

The New Order and Indonesian Islam Politics

Masykur Hakim

*Faculty of Uşūl al-Dīn, State Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta
masykurhakim@yahoo.com*

Abstract: *Snouck Hurgronje, the advisor of Government of Netherland in Indonesia observed that Islam could be seen from two aspects: ritual and politic. "Give the full freedom to the Indonesian Muslims to conduct their religious doctrines related to the spiritual aspects, and do not give them the full freedom related the political aspects," his suggestions at the time to the General Governor of Netherland to Indonesia. His view hence inspired the future leaders of Indonesia, Soekarno and Soeharto, particularly in the New Order under the President Soeharto. In the beginnings of his power he freed from the prisons the Masyumi figures, but did not permit to this Muslim organizations to rebirth; he forced all Islamic political parties to merger under one party, the PPP; he forced all political parties and mass organizations to use Pancasila as sole basic; he build hundreds of mosques every month; he supported the formation of ICMI (Association for Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals); he hesitated to capture and sent the prisons who criticized vocally all his policies, and this sad condition goes to continue till more than 30 years of his power. The time of big mutiny come to real condition following the all university students entire the archipelago came down to the streets and demanded Soeharto to resign, or they forced him to come down, and finally the fall of his power happened in 1998 with the sad ending, and it is the logical consequence of his politicization of Islam.*

Keywords: *Separation of religion and politic, depolization of Islam, HMI*

Abstrak: *Snouck Hurgronje, penasehat pemerintahan Hindia Belanda di Indonesia melihat Islam dari dua aspek: ritual dan politik. "Berilah kebebasan sepenuhnya kepada umat Islam Indonesia untuk mengamalkan ajaran-ajaran agamanya yang bersifat ritual, seperti salat, puasa, haji dan lain sebagainya. Tetapi jangan berikan kebebasan yang penuh kepada mereka dalam hal politik," sarannya ketika itu. Pendapat ini rupanya menginspirasi presiden Soekarno dan Soeharto di masa berikutnya dalam memerintah rakyat Indonesia. Terutama di zaman Orba, ketika mulai berkuasa, Soeharto membebaskan tokoh-tokoh Masyumi dari penjara, tetapi tetap tidak mengizinkan parpol Masyumi berdiri lagi; menyederhanakan parpol yang beraliran Islam untuk bergabung di PPP; memberlakukan Asas Tunggal bagi semua parpol dan ormas; membangun puluhan masjid setiap bulan; mendukung pendirian ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia) untuk menghibur umat Islam Indonesia, dan lain sebagainya. Namun krisis ekonomi dan pengangguran semakin meningkat di setiap kota. Bagi yang melakukan kritik akan ditangkap dan dipenjaran, dan keadaan ini terus berlangsung lebih dari 30 tahun hingga banyak rakyat menderita, pada akhirnya melahirkan protes dan gelombang demonstrasi besar-besaran di seantero Nusantara, dan mengakibatkan kekuasaan Orba tumbang di tahun 1998. Kenyataan pahit ini merupakan akibat logis dari sistem pemerintahannya yang selalu melakukan politisasi terhadap Islam Indonesia.*

Katakunci: *Pemisahan agama dan politik, depolitisasi Islam, HMI*

Introduction

In the history of Indonesian politics, Christian Snouch Hurgronje, Soekarno and Soeharto have applied Ali Abdul Raziq's notion. Even in the New Order Regime, President Soeharto handled the Islamic affair in the country based on the separation between religion and politics. The main reason of the two former Indonesian Presidents taking the decision was experience of the politics apparently weakened, the role of its religious and social dimensions has developed and flourished from time to time until today.¹

Like the view of former President Soekarno and secular nationalist group, HMI (Islamic Students Association) is of the view that Islam without political party became stronger. If the view of President Soeharto was predicated on political reasons, HMI's view was based on religious motivation, namely to make Islam a religion that helped to unite the entire people in order to gain the national interest, and the desire of togetherness, although the religious view was definitely quite different to those of historical Muslim thought.²

The motto of creating '*the intellectual-ulama and the ulama-intellectual*' is the other factor which indicated the strong desire of HMI to live as devote Muslims amidst the Indonesian cultural milieu. The effort meant to prepare the leadership of the *umma* to enabled them to formulate the religious and social notions needed for development. The encouragement to put broader human concern into doctrines of Islam, and interpret Qur'anic doctrine as social justice was indeed

¹ Victor Tanja, *HMI: Sejarah & Kedudukannya di Tengah Gerakan-Gerakan Muslim Pembaharuan di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1991), 142.

² Kenneth Cragg, *The Call of the Minaret* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 159.

a useful contribution and appreciate to be taken up by HMI, not only for the religious development of the *umma*, but even to meet demands for justice and prosperity of all Indonesian people.

HMI has been adopted the concept of *amal saleh* (good deed) within the Qur'an as their notion on the development of humankind. HMI's stand like this was inspired by Fazlur Rahman's suggestion to determine what is the best for the future of Islam and takes into consideration what is fundamental Islam, and what is historical Islam.³ The struggle for universal Islamic values, HMI as an organization of young Muslim intellectuals could accept for meeting the demands of modern Indonesian people without forcibly alienating it from the basic Islamic doctrines.

That the above concept of HMI for development could be seen as relevance to the general development and has lasted in the country under the New order's sponsorship.

General Condition of Socio-Political Life

The Indonesian development has shown a paradoxical implementation of models of the development between liberal model of Talcott Parson and conservative model of Huntington. In the Parsonian paradigm, development means change of social and economic structure and shift from a traditional system to a modern one that my result in social mobilization, development, while in the Huntington paradigm, becomes a combination of modernity and tradition with an effective government.⁴

³ Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1968), 310.

⁴ See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (London: New Haven, 1968), 80-3.

The first paradox is that national development in Indonesia has, to some extent, adopted elements of a liberal development by the creation of modern forms of social and economic structures, yet in the meantime reviving classical indigenous traditions. The second paradox lay in the fact of economic liberalisation at the cost of strong political control.

Strong evidence of that kind of development is to be found in the two different directions of structural transformation that occurred in the economic field and the political one respectively. Structural transformation in the economy already seen in a shift of the income of society from agriculture sector in the agro industry, industry in profit sectors.

The change civic polities, on the other hand, indicated structural transformation in polity, by praetorians. According to Huntington, the civic polity is a type of politics in which one or more independent political forces dominate social forces, whereas praetorian power of a government is that which is not controlled by the political parties.⁵ The latter term might not fit in to Indonesian politics very well, but some elements of praetorianism were discernible in the New Order government, such as the absence of and independent effective political force, the strength of the bureaucracy in decision-making, and its expansion and interference into almost all social spheres.

In relation to the 'ideology' of development, a praetorianistic polity has, of course, a political logic of its own, such as an argument for the necessity of national stability for the success and sustainability of development

itself. The accentuation of national stability has been one of the characteristics of the New Order's political engineering. Political institutionalization in this respect is reflected in the security and monolithic approaches exercised by the New Order government. As a consequence, the degree of political participation has been weakened, particularly because political parties, as vehicles of political expression, were not able to articulate the political interest of the people.

The political institutionalization achieved thus has not encouraged people's political participation, because the institutionalization process only strengthened what Professor Liddle has called the 'New Order Pyramid.'⁶ This pyramid consist of a dominant presidency, which becomes the centre of decision-making, and pattern of state society relationship that combines co-option and response with repression.

According to Liddle, the mechanism of the New Order political structure departs from the presidency at the top giving commands to the military which is a most important element of the bureaucracy and, which in turn, exercises power over society. The whole process of political engineering has effectively created a relatively stable condition of relationship between state and society, or between the ruler and the ruled.

