, and indeed, according to al-Suyūṭī, he had thoroughly read his works and even admired the \textit{Futūḥāt} to an extent.\textsuperscript{35} However, Ibn ʿArabī differs from Ibn Taymiyya in holding that the essence of hell as fire forever remains, but its heat and capacity to burn will disappear after a long period when the
manifestation of the divine name “Punisher” (al-Muntaqim) in the fire terminates.

Although al-Rāzī mentions the opinion that hellfire will eventually become cold and pleasant, he does not relate an argument based on the manifestation of a divine name. For Ibn ‘Arabī, the chastisement of the inhabitants of hell will come to an end because God’s mercy will overcome His anger, that is, the activity of the divine name “Merciful” (al-Raḥmān) will replace that of “Punisher.” All divine names, even “Punisher,” in fact embody God’s attribute of mercy (rahma), and mercy manifests both in all 100 levels of paradise and 100 pits of hell. However, its manifestation is hidden for the inhabitants of hell until a certain time, and it will appear when the manifestation of the name “Punisher” ceases. When “Merciful” discloses itself in hellfire, its dwellers will no longer suffer. Ibn ‘Arabī adduces as evidence the case of Prophet Abraham, who despite being placed in the fire was neither pained nor burned because God made it cool and comfortable. He explains that Abraham was indeed initially fearful due to his knowledge of the custom of fire to burn, but slowly he saw it transform into a kind of luminous light while still appearing as fire to others. The same situation, according to Ibn ‘Arabī, will prevail for the permanent inhabitants of hell.

Several Sufis have been attracted by Ibn ‘Arabī’s idea of the transformation of the nature of hellfire. This includes ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Jīlī (d. likely 811/1408), who in his well-known masterpiece, al-Insān al-Kāmil, elaborates the teaching. According to him, when creating hellfire God regarded it with His name “Subduer” (al-Qāhir), and it is through this name that He manifests His name “Forgiver” (al-Ghāfir). Through the manifestation of “Subduer,” the inhabitants of hell will acquire tremendous physical and mental strength to face their torment; through the manifestation of “Forgiver,” their expectation for a happy ending will be fulfilled. Like Ibn ‘Arabī, al-Jīlī also argues that hell itself is only an accident, not a truly existent, and thus it must come to an end. This ending consists of the elimination of its heat rather than the fire itself. At this point, the angels of punishment withdraw and those of compassion replace them, thereby transforming hell into a pleasant place.

Al-Sha‘rānī refutes an accusation that Ibn ‘Arabī denied that hell is the permanent abode of infidels. In this respect, he is correct. In the Futūḥāt, Ibn ‘Arabī delineates four types of eternal inhabitants in hell. The first are those arrogant to God who attribute to themselves the quality of lordship (rubūbiyya), such as Pharoah and Nimrod. The second is polytheists, who believe that others partake of God’s lordship. The third are atheists, who
deny the existence of God. The fourth are hypocrites, who openly declare their adherence to Islam while secretly rejecting it; these folk may also belong to one of the other three types.\textsuperscript{41} Al-Sha‘rānī specifies precisely these four types of people as eternal occupants of hell.\textsuperscript{42}

In addition to these four groups, Ibn ʿArabī includes Iblīs among those eternally in hell.\textsuperscript{43} Even though according to Ibn ʿArabī, Iblīs recognizes the oneness of God, which is usually considered the key to salvation in Islam, he considers himself a polytheist due to his incitation to polytheism.\textsuperscript{44} He contends that Iblīs has always known that he will be sentenced to hell for leading people to polytheism, but he does not worry so much because he also knows that God will eventually show His mercy to the inhabitants of hell and cause them to enjoy therein.\textsuperscript{45} Ibn ʿArabī indeed insists that Iblīs will take pleasure in hellfire.

One might question why, in Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching, Iblīs disobeys God even though he recognizes His oneness. In the Quran commentary usually attributed to Ibn ʿArabī,\textsuperscript{46} Iblīs is said to be an imaginary or delusive power. He differs from purely earthly angels, who, due to their perception of forms, cannot perceive meanings or essences (maʿānī) but are forced to obey God’s commands; and from heavenly angels, who, because they perceived the nobility of Adam, voluntarily obeyed God’s command to prostrate before him. Iblīs can only be categorized with the jinn, who are earthly and spiritually inferior. Unlike them, though, Iblīs has spiritual achievements like those of heavenly angels due to his interaction with them.\textsuperscript{47} It is probably for this reason that Iblīs acknowledges God’s oneness, and it is likely that his nature as an imaginary or delusive power makes it impossible for him to obey God’s command.

The idea that Iblīs has knowledge of God’s oneness was espoused by several Sufis before Ibn ʿArabī, including Abū Maṣṣūr al-Ḫallāj (d. 309/922), Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 517/1123 or 520/1126), and ʿAyn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadhānī (d. 525/1131). In Kitāb al-Ṭawāsīn, al-Ḫallāj depicts Iblīs pleading his innocence before God because his refusal to prostrate to Adam was motivated by his strong belief in God’s oneness. Iblīs also claims that he is far superior to Adam for several reasons: he has known God for all eternity, served God before Adam, and is made from fire, not clay.\textsuperscript{48} According to ʿAyn al-Quḍāt, both the light of Muḥḥammad and that of Iblīs originate from two lights of God: the light of Muḥḥammad is the manifestation of God’s attribute of mercy, while the light of Iblīs is the manifestation of God’s attribute of wrath.\textsuperscript{49}

Al-Shaʿrānī seems to think that Ibn ʿArabī’s understanding of Iblīs is inconceivable. He insists that Iblīs is a genuine polytheist, arguing that
otherwise, he would not be capable of inciting people to polytheism. When the notion of polytheism comes to Iblīs’ mind, that of God’s oneness disappears. The most that can be said is that Iblīs espouses the monotheism of the hypocrites; that is, he declares God’s oneness with his tongue but does not believe it in his heart.50

Conclusion

Al-Shaʿrānī deeply admired Ibn ʿArabī. He believed that the mystic was divinely inspired and praised him for his comprehensive and brilliant engagement with issues in the religious sciences. He also recognized the difficulty of comprehending some of Ibn ʿArabī’s controversial ideas. But rather than rejecting them outright and blaming Ibn ʿArabī, he argued that they were inserted into his works by others. This tendency to emphasize Ibn ʿArabī’s orthodoxy while criticizing or avoiding some of his doctrines and dissociating him from them, which al-Shaʿrānī shared in part with the Shādhiliyya as shown by their preference for wahdat al-shuhūd over wahdat al-wujūd, is reflected in his treatment of Ibn ʿArabī’s belief in the eventual elimination of the heat of hellfire and his conception of Iblīs.[]

Endnotes

1. One Shiʿite figure who attempted to integrate Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas into Shiʿite theology is Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī. On this trend in general, including Ḥaydar Āmulī’s role, see Henry Corbin, Histoire de la philosophie islamique (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), 255-59.
12. Jean-Claude Garcin, “Histoire, opposition, politique et piétisme traditionaliste dans le


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35. Ibn Taymiyya stated that he read the original edition of the *Futūḥāt* consisting of twenty volumes, and that it is wonderful because it contains brilliant ideas. See Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rahmān Hasan Maḥmūd (Cairo): Maktabat al-Ādāb, 1990, 69-70.

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