It is in such a political setting that the depoliticization of Islam has been processed. The manner of the process took the form of getting rid Islamic symbols for political activities, eliminating Islamic political parties, and clearing the political arena of Muslim politicians. The depoliticization of Islam has

⁵ R. William Liddle, "Soeharto's Indonesia, Personal Rule and Political Institution" in *Pacific Affairs*, No. 58, 1985, 68-90.

⁶ Nasir Tamara, "Islam Under the New Order: A. Political History," in *Prisma* (English Edition), No. 49, June, 1990, 14.

reached its culmination in terms of political vehicle in the amalgamation of all existing Islamic political parties into PPP in 1973, and in terms of political ideology in the obligation to adopt Pancasila as the *Asas Tunggal* (the sole basis) by all political parties and mass organizations in 1985.

The depoliticization of Islam was part of a broader target, namely the depoliticization of the people in general. This was seen in the creation of a floating mass population, which depoliticized people at the grass root level and alienated political leaders from their followers. The streamlining of political parties followed this in to Golkar, the PPP, and the PDI. Islamic political parties responded in a relativists 'easy' way toward this streamlining, though the story behind the creation of the PPP is not simple, as Nasir Tamara reported.

From the beginning, NU was the largest member. Although initially not very keen on merging, NU eventually joined without internal conflict. On the other hand, there was unrest within PSII resulting in a leadership change, which was won by pro-merger people. On the other hand, Parmusi and Perti supported a quick merger from the start.⁷

This 'easy and quick response' was due in part to the situational logic of politics at the time that led political parties to follow the current of political engineering, and in part to an 'intrinsic competition' among Islamic political groups to be seen as the first supporter of the regime.

Escaping from the obligation not to include any mention of Islam in the new party's name, Muslim leaders have chosen the term *persatuan* (unity) and *pembangunan*

(development.) They hoped by so doing not to delete some mention of Islam, because the term *persatuan* indicates one of the most important principles of Islam. They also hoped that the amalgamation would provide them with *hikmah* (in Indonesian language understood, interalia, in the sense of blessing in disguise.) To establish *ukhuwwa Islāmiyya* (Islamic brotherhood.) The adoption of the term *pembangunan* was perceived as agreement with and support for the New Order's policy of development. It is possible that the use of the term's *persatuan* and *pembangunan* was meant to convey a message that PPP, the Islamic party, had emerged to gain the support of the Muslim community in order to participate in the national development process.

It is notable that Muslims responses to the political change during the first ten years of the New Order (1996-1976) which, in relation to the agenda for the depoliticization of Islam, might be identified as a 'period of conditioning' appeared more political in nature, although with critical accommodation. Little intellectual response was shown, such as elaboration on the relationship between Islam and the state, the Pancasila, and politics with the exception of the accomodationalist responses of Mintaredja and Nurcholish Madjid.⁸

Mintaredja (then the chairman of Parmusi and later President of PPP) in his reflection on Islam and the Pancasila considered that Islam does not aims at the creation of an Islamic state because during the time of the Prophet Muḥammad, the term 'state' in the sense of state as we knew it today was not

⁷ Muhammad Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur, 1980), 78-116

⁸ H.M.S. Mintaredja, *Renungan Pembaharuan Pemikiran: Masyarakat Islam dan Politik di Indonesia* (Jakarta, 1971), 77.

yet in existence.⁹ In Mintaredja's view that the major duty of Muslims is to struggle for creating a true Muslim society which, should be distinguished from an Islamic state. A Muslim society could legitimately exist in a state without undermining its integrity as the nation-state.¹⁰ Concerning of relationship between Islam and politics, Mintaredja at the meantime believed in the totalistic character of Islam as a way of life, including political life. He maintains that the political issues are worldly in nature and as such an approach to political issues should be in accordance with its nature.

The slogan promoted by Nurcholish Madjid (than a national chairman of HMI) on the eve of the 1970's "Islam-Yes, Islamic party-No" is similar in nature. The idea is one of the main points of this 'his renewal project' which as severely criticised by many Muslims.¹¹ Having observed the problems of Indonesian Islam, which lay in the paradox between the defeat of politicised Islam and the rapid expansion of it, Madjid came to the conclusion that Islam's quantitative growth was not encouraged by the Islamic parties or Islam organizations, for the Islamic parties had failed to build a positive and sympathetic image of Islam.¹²

According to H. Munawir Sjadzali, in certain circumstances, the absence of the Islamic political parties was better for

⁹ H.M.S. Mintaredja, *Renungan Pembaharuan Pemikiran*, 78.

¹⁰ For more detailed in this account, see Nurcholish Madjid, "Keharusan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Ummat," 1-12.

¹¹ Nurcholish Madjid, "Keharusan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam," 1-12.

¹² H. Munawir Sjadzali, *Muslim's Interests are Better Served in the Absence of Muslim Parties: Indonesian Experience* (Jakarta: Departemen of Religious Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1992), 2.

Muslims. The experiences of national life in the past view years clearly showed that the Muslim umma's interests were even served at the time when there was no Muslim party in the Indonesian political sphere, he said.¹³

From the start of the New Order, especially in the last decade, many expectations of Muslim for the improvement and religious infrastructure and facilities have been sufficiently met. In the past, at the time when Muslim parties were presents, the same expectations had never been fulfilled. The following examples could be advanced.

In the field of law, for instance, with the passing of law No. 14 of 1970's on judicial Authority the existence of Religious Court of Law (read: Islamic Court) is fully recognized as an independent court of law and equal to the other three Courts of law: Public Court, Administrative Court, and Military Court. This law was then followed by the enactment of law No. 7 of 1989 on Religious Court, some of which had prevailed for more than 100 years, and at the same time served as the realization of the stipulation contained in law No. 14 of 1970 on the independence of the Religious Court, to the other three law.

In this context, it should be noted that in 1948, a Muslim party brought up a proposal for the improvement of religious court status to KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, Indonesian National Central Committee) which, at the time, served as provisional parliament, but the proposal met with strong opposition from other parties or factions and, being a minority group at the time, that Muslim party could do nothing about it.¹⁴

¹³ H. Munawir Sjadzali, *Muslim's Interests*, 3

¹⁴ Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Strategy for the Indonesian Middle Class," *Indonesia Paper*, October, 1993, 11.

Till in the development in the field of law, up to the year 1991, religious judges had no standardized books of law similar to the KUHP (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, Penal Code) for judges in the Public Court, in spite of the fact that the Religious Court had been established long before; the religious judges had to resort to numerous yet diverse reference *fiqh* books in dealing with the legal issues brought up by members of the community. As a result, it often happened that the two similar cases, headed by two different judges with two different books of reference, would result in two different verdicts, which meant that there was no legal.

The peculiar situation ended, once again, at the time of the New Order, in the absence of Muslim parties, with the issuance of a joint-decree of the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Religious Affairs on the establishment of an Islamic Law Compilation Project.

In December 1987, the project succeeded in completing three draft books of legal references to be used by the religious judges throughout Indonesia: book marriage, Inheritance, and *waqf* (religious endowment.) By the presidential instruction No. 1 of 1991, issued on June 10, 1991 just one week before the President and his family made a pilgrim to Mecca, those three books were officially sanctioned and ordered to be publicly used.

In the field of education. The Indonesian people has law No. 2 of 1989 on National Education System, in which religious education is affirmed to be a sub-system to the National Education System, and religious instruction is compulsory at all public schools and universities. The law also reaffirmed recognition to the long existing religious education institutions in conformity with the

claim of the New Order that the state which, is based on Pancasila is neither a theocratic nor a secular state.

In the relation to houses of worship there has been a sharp increase in the number of *mosques* and *muşallās* including over 500 strong and beautiful mosques built by the Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila (Muslim Charity Foundation) chaired by the President Soeharto.

In the realm of *dakwah* (Islamic propagation), it is well known that the major weakness of socio-Islamic organizations is a serious lack of financial back up. An international Islamic organization once promised to help the financing of 1000 preachers for the whole country. However, the realization was only for 300 preachers, far below the target, and later the number went down to just a little more than 100. To cope with that unfavourable situation and being fully aware of the urgency for religious guidance in the remote and isolated areas especially in the transmigration locations President Soeharto urged MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Ulama) to prepare 1000 *da'i* (preachers) for religious duties in transmigration sites. They would receive Rp.100.000 per month for the period of three years as financial support from the Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila. The same foundation has also donated financial support for other 1000 imams for transmigration sites channelled through MDI (Majelis Dakwah Islamiah, Council for Islamic Preaching.)

During the Old Order regime under President Soekarno and still more so under the New Order regime of his successor Soeharto, the Indonesian government was directly or indirectly involved in the construction

of many mosques and the development of public institutions of Islamic religious education, from the primary school to the IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Islamic University.)¹⁵

The New Order regime, on the other hand, has started for the depoliticization of Islam which, was primarily materialized by a ban on political parties based exclusively on Islam or its particularities; it favoured the development of Islamic values in the social, cultural and intellectual spheres of life, in order to create the so-called 'ethical' basis of national development.

Up to present time, Islam often functions as a source of motivation for demands of adjustment of different aspects of government policy. In the demands, the Islamic motive is generally combined with other reasons and motives, of a cultural, social, economic or political nature. An example is the movement for the democratization of the political system which has been growing for some years now. Its background is partly based on Islamic values, legal notions and organization.

The Islamic element was still more prominent in the recent campaign for the abolition of SDSB (Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah, Social Philanthropically Contribution with Prizes) lottery, in which formal arguments about Islamic law were combined with the denunciation of growing social and economic disparities. The latter campaign finally attained its goal on November 25, 1993, when minister of social Affairs announced the discontinuation of the lottery. However, at present Islam is seldom a source of criticism of the political system or the public authorities as a whole in the country.

¹⁵ Graha Insan Cita, *Pidato Ketua Umum PB HMI pada Dies Natalis ke 51*, February 5, 1998, Depok, 7.

HMI observed that the view of Munawir Sjadzali is true in certain aspects of development; but in the other it was insufficient, particularly, in order to develop a democratic political system. HMI is of the view that the time has come when the need of political reform has become urgent. It is an interpretation of commitment and responsibility of HMI as child of the nation as well as an intellectual community.

According to Anas Urbaningrum,¹⁶ the national chairman of HMI in 1995-1997, the reform concerning the main bases of having a society, nation and state should be radical, fundamental and systematic. The main agenda of the Indonesian nation in the years to come is to develop steady and matured social system and structure based on appropriate foundations. The strong and matured system able to anticipate needs in each sphere and demands of smooth social change without much turbulence.

HMI is of view that the promise of the New Order government to broaden Pancasila democracy in practical politics is only lip service. The organization considered that political democracy could not be built by political slogan only; it is possible only by way of creating healthy and qualified interaction among all political forces. This need a strong state with an effective government and a strong society with autonomy of people whit character. The effective administration could safeguard the social order and run the public service, while the antonymous people who have character would guarantee the growth of critical participants and emancipators of culture.¹⁷

¹⁶ Graha Insan Cita, *Pidato Ketua Umum PB HMI*, 8.

¹⁷ *Republika*, September, 1993

The democratic tradition that can accord respect to diversity should be tough at practical level. The politics of concentration of power and the policy of incorporation in operation since long should be reviewed. Indeed, the politics of concentration is not only not relevant to the democratic tradition, but is also contrary to the heterogeneous social nature of the Indonesian people. The motto *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* (Unity In Diversity) is a cultural treasure of the Indonesian people which quite relevance to be practiced in real practical life. The selection of public service officials should represent and respect this pluralistic society.

The strong demand for democracy and healthy political activity have forced the government to review political life, together with the legislative institutions to review the rules of political game. From time to time the people awareness towards their rights as citizens has increased, including right to politics and implementation of the clean government by the New Order administration.

While speaking in the student study Forum of HMI in September, 1993, chief of socio-political staff of ABRI, Lt. General Hariyoto P.S remarked that the ABRI's interest in the established political system in Indonesia is for the cause of national stability. In stable political system, all kinds of people's demand could be accommodated properly.¹⁸

According to him, stability is always to be associated with public pressure and demand should be implemented with security approach. He recognized the worried of many if the demands are not accommodated properly it would invite mass frustration in people, and aggressive

action by authority,¹⁹ and in turn, would lead to socio-political unrest.

The New Order and Indonesian Islam

In the last years of Soeharto administration, the political dynamism in the country has increased. After short period of decline following the repression of Megawati²⁰ supporter on 27 July 1996, a surge of democratic waves appeared throughout the Archipelago. Reminiscent of the last days of Soekarno, the current democracy movements has been championed by the university student who launched their protest in response to the government which is seen as being incapable of controlling the crisis and its negative impacts on the life of the people.

The politics off de-politicization of Soeharto consists of two strategies; the direct and indirect one. The first has been target to the rural masses, which constitute bulk of In Indonesian population (approximately 70 percent.) It has taken the form of the so-called 'floating mass' policy, the purpose of which is to limit the activities of political parties as far as the district level. The underlying assumption of the particular policy is to protect people from political manipulation by competing parties, which had occurred in the past and engendered political instability and promoted social disturbance.

The second strategy, namely the indirect strategy of de-politicization has been implemented through various mechanisms, most

¹⁹ Megawati Soekarno Putri is daughter of former Indonesia first President, Soekarno. She is also national chairwomen of the PDI Perjuangan, and known as a prominent opposition leader of the country along with Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid.

²⁰ H.M. Yusuf (ed.), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik* (Jakarta: LASPI/Lembaga Studi Pembangunan Indonesia, 1977), 132.

¹⁸ *Republika*, September, 1993

important of which have been the state's corporatization, co-optation, and ideological hegemony. Through the corporatist mechanism, the state is able to exert systematic control and surveillance over the existing interest groups in society through direct intervention in their existing organizations.

According to the Lt. General (ret.) Rudini,²¹ the rise of the people political awareness should be accompanied also with the rise of the government's role and socio-political structure. It was quite important in order to meet the development demands, their aspirations and aggregation of people's political interest could be developed to become 'affirmation potential' for sustained national development, not just 'trouble-maker potential' which hampers national integration.

Accordingly, the role of the ABRI, the political parties, the Golkar and all the existing mass organization, including youth organizations, should be enhanced maximally so that they could participate to increase the national awareness and to boost national unity in order to realize the national ideals based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. As custodians of people's aspirations all political parties and Golkar were expected to participate actively in enhancing of the quality of development and democracy. In this connection, the role of political institutions should be maximized.

All socio-political forces in the country should work to prepare the people qualified for development and capable of channelling the socio-political aspirations of the grass-root people; they are expected to serve the interest of the society, the nation and the state properly and consistently. Unfortunately, these political

parties, particularly the Golkar as ruling party was regarded as a political vehicle by its leaders for their self-interest, their families and their cronies.

The role of mass organizations as medium to articulate the people's interest should be advocated and supported continuously. The rise of all social institutions, including youth organizations is quite helpful to enhance the quality of political awareness in support of national unity and integration for better civilized Indonesian people in the future.²²

There are three Islamic university student organizations, namely HMI (Islamic Student Association), PMII (Islamic Student Movement), and IMM (Muhammadiyah Student Union), and each of them has had a form of cadre programme through training, usually it was range of training since primary level, mediums and advanced. Only HMI declared itself an independent organization. The other two: PMII and IMM, have been affiliated to the large Islamic religious organizations namely NU and Muhammadiyah.

The basis of membership of HMI is quite unique. The largest section of HMI membership is in the secular universities and colleges. On the contrary, most of PMII membership is from Islamic religious colleges, particularly from IAINs through the country and higher education institutions run by the private foundations, while those of IMM originated from Muhammadiyah higher education institutions, for instance, Muhammadiyah universities and IKIP (Institute for Teachers and educators) Muhammadiyah.

²¹ H.M. Yusuf (ed.), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, 132-3.

²² PB HMI, *HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman* (Jakarta: PB HMI), 136.

As most of its members are from general universities, so in cadre formation, HMI would try to provide sufficient Islamic knowledge for them. While those of them studying at IAINs has been provided a general knowledge in order to bring them at par with their counterpart in the secular colleges and universities. This programme has been formulated on the beautiful motto i.e to create 'the intellectual-*ulama* and the *ulama*-intellectual.'

The above motto has been programmed since the birth of HMI in 1947. Its main objective is to fill the vacuum of Muslim young intellectual circle, as ever has been done by the Jong Islamiten Bond (JIB) in Dutch colonial era. The JIB born on January 1, 1925 was dissolved as Japan came and annexed Indonesia. Therefore, in those circumstances, the establishment of HMI was inspired by notion of the JIB with its 'Islamic study club.' Hence, in several things, HMI focused its concern on long-term purpose of the JIB, namely it would like to convince the Muslim young intellectual to complete their academic education, they should also understand Islam.

The formulation was a response to the prevailing challenge faced by Muslim university students in the secular universities and colleges. Deliar Noer, ex-national chairman of HMI, observed that the Muslim young intellectuals were keep away the Islamic doctrine by the secular educational system. According to him, such a problem had been faced by the JIB and still remained before HMI.²³

Because secular education which was neutral towards the religious notion, they

²³ PB HMI, *HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman*, 137.

became alienated spaced from Islam. They tended to ignore the Islamic doctrine and *sharī'a*. More than that the secular educational system created friction among the Muslim youth between those who ignored and those who obeyed the Islamic doctrine. Above all, because in Java island could be found the tendency of religious assimilation, their presence in the secular education affected to deeper friction between intermingle Muslim group and those who desired to purify the *sharī'a* from all kind of derivations.

In order to over come the above problems, Deliar Noer has given inspiration to develop nationalism based of the deepest religious heritage. He believes that a nation which has identification with the religion of its majority population is a basic key for national unity and integration. Therefore, the Indonesian strength lay in its identification with Islam, and only Muslim which hardly endeavoured to develop the Islamic basis of nation potential become 'the *ulama*-intellectual and the intellectual-*ulama*.'²⁴

The noble desire, which likely underlined HMI programmes and activities, which implemented through series of leadership training, has been going on until today. In each period of chairmanship, such activities tended to become conventional. The platform of the organization almost never changed from year to year, particularly in branch levels, which later occurred routinely and even obstinately.

According to Sudirman Tebba,²⁵ ex-activist of Ciputat branch of HMI, the programme of HMI is to achieve the objective of ideal man

²⁴ PB HMI, *HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman*, 137.

²⁵ PB HMI, *HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman*, 147.

as stated by the government through the improvement measure of religious education in secular universities and syllabus of the IAINs throughout the country. Although its formulation was different from the HMI's platform, yet as stipulated by the 1983 GBHN (the Guidelines of State Policy) that the objective of national education is the enhancement of faith and devotion to the One and Only God, of intelligence and skill, of character, and of personality and spirit of nationhood and love of homeland.

The above formulation placed the enhancement of faith and devotion to the one only God as the top priority in the national education objective. It was indicated that religious education in secular higher education should get the man concern. One fact of the seriousness is the ongoing perfection of the Islamic religious subjects in the secular higher education.

After long time the religious subject was given in the conventional way, and today in the secular universities, the Islamic concept of any discipline was already taught. This indication is one step ahead with relating the process of science and technology to Islamization. Besides, it has developed many ways to delve deep into Islamic doctrine in various fields like in economics, politics, culture etc.

One the other side, the New Order administration policies generally weakened all Islamic university student organizations. Since its established, the New Order government engaged in bringing about economic development and repressing all political opponents and mass and religious organizations. This phenomenon is peculiar of neo-fascists, not only in Indonesia, but it was also common to several third world

countries like Brazil, Argentina and Iran under Shah Reza Pahlevi.²⁶

Although the real political condition was non-conducive for all-political parties and mass organization activists, HMI remained to serve for the benefits of umma. Under the real and reasonable approach, according to Adi Sasano,²⁷ the cadres of HMI whether in infra or in suprastructure have made an endless contribution, throughout in the time when the Indonesian people were struggling to defend the State against the colonial effort to reoccupy, or in the period of national character building, and at the time of consolidating the freedom. Because HMI and KAMI activists were also thinkers in the development sectors, the contribution is quite valuable. And up to today, HMI is the largest organization in the campuses of the country.

Each cadre of HMI is expected to be doing something of benefit for the umma wherever they lived and worked. The cadre outside government structure became writer, columnist, analyst and critic. Their actions are as pure activists functional outside the system, and have a function to remember and put forwarded a healthy norm for national life. This group is usually called 'pressure group.'²⁸

Meanwhile, there is also a group who entered the system. This group called institutionalist, which struggled from within the structure. Some of them succeeded in supporting the processes of change from

²⁶ Adi Sasano is ex-activist of Bandung branch HMI. Since May 1998 President B. J. Habibie appointed him as minister economic, co-operative and weak entrepreneurship development.

²⁷ H.M. Yusuf (ed.), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, 155.

²⁸ H.M. Yusuf (ed.), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, 156.

within the structure. However there was a group disinclined to motivating the change process from within. Beside that, there was professionalist group which was neutral towards power system. They tended to work related to the justice aspect, even distribution and freedom. They have given contribution, but their activities have not influenced to the wider social issues. They worked sectorally in their own field.

Therefore, a novel idea was needed to resume their activities and responsibilities based on professionalism. They did not need to do dichotomy between those worked in the state institutions and outside of it. But, they should develop togetherness in order to realize the sovereignty of the nation effectively.

As the ideal cadres of HMI, they did not get trapped in seminar activity and regarded as an escape from problems faced by the Indonesian society. Also if they worked in government offices, not automatically the ideal job as HMI's cadre will be over? They needed to be aware that the social change process toward the right direction is quite complicated process requiring collaboration with the other side or institutions, which existed in the government institution as well as outside of it. They needed to focus on the mass approach and practical action and more attention to the professionalism in their own field. It was a development of political education agenda.²⁹

Democracy is a social process and also a learning one. The social control towards the decision-making which quite often not inclined to justice was also time-consuming. To implement democracy shortcuts and romantic measures are not enough. The idea

²⁹ H.M. Yusuf (ed.), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, 154.

of revolution which is quite often talked in certain circle, particularly the radical young generation, did not offer the way-out of the umma problems, because the problems were very complicated and needed to discern the importance of all social forces to operationalize collective awareness.

In this connection, could be seen the role of intellectual organizations like KAHMI, ICMI or the other, to develop a positive interaction. In order to struggle for justice and even distribution which did not end with lip-service. Slogan and philanthropy programmes inclined to defend status-quo. Theoretically, there is no difference between philanthropy programmes and even distribution one. The gift of philanthropy programmes is to provide a social agenda, but it did not have impact of concrete economic structure. What has been expected by the society is even distribution programmes and has the impact on the productive asset of entrepreneurship.³⁰

It is hard to imagine that without support of KAHMI, ICMI could play a significant role and become the prestigious organization that it is today. Vast majority of ICMI is also members of KAHMI. The main job of HMI's alumnus is to become catalyst of the development for empowerment of the people. This job covered agendas of rapid reform in social, economic and political renewal in the society. The economic and political democracy is a necessity, and KAHMI has a role to guide and push up the political process within the framework of Pancasila democracy.³¹ It is no exaggeration to say that the success of all programmes of ICMI in economic and

³⁰ H.M. Yusuf (ed.), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, 157.

³¹ H.M. Yusuf (ed.), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, 157.

socio-political fields in the country is caused by KAHMI's support as one of the factors, "because both in the centre (Jakarta), and in the districts, the majority members of ICMI are members of KAHMI too."³²

While receiving PB HMI on August 13, 1993, vice President Try Sutrisno said that the globalization era demanded the quite tight competition, more advanced society and openness of action. As the natural resource decreased from time and all sectors needed better management.³³ In order to response the suggestions, the national chairman of HMI, Yahya Zaini agreed to the call of vice President, and stressed the importance of better political education. According to him, in the frame of political education, HMI wanted that the following issues must be included namely Pancasila as an ideological foundation, nationhood outlook and religious outlook. Yayha Zaini remarked that essence of nationalist outlook is the unity and the integration as a motivator, mover and cement in every struggle of the Indonesian people.³⁴

Regarding the economic crisis, HMI through its national chairman, Anas Urbaningrum³⁵ has expressed its apprehension. According to him, the monetary crisis of the country has given us the most important lessons and it has a bitter impact on the grass-root level people. The lessons were: First that the innate strength of economic globalization. The foreign debt should be utilized for the maximum benefit of people and their prosperity. Second that a tiny group of society could not develop the strength

of economic foundation. Strength of the tiny group caused the collapse of national economy and disrupt distribution.

At the practical level, the above constructive suggestions were not implemented by the government so that the apprehensions appeared and raised a huge social unrest and deep economic crisis in the country.

The deepening economic crisis was being matched by a growing political crisis Soeharto was facing a people who had slowly and painfully begun to recover from the terrible defeat of 1965. The first major sign of the revival of resistance came in 1974 when a million people spilled onto the streets during widespread student protests. Yet they were also brought together as workers, and as the 1980s progressed they began to use their collective strength to strike for better wages and working conditions with some success.³⁶

By 1996 the dissatisfaction against the Soeharto regime was spreading up to sections of the ruling and middle classes, who were being excluded from the profit and corruption bonanza by Soeharto's cronies. Protests at various levels were mounting throughout to come. The idea behind creating of ICMI is not revealed instantly, but it has historically a deep root in the last 30 years.

In the beginning of 1960's, some of *santri* alumni entered the universities and colleges. Seven years later, the boom of educated scholars from the *santri* cultural background occurred. After graduation, they became bureaucrats. During developing their career, for few years, they hid their Islamhood and after they occupied an important position, they begun to act foe 'Islamization' of offices, departments, or campuses. The managers and the leaders of the office held *pengajian* or

³² *Pidato Ketua Umum PB HMI pada Dies Natalis ke 51*, 15.

³³ *Kompas*, August 14, 1993

³⁴ *Kompas*, August 14, 1993

³⁵ "International Socialism," *A Quarterly Journal of Socialist Theory*, Autumn 1998, 11.

³⁶ See footnote No. 41.

teaching of Islamic doctrines and performed congregation prayers in the place where they worked. And lecturers revived the religious activities in the campus.³⁷

The former HMI activists occupied the important positions in the governance, for example, Arifin Siregar, Hasyirul Harahap, Abdul Ghofur, Azwar Anas, Akbare Tanjung, Mari'e Muhammad and so on. The number of educated Muslims has increased. They needed a container to channel their aspiration. They have an intention to play wider role in contributing to the development process. The role could be effective if they joined hand with the bureaucrats in decision-making. In the bureaucrats should be attracted to join the intellectuals outside bureaucracy, or non-bureaucrat-intellectuals should be called for merging with the bureaucracy.³⁸

The birth of ICMI was expected to determine Indonesian Muslim history in the year to come. Gradually, to fulfil the aspiration of umma to colour the decision-making, ICMI would like to become a platform to collect the ideas of Muslim intellectuals. ICMI is a non-political movement, although it was bound to Islamic commitment, ICMI was not intended to revive primordialism, because it thought in terms of entire Indonesian people. In Azyumardi Azra's words, ICMI will become 'brain-trust' of the New Order government in the years to come.³⁹

According to Ridwan Saidi, ex-national chairman of HMI in 1974-1976 the birth of ICMI was an inseparable part of the will Muslim scholars for vertical mobility.

³⁷ Jalaluddin Rakhmat, *Islam Aktual, Refleksi-Sosial Seorang Cendekiawan Muslim*, cet. IX (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), 101.

³⁸ Jalaluddin Rakhmat, *Islam Aktual, Refleksi-Sosial Seorang Cendekiawan Muslim*, 101.

³⁹ *Berita Buana*, December 7, 1990.

Because in the early of 1960s, there were thousands of Muslim scholars and they did not enter party was not likely to recruit a Muslim intellectual in top position. Second, the intellectuals felt that their views were not at home with the existing Islamic parties, because their social origin did not have roots in prevailing Islamic parties.⁴⁰

In order to resolve the deadlock, they constituted Persami (Indonesian Muslim Scholar Union) in 1964. While the New Order came into being, some of Muslim scholars headed by Subchan, Z.E, from NU element withdraw from Persami, and established ISII (Ikatan Sarjana Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Scholar association) affiliated to NU party. Unfortunately the two Muslim scholars associations never displayed their activities so that even many Muslim scholars did not know them.

When Parmusi emerged on surface, a lot at Muslim scholars put their hope on it. Some of them joined the Sekber Golkar. Through Golkar and Parmusi, Muslim intellectuals channelled their vertical mobility. In the 1970 the government restructured political parties and organizations on a large scale. The Islamic political parties were merged in one party. Islamic mass organizations were separated from political organization, and engaged in social activities. In the year 1985, the political renewal and consolidation reached its culmination with the enforcement of *Asas Tunggal* Pancasila. Since then, legally there was not any other Islamic party. And then the years after in 1990 established ICMI that was supported by the New Order government as a viable alternative to channel their socio-political activities. The vast majority of umma initially welcomed it with respect.

⁴⁰ *Kompas*, December 8, 1990.

In general, there were different approaches the Muslim leaders to the modern-challenges: legal, cultural, and social transformation. Legalistic approach aimed at revamping the existing order and society under the blueprint of Islamic legal, ritual and formalistic precept. Islamic doctrine and laws to become the sole arbiter and standard of reference in all practices and affairs in the society.

The cultural approach is aimed at distilling methods from Islamic teachings, which are capable of integrating non-religious sphere (secularist part) into a new totality of Islamic framework of development.⁴¹ The idea of ICMI that efforts for modernity are efforts to develop parallel institutions (banking, scientific enterprises, economic, politics, etc.) under Islamic teaching.

The transformation approach aimed at seeking solutions to the problems of modernity by avoiding exclusivist attitude both towards neo-orthodox and non-Islamic aspirations. It advocated accommodative attitude and introduced disturbing questions related to the central doctrine of orthodoxy. Therefore the leading advocates of ICMI like H.M Soeharto and Prof. Dr. B.J Habibie would like to mould ICMI on the ideology of Pancasila, close to Indonesian culture, 'Modern-Muslim,' and high quality Muslim.

The leading Indonesian Muslim intellectuals like Prof. Dr. B.J. Habibie,⁴² Dr. Nurcholish Madjid, Dr. Amien Rais, Prof. Dr. Quraish Shihab, Prof. Dr. Imaduddin, Prof. K.H. Ali Yafie, Abdurrahman Wahid and others have pursued this transformative

strategy, advocating non-confrontational understanding of Islam and modernity, seeking open dialogue with other groups for reaching mutual understanding of problems faced by society in general, and encouraging the umma to work together with others in resolving such pressing questions as massive poverty, abuses of human rights,⁴³ the stagnation of democratization, etc.

There are several reasons for HMI and KAHMI to support the birth of ICMI; in various point they have same platforms and purpose to uplift of the umma's fate toward better life educationally, culturally, economically, socially and politically. More important than these that one of the basic purposes of the ICMI is to call Indonesian people, particularly the umma for the demilitarization of Indonesian politic; to seek democratization; and to create a system of 'proportionalization' in which Muslim are represented in the cabinet, MPR and DPR, and so on in accordance with their percentage of the general populations.

Although ICMI is not a political organization, its basic purpose and objective has political impact. Prof. Dr. B.J Habibie, the general chairman of ICMI, firmly rejected the notion that ICMI is a political organization, and insisted it did not belong to any political group. It was established only to fight ignorance and poverty among Muslims.⁴⁴

In line with B.J Habibie's statement, Soetjipto Wirosardjono and Nurcholish Madjid rejected the thinking of those activists of ICMI whom employed Islamic symbols for political purpose; including democratization

⁴¹ John Naisbitt, *Megatrends Asia: The Eight Asia Megtrends that Are Changing the World* (London, 1996), 103-240.

⁴² See "Otokritik Tahun Keempat Silaturrahmi ICMI," *Gatra*, No. 9 Tahun I, Jakarta, January 14, 1995, 36.

⁴³ E. Ramage Douglas, *Politics in Indonesian, Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London, 1995), 36.

⁴⁴ *Merdeka*, December 8, 1992 and *Merdeka*, November 30, 1992

and de-militarization, especially when they did not understand the meaning of religious symbol they manipulated.⁴⁵ On the other side, Aswab Mahasin as a ‘non-active’ member of ICMI has expressed his worry that ICMI has become a *pseudo-political party* and behaves *like a political machine*.⁴⁶ For the same reason Nurcholish Madjid and Amien Rais had withdrawn their support from the organization in the years after its establishment, because they observed that the ICMI was too political.

Many in ICMI seek proportionalisation or the distribution of appointments to the senior bureaucracy or in the DPR/MPR in proportion to the religious makeup of the population at large. That is, Muslims should hold nearly 90 percent of seats in parliament and cabinet positions. Apparently after information of the ICMI, the umma has been represented in the cabinet and parliament. Even 200 members of HMI alumnus became MPR and 9 of them became minister.⁴⁷

Adi Sasono argued that they ‘key issues’ for ICMI are democratization and an eventual reduction in the military’s political role. The problem with ABRI, he noted, is that it was worried about any challenge to its position.⁴⁸ Hence, it was understandable that ABRI expressed its displeasure over the birth of ICMI. Democratization is not the primary goal of many in ICMI, because the main objective of its activities to “empower the state in order to Islamize society and enact Islamic value based on law and regulations.” Mohtar Mas’oed political scientist at Gajah Mada

University argues that Abdulrahmman and NU on the other hand “seek to empower the people” and in so doing both Muslim, and non Muslim Indonesian will be empowered.⁴⁹

How have the umma and Indonesian people responded to HMI? Of course it could not be ignored since the organization has from its inception expressed its basic commitment toward the umma and the nation. The formulation of objectives HMI at the time of its establishment was obviously revealed in its commitment towards the nation and the Islamic religion, namely:

1. Defending the Indonesia Republic, State and enhanced the dignity of Indonesian people.
2. Enforcing and spreading Islamic religious doctrine.

In the congress of HMI held on 1947, the above two objectives were spelt-out in the platform as below:

1. Collaboration with Indonesian people in general and the armed forces in particular in defending the Indonesia Republic and State.
2. Collaboration with organizations and Islamic political parties particularly, and those of other parties in general in order to improve political and economic life of Indonesian people in general and of the umma in particular.⁵⁰

As a logical consequence of HMI commitment toward the nationhood, the organization was expected to work together hand with the other organizations and institutions. The Islamic youth organization should have a cooperative attitude, toward

⁴⁵ E. Ramage Douglas, *Politics in Indonesian*, 95.

⁴⁶ *Politics in Indonesian*, 94.

⁴⁷ *Republika*, February 5, 1998

⁴⁸ E. Ramage Douglas, *Politics in Indonesian*, 96-7.

⁴⁹ *Politics in Indonesian*, 110-1.

⁵⁰ H.M. Yusuf (ed.), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, 215.

the fellow Islamic organization like PMII and IMM, as well as the non Islamic ones like Catholic Students Organization, Protestant-Christian Organization and from other religious backgrounds. HMI collaboration with other such organizations could be seen in the Kelompok Cipayung (Cipayung Group.) It consists of PMII, GMNI, GMKI, PMKRI and Indonesian people in various aspects. They used the medium to strengthen articulation of strategic issue of whole life which arose amidst the society. Beside that the motivation of unity in the Kelompok Cipayung is based on the awareness of better future for Indonesia appropriate to the noble aspiration of Independence. Initially Kelompok Cipayung has played the role of challenging that, aspiration, social controller and agent of development. Unfortunately, in the years following its formation, the role has been decreasing following the internal and external problems. One of the external problems came from the government which controlled strictly all activities of the organizations and thereby emasculated all political parties. In other words an account of internal and external conditions, Kelompok Cipayung creativity could not develop.

HMI could play its role maximally as agent of the umma aspirations if it had at least three things: first, independent position and attitude so that there is no over-intervention from outside to curb its freedom and creativity. To attain this was easy because a lot of its alumnus occupied strategic positions, particularly in governance, and influenced NGOs. Second, it should have qualified human resource in various skills. The quality of HMI's personnel is quite decisive in this regard. Third, the external conditions was favourable. It meant that all programmes

of HMI could not work properly unless the external condition is good.⁵¹

In another word, it was obvious that the government needed Islam when it supported the government and gave it legitimacy. Once the government supported establishment of Parmusi, for instance, aimed at countering the force of PNI. On the contrary, the government hampered all activity regarded as competitor with the government power; for instance, the proposal of Mohammad Hatta, former vice President, to establish PDII (Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia) was not okayed by the government.

Even the creation Parmusi, according to Samson, did not benefit even the Muslim modern group in Indonesia. One of the weakness of the party was its failure to get recognition as a legal and influential political forces, namely possess political power in proportion to the number of its followers.⁵² The several repressive policies had negative impact for future of Islam, it was more obvious in 1980's. According to Vatikiotis,⁵³ the government succeed in destroying Islamic parties, with the religious politics of the New Order which emphasized harmony, Muslim community felt it was political chaos. The Islamic political forces had indeed declined.

In the period between 1970-86, which, in terms of the process of the depolitization of Islam might be called the 'period of exorcising,' the regime began to exercise

⁵¹ H.M. Yusuf (ed.), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, 215.

⁵² A.A. Samson, "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism," in R. W. Liddle (ed), *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*, Monograph series No. 19, Yale University Southeast Asia studies, 116.

⁵³ M.R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change* (London: Routledge, 1993), 120.

a formal way to the depoliticize Islam by activating national laws obligating all political parties and mass organization to subscribe to the Pancasila as the sole foundation. While NU decided to replace its Islamic foundation with the Pancasila at its congress in 1984 when the draft law was under discussion in the DPR, Muhammadiyah and HMI chose to wait until the draft was legislated.

The Consequence of Politicization of Islam by Soeharto Regime

Many Muslim leaders were concerned that the process of Pancasilaization would mean deislamization. For them, Muslim acceptance of the Pancasila as a national consensus should not be understood as a theological statement, but only as a political one. They referred to President Soeharto's statement of 1982 that the Pancasila would not become a religion and the religion would not be 'Pancasilaified.'

There is a group within the Muslim community responded to the political process in a more reactionary way. The emergence of this group, which might be labelled fundamentalist, was a result of an internal dynamic within the Muslim community aimed at protecting Islam and Muslims from the impact of the ongoing political process. The majority of Indonesian Muslims did not support this group. Because, the nature of Indonesian Islam which, following the line of Indonesian culture, is devoted to moderation, tolerance and harmony. Beside this the situational logic of politics, which has created fear and to some extent apathy, within the society would scarce encourage Muslim cadres to initiate political change by attempting to seek justification for Islam.

The Indonesian Muslim intellectual has tried to give answers to the social problems faced by the Muslim community. The answers resulted from two coincidental factors; the real condition of the Muslim community stemming from its struggle in seeking the adequate relationship between Islam and Indonesian culture, and the emergence of a new educated Muslim generation, including HMI alumni. Majority of leaders of the new generation are dissatisfied with the ways of old generation who had been attempting to sidetrack the problems and the condition of the Muslim community.

The launching of *Asas Tunggal* Pancasila by the government initially got strong reaction from Muslim community of the country. The culmination of the reaction was in a riot in Tanjung Priok, the Jakarta Harbo; area in August 1984, in which hundreds of Muslim died at the hands of the Indonesian army and several prominent figures were arrested, including two members of the petition 50 group; A.M. Fatwa and (Lt. Gen. Ret.) H.R. Darsono. The former was a famous Muslim preacher and the latter a famous former commander in Chief the west Java based Siliwangi Division of the Armed Forces. This incident was followed by a series of incidents during the year 1984-1985 that threatened the stability of the governance, such as the explosion at Bank Central Asia (BCA) in Jakarta, the Borobudur Buddhist Temple in Yogyakarta, and the Marine Base in Cilandak, Jakarta. A Muslim group was accused of responsibility for the first two explosions. For many, these incidents were not unconnected, and were reactions to the regime's political engineering programmes, which showed the tendency to centralize and accumulate power.

The crisis in HMI over opposition to the Pancasila as *Asas Tunggal* would not only result in a split but eventually lead to the disintegration of the organization. The vast majority of HMI branches throughout the country eventually accepted the government policy over the *Asas Tunggal*, because since its creation, HMI had accepted Pancasila as the basis of Indonesian state. Even according to Abdurrahman Wahid, President of PBNU for 1980 up to today, HMI was an University students organization which 'more Pancasilaist' among Islamic movement in Indonesia.⁵⁴ However, viewed from the cultural aspects, Islam got support of the government except in political sphere.

In fact, the critical wrestling over *Asas Tunggal* within HMI body was temporary, not quite substantial. Because *Asas Tunggal* was accepted by HMI after long deliberation at its congress in Padang, North Sumatera. Until today, HMI-MPO leaders feel that there is no debate on Islam and ideology of Pancasila as an important issue. Most of them joined the society, worked and communicated with those who accepted *Asas Tunggal*. therefore, the ideological issue is not relevant to debate while observed that Islam eventually has been accommodated within the state. Fachry Ali, ex-HMI activist of Ciputat branch, said there is no difference as while HMI has its basis of Islam and those who accept Pancasila. The leaders are the same, and the ideas are similar.⁵⁵

The above issues presented a negative image of Islam before the young generation during the New Order era, and also forced their alienation from the government. Ali

this stage, the umma faced a dilemma. If they were close to the government, it was country to the real condition. If they remained away from the government, it would benefit the anti-Islam groups, particularly Christians. M. Amien Rais saw the former indication. According to him, Indonesia is a centre of Christians activities for 'Christianization' of the umma through five strategic steps, namely education: mass media, economic assistance, marriage relationship and political power.⁵⁶ The crucial condition, ideally, demanded the unity and integration of the umma to counter any obstacles either from within or outside of the umma. The expected condition did not develop, and the fragmentation of the umma occurred, including within HMI after the launching of *Asas Tunggal*.

At the same time, HMI support to the government policy brought benefits to Indonesian people at large, and the Muslim community in particular. If the policy deviated from the goal, HMI criticized the government, and gave the necessary suggestion for seeking the way-out, or urged it to review the policy. Although HMI has been close the government, this extra-Islamic university student Association did not lose sight of the fact that many deviations led to deep crisis. For instance, it was proved while the New Order government was facing a deep economic crisis. At that time, HMI through its national chairman, Anas Urbaningrum, expressed its apprehension due to the ongoing economic crisis of the country on the occasion of its 51st Anniversary celebration on 22nd February 1998 in Depok. Unfortunately, the

⁵⁴ A.R. Wahid, "HMI, Islam dan Pancasila," in *Kompas*, June 27, 1983

⁵⁵ H.M. Yusuf (ed.), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, 166.

⁵⁶ M. Amien Rais, "Gerakan Kristian di Asia Tenggara: Kasus Indonesia," kertas kerja dalam seminar Isu-Isu Dakwah Kontemporary dan Cabaran Abad ke 21, di Marang, Trengganu, September 1994.

government did not respond to the criticism and suggestion. The economic condition was worse due to the attitude of the World Bank and the country plunged into deeper crisis. The World Bank admitted that it turned a blind eye to corruption, social unrest and a collapsing financial system during the last years of former President Soeharto's rule. An internal report said that the Bank staff and managers were aware of the problems but continued to praise the country's economic performance.⁵⁷ Some media persons and public figures like Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid has articulated the same views as those HMI, but Soeharto and his close aides apparently ruled out the constructive critics and suggestions. The Indonesian malaise illustrate the high political cost excessive authoritarianism imposes upon economic development. Soeharto regime plainly had overstayed its welcome and built up the people's frustrations with its failure.

The condition was worse as the growth of corruption in the country under Soeharto regime had become so rampant, that it seems almost old fashioned to mention it. But it can hardly be avoided in a discussion of national level openly and transparently. While for long time, corruption was the whip with which neo-liberals would beat opponents of liberalization, now it is becoming increasingly obvious that there is a close correspondence between liberalization and the scale of corruption. This indeed is now recognized as a global problem.⁵⁸ The corruption adds to the myopia of private investment decisions,

since the commitments and contracts won through corruption are even more vulnerable to political instability. While the number of unemployed is more increasing and dismissal of workers in big factories occurred almost every day and it was quite vulnerable to the social unrest on large scale.

The people's frustrations reached culmination as the university students throughout the country voiced their suffering via a huge demonstration demanding of President Soeharto to step down immediately. It was on 21 May 1998. The downfall of Soeharto paved the way to Prof. B.J. Habibie as Vice President to become the third Indonesian President. Unfortunately, the downfall of Soeharto did not mark a complete break with the past. President Habibie has performed better than feared as he has tried to institute changes (such as the election), but he remains a Soeharto appointee in his policies. The corruption of Soeharto years has been white-washed rather than investigated.⁵⁹

While politicians and academics in Jakarta are preoccupied with political and economic reform, the concern in rural areas is much more down to earth. In the fast few weeks, demonstrations have broken out in at least 50 districts (called regencies in Indonesia) from Sumatera to Nusa Tenggara. Many of the protests are related to disputed land ownership. All fall into the category of what Indonesians call KKN,⁶⁰ which is fuelling public demands for a full investigation of Soeharto family's wealth. One Habibie noted "they are like people who have not had oxygen for 32 years."⁶¹

⁵⁷ "What's Ahead For Asia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Februari 25, 1999, 59.

⁵⁸ See "The Symposium on Corruption: Constraints," in *Annual World Bank Conference on Economic Development 1997*, edited by B. Pleskovic and J.E. Stiglitz, The World Bank 1998. See in particular the article by Susan-Acherman.

⁵⁹ *The Times of India*, May 10, 1999.

⁶⁰ KKN is the local abbreviation for corruption, collusion and nepotism

⁶¹ "Politics & Policy," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 25, 1998, 21.

Many sides regarded the Presidential post of Prof. B.J. Habibie as unconstitutional, and hence invited the controversial debate. On the other side, the vast majority of HMI and KAHMI members considered it as legal and constitutional. Therefore, they preferred to let him complete his tenure as transitional president until the new president was selected in the month of September 1999 following the result of the 7 June 1999 general election. Each result, usually, has an advantage and disadvantage, including the policies adopted by the President Habibie. HMI and KAHMI apparently observed that a number of reform agenda in one of the advantages of Habibie cabinet. The agenda aimed, among other things, to promote decentralization and reform, guard the country's interests in era of globalization, and improve links between small enterprises run by indigenous businessmen and large ones, which are usually Chinese-owned.⁶² Therefore, HMI and the KAHMI supported the reform agenda of President B.J. Habibie, and they remained of the view that the socio-political change was need of the time, and it should go on gradually, first evolutionary and eventually total.

Conclusion

In brief it can be said that the collapse of Soeharto regime is the logical consequences of his politicization of that non sided to Islam in the real meanings, and not for the prosperity of Indonesian people.

Bibliography

Abdullah, Taufik Abdullah, "Aspek Pembaharuan Islam dan Perubahan Sosial," *Panji Masyarakat*, No. 166, January, 1975.

⁶² "Politics & Policy," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 25, 1998, 24.

- Ali, Mukti, *Agama dan Pembangunan di Indonesia*, Jilid II. Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 1972.
- Ayoob, Mohammad (ed.), *the Politics of Islamic Reassertion*. London: Croom Helm, 1981.H.
- Asia's Wealth Club, *Who's Really Who in Business Top 100 Billionaires in Asia*. Nicholas Brealy Publishing Ltd.
- Cragg, Kenneth, *The Call of the Minaret*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Crouch, Harold, "Indonesia," in Mohammad Ayoob (ed.), *the Politics of Islamic Reassertion*. London: Croom Helm, 1981.
- Graha Insan Cita, *Pidato Ketua Umum PB HMI Pada Dies Natalis ke 51*, February 5, 1998, Depok.
- Hasan, Muhammad Kamal, *Muslim Intellectual Response to 'New Order' Modernization in Indonesian*. Kuala Lumpur, 1980.
- Hefner, Robert W., "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI dan The Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class in Indonesia," Paper 56 (October 1993.)
- Huntington, Samuel P., *Political Order in Changing Societies*. London: New Haven, 1968.
- Karim, M. Rusli, *HMI MPO dalam Kemelut Modernisasi Politik di Indonesia*. Bandung: Mizan, 1977.
- , *Perjalanan Partai Politik di Indonesia: Sebuah Potret Pasang Surut*, cet. III, CV. Jakarta: Rajawali, 1993.
- Kelompok Cipayung, *Tatanan Kehidupan Nasional dalam Menyongsong Masa Depan Bangsa*, Jakarta, June 15, 1977.
- Liddle, R. William, "Evolution from Above: National Development and Local Leadership in Indonesia," *Journal of Asian Studies*, No. 32, February 1973.
- , "Soeharto's Indonesia, Personal Rule and Political Institution" in *Pacific Affairs*, No. 58, 1985, 68-90.
- , R.W. Liddle (ed), *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*, Monograph series No. 19, Yale University Southeast Asia studies, 116.
- Madjid, Nurcholish, "Keharusan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Ummat," Nurcholisih Madjid et al., *Pembaharuan Pemikiran*. Jakarta: Islamic Research Centre, 1970.

- Mintaredja, H.M.S., *Islam and Politics and State*, Jakarta, Siliwangi, 1974.
- , *Renungan Pembaharuan Pemikiran: Masyarakat Islam dan Politik di Indonesia*, Jakarta, 1971.
- Naisbitt, John, *Megatrends Asia: The Eight Asian Megatrends that Are Changing The World*. London, 1996.
- Nasution, Harun, *The Islamic State in Indonesia: The Rise of Ideology, the Movement for Its Creation and Theory of Masyumi*, M.A. Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 1968.
- PB. HMI Periode 1995-1997, *Hasil-hasil Ketetapan Kngres ke-20 HMI Tahun 1995*. Surabaya, 21-31 August 1995.
- Plescovic, B., and JE. Stiglitz (ed.), *Annual World Bank Conference on Economic Development 1997*. The World Bank 1998
- Rahardjo, M. Dawam, "Basis Sosial Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia Sejarah Orde Baru," in *Prisma*, No. 3, LP3ES, Jakarta, 1991.
- Rahman, Fazlur, *Islam*. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1968.
- Rais, M. Amien, "Gerakan Kristian di Asia Tenggara: Kasus Indonesia," kertas kerja dalam seminar Isu-Isu Dakwah Kontemporary dan Cabaran Abad ke 21, di Marang, Trengganu, September 1994.
- Rakhmat, Jalaluddin, *Islam Aktual Refleksi-Sosial Seorang Cendekiawan Muslim*, cet. IX. Bandung: Mizan, 1996.
- Ramage, Douglas E., *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and Ideology of Tolerance*. London and New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Samson, A.A., "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism," in R.W. Liddle (ed), *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*, Monograph series No. 19, Yale University Southeast Asia studies, 116.
- Sitompul, Agussalam, *Sejarah Perjuangan HMI*. Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1976.
- Sjadzali, H. Munawir, *Muslim's Interests Are Better Served in the Absence of Muslim Parties*, Departemen of Religious Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1992.
- Syahrudin, Ekki, "Eksklusifisme Harus Punah," in *Panji Masyarakat*, No. 85, August, 1971.
- Tanja, Victor, *HMI, Sejarah & Kedudukannya di Tengah Gerakan-gerakan Muslim Pembaharuan di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1991.
- Vatikiotis, M.R.J., *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change*. London: Routledge, 1993.
- Vroom, C.W., "Perkembangan Organisasi: Sebuah Telaah Ulang tentang Krisis Birokrasi Patrimonial-Rasional di Asia," in *Prisma*, June 6, 1982.
- , *Administrasi Islam di Indonesia*, edisi baru, Jakarta: Rajawali untuk Yayasan Risalah, 1983.
- Widjaya, Albert, *Budaya Politik dan Pembangunan Ekonomi*. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982.
- , *Discussion on Islam in Indonesia Today, Studies on Islam*.
- Yusuf, H.M. (ed.), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*. Jakarta: LASPI/Lembaga Studi Pembangunan Indonesia, 1997.
- Journal, Magazine, Newspaper**
- Berita Buana*, December 7, 1990.
- Far Eastern Economic Review*, Februari 25, 1999.
- Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 25, 1998.
- Gatra*, No. 9 Tahun I, Jakarta, January 14, 1995.
- Indonesian Quarterly, The*, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, 1998.
- International Socialism*, A Quarterly Journal of Socialist Theory, Autumn, 1998.
- Journal of Asian Studies*, No. 32, February 1973.
- Kompas*, August 14, 1993.
- Kompas*, September 30, 1992.
- Merdeka*, December 8, 1992.
- Pacific Affairs*, No. 58, 1985.
- Panji Masyarakat*, No. 85, August, 1971.
- Panji Masyarakat*, No. 166, January, 1975.
- Prisma*, June 6, 1982.
- Prisma*, No. 3, LP3ES, Jakarta, 1991.
- Times of India, The*, May 10, 1999.